


## **Research Space**

Lecture


Operation Market Garden

Watts, M.




























## DEFEAT OF THE WEHRMACHT

## TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir,—I hesitate to differ from my great friend and late colleague General de Guingand, particularly during his absence in Southern Rhodesia, but I feel that I must join issue with him on one aspect of the opinion which he expresses in his third article on the defeat of the Wehrmacht and to which you draw attention in a leading article to-day. I refer to the controversy as to the advantages after the breakout of General Eisenhower's broad front strategy or of Field-Marshal Montgomery's plan for an all-out thrust north

General de Guingand bases his opposition to Field-Marshal Montgomery's plan broadly on:—(a) tactical and political objections; (b) administrative difficulties. As to the former I am not justified in expressing an opinion, although I can hardly believe that Field-Marshal Montgomery would have been anxious to commit himself, when final victory was already in sight, to a course of action which was likely to lead to a tactical disaster. As to the latter, I was quite confident at the time (nor would Field-Marshal Montgomery have pressed his views unless he had been assured on this point) that a deep thrust to the heart of Germany was administratively feasible.

General de Guingand appears to forget that at the period at which the advance would have taken place we were no longer based, as he suggests, on the Normandy beaches. The port of Dieppe was opened on September 5 and by the end of the month was dealing with over 6,000 tons a day. Ostend was captured on September 9 and opened on the 28th of the same month. Boulogne and Calais were captured on September 22 and 30 respectively. Meanwhile the depôts on the Normandy beaches were being rapidly cleared by rail and road and the new Advance Base established in central and northern Belgium. An additional 17 General Transport companies with a lift of some 8,000 tons and preloaded with petrol and supplies were borrowed from the War Office and arrived in the latter half of September and early October.

I personally have no doubt from a purely administrative point of view that, based as we were on the Channel ports, it would have been possible to carry out successfully the operation which Field-Marshal Montgomery desired.

I am, Sir, yours, &c.,

MILES GRAHAM, late Major-General i/c Administration, 21st Army Group. 10, Herbert Crescent, S.W.1, Feb. 22.