

**Peace and Violence in the Framing of the 2019 Algerian Hirak by  
Al-Jazeera English, the BBC and France 24:  
A Critical Discourse Study**

by  
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## **Dedication**

*This work reaches its conclusion during a critical juncture in Palestinian history, marked by appalling genocides against humanity in the besieged Gaza. It is solemnly dedicated to the souls of the thousands of martyrs, the injured, and the displaced individuals in Gaza and the West Bank, praying Allah all-mighty fervently for a swift and merciful end to this savage war.*

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## Abstract

The current study aims primarily to analyse the discourses presented by news websites—Al-Jazeera English (AJE), the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and France 24 (F24)—in relation to their coverage of the 2019 Algerian Hirak (2019 AH). Specifically, it seeks to uncover both commonalities and disparities in how these selected news outlets depicted key events of the 2019 AH. The pivotal events under examination include the emergence of the 2019 AH on 22<sup>nd</sup> February 2019 as a response to a fifth term bid by 82-year-old President Abdelaziz Bouteflika who had serious health issues, Bouteflika's resignation on 2<sup>nd</sup> April, the first live prosecution of business magnates and government officials from Bouteflika's political regime on 9<sup>th</sup> December. Moreover, the study aims to identify potential underlying ideologies that influenced the news outlets' portrayal of these events. An additional aspect explored by the study is the degree to which these three news outlets adhered to a peace journalistic perspective while reporting on the 2019 AH.

To achieve these aims, the study adopts critical discourse studies (CDS) and peace/war journalism (P/WJ) as its overarching theoretical framework. It adheres to Fairclough's dialectical-relational approach (DRA) (1995A; 2003; 2010; 2016) and Reisigl and Wodak's discourse historical approach (DHA) (2001b; 2009; 2016). Interestingly, the study proposes theoretical refinements to Galtung's P/WJ model (2006) to ensure its relevance within the context of the 2019 AH. For a detailed linguistic analysis of the representation of the 2019 AH's actors and actions, the study draws upon KhosraviNik's textual analytical framework, primarily the concepts of social actor and social action (2010a).

In examining the “social actor” dimension, the study delves into the utilisation of Reisigl and Wodak's concept of nomination, while also employing Van Leeuwen's Social Actor Model to facilitate a detailed and systematic analysis. Regarding the “social action” aspect, the study investigates Reisigl and Wodak's predication, placing particular emphasis on Halliday's system of Transitivity (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004). Crucially, the study establishes a conceptual linkage between the adapted P/WJ model and CDS, employing this model as an interpretative framework for its findings.

While all three news outlets concur that the 2019 AH's inception was rooted in a legitimate movement against Bouteflika's pursuit of a fifth term, the analysis reveals noteworthy disparities between AJE, on one hand, and the BBC and F24, on the other, in their portrayal of these events. AJE's perspective appears to align more closely with the principles of PJ, potentially reflecting pro-democratic inclinations. This is manifested in a positive depiction of the Algerian protesters as in control of their movement. In contrast, the stances of the BBC and F24 seem to be closer to WJ, potentially stemming from orientalist perspectives. These stances are predominantly characterised by dehumanising and victimising the protesters.

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## **List of Abbreviations**

AJ: Al-Jazeera

AJA: Al-Jazeera Arabic

AJE: Al-Jazeera English

AJ Net: Al-Jazeera Network

AS: Arab Spring

ASU: Arab Spring Uprisings

BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation

BS: Berber Spring

CL: critical linguistics

DHA: discourse historical approach

DRA: dialectical relational approach

F24: France 24

GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council

MENA: Middle East and North Africa

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

P/WJ: peace/war journalism

SFG: systemic functional grammar

The 2019 AH: the 2019 Algerian Hirak

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1. Research Overview and Rationale

As posited by Van Dijk (1998), the portrayal of sensitive events in media is not merely a narrative depiction. Rather, it is influenced by the ideological motivations of news institutions. These institutions shape ideologies, emphasise visibility, and present information as incontrovertible and natural (ibid). This study investigates the representation of peaceful pro-democracy movements by internationally reputable news websites. It aims to illustrate how a single event's reality can be constructed differently, leading to varied representations and interpretations. Specifically, the study scrutinises the portrayal of the 2019 Algerian Hirak (the 2019 AH) on three distinct news websites: Al-Jazeera English (AJE), the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and France 24 (F24).

The term “2019 AH” refers to the series of weekly protests that emerged across Algeria on 22nd February 2019, lasting nearly a year. This movement was a direct response to President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's bid for a fifth term, despite his advanced age and health concerns given that he came to power in 1999. Bouteflika's candidacy was perceived as a symbol of political corruption due to his twenty years old rule and six years absence from the political scene. This context is further elaborated upon in Section 2.2.1 of Chapter 2, which examines Algeria's political and socio-economic landscape during Bouteflika's final term (2014-19). Notably, Chapter 2 also highlights the movement's strategic incorporation of past experiences, such as the 1980 Berber Spring, the 1990s Black Decade/Civil War, and the 2010-11 Arab Spring, to maintain peaceful protests.

For a comprehensive interpretation of news discourses on the 2019 AH, a thorough understanding of the news outlets' identities—AJE, BBC, and F24—is essential. Section 2.3 of Chapter 2 offers an in-depth overview of these outlets, emphasising their influential roles in the global news industry. The selection of these three outlets is motivated by numerous factors: AJE's history of challenging authoritarian governments, the BBC's claim of impartiality despite past controversies, and F24's French perspective on Algeria, a former colony. These choices enrich the analysis of their representation of the 2019 AH.

To develop both a theoretical and methodological framework for analysing the discourses of the three news outlets surrounding the 2019 AH, Chapter 3 discusses the perspectives of critical discourse studies (CDS) and peace war journalism (P/WJ). This chapter consists of two parts. Part 3.2 demonstrates how and why this study aligns with the CDS paradigm and defines crucial concepts such as discourse, context, and ideology within the framework of CDS. Additionally, this section explores Fairclough's dialectical relational approach (DRA) (1995A; 2003; 2010) and Reisigl and Wodak's discourse historical approach (DHA) (2001b), illustrating how these approaches can be integrated to achieve the study's objectives.

Part 3.3 provides a detailed account of P/WJ, commencing with a general discussion of media analysis approaches including agenda-setting theory, framing theory, and the protest paradigm. The goal is to justify the use of P/WJ approach in interpreting the study's data (section 3.3.1). Section 3.3.2 defines P/WJ's core concepts. This includes distinguishing between violence and conflict, peace, peace journalism versus violence journalism, explaining how these terms are operationalised within the context of this study. Section 3.3.3 critically evaluates Galtung's P/WJ model (2006, p. 1), advocating for the possibility of making theoretical adjustments to the model by revising some of its principles and introducing others. These modifications are informed by Herbert's ideas on conflict analysis (2017), McGoldrick and Lynch's framework for P/WJ (2000), and Chouliaraki's analytics of mediation (2006). Section 3.3.4 addresses criticisms of PJ theory, especially regarding journalistic norms like objectivity. Finally, section 3.3.5 reviews previous research combining CDS and P/WJ, highlighting the study's contribution of using P/WJ alongside CDS linguistic categories (section 4.7) for interpreting findings in chapter 7. Overall, the chapter contends that P/WJ serves as a more effective framework for interpreting CDS textual findings. This assertion is based on several key points that will be explored in section 3.3.5.

The incorporation of both CDS and P/WJ perspectives was initially proposed by peace researchers Nohrstedt and Ottosen (2011, p. 224), who recommended using CDS to complement P/WJ, arguing that CDS includes elements overlooked by P/WJ. Subsequently, researchers like Budak (2018) and Mensah (2015) conducted studies combining both perspectives, confirming Nohrstedt and Ottosen's argument about the compatibility of CDS and P/WJ.

It is essential to note that the aforementioned studies employed CDS as a supplement to P/WJ in contexts related to wars. This aligns with Nohrstedt and Ottosen's assertion that all P/WJ frameworks, including those proposed by Galtung (2006) and McGoldrick and Lynch (2000), were primarily designed to address open wars (Nohrstedt and Ottosen, 2011, p. 235). Consequently, P/WJ frameworks are less applicable to the context of the 2019 AH due to its predominantly peaceful nature. Therefore, analysing the news discourses on the 2019 AH offers valuable theoretical and methodological contributions. Theoretically, it proposes refinements to Galtung's P/WJ model (2006) based on McGoldrick and Lynch's framework for P/WJ. Methodologically, it establishes a conceptual link with CDS and uses the adapted model as an interpretative framework for its textual findings. This model can potentially be applied not only to cases like the 2019 AH but also to any contentious issue, both local and international.

To the best of my knowledge, the study of Kessar and her colleagues (2021) is the only one that analysed news reports on the representation of the 2019 AH. The researchers compared and contrasted the news reports of F24 and AJE on the issue. This current study is more comprehensive, including reports from the BBC in addition to those from AJE and F24. Moreover, Kessar et al (2021) analysed twenty-four articles covering various events, including the first two weeks of the protests, Bouteflika's resignation, the cancellation of the 4th of July presidential elections, the announcement of the new presidential election on 12 December 2019, and the announcement of Abdelmadjid Tebboune as the winner of the presidential election, among others. In contrast, this study conducts a detailed linguistic analysis of reports focusing on three primary events: the start of the 2019 AH on 22<sup>nd</sup> February 2019, Bouteflika's resignation on 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2019, and the live prosecution of business tycoons and political officials from Bouteflika's government on 9<sup>th</sup> December 2019. It examines thirty-three reports issued between 22<sup>nd</sup> February 2019 and 10<sup>th</sup> December 2019, with headlines containing key terms related to these events. The first event is covered in twenty-one reports issued between 22<sup>nd</sup> February and 9<sup>th</sup> March 2019, while the second event is covered in seven reports issued between 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> April 2019, and the third event is covered in five reports issued between 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> December 2019.

Regarding methodology, Kessar et al (2021) applied Fairclough's three-dimensional framework (1995) and Van Dijk's ideological square (1998) to compare and contrast the depiction of F24

and AJE at the textual and discursive levels. In contrast, this study employs a different methodology, focusing primarily on a detailed linguistic analysis of news discourses using Fairclough's dialectical relational approach (DRA) (1995A; 2003; 2009; 2010) and Reisigl and Wodak's Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) (2001b; 2009; 2016). For the analysis of the representation of the 2019 AH's actors and actions, the study utilises KhosraviNik's textual analytical framework, specifically social actors, and social actions (2010a).

For the analysis of “social actors”, the study examines the use of Reisigl and Wodak's Referential Strategies (2001b) and incorporates elements from Van Leeuwen's Social Actor Model (2008) to conduct a detailed and systematic analysis. In the study of "social action", an analysis of Reisigl and Wodak's predicational strategies (2001b) is conducted, with a particular emphasis on Halliday's Transitivity from systematic functional grammar (SFG) (Halliday, 1994; Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004). The study presents its textual findings through an analytical framework that comprises Unger's "macro-strategies" (2013, p. 56) and aspects of representation. Macro-strategies refer to groupings of discursive strategies that may lead to constructions of social actors, actions, or phenomena (Unger, 2013, p. 56). These macro-strategies are grouped to form aspects of representation (see section 4.6).

It is important to highlight that the selection of the 2019 AH as the subject of study is not solely due to the scarcity of literature examining its representation by the international media, but also because it offers opportunities for valuable theoretical and methodological contributions in the field of peace war journalism. Through the critical analysis of news discourses on the movement, the study argues that Galtung's P/WJ model (2006) can be theoretically adapted to fit within various contexts beyond armed conflicts. Moreover, it can serve as an effective methodological complement to CDS and as an interpretative framework for its textual findings.

## **1.2. Position of the Analyst**

This research undertakes a critical language analysis of online news discourses regarding the 2019 AH, a recent pro-democracy movement led by Algerians against a long-standing government under Bouteflika's presidency. As an Algerian CDS researcher, I aim to spotlight the asymmetrical representations that downplay protesters' roles and underrepresent the movement's peaceful nature. In conducting this study, I adopt a perspective that strongly advocates for democratic principles while actively opposing orientalist biases. This approach



is characterised by a commitment to the values and principles of democracy and a firm rejection of any orientalist tendencies that may perpetuate stereotypes or misrepresentations of the Eastern cultures and societies.

It is important to clarify that this research aims to offer an analytical framework that uses P/WJ as a methodological complement to CDS, serving as an effective interpretative framework for textual findings. The objective is not to pass judgment on news outlets or cast doubts on their credibility. Instead, the aim is to draw attention to the possible repercussions of using linguistic choices, whether deliberate or inadvertent, that could inadvertently foster biased ideological portrayals. The framework has been meticulously designed with the aim of fostering a news reporting environment characterised by enhanced reflection and increased reliability. It does so by providing guidelines and mechanisms that encourage journalists and news organisations to engage in thoughtful, well-researched, and balanced reporting, bolstering the trustworthiness and credibility of their journalism.

### **1.3. Research Objectives and Questions**

The primary objective of this study is to conduct a detailed linguistic analysis of news reports published by the three prominent news websites, namely AJE, the BBC, and F24, with a specific focus on how they portrayed the 2019 AH. This overarching goal is achieved through an in-depth examination of both the commonalities and distinctions in how these news outlets depicted key events within the 2019 AH narrative. These pivotal events include the movement's inception on 22nd February 2019, triggered by President Bouteflika's bid for a fifth term, Bouteflika's subsequent resignation on 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2019, and the landmark live prosecution of influential business figures and government officials associated with Bouteflika's regime on 9<sup>th</sup> December 2019.

Additionally, the study endeavours to uncover any underlying ideological motivations that may have influenced the news outlets' representations of these events. Lastly, it seeks to evaluate the extent to which AJE, BBC, and F24 adhere to a peace journalistic perspective in their coverage of the 2019 AH. To fulfil these multifaceted objectives, this research addresses the following key questions:

- RQ1: How is the 2019 AH portrayed by AJE, BBC, and F24 to their global audiences?

- RQ1.1: What are the primary similarities and disparities in how AJE, BBC, and F24 portray the key events of the 2019 AH?
- RQ1.2: What discernible ideological representations can be identified within the news reports published by AJE, BBC, and F24 concerning the key events of the 2019 AH?
- RQ2: To what extent do AJE, BBC, and F24 maintain a peace journalistic perspective in their depiction of the 2019 AH?

#### **1.4. Outline of the Thesis**

This thesis consists of eight chapters, each contributing to a comprehensive exploration of the research topic. Chapter 1 serves as the general introduction to this thesis, offering readers an initial orientation to the research. It provides a detailed overview of the research rationale, explaining why the study is both relevant and timely. In this chapter, the analyst's position and perspective are also introduced, setting the stage for the research journey. Additionally, it outlines the precise research objectives and questions that the study aims to address. Finally, Chapter 1 offers a glimpse into the overall thesis structure, providing readers with a roadmap of what to expect in the subsequent chapters.

Chapter 2 takes a deep dive into the background and context of the research, providing essential historical and contextual information. This chapter places a strong focus on the 2019 AH, shedding light on its significance and the circumstances that led to its emergence. It also conducts an in-depth analysis of key events in Algeria and the Arab World's recent history, highlighting their relevance to the research. Furthermore, Chapter 2 delves into the profiles of the three news outlets under investigation, offering insights into their backgrounds and positions in the media landscape alongside their major criticisms, notably in relation to the portrayal of Arab contentious issues.

Chapter 3 establishes the theoretical foundation upon which the research questions will be addressed. This pivotal chapter consists of two parts. The first part explores CDS and its alignment with the study's objectives. It defines fundamental concepts such as discourse, context, and ideology, providing a solid theoretical grounding. The second part introduces some major approaches to media analysis, stating the main rationale behind opting for the P/WJ approach to interpret this study's data. It defines the core concepts of P/WJ), encompassing

definitions, criticisms, and the refinement of Galtung's P/WJ model. This theoretical framework sets the stage for the subsequent analysis.

Chapter 4 is dedicated to outlining the research methodology employed throughout the study. It offers a comprehensive overview of the data selection criteria and methods utilised to gather and analyse the necessary information. This chapter also elaborates on the analytical strategies deployed, ensuring transparency in the research process. It serves as a critical foundation for understanding how the research was conducted and the validity of its findings.

Chapters 5 and 6 represent the heart of the research, presenting the findings derived from the analysis. Chapter 5 focuses on the analysis of the 2019 AH's representation during its initiation, shedding light on the nuances and dynamics of this critical period. In contrast, Chapter 6 delves into the news coverage surrounding Bouteflika's resignation and the life prosecution of governmental officials and business tycoons from his circle, offering insights into how these momentous events were portrayed by the selected news outlets.

Chapter 7 builds upon the findings from the previous chapters, aiming to provide deeper insights and understanding. It focuses on the interpretation of the CDS findings by applying the adapted P/WJ model. It demonstrates how the features of the P/WJ model are linked to CDS linguistic features, allowing for a more comprehensive interpretation of the textual analysis.

In Chapter 8, the concluding chapter, the thesis reaches its culmination. It serves as the conclusion of the research journey, summarising the key findings and insights gleaned from the study. The chapter also provides a synthesis of the contributions made by this research highlighting its potential implications and applications. Finally, it offers a space for the researcher to share concluding thoughts and recommendations, potentially identifying avenues for future research or practical applications in the context of media discourse analysis.

## Chapter 2

### Research Background and Context

#### 2.1. Introduction

Since the broadest frameworks of this study are critical discourse studies (CDS) and peace war journalism (P/WJ), which are context-dependent, analysts of news discourse should consider the relevant aspects of the social, political, and historical backgrounds of the event under scrutiny. Context governs the production of news, and context aids in its interpretation. To address the dialectical relationship between language and society, the analysis in this study involves "moving back and forth... from the micro-level analysis of texts to the macro-analysis of discursive and social practice" (Mautner, 2008, p. 44). This chapter is divided into two parts.

Part 2.2 addresses the socio-economic and political backgrounds of the 2019 AH, including its major catalysts and outcomes. More importantly, it attempts to contextualise the 2019 AH within the framework of previous conflicts inside and outside Algeria, including the 1980 Berber Spring (the 1980 BS) (section 2.2.2.1), the 1990s black decade/civil war in Algeria (section 2.2.2.2), and the 2010-11 Arab Spring (the 2010-11 AS) (section 2.2.2.3). Providing this historical review, in line with one of the DHA's core principles, is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of the 2019 AH, as well as for interpreting the news discourses surrounding it.

Based on the literature reviewed in this chapter, I argue that the 2019 AH was a peaceful movement, and its sustained peaceful nature may have been influenced by lessons drawn from the experiences of the previously mentioned events. This illustrates the assertion of peace researchers Nohrstedt and Ottosen (2011, p. 225) that insights from past conflicts can be leveraged in achieving peaceful resolutions in current situations.

Part 2.3 provides the backgrounds of the selected news outlets for this study, namely: Al-Jazeera English (AJE), the British Broadcasting Corporation (the BBC), and France 24 (F24). This section delves into areas such as their history, ownership, viewership/readership, reach, their editorial practices, and previous research on their representation of specific Arab issues. This contextual information is necessary for a more comprehensive explanation and interpretation of the discourses of these three news outlets on the 2019 AH.

## 2.2. On the 2019 AH

### 2.2.1 An Overview on the 2019 Algerian *Hirak* (the 2019 AH)

The word "*Hirak*" is originally Arabic. Etymologically, it is derived from the Arabic word "*haraka*," which means "a movement". It was first used by Yemenis, referring to what was known as "the 2007 southern movement" or "*al-Hirak Al Janoubi*" (Belkaid, 2019). The latter, which took the form of peaceful protests, called for the unification of the Southern and Northern parts of Yemen (Day, 2010, p. 4). Day (2010, p. 4) attributes its chief reasons to the centralisation of power in the North, which raised concerns among the Southerners over access to political power, economic grievances, and issues of national identity (ibid).

Eight years later, the term "*Hirak*" was adopted by the Lebanese to refer to the protests that began in 2015 as a reaction to a mounting "garbage crisis" (Geha, 2019, p. 1). The term was also used by Moroccan peasants to describe the social contestations they led in the suburb of Rif, demanding reforms for their region, known as "*al-Hirak chaabi fil Rif*" or the popular movement in Rif (Belkaid, 2019). "*Al-Hirak*," therefore, could serve as the umbrella term for popular uprisings as a new stage in the Arab world, calling for several types of change: political, social, or economic (Belkaid, 2019).

The 2019 Algerian *Hirak* (the 2019 AH) emerged as a movement on 22nd February 2019, in the form of massive weekly protests across Algeria, lasting for nearly a year. Caruso (2019, p. 1) defines it from a socio-demographic perspective, stating that it is "a heterogeneous, inter-social, intercultural, and intergenerational movement for change". She adds that it granted Algerians, irrespective of their age, gender, and socio-cultural background, a unique opportunity to collectively advocate for radical changes in the then-political regime (ibid). Researchers such as Caruso (2019), Derradji and Gherbi (2019), and Zoubir (2019) agree that the protesters aimed primarily to oppose a fifth successive term bid by then-President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Bouteflika had taken office in 1999 and suffered a stroke in 2013, which kept him distant from the political scene for six years. The protesters also called for the immediate and radical dismantling of his political regime, known among Algerians as "le pouvoir". The term "le pouvoir" is defined by Allouche (2019, p. 3) as "the informal network of military and security officials, politicians, and businessmen who run the regime".

The movement took the form of weekly peaceful protests, occurring each Tuesday by students and each Friday by the entire population. Similar protests were even organised by the Algerian community in Europe and North America (EGP council, 2019). For example, in Paris, protests

used to be held around the Algerian embassy every Sunday to express solidarity with their compatriots in Algeria (ibid).

There seems to be a consensus among researchers, including Belkaid (2019) and Zraoulia (2020), among others, that Bouteflika's announcement of his candidacy on the 10th of February 2019 was the main catalyst behind the emergence of the 2019 AH. However, I would argue that it was primarily a result of political corruption, which cast a shadow over the Algerian economy and society.

Politically, as Belkaid (2019) puts it, Algerians never sought to change their political regime since Bouteflika took office in 1999. Their silence is mainly attributed by Caruso (2019) and Zraoulia (2020) to the trauma they experienced during the civil war of the 1990s (see section 2.2.2.2). Nonetheless, Bouteflika's announcement of his candidacy after six years of absence from power was seen by them as a sign of political corruption and an indication that Algeria was governed by a politico-military-economic clique, which is believed to have used his name to control Algeria's affairs (Caruso, 2019). This eventually had a negative impact on the performance of state institutions. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (2018) ranked Algeria 108th out of 180 countries (Zoubir, 2019).

Political corruption also seems to have had a negative impact on the performance of the state's economic institutions. In this regard, Gebremichael et al (2019, p. 5) argue that "one of the main repercussions of political corruption on the economy was economic mismanagement". This is attributed by them to the nature of the Algerian economy, which heavily relies on hydrocarbon revenues (ibid, p. 2). They further contend that a huge portion of these revenues was spent by Bouteflika's successive governments on financing subsidies, modernising infrastructure, and funding social projects to prevent unrest, rather than on developing economic projects to strengthen the national economy (ibid, p. 4). Similarly, Parks (2019) and Khaldoun and Avery (2019) state that Bouteflika's governments demonstrated an inability to implement effective economic reform programs that could promote development and maintain social welfare. According to the Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS) (2019, p. 17), this ultimately contributed to a stagnant economy characterised by a largely informal service sector, low productivity, and high unemployment (with 30% of Algerian youth unemployed in 2018).

Another significant consequence of the rentier economy, which led to economic stagnation, as stated by Parks (2019) and Burke and Michaelson (2019), was the sudden drop in international

hydrocarbon prices in 2014. This ultimately contributed to a notable reduction in the state's revenues (ibid). Specifically, the price of oil plummeted from \$100 per barrel in 2014 to \$50 by 2019, causing an approximate 50% decrease in the national budget and currency reserves. Additionally, the World Bank's Doing Business 2016 ranks Algeria 163rd out of 189 (Zoubir, 2019).

The economic stagnation resulting from political corruption has consequently cast its shadow on Algerian society, leading to issues such as unemployment and high inflation rates (Caruso, 2019). According to the National Office of Statistics (2018), the unemployment rate reached 24.6% for men and 51.3% for women in April 2018 (ibid). Chiheb and Northey (2019) and Zraoulia (2020) argue that the protests began a few years prior to the 2019 AH in football stadiums through songs of contempt and frustration, reflecting the youth's challenging social living conditions. This eventually led some Algerian youth to consider illegal immigration to Europe. According to Oran Porte d'Emigration (Oran's Portal of Immigration) (2017), the Algerian army thwarted the attempts of more than five thousand people to reach Europe in 2017.

In spite all, Volpi (2020, p. 5) asserts that the protesters' demands during the 2019 AH tended to be more political than economic or social. Perhaps they believed that a better economic or social change would only come about if their political system underwent radical reforms. This was evident in the slogans coined during the movement, such as "*Yetnahaw Gaa*" or "they shall all be removed". This slogan became a dominant force within the movement. Another slogan was "*Makach El-Kamsa ya Bouteflika*" or "there will be no fifth term Bouteflika," which aimed to prevent the President from seeking a fifth term and to call for his resignation. This likely influenced the focus on the political aspect in the reports on the start of the 2019 AH by the three news websites selected for this study. This is evident through the negative portrayal of Bouteflika as incapable of fulfilling his presidential duties due to health and age issues, as well as being an authoritarian leader for two decades. Further exploration of this will be conducted in chapter 5.

The 2019 AH is one of the recent movements that garnered extensive coverage from international news outlets. As far as I am aware, Kessar et al's study (2021) is the sole analysis of online news reports that investigated how the portrayal of the 2019 AH was approached by F24 and AJE. The current study stands out for its comprehensiveness, including some of the BBC's news reports on the movement. Furthermore, Kessar et al's study (2021) analysed

twenty-four articles encompassing six distinct events (with two articles on each event from both news outlets). The events covered include: the initial two weeks of protests, Bouteflika's resignation, the cancellation of the 4th of July presidential elections, the announcement of the new presidential election on the 12th of December 2019, and the declaration of Abdelmadjid Tebboune as the victor of the presidential election.

In contrast, the present study primarily focuses on three events: the commencement of the 2019 AH on 22nd February 2019, Bouteflika's resignation on 2nd April 2019, and the public trial of business tycoons and government officials from Bouteflika's administration on 9th December 2019. Methodologically, Kessar et al's study (2021) employed Fairclough's three-dimensional framework (1995a) and Van Dijk's ideological square (1998) to scrutinise and juxtapose F24 and AJE's depictions at both the textual and discursive levels. In contrast, this study adopts a distinct methodology, drawing on Fairclough's DRA (1995A; 2003; 2010) and Reisigl and Wodak's DHA (2001A; 2009; 2016). The study analyses the application of Reisigl and Wodak's nomination and predication (2001A; 2009; 2016), with a specific emphasis on Halliday's transitivity (Halliday, 1994), and incorporates certain aspects from Van Leeuwen's social actor model (Van Leeuwen, 2008). Further details are provided in chapter 4 (sections 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7).

The selection of the 2019 AH as a subject of study isn't solely due to the scarcity of literature addressing its media representation, but also because it offers intriguing theoretical and methodological contributions in the realm of Peace War Journalism, as will be illuminated in chapters 3, 4, and 7. Moreover, the decision to employ the 2019 AH as a case study can be attributed to its predominantly peaceful nature. This non-violent disposition was evidently moulded by insights drawn from similar and different internal and external conflicts to circumvent security issues. This encompasses events like the 1980 Berber Spring (the 1980 BS) and the 1990s black decade, occurring in Algeria, along with the 2010-11 Arab Spring (the 2010-11 AS), which erupted across numerous Arab countries. Of particular significance, these events were referenced in the reports analysed by the three news websites. Thus, providing a general overview of these events will aid in interpreting their discourses regarding the 2019 AH.



## **2.2.2 The 2019 AH within the Framework of Prior Events in Algeria and the Arab Region**

### **2.2.2.1. The 1980 Berber Spring (the 1980 BS)**

In Algeria's modern history, the Berber Spring of 1980 (the 1980 BS) marked a significant chapter in the struggle for the recognition of Berber culture and identity within the nation. Decades later, during the 2019 AH, the Algerian army, and a significant portion of the population, showed a cautious approach regarding the display of the Berber flag. It could be argued that this caution, often misinterpreted as a racist act (Kessar et al, 2021), was, in fact, motivated by a desire to prevent ideological conflicts and external interference, rather than a rejection of Berber culture and identity.

According to Aitel (2013), the 1980 BS emerged as a cultural and linguistic movement aimed at asserting the rights and identity of the Berber population in Algeria. Gebremichael (2020, p. 2) notes that the Berber minority, also known as Amazigh, is an Indigenous ethnic group primarily located in Algeria's Kabylia region in the Northeastern part of the country. The 1980 BS was a call for the recognition of the Berber language, customs, and traditions within the broader Algerian framework (Boudhan, 2017; Brent, 2013). This movement brought the Berber issue to the forefront of political discourse in Algeria and helped to lay the groundwork for the eventual recognition of the Amazigh language in the Algerian constitution in March 2003. Bouteflika's government issued a presidential decree, incorporating Berber as a national language in the constitution and passed a constitutional amendment recognising the Berber language as an official language in 2016 (Boudhane, 2017).

Fast forward to the 21st century, Algeria witnessed the commencement of the 2019 AH in February 2019. As discussed in the previous section, this movement was popular and largely peaceful, aiming to bring about political change and social justice. As the movement gained momentum, it became crucial to maintain unity among its diverse participants (Caruso, 2019).

During the 2019 AH, the Algerian army and a portion of the population showed caution regarding the prominent display of the Berber flag (Volpi, 2020). This decision was often misunderstood as a sign of prejudice against the Berber population (Kessar et al, 2021). However, as an Algerian researcher who was closely observing the events, it is essential to understand that the primary motivation behind this caution was to avoid the potential for ideological conflicts that might weaken the collective message of the movement.

The movement's central objective was political reform and the removal of a deeply entrenched political elite, rather than a focus on linguistic or cultural issues. While the Berber flag held great significance to Berber activists, its prominent display might have detracted from the 2019 AH's broader message of unity in the pursuit of political change. Perhaps the decision to emphasise the Algerian flag aimed at fostering a common identity, rather than accentuating differences, and to prevent the movement from becoming fragmented.

Furthermore, the caution exercised by the army regarding the display of the Berber flag also had a strategic element. It sought to prevent foreign forces from infiltrating and manipulating the protests for their own interests. In fact, this issue was clearly addressed by President Bouteflika in his message to the nation. It was also highlighted by the BBC, AJE, and France 24 in their reports on the movement. For instance, the BBC's reports published on 8th March say the following: "In a letter published by Algeria's official APS news agency on Thursday, the 82-year-old leader urged 'vigilance' against 'domestic and foreign' forces that might infiltrate the demonstrations" (BBC, 2019). AJE writes the following in its reports published on 8th March: "In a letter carried by Algeria's Press Service news agency on Thursday, Bouteflika cautioned against infiltration from 'internal and external' parties aimed at 'stirring seditions and spreading chaos'" (AJE, 2019). France 24 quoted Bouteflika saying the following: "However, we must call for vigilance and caution in case this peaceful expression is infiltrated by some insidious party... which could cause chaos," he said (France 24, 2019). Thus, by promoting a unified message under the Algerian flag, the movement aimed to minimise external interference and ensure that it remained a genuine expression of Algerian people's aspirations.

To sum up, the cautious approach taken by the Algerian army during the 2019 AH towards the Berber flag should not be misinterpreted as a racist act against the Berbers in Algeria. Instead, it was a pragmatic decision aimed at avoiding ideological conflicts within the movement and safeguarding its unity and integrity against external influences. The 2019 AH, like the 1980 BS before it, remains a testament to the complex dynamics of identity, unity, and political change in Algeria.

#### **2.2.2.2 The 1990's Civil War/Black Decade**

Schulhofer-Wohl (2007, pp. 103-124) summarises the key factors leading to the outbreak of the 1990s Algerian civil war in three points: the socio-economic crises that Algeria underwent in the 1980s, the regime's failure to handle them, and the military's rejection of the election

results. Regarding this last factor, Addi (1996) explains that the first opposition party in Algeria, known as the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut or FIS), won the national legislative elections in December 1991. The party emerged as a result of political reforms that transitioned Algeria from a one-party system under the National Liberation Front (FLN) to a multi-party system in 1989 (Gebremichael, 2020, p. 3). However, as Addi (1996) asserts, for unknown reasons, the military violently annulled the first-round results, cancelled parliamentary elections, banned the FIS, and arrested its leaders and many followers. This led to the resignation of then-President Chadli Benjedid (Amirouche, 1998; World Peace Foundation (WPF), 2015). According to Doyle and Sambanis (two thousand), the annulment of elections ultimately triggered the outbreak of a civil war between the army and newly formed armed groups, resulting in massacres and claiming over 200,000 lives in less than a decade (Quandt, 1998, p. 66). Gebremichael (2019, p. 11) notes that Bouteflika's reconciliatory programmes ended the "Black Decade". These programmes aimed to restore peace through a national referendum in September 2005 and by granting amnesty to regime opponents.

This section does not aim to determine culpability, as the only victims were the people. Instead, its goal is to explore the lessons drawn by the people, enabling them to maintain peace during the 2019 movement. Zeraoulia (2020) delves into this in her work titled "The Memory of the Civil War in Algeria: Lessons from the Past with Reference to the Algerian *Hirak*". Her study was based on extensive fieldwork in Algeria between August 2017 and June 2018, employing methods such as in-depth observation, semi-structured interviews, newspapers, and public debates. It involved conducting seventy interviews with families who were victims of the war, including those who directly experienced its atrocities and those who had information about them. The researcher also observed events related to the 2019 AH. She aimed to identify factors that influenced the peaceful nature of the movement. Two main "political determinants" were pinpointed as potential contributors to the movement's peaceful nature: trauma and fear of violence (p. 33) and "mistrust and deep rupture with opposition leaders" (p. 29).

According to Zeraoulia (2020), the Algerian people's first lesson from the black decade was that of trauma and fear of violence. As previously mentioned, the war claimed over 200,000 lives. Government officials, including former prime ministers Ahmed Ouyahia and Abdel Malek Sellal, adopted this traumatic narrative during Bouteflika's two-decade rule in their political discourses (ibid). These officials depicted Bouteflika as the "architect of peace" who liberated the country from the terror of the black decade (ibid, 2020, p. 2). It was also noted that the trauma and fear of violence persisted in people's minds. However, protesters expressed

these feelings counter to the official narrative. The decision to protest, even in small numbers, required courage due to the expected police violence. Surprisingly, the police refrained from violent confrontations, and the army remained inactive. She also attributes this response to slogans created by the protesters that indicated a rejection of violence. Examples include: "Algeria is not Syria," "Policemen and people are brothers," "The black decade ended, and we build a white decade..." (Zeraoulia, 2020, p. 19). Commenting on these slogans, Lebovich of the European Council on Foreign Relations stated, "Algeria's protesters, too, do not want a return to the dark 1990s". "They don't want the system, the power, but they don't want instability" (Bryant, 2019).

Zeraoulia (2020, p. 6) observes that trauma and fear were not the sole political determinants. Citizens also harbour a profound mistrust of the opposition. This mistrust, rooted in the black decade, shapes their perception that the political regime and opposition parties are similar. As mentioned earlier, these parties emerged as a result of political reforms that transitioned Algeria to a multi-party system (Khaldoun and Avery, 2019). The parties in the 1990s seemingly failed to improve people's socio-economic conditions as expected. This disappointment led protesters to assert their movement as a grassroots endeavour, asserting that no opposition party, secular, or Islamist, has the right to claim it (Zeraoulia, 2020, p. 9). All opposition leaders who participated in the protests were accused of pursuing their own agendas. Considering the earlier statement in section 2.2.1 that the 2019 AH was primarily a political movement, protesters refrained from religious connotations in practices or slogans, emphasising that it was not a religious movement (Zeraoulia, 2020, p. 10). When Abderrazek Makri, leader of the Islamic opposition in Algeria, expressed support for the protesters, he faced criticism for exploiting the protests to his advantage (ibid).

In summary, the 1990s civil war stands as a critical episode in Algeria's history. Its lessons have seemingly contributed to the peaceful nature of the 2019 AH. The first lesson was the trauma and fear of violence, countered by protesters' decision to demonstrate peacefully. They used slogans to signify their intent to protest peacefully and avoid the violent scenarios of the black decade. The second lesson was the failure of opposition parties to help improve socio-economic conditions in the 1990s, resulting in deep mistrust. Consequently, protesters highlighted the leaderless nature of their movement and declared it as a popular initiative, beyond the right of any opposition party to claim. This, as Volpi (2019) points out, favoured the movement by shielding it from regime co-optation and repression.

### **2.2.2.3. The 2010-11 Arab Spring (the 2010-11 AS)**

The following section pertains to the 2011 ASU in Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. These uprisings are of particular interest because they had a shared objective with the 2019 AH, which was the urgent displacement of long-standing political regimes. The 2010-11 AS, especially in these countries, has come to be known as "the Arab autumn" nearly a decade after its eruption in late 2010 (Sidani, 2020, p. 129; Alduhaim, 2019, p. 631). Whilst the populations in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen succeeded in overthrowing their long-standing rulers (Zuber and Moussa, 2016, p. 205), the political and socio-economic conditions they hoped to improve have seemingly deteriorated. Alduhaim (2019, p. 631) attributes this failure to two factors: "the lack of a peaceful transition of power" and foreign military interventions. Both were prevalent in the violence perpetrated by internal and/or external forces against civilians. Internally, the violence was executed by the army or security forces, whilst external forces were represented by foreign coalitions. Notable instances include NATO and the U.S. in Libya, the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, and Russian military forces in Syria. It can be argued that these factors were likely considered by Algerian protesters and the army to maintain peace and prevent violence during the 2019 AH.

Zuber and Moussa (2016, p. 205) note that the perpetration of violence against protesters by either the army or security forces characterised the protest climate in the aforementioned Arab Spring countries. In Egypt, the protesters successfully ousted the thirty-year dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak, and the majority seemingly agreed on Mohamed Morsi, head of the Muslim Brotherhood party, as the new President of Egypt (Alduhaim, 2019, p. 635). However, after a year, the army, under the leadership of General Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi, executed a violent military coup. As a result, President Morsi was ousted on 4<sup>th</sup> July 2013 (ibid), and over 21,000 civilians were detained, with about 1400 Islamists sentenced to death in 2014 (Abdelsalam, 2015). This suggests the emergence of a new dictatorship under the current President, General Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi.

In Libya, the toppling of Muammar Gaddafi's forty-year dictatorship with the assistance of NATO and U.S.-led forces has seemingly had negative repercussions on the state. The process of democratic transition has seemingly failed, especially after the emergence of a military group led by General Khalifa Haftar, who, with the support of powerful army personnel, fought against the transitional government in an attempt to establish himself as Libya's recognised leader (Alduhaim, 2019, p. 635). This ultimately led to a six-year-long civil war (2014-2020),

resulting in the loss of numerous civilian lives, and forcing many to migrate to neighbouring countries (Zuber and Moussa, 2015).

The instability following the military's use of violence against civilians seems to be a crucial lesson that influenced the trajectory of the 2019 AH. Ouali (2019) states that Algerians had already witnessed instability during the 1990s Black Decade and were unprepared for a similar experience. As a result, protesters emphasised solidarity with the army through slogans like "the army and the people are brothers". Additionally, they demonstrated peacefulness through innovative collective actions before, during, and after the weekly protests. In this regard, the Associated Press NEWS website reported that organisers began urging demonstrators on Facebook to remain peaceful and clean up after themselves (Ouali, 2019). The protesters themselves even roamed the streets, picking up bottles and debris left behind, underscoring the significance of their commitment to non-violence due to the horrors of the Black Decade (ibid). Consequently, the Algerian army, represented by Chief Gaid Salah, declared its support for the protests and contributed to unprecedented changes since Algeria's independence from France in 1962, as noted by Ghebouli (2020). According to Grewell (2021, p. 105), this support facilitated the overthrow of Bouteflika, prompting his immediate resignation on 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2019 and the cancellation of the April elections. However, protesters deemed this superficial, asserting that the political landscape would still be dominated by the same elite (Gebremichael, 2020, p. 12). They further demanded the complete dismantling of the regime they described as "the gang" (Grewell, 2021, p. 105). In response, Gaid Salah took further measures by detaining regime figures, including Bouteflika's brother Said and two former heads of the intelligence services, who were accused of engaging in anti-state conspiracy and "undermining the authority of the army" (France 24, 2020a). Gebremichael (2020) and Volpi (2020) note that he initiated an anti-corruption campaign targeting former prime ministers Ahmed Ouyahia and Abdelmalek Sellal, numerous former ministers, and prominent businessmen.

The second lesson was gleaned from the disastrous outcomes of Western and regional military interventions, particularly in Syria and Yemen. In Syria, the Russian-led military intervention contributed to what Abdelsalam (2011, p. 138) describes as "the most complex war in the Middle East since WWI" and the bloodiest and longest conflict in the region since 2011 (Zuber and Moussa, 2015, p. 247). This intervention resulted in an alarming death toll. According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, a list of 350,209 documented deaths was compiled directly from the conflict by June 2022, with 143,350 of those being civilians (Loft, Sturge, and Wade, 2022, p. 7). In Yemen, the military intervention by the Saudi-

led coalition sparked what the United Nations now deems "one of the world's worst humanitarian crises" (Sharp, 2021, p. 14).

These catastrophic effects of foreign military interventions in these two countries appear to have imparted a significant lesson to both the protesters and the Algerian army. Since gaining independence, Algeria has placed strong emphasis on protecting its sovereignty and firmly rejecting political and military foreign interference in its domestic affairs (Gebremichael, 2020, p. 14). Nevertheless, various foreign powers, including the U.S. and Europe, apparently appealed for political intervention in Algeria. A few days after the onset of the protests, the U.S.-based Centre for Preventive Actions released a report titled "Political Instability in Algeria". According to Gavin (2022), the centre aids U.S. policymakers in developing strategies to prevent armed conflicts in areas posing the greatest risk to U.S. interests. The report predicted the failure of the protests or a similar end as the 2010-11 AS. It claimed that Algeria's instability jeopardises U.S. counterterrorism interests and regional stability (Porter, 2019). It therefore urged the U.S. to take appropriate steps to manage the risk of growing political instability, including precautionary measures to safeguard its interests (ibid). Furthermore, the European Parliament issued a statement on November 27, 2019, entitled "JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation of freedoms in Algeria". It called on the European External Action Service, the Commission, and the Member States to support various groups, including civil society, human rights defenders, journalists, and protesters (European Parliament, 2019). The support involved activities such as arranging prison visits, monitoring trials, and issuing public statements. The aim was to back not only the UNOA Commission, but also other organisations engaged in defending human rights. Additionally, the call included a directive to closely monitor the human rights situation in Algeria, using all available instruments, which include the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (ibid). It claimed that human rights in Algeria were violated by the army and security forces (Ghanmi, 2019).

Ghanmi (2019) cites leading protest figure and Jil Jadid opposition party head, Soufiane Djilali, who responded to the appeal tweeting the following: "the European parliamentarians used the Algerian *Hirak* to pander to their voters and not for the good of Algerians. Yes, to the solidarity between the peoples but not at any cost". The Foreign Ministry also dismissed the resolution "as an attempt by Europe to cause chaos in Algeria as a new attempt to bring into Algeria the type of "engineered chaos" that had already spread ruin and armed conflict elsewhere in the Arab world," hinting to Libya and Syria as demonstrated above (ibid).

Perhaps for fear of foreign intervention in Algeria, the army chief pushed for swift elections on 12<sup>th</sup> December 2019, which was largely boycotted, with the participation of only 41% of the electorate (Zoubir, 2020). The election resulted in the victory of the current President, Abdelmajid Tebboune, with 58.14% of the vote. The latter was criticised for being a long-time regime insider because he had occupied several senior government roles, including Minister of Communication, Minister Delegate to the Ministry of the Interior, and Minister of Housing (Alilat, 2019). However, it seems that even President Tebboune was a victim of Bouteflika's government. He was dismissed from his office as prime minister in 2017 after just three months of service, even though his administration embarked on a transitional reform process. Nasira (2019) writes that after his election, President Tebboune promised to restructure the economy away from hydrocarbon dependency and provide the youth with greater political opportunities. Nasira (2019) adds that President Tebboune released political prisoners and activists of the movement and announced on 8<sup>th</sup> January 2020, that he would amend the constitution. These steps, according to Gebremichael (2020, p. 15), show positive signs.

Therefore, the bloody experiences of civilians in Libya, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen due to the violence perpetrated by their armies and/or foreign powers seemed to be a lesson learned by the Algerian army and the people. The protesters' peaceful practices won the support of the army. The latter aided in achieving the protesters' main demands of ousting Bouteflika and prosecuting the corrupt individuals from his circle. The army also avoided entangling the country in a civil war, as was the case in some Arab countries due to foreign interference, particularly as foreign powers such as the U.S. and Europe appealed for political interference in Algeria.

### **2.2.3. Catalysts and Complications: Factors Influencing the Trajectory of the 2019 AH Movement**

It is commonly agreed by researchers such as Boubekour (2020, p. 315), Grewell (2021, p. 105), and Ghebouli (2020) that the 2019 AH succeeded in removing Bouteflika from power, postponing April's elections, arresting figures from 'le pouvoir,' and prosecuting them. Simultaneously, they argue that it fell short of the people's expectations. They hold the army responsible for this despite its prominent role in contributing to the movement's successes and maintaining peace during a year of weekly peaceful protests. Their argument is that the army refused to respond to some of the people's demands, which included dismantling the military



institution and establishing a transitional council (ibid). I argue that even the protesters should be held accountable for the 2019 AH's shortcomings, and that the army's decisions appeared to be for the people's benefit.

One must acknowledge the significant role the army played during the 2019 AH in comparison to the cases of the AS countries mentioned above. It served as Algeria's backbone, aiding the protesters in achieving some of their main objectives. It faced criticism for undermining democracy by restricting freedom of expression and arresting some protesters who raised the Berber flag and rejecting the establishment of a transitional government (Boubekeur, 2020, p. 6; Volpi, 2020). However, the trajectory of the 2019 AH appears to have been influenced by other factors related to the people, including political and ethnic divisions and the leaderless nature of the movement.

Ghibouli (2020) attributes the first setback of the 2019 AH to the political and ethnic divisions among the Algerian people. According to him, while the majority agreed on the need to change Bouteflika's regime, there was disagreement on the form that change should take. Additionally, there was rejection of authoritarian continuity in favour of a just and free state, yet without a clear path to achieving it (ibid). He further notes that the ethnically and ideologically diverse nature of the Algerian people complicated matters. For instance, some regions cooperated with the system out of fear of a potential power vacuum, while others, particularly the Berbers, rejected it due to the region's historical opposition to the system (ibid). These divisions, combined with the existing rupture with the opposition as explained in section 2.2.2.2, may have contributed to the leaderless nature of the 2019 AH. This absence of clear representatives for negotiations is considered a shortcoming of the 2019 AH by Grewell (2021, p. 106). He asserts that this aspect left Algerians without defined leaders for negotiations (ibid), potentially hindering the establishment of a transitional council in Algeria.

Grewell (2021) draws a comparison between the 2019 *Hirak* in Sudan, which successfully ousted the long-standing ruler Omar Al-Bashir, and the 2019 AH. He argues that the former's success in forming a transitional government was due to its leadership by the labour union, consisting of doctors, lawyers, and journalists. However, it is worth noting that this process required international mediation, which was rejected by both the Algerian army and the people. They seemed convinced that foreign interference in any Arab state could complicate the situation, not just as observed in Libya and Yemen, but also in Sudan. While Sudan achieved a transitional council, the trajectory of its peaceful *Hirak* movement diverged into a brutal

massacre of protesters on 3rd June 2019 (Grewal, 2021, p. 106). This resulted in the death of one hundred protesters, many of whom were thrown into the Nile River (ibid, p. 112). Additionally, politics in Sudan have become militarised, as the country is currently under a de facto military government. This government took power after a coup in October 2021 against the joint civilian-military transitional government and refuses to relinquish power to civilians, even after four years of their *Hirak* (REDRESS, 2022, p. 9). Therefore, it could be argued that the army's refusal to establish a transitional government may have been aimed at preventing Algeria from being further engulfed in internal conflicts, similar to the situations in various Arab countries where the creation of transitional governments led to unprecedented human and political crises. It is important to note that one significant achievement of the 2019 AH is the maintenance of order during and after the movement. For me, this stands out as one of the most crucial gains, particularly considering Algeria's current location in a geopolitically unstable region. The nation faces political tensions with Morocco to the Northwest, internal conflicts in Mali and Niger to the South resulting in an influx of immigrants to Algeria, a civil war in Libya to the South-East, and a political crisis in Tunisia to the North-East.

In summary, this first part of the chapter has argued for the peaceful nature of the 2019 AH, a disposition seemingly influenced by lessons gleaned from previous conflicts both within and beyond Algeria. The first lesson was derived from the experience of the 1980 BS. I have demonstrated that the army chief's decision to prohibit the display of the Berber flag during the protests could have been an effort to preserve unity among the populace against potential external threats that might alter the course of the 2019 AH from an anti-government struggle to an ideological one. The second lesson was informed by the harrowing ordeal of the 1990s Black Decade, a civil war that resulted in the loss of over 150,000 lives. Its insights were condensed by Zeraoulia (2020) into two primary points: apprehension of violence and a profound disconnect with the opposition. Protesters addressed the former by employing peaceful methods to circumvent violence. They organised sanitation campaigns and chanted conciliatory slogans with security forces. To pre-empt disillusionment with the opposition, the protesters proclaimed their movement to be purely grassroots, disallowing any party from adopting it. This stance ultimately earned them recognition both nationally and internationally. The third and pivotal lesson was derived from the broader Arab experience with the 2010-11 AS. This period was characterised by the militarised use of violence against protesters in Egypt, culminating in the establishment of a new dictatorship under General Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi. It

instigated civil conflicts in Libya, Yemen, and Syria, primarily incited by foreign and regional military interventions. To avert such dire consequences, the Algerian army openly supported the protesters and assisted them in realising their initial demands, including the removal of Bouteflika, the apprehension of influential businessmen, military and political figures implicated in corruption, and their subsequent prosecution. Lastly, I have illuminated the primary setbacks of the 2019 AH, where I have expounded that accountability for its untimely conclusion should be shared by both the army and the people.

### **2.3. On the Selected News Outlets of this Study: Al-Jazeera English (AJE), British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and France 24 (F 24)**

Richardson (2007, p. 11) highlights that "the meanings of an utterance, an argument, a newspaper text, or whatever are intimately related to the identity of the producer responsible for its content and the context of its articulation". The preceding section has presented the articulation context, and this section delves into the identities of the text's producers, namely AJE, the BBC, and F24. It also elucidates the significant role these outlets play in the global news industry, which forms part of the rationale for selecting them as the primary data sources for this study. It is important to note that this section does not strictly adhere to the same structural outline of ideas when introducing the news outlets. Instead, it approaches them differently in accordance with their relevance to this study's context.

Collectively, alongside their prominent roles in the international news arena, these three news outlets are chosen for the following reasons. The Al-Jazeera network has faced rejection from authoritarian Arab governments who accuse it of "interfering in their domestic affairs," including its coverage of Bouteflika's regime, which led to the closure of its bureau in Algeria since 2004. This study offers an opportunity to explore the 2019 AH's portrayal as another democratic social movement within the Arab world. While the BBC's editors profess impartiality in their coverage of contentious events, existing literature on its representation of Arab issues—such as the 2003 Iraq war and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where Britain was involved both militarily and politically—suggests that true impartiality may not be entirely achieved. Therefore, this study will analyse the BBC's reporting of the 2019 AH, as Britain had no political or military involvement in its eruption. France's F24 is selected to scrutinise the French perspective on Algeria, a former colony and often referred to as the "jewel" of France's territorial holdings (Brown, 2018, p. 5). This choice takes into consideration Algeria's

sensitivity towards France regarding the memory of the war, France's reluctance to acknowledge its war crimes during the Algerian conflict, and the matter of transitioning from French as the primary foreign language to English, which was one of the protesters' core demands. Together, the following sections offer a comprehensive portrait of AJE, BBC, and F24, revealing news outlets that wield significant global reach and influence. They navigate the intricate terrain of international journalism while grappling with questions of editorial independence and alignment with governments interests.

### **2.3.1. Al-Jazeera Network (AJ net)**

This section discusses AJ's context (the Qatar-based network). It starts with a brief account of its foundation and funding, highlighting the regional and international significance of its Arabic and English news channels AJA and AJE respectively (2.3.1.1). Then, it presents the AJE's editorial practices and structures explaining how its English language reporting relate to other language versions (2.3.1.2). The section also presents the network's main related criticisms concerning its controversy in the Arab news reporting, presenting the main factors leading to troubled relations between the network and Bouteflika's government. I will explain the context of AJE in parallel with AJA's context for the following reasons. The former was launched to extend the international presence of the latter. Both outlets are specialised in news production. They belong to the same network, which currently consists of AJ Mubasher (live), AJ Documentary, AJ Investigative Unit, beIN Sport, and AJ Plus, all sponsored by the state of Qatar. Thus, they should have similar ideological and political orientations.

#### **2.3.1.1. Al-Jazeera's Foundation, Funding, and Prominence in the Regional and International Media Landscape**

Following the toppling of the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Khalifa Ben Hamad Al-Thani, through a bloodless coup by his son, Sheikh Hamad, in 1995, the latter eventually issued a set of reforms described by Schulthies and Bourn (2007, p. 144) as "unprecedented". These reforms, may indicate his liberal and democratic orientations, focused on the liberalisation of women from the conservative norms of Qatari society and the abolition of censored media. To liberalise women from conservative cultural norms, Sheikh Hamad established the municipal council that granted women the right to vote, drive, work, and take part in regular municipal elections that were first held in 1999 (Rathmell and Schulze, 2000, p. 55; Sultan, 2013, p. 258). To foster democracy in Qatar, the Emir abolished the Ministry of Information, regarded by Schulthies

and Bourn (2007, p. 144) as the famous media censorship arm of most Middle Eastern governments. He established the first pan-Arab network, Al-Jazeera, officially launched on 1st November 1996, with the aim of promoting freedom of the press (Schulthies and Bourn, 2007, p. 144; Rushing and Elder, 2007, p. 120). The network, which mainly broadcasted in Arabic, is owned, and partially funded by the Qatari government via the Qatar Media Corporation headquartered in Doha (Hashmi, 2012, pp. 3-4). To strengthen its income and increase viewership, Hashmi (2012, pp. 3-4) adds that AJ Sport, later called beIN Sport, was launched in 2003 and eventually became "a FIFA licensee in 2009". In addition, AJ "relies partially on revenues from advertising and sells its exclusive footage to prominent news institutions, particularly Western ones" (Schulthies and Bourn, 2007, p. 144). To extend its international presence, AJ Network launched AJE on 15th November 2006, providing new income streams (Hashmi, 2012).

The transformative impact of AJ on the media landscape and its international influence is evident in its groundbreaking approach to news reporting. The following paragraphs delves into the factors that contributed to its success and recognition as a significant global news network. In this respect, Sultan (2013, p. 250) considers AJA to be a revolution due to the way it collects, presents, and discusses news. He writes that it is the only channel to provide live and intensive coverage of the U.S.-led war on Afghanistan in 2001 (ibid). Another crucial factor behind its success, according to him, is related to the fact that its correspondent, Tayseer Allouni, secured a unique opportunity to film Bin Laden and some of his children, making it "an audacious if not notorious media channel" (ibid, p. 250). This might explain Allan's (2004, p. 352) statement that the number of its Arab viewers increases during crisis times.

Other crucial factors behind AJA's success might be the following. First, it promotes political discussion of controversial issues and provides a sharp reporting style on regional matters. Specifically, it provides sharp criticism of Arab regimes, namely their internal policies and affairs, which contrast strikingly with the dominant pro-government propaganda (Eliades, 2006, p. 6; El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2004, p. 319). This has eventually fuelled the anger of some Arab governments that rejected the network's establishment (ibid). Kuwait and Bahrain, for instance, expressed this rejection by cutting their diplomatic ties with Qatar, while other governments banned the station from reporting news from their territories (Eliades, 2006, p. 2).

Even AJE seems to have achieved international success through its news coverage. For instance, Harnden (2011) describes U.S President Barack Obama and Prime Minister David Cameron as AJE's fans during the 2011 ASU. Hillary Clinton, the then U.S Foreign Secretary, praised both versions of AJ, Arabic and English, and acknowledged their growing viewership in the U.S. She was quoted by Tharoor (2011) saying the following: "You may not agree with it, but you feel like you're getting real news around the clock instead of a million commercials and arguments between talking heads and the kind of stuff that we do on our news, which, you know, is not particularly informative to us, let alone foreigners".

### **2.3.1.2. AJE's Editorial Approaches and Primary Criticisms**

AJE is considered the first English-speaking channel headquartered in the Middle East, specifically in Doha (Aljazeera, 2006). Aljazeera's corporate profile( 2006()) summarises AJE's editorial mission in the following points: "give [a global] voice to untold stories, promote debate, and challenge established perceptions". It contends that the network aimed to extend AJA's regional perspective to a global one through "accurate, impartial, and objective reporting" and "revolutionise English-language media" (ibid). This is by setting out "a different news agenda" from that of the western news outlets including CNN, BBC, Fox News etc (Gunawardene, 2007).

AJE follows a similar approach to its Arabic-language counterpart, emphasising comprehensive and in-depth reporting. According to Alnajjar (2019), AJE is described as the New United Nations, maintaining a network of correspondents, reporters, producers, and editors from over fifty nations. These teams are responsible for producing news content that is tailored to the preferences and interests of the global English-speaking audience (ibid). In terms of global reach, it is worth noting that AJE's presence in South America and Africa is extensive and, in some cases, surpasses the combined reach of CNN and the BBC (Sosibo, 2007).

The channel also broadcasts a weekly program called People and Power, which discusses the various means employed by ordinary citizens around the world to empower themselves. Listening Post, presented by Richard Gizbert, is another example of the channel's policy, emphasising grassroots reporting. Such perspective is also echoed by AJA with proponents such as (Eliades, 2006, p. 6) and (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2004, p. 319) asserting that it aligns with the Arab peoples in their resistance against their authoritarian regimes. This alignment is evident through the channel's sharp criticism of these regimes, particularly in relation to their

domestic policies and affaires, which sharply contrasts with the prevailing pro-government propaganda (ibid).

Regarding its language services, AJE shares a common commitment to its core journalistic principles with other language versions of Al Jazeera such as AJA. This unity in approach across languages is aligned with the network's goal of providing diverse viewpoints to a global audience (Aljazeera, 2006).

However, the network's government sponsorship has raised concerns among researchers and political analysts regarding its editorial independence. Samuel-Azran et al (2016, p. 1) argue that it rarely addresses Qatari issues in the news. El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003) agree and add that AJA, for instance, criticises everyone except its sponsor. Moreover, Khatib (2013, p. 428) chastises the two news channels for being selective in what they cover. He illustrates this by stating that intensive coverage during the 2010-11 AS was dedicated to uprisings in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria, whereas little coverage was allocated to the Bahraini uprising (ibid). Khatib relates this to Qatari foreign policy towards the Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC), of which Qatar and Bahrain are members. He adds that Qatar cannot encourage rebellion against GCC members even if it disagrees with one of them (ibid). He explains that its position might stem from a belief that any political change affecting one of the GCC monarchies would threaten the geopolitical stability of the Arab Gulf as a whole (ibid). Hashmi (2012, p. 13) points out that AJ was strongly criticised for being "fiercely opinionated, Islamist, or pan-Arab leftist nationalists, presenting 'an aggressive mix of anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism,' and these hostilities drive the news channels' coverage. However, I would say that the nationalist, pan-Arab, anti-American, and anti-Zionist ideologies could be other factors contributing to their success among their viewers.

AJA's way of reporting Arab news was criticised by the ex-Algerian government, which banned the station from reporting news from Algeria (Al-Jazeera, 2004). Mokhefi (2014, p. 4) states that it regards the channel as a tool of destabilisation at the Emir's hands. The disagreement dates back to 2004 when the channel's program "The Opposite Direction" presented a heated debate between Mohamed Al-Arbi Zitout, an ex-Algerian diplomat, and Khaled Amer Ben Kaka, an Algerian journalist and writer. (Al-Jazeera (2004) writes that the debate centred around the then-situation in Algeria after the 1990s Black Decade and questioned Bouteflika's reconciliatory programs. In response, Rugh (2004, p. 233) states that the Algerian authorities cut Algiers' electricity, leaving millions of the channel's viewers in the dark. Consequently, the

station has been blocked since 30<sup>th</sup> June 2004 by the local authorities, justifying this procedure with the pretext of reorganising the work of foreign correspondents and press in the country (Reporters Without Borders, 2016).

However, this soured relation between AJ Network and the ex-Algerian government does not seem to have affected the Qatari-Algerian relation during Bouteflika's era. Rather, the Qatari Emir described it as strong (Al Jazeera net, 2014). Abu Rizk (2020) points out that this relation was strengthened further after the non-aligned position claimed by Algeria regarding the 2017-21 Gulf crisis between Qatar on the one hand and other GCC members, namely Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt on the other.

Therefore, AJE is selected among other Arab news outlets due to two outstanding factors. First, it is one of the most influential outlets that gained the admiration of its viewers inside and outside the Arab region due to its audacity and notoriety in news reporting (Sultan, 2013, p. 250). This, in turn, might make its influence of their perceptions of the events of the 2019 AH higher. Second, considering the disagreement between Bouteflika's government and AJ Network over its intervention in Algeria's domestic issues and its authoritarian perspective, the study provides a good opportunity to investigate AJE's reporting on the 2019 AH as another social movement for democracy in the Arab world.

In summary, this section has provided a comprehensive overview of Al-Jazeera's context, particularly focusing on its English language channel, AJE. It has begun by tracing the foundation and funding of the AJ net, highlighting the pivotal role played by Sheikh Hamad in ushering in unprecedented reforms and the establishment of the network as a platform for promoting freedom of the press. The network's expansion into the international arena through AJE has also been discussed, emphasising its goal to provide a global voice to untold stories and challenge established perceptions. The section has underlined the prominence of AJ Network in both regional and international news landscapes, highlighting its role in providing live and intensive coverage of momentous events and its willingness to offer critical perspectives on Arab regimes.

The editorial approaches of AJE have been examined, highlighting its commitment to comprehensive and in-depth reporting, as well as its unique perspective as the first English-speaking channel headquartered in the Middle East. While AJE aims to extend the regional



perspective of its Arabic counterpart, AJA, to a global audience, it has faced criticisms related to its government sponsorship and editorial independence. These criticisms raise questions about the channel's ability to address Qatari issues and its selectivity in covering certain events. Furthermore, the section has explored the troubled relationship between AJ Network and the ex-Algerian government, which led to the channel's ban in Algeria. Despite this tension, it did not significantly impact Qatar's relations with Algeria during Bouteflika's era.

Overall, this section provides a crucial foundation for understanding the context and significance of AJE, setting the stage for a deeper analysis of its reporting on the 2019 AH and its implications for the broader Arab world.

### **2.3.2. The British Broadcasting Corporation (the BBC)**

Exploring the historical path of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), which embarked on its journey in 1922 under the name of the British Broadcasting Company, helps in delving into the origins of an institution that has since become a preeminent global media presence. Section 2.3.2.1 aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the BBC's evolution, from its formative years as a private venture to its transformation into a publicly funded organisation in 1927, marking the birth of the British Broadcasting Corporation (Schlesinger, 1987, pp. 14-16). Within this historical narrative, I underscore the BBC's global significance as a major news provider by presenting important statistics on its viewership/readership and reach in 2019. Section 2.3.2.2 highlights the corporation's enduring commitment to journalistic principles, notably impartiality, accuracy, and fairness. Moreover, the section draws attention to the television license fee as the funding model that is aimed to underpin the BBC's independence. Additionally, it explores in greater detail the BBC Style Guide, a tool designed to uphold the corporation's credibility and impartiality.

The section does not include the BBC's esteemed reputation only but also the persistent debates surrounding its perceived impartiality. It presents a list of case studies, examining how the BBC has tackled contentious international events, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the American-Iraqi war, and the 2010-11 AS. These case studies will illuminate the complexities the BBC faces in maintaining impartiality amid geopolitical intricacies, providing crucial context for my subsequent analysis of its coverage of the 2019 AH. This study will culminate in an exploration of the BBC's reporting on the 2019 AH, offering insights into the evolving

landscape of journalism and the challenges of impartiality in an era marked by an abundance of information and diverse perspectives.

### **2.3.2.1. The BBC's Evolution, Funding, and Broader Reach**

Initially known as the British Broadcasting Company, the BBC was inaugurated in 1922 as a private endeavour involving six radio manufacturers (Schlesinger, 1987, pp. 14-16). In 1927, it underwent a significant transformation. It became a publicly funded institution and adopting the name the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), with John Reith serving as its inaugural director general (ibid). The BBC, as described by Barnett (2005, p. 331), functions as a public service corporation dedicated to providing journalism in the public interest. Its primary revenue source is the television license fee, paid by every household with a television.

The BBC is considered by Bourne (2016, p. 67) as the largest news provider in the UK and globally, boasting a workforce of over 23,000 individuals, ten UK TV channels, fifty-nine radio stations (both local and national), and a significant online presence (Oxford University Press, 2014). According to the annual global audience news measure, the BBC's worldwide reach expanded to 468.2 million in 2019-2020, potentially marking its highest number ever (Hall, 2020). Its website, launched in 1997, has arguably become one of the most influential news sources and is widely read worldwide (Barnett, 2011; the BBC Global, 2007; the BBC Governors, 2004, pp. 43-45). On 21st January 2020, it was ranked by the electronic website oTech World among the fifteen most popular news websites globally, with 132 million monthly visitors and over fourteen million monthly readers worldwide (Bhangu, 2020).

The BBC broadcasts news in more than forty languages to reach diverse audiences around the world (BBC, 2023). This approach is driven by the organisation's commitment to providing news, information, and entertainment to a global audience (the BBC Global, 2007). Its language services include Arabic. BBC (2023) writes that BBC Arabic provides news, current affairs, and documentaries through television, radio, and digital platforms. The website adds that BBC Arabic became the first non-English language service to air on the BBC, marking its debut with the inaugural Arabic radio bulletin in January 1938. Six decades later, in 1998, the service expanded its presence to the digital realm with the launch of [bbc.com/arabic](http://bbc.com/arabic). Then, in March 2008, the BBC introduced the BBC Arabic TV channel (ibid). Notably, Arabic stands as the sole language, aside from English, to receive continuous 24-hour coverage from the BBC, spanning television, radio, and online platforms, thereby serving millions of Arabic-speaking individuals worldwide (ibid). It is worth noting that online search has revealed that

the English and Arabic versions of the BBC news websites contain different articles on the same date about the 2019 AH (see section 4.2 for instances). This might suggest that the corporation's multilingual services customise their content to meet the specific requirements and preferences of their target audience. They do this while still following the BBC's overarching editorial guidelines which are explained below.

### **2.3.2.2. The BBC's Editorial Structures and Practices and its Controversy in Reporting on Contentious Arab Events**

As demonstrated in the previous section, The BBC is a reputable public service broadcaster which has played a significant role in shaping the media landscape in the UK and around the world. This distinct role is underpinned by a series of editorial practices and structures designed to maintain its credibility and impartiality. According to one of the BBC's own reports, the license fee plays a pivotal role in safeguarding the independence of BBC News services, shielding them from political interference and the influence of advertising (BBC, 2020). This framework aims to ensure the delivery of news that is inherently impartial, truthful, and accurate, aligning with the principles outlined in the BBC's editorial guidelines (BBC Guidelines, 2011). These guidelines shape the editorial decisions made by BBC journalists and content producers across various media platforms (ibid).

As part of its commitment to its global audience and to its journalistic values of impartiality, the BBC places a responsibility on those involved in writing for the corporation. Its Style Guide, whose last version was crafted by John Allen in 2003, is intended for journalists and, more broadly, for anyone tasked with scripting content for BBC News. It offers writers guidance on the clear, effective, and proper use of the English language in their news script writing. The style guide encompasses a wide range of aspects related to English language writing, particularly those intricately involved in the process of news writing. Some of these aspects include the use of active and passive voice, reported speech, superlatives, collective nouns, abbreviations and acronyms, attribution, and the appropriate use of simple, troublesome, and superfluous words. For instance, while the style guide acknowledges the potential of the passive voice to shift focus towards more critical information, it underscores the importance of employing the active voice in news writing, which primarily concerns "people doing things" (Allen, 2003, pp. 17-18).

However, Bourne (2016, p. 68) argues that inherent biases exist within all news institutions, including the BBC, in the way they present issues. According to Barnett (2005, p. 331), the

BBC has faced governmental control and pressure since its establishment in 1926, a claim supported by Bourne (2016, p. 67). Bourne provides instances of content constraints and limitations on event coverage imposed on the BBC. For instance, during the 2015 Scottish independence referendum, the BBC appeared to maintain a pro-union stance, as reported by The Guardian in an article titled “Peter Mullan: BBC showed 'horrendous bias in Scottish referendum’”. Another instance cited by Bourne (2016) revolves around a complaint about the BBC's reporting on the royal family as being "deferential" (p. 67). He further substantiates his statement with a report issued by the Republic website titled "BBC accused of blocking embarrassing royal stories" (ibid). These instances raise questions about the standard of impartiality, which former BBC and now independent editorial advisor Andrea Wills defines as “about not taking sides” (Riordan, 2014, p. 29).

Additionally, Flood et al (2011, p. 4) note that such an issue often clashes with the BBC's broader mission. This mission includes supporting fundamental values associated with British liberal democracy, such as nurturing citizenship and civil society, promoting understanding of the UK political system, and representing the UK, its nations, regions, and communities (BBC Agreement, 2006, pp. 3-4). The difficulty also emerges when attempting to reconcile these values with the imperative of impartiality, particularly when reporting on contentious events, notably those related to the "Arab world", such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the U.S.-Iraq war, and the 2010-11 AS.

In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Barkho and Richardson (2010) conducted a study on the representation of key actors by the BBC. Their analysis delved into how the newsroom strategies employed by the BBC shape and influence the discourse surrounding the conflict, with a particular focus on the role of the BBC's College of Journalism. They elucidated that this college, under the BBC's authority, imparts specific terminology to journalists when referring to the social actors involved in the conflict. For instance, journalists are instructed to use the term 'Palestinians' when mentioning 'Palestine'. This choice of terminology could imply a pro-Israeli stance that does not acknowledge Palestine as a sovereign state. Furthermore, while AJE generally refers to HAMAS as the Islamic resistance group, the BBC labels them as "militants," "gunmen," "bombers," or "suicide bombers”. Consequently, such negative nomination portrays HAMAS members as a threat, potentially legitimising the violence perpetrated by Israeli forces in response to this perceived threat.

In the case of the American-Iraqi war, another significant Arab event, British broadcasters, including the BBC, faced allegations of adopting a pro-American stance in their reporting, despite their commitment to impartiality (Luis, 2004). Tensions between the U.S. and Iraq escalated in 2002, driven by the Bush administration's plans to invade Iraq, citing the need to remove President Saddam Hussein's dictatorship. The administration also claimed links between Hussein and the 9/11 attacks and alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction, which were later proven to be unfounded (Luis, 2004). These claims were seemingly exploited by the British media to garner support for intervention in Iraq. Luis (2004) argued that the UK's public backing of military efforts in Iraq was partly a result of media coverage that propagated pro-war assumptions and excluded more critical perspectives. For example, Salter (2011) examined BBC news reports on the war and observed the consistent use of the term "insurgent" to describe Iraqi combatants between June 2003 and 2010. The news editor, Helen Boaden, justified this choice, stating that it described people who were "rising in active revolt" when no free-standing government was present. However, Salter noted that this definition did not align with most English dictionaries, potentially framing the 2003 events in Iraq as an insurgency to topple Hossain's regime rather than a war, and Britain was helping the Iraqis in doing so.

The 2010-11 AS, another critical event, underwent scrutiny in terms of its portrayal by the BBC. Alshareif (2016) analysed six BBC news reports covering the events in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt during the 2010-11 AS. Additionally, thirty interviews with tutors and students from the Libyan University of Sebha were conducted to gauge the impact of these reports. Alshareif (2016) concluded that the BBC demonstrated professionalism and impartiality in its coverage of these incidents. However, this conclusion might be considered somewhat superficial, as it relied on the perceptions of participants regarding the BBC's reports and editorial values. Furthermore, the concept of impartiality can be subjective, with what some view as impartial being seen as partial by others. A more comprehensive analysis involving a larger sample of articles might yield broader insights.

These claims are countered by other researchers like Mensah (2015), whose analysis produced notably different results. Mensah investigated the coverage of the final stages of the 2010-11 AS in Egypt and Libya by the BBC, CNN, and AJE news websites. The study explored the main drivers and the role of international news media in conflict reporting and resolution. Mensah analysed six stories concerning the resignation of Egyptian President Mubarak and the death of Libyan Colonel Gaddafi, employing Fairclough's DRA (1995A) and Reisigl and Wodak's DHA (2009). His analysis revealed that Gaddafi was negatively labelled using terms

such as "a chattel" and "a fugitive running from law". Such terminology might suggest that Gaddafi posed a threat to the Libyan people, justifying military intervention. Indeed, the NATO and U.S.-led intervention contributed to a bloody civil war, as further discussed in section 2.2.2.3.

Hence, an analysis of the BBC's news reports on the 2019 AH offers a compelling opportunity to scrutinise the concept of impartiality within the context of its coverage of this movement. This is particularly significant because the UK had neither political involvement, as in the case of Palestine, nor any military engagement, as observed in the instances of Iraq and Libya. Additionally, analysis provides a window into the intersection of media, politics, and international relations, offering valuable insights into how a major global news outlet covered and contextualised a critical socio-political movement in the Arab world such as the 2019 AH.

In summary, the BBC's role as a public service broadcaster and its commitment to journalistic principles have positioned it as a global media powerhouse with a profound impact on shaping public discourse. It has showed that its reliance on the television license fee as a revenue source underscores its editorial independence, ensuring a steadfast dedication to impartiality, accuracy, and fairness in its reporting. However, as I have explored in section 2.3.2.2, the BBC has not been immune to controversies and debates over its impartiality, particularly in the context of contentious international events. The case studies of its coverage of events like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the American-Iraqi war, and the 2010-11 AS demonstrate the challenges the BBC faces in maintaining perceived impartiality in the eyes of various stakeholders.

These debates underscore the complex interplay between journalistic values, editorial practices, and the broader geopolitical context. While the BBC strives to provide comprehensive and impartial coverage of global events, its ability to navigate the nuances and sensitivities of international reporting remains a topic of ongoing scrutiny. As I delve into the examination of the BBC's coverage of the 2019 AH, I embark on a journey to further unravel the intricacies of journalistic impartiality within the context of another critical socio-political movement in the Arab world. This analysis promises to shed light on the ever-evolving relationship between media, politics, and international relations, providing valuable insights into the dynamics of global journalism in an age of information abundance and complexity.

### **2.3.3. France 24 (F24)**

This section offers an overview of France 24 (F24), beginning with its establishment in 2006, its viewership/readership and reach (section 2.3.3.1), and editorial practices and structures, delving into France's relations with its former African colonies, with a particular focus on Algeria (section 2.3.3.2). These relations, while normalised during Bouteflika's tenure, remain sensitive due to historical issues such as the memory of the war, France's reluctance to acknowledge its war crimes, and the demand by protesters during the 2019 AH for a shift from French to English as a first foreign language (section 2.3.3.3).

#### **2.3.3.1. F24's Genesis and Global Reach**

The catalyst for the launch of F24 on 6<sup>th</sup> December 2006, is attributed to the 2003 Iraq war. Concerns within the government arose from the perception that the French perspective on the war was not adequately represented in existing news outlets. As a response, F24 was established to provide a French alternative voice, countering what France perceived as the dominant Anglo-Saxon narrative on global events, primarily represented by the BBC and CNN (Lagorce and MarketWatch, 2006).

F24 is positioned as the first international news outlet in North Africa and French-speaking African countries. The channel, headquartered in Paris, is owned by Group Media Monde, operates with both state funding, and advertising sponsorship (Lagorce and MarketWatch, 2006). It has a multilingual approach to news reporting broadcasting news in Arabic, English, and French. This linguistic diversity allows F24 to effectively engage global audience, presenting news from various cultural and regional vantage points. According to statistics, it reaches 355 million households worldwide, boasting 61.2 million weekly viewers (France 24, no date). Additionally, F24's digital platforms are multilingual, significantly enhancing its reach with 16.5 million monthly visits, 45.6 million video views (2018 average), and 38.2 million followers on Facebook and Twitter (ibid).

#### **2.3.3.2. France 24's Editorial Landscape: Ownership, Influence, and Controversies**

F24 is a prominent international news outlet that warrants examination through an exploration of its editorial structures and practices. Similar to AJE and the BBC, the ownership and operational structure of F24 appear to exert notable influence on its news content and presentation, particularly when it comes to topics related to France's previous colonies.

As mentioned in the previous section, F24 is owned and partially funded by the French government through France Médias Monde, a holding company overseeing various French

media entities (Lagorce and MarketWatch, 2006). It upholds a set of core editorial values and a mission that emphasises accuracy, objectivity, and the provision of comprehensive news coverage (France 24, no date). Its journalists articulate the network's mission as promoting French values on a global scale and reporting on world events from a French perspective (DUFOUR, 2017, p. 7). The concept of 'the French perspective' encompasses defending freedom, independence, and pluralism of information while striving to advance gender equality, diversity, the exchange of viewpoints, and the spirit of debate through its programmes (ibid). Despite its government funding, F24 emphasises its independence and freedom from government interference or political party influence, asserting itself as "the voice of nobody" (France 24, no date, p. 1). Nonetheless, similar to the cases of AJE and the BBC, F24 has encountered challenges and criticisms. Some observers, such as Kessar et al (2021), have questioned its editorial choices and raised concerns about potential alignment with French government positions. Others have scrutinised specific aspects of its coverage, particularly in relation to France's previous African colonial territories and their events. For instance, Kessar et al's (2021) study which critically analysed F24's reports on the 2019 AH revealed that its reporting displayed hidden ideological undertones, including a focus on sensitive topics like the Berber flag. They concluded that this coverage may have aligned with French government interests in Algeria, especially the economic ones as will be elucidated further in section 2.3.3.3.

In the realm of academic discourse, F24 has often been overshadowed by prominent news outlets such as AJE and the BBC. Notably, Kessar et al's (2021) study explored F24's coverage of the 2019 AH movement, revealing hidden ideological undertones characterised by the recurrent coverage of sensitive topics, notably "the Berber flag". Their study suggested that F24's reporting was influenced by intricate economic and political factors. Building upon these findings, the present research delves deeper into these factors and investigates the enduring colonial legacy that continues to shape the complex relations between Algeria and France.

To a significant extent, F24 appears to align with French efforts to maintain a dominant influence in its former African colonies, as exemplified by the televised program "Eye on Africa". This program serves as a conduit for daily updates on African affairs, with users simply entering a country's name alongside keywords like "news, videos, reports, and analysis" into the website's search bar. The result is a plethora of reports, often focusing on African nations whose resources, according to Benneyworth (2011), are of particular interest to France, including Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Chad, Djibouti, Gabon, Cameroon, and the Central African



Republic, all of which host French military bases. Interventionism emerges as another tool for sustaining hegemony. Charbonneau (2008, p.283) documents thirty-three military operations launched in Africa between 1997 and 2002 through defence agreements with nearly half of the continent's nations. This earned France the moniker "the gendarme of Africa" (ibid, p. 282).

The backdrop to this Franco-African dynamic is the colonial history that dominated much of the twentieth century. As Brown (2018) notes, the French empire extended its reach across the continent, encompassing territories like French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, Madagascar, and the Maghreb in North Africa, including Algeria. Unlike many African colonies that achieved independence through peaceful constitutional negotiations, Algeria stands as an exception. Bottaro (2011) underscores that Algeria's path to independence was paved with a revolution, setting it apart from its counterparts whose nationalist leaders engaged in diplomatic dialogues with European governments.

#### **2.3.3.4. The Complex Legacy of the Algerian War in Franco-Algerian Relations**

The Algerian war is a historical chapter that Shepard (2016, p. 12) considers "a blind spot in the French historiography". It has garnered global interest, capturing the attention of not only the French public but also spotlighting the contradictions, boundaries, and inconsistencies inherent in Western universalism, along with the violence it necessitated and consequently generated (ibid). This may explain France's reluctance to include the Algerian War in its official historiography, as noted by Michel (2010), who highlights how it imposes cognitive frameworks that hinder historians from challenging the official public memory.

French historians like Benjamin Stora have addressed this issue through their writings. In 1992, Stora published his book 'La Gangrène et l'Oubli' (The Gangrene and the Forget), which examines the erasure of the Algerian War of Independence from French historiography. Stora's extensive archival research unearthed the darkest hours of the conflict and exposed how France had employed censorship since 1962 to deny the very occurrence of the war. Stora's work influenced French decision-makers in the 1990s, leading to the adoption of a set of memorial laws and policies framing the remembrance of the war (Calvet, 2017).

In 1999, deputies of the French National Assembly voted to replace the expression "events of Algeria" with the "War of Algeria" in the French republic's legal documents, over 35 years since its outbreak (ibid). In 2005, a law extolling the "positive aspects of colonisation" failed to be adopted in the Deputy Chamber, while in 2012, a law recognising "the civilian and military victims' memory of the war" highlighted the ongoing sensitivity of this issue in

contemporary France (Calvet, 2017). The 2017 French Presidential elections even saw candidates debating whether French colonisation and the war in Algeria should be classified as crimes against humanity (Anne, 2017). During his campaign, Emmanuel Macron, the current French President, acknowledged that France's history in Algeria was a "crime against humanity" and expressed the need to face this past and apologise to those who were hurt (Boudina, 2017). Yet, no formal apology has been issued, leaving the Algerian side waiting for further steps (Al-Jazeera, 2020).

### **2.3.3.3. Economic and Cultural Diplomacy: The Evolving Relationship between Algeria and France under President Bouteflika**

Despite these historical complexities, bilateral relations between the two countries remarkably improved under President Bouteflika. Naylor (2009) notes that Bouteflika praised the French language and culture, emphasising their importance in the Algerian educational system. In return, France decided to reopen its consulates in the two provinces of Oran and Annaba and expanded visa application facilities (ibid). Additionally, French cultural centres were reactivated in several regions of Algeria (ibid).

Economically, France holds a significant position as Algeria's second most important economic partner after China (Kahhal, 2019). Notably, during Bouteflika's tenure, France enjoyed economic privileges in Algeria that no other country received. Kahhal (2019) points out that many major French companies investing in Algeria violated the "Algerian Investment Law," which typically requires foreign investors to hold only 49% of any investment while allocating 51% to Algerian investors. Furthermore, these investments were often consumer-oriented, focusing on industries like yogurt and mayonnaise, as opposed to Morocco, where French investments centred on the automotive industry (Maghreb Voices, 2017).

Maghreb Voices (2017) adds that France dominated the Algerian economic market, with an annual trade volume of five billion Euros and approximately 6000 French companies exporting goods to Algeria. In response to this economic hegemony, Kessar et al (2021) highlight how protesters called for cutting diplomatic and economic ties with France. Culturally, they also demanded the replacement of French as the first foreign language with English, arguing that French was the language of the occupier and had less international prominence than English (Arab, 2019). This call received swift attention from the then-Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Tayeb Bouzid, who announced plans to promote the use of English in

higher education and scientific research (ibid). This decision drew criticism from the French newspaper 'Le Monde' (Eshorouk, 2019).

In summary, through this comprehensive examination of F24, I have traversed the channels of its origin, editorial landscape, and its intricate relationship with Algeria. Each section has offered a unique lens through which we view this prominent international news outlet and its complex role in shaping narratives and influencing perceptions.

Section 2.3.3.1 has uncovered the genesis of F24, a direct response to the changing global media landscape catalysed by the 2003 Iraq war. Driven by a desire to provide a French perspective on international events, F24 emerged as a significant player in the world of news reporting. The section has explored its reach, linguistic diversity, and the pivotal role it plays as the first international news outlet in North Africa and French-speaking African countries. F24's global footprint, spanning millions of households worldwide and a substantial digital presence, underscores its influence in the realm of international news dissemination.

Section 2.3.3.2 has delved into the editorial structures and practices that shape F24's news coverage. Like other renowned international news outlets AJE and the BBC, F24's ownership and operational structure seem to exert a notable influence on its content and presentation. Despite partial funding by the French government, F24 upholds a mission centred on accuracy, objectivity, and comprehensive news coverage. Its commitment to promoting French values on a global scale and offering a 'French perspective' on world events further complicates its editorial landscape. The section has explored the criticisms and challenges it has faced, notably the question of alignment with French government positions and its coverage of sensitive topics.

Section 2.3.3.3 has delved into F24's relationship with Algeria, a nation marked by a complex history of colonialism, revolution, and post-colonial relations. F24's role in this dynamic has been multifaceted, with its news coverage, economic interests, and cultural diplomacy impacting the Franco-Algerian nexus. The legacy of the Algerian War, seen as “a 'blind spot’” in French historiography (Shepard, 2016, p. 12), continues to influence these relations. I have demonstrated how President Bouteflika's era saw both economic cooperation and cultural exchanges between the two nations yet simmering sensitivities surrounding the colonial past persisted.

Together, these sections offer a comprehensive portrait of F24, revealing a news outlet that wields significant global reach and influence. It navigates the intricate terrain of international journalism while grappling with questions of editorial independence and alignment with government interests. This study presents a valuable opportunity to explore how a news outlet associated with a former colonial power portrays pro-democratic movements within one of its historically significant colonies, all while considering Algeria's sensitivity to its colonial history with France.

## **2.4 Summary of the Chapter**

In conclusion, this chapter has provided essential socio-political context for the 2019 AH and has introduced the three key data sources that will aid in interpreting the discourse surrounding this movement. The chapter is divided into two main parts. Part 2.2 has emphasised the prevailing peaceful nature of the 2019 AH, influenced by past experiences within and beyond Algeria. Section 2.2.1 has offered an overview of the 2019 AH, highlighting political corruption as its primary catalyst, ultimately affecting the economy and society. Section 2.2.2 has outlined momentous events within and outside Algeria, which, though disastrous, appear to have guided Algerian protesters in maintaining peaceful demonstrations and preventing security lapses. Section 2.2.2.1 has delved into the 1980 BS, suggesting that the army's decision to restrict the Berber flag may have aimed to preserve unity among protesters and prevent ideological shifts. Section 2.2.2.2 has discussed the lessons learned from the violent 1990s civil war, emphasising the protesters' peaceful approach and distancing from political parties. Section 2.2.2.3 has focused on the critical lessons drawn from the 2010-11 AS, where the use of military force and foreign interventions led to adverse outcomes, prompting the Algerian army to support the protesters' demands. Section 2.2.3 has identified the main setbacks of the 2019 AH, attributing responsibility for its unwanted conclusion to both the army and the people.

Moving to Part 2.3, the chapter has examined the contexts of the three news outlets. Section 2.3.1 has centred on AJ Net, highlighting its rejection by authoritarian Arab governments, including Bouteflika's one, which accused the network of interference in domestic affairs, leading to its closure in Algeria since 2004. Section 2.3.2 has focused on the BBC and its claim of maintaining impartiality in reporting on controversial Arab issues, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the American-Iraqi war, and the 2010-11 AS. Section 2.3.3 has explored the context of F24, considering France's colonial history in Africa and Algeria, as well as the

socio-economic and political aspects of bilateral relations. This includes French economic dominance in Algeria, Algerian sensitivity regarding the memory of the war, France's reluctance to acknowledge its war crimes in Algeria, and the demand for a shift from French to English as a first foreign language, which was a key demand by the protesters.

## **Chapter 3**

### **Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) and Peace/War Journalism (P/W J)**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

To develop both a theoretical and a methodological framework for analysing the news discourses surrounding the 2019 AH by AJE, the BBC, and F24, it is necessary to first evaluate previous literature on the two perspectives of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) and Peace/War Journalism (P/WJ). The chapter comprises two parts, with each discussing one perspective, starting with CDS (section 3.2) then P/WJ (section 3.3). Overall, the chapter contends that P/WJ serves as a more effective framework for interpreting CDS textual findings. This assertion is based on several key points that will be explored in section 3.3.5.

#### **3.2. Critical Discourse Studies (CDS)**

This part starts with a brief initiation to the CDS paradigm through an explanation of the notion of discourse analysis (DA) (section 3.2.1). It reviews scholarly work on CDS, illustrating how and why this study aligns with this paradigm. Once this alignment has been established, concepts such as discourse, power, and ideology should be defined, elucidating how these definitions are operationalised throughout this study (section 3.2.3). Subsequently, a detailed account of the two concepts of orientalism and democracy is presented in sections (3.2.3.1 and 3.2.3.2) respectively. The chapter explores Fairclough's dialectical relational approach (DRA) (1995a; 2003; 2009; 2016) and Reisigl and Wodak's discourse historical approach (DHA) (2001b; 2009; 2016), offering reasons for selecting these approaches over others for the purpose of analysis.

##### **3.2.1 Discourse Analysis (DA)**

According to Stubbs (1983, p. 1), DA is the study of meaning beyond the scope of a single sentence, encompassing text, paragraphs, and conversation. It focuses on how speakers construct meaning in larger communicative units, rather than just grammatical structures. Stubbs' view of DA is further supported by Cook (1989), who emphasises the importance of context in analysing discourse rather than solely examining the linguistic patterns that

constitute it. In other words, DA represents a departure from traditional linguistics, which primarily examines language at the level of individual words or sentences. Discourse analysts situate texts within their communicative contexts to reveal the underlying meaning within each segment.

Halliday's Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG) (1978) has played a pivotal role in allowing DA to incorporate insights from other disciplines, such as sociolinguistics, into the study of meaning. SFG helps illuminate the ways in which personal and social processes are embedded in the text. A year later, in 1979, Roger Fowler, Tony Trew, Bob Hodge, and Gunther Kress co-authored a book titled "Language and Control", in which they relied on Halliday's SFG to develop 'critical linguistics' (CL). Critical linguistics represents a new branch of linguistics that goes beyond the systematic description of language to engage with society in a dialectical manner by analysing political economy, domination, exploitation, and ideology (FUCHS, 2016, p.1). Consequently, CL represents a significant step forward in contributing to the development of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) as a comprehensive linguistic paradigm.

### **3.2.2. CDS**

Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), formerly known as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), underwent a transition, recommended by van Dijk (2013), to better reflect its diverse methodologies and approaches. Van Dijk critiqued instances where CDA was treated merely as "a method of critical discourse analysis". Recognising the wide array of methods employed by critical discourse analysts, he argued for a more inclusive term, acknowledging that "CDA is as diverse as DA". Consequently, van Dijk (2013) and others advocated using the term "Critical Discourse Studies" to encompass theories, methods, analyses, applications, and other practices of critical discourse analysts. This transition reflects the evolving nature of the field, recognising the variety of critical approaches within the study of discourse.

CDS revolves around the critical examination of language use within its socio-political and economic context. It represents a reaction against the dominant formal paradigms prevalent in the 1960s and 1970s, often characterised as "asocial" or "uncritical" (Van Dijk, 2001, p. 351). CDS goes beyond the mere explanation and interpretation of society; its methods are geared towards critiquing and transforming social realities (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p. 7). Importantly, CDS is not a singular method. Rather, it is a school of thought with roots in various disciplines of social science, including Journalism and Media Studies. For example, peace

researchers Nohrstedt and Ottosen (2011, p. 224) proposed that CDS could complement the theory of Peace/War Journalism, highlighting the potential overlooked by the latter (see section 3.3.5).

Van Dijk (2001, p. 352) defines CDS as “a type of discourse analysis research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in social and political contexts”. CDS focuses on the substantially linguistic and discursive nature of power relations in contemporary societies (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997, p. 272). Its primary goal is to identify and analyse unequal power relations, exposing the role of discourse in either perpetuating or challenging socio-political dominance (Garret and Bell, 1998, p. 6). This is achieved by connecting linguistic analysis with social analysis (Wood and Kroger, 2000, p. 206). CDS approaches aim not only to describe and explain but also to emancipate and enlighten society (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p. 7). In essence, CDS carries an emancipatory impulse directed at challenging all forms of social inequality (Wood and Kroger, 2000, p. 206). In other words, CDS raises awareness and equips individuals with the means to comprehend their surroundings, empowering them to resist the social inequalities imposed by powerful entities in their societies. Therefore, CDS adopts a constitutive, problem-oriented, and interdisciplinary approach that sets it apart from other forms of discourse analysis (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p. 2).

In the context of the current study, an eclectic approach is employed, drawing on Fairclough's dialectical relational approach (DRA) (1995a; 2003; 2010) and Reisigl and Wodak's discourse historical approach (DHA) (2001b; 2009; 2016) to analyse the representation of the 2019 AH by three ideologically distinct and influential news outlets. Additionally, elements from the discipline of Journalism are incorporated to interpret the CDS textual findings. This approach serves not only CDS analysts and journalists but also the general readership by shedding light on social injustices perpetuated through specific discursive practices of news outlets and inspiring action to challenge them.

During the analysis and interpretation process, CDS analysts are encouraged, and indeed, should explicitly state their positions while maintaining their respective scientific methodologies (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p. 3). Nevertheless, this explicitness has led to criticisms, with Widdowson (1998, p. 144) contending that CDS analysts may prioritise interpretations aligned with their ideological stances. It is important to note that no research is entirely immune to subjectivity and political motivations, as pointed out by Van Leeuwen



(2006, p. 293). However, CDS analysts, by explicitly stating their positions, aim to be transparent about their critical stance in their work (ibid).

CDS is a multidisciplinary approach with the capability to integrate subjective interpretations with objective analysis within the same study. It doesn't merely highlight and explain social wrongs but also serves to raise awareness among individuals regarding social inequalities perpetuated by discursive practices, empowering them to challenge these injustices. This distinct characteristic makes it an independent school of thought that enriches other disciplines, such as Journalism, by providing a critical lens through which to view societal issues.

In summary, this section has provided a clearer understanding of CDS, its evolution, interdisciplinary nature, emancipatory goals, transparency, and its potential to inspire change. It also emphasises CDS as a critical and distinct school of thought that contributes to a deeper understanding of social issues through the analysis of language and discourse. Within CDS, three fundamental concepts play a crucial role: “discourse”, “power”, and “ideology”. These concepts help illuminate how language operates within specific socio-political frameworks, enabling researchers to critically analyse the relationships between discourse and society.

### **3.2.3. Discourse and Its Intersection with Power and Ideology**

Discourse, within the context of this study, is a pivotal component for understanding how different media outlets like the BBC, F24, and AJE represents the 2019 AH to their global audiences. The various dimensions of discourse, along with its entwinement with power and ideology, are critical for achieving a deeper comprehension. This section provides an in-depth exploration of the key concepts in discourse studies, namely discourse, power, and ideology, and explain how they are adapted for the purposes of this research.

The foundation of discourse analysis is built on the premise that language is not merely a system of symbols but rather "language in use" (Brown and Yule, 1983, p. 1). Discourse is the manifestation of language when employed in specific contexts and for particular purposes. In the context of this research, it is the language used by media outlets such as the BBC, AJE, and F24 to portray the 2019 AH. It is crucial to emphasise that discourse is not merely the conveyance of information. It is a complex medium of communication that shapes and is shaped by social interactions and the broader sociocultural environment (Fairclough, 2010, p.

92). Discourse, in this sense, becomes “a form of social practice” (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997, p. 258), reflecting and perpetuating the social, political, and ideological conditions in which it is produced. CDS takes this notion further by analysing how discourse is implicated in the (re)production of unequal and discriminatory social relations (Richardson, 2007, p. 43). This implicates a dialectical relationship between discourse and the broader socio-political structures that frame it, indicating that discourse is both socially framed and socially framing.

A fundamental aspect of discourse studies is its entwinement with power and ideology. Discourse practices have the capacity to signify meaning while also constituting modes of social action and representation (Fairclough, 2003). In other words, the way people use language, the narratives they construct, and the choices they make in communication are not neutral; they are influenced by and, in turn, influence power relations and the prevailing belief systems. This aligns with Fairclough and Wodak's (1997) assertion that discourse contributes to the production and reproduction of social inequalities in power relations. It achieves this by the ways through which it represents objects and positions people (*ibid*). The concept of power in CDS is predominantly seen in terms of how certain structures, whether discursive or social, can establish, maintain, or resist dominance. Reisigl and Wodak (2016, p. 10) outline three strands of power that inform CDS scholars:

1. Power as a result of specific resources of individual actors: This perspective focuses on the power held by individual actors based on their resources (e.g., French and Raven, 1959). In the context of this study, this perspective can be linked to the specific actors within the media organisations, such as journalists, editors, and media owners. These individual actors possess resources like editorial control, access to information, and the ability to shape narratives. The power they wield influences how the 2019 AH is portrayed in the media.
2. Power as a specific attribute of social exchange in each interaction: It emphasises the power dynamics in social interactions, where the distribution of resources among actors determines power (e.g., Blau, 1964; Emerson 1962, 1975). This strand of power is particularly relevant when considering how different actors interact within the media landscape. It underscores that power relations can vary in different social interactions. E.g., in interviews by the three news outlets with government officials or activists related to the 2019 AH, the power dynamics within these interactions can shape the discourse presented in their coverage. This perspective can help in analysing how power

plays out in the interviews, press releases, and statements that contribute to media representations.

3. Power as a widely invisible systematic and constitutive characteristic of society (e.g., Foucault, 1975; Giddens 1984; Luhmann, 1975). This perspective delves into the structural and systemic aspects of power within society. In the case of media representations of the 2019 AH, this aspect of power might be evident in how media organisations are structured, their ownership, and their historical and cultural context. It can help explore how societal and historical power structures influence media discourse and coverage over time.

By considering these three strands of power, some observations of how power relations influence the way media outlets like the BBC, F24, and AJE represent the 2019 AH can be provided. They allow to explore the role of individual actors, the dynamics of social interactions, and the overarching systemic and structural factors in shaping media discourse and ideology. Nonetheless, the current study focuses primarily on the third strand of power, which pertains to power as a widely invisible and systematic characteristic of society for the following factor. It aims primarily to dissect how the 2019 AH is represented to worldwide audiences. Given this research objective, the emphasis on systemic power is not only logical but also indispensable. Systemic power, within the framework of CDS, addresses the structural and systematic dimensions of power within society. Therefore, concentrating on systemic power allows us to unveil that media discourse is deeply rooted in broader societal structures, extending beyond individual actions. For that reason, sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2, and 2.3.3 provide a detailed account of the three news outlets, AJE, BBC, and F24, respectively, namely in relation to their ownership and funding, editorial policies and guidelines, historical and geopolitical contexts, global reach, and some studies on their portrayal of Arab social movements such as the 2010-11 AS.

In accordance with van Dijk's (2016, p. 71) definition, power is characterised as “a specific relationship of control between social groups or organisations and seen as possessing both social and cognitive dimensions”. This conceptualisation of power raises the possibility of misrepresenting certain social groups, such as the protesters, by powerful or elite groups including western news outlets, potentially relegating them to subordinate positions. Consequently, this process contributes to the creation and perpetuation of forms of inequality within society, some of which may eventually become widely accepted and, thus, remain unchallenged. Moreover, van Dijk (2016, p. 71) distinguishes between what he labels as

"legitimate" power, describing relationships between teachers and their students or parents and their children, and illegitimate power, which is the main concern of CDS. Instances of illegitimate power or power abuse include the perpetuation of certain stereotypical images, which can be wielded to reinforce existing power structures or to exert power over specific groups. However, as Wodak and Meyer (2016) note, CDS does not focus merely on social injustices and illegitimate power relations. Rather, it can focus on positive developments, non-political aspects, or human-interest stories related to the studied event. Instances include the emphasis on positive, constructive efforts which aim at advancing democratic principles, even in challenging political contexts. The current study further exemplifies these nuances by demonstrating how the critical analysis centres on both legitimate and illegitimate power relations within the 2019 AH.

Concerning the intersection of language and power, Jürgen Habermas, a prominent social theorist, emphasised that "language is a medium of domination and social force, serving to legitimise relations of organised power" (Habermas, 1967, as cited in Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p. 12). In essence, Habermas underscores the role of language in reinforcing and justifying power structures within society. While language itself may not possess inherent power (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016), Wodak and Meyer (2016, p. 12) state that it plays an intricate role in the dynamics of social power. According to them, this connection between language and power can be observed in many ways as shown below:

1. Language indexes and expresses Power: Language is a tool through which power relationships are indicated and conveyed. It allows for the identification of who holds authority and control in various contexts.
2. Language in Contention and Challenge: Language is often central in situations where there is conflict or opposition to existing power structures. It becomes a means for contestation and resistance against established forms of power.
3. Language as a Mechanism for Challenging Power: Although power may not originate directly from language, it can be harnessed as a tool to challenge and contest power dynamics. Language can be employed to subvert existing power structures and effect changes in the distribution of power, whether in the short or long term.
4. Language as an Expression of Power Differences: Within hierarchical social structures, language offers a finely nuanced vehicle for articulating and reflecting disparities in power. It serves as a medium through which power imbalances can be expressed and examined.

The four elements therefore summarise the multifaceted roles that language plays in relation to power dynamics in society by shaping, reflecting, or challenging them. Furthermore, within the realm of CDS, an equally pivotal dimension is the exploration of ideology. Ideology, like power, is deeply ingrained in discourse and language, influencing not only how individuals perceive the world but also how societies are structured. The following delves into the intricate interplay between discourse and ideology, fundamental for understanding how dominant belief systems or negative ideologies are perpetuated, as well as how they can be challenged and reshaped by discursive practices in favour of positive ideologies.

Ideology is a cornerstone concept within CDS. While the term is commonly understood as a system of ideas and ideals (Van Dijk, 2021), it represents a complex and multifaceted notion that can be perceived through various sociological and epistemological lenses. This is especially true with regard to the relationship between discourse and ideology. As Mills (1997, p. 29) explains, many cultural theorists have tended to avoid the notion of ideology within their work, especially since the 1990s when a more "pessimistic political climate" surrounded Marxism in the fall of communism. The Marxist view often defined ideology as "false consciousness", where people (especially the proletariat) were misled about their social and economic conditions to benefit the dominant class (Thompson, 1990, p. 38). Van Dijk (2021, p. 147) challenges this notion of ideology as inherently negative and suggests that ideologies can be both negative and positive, depending on the context in which they are used and who is using them.

In contrast to the prevailing trend of diminishing the use of the term "ideology" within contemporary postmodern thought and research, CDS scholars such as Fairclough, Reisigl and Wodak, and Van Dijk take a resolute stance in favour of retaining and actively investigating this concept within the realm of power relations. In addition, they prefer a more nuanced understanding of ideology, rather than framing it solely as "false consciousness", focusing on how discourse constructs and reinforces ideologies and how individuals engage with and contest these discourses in various ways. As will be shown below, their research often highlights the multifaceted nature of ideology, considering it negatively as a tool of domination and positively as a means of resistance within a specific social and linguistic context. The scholars emphasise that ideology is not a monolithic concept and that its interpretation varies among different social groups.

Fairclough (2010) advocates for the continued relevance of social classes as a crucial category for analysis, counter to the prevailing trends in postmodern scholarship. He articulates this perspective by asserting that in contemporary capitalist societies, such as Britain, class-based structures continue to be pivotal in shaping social dynamics (ibid). According to him, these structures and their effects on power relations necessitate a comprehensive examination of ideology, which he regards as a fundamental component within the processes that establish, perpetuate, enact, and transform relations of power (Fairclough, 2010, pp. 25-26).

However, Fairclough's engagement with the concept of ideology extends beyond mere semantic or definitional exercises. Rather than treating ideology as a static, fixed construct, or a form of "social cement" that merely buttresses the status quo, he aligns his thinking with the viewpoint espoused by Thompson (1990). This perspective pivots away from an exclusive focus on the intrinsic nature of ideologies and instead directs attention towards their practical effects and real-world consequences. Within this framework, Fairclough's approach views semiotic features as ideological to the extent that they influence, either by sustaining or undermining power relations. The crux of this influence lies in the way language, as a primary carrier of semiotic features, shapes perceptions, constructs narratives, and frames discourse. Language acts as a potent tool in disseminating and legitimising certain ideologies, thus contributing to their acceptance or contestation within society. These ideologies, according to Van Dijk (2021), might be positive or negative depending on the social collective's position in the society; they can be seen as positive when they promote positive change in power dynamics or negative when they contribute to maintaining or exacerbating existing power imbalances. Thus, Fairclough's approach underscores the dynamism and fluidity of ideologies in action, considering them not as abstract constructs but as potent drivers in the shaping of power dynamics (Fairclough, 2010, p. 27).

Reisigl and Wodak (2016, p. 88) define ideologies as "an (often) one-sided perspective or worldview composed of related mental representations, convictions, opinions, attitudes, and evaluations, which is shared by members of a specific social group". Their conceptualisation of ideology offers a more comprehensive and dynamic view that goes beyond the simplistic notion of "false consciousness", considering the multifaceted nature of ideologies and their role in social discourse. This is salient through the way they see discourse. Reisigl and Wodak (2016, p. 27) define 'discourse' as a complex concept that involves various elements:

1. A cluster of Context-Dependent Semiotic Practices: meaning that Discourse refers to a collection of communicative practices that involve the use of signs and symbols. These semiotic practices tend to communicate and express certain ideologies which are context dependent (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p. 5).
2. Situated within Specific Fields of Social Action: Discourse is not an isolated entity but is embedded within specific social contexts and situations. Similarly, ideologies are not independent of social contexts but are shaped and expressed within these contexts. The context in which discourse occurs influences the formation and expression of ideologies (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016).
3. Socially Constituted and Socially Constitutive: Discourse is shaped by society and, in turn, contributes to the construction and maintenance of social reality. Similarly, ideologies are socially constituted, reflecting the values and beliefs of a society, and they, in turn, contribute to the construction and maintenance of social reality by influencing people's beliefs and actions (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p. 5).
4. Related to a Macro-Topic: Discourse often revolves around overarching or macro-topics, which can be broad themes, issues, or subjects of discussion related to specific ideologies. For instance, discourse about political ideologies often centres on broader societal issues and political themes. These macro-topics provide the framework for the communicative practices within the discourse.
5. Linked to Argumentation about Validity-Claims: Discourse frequently involves discussions and arguments regarding the validity of claims, which can also relate to ideological debates. Ideological viewpoints are often contested within discourse, and various social actors with diverse viewpoints engage in these debates (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016).

Van Dijk's conceptualisation of discourse appears to align largely with Reisigl and Wodak's definition provided above. They describe discourse as "Situated within Specific Fields of Social Action", emphasising its embedded nature within social contexts. Van Dijk's approach also acknowledges the role of discourse within a Discourse-Cognition-Society triangle (Van Dijk, 2016). This triangular relationship signifies that discourse, as a linguistic and communicative phenomenon, is both influenced by and influences cognitive processes and broader societal structures. In other words, discourse shapes and is shaped by the ways individuals think and the social structures within which communication occurs, illustrating a dynamic interplay between discourse, cognition, and societal contexts. Furthermore, they emphasise that

discourse is shaped by society and contributes to the construction and maintenance of social reality, while Van Dijk discusses how society and specific groups produce and share knowledge, attitudes, and ideologies, indicating a reciprocal relationship between discourse and social factors. Nevertheless, the two approaches differ with regard to the cognitive aspect.

Van Dijk's approach places a stronger emphasis on the cognitive aspects of discourse. He distinguishes between "situation/semantic models" and "context/pragmatic models" as cognitive structures that mediate the processing of discourse (Van Dijk, 2016, p. 67). This cognitive perspective delves into how individuals interpret discourse and perceive its appropriateness (ibid). Reisigl and Wodak's (2016) definition offers an overview of discourse, focusing on its contextual, semiotic, and social dimensions without explicitly delving into the cognitive processes of interpretation. While both perspectives acknowledge the social nature of discourse, Van Dijk's approach incorporates cognitive structures and their role in mediating between discourse and social structures.

Concerning their views on ideology, while Reisigl and Wodak's (2016) definition of ideologies is more general and does not necessarily imply a state of deception or false awareness, Van Dijk (2021) views the concept as any general belief system of social collectives that can be used to dominate or resist domination depending on their position in society (Van Dijk, 2021, p. 149). He suggests that ideologies are shared belief systems that have social and political functions, in that they influence the social practices of the members of these ideological groups, and in particular their discourse (ibid). He further clarifies that they can be both negative and positive depending on the context in which they are used and who is using them (ibid, 147).

In the context of the 2019 AH, exploring the ideologies of the three news outlets concerning their portrayal of the movement can reveal how they are harnessed for both positive and negative purposes. It is essential to consider which news outlet is promoting these ideologies and in what context, as this can determine whether they contribute to the promotion of democratic principles or the perpetuation of certain orientalist tendencies. This nuanced perspective allows for a detailed analysis of how ideologies influence the representation of the 2019 AH and its consequences. Thus, the two concepts of negative and positive ideologies are used to refer to Orientalism and pro-democracy respectively (sections 3.2.3.1 and 3.2.3.2). Importantly, they could align with Galtung's principles of war and peace journalism. WJ as a form of negative ideology often sensationalises conflicts, promotes division, and perpetuates stereotypes. If a news outlet portrays the 2019 AH in a way that fuels tension, stereotypes, or



perpetuates negative biases, it can be seen as perspective perpetuating negative ideologies. This approach can exacerbate conflicts and hinder peaceful resolution. Nonetheless, PJ, as stated by Galtung (2006) and McGoldrick and Linch (2000), focuses on reporting in a way that emphasises peaceful resolutions, dialogue, and understanding. If a news outlet promotes pro-democracy values in a way that supports peaceful dialogue and resolution of conflicts related to the movement, it can be seen as reflecting positive ideologies.

In examining the discourse surrounding the 2019 AH, the dynamics of power and ideology manifest through the lenses of negative and positive ideologies, corresponding to Orientalism and pro-democracy perspectives. To gain deeper insights into these ideological frameworks, the subsequent sections delve into specific analyses of Orientalism and pro-democracy discourse, shedding light on how these perspectives may shape the narrative surrounding the movement.

### **3.2.3.1. Orientalism**

Orientalism, rooted in the term "Orient" or "the East", stands in contrast to "the Occident" or "the West" and encapsulates a power dynamic marked by domination and control (Said, 1978). This term carries a negatively evaluative perception of the East, attributing stereotypical traits such as being "irrational", "devoid of energy and initiative", "inveterate liars", "depraved", and "childlike" juxtaposed with the "rational", "virtuous", and "mature" European/Western counterpart (Said, 1978, pp. 38–40). Said's conceptualisation aligns with negative ideologies and can be distilled into four points, as articulated by Sayyid (1997, p. 32). The first posits an 'absolute and systematic difference' between the Occident and the Orient, establishing a foundation for negative representations. Second, these representations stem from textual exegesis rather than an engagement with "modern oriental realities". Galtung (2006) suggests that Western reporting on Muslims and Arabs may unconsciously draw from enmities rooted in the eleventh century's crusades, perpetuated through Western literature. Third, the Orient is depicted as unchanging, uniform, and incapable of self-description, elements that sustain negative biases. Fourth, the Orient is framed as a force to be feared or mastered, employing language that can dehumanise and victimise, thereby perpetuating negative ideologies.

Said (1978) contends that Orientalism should be studied as a discourse to comprehend how European culture systematically represent the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively (p. 3). This discourse constructs narratives and images reinforcing feelings of unity within the imagined community, assuming superiority over

the Orient described as "the strange" (Said, 1978, p. 43). Freund (2001, p. 3) expands on this, asserting that Orientalism transforms the East into an alien "other", typically depicted as dark and inferior to the West—unenlightened, barbarous, cruel, craven, enslaved to its senses, given to despotism, and, in general, contemptible. This dichotomous representation of "us" vs "them" aligns with negative ideologies and is examined by CDS scholars, such as Van Dijk's ideological square model (1998) and Reisigl and Wodak's notion of "us" vs "them" (2001b). Galtung's P/WJ model (2006, p. 1) suggests that such representations contribute to the escalation of cultural violence, a manifestation of negative ideologies. This can be seen in the dehumanising and stereotypical portrayals that not only impact individuals but also contribute to broader societal prejudices and discriminatory practices.

However, this understanding of Orientalism appears less applicable to the context of this study, potentially due to the predominantly peaceful nature of the 2019 AH. Instead, traces of Orientalism in this study are semantically dissected using CDS terminology, such as Van Leeuwen's socio-semantic inventory (2008) and Halliday's affective mental and negative material processes (sections 4.7.2 and 7.3). Such terminology provides a lens to uncover subtle instances of negative ideologies embedded in discourse.

This shift allows for a more intricate exploration, acknowledging that negative ideologies may manifest not only through explicit language but also through nuanced choices in framing and emphasis. The study delves into the semantic implications, uncovering the ways in which negative ideologies might be subtly perpetuated and influencing perceptions, even in a context that appears dominantly peaceful. This approach aligns with Van Dijk's (2013, p. 182) perspective that ideologies, including negative ones, can manifest in discourse through subtle and implicit means, contributing to the overall understanding of the intricate interplay between language, power, and ideology in the representation of the 2019 AH.

### **3.2.3.2. Democracy and its Relationship with Orientalism/Anti-Orientalism**

Democracy, a multifaceted concept often touted as a cornerstone of modern governance. It holds different meanings and implications depending on the context in which it is examined. This section explores the intricate interplay between democracy, orientalism, and anti-orientalism within the context of countries like France and the UK, both former colonial powers, and Algeria as a former French colony. It begins by examining democracy's institutional form, its exportation, and the criticism it faces through the lens of orientalism. The section also discusses democracy as a set of values and beliefs concerning political self-

determination, participation, and individual rights and establishes an explicit link with the concept of PJ. It then delves into anti-orientalism's challenge to the notion that democracy is solely a Western construct. This analysis sets the stage for understanding the complexities of how previous colonial powers perceive pro-democratic movements within post-colonial nations such as “the Arab Spring”. Ultimately, it explores the role of media outlets, notably the Western ones, in shaping perceptions and interpretations of these dynamics.

According to Beetham (1999), democracy fundamentally signifies a departure from autocratic, totalitarian, and authoritarian governance, where singular authorities, such as monarchs or chiefs, wield unilateral decision-making power. It thrives on the principle of inclusivity, affording citizens the opportunity to actively participate in shaping the trajectory of their society (ibid). This engagement takes various forms, including direct involvement in state administration and policymaking (Ehrenberg, 1950, p. 530). For instance, citizens have the opportunity to cast votes on laws, policies, and other issues without reliance on elected representatives. This form of participation finds historical precedent in ancient Athens, regarded by Ehrenberg (1950) as the cradle of democracy, evolving under the leadership of political figures like Solon and Cleisthenes. Another manifestation of civic engagement according to Beetham (1999) is represented by the modern practice of representation through institutions such as Parliaments, known as representative democracy. Here, elected representatives make decisions on behalf of citizens, and these representatives are accountable to the electorate through regular elections.

The coexistence of direct and representative democracy within an institutional democracy is highlighted by Hay (2006, p. 3). He defines institutional democracy as designed to temper both the excesses of majority rule and the perils of authoritarianism. In its purest form, this system seeks to equitably distribute power among citizens, ensuring checks and balances that prevent any one branch or aspect of democracy from becoming overly powerful (ibid). The practical realisation of this democratic ideal hinges on a complex process, prominently manifested in the act of voting and majority decisions. Beetham (1999) underscores the vitality of democratic governance lying in the regular and fair conduct of elections, which serves as the linchpin, facilitating the expression of public opinion and fostering legitimacy. However, Kiyani (2013) explores the intricacies of democratic systems, specifically emphasising the role of institutions like election commissions in strengthening the democratic structure. To bolster the institutional underpinnings of democracy, she underscores the pivotal role of impartial institutions, such as election commissions, in formulating and implementing election policies. However, she injects

a note of caution, acknowledging that the performance and scope of these commissions may not be beyond doubt in every democratic nation (*ibid*). In this regard, the effectiveness of these institutions in safeguarding the democratic process warrants careful scrutiny. Furthermore, Kiyani (2013) sheds light on another potential threat to democracy which is the involvement of the military in the political landscape, advocating for a nuanced approach, urging for a clear definition, control, and minimisation of the military's role. By doing so, nations can mitigate the risks associated with military intervention and preserve the integrity of their democratic institutions. Finally, to recognise the importance of democracy as institutions, Kiyani (2013) emphasises their indispensable role in establishing a resilient and enduring democratic system of governance. Thus, democracy, in its institutional manifestation, becomes not merely a political framework but a dynamic and changing system deeply intertwined with a nation's political identity (Beetham, 1999).

In its global manifestation, the democratic model, as exemplified by countries like France and the UK, finds its roots in representative democracy. Cincotta (2013, p. 7) notes that elected officials in these nations are entrusted with the responsibility of making political decisions, formulating laws, and administering programs for the public good. These former colonisers, with extensive colonial histories, have often been lauded as champions and exporters of their democratic ideals and institutions worldwide.

However, the export of institutional democracy by these nations has faced scrutiny when viewed through the lens of orientalism. The intersection of orientalism with democracy becomes particularly evident when Western powers perceive non-Western societies as inherently undemocratic. This perspective often serves as a justification for intervention in those societies with the aim of 'imposing' democratic institutions and practices (Sayyid, 1997, p. 32). The underpinning of this viewpoint lies in a sense of cultural superiority, where the West is cast as the standard-bearer of democracy and modernity, while the East is portrayed as inherently backward and in need of Western guidance and civilising intervention (Hosford and Wojtkowski, 2010; Said, 1978, p. 43). This perception raises important questions about how governance and representation worked in democratic systems, particularly in the historical context of French colonialism in Algeria. These questions focus on how actively nations like Algeria participated during colonial rule and the challenges in ensuring inclusive citizenship and equal rights, especially in interactions with European settlers. Sheikh Ahmed Taleb Al-Ibrahimi, an Algerian doctor and former minister, articulated these concerns in a televised

interview on Al Jazeera Arabic during the program "Witness to the Era" (2013), hosted by the Egyptian animator Ahmed Al-Mansour.

Addressing the question of Algerian involvement in what France terms the democratic process, Al-Ibrahimi underscored that while there was rhetoric promoting democracy, the practical implementation varied significantly. He emphasised the limited agency of Algerians in shaping these democratic systems, noting that decision-making processes were often more influenced by the French colonial power and European settlers. Regarding the inclusivity of citizenship and the assurance of equal rights, Al-Ibrahimi contended that these principles were far from universally upheld during the exportation of democratic ideals. He argued that colonial powers, in imposing democratic structures, frequently operated with hierarchical distinctions. Al-Ibrahimi asserted that citizenship was selectively granted, resulting in the uneven distribution of rights, particularly with indigenous populations experiencing systemic discrimination and being denied the full rights and privileges accorded to their colonisers.

Beyond its institutional framework, democracy encompasses a diverse array of values and beliefs which align closely with the concept of PJ, especially its principle "PJ as people/human-oriented" (see sections 3.3.3 and 4.7.2). These values, which reflect a form of positive ideologies, include political self-determination, where individuals shape their political destiny through processes like voting and decision-making (Beetham, 1999). It aligns with the PJ's principle of giving voice to various perspectives (Galtung, 2006), providing a platform for individuals to express their political choices and aspirations. Active participation is another essential aspect of democracy, moving beyond voting to meaningful engagement in political processes (Cincotta, 2013). This involvement spans civic activities, community initiatives, and the open exchange of ideas (ibid). By promoting meaningful engagement in political processes, PJ aims to foster a sense of agency and empowerment among individuals, contributing to a more informed and involved citizenry (McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000). Within a democratic framework, individual rights include various freedoms such as speech, expression, and religion (Cincotta, 2013). These rights act as pillars, protecting the autonomy and dignity of citizens. PJ aligns with this by prioritising the protection of human rights and advocating for fair and unbiased reporting, avoiding sensationalism or the amplification of divisive narratives (Galtung, 2006).

Beetham (1999) asserts that this democratic perspective is universally valuable and not restricted to any particular geographic or cultural context. In this broader sense, democracy

goes beyond procedural aspects like elections and government structures, permeating societal fabric. It advocates for principles like freedom of speech and religion, equal protection under the law, and the safeguarding of civil liberties (Cincotta, 2013, p. 5). I would therefore say that democracy becomes a holistic framework defining governance mechanics while striving to ensure the well-being, autonomy, and active engagement of every individual in society.

Moving to the concept of Anti-orientalism, according to Label (2018, p. 83), it serves as a critical counterpoint to the orientalist perspective by challenging the assumption that democracy is an exclusive Western construct, only replicable under Western guidance. It recognises that democratic principles have deep roots in a diverse human experience, extending across various historical and cultural contexts (ibid). This perspective emphasises that democracy should not be treated as a rigid, universal template that can be applied everywhere in the same way. Instead, it is viewed as a concept that can organically adapt and develop within the unique context of each cultural, social, and political setting (Beetham, 1999).

The complex interplay between democracy, orientalism, and anti-orientalism emerges when delving into the representation of pro-democratic movements in postcolonial countries. These nations, having endured the impacts of colonialism, face a nuanced struggle in navigating the legacy of external influence on their political and social structures. While orientalism tends to homogenise non-Western societies and prescribe a Western-style democracy (Sulaiman, 2019), anti-orientalism resists such oversimplification (Label, 2018). It acknowledges the adaptability of democratic principles across diverse cultures and the importance of recognising and preserving local forms of governance that may align with democratic values (ibid).

The intricate interplay arises as postcolonial societies strive to define their own democratic paths while contending with historical imbalances and power differentials inherited from the colonial era. The representation of pro-democratic movements within these contexts becomes a multifaceted challenge. The complexity lies in balancing the need for democratic governance with the preservation of cultural identity and autonomy. Pro-democratic movements may seek to integrate democratic principles into their societies, but the challenge is to do so in a way that respects the local context and historical trajectory, avoiding a mere replication of Western models (Kiyani, 2013).

Examining the intricate dynamics becomes especially complex when analysing how pro-democratic movements are portrayed in postcolonial nations grappling with the enduring legacy of colonialism. An illustration of this complexity is evident in the representation of the

2010-11 AS by Western news outlets like the BBC and F24, which belong to the UK and France respectively. It is important to note that these outlets, with their global reach, editorial principles, and international reputation, may approach the coverage of pro-democratic movements in the Arab world differently compared to AJE, representing Qatar and the Middle East. The geographical categorisation is not intended to stereotype or 'represent' entire regions, but rather to highlight the geopolitical factors, historical ties, and audience considerations that can influence these outlets. For example, F24 and the BBC may emphasise democratic values, human rights, and international norms in their reporting on the movement. However, as noted by Gani (2022), their framing of the movement as a struggle for Western-style democracy within their discourses can be advanced, implicitly suggesting that Western values are superior. This framing, she adds, can oversimplify the complex socio-political dynamics of the region, and downplay the agency of local protesters in bringing about change (ibid).

In contrast, AJE, an Arab news outlet, attempts to provide an alternative viewpoint that challenges the Western-centric framing of Arab pro-democratic movements (Gunawardene, 2007). It doesn't necessarily mean it is against the West, but rather aims to present a different, more regionally informed perspective. It therefore may have a unique regional perspective and may prioritise regional interests and viewpoints in its coverage. This might reflect its attempt to adhere to its set editorial mission which underscores giving [a global] voice to untold stories, promoting debate, and challenging established perceptions (Aljazeera, 2006).

As previously noted in this section, this diversity in media perspectives highlights the complexities in understanding the interplay between democracy, orientalism, and anti-orientalism, especially when examining pro-democratic movements in countries with colonial legacies, such as The MENA region. It is noteworthy that the case of the 2019 AH serves as another compelling example of the complexity in the representation of pro-democratic movements. It highlights the intricate interplay between the BBC, F24, and AJE in shaping narratives surrounding a movement that seeks democratic reforms in Algeria. The way these media outlets depict the 2019 AH underscores the need for a more inclusive and culturally sensitive approach to democracy's promotion and implementation, respecting the unique contexts and aspirations of different societies.

### **3.2.4. A Critical Review of Fairclough's DRA and Reisigl and Wodak's DHA**

One of the fundamental principles of CDS is its flexibility in accommodating eclectic frameworks capable of addressing various aspects of linguistic, discursive, and social phenomena (Weiss and Wodak, 2003). This flexibility enables the adoption of diverse yet compatible analytical approaches, including Fairclough's DRA (1995a; 2003; 2010) and Reisigl and Wodak's DHA (2001b; 2009; 2016). According to Wodak and Meyer (2016, p. 14), CDS approaches must be systematic and, more importantly, they need to translate their theoretical claims into practical instruments and methods of analysis. Richardson (2007) further emphasises that these approaches should extend beyond the mere description of linguistic components within texts and elucidate the purposes and functions these components serve in human affairs. As noted by Hart and Cap (2014, p. 1), these diverse approaches serve distinct analytical objectives, providing analysts with various starting points for examining the intricate and dialectical relationship between discourse and social reality along a continuum that bridges the 'micro' (linguistic) and the 'macro' (social). This continuum will be thoroughly explored in the subsequent sections.

#### **3.2.4.1. Dialectical relational Approach (DRA)**

The DRA, proposed by Norman Fairclough, serves to examine the relationship between discourse (the linguistic element here) and other non-linguistic elements within social practices. Specifically, DRA seeks to investigate how semiosis, as a component of the social process, is dialectically connected to other elements. This social process encompasses three levels of social reality: social structures, practices, and events (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). Social practices act as intermediaries between general and abstract social structures and specific and concrete social events. A dialectical relationship implies that discourse plays specific roles in either reproducing or challenging these practices and structures. The primary objective of DRA is to analyse these functions. In this study, DRA proves valuable in exploring the social practices that may have influenced the discourses of the three news outlets on the 2019 AH by examining specific linguistic choices, such as transitivity (see section 4.5.2.1). Additionally, the study considers Fairclough's conceptualisation of discourse as a means of "construing aspects of the world associated with a particular social perspective" (Fairclough, 2016, p. 87). This perspective is employed to refer to various facets of a particular worldview derived from the same reality of the 2019 AH but represented differently by three ideologically distinct news outlets.



The DRA regards discourse as having three dimensions. The first is text, encompassing syntactic organisations and lexical choices made by the author. The second is discursive practices, which encompass how the text is produced, distributed, interpreted, and re-appropriated. The third is sociocultural practices, which pertain to the context on situational, institutional, or societal levels (Fairclough, 1995a, p. 97). This clearly demonstrates the dialectical relationship between texts and society; their production is influenced by cumulative societal, institutional, and situational factors.

For each dimension of discourse, Fairclough suggests a corresponding dimension of analysis. The textual dimension aligns with the analysis of the form and function of discourses. Discursive practices are examined through the analysis of how discourses are produced and consumed. Socio-cultural practices are linked to the analysis of the broader socio-political structures responsible for discourse production (Richardson, 2007). Fairclough (1995a, p. 57) argues that the textual dimension involves the analysis of vocabulary, semantics, grammar, textual organisation beyond the sentence level, such as cohesion, and the overall structure of a news article. During this analysis, I incorporate KhosraviNik's textual analytical framework (2010a), primarily focusing on social actors and social actions. This includes the analysis of Reisigl and Wodak's discursive strategies, namely nomination and predication, Halliday's transitivity, and elements from Van Leeuwen's socio-semantic inventory (see section 4.5).

However, as Gerbner (1958) notes, the form and content alone are insufficient for elucidating meaning; their function during their moment of use must also be considered (cited in Richardson, 2007, pp. 39-40). Therefore, these linguistic forms should be examined in relation to their direct or indirect involvement in reproducing or challenging systems of social power and ideology (Richardson, 2007, p. 40).

The second dimension of analysis, corresponding to discursive practices, is referred to as discursive analysis. This dimension mediates discursive practice, encompassing processes of text production, distribution, and consumption (Fairclough, 1995a). The relationship between the processes of production and consumption is described by Richardson (2007, p. 112) as dialectical. In simple terms, discursive analysis explores the dialectical relationship between the processes involved in producing specific news discourses and their consumption. It considers journalistic practices used to produce news text for a particular category of readers, considering their socio-political backgrounds. The analysis also involves decoding this text by consumers, considering the producer's intentions, the website's name, ideological orientations,

values, and more. This type of analysis may involve ethnographic studies, where researchers closely observe the journalistic practices that influence news production. An example is Barkho and Richardson's study (2010), which analysed how BBC newsroom strategies shape and inform the discursive and social practices of their discourses on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with a particular focus on the College of Journalism. However, this type of analysis is beyond the scope of this study.

The third dimension of analysis, dealing with the material social context, examines "the structures, institutions, and values that, while outside of the newsroom, permeate and structure the activities and outputs of journalism" (Richardson, 2007, p. 114). In simple terms, this dimension focuses on the socio-political and economic backgrounds that, although external to the newsroom, influence and interfere with the production of news discourses. At this point, Richardson (2007, p. 114) suggests that analysts need to "look outside the text and examine the relationships between journalism and the social formation as a whole". He distinguishes between the political and cultural aspects of social structures that may be referenced in the critical analysis of texts with varying emphasis. Political practices concern the influence that governments exert on news discourse production, while ideological practices work "through the circulation of ideas, representations, and portrayals of social reality" (Richardson, 2007, p. 135). These practices are approached differently in my analysis, considering the news outlet, its global reputation, and editorial values, and, most significantly, its perspective towards Algeria as an Arab state.

Fairclough (1995a, p. 62) argues that the framework is compatible with different emphases. The focus on each of the three dimensions depends on the research questions and objectives. Therefore, the current study critically examines the textual/micro/linguistic aspects of AJE, the BBC, and F24 discourses on the 2019 AH in relation to the political and ideological practices that underlie their production. This analysis situates the discursive functions in the broader political and socio-cultural context of use. The exploration of discursive practices falls beyond the scope of this study due to the challenge of encompassing all three dimensions within one project, especially when analysing reports from three news outlets. Instead, this is recommended as a potential area for future research in the general conclusion (see section 8.4). The following section delves into "Systemic Functional Grammar" and explains how it is helpful in conducting the analysis, particularly its system of transitivity.

### 3.2.4.1.1. Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG)

SFG is one of the DRA attracters and main linguistic methodologies. Richardson (2007) argues that one of its main characteristics is that the format of the system network that is central to Halliday's model of language is all about meaning choice. Choices have to be made throughout the different stages of text production: "the choice to use one way of describing [labelling or categorising] a person, an action or a process over another; the choice to use one way of constructing a sentence over an alternative; the choice to include a particular fact or opinion or argument over another" (p. 38), and the rest of the choices available to a text producer. More importantly, unlike formalist methodologies, SFG links language articulation to varying functions, thus demonstrating part of the correlation between discourse and social context, which is consistent with the general commitment of CDS. Specifically, Fairclough (1995a) argues that, in dealing with media discourse, SFG can "anchor social and cultural research and analysis in a detailed understanding of the nature of media output" (p. 16). He adopts Halliday's (1978) multi-functionality of texts which views texts as serving three meta-functions: ideational, interpersonal, and textual.

The ideational Experiential Meta-Function (representation); This type of meta-function involves the text producer's representation of the world. It involves lexico-grammatical choices that are realisations in language of the text producer's experience of the world (Fairclough, 1995a, p. 58). It is concerned with the language's function that construes the writer/speaker's experiences in the inner (psychological) and the outer (physical) world (Sakrikar, 2019, p. 62). Halliday (1978, p. 112) argues that whenever reflecting on the external world of phenomena or the internal world of one's consciousness, the representation of the reflection would take the form of "content" called "the experiential meaning" (Sakrikar, 2019, p. 62). This experiential function is realised through the application of the system of transitivity whose primary aim is to reveal how reality can be differently constructed via discourse. This includes an emphasis on what aspects of that reality are foregrounded and what aspects are backgrounded or suppressed.

The Interpersonal Meta-Function: This function involves the text producer's use of language as a mean to be part of an interactive speech event: "the expression of [her/] his comments, attitudes, evaluations", as well as her/his relationship with the text (Halliday, cited in Fowler, 1991, p. 69). It involves the text producer's evaluation of representations and social relations and interactions established through discourse (Fairclough, 1995a, p. 58). Interpersonal meta-function is realised by the mood system which attempts to reveal how the relationship between

people involved in a communicative event is constructed. This meta-function can be studied in editorials and feature articles in which writers' own judgments and evaluations are allowed contrary to news reports whose writers should stick to the journalistic rules and policies that require them to maintain "objectivity" in news making.

The Textual Meta-Function: This function consists of two main components: context and language structure which are used to carry the meaning of the text. It creates discourse and is realised through information packaging and text structuring. In this function, language is used to establish a relationship between what was said or written, which involves how language is used to organise text itself, like textual structure and coherence.

It is important here to reiterate Fowler's (1991) notion that the three functions of language are influenced by the wider context of use. In other words, speakers or writers are not completely free in using language, rather they are invariably restricted by the immediate and wider context of language use. As Halliday (1985) sums up, transitivity views language as representation, mood views language as exchange, and theme views language as a message. Yet, Halliday emphasises that although the three functions of texts operate simultaneously, they vary from one text to another, providing three different points of departure for different kinds of analysis. This study is, therefore, concerned with the ideational function that views language as representation which is its core objective.

It is worth indicating that the DRA is not a fixed method but rather a framework which provides a theoretical basis on which different methods can be used according to how the object of research is theoretically constructed (Fairclough, 2016, p. 91). Simply put, the approach is flexible in combining a set of analytical tools to address different questions. Thus, providing an accessible method for doing CDS (Richardson, 2007, p. 37). This means that the DRA is not restricted to one methodology only such as SFG. Other methods can be applied within this framework according to the research aims and questions. This justifies the reliance on Reisigl and Wodak's DHA (2001b; 2009; 2016) along with Van Leeuwen's socio-semantic inventory (2008) since these tools are involved in the realisation of representation of social actors (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 53).

#### **3.2.4.2 Discourse Historical Approach (DHA)**

The DHA was developed by Ruth Wodak and associates at Vienna University in the 1990s. It emerged from a study that aimed to trace "the constitution of an antisemitic stereotyped image... as it emerged in public discourse in the 1986 Austrian presidential campaign" (Reisigl and

Wodak, 2001a). DHA is a three-step process with a specific methodology. It begins with the identification of specific content or topics within a particular discourse. Next, the discursive strategies are investigated. Finally, linguistic means are examined in terms of types and specific, context-dependent linguistic realisations (as tokens) (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009). It involves identifying the content, investigating the strategies used to convey that content, and examining the linguistic means employed to implement those strategies. This structured methodology helps researchers gain insights into how discourse constructs and conveys meaning, as well as how it relates to broader social, political, and cultural contexts.

By discursive strategies, Reisigl and Wodak (2001b, p. 94) refer to the “more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) employed to achieve a particular social, political, psychological, or linguistic goal”. They suggest five strategies that are worth considering when analysing any particular discourse: nomination, predication, argumentation, mitigation/intensification, and perspectivisation. However, this study only focuses on the use of nomination and predication since its main interest is to examine the representation of the 2019 AH's main actors, such as Bouteflika, the protesters, and the police (see sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2). Regarding the issue of representation in the context of news reports, Fairclough (1995b, p. 97) raises a key question, “which requires historical research and research on the production process: where do the discourses of the reporters come from?”. This dimension of discourse is best addressed in the DHA, which emphasises the importance of tracing the sources of a particular discourse and how it (re)manifests itself across different genres and media (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001b).

In this respect, KhosraviNik (2010b, p. 174) argues that the historical aspect of both discourse production and comprehension is highlighted within the approach and forms the basis for the description, explanation, and interpretation of discourses. Reisigl and Wodak (2001, p. 41) further argue that the DHA analyses discourse at four contextual levels: (1) the text and its intimate linguistic properties; (2) "the intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between texts, genres, and discourses"; (3) the social situation (formality, participants, location); and (4) the history of the discursive event and its topics.

I would say that the first three levels more or less correspond to Fairclough's dimensions of discourse, as discussed under Section 3.2.6.1, which focus on contextual breadth, whereas the fourth level adds contextual depth by revealing the historical factors behind various discourses and their associated terminology. Chapter 2 has provided the necessary historical account of

the 2019 AH and the three news outlets selected for this study, which I rely on to describe, explain, and interpret their news discourses surrounding the movement.

### **3.3. Peace/War Journalism (P/W J)**

This part of the chapter discusses the perspective of P/WJ, whose integration into this study, alongside the CDS framework, promises an intriguing methodological contribution. Section 3.3.1 delineates several media analysis approaches, namely agenda-setting theory (Weaver, 2007; McCombs and Weaver, 1996; Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007), framing theory (Goffman, 1974), and the protest paradigm (Chan and Lee, 1984; McLeod and Hertog, 1992). This review aims to contextualise the study within the broader field of media studies and rationalise the adoption of the P/WJ approach for interpreting its data. Section 3.3.2 explains P/WJ's related key concepts. This encompasses the distinction between violence and conflict (3.3.2.1), peace (3.3.2.2), the comparison between peace journalism and violence/war journalism (3.3.2.3), explaining how these terms are operationalised within the study's context. Section 3.3.3 presents a critical assessment of Galtung's P/WJ model (2006, p. 1). This section argues for the potential to make theoretical adjustments to the model based on McGoldrick and Lynch's framework for P/WJ (2000). These adjustments are also informed by the ideas of Herbert on conflict analysis (2017) and Chouliaraki on the analytics of mediation (2006).

Subsequently, section 3.3.4 presents criticisms directed at the PJ theory, particularly concerning its conceptualisation of journalistic norms such as "objectivity". Section 3.3.5 provides a review of previous research utilising CDS in conjunction with P/WJ. This review aims to emphasise a notable contribution of this study: the utilisation of P/WJ as a supplementary lens to CDS. This is practically achieved by establishing a connection between the principles of the adapted P/WJ model and CDS linguistic categories (section 4.7). This combined framework will be employed to interpret the CDS findings of this study (chapter 7).

#### **3.3.1. Approaches to Media Analysis**

This section introduces various approaches to media analysis that are relevant to the current study, including agenda-setting theory (Weaver, 2007; McCombs and Weaver, 1996), framing theory (Goffman, 1974), and the protest paradigm (Chan and Lee, 1984; McLeod and Hertog, 1992). While all three perspectives have their merits for interpretative purposes, this review

aims to justify the selection of the P/WJ approach specifically to interpret this study's textual findings. Overall, agenda-Setting Theory and Framing Theory are communication theories that delve into how media shapes individuals' perception and comprehension of issues (Weaver, 2007). While intertwined and frequently discussed in tandem, these theories possess distinct concepts that emphasise varied facets of media effects (ibid). Below, I outline the primary disparities between the two theories. This is followed with a discussion of Chan and Lee's protest paradigm (1984) which is one of the predominant angles used by media analysts to examine protests' framing.

Agenda-Setting Theory primarily centres on the media's capacity to influence the public's recognition of important or noteworthy issues (Weaver, 2007). It assesses how the media's selection and positioning of news topics determine the public's perception of issue importance (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). This approach concerns itself with the hierarchical sequence in which issues are presented and how this sequence influences public attention and priorities (ibid). The focus is not on how issues are perceived, but rather on which issues are accentuated as significant. For instance, consistent media coverage of environmental matters can elevate public concern about environmental issues.

Conversely, framing theory underscores how issues are presented to the public, diverting attention to specific events, and contextualising them (Mass Communication Theory, 2017). The theory contends that how information is presented to the audience, referred to as the "frame", shapes the audience's processing of that information. Frames serve as abstractions that structure the message's meaning (Arowolo, 2017), achieved through processes like selection, exclusion, emphasis, and elaboration (Harlow and Johnson, 2011; Weaver, 2007). Framing theory examines how media's choice of framing can guide the audience's interpretation of events or issues (Weaver, 2007). It scrutinises how different frames applied to the same information may lead to diverse audience interpretations, influencing perspectives on causes, consequences, and solutions (ibid). E.g., when media portrays a political protest as a violent clash, the audience might focus on violence. However, if framed as a peaceful demonstration, attention may shift to the protest's message and goals.

Boyle, McLeod, and Armstrong (2012) argue that journalists can employ "injustice" frames when presenting protest stories, assigning blame, and highlighting moral outrage (Gamson, 1992). Frames can also be legitimising, fostering public support for activists, or delegitimising, marginalising activists' actions (Gitlin, 1980; McLeod & Hertog, 1992).

Moreover, McLeod and Hertog (1992) state that news stories often frame protests to emphasise deviant behaviours and clashes, even if most protesters are peaceful. This framing, often termed the "spectacle" frame, obscures the underlying issues and discredits protesters, potentially deterring supporters (Gitlin, 1980). The "spectacle" frame, along with de-legitimising frames, align with what Chan and Lee characterise as the protest paradigm.

The protest paradigm, introduced by Chan and Lee in 1984, is a specific application of the framing theory. It underscores coverage focusing on the disruptive aspects of protests, portraying protesters as uninformed and their actions as ineffective (McLeod and Hertog, 1992). This paradigm emphasises the theatrical elements of protests while neglecting substantive issues, often swaying public opinion against protesters, and favouring government-aligned sources. Researchers like Boyle, McLeod, and Armstrong (2012), and Harlow and Johnson (2011) applied the protest paradigm as an analytical framework to study various types of protests. This paradigm focuses on how media coverage shapes the narrative surrounding protests and often highlights disruptive or violent elements. For instance, Boyle et al. (2012) conducted content analysis of international newspaper stories on protests occurring between 27<sup>th</sup> August 2007, and 27<sup>th</sup> August 2009, covering both political and war-related protests. Similarly, Harlow and Johnson (2011) analysed articles from sources such as The New York Times, Nick Kristof's Twitter feed, and Global Voices blog posts to explore the dominant frames used in depicting Egyptian protesters. Thus, the protest paradigm is an analytical approach used to examine how media portrays protests and their associated narratives. It assesses the framing and representation of protests within media coverage, rather than being a journalistic approach like WJ.

All three of the mentioned perspectives, agenda setting theory, framing theory, and the protest paradigm, are applicable within the context of the 2019 AH. They can be effectively used to both interpret the news discourses surrounding the movement and analyse the content found on the three news websites. Nevertheless, this study has chosen the P/WJ approach for interpreting the textual findings, and this decision is supported by several reasons.

First, this research is centred primarily on linguistic analysis. It embarks on an exploration of micro-textual elements and employs the P/WJ framework to interpret the CDS textual findings. Although the three aforementioned perspectives can be considered as viable alternatives, it has been observed that the P/WJ approach aligns more closely with the linguistic focus that forms the core of this investigation. This research fundamentally grounds itself in linguistic analysis,



necessitating a deep dive into the intricacies of language, discourse, and textual elements. This entails not only examining the content of the texts but also scrutinising the way language is employed to construct meaning. Thus, the P/WJ approach offers a suitable framework that underpins this linguistic exploration, enabling researchers to dissect and interpret the subtleties of the discourse. It permits a close scrutiny of language choices, narrative structures, and rhetorical strategies used within media texts. This alignment with the linguistic focus makes the P/WJ approach a more fitting choice for the objectives of this research.

Second, the underlying principles of P/WJ can complement these approaches in specific ways. For instance, the protest paradigm's tendency to frame protesters negatively, depicting them as violent and uninformed, corresponds with the WJ perspective, which often portrays protesters as posing a threat or behaving uncivilly (McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000). This aligns with the added tenet to P/WJ model “WJ as a form of dehumanisation” (see section 3.3.3 below). Furthermore, concepts such as legitimising frames find a connection with PJ, which seeks to portray the actions of protesters as legitimate. Therefore, the P/WJ approach offers a more inclusive framework that, not only accommodates this study’s linguistic focus, but also aligns with key elements of the other approaches.

Lastly, this study represents a pioneering effort by applying the P/WJ framework to the context of peaceful social movements, such as the 2019 AH. This endeavour involves making theoretical adjustments to Galtung's model and establishing a link between the adapted model and the CDS analytical categories proposed by Halliday and Matthiessen (2004), Reisigl, and Wodak (2001b, 2009), and van Leeuwen (2008), a key methodological contribution of this study.

In conclusion, this section has introduced various approaches to media analysis relevant to the current study, including agenda-setting theory, framing theory, and the protest paradigm. This review aims to justify the selection of the P/WJ approach as the most appropriate lens for interpreting this study's textual findings. While all three perspectives have their merits, the P/WJ approach has been chosen for specific reasons. It aligns with the linguistic focus, which is at the core of the research, allowing for a deep examination of language choices, narrative structures, and rhetorical strategies used within media texts. Furthermore, the P/WJ approach complements aspects of the other approaches, making it an inclusive framework. Lastly, this study represents a pioneering effort by applying the P/WJ framework to the context of peaceful

social movements, such as the 2019 AH. This involves making theoretical adjustments to Galtung's model (3.3.3) and establishing a link between the adapted model and analytical categories proposed by CDS key scholars, contributing to a rich methodological framework (chapter 4). The rest of this chapter is dedicated to delving into the P/WJ approach, commencing with an elucidation of its fundamental concepts.

### **3.3.2. P/WJ's Related Concepts**

#### **3.3.2.1. Violence vs Conflict**

McGoldrick and Lynch (2000) observe that there is often confusion between the term's "violence" and "conflict", with journalists sometimes using the former to refer to the latter in their reports. This requires a clearer distinction between the two. According to McGoldrick and Lynch (2000, p. 6), conflict is "a process through which two or more actors or parties pursue incompatible goals, with each party seeking to obstruct the others from achieving their goals". The 2019 AH exemplifies this definition as it reflects the ongoing divide between two parties: the protesters on one side, and the former president Bouteflika and his government on the other. Both parties share a common goal which is the pursuit of power. The protesters demonstrate peacefully to demand a change in power. Conversely, the government's initial strategy revolves around maintaining power through warnings, often conveyed by the then prime minister. Additionally, the government deploys the police to disperse protests in the vicinity of crucial governmental establishments including the presidential palace and the Constitutional Office.

Conflicts rarely emerge in isolation. As stated by McGoldrick and Lynch (2000), they often result from accumulative factors. One contributing factor is resource scarcity, which can lead to issues such as poverty, unemployment, and housing shortages. Another factor can be attributed to a lack of communication between conflicting parties who hold biased or erroneous perceptions of each other, and who fail to value their relationship (ibid). However, I would contend that these reasons are broad and somewhat simplistic, as the causes of conflicts can differ depending on their type, internal conflicts like civil wars and anti-government protests, or external conflicts like interstate disputes.

Inadequate management of conflicts can lead to escalation into violence (McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000). The failure of decision makers in Algeria to address the needs of the populace appears to have triggered the eruption of the 2019 AH. This led to the occurrence of a few violent clashes between the government, represented by security forces, and protesters during

the initial days of the protests. According to reports from the three news websites, violence was perpetuated through the use of tear gas by the police and the hurling of stones by protesters in response. This aligns with Kempf's (2019, p. 3) definition of "violence" as the violation of individuals' physical or mental well-being. Accordingly, Galtung (1990) introduces two types of violence: direct and indirect.

Direct violence refers to the concrete exercise of power, such as the police's use of tear gas against protesters. In contrast, indirect violence suggests the abstract application of power that can impact individuals' mental or psychological state (Galtung, 1969, p. 171). This form of violence is further divided into structural and cultural forms. Structural violence signifies a systematic integration of violence into custom, practice, and organisation, resulting in "unequal power" and "unequal life chances" that can obscure the identification of main actors (Galtung, 1969, pp. 170-171). In essence, the intricate relationship between subject and object makes structural violence challenging to pinpoint and less conspicuous. Structural violence can be found in society's structure, through government authorities and civil society via laws and policies. More significantly, it can impact people in various aspects of life, such as denying them access to housing and jobs. Structural violence was seemingly prevalent during Bouteflika's era, particularly his last term. Section 2.2.1 has demonstrated that the concentration of power among a few individuals cast a shadow over the economy, leading to issues like unemployment. This issue might also result from unjust practices such as nepotism and bribery.

The second type, cultural violence, refers to "any aspect of culture that can be used to legitimise violence in its direct or structural forms" (Galtung, 1990, p. 291). Cultural violence can be transmitted through various means, including language and ideology (Galtung, 1990). In essence, semiotic tools, both verbal and non-verbal, transmit specific ideologies that aid in propagating cultural violence. Consequently, this can make other forms of violence, direct and structural, seem legitimate and natural, rendering them acceptable in society (ibid). One instance of using linguistic methods to escalate cultural violence is the way Western scholarship constructs a negatively evaluative perception of the 'Orient' or the 'East'" in contrast to "the west" (Said, 1978, p. 23). Derogatory perceptions are formed through various orientalist representations, stereotypically portraying "the Orient" as irrational, devoid of energy and initiative, inveterate liars, depraved, and childlike, in contrast to the rational, virtuous, and mature European/Western counterpart (Said, 1978, pp. 38 - 40). Consequently, in this study,

the term "cultural violence" is employed to refer to unequal representations related to the 2019 AH, particularly regarding the BBC and F24's portrayal.

### **3.3.2.2. Peace**

The present study aims to conceptualise the term "peace" within the context of the 2019 AH. Typically, "peace" is understood as the absence of war, aggression, violence, or hostility (Herath, 2016, p. 104). However, its meaning extends beyond that definition. Herath (2016, p. 104) and Kempf (2019) attribute this simplistic understanding to the complexity of the term and the lack of a clear definition of the concept of "peace" among peace scholars. Consequently, its significance gets diminished by associating it solely with the absence of war. This viewpoint is contested by peace scholars like McGoldrick and Lynch (2000) and Galtung (1985).

McGoldrick and Lynch (2000, p. 5) view "peace" as the fusion of non-violence and creativity. They define "non-violence" as the pursuit of goals without causing substantial material or psychological harm and "creativity" as generating innovative ideas for conflict resolution and transformation. The 2019 AH illustrates non-violence through the protesters' commitment to peaceful means in pursuing their objectives. They employed amusing slogans to advocate for the regime's downfall, alongside messages emphasising unity and fraternity between the people and the army, such as "the army and the people are brothers". This suggests a level of political awareness, which, as per Zeraoulia (2020), resulted from the bitter experience of the violent 1990s decade and the setbacks of the 2011 AS.

The protesters also demonstrated environmental awareness through their creativity (Grira, 2019). Initiatives like cleaning the streets after their marches and chanting phrases like "NADIFA" (clean), "HADARIA" (civil), and "SILMIA" (peaceful) emerged. These actions contributed to fostering a harmonious and cooperative atmosphere between the protesters and the army, leading to mutual support and significant achievements. These accomplishments encompassed Bouteflika's resignation, the apprehension of government, military officials, business magnates, and their subsequent prosecution. This collaborative spirit, termed "positive peace" by Galtung (1985, p. 151), involves an "associative approach" where parties are united, and peaceful relations are cultivated. Therefore, this study endorses McGoldrick and Lynch's perspective of peace as a mechanism for conflict resolution and considers Galtung's notion of positive peace as the outcome resulting from adopting this approach.

### **3.3.2.3. PJ vs V/WJ**

This section distinguishes between the concepts of "PJ" and "WJ". "Peace journalism", also referred to as "health journalism" by Galtung and Fischer (2013, p. 96), stands as the antithesis of "war or Violence Journalism". As explained by Galtung and Vincent (1992, p. 7), PJ rejects the prevailing criteria for news selection in conventional journalism, particularly those tied to negativism, personalisation, and proximity to elite nations and individuals. Hanitzsch (2004, p. 483) regards it as a distinct form of socially responsible journalism. It is defined as a journalistic news coverage programme or framework that contributes to both the process of establishing and maintaining peace and the non-violent resolution of conflicts. In practical terms, PJ occurs when editors and reporters make choices about what to report and how to report it, creating opportunities for society to consider and value non-violent, developmental responses to conflict (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005, p. 5). In essence, PJ is consumer-oriented, involving the audience in peaceful conflict resolution through both the content and presentation of news. McGoldrick and Lynch (2000) assert that PJ is founded on the premise that journalists' choices in reporting conflict should help society envision and strive for peaceful resolutions. They proposed seventeen recommendations to journalists, forming an explanatory framework for Galtung's P/WJ model. The framework is aimed at maintaining peace and averting the escalation of violence through their conflict reporting. It is worth noting that these frameworks have been criticised by Nohrstedt and Ottosen (2011, p. 235) for being "generalised and not properly contextualised" and for not being relevant to studying all conflicts. I would thereby propose further revisions to Galtung's model (2006, p. 1) to make it compatible with the context of the 2019 AH as a predominantly peaceful social movement, rather than an open war, which PJ-related models typically target (Nohrstedt and Ottosen, 2011, p. 235).

The subsequent section presents a critical review of Galtung's (2006, p. 1) model, shedding light on the main adjustments I would suggest, including changing some principles and proposing others to make it compatible with the context of this study. The adapted model is thoroughly explained in the methodology chapter using Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) related categories, which is the main methodological contribution of this study (see Section 4.7).

### **3.3.3. A Critical Review of Galtung's P/WJ Model**

The following table presents Galtung's model of Peace and War Journalism.

PEACE/CONFLICT JOURNALISM	WAR/VIOLENCE JOURNALISM
<p data-bbox="240 253 671 282">I. PEACE/CONFLICT-ORIENTED</p> <p data-bbox="240 353 802 434">explore conflict <u>formation</u>, x parties, y goals, z issues general "win- win" orientation.</p> <p data-bbox="240 506 802 586">open space, open time; causes and outcomes anywhere, also in history/culture.</p> <p data-bbox="240 658 580 687">making conflicts transparent</p> <p data-bbox="240 759 802 840">giving voice to all parties; empathy, understanding</p> <p data-bbox="240 911 802 1144">see conflict/war as problem, focus on conflict creativity humanisation of all sides; more so the worse the weapons <u>initiative-taking</u>: prevention before any violence/war occurs.</p> <p data-bbox="240 1167 802 1247">focus on invisible effects of violence (trauma and glory, damage to structure/culture)</p>	<p data-bbox="836 253 1246 282">I. WAR/VIOLENCE-ORIENTED</p> <p data-bbox="836 353 1398 434">focus on conflict <u>arena</u>, 2 parties, 1 goal (win), war general zero-sum orientation!</p> <p data-bbox="836 506 1382 586">closed space, closed time; causes and exits in arena, who threw the first stone.</p> <p data-bbox="836 658 1166 687">making wars opaque/secret</p> <p data-bbox="836 759 1398 840">"Us-them" journalism, propaganda, voice, for "us"</p> <p data-bbox="836 911 1326 1144">see "them" as the problem, focus on who prevails in war dehumanisation of "them"; more so the worse the weapon <u>reactive</u>: waiting for violence before reporting.</p> <p data-bbox="836 1167 1326 1247">focus only on visible effect of violence (killed, wounded and material damage)</p>
<p data-bbox="240 1272 536 1301">II. TRUTH-ORIENTED</p> <p data-bbox="240 1323 448 1352">expose untruths</p> <p data-bbox="240 1375 448 1404">on all sides</p> <p data-bbox="240 1426 448 1456">uncover all</p> <p data-bbox="240 1478 360 1507">cover-ups</p>	<p data-bbox="836 1272 1235 1301">II. PROPAGANDA-ORIENTED</p> <p data-bbox="836 1323 1027 1352">expose "their"</p> <p data-bbox="836 1375 1027 1404">untruths help</p> <p data-bbox="836 1426 1027 1456">"our" cover-</p> <p data-bbox="836 1478 932 1507">ups/lies</p>
<p data-bbox="240 1529 555 1559">III. PEOPLE-ORIENTED</p> <p data-bbox="240 1630 778 1711">focus on suffering all over; on women, aged, children, giving voice to the voiceless</p> <p data-bbox="240 1733 469 1762">give name to all</p> <p data-bbox="240 1785 469 1814">evil doers focus on</p> <p data-bbox="240 1836 325 1865">people</p> <p data-bbox="240 1888 395 1917">peacemakers</p>	<p data-bbox="836 1529 1126 1559">III. ELITE-ORIENTED</p> <p data-bbox="836 1630 1347 1711">focus on "our" suffering; on able-bodied elite males, being their mouthpiece.</p> <p data-bbox="836 1733 1054 1762">give name of</p> <p data-bbox="836 1785 1054 1814">their evildoer</p> <p data-bbox="836 1836 1054 1865">focus on elite</p> <p data-bbox="836 1888 995 1917">peacemakers</p>

<p>IV. SOLUTION-ORIENTED</p> <p>Peace = non-violence + creativity</p> <p>highlight peace initiatives, also to prevent more war focus on structure, culture the peaceful society.</p> <p>aftermath: resolution, re- construction, reconciliation</p>	<p>IV. VICTORY-ORIENTED</p> <p>peace = victory + cease-fire</p> <p>Conceal peace-initiative, before victory is at hand focus on treaty, institution the controlled society leaving for another war, return if the old flares up</p>
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Table 1. Galtung's P/WJ Model

As table 1 demonstrates, Galtung's model of Peace and War Journalism (P/WJ) (2006, p. 1) is founded on the dichotomy between what he labels as "PJ" and "WJ" approaches. The model encompasses four major principles that contrast these two approaches: peace-oriented vs violence-oriented, people-oriented vs elite-oriented, propaganda-oriented vs truth-oriented, and solution-oriented vs victory-oriented. Each principle is supported by a set of elements that explain it. E.g., PJ as people-oriented is one tenet of the model which is realised by elements such as focusing "on suffering all over: on women, aged," giving "voice to the voiceless" and giving "name to all evil doers" ... (Galtung, 2006, p. 1).

In conducting a more meticulous scrutiny of the model, it becomes evident that certain elements within it exhibit redundancy and could benefit from a more efficient reorganisation. Furthermore, certain principles within the model appear to lack alignment with their underlying constituent components. Consequently, I posit the feasibility of effecting theoretical refinements to Galtung's model based on McGoldrick and Lynch's (2000) framework to P/WJ. The adapted model also incorporates concepts from Herbert's conflict analysis (2017) and Chouliaraki's ideas on the analytics of mediation (2006).

First, I propose replacing "peace/conflict-oriented" and its opposite, "war/violence-oriented," the first principles in the model, with "context-oriented" and "decontextualisation," respectively. Galtung suggests "peace/conflict-oriented" and "war/violence-oriented," which correspond to PJ and WJ, respectively. The former centers around exploring the conflict's

formation, its parties, goals, and issues, while the latter focuses on the conflict arena, two parties and one goal portraying conflicts as taking place in closed space and time (Galtung, 2006, p. 1). The rationale for this change is that these elements are related to the conflict's context. While the first set related to PJ requires giving much contextual details on the conflict's causes, actors, and goals, the second, which relates to WJ, revolves around the Decontextualisation of conflicts by giving less or no contextual details on them. More importantly, elements such as conflict formation, parties, goals, issues, causes, and outcomes are thoroughly addressed in the field of conflict analysis under: "conflict profile, actors, and dynamics" (Herbert, 2017, p. 12). According to Herbert (2017), contextualising conflicts requires exploring elements including their profiles (the historical, economic, social, political, and environmental factors shaping them), actors (identifying the main actors and understanding their interests, concerns, goals, etc.), and dynamics (their current trends and possible scenarios) (Herbert, 2017, p. 12). Additionally, using such terminology, conflict profile, actors, and dynamics, corresponds with the new tenet "PJ as context-oriented" instead of peace/conflict-oriented.

Second, Galtung's use of "PEACE/conflict-ORIENTED" and "war/violence-oriented reporting" in the model appears to exhibit a degree of redundancy with the terms PJ and WJ, respectively. "Peace-oriented" can be used interchangeably with PJ, and "war/violence-oriented reporting" can serve as an alternative to WJ. using "context-oriented" and "decontextualisation" serves to establish congruence within the model while mitigating redundancy. Moreover, PJ as context-oriented is supported by Peleg's idea that providing readers with thorough contextual details on a conflict can help them form their own positions and potentially deescalate violence (Peleg, 2007, pp. 4-5), referring mainly to cultural violence in the case of this study.

Decontextualisation can be seen as reporting conflicts as if they occur in a "closed space and time," making them secret and opaque (Galtung and Fischer, 2013, p. 96). This representation often results in a "them vs. us" scenario, where the parties are portrayed as warriors struggling to impose their own goals (Galtung, 2006, p. 1). PJ as context oriented implies the provision of comprehensive conflict context, aiding the audience in achieving a deeper understanding and making more informed judgments. Conversely, decontextualisation, involving the presentation of minimal or no contextual information, can foster a distorted and incomplete perspective that can potentially endorse and exacerbate violence.

Secondly, I propose the inclusion of two additional tenets, namely "PJ as Human-oriented" and



its opposite, “Dehumanisation.” These new tenets encompass elements related to PJ that align with Galtung's initial dichotomy of PJ as peace/conflict-oriented and WJ as war/violence-oriented. To elaborate further, "PJ as human-oriented" involves giving voice to all involved parties, demonstrating empathy, and understanding towards their respective situations (Galtung, 2006, p. 1). It humanises all sides (ibid) and mandates that journalists refer to individuals and groups using the names they choose for themselves, avoiding the use of demonising descriptors like "terrorists" and victimising language such as "devastated" or "defenseless" (McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000). "PJ as human-oriented" extends beyond merely acknowledging people's feelings; it actively engages them in conflict resolution by soliciting their perspectives on how to address the conflict (McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000).

Conversely, elements of dehumanisation in news reporting, as per Galtung's model under "war/violence-oriented", encompass concepts such as “Us-them”, “for 'us'“, “seeing 'them' as the problem”, dehumanisation of "them”, and aiding "our" cover-ups by exposing "their" untruths (Galtung, 2006, p. 1). Such representations can evoke a negative perception of the opposing party as a 'threat' or as 'beyond the pale' of civilised behavior (McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000). Consequently, "PJ as human-oriented" considers the emotional aspects of all conflict parties and actively involves them in its resolution. In contrast, WJ as a form of dehumanisation may manifest through an "us vs. them" portrayal, potentially resulting in the depiction of "the other" as exotic or 'beyond the pale of civilisation' (McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000).

In addition to using PJ as context-oriented vs decontextualisation and PJ as human-oriented vs dehumanisation, this study incorporates other tenets from Galtung's model when interpreting its textual findings. Specifically, it considers WJ as propaganda-oriented, PJ as people-oriented, and PJ as solution-oriented for the following reason. These tenets can be adapted to align with CDS terminology. For example, WJ as propaganda-oriented can be observed through the lens of Reisigl and Wodak's intensification, particularly when employed in violence contexts. It is worth noting that the term WJ as propaganda-oriented can be adapted to fit within the 2019 AH, despite it being an unarmed conflict. It is used to describe potential biases in media coverage and framing of the 2019 AH along with instances where media outlets might be aligning with particular perspectives or agendas (see section 4.7.3).

It is important to note that certain tenets, namely PJ as truth-oriented, WJ as elite-oriented, and WJ as victory-oriented, are not considered in this study for specific reasons. WJ as elite-oriented primarily focuses on the representation of elite peace figures. This may not align with

this study’s context, where emphasis was likely placed on the general populace rather than elite figures due to the movement's purportedly popular and non-coopted nature. Additionally, PJ as victory-oriented is more suited to a wartime context, given its associated terminology, such as “ceasefire”, “peace treaty”, and “concealment of peace initiatives” (Galtung, 2006, p. 1). Instead of PJ as victory-oriented, the study opts for “WJ as problem-oriented”. All these choices are rooted in the data-driven analysis (see sections 4.7.3 and 4.6.4). The summarised changes suggested above are realised through practical examples drawn from the 2019 AH, as illustrated in table 2 below for clarity and reference.

PJ	WJ
<p><b>1. PJ AS CONTEXT-ORIENTED</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• reporting on conflicts as if they are taking place in open space and time (Galtung, 2006). This implies a broader perspective. It suggests that instead of narrowly focusing on specific incidents or moments of conflict, reporters should consider the broader context, historical factors, and underlying issues.</li> <li>• To contextualise the 2019 AH, the following elements should be explored:</li> <li>• Its profile, by asking questions on the historical, economic, social, political structures which shaped it.</li> <li>• Its dynamics/current trends, referring to the patterns or directions that the movement is taking at a particular point in time. This includes the various events of the 2019 AH such as the violent confrontations between the police and protesters.</li> </ul>	<p><b>1. WJ AS A FORM OF DECONTEXTUALISATION</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reporting on conflicts as if they are taking place in closed time and space (Galtung, 2006, p. 1). This implies a narrow or limited perspective which portrays the 2019AH in a way that focuses only on specific incidents or moments of violence at the expense of its broader peacefulness. This approach may lead to an incomplete understanding of the movement’s dynamics.</li> <li>• WJ also considers the profile and trends of the conflict but incorporates unrelated and delicate historical matters that could jeopardise the cohesion of the individuals in the conflict zone.</li> </ul>
<p><b>2. PJ AS PEOPLE/HUMAN-ORIENTED</b></p> <p>This approach requires Revealing the identity of the main actors, asking questions</p>	<p><b>2. Dehumanisation as a form of WJ</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This approach depicts the protesters as the problem.</li> </ul>

<p>about their interests, concerns, goals, strategies, positions, worldviews, expectations (Herbert, 2017).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• showing empathy and understanding to the protesters' situation.</li> <li>• calling the protesters by the names they give to themselves such as “protesters” and “demonstrators”.</li> <li>• Involving the protesters in their conflict resolution; asking them on how they are coping with the current status quo and what mechanisms they suggest to ending it.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is realised by negatively charged terminology, victimising language, Focusing on the protesters' feelings.</li> </ul>
<p><b>3.</b></p>	<p><b>3. WJ as propaganda-oriented</b>  <b>This approach serves to elucidate potential biases in the three news outlets' coverage and framing of the 2019 AH, shedding light on occasions where their reporting may be inclined towards negative perspectives, namely violence.</b></p>
<p><b>4. PJ AS SOLUTION-ORIENTED</b></p>	<p><b>4. WJ AS PROBLEM-ORIENTED</b></p>

Table 2. The Adapted Model of P/WJ

In conclusion, this subsection has delineated several key modifications proposed to enhance the applicability of Galtung's P/WJ model. These alterations encompass the replacement of “peace/conflict-oriented reporting” and “war/violence-oriented reporting” with the more elucidative “PJ as context-oriented vs decontextualisation”, respectively. As previously discussed, the adoption of “PJ as context-oriented” holds significant potential for facilitating the peaceful resolution of conflicts. This approach furnishes both local and global audiences with essential contextual cues, enabling them to cultivate a more nuanced understanding of conflicts and independently formulate judgments. Conversely, the dissemination of decontextualised representations of conflicts, characterised by a paucity of contextual information, engenders a distorted, truncated perspective that can inadvertently sanction acts

of violence and exacerbate their intensity.

Furthermore, this endeavor has introduced two novel tenets into the model: “PJ as human-oriented vs dehumanisation”. The former transcends the mere consideration of emotional states within the conflict's stakeholders, actively involving them in the resolution process rather than focusing solely on their emotional dimensions. Conversely, WJ as a form of dehumanisation often assumes the guise of an “us vs them” narrative, fostering a detrimental portrayal of the "other" as an existential threat or as transgressing the bounds of civilised conduct (McGoldrick and Lynch, two thousand). These refinements collectively contribute to a more refined articulation of Galtung's P/WJ model, offering a broader analytical framework that accommodates the complexities and nuances of peaceful social movements and their socio-political implications. In spite of that, Galtung's theory of PJ, notably its conceptualisation of the journalistic norm of objectivity, has encountered criticism from various angles as discussed in the subsequent section.

#### **3.3.4. A General Criticism of PJ's conceptualisation of the journalistic norm of objectivity**

Objectivity is a cornerstone of journalism, a norm deeply ingrained in the profession's ethical and practical framework. It is imperative to explore and critically analyse the multifaceted interpretations of objectivity in journalism, particularly within the context of PJ. This section aims to provide an encompassing understanding of objectivity specifically within the context of reporting on the 2019 AH. In journalism, objectivity is traditionally defined as the practice of impartiality, demanding that journalists remain neutral, free from personal bias, and detached from the subjects they report on (Allan, 2010, p. 45). This interpretation underscores the importance of presenting “facts free from partisan values” while avoiding the “overt expression of personal impressions” (Schudson, 1995, p. 141). However, this traditional understanding encounters challenges in contexts of pro-democratic movements where power dynamics are unequal. Within the PJ perspective adopted in this thesis, objectivity takes on a nuanced dimension, which does not necessitate complete detachment of journalists from their reports. Instead, it calls for a humanistic approach to conflict reporting, encouraging journalists to avoid negative language, empathise with those in conflict areas, and offer verified facts with thorough contextual information.

Within the broader discourse of journalism, there are critics who challenge the effectiveness and feasibility of PJ's interpretation of objectivity. To gain insight into these criticisms, I turn

to the perspectives of journalists and scholars who engage with the concept. From a professional standpoint, BBC correspondent David Loyn (2004, p. 1) critiques PJ, contending that it may inadvertently promote redundancy by equating it with “good or better journalism”. He asserts that the primary aim of news reporters is to serve as “witnesses of the truth”, a commitment best upheld through the strict adherence to objectivity, which he deems the “sole sacred goal” of reporters (Loyn, 2004, p. 4). However, Loyn's conception of objectivity faces challenges when applied in contexts involving extreme brutalities, such as The Holocaust. In considering David Loyn's emphasis on strict objectivity and witnessing the truth, questions arise about whether this vision necessitates a form of “aloofness” that may compromise journalistic ethics and professionalism (Peleg, 2007, p. 3). The concern is that a purely observational and objective portrayal, especially in challenging circumstances, could inadvertently lead to ethical pitfalls.

From the perspective of PJ, there is an acknowledgment that objectivity requires more than detached observation. Mensah (2015) argues that journalists should transition from being mere observers to active participants in order to prevent adverse repercussions at institutional and societal levels. The PJ framework asserts that objectivity involves adopting a humanistic approach, finding a delicate balance between truthfulness and minimising harm while respecting cultural values that may differ from the journalists' own (Mensah, 2015). Peleg (2007) contributes to this discussion by arguing that objectivity does not mandate complete detachment from journalists' texts; taking a stance on an issue is permissible as long as the chosen side is accurately presented, providing the opposing side with a fair opportunity to respond (ibid). In navigating these complexities, PJ offers a nuanced perspective that goes beyond the dichotomy of strict objectivity versus advocacy, encouraging a more ethically sound approach to reporting on conflicts (Galtung, 2006).

From an academic perspective, German Professor of Communication Thomas Hanitzsch criticises PJ, asserting that objectivity is inherently unattainable due to structural and textual limitations that shape and restrict journalists' work. These limitations encompass factors like “limited personnel, time, and material resources, editorial processes and hierarchies”, as well as “news formats, source availability, scene access, and general information” (Hanitzsch, 2007, p. 1). While I concede the complexity of achieving absolute objectivity in reporting, I share the view that considerable strides can be made in this direction. Galtung's (2006) proposed journalistic practices, emphasising the attribution of information to sources and the use of direct quotes to distinguish the journalist's account from sources, may offer a practical framework to

address some of these constraints. Additionally, Hackett's (2011) emphasis on conveying "credible facts" witnessed personally or confirmed by official sources aligns with the pursuit of objectivity in reporting. While recognising the structural and textual challenges outlined by Hanitzsch, the commitment to these journalistic practices when reporting on the 2019 AH may provide a pathway to navigate and mitigate these limitations, fostering a more objective approach to reporting.

CDS scholars emphasise that the "material social context" significantly influences the objective portrayal of conflict news (Richardson, 2007, p. 114). This context, comprising ideological, economic, and political factors external to the newsroom, inevitably shapes journalistic outputs (ibid). Fowler (1991, p. 110), for instance, contends that the collective impact of these contextual factors inevitably results in the communicated message being "reported from some particular angle", implying that context introduces bias into reporting. The same reality can be linguistically melded into different narratives aligned with varying ideologies of news institutions (Iwamoto, 1995).

To address these concerns regarding the influence of the material social context when reporting on the 2019AH, journalists should incorporate diverse versions of reality and viewpoints. For instance, they can interview participants from different backgrounds within the movement, including activists, students, professionals, and individuals with varied socio-economic statuses. They should also report on violence between the police and protesters, providing sufficient supporting evidence, while highlighting peace as the dominant character of the protests. Additionally, naming actors within the movement according to their self-identification is crucial for respecting their autonomy and identity, preventing the imposition of external labels that may carry implicit biases. This aligns with McGoldrick and Lynch's (2000) recommendation to avoid demonising and victimising language when referring to the social actors. This is to avoid framing the movement in a negative light. In this sense, in-depth contextual information is necessary to deepen the understanding of the HIRAK movement (Galtung, 2006; Peleg, 2007). Journalists should delve into the historical background, origins, and core issues driving the movement, providing readers with the necessary context to interpret events accurately. Eventually, these reporting strategies align with recommendations by Galtung (2006), emphasising the ongoing need for reflexivity. Journalists must continually reflect on their own biases, the evolving dynamics of the HIRAK movement, and the broader socio-political context to maintain objectivity and minimise potential biases in their reporting.

In conclusion, the examination of PJ's conceptualisation of the journalistic norm of objectivity reveals a nuanced perspective that challenges traditional understandings within the broader discourse of journalism. Objectivity, a fundamental tenet deeply embedded in the ethical and practical fabric of journalism, encounters complexities when applied to contexts involving pro-democratic movements with uneven power dynamics. The PJ perspective, as explored in this study within the context of reporting on the 2019 AH, offers a distinctive interpretation. Unlike the traditional view that necessitates complete detachment, PJ advocates for a humanistic approach, urging journalists to navigate conflict reporting with compassion, empathy, a commitment to verified facts, and thorough contextual information. While Galtung's perspective may not be widely evident in contemporary conflict news reports, it has the potential to enhance the reliability of news and contribute to improved journalistic practices.

### **3.3.5. Bridging the Gaps: Combining Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) and Peace/War Journalism (P/WJ) in Conflict Reporting Analysis**

This section commences with a review of prior studies that have incorporated CDS as a supplementary framework to Galtung's P/WJ. Subsequently, it elucidates the principal shortcomings within the P/WJ theory that can be effectively addressed through the application of CDS. The objective of this review is to underscore two discernible gaps that this study endeavours to bridge. The first involves the introduction of a novel and distinct dimension to consider within the adapted P/WJ model. This dimension centres on the realignment of its frameworks to scrutinise news concerning conflicts predominantly characterised by their peaceful nature, such as the 2019 AH, as opposed to the "open wars" for which PJ-related frameworks were initially developed (Nohrstedt and Ottosen, 2011, p. 235). The second pertains to the utilisation of P/WJ as a complementary tool to CDS, in contrast to earlier literature where CDS functioned as an adjunct to P/WJ. This tool will be used to interpret and underpin the CDS textual findings obtained in this study.

Nohrstedt and Ottosen (2011) were pioneers in advocating for the supplementation of P/WJ with CDS. In their research, they sought to critically assess the applicability of Galtung's P/WJ model (2006, p. 1) in addressing media coverage of historically oriented security policy issues, particularly the Nordic defence cooperation. This cooperation involves military collaboration among the Nordic countries, including Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, and Finland, aimed at bolstering national security in the face of potential threats. Nohrstedt and Ottosen

(2011) scrutinised editorial content, debates, and feature articles in Norwegian and Swedish mainstream media concerning the future involvement of Nordic forces in Afghanistan, given that most NATO members considered the withdrawal of their international security forces from Afghanistan by 2014. Employing CDS as a complementary approach, specifically Reisigl and Wodak's DHA (2001b), they underscored the discursive deployment of historical examples and analogies. Their findings revealed the conspicuous absence of discourse concerning Afghanistan in public discussions on Nordic defence cooperation. Consequently, Nohrstedt and Ottosen (2011, p. 224) concluded that CDS offers unexplored potentialities not addressed by Galtung's model.

Nohrstedt and Ottosen (2011) argue that CDS furnishes linguistic tools to scrutinise propaganda discourses during peacetime, an aspect overlooked by the P/WJ model and one that may inadvertently contribute to conflict escalation (p. 224). In fact, CDS extends its analysis beyond just linguistic elements to include semiotic aspects such as images, symbols, and visual representations. In peacetime propaganda, visual elements can play a significant role in shaping public opinion, which CDS can dissect. P/WJ predominantly deals with textual analysis and may not cover these semiotic dimensions comprehensively.

Additionally, the CDS perspective facilitates the exploration of interrelated mediated discourses (Nohrstedt and Ottosen, 2011), particularly through DHA. Reisigl and Wodak's (2001b) approach underscores the importance of historical context when interpreting texts and discourses. The historical orientation enables the reconstruction of how recontextualisation functions as a crucial process linking texts and discourses intertextually and interdiscursively over time (Nohrstedt and Ottosen, 2011, p. 225). This is crucial in understanding how propaganda narratives evolve and adapt during peacetime, as they may draw upon historical events or reference past conflicts. P/WJ might not delve deeply into this aspect, as it is primarily concerned with the immediate context of conflict (Peleg, 2007). Nohrstedt and Ottosen, (2011) assert that the incorporation of this approach is logical, as “a war must be analysed as a historical process starting long before the first bullet is fired” (p. 225). For example, the 2019 AH should be assessed in relation to past conflicts in Algeria, such as the 1990s civil war, as well as similar conflicts in the MENA region, like the 2011 AS. This historical contextualisation may enhance comprehension and potentially suggest effective solutions to prevent violence escalation.



Drawing on these insights, researchers such as Budak (2018) and Mensah (2015) undertook studies that combine CDS and the P/WJ model. Budak (2018) examined newspaper discourses surrounding the downing of a Russian attack aircraft by Turkey on the Syrian-Turkish border on 24<sup>th</sup> November 2015, from a P/WJ perspective. Initially, he applied Galtung's P/WJ to news reports from Turkish newspaper *Hürriyet* and the Russian newspaper *Komosomolska Pravda*. He interpreted his findings using Van Dijk's concept of ingroup-outgroup ideological polarisation (1998), which is already addressed by Galtung in his P/WJ model (2006) to explain the tenet of War Journalism as propaganda-oriented. The findings underscore the value of combining P/WJ and CDS in dissecting the complex discourses surrounding conflicts, even those occurring in peacetime, as it provides a more comprehensive understanding of media representations and their potential influence on public opinion and peace initiatives.

In a different context, Mensah (2015) investigated the framing of the 2011 ASU in Egypt and Libya by the BBC, CNN International, and AJE in light of their primary drivers. The study aimed to probe the role of international news media in conflict reporting and resolution. Framing served as the theoretical foundation for the analysis, based on Galtung's P/WJ framework. It was used to define problems, diagnose their causes, propose as well as justify treatments and predict potential outcomes. Mensah (2015) relied on Fairclough's DRA (2010) and Reisigl and Wodak's DHA (2001b) to analyse news stories, shedding light on the framing within the news. The analysis encompassed six news reports by the three news outlets pertaining to the ousting of Egyptian President Mubarak and the death of Libyan Colonel Gaddafi. The findings exposed that the BBC and CNN reports neither aimed to unveil the root causes of the 2011 ASU nor sought to promote resilience and peaceful conflict resolution. His conclusion shows that that the CNN and BBC's reporters perceived the upheaval through ethnocentric lenses, attributing the main causes of the uprisings to the leaders, while disregarding other political, social, and economic drivers. Such representations, according to Mensah (2015), indicate a lack of a peace-oriented agenda, with reporters framing the news based on values that "serve the institutional agendas of their organisations" (p. 89). In contrast, AJE's reporting on Gaddafi was seen as a modest attempt to promote peace initiatives. It did not delve into the specifics of Gaddafi's death. Rather, its aim was to advance moral judgments that underscored the enduring principles of modern nation-states, such as inclusiveness, respect for human rights, and freedom (*ibid*, p. 98).

Differing from previous studies that employed CDS as a complementary approach to the P/WJ model, the present study primarily focuses on a comprehensive linguistic analysis of the

discourses presented by AJE, the BBC, and F24. It subsequently employs the adapted P/WJ model as an interpretative framework to underpin its textual findings. This approach is of paramount significance for Critical Discourse analysts, as it helps in achieving the following. Firstly, P/WJ provides a structured framework for categorising and analysing media content, making it easier to organise and interpret textual findings from CDS. It offers a clear set of criteria for evaluating whether media narratives lean towards peace or war-oriented journalism. Secondly, P/WJ framework allows for a comparative analysis of media texts, which is the aim of this study, by providing a dichotomy between PJ and WJ. This contrast facilitates the identification of the differences in media coverage, framing, and narratives, enhancing the depth of my analysis. Thirdly, applying P/WJ frameworks to CDS findings helps in assessing the ethical dimensions of media discourses and identifying biases within media narratives. When used in conjunction with CDS, it enables a more comprehensive examination of how biases, whether intentional or unintentional, manifest in the linguistic and discursive elements of news reports.

### **3.4 Summary of the Chapter**

Overall, this chapter has laid the groundwork for a comprehensive and interdisciplinary exploration of media discourses in the context of peaceful conflicts, capitalising on the synergies between CDS and P/WJ to enrich the analytical depth and breadth of this research. The chapter has undertaken a comprehensive exploration of the theoretical and methodological foundations of this research, approaching it from two distinct yet interconnected perspectives: CDS and P/WJ. The overarching argument presented here is that P/WJ can effectively complement and enrich the analytical framework provided by CDS.

The chapter has unfolded in two key segments. Part 3.2 has established the research's alignment with CDS. Within this context, the chapter has emphasised the interdependence of discourse, power, and ideology as inseparable entities (section 3.2.3), illustrating that language in use is both shaped by society and, in turn, shapes it. Recognising that discourse cannot be studied in isolation, it was deemed essential to position it within its production context, echoing the foundational CDS principle of contextualising texts. Additionally, the analysis extended to the examination of the mentally represented social structures influenced by the ideologies of news outlets, which can manifest as either negative, such as "Orientalism", or positive, like "pro-democracy" (sections 3.2.3.1 and 3.2.3.2). These perspectives, in turn, correspond to the

paradigms of WJ and PJ respectively. The analysis process necessitated a harmonious blend of DRA and DHA (sections 3.2.4.1 and 3.2.4.2), with the former providing a broader contextual breadth while the latter delved into the historical factors underpinning various discourses and their associated terminologies.

Part 3.3 has shifted the focus to the perspective of P/WJ, highlighting its potential theoretical and methodological contributions in the two fields of P/WJ and CDS. Section 3.3.1 has delineated several media analysis approaches, namely agenda-setting theory (Weaver, 2007; McCombs and Weaver, 1996; Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007), framing theory (Goffman, 1974), and the protest paradigm (Chan and Lee, 1984; McLeod and Hertog, 1992). This review aims to contextualise the study within the broader field of media studies and rationalise the adoption of the P/WJ approach for interpreting its data. Section 3.3.2 has discussed P/WJ-related concepts, encompassing distinctions between violence and conflict, the understanding of peace, and the differentiation between peace journalism and violence/war journalism, detailing how these terms are operationalised within the specific context of this study.

Furthermore, Section 3.3.3 has presented a critical examination of Galtung's (2006) P/WJ model. Here, the study has introduced fundamental revisions to the model, drawing inspiration from McGoldrick and Lynch's framework (2000), Herbert's insights on conflict analysis (2017), and Chouliaraki's analytics of mediation (2006). These adaptations aimed to refine the P/WJ framework to better suit the nuanced requirements of this research. Section 3.3.4 has presented the main criticism directed at the theory of PJ, notably its conceptualisation of the journalistic norm of objectivity.

Lastly, Section 3.3.5 has offered a review of prior research endeavours that had incorporated CDS as a supplementary tool to P/WJ, highlighting a distinctive contribution of this study, the use of P/WJ as a complementary framework to CDS. This practical integration is realised through an adapted P/WJ model, which will be conceptually linked to CDS analytical categories (Section 4.7). The framework will be used to underpin and interpret the CDS textual findings presented in chapters 5 and 6 (see chapter 7).

## Chapter 4

### Methodology

#### 4.1. Introduction

The current study primarily aims to analyse the news reports from AJE, the BBC, and F24 websites concerning their representation of the 2019 AH. Specifically, it endeavours to explore similarities and differences between the selected news outlets in their representation of the 2019 AH's key events and dissect the hidden ideologies behind such representation. Finally, the study seeks to establish the extent to which the news outlets could adhere to the norms of PJ in their reporting on the 2019 AH by reflecting its dominant peacefulness demonstrated in chapter 2. Therefore, the following items are discussed:

- Criteria for the selection of this study's data
- Methods of data collection
- Ways of preparing and organising the data before embarking on the analysis
- Micro linguistic features for analysis
- Analytical framework for the organisation and presentation of the textual findings
- The interpretative framework of the textual findings

This chapter begins with an account of the data selection criteria (section 4.2). This is followed by the methods used to collect the data (section 4.3), and the ways of preparing and organising them (section 4.4). To analyse the obtained data for the underlined objectives, the study adopts an eclectic approach drawing on Fairclough's dialectical relational approach (DRA) (1995A; 2003; 2010; 2016) and Reisigl and Wodak's discourse historical approach (DHA) (2001b; 2009; 2016) as discussed in the theoretical framework (see sections 3.2.4.1 and 3.2.4.2). For a detailed linguistic analysis of the representation of social actors and their actions, the study begins with the analysis of the use of Reisigl and Wodak's nomination and predication (2001b) with a special focus on transitivity (Halliday, 1985; Halliday, 1994; Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004). For a comprehensive and detailed analysis of nomination and predication, the study incorporates elements from Van Leeuwen's social actor model (2008). This is thoroughly explained under section 4.5. Textual findings are organised in accordance with an analytical framework consisting of Unger's (2013) macro-strategies and aspects of representation (section

4.6). I consider this step to be crucial for the analysis as it helps mediate between the discursive functions of textual practices and their cultural and socio-political contexts of production. Lastly, I will show how the adapted model of P/WJ can complement CDS by establishing an explicit link between the model's tenets and CDS linguistic categories in accordance with the data of this study (section 4.7). The framework will be used to interpret the CDS textual findings (see chapter 7).

## **4.2. Criteria of Data Selection**

This section aims to outline and explore the main criteria that govern the data selection and to explain the rationale behind opting for each criterion. According to Bell (1991, p. 3), one of the challenges of media research lies in how to limit the analysis to a manageable amount of relevant data. In this regard, Reisigl and Wodak (2016, p. 38) provide a list of criteria which they recommend analysts to consider for a systematic collection of data:

- Specific political units... or language communities.
- Specific periods of time relating to important discursive events.
- Specific social and political actors.
- Specific discourses.
- Specific fields of political action.
- Specific semiotic media and genres.

Based on these recommendations, the following criteria were identified for the selection of this study's data, supporting a systematic gathering of data rather than random sampling. To begin with, the news articles sourced are specifically about the critical events of the 2019 AH. They were published between 22nd February and 10th December 2019. The critical events are as follows:

- The commencement of the protests on 22nd February 2019 as a reaction against Bouteflika's announcement of his candidacy for a fifth term.
- Bouteflika's resignation on 2nd April 2019.
- The first live trial of officials from Bouteflika's regime who were tried on corruption charges on 9th December 2019.

There are two compelling reasons for selecting these three events. Firstly, online research has revealed that they are the most extensively covered events by international media, including the data sources for this study, owing to their significance. For instance, the three news outlets published twenty-one articles on the commencement of the 2019 AH, seven articles addressed Bouteflika's resignation in a single day, and the prosecution event was featured in five articles. Secondly, they can be considered pivotal moments in the modern history of Algeria. The initial event, Bouteflika's candidacy, is regarded by researchers as the primary catalyst behind the 2019 AH's eruption, while the other two events, Bouteflika's resignation and the first televised trial, were the primary outcomes of the 2019 AH (For more details, refer to Chapter 2, section 2.2).

Mautner (2008, p. 37) and Bell (1991, pp. 12-13) underscore the importance of time as a significant criterion for data collection, especially concerning specific events. Consequently, this study considers the set of reports issued between 22nd February 2019 and 10th December 2019, with headlines containing key terms related to the 2019 AH main events (see section 4.3 for details on data selection methods).

Data concerning the first event, Bouteflika's candidacy and the commencement of the protests, were chosen within a timeframe extending from 22nd February 2019 to 9th March 2019. Data on the resignation event were selected between 2nd and 3rd April 2019, and the news reports covering the prosecution were chosen between 9th and 10th December 2019. It is worth noting that the substantial number of articles covering each event determined the timeframe for data selection, as explained in the methods outlined below. It is noticeable that the timeframes of the second and third events are shorter compared to the first one. This does not imply that there were no articles covering the movement between the mentioned timeframes. Rather, Bouteflika's resignation, announced five weeks after the start of the protests, was followed by a series of events, such as the formation of a caretaking government and the imprisonment of ministers and businessmen. Therefore, the events of resignation and prosecution were included as brief sections within the articles reporting on the new developments. This ultimately made it impossible to read all the articles written about the 2019 AH's secondary events to search for passages on the resignation and prosecution.

The second criterion for data selection is centred on the specific journalistic genre employed in this study. The data exclusively consists of news reports, and other forms of news coverage, such as feature articles and commentaries, were not included in the dataset. This decision was

made because feature articles and commentaries tend to present the perspective of the news outlets (Fowler, 1991, p. 208), which is beyond the primary focus of this study.

The third criterion pertains to the language of publication, which is English in all cases. This choice stems from a multi-faceted rationale. To begin with, the decision to use English as the language of analysis was driven by the objective of reaching an international readership rather than targeting local or national audiences. This approach aligns with the observations made by researchers such as Volkmer (2005, pp. 357-358), who highlights that news outlets like the BBC primarily cater to an audience interested in Western perspectives, while Al Jazeera English (AJE) focuses on those keen on Arab viewpoints. Furthermore, France 24 (F24) seeks to provide a French perspective on global developments (Lagorce and MarketWatch, 2006). Therefore, the analysis of news reports from three distinct English-language news sources serves as a means to facilitate a meaningful comparative examination.

By doing so, we can gain valuable insights into how different news organisations, each possessing its own unique background and perspective, approach the coverage of the 2019 AH. This approach enables analysts to uncover potential biases, observe framing choices, and decipher editorial priorities adopted by these news outlets. In essence, the choice of English as the common language enhances the comprehensiveness and depth of the comparative analysis, shedding light on the nuanced ways in which diverse news agencies address the 2019 AH phenomenon.

Secondly, each of the BBC, F24, and AJE are prominent international news organisations known for their extensive global coverage. Their English-language services have a substantial reach and influence, making them significant players in shaping international public opinion. According to the annual global audience news measure, the BBC's global reach increased in 2019-2020 to 468.2 million, which could be considered the 'highest number ever' (Hall, 2020). Its website was ranked among the fifteen most popular news websites in the world by the electronic website oTech World on 21st January 2020, with 132 million monthly visitors and more than fourteen million monthly readers (Bhangu, 2020). F24's digital platforms attract 16.5 million visits per month, 45.6 million video views (2018 average), and 38.2 million followers on Facebook and Twitter (France 24, no data).

It is important to note that the news reports were not mere translations of their counterparts on the Arabic version of the news websites. This distinction was confirmed by comparing samples of the Arabic and English news texts released on the same date. For instance, AJE's article

published on February 22, 2019, was titled "Algerians protest against Bouteflika's bid for a fifth term", while the title of AJA's report could be translated literally as "Demonstrations in Algeria against Bouteflika's Candidacy for a Fifth Term Bid" (Al-Jazeera Net, 2019). Similarly, the Arabic version of the BBC's report issued on March 1, 2019, was titled "Demonstrations in Algeria: what is Happening in the Backstage?" (BBC, 2019), whereas the English text bears the title "Algeria protests: Thousands denounce the president's bid for a fifth term". F24's Arabic text, released on March 3, is titled "The Algerian Community Protests again in Paris against a Fifth Term Bid by Bouteflika" (France 24 2019), while the English text carries the title "Fresh protests break out as Algeria's Bouteflika submits re-election bid". This might suggest that the three news organisations' multilingual services customise their content to meet the specific requirements and preferences of their target audiences. They do this while still following their overarching editorial guidelines which are explained in sections 2.3.1.2, 2.3.2.2, and 2.3.3.1.

Avoiding the direct English translation of the Arabic texts was a deliberate choice to prevent any ideological interference that could arise during the translation process. Such interference could potentially influence readers' interpretations of the texts.

### **4.3. Methods of Data Collection**

Wodak and Meyer (2016, p. 21) elucidate that "there is no CDS-way of collecting data", and certain discourse analytic approaches "do not explicitly explain or recommend data sampling procedures" in research projects analysing news articles. Nevertheless, data for this study were selected based on two primary methods. The first was by the dates of the occurrence of these events: 22nd February 2nd April, and 9th December 2019. However, relying solely on this method resulted in a limited number of articles, with only two on the first event by the BBC and AJE. This was considered inadequate for a comprehensive analysis within a PhD project. Another challenge with this method was that F24 reports on the first event were published one day later, on 23rd February 2019. This led me to consider using a keyword search as an additional method for data selection and collection. These keywords were entered into the search bar of the three news websites, AJE, the BBC, and F24, and had to be related to each event. For instance, when searching for articles on the 2019 AH's start, the following search terms were included: Bouteflika/the president, fifth term/candidacy, rallies/protests/protesters/students. When seeking articles on the resignation event, the



following search terms were entered: “Bouteflika, resigns, resignation/stepdown, dismissal, protests”. When searching for articles on the prosecution event, the following search terms were included: “Algerian court, live trial, prosecution of the prisoners”. The chosen keywords were intentionally broad to minimise the risk of excluding key articles. The following section provides details on how data were prepared and presented.

#### **4.4. Data Preparation and Presentation**

In accordance with the criteria and methods outlined above, a corpus of thirty-three articles, totalling 19,639 words, was obtained from the three news websites: ten from the BBC, twelve from AJE, and eleven from F24. This word count was achieved after excluding all extraneous aspects and peripheral information that fall outside the scope of analysis. These aspects include datelines, such as "Published 10 February 2019", photos and accompanying captions for the BBC and AJE, and videos with their accompanying captions for F24. Additionally, hyperlinks leading to related web pages, for example, "Who could succeed Algeria's ailing president?" (BBC4Mar19), names of reporters, contributors, and news sources from which the website quoted information, such as "AFP", and peripheral information like "reading time", were also omitted. A total of twenty-one news reports were released between 22nd February 2019 and 9th March 2019 by the three news websites on the first event, the start of the protests as a reaction against Bouteflika's announcement of his candidacy for a fifth term, with a total of 13,119 words. The second event, Bouteflika's resignation, was covered by the three news websites in seven news articles, comprising 4,229 words, issued between 2nd and 3rd April 2019. The first televised trial of the initial group from Bouteflika's government was addressed by the three news websites in five articles, totalling 2,345 words, and ranging between 9th and 10th December 2019.

The analysed articles are identified using the following structure: Name of the outlet (BBC, AJE, F24), issue date in the following format (day, initial/s of the month: F for February, Mar for March, Apr for April, D for December, the year 19 instead of 2019). One example is (AJE9Mar19).

#### **4.5. Micro Linguistic Features for Analysis**

This section concerns Fairclough's (1995a, p. 57) textual dimension which involves the analysis of vocabulary, semantics, and grammar, as well as textual organisation above the sentence level such as cohesion, and things like the overall structure of a news article. In this stage of analysis, I consider KhosraviNik's textual analytical framework mainly: social actor and social action (2010a). At each level of analysis, KhosraviNik (2010a, p. 63) suggests that analysts should ask the *what* and the *how* questions. The *What* question is meant for the critical analysis of what is included in the text. The *How question* is to examine the linguistic processes that tend to mark the qualities of such presence (ibid).

The first level of analysis is "social actor". It requires analysts to investigate which actors are present in or absent from the text, justifying this presence or absence (KhosraviNik, 2010a). Thereby, this research analyses the use of Reisigl and Wodak's Referential Strategies (section 4.5.1) and considers Van Leeuwen's Social Actor Model for a detailed and systematic analysis of them (section 4.5.3).

The second level is "social action". It deals with the analysis of the qualities attributed to the social actors in case of presence and the linguistic processes employed in marking this presence (KhosraviNik, 2010a), For example, what actions are or not associated with the social actors mentioned in the text against the variety of choices available. In this level, I analyse Reisigl and Wodak's predication (section 4.5.2) with a special emphasis on Halliday's Transitivity (section 4.5.2.1.).

Therefore, the subsequent sections aim to demonstrate how analysing nomination using elements from Van Leeuwen's social actor model along with the analysis of predication with a special focus on transitivity choices can form a robust methodology to examine the representation of social actors and actions. Specifically, they attempt to show how the proposed methodology can help in examining similarities and differences of representation of the same event by the three news outlets.

##### **4.5.1. Nomination**

Referential strategies or nomination are defined by Reisigl and Wodak (2001b, p. 45) as means "by which one constructs and represents social actors". In Richardson's terms, they are a set of linguistic and rhetorical tools with which individuals and groups are identified

(Richardson, 2007, p. 49). He argues that social actors are referred to with specific names chosen by writers representing particular categories, leading to their exclusion from certain social categories and their inclusion in others (ibid, p. 50). Reisigl and Wodak (2001b, p. 47) explain that this description serves various political, psychological, or social purposes on the side of the speaker/writer.

Referential strategies chosen by writers/speakers perform a function within the text; along with attributing meaning and social value to referents (Richardson, 2007, p. 50). For instance, referring to Bouteflika with “ruler” or “leader” does not have the same connotation though the two words appear roughly the same. While the first carries a negative connotation of power monopoly, the second seems to be more positive connoting a sense of responsibility and hard work. The use of these terms could therefore express the standpoints of their users towards “Bouteflika”. The use of “ruler”, for instance, might indicate an opposition to and a rejection of Bouteflika’s policies, whereas “leader” could imply a support to him and satisfaction with his governance.

#### **4.5.2. Predication**

When identified, social actors are attributed to with predicational strategies which are defined by Richardson (2007, p. 52) as words chosen by the writer/speaker for a more direct representation of the social actors’ values and characteristics. In Reisigl and Wodak’s words (2001b, p. 54), they are “the very basic process and result of linguistically assigning qualities to persons, animals, objects, events, actions and social phenomena”. Though the word “leader” connotes a positive sense, its meaning becomes negative once assigned a negative attribute, such as “the ailing” in “the ailing leader”. This construct could, thereby, evoke a sense of sarcasm, or an alternative to wonder how an ailing president can lead a country given that leaders are commonly expected to enjoy good mental and physical health for an efficient running of its affairs.

Predicational strategies do not take the form of adjectival attributes only, such as the case of “ailing” shown above. They rather can be realised by transitive choices in the form of appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctive clauses, infinitive clauses, and participial clauses or groups...etc (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009, p. 104). This is thoroughly explained below under the section of transitivity.

#### 4.5.2.1. Transitivity

The current study examines the use of transitivity as one important predicational strategy. Transitivity is “an essential tool in the analysis of the representation” of certain aspects of reality such as the structure of events and their attendant participants (Fowler, 1991, p. 71). It is also regarded by Hart and Cap (2014) as an influential analytical and theoretical attractor of CDS in general and of the DRA in particular. It enhances the critical dimension of CDS, not only because it analyses the micro-choices of texts, but also because it conceives language choices as socially situated and politically and ideologically motivated (Hart, 2014, p. 6). This grammatical model allows the analyst to compare between different grammatical choices, tracking their discursive functions and identifying their different ideological motivations (ibid).

Largescale studies have been undertaken by researchers including Bazzi (2009), Richardson (2007), Van Leeuwen (2008), Qawariq (2016), and Mustafa (2013) among many others adopting Halliday’s SFG, notably his system of transitivity. They aimed chiefly to analyse news discourses on a wide range of issues including internal and interstate conflicts, such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Qawariq, 2016) and the 2006 Israeli Lebanese war (Mustafa, 2013). This wide reliance on the model, as Richardson (2007), Hart (2014) and Sakrikar (2019) explain, is due to its analytical potential to uncover the relationship between grammar and ideology, as well as its usefulness in the critical analysis of texts. It “provides systems of resources for referring to entities in the world and, crucially, the way that they interact with or relate to one another” (Hart, 2014, p. 22). Transitivity, therefore, is the “foundation of representation”, how the clause is used to analyse events and situations as being of a certain type (Fowler, 1991, p. 71). It enables analysts to see how, by making certain grammatical choices rather than others, the author of a text can “*foreground* certain meanings in discourse while suppressing others” (Chen, 2001, p. 190). It can unveil a world view encoded by linguistic choices and provide a method of analysing ideologies that construct these world views (ibid).

In the context of this study, when analysing and comparing the linguistic choices made by ideologically distinct news websites in their coverage of the same event, the key events of the 2019 AH, I find that transitivity analysis plays a crucial role. It helps functionally distinguish between the various lexical and grammatical choices made by these news websites and, in turn, the different worldviews they project, all stemming from the same underlying reality. Here, it is essential to emphasise that transitivity analysis serves as a powerful tool for uncovering the linguistic strategies employed by news outlets. By examining the transitivity patterns in their discourse, analysts gain insights into how these outlets frame and construct the narrative around

the 2019 AH events. These patterns reveal not only the selection of specific participants and processes but also the implicit ideologies and perspectives that underlie their reporting. Transitivity analysis, in essence, allows to dissect the news coverage at a deeper level, going beyond the surface-level reporting to reveal the subtle nuances and underlying ideologies that shape the news articles. It provides a structured framework for understanding how different news outlets choose to depict the same reality through their linguistic choices. Ultimately, transitivity analysis serves as a valuable analytical tool in this study, enabling the analyst to unravel the intricate relationship between language, ideology, and news reporting when comparing the coverage of a significant event like the 2019 AH across various news websites.

Transitivity consists of processes that are made up of three elements: the process itself, participants in the process, and circumstances (associated with the process) (Halliday, 2000, p. 107). Processes demonstrate the actions that appear in a text, participants represent who/what does the action to whom/what, and circumstances represent time, place, manner, and other contextual factors (Mills, 1995, pp. 143-144). Processes are expressed by verbal groups, participants are typically realised by noun phrases, and circumstances are usually expressed by prepositional and adverbial phrases (Simpson, 1993, p. 88). Thompson (2004, pp. 86-87) explains that “there are ‘goings-on’ (verbs) which involve things (nouns) which may have attributes (adjectives), and which go on against background details of place, time, manner, etc (adverbials)”. In such circumstances where language use can be said to be ideological, transitivity may indicate different ideological viewpoints (Fowler, 1991, p. 71). To that end, Richardson (2007, p. 57) argues that transitive choices cannot be ignored in any linguistic analysis of journalism. Analysing the use of transitivity in news discourses can therefore fulfil the following objectives: analysing the experiential or the ideational functions in the text, the cognitive meanings, the commonsensical beliefs about a particular struggle, the preferred readership of a political event, how political reality is variously represented. Further, transitivity analysis helps one to establish who is represented as causing what to whom; what agents are consistently and actively incriminated; who are the affected participants (Bazzi, 2009, p. 82). It makes it possible to observe what conditional relations exist between clauses (i.e., what causes are deleted or emphasised and what facts are conditionally related in the circumstantial element to reflect firm beliefs, cognitive bias or to incriminate the ideological enemy (ibid)). Transitivity, as a grammatical tool used by writers to represent a certain viewpoint on aspects of the world, is analysed to find out how the news outlets represent the

2019AH, its events and participants, as well as the way this representation could be indicative of the news outlet's ideologies on the issue.

Halliday and Matthiessen (2004, p. 170) distinguish between three main types of processes, namely material, mental, and relational processes, and three other subsidiary ones which lie at the three boundaries: verbal, behavioural and existential processes. This classification is based on two main characteristics: whether the process takes place in the inner or outer world of the speaker/writer; whether it happens in or outside their mind, and whether it represents a dynamic action (actual doing) or a state of being (static relation) (ibid, p. 196).

#### **4.5.2.1.1. Material Processes**

According to Halliday and Matthiessen (2004, p. 181), material processes “construe figures of ‘doing- and-happening’”. They represent an entity doing an action “which may be to another entity” (ibid). The first entity is referred to as “the actor” who/which represents the doer of the material process, while the second is called “the Goal”. The latter is considered by Halliday (1985, p.103) as an optional participant “to which the process is extended” or who is affected by the action and implies being “directed at”. These types of processes can be figured out by answering the question what did the actor do to the goal? (a process of doing) or what happened? (a process of happening) (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004, p. 180). In the following example from F24, the entity “more than 40 people” is the Goal, while the Actor is “security forces”:

*72. (Security forces (actor) arrested (Material Process) more than 40 people (Goal) after that protest (Circumstance) (F24 24F19).*

Therefore, Analysing the material processes helps to find out the agents/actors who claim responsibility for bringing about actions to the real world. Additionally, it identifies what actors are concealed or present in shaping the main events of the 2019 AH, and which actors are backgrounded or suppressed. this is further explained through Van Leeuwen's concepts of “inclusion” and “exclusion” (see section 4.5.3).

Halliday and Matthiessen (2004, p. 194) add another property belonging to the material process labelled ‘the scope’ which is, according to them, hardly distinguishable from ‘the goal’ since both take the form of a direct object. They further characterise it with two main principles: (1) It “may construe an entity which exists independently of the process, but that indicates the domain over which the process takes place”. (2) It “may be not an entity at all but rather another

name for the process” (ibid). Examples from the data are “tear gas” and “water canon” in the following instance where the goal is “the protesters”.

*67. Police (Actor) used (Material Process) tear gas and water cannon (Scope) to discourage (Material Process) the protesters (Goal) ‘from reaching (Material Process) the heavily guarded Constitutional Council office (Goal) (AJE3Mar19).*

“...tear gas and water canon” cannot be considered as goals though they take its position – the position of the direct object in the sentence. It is the mean used against the goal “the protesters”.

It is worth noting that other structures including infinitives “to discourage”, gerunds, participles and nominalisations are analysed as the type of the transitive process of their main verbs. For instance, the gerund “reaching” is analysed as a material process. The infinitive “to discourage” is analysed as a mental process. The nominalisation “statement” is analysed as a verbal process...

Two other grammatical participants can be included within the material processes which are: initiator and actor. It is worth adding that the initiator is the participant (the agent) that provokes the other participant (the actor) to do the process. In the case of this study, initiator is used to refer to the participant whose process or action provokes another actor in the construction to respond with another action as shown below.

*68. (...police (Initiator) fire (Material Process) tear gas (Scope) to block (Material Process) a march (Goal) on the presidential palace (Circumstance) prompting (Material Process) demonstrators (Goal) to respond (Material Process) with stone-throwing (Circumstance) F24 24F19).*

“Stone throwing” is the reaction of “the demonstrators” which is provoked by the process “fire tear gas initiated by” “police”.

Richardson (2007, p. 54) further classifies the material processes into: a transitive action which involves two participants, an actor and an object, and intransitive actions which involve one participant, an actor only. The former can be characterised with processes of doing whereas the latter is realised by processes of happening (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004, p. 180). These are functionally different and therefore there is a reason for one choice over the other. Instances on this are as follows:

43. *(Thousands more (actor) staged (transitive material process) new anti-government protests (scope) on Monday (circumstance) in the capital and other cities (circumstance)... AJE3Mar19).*

AJE's construction assigns agency to the protesters in bringing about the protests. More importantly, such distinction between transitive and intransitive processes, as Van Leeuwen (2008) notes, is not "neutral". Rather, it helps to distinguish between actions which have an effect on other entities or on the world and actions which do not have. For instance, the "protesters", in F24's analysed reports, are mostly activated in relation to intransitive material processes evoking a sense of powerlessness. The police, by contrast, is mostly activated in relation to transitive material ones which denote the perpetration of violence against the passive protesters. The overall representation indicates that the protesters are victims of the police's actions (see section 5.4.2).

#### 4.5.2.1.2 Relational Processes

Relational processes establish a more or less static relationship between two concepts, with the process signalling this relationship (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004, p. 210). A typical realisation includes two nominal phrases in which one characterises or identifies the other by the process "be" including: "is, was, are and were" (ibid). Due to the fact that relational processes characterise the concepts and identify them, the label process does not indicate doing but rather, in functional terms, a continuous happening (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004, p. 210). Relational processes are classified into three types:

1. Intensive relational processes: one is the other. The relationship between the two concepts is the same. This can be used to refer mainly to the identifying relational clause which is composed of two entities: token and value as explained later under this section.
2. Circumstantial relational processes: one is at the other. The relationship between the two concepts is one of time, place, manner, cause, accompaniment, matter, or role. For instance:

3. *The leader (carrier) has been (relational process) largely (circumstance) out of sight attribute... (F24 8 Mar19).*

3. Possessive relational processes: one has the other. The relationship between the two concepts is one of ownership, one entity possesses another. For example, Businessman Rachid Nekkaz (Carrier), who has (Relational Process) a sizeable Facebook following (Attribute).



Each type can be distinguished by two different modes: attributive relational processes and identifying relational processes. In attributive relational processes, a relationship is established between two participants: carrier and attribute. The attribute is ascribed to the carrier, representing one of its characteristics. The attribute is either an adjective or an indefinite nominal group that assigns the carrier to a general class of entity (Thompson, 2004, p. 96). This mode is typically characterised with the irreversibility of its main components (the carrier and attribute) (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004, p. 215). The noun phrases “in power” and “a sizeable Facebook following” are attributes to the carriers “Bouteflika” and “businessman” respectively, and their positions in the clauses cannot be switched.

The second type is referred to as identifying relational processes. They are those which identify one participant by another. Both participants, realised by definite nominal phrases, refer to the same entity. One of the participants belongs to a specific semantic category while the other belongs to a general semantic category where both concepts refer to the same real-world entity (Thompson, 2004, pp. 96-97). The more category is called “value”, while the specific embodiment is labelled “token” (Thompson, 2004, p. 98). The identification process is realised by either the token identifying the value, or the value identifying the token, meaning that the two entities are reversible (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004, p. 215).

Analysing this participant/token can show what values the writers draw up on in their representation of entities, consequently, they reveal some aspects of their underlying assumptions (Thompson, 2004, p. 98).

#### **4.5.2.1.3. Mental Processes**

Mental processes represent ‘goings on’ as they happen in the internal world of the mind and reflect some aspects of the mental states of actors. They are classified into four sub-types: processes of emotion (feeling), processes of cognition (deciding, knowing, understanding etc.), processes of desideration (wanting), and processes of perception (seeing, hearing etc.). These processes involve two main participants: the sensor, within whose mental world the process occurs, and the phenomenon, which is the entity that triggers the unfolding of the mental process. The sensor who would be assigned this role will be perceived as being conscious (Halliday, 1994, p. 114).

*99. They (sensor) (referring to the protesters) want (mental process) a leader (phenomenon) who could (modal) take (material process) them (goal) into the future (circumstance)... [THE BBC3APR19(1)].*

#### 4.5.2.1.4. Verbal Processes

Tomson (2004, p. 100) argues that verbal processes, or processes of saying, are intermediate material and mental processes: “saying something is a material action that reflects mental operations”. Every verbal process includes a sayer participant who or that sends a message, the recipient to whom or to which the saying process is directed, a target, which is the entity at which the message of the verbal process is directed, and the verbiage which is the message itself. It should be noted, in many cases, that some elements of the verbal process are absent such as the recipient, which could refer to the constitutional council in Algeria in the following instance.

*85. (The powerful (attribute) Algerian army) (Sayer) had called (verbal process) for the 82-year-old (target) (to be declared incapable of carrying out his duties) (verbiage) (BBC3Apr19 (2)).*

It can be noticed in this passage that the recipient who is addressed by the call of the sayer “Gaid Salah” is excluded using the passive construction “be declared”.

Projected clauses are separate clauses in the verbal process which are functionally independent and should be analysed separately from the main clause (Halliday, 1994, pp. 140-142). An indicative instance is provided below:

*103. Nazim Taleb... said a transitional council was necessary to pave the way for a free and fair election in the country (AJE 3APR19).*

The projected clause in the instance is “a transitional council was necessary to pave the way for a free and fair election”.

There are two reasons which can explain conducting an analysis of projected clauses as part of the analysis of representation although they represent the inner world of the sayer rather than the text producer. The first is that the projected clause is often reported in the text producer’s own words, i.e., reported speech, which shapes the reported content through the writer’s linguistic system and hence ideological system (Mautner, 2008, p. 42), either his or her own ideology or the news source’s ideology. The second is that the text producer’s selection of certain quotes can also reflect his/her opinion and attitudes (Kress, 1983, p. 136). More specifically, analysing the projected clauses and identifying the type of the transitive process help to determine whether the reporter maintains a peace or a war journalistic stance when reporting on the event. In other words, if the type of process embedded within the projected clause is cognitive mental, material, or positive relational, which reflects the awareness of the

Sayer, it might be argued that the journalist's stance is peace oriented. Conversely, if the processes are negative mental and relational which reflect the troubled inner state of the Sayer, it can be argued that the writer's perspective is war-oriented (see section 4.7.2). Thus, identifying the identity of the sayer would help to find out whose voices are included in the texts and whose voices are excluded, and analysing the projected clauses helps to dissect the stance adopted to represent the event; whether a peace or war journalistic one.

#### **4.5.2.1.5. Existential Processes**

Existential Processes occur on the borderline between the Relational and Material Processes (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004, p. 171). Thompson (2004, p. 104) argues that existential processes express "the mere existence of an entity without predicating anything else". The only participant in these processes is labelled the Existent.

*77. ...there were (existential process) clashes (existent) between stone-throwing protesters and riot police... (BBC8Mar19).*

#### **4.5.2.1.6. Behavioural Processes**

This last type of processes will be introduced briefly as it is rare in my data, thus, does not form part of the analysis. Behavioural Process's, according to Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004, p. 170) "represent the outer manifestations of inner workings, the acting out of processes of consciousness" ... "and physiological states". They are those which lie in the borderline between mental and material processes. They represent psychological human actions which involve mental and physical characteristics (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004, p. 251). The main participant of this process is the behavior, the one who/ which does the action. The behavior is usually a conscious being, but the process is more like one of doing.

As demonstrated above, transitivity, a critical component of linguistic analysis, deals with the representation of participants as social actors and processes as actions. However, it is essential to emphasise what Hart (2014, p. 23) underscores regarding these processes and their participants. According to him, these aspects "pertain to the semantic level and are not necessarily rendered explicit in the clause" (Hart, 2014, p. 23). In simpler terms, the differentiation between various types of processes and the identification of their components depends on the inherent meaning they carry and the specific role they fulfil within the clause's structure.

It is worth reiterating that the scope of options available to language users when representing social actors extends "beyond the functional participant categories of SFG" (Hart, 2014, p. 33).

This means that the nuances and variations in how social actors are portrayed cannot be fully captured by Halliday's SFG alone.

To address this limitation and ensure a more comprehensive analysis, it is imperative to incorporate elements from Van Leeuwen's socio-semantic inventory (2008). Van Leeuwen's framework extends beyond the boundaries of Halliday's system and provides a valuable set of tools for examining the complex and multifaceted ways in which language represents social actors and their actions in discourse. By integrating Van Leeuwen's perspective with the foundational understanding offered by transitivity analysis, one can gain a richer and more holistic insight into the intricate role of language in constructing meaning and influencing public perception.

#### **4.5.3. Socio-Semantic Inventory**

Van Leeuwen's socio-semantic inventory (2008) was devised to study and analyse the representation of social actors through a network of socio-semantic categorisations. The inventory examines how a certain social role can be realised using different linguistic constructions (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p.23). One example is "passivation" which can take different textual realisations. This can be either by passivising the social actor giving him/her/it a goal/patient role, such as "more than 40 people" in "Security forces arrested more than 40 people" or placing the goal in a grammatical agent position, such as the reference "protesters" and its grammatical reference "they" in the following instance "Protesters say they received hot water from the police". Though the actor "protesters" and its grammatical reference "they" take grammatical agency, they are sociologically passive. This could explain Van Leeuwen's argument that "There is no neat fit between sociological and linguistic categories" (2008, p. 24), referring to the incongruence between certain social roles and their linguistic realisations. This is a fundamental interest of CDS, which aims to uncover how the discursive construction of specific social roles can be ideologically motivated. To this end, Van Leeuwen (2008) proposes a comprehensive network of socio-semantic roles that account for the most frequently occurring social roles and their potential linguistic expressions. I would argue that these categories are not exclusive to CDS but are also pertinent to P/W J.

The findings demonstrate that the utilisation of certain categories in news discourses can indicate a peace-oriented journalistic stance, while others may imply a more war-oriented perspective. This is extensively elaborated upon in Section 4.7. It is important to note that the

categorisations presented below represent the most prevalent in the data. All definitions provided here are based on Van Leeuwen's work (2008, pp. 29-52).

- Exclusion/Inclusion

Exclusion/inclusion are among the basic categories accounted for in this model to identify whether a social actor is mentioned in the text or not. Linguistic exclusion can take two forms: Suppression/Backgrounding. Suppression refers to the categorical omission of social actors but referring to their actions or activities. This type of exclusion, according to Van Leeuwen (2008, p. 29), can play a significant role in drawing critical comparison of different representations of the same social actor in different texts. It can be realised through passive agent deletion, non-finite clauses that function as grammatical participants, and nominalisations and process nouns. In backgrounding, the social actor is present or referred to elsewhere in the text. Backgrounding can be achieved through simple ellipses, in non-finite clauses with -ing and -ed participles, in infinitival clauses with to, and in paratactic clauses. Social actors, on the other hand, can be included in texts. They can be allocated different social roles, articulated by varying textual realisations as the following categories show.

- Activation/ Passivation

Activation refers to the endowment of social actors with active or dynamic forces in an activity. It can be realised through participation or through circumstantialisation by prepositional circumstantial with “by” or “from”. One instance on circumstantialisation:

*81 ...long-time president Abdelaziz Bouteflika who was pushed out by protesters...(AJE10Dec19).*

Another instance on participation:

*70. Some protesters threw stones near the presidential palace and were driven back by police firing tear gas” (BBC1Mar19).*

Though the actor “some protesters” is included in this instance, they are dehumanised by being activated in relation to the material process “through”. This goes in line with Reisigl and Wodak (2001b, p. 47) who reiterate that the inclusion of social actors does not necessarily mean a fair or equal representation, rather this can also have a “disguising, relativising or averting function” which can be a form of WJ as explained under section 4.7.2.

Passivation, on another hand, is the representation of social actors as receiving or undertaking the activity. Passivated social actors can be subjected or beneficialised. Subjected social actors

are treated as objects in the representation. Beneficialised social actors is the third-party which benefits negatively or positively from the action. One example on subjected social actors is the following:

*13. Bouteflika's re-election bid comes after the ruling FLN party picked him as its official presidential candidate (AJE22F19), (F24 23F19).*

In this instance, Bouteflika is represented as a goal of the material process “picked”. Considering his difficult health situation, he is represented as subject by the FLN ruling party, positively depicted as the beneficialised from a new term in power.

Relevant to this study, the application of categorisations such as exclusion and inclusion, along with their associated sub-categories, becomes instrumental. These tools help discern the similarities and differences in how the 2009 AH movement is depicted by the three news outlets. Specifically, they assist in identifying which actors are attributed active roles during the movement and which ones are marginalised, silenced, or relegated to the background.

Furthermore, this analysis allows to gauge whether the news outlets maintain a peace journalistic stance by including social actors and foregrounding their positive contributions toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Conversely, it also helps evaluate whether a war journalistic approach is employed, where the focus is on suppressing or downplaying the actors and their constructive actions while highlighting them predominantly in relation to negativity. (For further details, refer to section 4.7.2.)"

#### •Assimilation/Individualisation

The two categories of assimilation and individualisation are used to refer to social actors as groups or individuals. They are of a primer significance to CDS due to the value placed on individuals in some spheres of the society and the value of conformity in others (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 37). Simply put, if the actors play a prominent role in the society, they are individualised. Yet, if they belong to the general public, they are collectivised.

Assimilation can be further classified into aggregation and collectivisation. The former refers to the statistical representation of social groups including the use of numeratives or quantifiers. Van Leeuwen interprets the use of aggregation negatively. He analyses the use of aggregation in the context of immigration to Australia and argues that aggregating immigrants “makes them not only the subject of “rational” economic calculation, but also that large horde which is so “legitimately feared” by Australians” (2008, p.38) which is a form of propaganda against the

immigrants. In addition, Galtung (2006, p. 1) argues that reporting on a conflict's casualties by emphasising the number of the wounded and killed people, which can be achieved through aggregation, is also a form of propaganda that might eventually contribute to cultural violence escalation. However, it could be argued that these two interpretations are context dependent. The use of aggregation, whether realised through numeratives or quantifiers, cannot universally be categorised as a form of Western Journalistic propaganda. In many cases, it serves the purpose of informing the audience about the context and trends of a conflict. Instead, it is the manner in which news is presented that should be scrutinised, as this presentation may inadvertently create propaganda and, consequently, contribute to the escalation of cultural violence."

Collectivisation represents the social actors as one homogeneous group signalling their agreement on one single issue. It can be realised using the plural such as "the protesters, the demonstrators" and metonymic terms like "Algeria" in "Algeria seeks heavy sentence is on..." (AJE10D19).

Association-Dissociation: Association refers to groups formed by social actors. This group constitutes "an alliance which exists only in relation to a specific activity or set of activities (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 39). This category is represented by Parataxis as will be illustrated below.

*...his words have failed to end the protests...drawing Algerians from all walks of life, including students, lawyers and journalists (F24 5Mar19).*

The association of "students, lawyers, and journalists" in the context of the protests can suggest a consensus or a united front among these diverse categories, which might collectively represent the elite or educated segments of society. This unity in their participation in the protests implies that there is a shared opposition to Bouteflika's bid to remain in power. In other words, it indicates that not only a broad spectrum of society but also individuals from educated or professional backgrounds agree in their resistance against Bouteflika's continued rule.

#### •Nomination and Categorisation

According to Van Leeuwen (2008, p. 40), nomination refers to the representation of the social actors in terms of their unique identity. It is different from Reisigl and Wodak's term explained above in section 4.5.1. It is typically realised by proper nouns which can be formal giving surname with or without honorific such as Bouteflika or Mr Bouteflika, semi-formal by giving

name and surname as with “Abdelaziz Bouteflika” and informal by giving name only. Categorisation refers to the representation of social actors in terms of identities and functions they share with others. Categorisation can be further divided into Functionalisation and identification.

Functionalisation occurs when social actors are referred to in terms of their activities, their occupations, or roles, such as referring to Bouteflika with his function using “president, leader, and ruler”. Unlike functionalisation, Identification occurs when social actors are defined in terms of what they are instead of what they do. It can be further categorised into other elements such as classification and physical identification.

Classification occurs when social actors are differentiated in terms of the major categories in a given society including information on their ages, social classes, and ethnicities. An instance on this is referring to Bouteflika using the age attribute “the 82-year-old” and the adjectival “octogenarian”. Social actors in physical identification are represented in terms of physical characteristics, referring to their unique identification in a particular context such as the use of “chair-bound” as an attribute to the actor “leader”, referring to Bouteflika (AJE8Mar19).

#### •Personalisation/Impersonalisation

When starting the analysis, one should ask whether the participants in the process are personalised or impersonalised. Impersonalisation could be used “to give extra weight to a particular statement” (Machin and May, 2012, p. 79). It can be divided into objectivation and abstraction. Abstraction occurs when social actors are represented by means of a quality assigned to them by and in the representation. Objectivation occurs when social actors are represented by means of reference to a place or thing associated either with their person or with the action in which they are represented as being engaged. In other words, objectivation is realised by metonymical reference which takes different forms such as spatialisation, utterance autonomisation, and instrumentalisation.

In spatialisation, social actors are associated to a place by means of reference in a given context. For instance:

*113. Algeria jails two Bouteflika-era PMs in landmark corruption trial  
(F24 10D19 (1)).*

An alternative could be as follows: “Judicial authorities in Algeria jail...”



Utterance autonomisation occurs when social actors are represented by means of reference to their utterance. Van Leeuwen argues that this form is often used in relation to the utterances of high-status personnel. It lends a kind of impersonal authority to the utterances, such as “a news source said”. Through instrumentalisation, social actors are represented by means of reference to the instrument with which they conduct the action. An example on this is the use of the nominalisation “the demonstrations” to refer to the protesters in the following instance:

*88. His resignation on Tuesday came after six weeks of anti-government protests (BBC3Apr19).*

The nominalisation “demonstrations” can be regarded a mean by the demonstrators to achieve their goals.

Impersonalisation, as defined by Van Leeuwen (2008, p. 49), is a linguistic strategy that can either add positive or negative connotations to an action or utterance of a social actor. In the context of CDS, Impersonalisation is a crucial element to consider because it has the potential to shape the overall tone and implications of a discourse, particularly in the realm of journalism. When Impersonalisation is used to portray positive actions or utterances of social actors, it tends to create a more neutral and objective tone. This can be seen as a favourable aspect, especially in journalism that aims to provide unbiased reporting and maintain a balanced perspective. Conversely, when Impersonalisation is applied to negative actions or utterances of social actors, it has the effect of depersonalising or backgrounding the identity or role of those actors. While this might seem like a way to diminish the impact of negative actions, it can be a double-edged sword. When Impersonalisation is excessively used to background individuals or groups involved in negative actions, it can hinder accountability. This can be problematic because it may downplay the consequences of harmful behaviours and reduce the clarity regarding who is responsible for such actions. By distancing the social actors from their actions, the discourse may fail to address the root causes of issues, thus hindering efforts toward conflict resolution or problem-solving.

In summary, Section 4.5 has provided an overview of the primary linguistic and semantic categories that will be examined throughout the course of this study. The study commences by delving into the analysis of referential and predicational strategies (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001b), with a special emphasis on Halliday's Transitivity framework (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004). This framework, in particular, offers the analyst a valuable tool for discerning the

distinct worldviews that the three news outlets endeavour to construct. This is achieved through a systematic comparison of the various grammatical structures employed and the discursive functions they serve.

However, as previously noted, merely identifying participants and processes in accordance with Halliday's terminology falls short of fully revealing how specific social actors and their actions are portrayed. This limitation becomes especially apparent when considering the vast array of linguistic resources available for referencing and evaluating these social actors and their actions. To address this complexity, it is essential to incorporate Van Leeuwen's semantic categories into the analysis. These categories offer a more nuanced lens through which to examine not only who the social actors are but also how their actions are depicted in discourse.

By integrating Halliday's Transitivity framework with Van Leeuwen's semantic categories, this study gains a more comprehensive perspective on how language shapes our understanding of social actors and the constructed realities presented by various news outlets. This combination equips analysts to uncover the intricate ways in which language influences public perception and conveys the nuances of social action within the context of news discourse.

#### **4.6 Analytical Framework: Macro-Strategies and Aspects of representation**

The current study follows a bottom-up approach in conducting its linguistic analysis, progressing from micro-textual to macro-social analysis. To achieve this, it organises its findings within an analytical framework that comprises macro-strategies and aspects of representation. The term "macro-strategies" is borrowed from Unger (2013, p. 54) and refers to groupings of discursive strategies that may ultimately lead to specific constructions of social actors, actions, or phenomena. Each macro-strategy of representation results from the aggregation of micro-textual choices dispersed throughout texts (Unger, 2013, p. 54).

For example, one macro-strategy in this study is "Bouteflika as an incapacitated president" (section 5.2.1). This macro-strategy is constructed through various discursive strategies that emphasise Bouteflika's inability to fulfil his presidential duties. These strategies include Material Processes connoting weakness, such as "suffered/suffering", "is undergoing", and "uses a wheelchair", as well as the repetitive use of health and age attributes such as "ailing", "the 81/82-year-old", and "octogenarian". Another macro-strategy is "Bouteflika as an authoritarian president" (section 5.2.2), which is realised by portraying him in relation to

transitive and intransitive processes that evoke a sense of authoritarianism, such as “has held office”, “ruled Algeria”, “came to power”, and “clung to power” (see section 5.2.2). These various macro-strategies collectively constitute aspects of representation. For instance, the two macro-strategies mentioned contribute to the representation of “The 2019 AH as a legitimate action against Bouteflika's fifth term” (see section 5.2). This elucidates the use of the term “aspect of representation”. Consequently, aspects of representation serve as a bridge between discursive strategies and context, aiding in the identification of contextual functions based on the discursive functions of processes and the analyst's contextual awareness.

This analytical framework serves two primary purposes. Firstly, it offers an interpretation of the textual findings by systematically progressing from internal discursive structures to external social dimensions, thereby addressing the overarching question of how the 2019 AH was portrayed by AJE, the BBC, and F24 news websites. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, the framework facilitates a more thorough explanation and interpretation of the CDS textual findings in alignment with the adapted model of P/WJ. For example, the macro-strategy “the protesters are strongly determined to change the political regime” (section 5.3.1) can be readily linked to PJ, as it underscores the protesters' determination and initiatives during the conflict. Conversely, the macro-strategy “protesters as the initiators of violence against the police” (section 5.4.4) can be connected to WJ, as it contributes to a negative portrayal of the protesters as violent and downplays their active role during the conflict (for further details, see section 7.3).

#### **4.7 the Adapted Model of P/W J as an Effective Complement to CDS: an Interpretative Framework**

Section 3.3.2 in Chapter 3 has provided a comprehensive overview of the P/W J framework, commencing with definitions of its core concepts, including violence and conflict, peace, and the distinction between PJ and VJ. In Section 3.3.3, a critical evaluation of Galtung's P/W J model (2006) has been presented, demonstrating its potential for theoretical adaptation through the use of terminology slightly different from Galtung's original proposals. These theoretical adaptations introduced the terms “PJ as context-oriented” and its opposite, “decontextualisation”, replacing Galtung's “peace/conflict-oriented reporting” and “war/violence-oriented reporting”. This change was influenced by Herbert's concepts of conflict analysis (2017). Additionally, two new principles have been introduced: “PJ as human-

oriented" and its opposite, "dehumanisation", drawing inspiration from McGoldrick and Lynch's P/W J framework (2000) and Chouliaraki's ideas on the analytics of mediation (2006). The study does incorporate the principles "PJ as people-oriented", "WJ as propaganda-oriented", and "PJ as solution-oriented" from Galtung's model (2006, p. 1).

It is important to note that due to specific data-related constraints, this study does not consider the two principles "PJ as truth-oriented" and "WJ as elite-oriented". In addition, it replaces "WJ as victory-oriented" with "PJ as problem-oriented". (refer to Section 3.3.3). These modifications stem from the nature of Galtung's model, which was originally developed to analyse violent conflicts such as interstate and civil wars. Nevertheless, this study argues that Galtung's model, with these new adaptations, can effectively analyse news reports concerning various contentious issues.

The theoretically adapted model is methodologically elucidated below in connection with concepts related to CDS, particularly those proposed by Van Leeuwen (2008), Reisigl and Wodak (2001, 2009, 2016), Halliday (1994), and Halliday and Matthiessen (2004). This adapted P/W J model is demonstrated to be a valuable complement to CDS, efficiently aiding in the interpretation of textual findings. It also provides clear criteria for assessing media narratives as either peace-oriented or war-oriented journalism. Subsequently, this framework enables a comparative analysis of media texts, which aligns perfectly with the study's objectives. By providing a dichotomy between peace journalism and war journalism, it facilitates the identification of differences in media coverage, framing, and narratives. Consequently, this contrast enhances the depth of my analysis.

Moreover, applying P/WJ frameworks to CDS findings serves a dual purpose. Firstly, it helps in assessing the ethical dimensions of media discourses. Secondly, it aids in identifying biases within media narratives. When used in conjunction with CDS, it leads to a more comprehensive examination of how biases, whether intentional or unintentional, manifest in the linguistic and discursive elements of news reports. Chapter 7 provides an in-depth exploration of the model, accompanied by further illustrations from the data.

#### **4.7.1 PJ as Context-Oriented vs Decontextualisation**

Section 3.3.3 in Chapter 3 has presented an in-depth exploration of the concept of PJ being context oriented. PJ as context-oriented seeks to provide context to conflicts and render them

transparent by delving into their origins, involved parties, objectives, and issues (Galtung, 2006, p. 1). This conceptualisation closely aligns with conflict analysis, albeit under different terminologies such as “conflict profile”, “actors”, and “trends” (Herbert, 2017, p. 12). To address each component comprising the conflict's context, Herbert (2017, p. 12) proposes a set of pertinent questions.

Regarding the context's formation or profile, Herbert (2017) suggests probing its historical, economic, social, political, and environmental underpinnings. This becomes particularly crucial when examining conflicts like the 2019 AH, where understanding the political backdrop behind its eruption holds paramount significance. Researchers widely concur that Bouteflika's announcement of his fifth term candidacy, despite prevailing circumstances, served as the primary catalyst for the 2019 AH's eruption. Consequently, providing readers with comprehensive contextual details concerning Bouteflika's situation, including his health, age, and rule, as well as insights into Algeria's political landscape during his last six years, becomes imperative. Such meticulous contextual representation aids in averting the escalation of cultural violence by offering readers a more complete understanding of the 2019 AH.

As a peace researcher or political analyst, I concur with Peleg's assertion (2007, pp. 4-5) that furnishing contextual elements around a conflict enhances comprehension. However, from a critical discourse analysis perspective, I advocate a discerning approach to inclusion and consider the source. For instance, F24 references the 1980 Berber spring issue, despite its potential differences from the 2019 AH in core aspects such as scale and demands (see Section 2.2.2.1). Incorporating such historical information within the context of the 2019 AH may carry significant socio-political implications, especially considering F24's historical connection to a former colonial power (see Section 7.2). Consequently, when reporting on any conflict, journalists should exercise caution in including relevant historical issues, especially if their inclusion may potentially undermine the unity of individuals within the conflict zone. Instead, the focus should remain on direct political, economic, and social factors fuelling the conflict, along with analogous historical events that contribute to a more profound comprehension.

The second element of "PJ as context-oriented" involves identifying the "parties" (Galtung, 2006) or "actors" (Herbert, 2017, p. 12) central to the conflict. This aspect can be better elucidated under "PJ as people/human-oriented" (see Section 4.7.2), where emphasis is placed on the principal actors in conflicts and their representation.

The third element within PJ's context-oriented approach, as proposed by Herbert (2017, p. 12), pertains to exploring the conflict's "dynamics" or "current trends". In this regard, PJ should portray conflicts as if they are unfolding in an "open space and time" (Galtung, 2006, p. 1). McGoldrick and Lynch (2000) recommend that journalists should refrain from treating conflicts as if they are confined solely to the time and place of violence. Otherwise, this aligns with what Galtung terms "closed time and space", essentially constituting WJ (2006, p. 1). Reporting conflicts in this manner serves to decontextualise them, rendering them secretive and opaque (Galtung, 2013, p. 96). It portrays conflicts as wars, akin to a sporting or gladiatorial arena where parties are depicted as warriors striving to impose their objectives (ibid). Analysing spacetime necessitates focusing on linguistic references, notably adverbs of space, geographical markers, and temporal adverbials (Chouliaraki, 2006, p. 22-23). An example of a locative expression would be "in Algiers, the capital". However, in the context of this study, merely stating that violent clashes between protesters and security forces occurred solely in the capital could inadvertently imply that violence predominantly characterises protests in Algiers. To mitigate such negative representation, specifying the exact location of violence becomes necessary. This can illustrate that the use of violence in a particular area might be a systematic effort to maintain overall order. For instance, the use of "the presidential palace" implies that resorting to less lethal means like tear gas and water cannons may serve to preserve general order in that geopolitically significant area. Consequently, PJ, being context-oriented, advocates the use of precise circumstantial details when reporting on violence to avoid decontextualised portrayals of conflicts that may lead to a perception of them as predominantly violent.

In summary, "PJ as context-oriented" focuses on three elements whose inclusion in conflict reporting contributes to a deeper comprehension. The first pertains to the conflict profile, where comprehensive details on the immediate political, economic, and social factors involved in the conflict's eruption should be provided, along with relevant historical events aiding in its explanation. Simultaneously, references to sensitive historical events that may exacerbate ideological tensions among individuals within the conflict zone should be avoided. The second element involves identifying the primary actors in the conflict. The third revolves around portraying the current trends in the conflict, specifically the time and the space where violence occurs. To this end, it is advisable to use precise locational information when reporting on violence to prevent a decontextualised representation that may foster perceptions of the conflict as predominantly violent.

#### 4.7.2. PJ as People/Human-Oriented vs Dehumanisation

This is a combination of two key principles: Galtung's "PJ as people-oriented" and what I term "PJ as human-oriented". The former centres on "people peacemakers" and "naming all evil doers" (Galtung, 2006, p. 1). In CDS terms, "PJ as people-oriented" foregrounds the social actors engaged in peace-making. This can be actualised through activation, nomination, individualisation, personalisation, and specification. However, it is insufficient to deem a news outlet's approach as peace journalistic solely by revealing the identities of these social actors. Hence, it is preferable to employ "PJ as human-oriented" or "humanisation", as termed by Chouliaraki (2006), as a complement to "PJ as people-oriented".

I contend that "Human-oriented reporting" can be viewed as a principle reinforcing the pro-democratic perspective, which seeks to uphold democratic values, including popular control, civil liberties, and respect for human rights (Beetham, 1998, p. 21). Principally, "PJ as human-oriented" demonstrates understanding and empathy towards the situation of individuals in the conflict zone, giving them a voice (McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000). More specifically, it empowers them to act or express their thoughts about their circumstances (Chouliaraki, 2013, p. 25). In CDS terminology, this can be achieved using two types of transitivity processes. The first is material processes highlighting the protesters' active involvement in the protests, such as "have defied" and "resumed", as exemplified below:

*46. Tens of thousands of Algerians have defied large contingents of riot police and resumed mass demonstrations against ailing... (AJE8Mar19).*

The second lies in projected clauses to express their perspectives on the conflict, their coping mechanisms, and potential solutions for resolution (McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000). In the case of PJ, projected clauses can take the form of both material and cognitive mental processes, as illustrated in the following instances:

*148. "... We, the people, will answer to his letter by massively and peacefully taking the streets" (AJE3Mar19)*

*149. Abderrahmane...agreed. "The content of this letter does not meet the population's expectations" (AJE3Mar19).*

Therefore, "PJ as people/human-oriented" should not only reveal the identities of social actors, but also involve them in conflict resolution. This extends beyond focusing solely on their emotions expressed through negative affective mental and relational processes. Genuine peace journalistic reporting should encompass quotes on the strategies people employ to adapt to the

conflict and the potential means to resolve it, utilising both material and cognitive mental processes.

If "PJ as human-oriented" revolves around the idea of "seeking the other in the self" (McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000) by humanising all parties and involving people in the peace-making process, "Dehumanisation" is oriented towards an "Us vs Them" representation (Galtung, 2006, p. 1). Dehumanisation can be considered a characteristic of the orientalist tendency, which aims to construct an "evaluatively derogatory perception of the "Orient" or the "East", contrasted with the "Occident" or the "West" (Said, 1978, p. 23). Galtung 2006, p. 1) argues that such tendencies in news reporting "dehumanise them", referring to the primary social actors mentioned in the reports, and "portray them as the problem". Similarly, McGoldrick and Lynch (2000) note that this distinction can indicate that the other party is a threat or "beyond the pale" of civilised behaviour". In this study, dehumanisation is realised both overtly and covertly. The overt form involves the use of negatively charged referential and predicational strategies when referring to social actors. An example of this is the use of "stone-throwing" (BBC8Mar19) when describing "the protesters" in clashes with the police. The covert form involves backgrounding social actors through exclusion, assimilation, collectivisation (including objectivation and abstraction), and nominalisation concerning the 2019 AH's peacefulness and main outcomes. An example is the use of the abstract/nominalised term "protests" rather than "protesters" when discussing the peacefulness of the 2019 AH and highlighting the protesters in relation to violence.

Victimisation can also be a form of dehumanisation, expressed through activating protesters in relation to negative affective mental and relational processes that reflect their troubled state. Examples from the data include the use of the mental process "wanted" and the attribute "afraid", as demonstrated below:

*158. "...They are afraid that the demonstrations will descend into violence" (F24 1Mar19 (1)), "they want to get rid from the regime peacefully" (F24 1Mar19 (1)).*

Victimisation can also be realised by intransitive material processes which has no material effects such as "protested, rallied, marched..." and verbal processes including chanted, shouted..., namely if these processes are juxtaposed with violent material processes. An indicative instance is the following.



55. *“Regime murderers”, groups of flag-waving demonstrators chanted as riot police used tear gas to try to prevent them from reaching key central locations in Algiers, several independent news outlets reported (F24 1Mar19 (1)).*

Consequently, dehumanisation as a form of WJ can manifest both overtly, using negatively charged language when referring to social actors, and covertly, through backgrounding them in relation to positively framed predicates, relying primarily on assimilation, nominalisation, abstraction, and exclusion. Victimisation, a subtype of dehumanisation, can be expressed through intransitive material processes with no obvious material outcomes, especially when paired with negative violent material processes as indicated in instance 55 above.

#### **4.7.3. WJ as Propaganda-Oriented**

War journalism (WJ) is often described as "propaganda-oriented" (Galtung, 2006, p. 1). Before delving into this, it is essential to clarify the term "propaganda" as employed in this study. Foley (2021, p. 2) contends that the definition of "propaganda" varies due to its contentious nature. In this study, I adopt Ryan and Switzer's (2009, p. 49) interpretation of propaganda, which suggests that “propagandists typically serve someone's narrow agenda, make claims that lack evidence, disseminate falsehoods and deception, provide incomplete or misleading information, serve authority figures, and conceal or obscure their own interests and biases”. Foley (2021, p. 2) emphasises that propaganda, particularly in Western media, “does not overtly label itself as such”. Instead, it achieves propagandist objectives through the framing of issues, emphasis, and omission, favouring specific sources, perspectives, and information over potential alternatives, as well as through the use of language (both verbal and visual) to achieve these effects (Jowett and O'Donnell, 2018). Foley (2021, p. 3) suggests additional mechanisms such as “selection, omission, and contradiction”. Based on the findings of this study, I would propose "intensification" as another property that may contribute to the propaganda of violence.

In the process of selecting news, Schudson (1995, p. 14) argues that while news stories typically aim to address the five journalistic questions, what, who, where, when, how, decisions regarding what becomes news often involve "presences" and "absences”. Van Leeuwen refers to these presences and absences as “inclusion and exclusion”, which pertain not only to the social actors but also to the events reported and how they are presented. In terms of news presentation, selection can be achieved through Fairclough's (1995a, pp. 120-121) foregrounding and backgrounding within complex clauses, or the ordering of clauses to create

a specific effect. The foregrounded element, or theme as termed by Halliday, represents "the topic of the clause" (Fairclough, 1995a, p. 120) and "the element the clause focuses on" (Halliday, 1994, p. 37). Theme carries informational significance, often linked to specific sentential positions, including sentence-initial and sentence-final positions, which can be seen as positions of thematic emphasis (Fairclough, 1995a, pp. 120-121). For example:

*74. Security forces in riot gear fired tear gas to block a march on to the presidential palace in the capital, Algiers. But protests in the rest of country passed off peacefully (BBC22F19).*

By positioning the process "fired tear gas" at the beginning, the reader's attention may be directed towards the few instances of violence, potentially magnifying their significance while downplaying the peaceful protests, which are placed at the end.

"Omission" can result from the selection process and may serve as an alternative to Van Leeuwen's (2008) exclusion of social actors, taking the forms of suppression and backgrounding (see section 4.5.3). This may include "passive agent deletion" in cases where the focus is on the presence of security forces, or "arrested" and "injured" when highlighting protesters who are portrayed as victims. Another tool for omission could be "Impersonalisation", involving abstraction and objectivation. Abstraction, for instance, can be achieved through terms like "unrest", attributing chaos and turbulence to protests across the entire country, as in "A wave of unrest began last month after..." (BBC8Mar19). An example of objectivation would be the use of "a police toll" in "According to a police toll, 56 police and seven demonstrators were hurt..." (F24 1Mar19 (1)).

It is important to note that propaganda of violence may manifest when the above-mentioned categories are present in reporting on violence, such as casualty reports, police presence, and clashes between protesters and the police.

Propaganda can also manifest through contradictions. According to de Marneffe et al (2008, p. 1037), "contradictions have the potential to highlight areas of contention and differences among positions". Journalists may inadvertently reveal the falsehood of previous statements through "complex differences in assertion structure, discrepancies based on world knowledge, and lexical contrasts" (de Marneffe et al, 2008, p. 1040). Contradictions may be found in different texts released by the same news source concerning the same event. For example, the BBC referred to the protests using the negatively connoted expression "a wave of unrest"

(BBC8Mar19) before Bouteflika's resignation and the positively connoted expression "weeks of peaceful...protests" (BBC3Apr19) after the resignation.

It is worth noting that detecting contradictions does not necessarily require comparing texts from the same source. Instead, contradictions can be identified by comparing different texts from various sources, as long as they report on the same event. An example of this is the use of contrasting terms, such as the negatively connoted "a wave of unrest" by the BBC and the positively connoted "mass-democratic celebration" by AJE when referring to the 19AH in reports on 8 March.

Finally, Reisigl and Wodak's concept of "intensification" (2001b) can be considered another mechanism for propaganda, particularly when applied in contexts related to violence. They view intensification as a strategy used to "qualify and modify the epistemic status of a proposition, the degree of certainty, and to modify the speakers' or writers' expressiveness as well as the persuasive impact on the hearers and readers" (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001b, p. 81). In news discourse, intensification can be realised through superlative adjectives, intensifying particles (e.g., "really", "absolutely", and various linguistic expressions that exaggerate or intensify statements, including metaphors, irony, and hyperbole (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001b, p. 83). For instance, the use of the hyperbolic expression "a wave of" by the BBC along with the term "unrest" when referring to the protests suggests that the level of unrest is not isolated or sporadic but rather has intensified or spread, potentially indicating a growing problem or crisis across the entire country.

#### **4.7.4 PJ as Solution-Oriented vs WJ as Problem-Oriented**

A solution-oriented approach to news reporting seeks to proactively mitigate the escalation of violence by emphasising and exploring peace initiatives from various sources, with a primary focus on conflict resolution and reconstruction (Galtung, 2006). From a linguistic perspective, this orientation can be effectively conveyed through the use of modal expressions such as should and can, as well as their adjectival equivalents like it is necessary and it is possible. For example:

*179. Nazim Taleb... said a transitional council was necessary to pave the way for a free and fair election in the country (AJE3Apr19).*

In contrast, the concept of "WJ as victory-oriented" is centered around notions that are more

pertinent to a wartime context, including the equation "peace = victory + cease-fire", the concealment of peace initiatives until victory is imminent, and the predominant focus on treaties (Galtung, 2006, p. 1). As an alternative and in opposition to "PJ as solution-oriented", I propose the term "WJ as problem-oriented". This proposed change is based on the findings from the data, which indicate that while AJE views the transitional period as a potential solution to the crisis, F24 portrays it as a significant problem (as elaborated in section 7.5). The explanation provided under section 4.7 is summarised in Table 3 below.

PEACE JOURNALISM	WAR JOURNALISM
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PJ as context-oriented</li> <li>• PJ is context-oriented, focusing on the conflict's profile and trends:</li> <li>• Exploring the 2019 AH's profile requires an in-depth examination of its political drivers through macro-strategies which revolve around political corruption.</li> <li>• Exploring the 2019 AH's current trends when reporting on the violent confrontations, for example, involves the use of exact locative expressions on their whereabouts.</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: center;">○</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WJ as a form of decontextualisation</li> <li>• WJ also addresses the conflict's profile and trends but includes irrelevant and sensitive historical issues that might threaten the unity of the Algerian people, such as the 1980 Berber Spring.</li> <li>• It tends to report on violence employing general locative expressions or omitting specific details, potentially drawing a negative picture on the movement as being dominantly violent.</li> </ul>
<p>2. PJ as PEOPLE/HUMAN-ORIENTED:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PJ as People/Human-Oriented gives names to all social actors and foregrounds those involved in peace-making. This can be realised with the following:</li> </ul>	<p>2. Dehumanisation as a form of WJ</p> <p>represents a us vs them orientation. Dehumanization can be overt or covert. The former is achieved by referring to the protesters through negatively charged referential and predicational strategies, while the latter can be realised by backgrounding</p>

<p>Activation, nomination, individualisation, personalisation, specification.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ In this approach, PJ revolves around seeking the other in the self (McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000) by showing understanding and empathy to the protesters' situation, highlighting their achievements, and providing them with a platform to express themselves. This can be realised using the following:</li> <li>○ First, positive material and relational processes which highlight the protesters' involvement in their movement.</li> <li>○ Second, projected clauses where the protesters are quoted on their views about the conflict, their adaptive measures, and possible solutions. These projected clauses can take the form of transitive material and cognitive mental processes, showcasing the protesters' political awareness.</li> </ul>	<p>them in relation to their movement's positive outcomes through exclusion, nominalization, and objectivation.</p> <p>The covert form of dehumanisation can also be expressed through victimisation, realised by passivation, either as a goal or agent in transitive material processes, both active and passive.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• dehumanisation's related projected clauses centre on violence using violence related material processes or the protesters' feelings using negative affective mental and relational processes.</li> <li>•</li> </ul>
	3. WJ as propaganda-oriented

	<p>This approach serves to highlight potential biases in the three news outlets' coverage and framing of the 2019 AH, shedding light on occasions where their reports may be inclined towards violence at the expense of peace. This can be realised with the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Selection: news selection involves choices related to both inclusion and exclusion, not only to social actors, but also to the reported events and their presentation. In terms of news presentation, Fairclough's (1995a, pp. 120-121) foregrounding and backgrounding within complex clauses, or ordering of clauses serve as selection mechanisms. The foregrounded element carries informational weight, whereas the backgrounded element is less important.</li><li>• Omission: this technique involves intentionally leaving out specific information or details from a news story, report, or narrative, using for instance passive agent deletion</li></ul>
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contradictions: this involves the Identification of instances where conflicting narratives or information are present. This could include contradictory statements from different sources, inconsistent reporting on events, or varying perspectives on a particular issue.</li> <li>• Intensification: this strategy refers to the strategic use of language to amplify or exaggerate certain aspects of the movement. This can involve employing superlative adjectives, intensifying particles, metaphors, irony, and hyperbole, particularly in violence-related contexts.</li> </ul>
<p>4. Solution-oriented</p> <p>This approach focuses on presenting not only the problems and conflicts but also potential solutions and positive actions. It seeks to highlight efforts towards resolution, reconciliation, and peacebuilding.</p>	<p>4. WJ as problem-oriented</p> <p>This approach tends to focus primarily on the negative aspects of the 2019AH. It emphasizes violent confrontations and future uncertainties often without providing a clear view of peace-building efforts or potential solutions.</p>

Table 3: P/WJ's Adapted Model as a Complement to CDS

## **4.8 Summary of the Chapter**

This chapter has commenced with a comprehensive elucidation of the criteria, methodologies, and presentation format employed in the selection of data (Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4). Subsequently, it has delineated the linguistic features subjected to analysis in this study (Section 4.5). This analysis has commenced with an examination of Reisigl and Wodak's referential and predicational strategies, as these strategies facilitate the examination of how social actors are referred to and the implicit and explicit values ascribed to them (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001b; 2009; 2016) (Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2).

The chapter has also demonstrated the utility of Halliday's transitivity (2004) as a predicational strategy in identifying the diverse worldviews that the three news outlets endeavoured to construct. This was achieved through a systematic comparison of the distinct grammatical structures and their respective discursive functions. However, as previously noted, the identification of participants in Halliday's terms alone does not suffice in revealing how a particular social actor is represented, especially considering that language offers an array of options for reference and evaluation that extend beyond the functional participant categories of SFG (Hart, 2014, p. 33). Consequently, the chapter has explored certain semantic categories proposed by Van Leeuwen (2008) (Section 4.5.3).

The presentation and interpretation of the CDS textual findings were organised using an analytical framework that incorporates Unger's (2013) macro-strategies and aspects of representation (Section 4.6). The concept of macro-strategies refers to groupings of micro-textual features that may collectively contribute to the construction of specific representations of social actors, actions, or phenomena. Similar macro-strategies were categorised under common aspects of representation. To facilitate the interpretation of the textual findings and to enhance the depth of my analysis, this study proposed an adapted version of Galtung's P/WJ model, which is argued to be a valuable complement to CDS (Section 4.7).



## Chapter 5

### The Start of the 2019 AH against Bouteflika's Fifth-Term Bid

#### 5.1. Introduction

This chapter constitutes the first of two findings' chapters dedicated to the examination of the portrayal of the 2019 AH's key events by the BBC, F24, and AJE 's news websites. More specifically, it delves into the second research inquiry concerning the commonalities and disparities among these three news websites in their presentation of the 2019 AH during its initial sixteen days, spanning from 22nd February to 9th March 2019. Furthermore, it seeks to answer the third research question which centres on the identification of the possible latent ideological underpinnings behind such portrayals.

Within the identified timeframe, a total of twenty-one news reports were disseminated, with the BBC contributing five, F24 providing seven, and AJE producing nine. As have been elucidated in section 4.5, the analysis centres on the examination of Reisigl and Wodak's (2001b) referential and predicational strategies, with a particular emphasis on transitivity (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004). For an exhaustive and comprehensive analysis of the referential strategies, elements from Van Leeuwen's Social Actor Model (2008) are incorporated. To substantiate the interpretation of the linguistic findings, the frequency of the occurrence of certain linguistic patterns is cited when deemed necessary. To organise the textual findings, the discursive strategies which perform similar functions are grouped under Macro-Strategies (Unger, 2013). Similar macro-strategies of representation are mapped to form one aspect of representation. In order to maintain an engaging presentation of the analysis, I start with one aspect of representation and explain it in accordance with its macro-strategies. Meanwhile, I provide indicative examples that make up each macro-strategy (see section 4.6).

Overall, the analysis suggests a consensus among the three news websites regarding the 2019 AH being a legitimate response to Bouteflika's quest for a fifth term (section 5.2.). However, upon closer examination, distinct disparities become evident between AJE, and the BBC/F24 in their coverage of the protesters and their protests. AJE's perspective seems to be more pro-democratic, predominantly portraying the 2019 AH positively as a peaceful and transformative movement. In contrast, the perspectives of the BBC and F24 seem to carry certain Orientalist undertones, depicting the movement more negatively with a focus on its alleged violence. This portrayal appears to contradict the argument advanced in Chapter 2, which posits that the 2019 AH was indeed a peaceful movement, and its non-violent character was influenced by valuable lessons derived from prior experiences of instability, both within Algeria and beyond.

This dichotomy in how the 2019 AH is portrayed, with AJE on one side and the BBC and F24 on the other, may be attributed to a range of contextual factors. These factors encompass the political, social, economic, and historical dimensions that evidently shaped the discourse surrounding the 2019 AH's actions and actors during the movement's initial sixteen days. These contextual factors are intricately intertwined with power relations, where the influence and interests of various political and social actors play a significant role in shaping the divergent narratives within the global news landscape during this crucial period in Algerian history.

## **5.2 The 2019 AH as a Legitimate Action against Bouteflika's Fifth Term**

This aspect of representation delves into the portrayal of the 2019 AH by AJE, the BBC, and F24 as a legitimate response to Bouteflika's fifth term in office. By examining their reports on the movement's initial sixteen days, common macro-strategies are identified, particularly those related to the factors contributing to its emergence. The first macro-strategy involves the depiction of Bouteflika as physically incapacitated, possibly rendering him incapable of fulfilling his presidential duties due to health and age-related concerns (Section 5.2.1). The second characterises Bouteflika as a long-standing president who shows reluctance to relinquish control, raising questions about the democratic nature of his rule (Section 5.2.2). The third strategy, more pronounced in F24's reports, emphasises the adverse social and psychological impact of the authoritarian practices of their political regime, particularly on the nation's youth (Section 5.2.3).

Therefore, the way in which these issues are linguistically addressed by the three news outlets can be seen as a reflection of their editorial values. These values prioritise factual reporting and include the provision of essential contextual information, especially when dealing with sensitive topics like the 2019 AH. This adherence to factuality and contextual depth in their reporting suggests a commitment to delivering comprehensive and balanced news coverage (see sections 2.3.1.2, 2.3.2.2, and 2.3.3.2). It is important to acknowledge that the BBC and F24's portrayal of Bouteflika's rule as authoritarian and the Algerian political system as undemocratic should be viewed within the broader context of historical narratives and the concept of Orientalism, given their status as global Western news outlets (a thorough explanation is presented throughout the subsequent sections).

It is noteworthy that F24's stance towards Bouteflika appears somewhat ambivalent. While it highlights his incapacitation and authoritarian rule, akin to the other two news outlets, it concurrently portrays him positively as Algeria's hero (Section 5.2.4). This ambivalence may reflect the complex nature of international relations, where historical legacies and diplomatic considerations sometimes interplay with democratic ideals, making it important to consider the multifaceted roles played by global news institutions in their coverage of such issues.

In this context, it is crucial to recognise the impact of historical narratives and the concept of Orientalism in framing the depiction of Algeria by Western news outlets, while also acknowledging the evolving democratic landscape and the role of news institutions in reflecting these complexities.

### 5.2.1. Bouteflika as an incapacitated President

The first macro-strategy highlighting the legitimacy of the 2019 AH against Bouteflika's fifth term centres on his depiction as unfit for his presidential role. In twenty-one reports, Bouteflika is described as "president" (47 times), "ruler" (once), "head of state" (twice), and "leader" (eight times), but these terms often imply vulnerability due to three recurring linguistic patterns denoting his incapacity. See table 4 below for a full overview.

Referential and Predicational Strategies	BBC	AJE	F24
President	17	18	12
Head of state	0	1	0
Ruler	0	1	0
Leader	1	3	4
81/82-years-old	6	7	5
Ailing	1	7	6
Suffer/suffering a stroke	3	7	6

Table 4. Referential and Predicational Strategies of Bouteflika

The first pattern features the repeated use of the material process "suffered/suffering a stroke", which may imply passivity and weakness. The process occurs sixteen times: three times in the BBC, seven in AJE, and six in F24. The BBC also mentions him in "undergoing medical checks" twice. Additionally, he is placed as an actor in the process "uses a wheelchair". Illustrative excerpts are provided below.

1. *The Algerian premier...has rarely been seen in public since **suffering** a stroke in 2013 (BBC22F19).*
2. *Bouteflika...**suffered** a debilitating stroke that confined **him** to a wheelchair in 2013 (AJE5Mar19).*
3. *The leader has been largely out of sight since he **suffered** a stroke in 2013 that confined **him** to a wheelchair and severely impaired his speech (F24 8Mar19).*
4. *He has rarely been seen in public since suffering a stroke in 2013 and **is** currently **undergoing** medical checks in Switzerland (BBC1Mar19).*
5. *The 81-year-old, who **uses a wheelchair** (AJE22F19, 23F19).*

The three processes "suffered/suffering", "is undergoing", and "uses", despite their material nature, they emphasise Bouteflika's weakness and incapability. In instances 5 and 6, Bouteflika is activated in connection with the material process "uses a wheelchair", which, within van Leeuwen's framework (2008), may be construed as a physical identification. This deployment serves to direct the reader's focus towards his physical attributes, particularly the nature of his disability.

Two additional linguistically significant choices that contribute to the portrayal of Bouteflika as being incapacitated are the adjectival attributes "81/82-year-old" and "ailing". Illustrative passages are presented below.

6. *Tens of thousands of Algerian students have joined the protests against **81-year-old President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's** decision to run for a fifth term (BBC27F19).*

7. *Tens of thousands in Algeria have taken to the streets angry at **81-year-old President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's** plan to seek a fifth term in office (BBC1Mar19).*
8. *The 81-year-old **head of state** uses a wheelchair... AJE22F19).*
9. *as the **ailing** leader was scheduled to go to Switzerland for a medical check-up (F24 24F19).*

As is evident, Bouteflika is functionally represented through the utilisation of three referential strategies: "president", "head of state", and "leader". These designations are typically attributed to the individual who occupies the highest office or exercises control over a nation, particularly in the context of a republic. However, the three referential strategies are assessed negatively as they are coupled with the attributes "ailing" and "81/82-year-old". This connotes vulnerability which stems from health and age-related concerns. Additionally, AJE employs two other attributes to underscore Bouteflika's incapacitation: "wheelchair-bound" and "a puppet". Specific instances are provided below.

12. *...prompting critics to question whether he is being used as **a puppet** candidate...(AJE8Mar19).*

The employment of such "offensive" attributes by AJE may be traced back to the network's discord with authoritarian Arab governments, including Bouteflika's regime. The latter took the decision to close the network's bureau in June 2004, citing allegations of interference in Algeria's domestic affairs (Mokhfi, 2014, p. 5).

I would argue that AJE's use of negative terminology, coupled with the repetitive inclusion of the attributes "81-82-year-old" and "ailing" by the three news outlets, can be seen as offensive towards Bouteflika in his role as president. This contravenes the established norms of PJ, which advocate for journalists to show respect towards the individuals they report on and to refrain from using derogatory language (Mensah, 2015). Furthermore, I would contend that the repetition of such attributes is superfluous, given that the three news outlets employed alternative linguistic choices, including the transitive processes "suffered" and "suffering", as well as "uses a wheelchair", which should suffice to convey Bouteflika's incapacitation.

The second feature that underscores Bouteflika's incapacitation is passivisation. This is achieved by positioning him as the Goal in the two Transitive Material processes "picked" and "putting...forward", respectively. Instances are provided below.

13. *Bouteflika's re-election bid comes after the ruling FLN party **picked him** as its official presidential candidate (AJE22F19), (F24 23F19).*

14. *Keenan told Al Jazeera the "gang" around the presidency had "miscalculated hugely" in **putting the war veteran forward** for a fifth term (AJE9Mar19).*

The two transitive Material processes, "picked" and "putting...forward" illustrate that Bouteflika, as a goal, is being utilised as an object or instrument by certain political actors, namely the "FLN party" and "the gang", to further their own interests. Metaphorically, he is portrayed as a pawn in a chess game orchestrated by "the gang around the presidency" and "the FLN", who are depicted as the primary beneficiaries of Bouteflika's extended tenure in power. More significantly, these two processes depict Bouteflika as being unaware of his surroundings. Instead of being the one responsible for his decision to participate in April's elections, the decision appears to have been made by other actors, abstracted under "the gang" and "the ruling FLN party".

### 5.2.2. Bouteflika as an Authoritarian president

It appears that there is a consensus among the three news outlets regarding the centrality of democracy and democratic reforms as a prerequisite for change in Algeria. In addition to their portrayal of Bouteflika as incapacitated, the three news outlets emphasise the issue of authoritarianism. This is accomplished through a negative portrayal of him as an authoritarian president for twenty years, employing various grammatical and lexical choices. To start with, AJE and the BBC use two processes, material and verbal in the form of nominalisation, in which the actor and sayer are excluded. For example:

15. *Bouteflika **was brought in** to head a transition period in 1999 (AJE23F19).*

16. *Abdelaziz Bouteflika came to power in 1999 **despite allegations of election fraud** (BBC22F19).*

AJE and the BBC employ two important constructions to report on how Bouteflika came to power in 1999. The first consists of the passive transitive material process "was brought in to head", where the identity of those responsible for Bouteflika's ascent to power is excluded. Furthermore, there is no mention or reference to general elections, which might imply that the electoral process lacked transparency. This lack of transparency, implied in AJE's instance, is

expressed differently but clearly in the BBC's instance through the prepositional phrase “despite allegations of election fraud”. By using the nominalisation “allegation”, the agency of the Sayer is concealed, with the intention of drawing the reader's focus to the term “election fraud”. Therefore, the first indication of authoritarianism in Algeria is the absence of institutional democracy particularly in the form of transparent and free elections, as stated by Bedeski (2009). He highlights that, in a healthy democracy, elections are a fundamental mechanism for citizens to express their preferences and choose their representatives. These elections are expected to be conducted fairly, without manipulation or interference, allowing for a genuine representation of the will of the people (ibid). The undisclosed narrative regarding Bouteflika's rise to power and the individuals who aided him in doing so led the three news outlets to portray him in relation to instrumental material actions, both transitive, such as "has held office" and “has ruled Algeria”, and intransitive, such as "came to power" and “has clung to power”, from which the Algerian people are excluded. Illustrative excerpts are provided below.

17. *Bouteflika, who **came to power in 1999**... (F24 26F19).*

18. *Bouteflika, 81, who **has clung to power since 1991** (F24 26F19).*

19. *The Algerian premier **has held office since 1999**... (BBC22F19).*

20. *Bouteflika, who has ruled the North African country since 1999... (AJE23F19)*

21. *Bouteflika himself has ruled Algeria since 1999 (AJE1Mar19).*

22. *The president...**has ruled Algeria for 20 years** (BBC8Mar19).*

The activation of Bouteflika in transitive and intransitive material processes, where the Algerian people are excluded, along with the repetition of the year 1999 and the mention of “20 years”, might imply an authoritarian rule and a monopoly of power for two decades. Furthermore, referencing Algeria as "the North African country" in instance 18 could subtly serve as a reminder to the reader about the region's history with authoritarianism. Historically, the region has been governed by either monarchs, such as in Morocco, or dictators, as is the case in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. For instance, Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali ruled Tunisia for 20 years (Howard and Hussain, 2013, p. 1), Gaddafi led Libya for four consecutive decades without presidential elections, and Egypt was under Mubarak's rule for 30 years (ibid). The use of the term "ruler" and the noun "the rule of Bouteflika" in the following examples are two additional features that might suggest Bouteflika's authoritarian disposition.

23. ...as 81-year-old **ruler** announces re-election bid (AJE22F19).

24. Algerians protesting against the **rule of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika** have staged huge demonstrations in the capital, Algiers, and other cities (BBC8Mar19).

In general, the term “rule”, especially in the context of republics like Algeria, carries a predominantly negative connotation, often associated with concepts of control, dominance, and the exercise of power over people (Joudeh and Atheeb, 2020, p. 704). This negative undertone is further underscored by the inclusion of the descriptive label “81-year-old”, which might imply a dominance of elderly figures in a country 'where half the population is under 30' (F24 1Mar19 (2)). Furthermore, the utilisation of the noun phrase 'the rule of Bouteflika' as an indirect complement in the transitive material process “protesting”, introduced by the preposition “against”, suggests that the populace harbours discontent towards Bouteflika's political regime due to its perceived authoritarian practices.

Another notable characteristic of authoritarian regimes, as outlined by Bedeski (2009, p. 2), is the suppression of citizens' freedoms of action and thought, thereby making it challenging for them to form opposition groups. This aspect is conveyed by AJE and F24 through the evaluative prepositional phrase “with little space” and the descriptive adjectival attribute “restrictive”, both of which attribute negative qualities to Bouteflika's political system. Illustrative examples are provided below.

25. Because of the extreme brutality of that conflict, many Algerians have long tolerated **a restrictive political system** in return for peace and stability (F24 26F19).

26. Many Algerians have long tolerated **a political system with little space for dissent** as a price to pay for peace and stability (AJE1Mar19).

I would say that Bouteflika was indeed authoritarian, and his difficult health situation cast a shadow on Algeria's economy and society. Nonetheless, his representation by the three news outlets, including the BBC, is not as negative as the way the latter represented Gaddafi after his murder. Mensah (2015, p. 96) noticed the use of dehumanising language, such as "a fugitive running away from justice" and “a threat to democracy”. He suggested that such representation is offensive to his supporters and sympathisers. In addition, it violates one of PJ's norms, which requires journalists to show respect to the represented actors, minimise harm, and also be mindful of cultural values different from theirs (ibid). This asymmetrical representation between Bouteflika on one hand and Gaddafi on another might be ascribed to two reasons.



The first reason stems from the fact that the former resigned quickly after five weeks from the start of protests. The latter, by contrast, refused to cede power. Alduhaim (2019, p. 633) writes that he was expelled from the Libyan capital, Tripoli, in August 2011 after massive demonstrations against him and a NATO and U.S.-led international military intervention. The intervention resulted in his murder on 20th October 2011. The second reason behind the asymmetrical representation of Bouteflika and Gaddafi might relate to the nature of the political rule in the two states. Both of them are republics. However, while the Algerian government used to organise general presidential elections at the end of each term, Libya had never witnessed elections during the rule of Gaddafi since 1969 (BBC Trust, 2012, p. 18).

Hence, representing Bouteflika as incapacitated to undertake his presidential duties and authoritarian as part of the 2019 AH's context by the BBC, F24, and AJE can be seen as a reflection of the news outlets' editorial values. These values prioritise factual reporting and include the provision of essential informative contextual information about global events. This adherence to factuality and contextual depth in their reporting might suggest a commitment to delivering comprehensive and balanced news coverage.

The BBC's representation of Bouteflika can be seen as in alignment with the news outlet's commitment to providing comprehensive and accurate reporting (BBC Guidelines, 2011). The corporation, known for its dedication to journalistic standards, such as comprehensiveness and accuracy, is likely to base its portrayal of Bouteflika's incapacitation on verifiable facts and solid evidence, ensuring the integrity of its reporting. In the case of authoritarianism, particularly within a sensitive political context, the BBC may frame it in a manner that underscores the importance of transparency and government accountability, reflecting its dedication to delivering balanced and informative reporting.

Turning to F24, its representation of Bouteflika as incapacitated and authoritarian may be interpreted as a manifestation of its commitment to providing essential context and comprehensive news coverage to its audience (France 24, no date). When addressing authoritarianism, F24's framing might emphasise the significance of democratic values and human rights, aligning with its mission to promote French values on a global scale and reporting on world events from a "French perspective" (DUFOUR, 2017, p. 7).

Concerning AJE, its representation of Bouteflika as incapacitated and authoritarian likely resonates with the network's editorial values of advocating for government transparency (Aljazeera, 2006). AJE's reporting may accentuate the need for political change and reform in

the region, and its commitment to factuality and contextual depth could be in line with its mission of presenting diverse viewpoints and facilitating informed discussion (Eliades, 2006, p. 6; El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2004, p. 319). In the case of the 2019 AH, AJE's reporting is likely aimed at providing a nuanced understanding of the situation, drawing upon its role as a global news outlet with regional expertise. However, it is important to conduct a thorough analysis of the nuanced portrayal of authoritarianism in Algeria by the BBC and F24 on one hand and AJE on the other. These interpretations are not solely based on the current political situation but may be deeply influenced by historical legacies of colonialism and Western perceptions of Algeria as part of the 'Orient'.

The Western media outlets, the BBC and F24, may carry the historical burden of colonialism in their coverage of Algeria. The historical ties between Western colonial powers, such as the UK and France, and Algeria, along with broader 'Orientalist' perspectives, subtly shape how they present Algeria's political landscape. While they seem to express concerns about authoritarian tendencies, it is vital to acknowledge that their portrayals are not just a reflection of the lack of institutional democracy in Algeria. Instead, they must be understood within the intricate historical and geopolitical context in which they arise. The Western media's involvement with Algeria is influenced by complex historical legacies and power dynamics, including their role as global news sources representing colonial powers' perspectives and potential Western political and economic interests in the region. As such, their depiction of Algeria's political landscape might be intertwined with these broader factors, making it a multifaceted issue.

On the other hand, AJE, with its regional and global perspective, may consider different historical and geopolitical factors. Its interpretation of authoritarianism in Algeria could be influenced by the broader regional context, dynamics within the MENA, and AJE's mission to amplify underrepresented voices. AJE's framing may emphasise the necessity of political change and reform within the region, especially as the network is known for its support to the Arab peoples in their fight against their authoritarian regimes (Eliades, 2006, p. 6).

Hence, the contrasting interpretations of authoritarianism in Algeria by these news outlets should be viewed through the lens of intricate historical and geopolitical elements that shape their reporting. While concerns about authoritarian tendencies are evident, these concerns are part of a more extensive, multifaceted narrative involving historical legacies, Western perceptions, and the power dynamics that influence how the international media portrays

Algeria's political landscape. F24, in particular, highlights the adverse impact of authoritarianism on the youth as will be explained under the subsequent macro-strategy.

### **5.2.3 the Algerian Youth as a Victim of the Authoritarian Practices of its Political System**

F24, in particular, represent the 2019AH as a legitimate action by depicting the youth as victims of Bouteflika's autocratic political system. This macro-strategy is expressed through affective mental processes such as "have long tolerated" and "struggle", along with the adjectival attribute "disgruntled", which highlights their challenging living and psychological conditions.

*28. Because of the extreme brutality of that conflict, many Algerians have long tolerated **a restrictive political system** in return for peace and stability (F24 26F19).*

The actor "Algerians" is predicated with the aggregation "many". It is represented dynamically as a Sensor in the Mental Process "have long tolerated". The process also suggests that Algerians have endured autocratic practices for a long time due to their prioritisation of the country's stability over individual interests, portraying this as a "price to pay". It also implies that they have accepted these practices reluctantly to avoid a repeat of the extreme brutality experienced in the 1990s, as described by F24 with the hyperbole "the extreme brutality", which may have resulted from structural violence by top officials. Zraouia (2020) notes that when the 2019 AH began, former Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia warned against expressing objections and seeking reforms by invoking the fear of a return to the instability of the 1990s and the 2011 AS, a sentiment echoed by AJE in the following quote.

*29. Commenting on images of protesters offering flowers to policemen, Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia on Thursday warned that demonstrations in Syria had started in a similar fashion (AJE22F19).*

Second, F 24 seems to sympathise with the Algerian youth concerning the issue of unemployment. This is expressed through the mental process "struggle" twice. Instances are presented below.

*32. Calls to demonstrate have resonated with young Algerians, many of whom struggle for employment in a country where half the population is under 30 (F24 1Mar19 (2)).*

*33 many young people struggle to find jobs (F24 5Mar19).*

*34 More than a quarter of Algerians under 30 are unemployed, according to official figures (F24 23F19).*

In the instances mentioned above, the actor "the young people" is statistically addressed through quantifiers like "many" (instances 32 and 33) and "more than a quarter" (instance 34). It is associated with the mental process "struggle" twice and described as "disgruntled youth" which evokes emotional responses and highlights the perceived victimisation of the Algerian youth. Importantly, the choice to attribute affective rather than cognitive actions to social actors is regarded by Van Leeuwen (2008, p. 58) as an indication of a sense of powerlessness. This can, in turn, be interpreted as a manifestation of certain Orientalist traditions which often portrays the "Orient" as a place of suffering and in need of Western sympathy and intervention (Said, 1978, p. 43).

However, as previously noted in this chapter, F24's stance towards Bouteflika appears to be ambivalent. On one hand, its reports depict him as incapacitated and authoritarian (sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2), highlighting the struggles of Algerian youth with issues like unemployment (section 5.2.3). On the other hand, it portrays him as a hero of Algeria whose effective policies contributed to regaining and preserving peace in the country, as discussed below.

#### **5.2.4 Bouteflika as the Hero of Algeria**

This macro-strategy, exclusively present in F24's reports, revolves around the positive portrayal of Bouteflika as the hero of Algeria. It is realised by depicting him in Transitive Material processes with positive denotations and connotations, including "helped foster", "rode out the storm", "lifting", and "using". Instances are presented below.

*35. Bouteflika helped foster peace after a civil war in the 1990s (F24 1Mar19(1)).*

*36. ...he rode out the storm by lifting a 19-year state of emergency and by using oil revenues to grant pay rises (F24 1Mar19(1)).*

As can be noticed, Bouteflika's effective role in regaining and reinforcing Algeria's stability is acknowledged in the two instances. In instance 35, he is activated in relation to the two material processes "helped" and "foster" which represent him as the peacemaker after coming to power in 1999 after a long bloody decade. This was achieved by launching a charter for peace and reconciliation in 2004 not in 2002 as mentioned in the report published on 26th Feb. Another construction that activates Bouteflika in relation to ending the civil war is presenting him in

the PPS “for his role in ending the war” which modifies the descriptivised action gained respect” as shown in the following excerpt.

*37. ...Bouteflika gained respect from many for his role in ending the war...  
(F24 1Mar19 (1))*

In instance 36, Bouteflika is represented as an actor in the Material process “rode out the storm”, which is a metaphor whose conventional meaning is “to manage not to be destroyed, harmed, or permanently affected by the difficult situation you experience” (Cambridge Online Learners Dictionary). Considering the material process “rode out” along with the scope “the storm” in connection with the actor “Bouteflika”, it might suggest that more emphasis is placed on the actions he took during the 2010-11 AS to navigate and maintain his political position. It highlights his strategic measures, such as lifting the state of emergency and using oil revenues for economic concessions, as a means to withstand the challenges posed by the movement. F24, as a French news outlet, underscores these specific actions in the context of the political turbulence brought about by the Arab Spring. The AJE’s reports, however, express a similar idea, but through a different process with a different meaning as shown below.

*38. Bouteflika...was spared in the pro-democracy uprisings of the Arab Spring...(AJE22F19).*

The AJE’s instance primarily focuses on the outcome of the 2010-11 AS in relation to Bouteflika. It suggests that Bouteflika managed to survive politically during the Arab Spring, avoiding being overthrown or directly impacted by the pro-democracy movements such as the case in other Arab Spring countries. AJE's global perspective and focus on the Arab world emphasise Bouteflika's political resilience during a period of significant regional change.

Perhaps restoring peace to Algeria and acting intelligently to maintain its security after the outbreak of the 2010-11 AS could be among the main reasons behind labelling Bouteflika “the veteran leader” by F 24 as shown below.

*41. ...the veteran leader promised that if he wins the April poll, he will organise a "national conference" to set a date for further elections which he would not contest (F24 5Mar19).*

Bouteflika is positively represented through the reference “leader”, predicated with the attribute “veteran”. The reference “leader” has a positive connotation, notably as it is predicated with “veteran” which refers to a person with a lot of expertise in a particular field. This positive representation of Bouteflika can be attributed to his role in repairing Algerian French relations

after a long rupture. The rupture was triggered by historical issues, including France's reluctance to acknowledge its war crimes in Algeria and its efforts to erase the memory of the war from its historiography (see section 2.3.3.3). Furthermore, Bouteflika praised the French language and culture, asserting that it would play an important role in the Algerian educational system (Naylor, 2009). More significantly, Kahhal (2019) observes that during Bouteflika's era, France enjoyed economic privileges in Algeria that no other country received. Consequently, removing Bouteflika from power could pose a threat to France's interests, particularly its economic ones.

In summary, the critical analysis in section 5.2 has uncovered a common aspect in the reports from all three news outlets, which is the portrayal of the 2019 AH as a legitimate response to Bouteflika's fifth-term bid. This aspect is manifested through overarching macro-strategies. The first strategy revolves around depicting Bouteflika as physically incapacitated in carrying out his presidential duties (section 5.2.1). This incapacitation is conveyed through repetitive linguistic strategies, including the use of material transitive processes that connote vulnerability, such as "suffered/suffering a stroke", "is undergoing a medical check-up", and "uses a wheelchair", as well as adjectival attributes like "ailing" and "81/82-year-old." This repetition may serve persuasive purposes in portraying Bouteflika as unfit for his presidential role.

Furthermore, AJE employs two negatively connoted attributes, "the wheelchair-bound" and "a puppet" (AJE8Mar19). As discussed in section 5.2.1, these negatively connoted references might stem from the historical tensions between Bouteflika's government and AJE, whose bureau was closed in 2004 over allegations of interference in Algeria's domestic affairs (Mokhfi, 2004, p. 5). Additionally, the analysis demonstrates how Bouteflika is portrayed as passive, being the direct object in the two transitive material processes "picked" and "putting... forward". These processes could signify Bouteflika as a mere instrument used by certain actors to further their political interests. This portrayal could be perceived as a critique of democratic principles such as transparency and accountability, which are pivotal for a well-functioning institutional democracy (Beetham, 1999).

The second overarching macro-strategy that potentially legitimises the 2019 AH is the negative portrayal of Bouteflika as an authoritarian president (section 5.2.2). The three news websites employ a range of linguistic devices that imply authoritarian tendencies in Bouteflika's rule.

These include passive Agent Deletion in "was brought into head" (instance 15), the repetition of the two-time circumstances, "in/since 1999" and "for 20 years", and the activation of Bouteflika in transitive and intransitive material processes, where the Algerian people are excluded, such as "ruled Algeria", "came to power", and "has clung to power."

The impact of authoritarian practices extended to the Algerian populace, particularly the youth, who were portrayed in F24's reports as victims of the authoritarian practices within their political system (section 5.2.3). This portrayal is characterised by affective material processes like "has long tolerated" and the repeated use of the mental process "struggle". These linguistic choices might also signify a disregard for human rights and dignity, which are fundamental democratic principles that can only be achieved if Bouteflika's system undergoes significant reform.

The representations of Bouteflika as incapacitated and authoritarian by the BBC, AJE, and F24, along with the latter's depiction of the Algerian youth as victims of the authoritarian practices of their political system, can be understood within the context of these news outlets' editorial values. The BBC's portrayal aligns with its commitment to comprehensive and accurate reporting, emphasising verifiable facts and journalistic integrity (BBC Guidelines, 2011). F24 emphasises essential context and democratic values, reflecting its mission to promote what it refers to as "the French perspective" on global events (DUFOUR, 2017, p. 7). AJE's representation could be seen as a reflection of its perspective of advocating political reform in Arab authoritarian systems and facilitating informed discussion (Aljazeera, 2006).

However, it is important to note that such representation of Bouteflika, namely by the BBC and F24, is not solely a result of journalistic practices advocating for factuality and contextual depth. Rather, it may also be influenced by historical legacies of colonialism and Western perceptions of Algeria as part of the 'Orient'. Western media outlets like the BBC and F24 which belong to previous colonial powers, Britain and France, may carry the historical burden of colonialism, which could in turn shape their coverage of Algeria. Their portrayals are not just about institutional democracy but might be intertwined with complex historical and geopolitical factors, including representing colonial powers' perspectives and Western interests in the region. AJE's perspective may be influenced by broader regional dynamics and its mission to amplify underrepresented voices.

Interestingly, the analysis has revealed another macro-strategy, primarily prevalent in F24's reports, which centres on the positive depiction of Bouteflika as a hero of Algeria. This positive

representation is achieved through the use of transitive processes with positive connotations, such as "helped foster" and "rode out the storm" (instances 35 and 36). Such a positive portrayal may be linked to Bouteflika's role in repairing relations with France and preserving French interests in Algeria.

However, the analysis also reveals striking differences of representation between AJE, on one hand, and the BBC and F24, on the other. While AJE tends to highlight the predominantly peaceful nature of the movement, the BBC and F24, while acknowledging its peaceful aspects, seem to place a greater emphasis on instances of violence within the protests. These divergent representations may be attributed not only to editorial choices but also to the influence of power dynamics within the regions each outlet operates. The geopolitical context and nuanced relationships between these news outlets and the political environment likely played a role in shaping their narratives. It's crucial to recognise that these differences may not solely reflect the nature of the movement but could also be influenced by broader contextual factors and power relations within the media landscape.

### **5.3. The 2019 AH as a Dominantly Peaceful Movement**

The introductory analysis of the representation of the 2019 AH reveals a noteworthy aspect of representation predominantly present in AJE's reports. This aspect revolves around the positive portrayal of the 2019 AH as a primarily peaceful movement. This particular mode of representation within AJE's coverage is underpinned by the implementation of three discernible macro-strategies. The first portrays the protesters as strongly determined to change the political regime in their nation's political landscape (section 5.3.1). The second accentuates the peaceful nature of the protesters (section 5.3.2). Finally, the third delineates the weekly protests as being characterised more by peaceful demonstrations than by instances of violence (section 5.3.3).

These strategies employed by AJE in depicting the 2019 AH movement collectively serve to construct a narrative that positions the movement as a predominantly peaceful and determined force for change within the broader context of the Algerian political landscape. Such positive representation which could align with Van Dijk's (2021, p.147) "positive ideology" may be indicative of AJE's effort to adhere to its editorial policies as will be elaborated upon throughout the subsequent sections.



### 5.3.1 Protesters are Strongly Determined to Change the Political Regime

This macro-strategy revolves around the positive representation of the protesters as strongly determined to change the political regime in Algeria. It is realised with material processes both transitive and intransitive as shown below.

*42. Thousands of university students **have marched** in Algeria 's capital as peaceful rallies against President Abdelaziz Bouteflika 's bid to seek a fifth term continued for a second week (AJE5Mar19).*

The protesters are collectively identified as “Thousands of university students”, a reference that consolidates their identity. This reference is specifically associated with the intransitive process "marched", highlighting their active participation in peaceful demonstrations. Furthermore, the broader spectrum of social categories engaged in these protests is somewhat subdued, as they are alluded to through the term “rallies”, which is coupled with the description of these gatherings as “peaceful”. The unwavering commitment of these protesters is notably underscored through the use of the intransitive material process "continue”. This linguistic choice signifies their persistence and dedication to their cause, suggesting an enduring resolve to effect change.

It is worth noting that the peaceful nature of these demonstrations appears to have acted as a catalyst for wider participation. This is evident in the two subsequent instances, where the text suggests that the peaceful environment fostered by the protests has motivated a growing number of individuals to join the movement.

*43. **Thousands more** staged new anti-government protests on Monday in the capital and other cities, including **Oran, Constantine and Bouira**, according to witnesses and local TV footage (AJE3Mar19).*

*44. **Hundreds of** mostly young people once again demonstrated against Bouteflika 's plan, yelling chants and slogans such as “No fifth term” (3Mar19).*

In both instances, the actor “protesters” is aggregated using the two references “thousands more” and “hundreds of”, underscoring their ever-increasing number. This aggregation vividly conveys the idea that the protests are gaining momentum, with an influx of participants joining the cause. Their unwavering commitment to the movement is further emphasised through the use of "new anti-government protests" and the adverb "once again" in instances 43 and 44 respectively. These linguistic choices serve to highlight the persistence of the protesters in their pursuit of change. Moreover, the actor “thousands more”, in its association with the material

process “staged”, conveys a sense of agency and control exercised by the protesters themselves. This could align with the AJE’s editorial policies and missions, which centre on amplifying the voices of marginalised communities in the Southern hemisphere (Aljazeera, 2006). The deliberate selection of cities, as indicated by the circumstance in “...Oran, Constantine, and Bouira”, suggests that the protests have erupted nationwide. The inclusion of Oran in the west, Constantine in the east, and Bouira in the central region of Algeria signifies a widespread, coordinated movement encompassing the entire country.

Another compelling element that underscores the determination of the populace in their quest to challenge the regime is the projected clause “they will keep up...”. in the subsequent excerpt. This choice of words hints at a sustained and unwavering commitment to the cause, indicating that the protesters are resolute in their resolve to bring about change.

*45. Protesters in Algeria say they will **keep up** the pressure for political change, after a huge turnout at rallies across the country (AJE9Mar19).*

The use of the phrasal verb “keep up”, signifying the persistent exertion of pressure on the government without cessation, in conjunction with the future modal verb “will”, strongly implies the unwavering determination of the protesters to achieve “political change”. This linguistic construction conveys a sense of their long-term commitment to their cause, suggesting that they are resolute in their pursuit of transformation.

This representation of determination is further underscored through the deployment of two transitive material processes. Firstly, the phrase "have defied large contingents of riot police" vividly illustrates the protesters' defiance in the face of formidable opposition, highlighting their resilience and courage. Secondly, the expression "resumed mass demonstrations" indicates not only their persistence but also their ability to regroup and continue their collective action. This demonstrates their commitment to the cause, showcasing their readiness to mobilise and advocate for the desired political change.

*46. Tens of thousands of Algerians **have defied** large contingents of riot police and **resumed** mass demonstrations against ailing President Abdelaziz Bouteflika 's bid to extend his 20-year rule (AJE8Mar19).*

Employing the transitive material process "have defied" in conjunction with the goal “contingents of riot police” predicated by the adjectival attribute "a large" serves to highlight the remarkable courage of the protesters. This construction suggests that they exhibited such extraordinary bravery that they were not only able to confront riot police but also to

successfully organise additional demonstrations, described as “a huge turnout”. This portrayal underscores the protesters' resilience and their ability to overcome significant challenges in their pursuit of change.

In addition to being positively depicted by AJE as resolute in their determination to change the regime, the news outlet sheds light on the peaceful nature of the protesters. This aspect, which I consider to be a second macro-strategy, contributes significantly to the portrayal of the 2019 AH as predominantly peaceful. This representation is crucial in shaping the overall image of the movement as a non-violent force advocating for change.

### **5.3.2. Protesters are Peaceful**

This macro-strategy portrays the 2019 AH, particularly in its initial stages, as predominantly peaceful. This is achieved by positively representing the protesters as peaceful actors. This portrayal is accomplished through the repetition of linguistic structures laden with peace-related denotations and connotations. These structures include the adjectival attribute "peaceful" and its adverbial form “peacefully”, as well as the verb "march" and its past tense form “marched”.

Furthermore, this peaceful image is reinforced by the strategic choice of linguistic actors. These actors, whether aggregated as "hundreds" or assimilated as "protesters" or “demonstrators”, are activated in relation to material and behavioural processes that do not involve any adverse effects on other actors or entities. This means that their actions and behaviours, as depicted in the language, do not cause harm, disruption, or conflict with other parties, aligning with the peaceful nature attributed to the 2019 AH movement. This linguistic approach serves to establish a clear and consistent narrative of non-violence associated with the initial stages of the AH movement.

*47. Hundreds march in the capital and other cities amid heavy security  
(AJE22F19).*

Another noteworthy pattern that reinforces the peaceful nature of the protesters is observed through the utilisation of specific linguistic processes. In particular, the verbal process "chanted" and the material process "waving Algerian flags" stand out as significant linguistic choices that underscore the non-violent character of the demonstrators. Indicative instances are provided below.

48. *“No fifth mandate”, **chanted** the mostly young demonstrators, many waving Algerian flags, as they started to march through central Algiers (AJE22F19).*

The use of the verbal process "chanted" implies that the protesters are engaging in vocal expressions of their grievances or aspirations. Chanting is commonly known to be a form of peaceful and often symbolic protest, where individuals voice their concerns collectively. This linguistic choice indicates that the demonstrators are employing a non-confrontational means of communication to convey their message and make their demands heard. Likewise, the material process “waving Algerian flags” signifies a peaceful and patriotic act. Waving flags is a common gesture of national unity and pride, frequently employed in peaceful demonstrations to symbolise solidarity and a shared identity. This choice of language highlights the protesters' peaceful and civic engagement, as they express their allegiance to their country without resorting to violence. I would say that incorporating these specific linguistic processes into the narrative not only reinforces the notion of the protesters' peacefulness but also adds depth to the description of their non-violent actions and expressions during the 2019 AH.

It is worth noting that even the reports from the BBC and F24 exhibit similar linguistic features to those found in AJE's coverage, such as the frequent use of the nominalisation "a march" or its verbal form “marched”, as well as the repetition of the adjectival attribute "peaceful" and its adverbial form “peacefully”. However, the way these features are employed in the BBC and F24's reports seems somewhat different from that of AJE. In the case of the BBC's reports, while they do incorporate these peaceful descriptors, they do so in a more sparing manner when compared to the prevalence of grammatical and lexical choices related to violence. This discrepancy becomes more apparent in section 5.4, where I illustrate how violence-related language is more dominant in the BBC's texts.

On the other hand, F24's reports similarly acknowledge the peaceful nature of the protesters but adopt a unique approach by juxtaposing sentences that highlight police-perpetrated violence against the protesters. This narrative framing results in a more complex portrayal: on one hand, the protesters are depicted as peaceful advocating for change, as shown here, while on the other hand, they are portrayed as victims of the police's violent actions (section 5.4.3). Simultaneously, the police are cast as the enemy of the protesters (section 5.4.2).

### 5.3.3 Protests are More Peaceful than Violent

Before delving into the details of this macro-strategy, it is important to clarify the distinction between the two terms: "protests" and "the 2019 AH" as used in the headings "The 2019 AH as a Dominantly Peaceful Movement" (section 5.3.3) and "Protests are More Peaceful than Violent" (section 5.3.4). The assertion that the entire movement is peaceful is grounded in the representation of its weekly protests as primarily non-violent.

This macro-strategy is particularly evident in AJE's reports, where a deliberate effort is made to convey a prevailing sense of peacefulness within the 2019 AH. This is achieved through the use of various referential strategies that carry connotations of peace. For instance, AJE employs terms like "mass democratic celebrations" and "grassroot movement", both of which inherently evoke a sense of non-violence and civic engagement. These expressions not only describe the nature of the movement but also imbue it with positive, peaceful connotations. For instance:

*49. Nassim Bala, an Algerian political activist present at the protest in Algiers on Friday, said "the capital was gripped by a mass "democratic celebration" (AJE8Mar19).*

In this instance, AJE includes a quotation from an activist who characterises the protests as a "mass democratic celebration". This choice of terminology is significant as it conveys a powerful message about the nature of the 2019 AH. Notably, Kessar et al (2021) also commented on this expression in their study, highlighting its implications. According to Kessar et al (2021), referring to the protests as a "mass democratic celebration" suggests that the 2019 AH is fundamentally a non-violent movement. This description implies that the movement is led by individuals who prioritise peaceful and civil means of expression. In essence, it portrays the AH as a collective expression of democratic ideals and aspirations, aligning it with principles of non-violence and civil society engagement.

This representation is not limited to a single instance but can be discerned through multiple examples within AJE's reports. Such as the reference "movement" predicated with the attribute "large-scale grassroots" in the following instance.

*50. ...the president addressed for the first time the unprecedented large-scale grassroots **movement** calling for him to step down immediately and peacefully (AJE3Mar19).*

As evident in instance 50, AJE employs a set of positively connoted attributes to describe and predicate the reference "movement", thus crafting a distinctly positive image of the 2019 AH

as a peaceful entity. This positive representation is notably realised through the use of attributes like "largescale" and "grassroots". This choice of language serves to evoke a sense of unity and harmony among the diverse segments of society that make up the AH.

The term "movement" holds particular significance in this context. According to Leach and Haunss (2009, p. 259), a "movement" can be conceptualised as networks of individuals who share a common identity and a collective set of subcultural or countercultural beliefs, values, norms, and convictions. Simultaneously, it represents networks of physical spaces where members of that group congregate (ibid). This multifaceted understanding of a "movement" aligns well with Caruso's (2019, p. 1) definition of the 2019 AH as "a heterogeneous, inter-social, intercultural, and intergenerational movement for change". These definitions converge to emphasise the inclusive and peaceful nature of the 2019 AH, portraying it as a diverse yet harmonious force striving for positive transformation.

Therefore, the use of the expressions "mass democratic celebration" and "a largescale grassroots movement" when referring to the 2019 AH collectively reinforces the narrative that it is predominantly characterised by peaceful and civil activism, underlining its commitment to democratic change through non-violent means. Additionally, AJE employs the following complex sentence structure that places thematic emphasis on peace while downplaying violence, positioning the latter towards the end of the sentence.

*51. The protests **were mostly peaceful**, but **scuffles** broke out in the capital between police and protestors later in the day near the presidential palace, witnesses said (AJE1Mar19).*

The instance contains a distinct linguistic pattern at play here. It revolves around the use of the relational process that signify peace, "...were peaceful". This phrase is strategically placed at the beginning of the sentence, and it carries the additional qualifier "mostly", which underscores the overarching theme of non-violence within the 2019 AH. In contrast, the term "violence" is intentionally relegated to the end of the sentence, encapsulated within the reference "scuffles".

The choice of the reference "scuffles" in itself is significant. It suggests that any instances of violence were minimal and contained, evoking a sense of minor altercations rather than widespread turmoil. Furthermore, the specific location where these "scuffles" occurred is mentioned as "near the presidential palace", indicating that any violence was geographically limited and did not engulf the entirety of the protests. This strategic use of language subtly

redirects the reader's attention away from violent elements and towards the peaceful aspects of the movement, further reinforcing the overarching narrative of the 2019 AH as a predominantly peaceful force advocating for change.

Interestingly, It is worth noting that the BBC uses an opposing linguistic structure to construct a different narrative surrounding the protests, one that characterises them as predominantly violent. This contrasting approach will be explored further in section 5.4.6, shedding light on how the BBC's linguistic choices shape an alternative image of the AH movement that diverges from the predominantly peaceful portrayal found in AJE's coverage.

In summary, this aspect of representation in AJE's coverage is fundamentally concerned with presenting the 2019 AH as a predominantly peaceful movement. This portrayal is primarily achieved by positively depicting the protesters as resolute to bring about political change (5.3.1). This positive representation is consistently realised through a range of linguistic devices, including activating the protesters in relation to various processes such as intransitive material actions like "continued" and transitive actions like "staged new anti-government protests", "will keep up the pressure", and "have defied large contingents of riot police...resumed mass demonstrations" (instances 43, 45, 46). Additionally, adverbs like "once again", scopes like "new anti-government protests", and aggregative forms emphasising increasing numbers, such as "thousands more", "hundreds of mostly young people", "tens of thousands of Algerians", and "a huge turnout" contribute to this portrayal. These lexical and grammatical choices collectively signal a pro-democratic perspective, emphasising the people's agency and control over events.

Another macro-strategy that contributes to the positive depiction of the 2019 AH as predominantly peaceful is the representation of the protesters themselves as peaceful (section 5.3.2). This representation is achieved through the recurrent use of terms like "march" and "marched" in conjunction with the adjective "peaceful" and its adverbial form "peacefully", effectively highlighting the non-violent nature of the protesters' actions.

Furthermore, another significant macro-strategy involves representing the weekly protests as more peaceful than violent (section 5.3.3). This portrayal is realised by positively connoted attributes such as "unprecedented largescale grassroots movement" and "mass democratic celebration" (instance 50 and 49). These linguistic choices not only attribute positivity to the

protests but also suggest that the 2019 AH was not as violent as reported by the BBC and F24. This contrast is reinforced through a juxtaposing sentence that foregrounds peace as the dominant characteristic, modified by the quantifier “mostly” (instance 51). It is important to note that Kessar et al (2019) have also reached similar conclusions regarding AJE's positive representation of the protesters and their protests. They interpreted this positively as a sign of neutrality and friendly relations between Qatar and Algeria (ibid).

Upon closer examination, it becomes apparent that AJE's inclination to portray the 2019 AH movement as predominantly peaceful could align with its editorial policy and mission. This policy, as outlined in its Corporate Profile, emphasises providing a platform for marginalised voices and supporting movements advocating for democracy and social justice. AJE's approach not only conforms to the positive ideology but also challenges prevalent stereotypes in Western media that often depict Arab and Muslim movements as inherently violent or chaotic.

Analysis also reveals that AJE's reporting on the 2019 AH extends beyond highlighting the people's suffering; it actively showcases their efforts to instigate positive change in their status quo. This aligns with the principles of peace journalism (PJ), emphasising a proactive approach to objective reporting that seeks to promote positive transformations in power dynamics. It is noteworthy that while AJE does cover instances of violent confrontations, it consistently approaches such cases from a peace journalistic angle, as will be explored further in subsequent sections.

Fundamentally, news organisations aim to deliver objective reporting. Therefore, depicting the 2019 AH as primarily peaceful, as argued in Chapter 2, might resonate with the principles of objective journalism, contributing to a portrayal that aligns with certain positive ideologies in the AJE's reports and its broader mission of fostering positive change in power dynamics.

#### **5.4. The 2019 AH as a Dominantly Violent Movement**

The third aspect of representation appears to contradict the argument presented in Chapter 2, which characterises the 2019 AH as a peaceful movement. This aspect portrays the first sixteen days of the 2019 AH as predominantly marked by violence. It is important to note that this portrayal does not dismiss the occurrence of some violent confrontations between the police and certain protesters as fake or unfounded. Rather, it emphasises that media outlets like the



BBC and F24 seem to place significant emphasis on instances of violence at the expense of highlighting the prevailing peace, as demonstrated in Chapter 2.

Upon closer analysis, it becomes evident that the issue of violence during the protests is addressed by these news websites using a wide array of reporting techniques. F24, for instance, portrays the police as the instigators of violence against protesters in seven reports, employing various processes such as "detained", "arrested", and "fire/used/spray tear gas". It also emphasises the intensive police presence through passive transitive processes, including terms like "deployed", and highlights police equipment like "police helicopter" and "police vans".

On the other hand, AJE uses a total of eleven processes in nine reports when reporting on violence. It consistently foregrounds the police as the initiators of violence in nine instances, utilising processes like "push back" and "detained", along with processes indicating material effects such as "used tear gas and water cannon".

The BBC, in its reporting on violence, employs fifteen processes in five reports. It depicted the police as the perpetrators/initiators of violence in eight instances, featuring transitive processes with material effects like "use tear gas" and transitive material processes such as "arrested". Protesters are also portrayed as recipients of police violence in four passive transitive material processes, where the passive agent is omitted, as seen in phrases like "were arrested" and "were injured". Interestingly, the protesters are portrayed as the initiators of violence in relation to one transitive process with a material effect, namely, "threw stones". Notably, AJE and F24 perceived this last action as a reaction to police violence, creating a contradiction in their portrayals (section 5.4.5).

Such a negative representation of the 2019 AH as predominantly violent by F24 and the BBC can be linked to van Dijk's notion of "negative ideology", which contributes to the maintenance or exacerbation of power imbalances (Van Dijk, 2021, p. 147). This representation may be rooted in a potential orientalist perspective, which tends to depict violence as arbitrary and often results in the victimisation or dehumanisation of protesters, downplaying their positive constructive role during the protests. Moreover, it could be linked to external influences, with historical contexts and societal perspectives intricately shaping the narrative lens.

#### **5.4.1 Intense Police Presence during Protests**

This macro-strategy is primarily observed in F24 reports. It contributes to portraying the movement as predominantly violent by highlighting police presence at protests. This emphasis

is achieved through the frequent use of the passive material process 'were/have been deployed' five times along with other linguistic choices which enhance this portrayal. Examples are provided below.

52. *Security forces, **deployed** since the early hours of the morning and backed by a police helicopter, evacuated the central square, prompting the demonstrators to head elsewhere (F24 24F19).*

53. *Dozens of police vehicles that **had been deployed** in the morning at the Grand Post Office square (F24 8Mar19).*

54. *they were met by a heavy police deployment (F24 26F19).*

In examining the three excerpts, a notable linguistic strategy emerges: the deliberate suppression of the passive agent in the narratives. Instances 52 and 53 illustrate the use of passive material processes like "deployed" and "had been deployed". This linguistic choice serves to obscure the identity of the actor responsible for the actions described in the reports. The effect is twofold: it shifts the focus toward the police, emphasising their presence, and diminishes the significance of identifying the doer of the action, who may either be unknown or considered unimportant within the narrative.

In instance 52, intensification is achieved through the utilisation of hypotactic participle clauses. These clauses incorporate various transitive material processes, including "deployed", "backed", "evacuated", and the mental process "prompting". This construction paints a vivid picture, portraying the situation in Algiers as if it were on the brink of a state of emergency. The circumstance "since the early hours of the morning" implies that the police were prepared for potential extraordinary situations later in the day. Furthermore, using three distinct material processes "deployed", "backed", and "evacuated" suggests that these actions were meticulously planned by the police.

In this context, it is worth noting that the implementation of emergency preparedness plans is considered one of the core components during states of emergency. Such plans often aim to restrict certain human rights, including the right to protest. Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (2005, p. 1) highlights this aspect, underscoring the significance of understanding the implications of such preparedness in a crisis situation. This notion is further underscored by the mental process "prompting" aimed at dispersing the demonstrators.

Instance 53 employs intensification through an informal hyperbolic expression: "dozens of" which serves as a determiner for the head "police vehicles". This hyperbolic language is used

to exaggerate the phenomenon, suggesting a high number of police cars while also connoting a degree of vagueness regarding the exact count. The adjectival attribute "heavy" is another feature denoting intensification, used to modify the nominalisation "police deployment". This linguistic choice serves as an alternative means of dramatising the situation, giving the impression of a substantial and potentially oppressive police presence.

#### 5.4.2 The Police as the Enemy of the Peaceful Protesters

The second macro-strategy which depicts the 2019 AH negatively as violent is the representation of the actor "police" as the enemy of the protesters and its actions as a threat to their life. Such representation is also found in F24 reports only. It involves juxtaposing the protesters' peacefulness realised with intransitive material and verbal processes with the police's violent actions achieved by transitive material processes while foregrounding the protesters' peacefulness. Indicative instances are the following.

*55. Regime murderers, groups of flag-waving demonstrators **chanted** as riot police **used** tear gas to **try to prevent** them from reaching key central locations in Algiers, several independent news outlets reported (F24 1Mar19 (1)).*

*56. Two days later hundreds of protesters **rallied** in Algiers, but they **were met** by a heavy police deployment and tear gas (F24 26F19).*

*57. At the faculty of journalism some 500 students **protested** on campus, while another demonstration took place at the school of medicine, also in Algiers, with police **blocking** them inside the university grounds (F24 24F19).*

Despite being referred to by different labels such as "protesters", "students", or simply "people", these social actors are predominantly treated as statistical entities, often aggregated into numerical figures. They are activated in relation to intransitive material and verbal processes, such as "rallied", "chanted", and "protested". These processes, characterised by their lack of direct impact on other entities, underscore the peaceful nature of the protesters' activities.

In stark contrast, the police, frequently referenced as "riot police", are closely associated with direct transitive material processes, such as "used...to try to prevent", "met", and "blocking". These linguistic choices depict the police as suppressors of the people's fundamental right to protest, even when such protests are entirely peaceful. The portrayal of the protesters'

peacefulness is also emphasised through the adjectival attribute "flag-waving" and the verbal process "chanted".

In instance 55, although the riot police are activated in conjunction with the transitive material process "fired", there is an implied incapacity to fully control the situation. This nuance is embedded within the verbal complex "try to prevent", suggesting a struggle in achieving the already highlighted objective of preventing protesters from "reaching key central locations in Algiers".

To bolster the credibility of its event coverage, F24 cites multiple news outlets, predicating them with the adjectival attribute "independent". This adjectival underscores their status as private news sources independent of state influence. This contrast highlights that state-owned media outlets may have been subjected to a media blackout, potentially restricting their ability to report on the events. Additionally, F24 includes quotes from some journalists who actively participated in the protests chanting the following.

*58. "No to censorship" and "Fourth estate, not a press that follows orders"  
(F24 1Mar19 (1)).*

Instance 57 highlights a situation where peaceful students face limitations on their ability to protest due to the presence of the police, particularly within their university campus. While there is no explicit mention of using force by police, they are portrayed as an enemy in the eyes of these students who are actively engaged in peaceful protests. These students are not passive observers; they actively participate in the protests by demonstrating and organising events within the university. This shows their commitment to their cause and their desire to express their opinions within the boundaries of their academic institution. Besides presenting the police as an enemy of the protesters, F24 goes a step further to emphasise that the protesters directly experience violence inflicted by the police.

#### **5.4.3 Protesters as a Receiver of the Police's Violent Actions**

This macro-strategy revolves around the portrayal of the protesters as the recipient of violence carried out by the police. This portrayal is achieved by presenting the protesters as a goal in both active and passive direct material processes, as well as recipients in indirect material processes introduced by prepositions like "at", "against", and "over". Additionally, the

protesters are depicted as actors in processes denoting powerlessness. Indicative instances are provided below.

*59. police used tear gas to disperse crowds in the capital (F24 23F19).*

*60. The police fired tear gas and stun grenades to disperse protesters who tried to force their way through a police cordon that was blocking access to a road leading towards the presidency, an AFP journalist said (F24 5Mar19).*

*61. police firing tear gas over a crowd that ran to escape (F24 23F19).*

*62. Police sprayed tear gas, brought in a water cannon and rounded up several people as shopkeepers pulled down their shutters, an AFP journalist said (F24 24F19).*

*63. The new mobilisation comes a day after Algerian police briefly detained several journalists at a protest in the capital (F24 1Mar19 (1)).*

As noticed, F24 activates the police in relation to the voluntary violent actions aimed at the peaceful protesters/people/journalists. It relies on overlexicalisation when reporting on the violent actions using verbal groups such as: “used tear gas”, “fired tear gas and stun grenades”, “sprayed tear gas”. It uses short parallel structures with persuasive effects “sprayed tear gas, brought in a water cannon and rounded up several people” creating a sense of urgency and underscoring the severity of the police's actions against the protesters. The victimisation of the protesters in the above constructions is realised through transitive and intransitive material processes. For instance, using the complex material process “try to force” along with the goal “their way” (60) might suggest that security is so tightened around the presidential palace that the protesters find it difficult to move forward in the area. Using the verbal complex “run to escape” (61) might indicate that the protesters cannot stand the pain caused by the tear gas, leading them to escape from the area.

Another noteworthy aspect which adds to the victimisation of the protesters is the backgrounding of the exact location where violence takes place by referring merely to the capital Algiers (59). Such representation gives the impression that violence is pervasive throughout the city and that protesters have limited safe spaces. The following instances, which are found in the BBC articles, may yield a similar interpretation.

*64. Police **fired tear gas** at protesters in the capital, Algiers (BBC1Mar19).*

*65. Algerian police **use tear gas** in clash with protesters (BBC1Mar19).*

In instances 61, 62, and 65 of the reported events, the precise locations where these incidents occurred are omitted. This omission leaves readers to ponder whether the security forces' violent actions targeted all the protesters in the city. This approach raises questions about whether the news outlets are portraying the protesters as victims of these actions. One might initially interpret this representation as an indication of the news outlets' sympathy towards the protesters. However, it's important to recognise that the victimisation of individuals in conflict-ridden areas is a common characteristic of WJ reporting (Galtung, 2006, p. 1). Such a portrayal might align with certain orientalist perspectives that view the protesters as passive and "devoid of energy and initiative (Said, 1978, p. 28).

Similar events are covered by AJE, and yet employing a different reporting style. It provides detailed information about the specific locations where these events take place, which suggests that instances of violence may not be as prevalent as depicted in the BBC and F24's reports. Examples are presented below.

*66. Security forces fired tear gas at protesters in the **Belcourt neighbourhood** on the city's Mediterranean shore (AJE1Mar19).*

*67. Police used tear gas and water cannon to discourage the protesters from reaching the heavily guarded **Constitutional Council office** (AJE3Mar19).*

*68. Police fired tear gas on Friday afternoon to block a protest march on **the presidential palace**, prompting demonstrators to throw stones in response (AJE23F19).*

Moreover, unlike F24 and the BBC which depict Algiers as a hot spot, AJE states that the protests were tolerated even in Algiers despite of twenty years of a ban through the following instance:

*69. Despite the arrests, protests around the country **were largely tolerated** by authorities, even in the capital, where demonstrations have been strictly banned since 2001 (AJE23F19).*

While F24 portrays the protesters as victims of direct police violence, the BBC depicts them as initiators of violence against the police.

#### 5.4.4. Protesters as the Initiators of Violence against the Police

This macro-strategy represents the protesters as the initiator of the violent action “threw stones<sup>2</sup>”. This in turn gives legitimacy to the police’s violent intervention, particularly as the clashes take place “near the presidential palace”. One indicative instance is provided below.

*70. Some protesters threw stones **near the presidential palace** and were driven back by police firing tear gas” (BBC1Mar19).*

The actor 'protesters' is aggregated using the quantifier “some”. It is activated in relation to the material process “threw”, and the scope “stone” which might help to draw an orientalist picture on them as being “irrational” (Said, 1978, p. 38). Furthermore, the usage of the passive transitive process “were driven back” may imply that the protesters are treated as unruly, potentially depicting them as a disorderly group or even suggesting an Orientalist perspective of viewing them as rebels or unruly subjects. Consequently, this portrayal may inadvertently or advertently legitimise the police's violent response of “firing tear gas”. This negative representation is expressed differently through the negatively connoted attribute “stone-throwing”, as illustrated in the following instance”.

*71. Despite calls for calm, there were clashes between **stone-throwing** protesters and riot police, who fired tear gas (BBC8Mar19)*

As previously noted, the actor “protesters” is predicated with the complex adjective “stone-throwing”, a characterisation that can be interpreted as pejorative, suggesting a portrayal of them as uncivilised. This description implies that the act of throwing stones is presented as one of “their primary characteristics”, aligning with Orientalist tropes of depicting non-Western groups as possessing inherent 'barbaric' traits (Said, 1978, p. 121).

The presentation of 'barbarity' by the BBC as one of the protesters' traits during the protests may be seen as an attempt to frame their actions in a negative light. However, both AJE and F24 view this portrayal as a defensive strategy and legitimate action, as explained further below.

#### 5.4.5. Protesters’ Violent Reaction as a Normal Defensive Strategy

As shown in the previous section, the BBC represents the protesters as the initiator of the violent action “threw stones near the presidential palace”, which legitimise the violent response

of the police. AJE and F24, by contrast, shift the police's violent action to initial position and considers the protesters' violent reaction as a defensive strategy. Examples are indicated below.

*72. Security forces arrested more than 40 people after that protest, which saw **police fire tear gas** to block a march on the presidential palace, prompting demonstrators to respond with stone-throwing (F24 24F19).*

*73. **Police fired tear gas** on Friday afternoon to block a protest march on the presidential palace, prompting demonstrators to throw stones in response (AJE23F19).*

In the two instances provided, the actor “police” is portrayed as the instigator of violence against the peaceful demonstrators by initiating the violent action of “firing tear gas”. The peaceful nature of the demonstrators is evident through the reference to them as 'demonstrators' who are collectively described as participating in a march, connoting a sense of peaceful assembly rather than employing negatively charged terms like rioters or unrest, which tend to evoke a perception of disorderliness.

Furthermore, the use of the mental process 'prompting' suggests that the protesters' feelings of oppression or provocation might have driven them to react violently as a defensive strategy. This interpretation highlights how the portrayal of protesters as reacting to police actions with stone-throwing could be seen as a response to perceived aggression rather than an unprovoked act of violence. In addition to representing the protesters as the initiators of the action 'threw stones' at the police (section 5.4.4), the BBC employs other linguistic features that contribute to depicting the overall atmosphere of the weekly protests as violent rather than festive and calm, as explained below.

#### **5.4.6. Protests are Dominantly Violent**

As noted in section 5.3.3, using the term “protests” is not interchangeable with the 2019 AH as the study of the former helps to explore the overall representation of the latter. This macro-strategy, found out in the BBC's reports, centres on the negative portrayal of the protests as dominantly violent, leading to a negative depiction of the 2019 AH as a dominantly violent movement. It is achieved using one juxtaposing sentence where it prioritises violence over peace and the negative lexical reference “unrest” when referring to the protests.



*74. Security forces in riot gear fired tear gas to block a march on to the presidential palace in the capital, Algiers. But protests in rest of the country passed off peacefully (BBC22F19).*

This instance juxtaposes the Security forces 'violent action realised with the transitive material process "fired tear gas" with the generalised material process "pass off" modified with the two circumstances "peacefully" and "in rest of the country". This juxtaposition overall gives priority to the rare show of violence which seems to overshadow the dominantly peaceful character of the protests. More significantly, using the adverbial "peacefully" does not necessarily mean that the BBC acknowledges that the protesters were peaceful. Rather, they are backgrounded using the objectivation "protests" as an actor of the generalised process "pass off" which conceals the involvement of human agency. Another possible realisation of deagentialisation would be the following instance:

*75. A wave of unrest began last month after Mr Bouteflika announced he would seek a fifth term in office (BBC8Mar19).*

Here, the protests are referred to with the reference "unrest", which may suggest turbulence and disorder. It is predicated with the hyperbolic expression "a wave of" which exaggerates the scene of violence and draw the reader's attention to it particularly as it is placed in initial position. Denotatively, the expression "a wave of unrest" refers to a sudden and substantial increase in instances of social or political disturbance, discontent, or turmoil. It signifies that unrest or dissatisfaction is spreading widely and rapidly across Algeria.

Connotatively, "a wave of unrest" adds emotional or subjective nuances. It suggests not only a significant increase in unrest but also implies a sense of heightened intensity, potentially turbulent or chaotic conditions, and a notable impact on the affected area or society. The use of "wave" in this context conveys the idea of unrest surging and spreading like a powerful force, capturing attention, and implying that the situation is particularly concerning or significant. Even F24 uses the reference "unrest", and yet in relation to a violent protest which left victims as shown below.

*76. The unrest left 112 members of the security forces injured, according to police... (F24 8Mar19).*

Here, 'unrest' is linked to a violent protest that resulted in casualties. While both instances use the term "unrest", the difference in context significantly shapes its connotations. In the BBC's instance 75, "a wave of unrest" paints a broader, more encompassing picture of societal

discontent and turmoil, suggesting a larger-scale and rapidly spreading issue. In contrast, F24's instance (76) links 'unrest' to a specific incident involving violence and injuries, providing a more specific and localised perspective on the situation.

This contrast highlights how word choice and context can influence the connotations and interpretations of language in news reporting. While The BBC's instance suggests that the 2019 AH is characterised with intensive violence since its start, AJE uses instead other terms with a positive connotation, such as “democratic celebration” and “grassroots movement” which indicate that the 2019 AH is peaceful (section 5.3.3).

#### **5.4.7. Police and Protesters are Involved in Violence**

Another macro-strategy which helps represent the 2019 AH as dominantly violent is the BBC's representation of both actors as involved in violence. Such representation is achieved through some linguistic patterns including existential processes, objectivation, imprecision, and aggregation. Explanation is provided below.

*77. Despite **calls for calm**, there were clashes between stone-throwing protesters and riot police, who fired tear gas (BBC8Mar19)*

Instance 77 starts with a noun process “calls for calm” introduced by the conjunction “despite”. The identity of the Sayer is suppressed which could be meant to draw the readers' attention to the main clause “there were...tear gas”, which portrays the whole climate of the protests as unstable. In addition, important details on where the clashes took place are concealed, which might give the impression that violence dominates the protests, not in Algiers merely, but across Algeria as a whole.

*“78. Witnesses said there were **injuries on both sides**” (BBC1Mar19).*

By analysing the verbiage of this process, one finds that using the existential process dramatises the situation and suggests that the protests which escalated to violent clashes between the protesters and the police resulted in injuries on both sides. This is realised statically through aggregations as the following example demonstrates.

*79. According to authorities seven protesters and more than 50 officers **were injured** with 45 people arrested (BBC1Mar19).*

Using statistics in instance 79 might be another tool to stress violence notably in relation to the number of the wounded officers “50” modified with the intensifier “more than”. More

importantly, the instance shows that the protesters are more violent than the police. This is evident through the number of the injured protesters' "7 protesters" which is fewer than the number of the injured officers "more than 50 officers". According to Van Leeuwen (2008, p. 37), aggregations are used as recorded facts to strengthen the impression of a news outlet's objectivity, and "to manufacture consensus opinion" among the readers regarding the escalation of violence in Algeria.

Violence is stressed in the same instance relying on another semantic tool which is imprecision in "seven protesters and more than 50 officers were injured" (BBC1Mar19). This construction does not provide contextual details on who caused harm to whom or how this happened. Instead, it is a conclusion which may confuse the readers and hinders any involvement on their part. In this respect, Chouliaraki (2006) explains that recipients of news feel powerless about misfortune to other actors when the doer of the action and their purposes are not clearly stated. Imprecision is also realised through Assimilation and or anonymity such as "authorities" in the following construction along with the adverb "reportedly". According to authorities,

*80. Authorities reportedly arrested 45 people after clashes between police and protesters (BBC1Mar19).*

As noticed, ambiguity is realised using the assimilated reference "authorities" and "reportedly" where the identity of the doer of the action and the Sayer are glossed over. This could be meant to put an emphasis on the actions of violence themselves or (what happens) and what is being reported rather than on who did what (the actor) or who is/are responsible for what is being reported. Therefore, using the existential processes which denote the occurrence of violence and imprecisions where the agency of the real doer of the action is concealed could be meant to emphasise violence.

In summary, this aspect of representation has focused on the negative portrayal of the 2019 AH as a predominantly violent movement in the BBC and F24's reports. As I have previously argued, such representation can be construed as potentially reflecting a certain Orientalist perspective, often achieved through victimisation and dehumanisation. Such negative representation of the 2019 AH as dominantly violent in its first sixteen days by F24 may have been influenced by the "yellow vests movement" in France. The movement revolved around the French people's protests against their government's dramatic increase in fuel prices (Kessar et al, 2019). Coincidentally, this movement occurred alongside the 2019 AH. However, while

the latter was predominantly peaceful, as argued in chapter 2, the former escalated to extreme violence. In this regard, F24 reported the following: 'The government says around 2,000 people have been injured in protests since the movement began on Nov. 17, including at least four serious eye injuries. Separately, 10 people have died in road incidents related to yellow vest actions' (NEWS WIRES, 2019). A similar viewpoint is shared by Kessar et al (2019), who argued that in the first week of the 2019 AH, F24 presented a picture of violent protests filled with inhibition, arrests, and police encirclement. They suggested that the peaceful nature of the protests provoked the French government and media, which advanced a fierce scenario for the Algerian movement and tried to transmit this view through its news reporting.

The few violent confrontations during the protests were directed at the protesters themselves, resulting in a negative portrayal of them as passive. This pacification or victimisation aligns with one of the four dogmas of Said's Orientalism, which characterises Western writings on the East (Said, 1978). This perspective is realised through a range of mechanisms, including juxtaposing the protesters' peacefulness, depicted through intransitive material and verbal processes such as "chanted" and "rallied", with the police's violent actions, achieved by transitive material processes like "fired tear gas" and "blocking them" (55, 57). Another mechanism contributing to the passivisation of the protesters is placing them as direct targets in active and passive direct material processes. E.G, "police...rounded up several people as shopkeepers pulled down their shutters..." (F24 24F19) (62), and indirect material processes introduced by "at", "against", and "over" in 'police firing tear gas over a crowd that ran to escape' (F24 23F19) (61). These elements collectively contributed to a negative portrayal of the protesters as direct targets of security forces' violence (see section 5.4.3).

In contrast, the features of Orientalism dissected in the BBC's reports appear to differ from those identified in F24's reports. The BBC's representation emphasised the protesters/demonstrators as violent through the use of the violent material process 'threw stones' and the attribute "stone-throwing protesters" (70, 71), contributing to a negative representation of the protesters as 'irrational' (Said, 1978, p. 38) and potentially more violent than the security forces (section 5.4.4). Dehumanisation is also evident through an overrepresentation of the protests as predominantly violent (section 5.4.6). This was achieved through references with negative connotations such as "unrest", predicated by the hyperbolic expression "a wave of" (BBC8Mar19) (75).

Furthermore, the BBC downplays the protesters' role in relation to their movement's peacefulness through the nominalisation "protests" in instance 74. Another instance that could suggest dehumanisation is the following: "Despite calls for calm, there were clashes between stone-throwing protesters and security forces" (BBC8Mar19). This raises questions about whether this instance aligns with Said's Orientalism, which suggests that the Orient is unchanging and always the same. In other words, despite attempts to calm the atmosphere in the capital Algiers, clashes were deemed inevitable.

Additionally, it could be argued that the BBC's representation of the protests as more violent than peaceful could also be influenced by the events of what was known as the Arab Spring, which began almost twelve years ago. Although the uprisings began peacefully, they eventually escalated into violence, either due to military interference, as seen in Egypt, or foreign intervention, as observed in Yemen, Libya, and Syria (see section 2.2.2.3).

In light of these considerations, it becomes evident that orientalist perspectives, inherently carrying negative connotations, can indeed be directly correlated with WJ. This correlation points to the propensity of WJ to unintentionally exacerbate pre-existing unequal power dynamics, consequently playing a role in the heightened levels of cultural violence. It is crucial, however, to approach this link with nuance, recognising that various factors, historical, political, and cultural, contribute to the complexity of these relationships.

## **5.5. Summary of the Chapter**

This chapter marks the first of two analytical chapters, focusing on the portrayal of the 2019 AH across the news websites of the BBC, F24, and AJE. Its primary aim is to investigate the similarities and differences in how the three news outlets depicted the 2019 AH during its initial sixteen days, with a particular focus on uncovering the underlying ideologies that shaped their representations.

Overall, the analysis has revealed a shared consensus among the three news websites regarding the 2019 AH being viewed as a legitimate response to Abdelaziz Bouteflika's bid for a fifth term (section 5.2). This representation might be seen as an alignment with the journalistic values that these international news outlets appear to hold, such as factuality and contextual depth. However, when it came to depicting the protesters and their actions, the three news sources presented differing perspectives.

AJE's stance leaned toward a more pro-democratic viewpoint by providing a factual portrayal of the 2019 AH as being dominantly a peaceful movement (section 5.3). In contrast, both the BBC and F24 appeared to exhibit tendencies that could be described as more orientalist (section 5.4). This was achieved through a negative portrayal of the 2019 AH as a violent movement, which seems to contradict the argument presented in Chapter 2, emphasising the predominantly peaceful nature of the 2019 AH.

The dichotomous representation observed between AJE on one hand, and the BBC and F24 on the other, may be attributed to a range of contextual factors, including political, social, economic, and historical influences that appeared to shape the discourses surrounding the actions and actors of the 2019 AH during its initial sixteen days.

The subsequent chapter serves as a continuation of the current analysis. It endeavours to delve deeper into whether these pro-democratic and orientalist tendencies persist in the reporting of events following Abdelaziz Bouteflika's resignation and the subsequent developments in Algeria. By doing so, it aims to provide a more comprehensive understanding of how these international news outlets frame and interpret a significant period in Algerian history.

## Chapter 6

### **The Key Developments of the 2019 AH: Bouteflika's Resignation and the Initial Prosecution of Officials from his Political Regime**

#### **6.1 Introduction**

The preceding chapter has delved into the primary similarities and differences in the representation of the 2019 AH during its initial sixteen days as a response to Bouteflika's pursuit of a fifth term. The findings have highlighted a consensus among the three news outlets in viewing the 2019 AH as a legitimate movement against Bouteflika's fifth term bid (section 5.2). This representation was largely achieved by presenting Bouteflika as incapacitated in fulfilling his presidential duties and as an authoritarian figure (sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2).

However, when it came to portraying the protesters and their actions, analysis has demonstrated that the three news outlets exhibited distinct perspectives. AJE's perspective leaned towards a more pro-democratic viewpoint, emphasising the protesters' control of the movement and its recurrent peaceful nature (section 5.3). In contrast, both the BBC and F24 seemed to exhibit certain orientalist tendencies. These tendencies were characterised by the dehumanisation and victimisation of the protesters, alongside a portrayal of their movement as predominantly violent (section 5.4). This contrast raises questions about how political, social, economic, and historical contextual factors may have shaped these discourses around the 2019 AH's actions and actors during its initial days.

This chapter serves as a continuation of the critical analysis undertaken in chapter 5. It aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of how these international news outlets frame and interpret the key developments that transpired during the 2019 AH. These developments encompassed Abdelaziz Bouteflika's resignation and the initiation of the first live trial of business tycoons and government officials from his political regime. It investigates the extent to which previously identified pro-democratic and orientalist tendencies persist, offering insights into the evolving discourse surrounding this pivotal period in Algerian history.

The chapter unfolds in two main parts, each addressing a specific event: Bouteflika's resignation on 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2019 and the live trial conducted on 9<sup>th</sup> December 2019. The decision to analyse both events in a single chapter, unlike the previous one, where only one event was scrutinised, was primarily influenced by the number of articles available for each event. While

the first event garnered coverage in twenty-one news articles, the second and third events collectively featured in only twelve articles. This approach ensures that each chapter maintains a balanced length. The analysis of reports on these two events reveals the persistence of the pro-democratic stance observed in AJE's reporting. It continues to assign the agency of change to the protesters, portraying them as catalysts for transformation. Additionally, there appears to be a continuation of certain orientalist tendencies in the reporting by the BBC and F24, despite the positive changes brought about by the protesters.

In the section dedicated to Bouteflika's resignation, three distinct narratives concerning this event are explored. AJE presents it as a direct outcome of mounting pressure from the protesters (section 6.2.1.1). The BBC attributes the resignation primarily to the Algerian army's interference (section 6.2.1.2), while F24 depicts it as a result of the army chief Gaid Salah's involvement (section 6.2.1.3). Notably, the BBC and F24 acknowledge the peacefulness of the 2019 AH after Bouteflika's resignation, albeit with subtle differences. The BBC's reports tend to background the protesters' role in relation to their movement's peacefulness (section 6.2.2.1). F24 portrays them as victims of an unjust political system (section 6.2.2.2). In contrast, AJE represents the protesters as determined to achieve further changes, suggesting that Bouteflika's resignation alone is insufficient (section 6.2.2.3).

Another disparity emerges in the portrayal of Algeria's political landscape, both past and future, among AJE and F24 on one side, and the BBC on the other (section 6.2.3). While AJE advocates for the establishment of a transitional government as a resolution to the political crisis (section 6.2.3.1), the BBC's focus remains on Algeria's historical narrative, portraying Bouteflika as a successful leader who effectively shielded Algerians from the turmoil of the "black decade" (6.2.3.2). In contrast, F24 characterises the transitional period as a source of potential political uncertainty in Algeria's future (section 6.2.3.3).

In the section dedicated to the live prosecution of business tycoons and government officials, analysis unveils two significant aspects of representation. Firstly, there is a positive portrayal of the 2019 AH as successful, with all three news outlets depicting the prosecution as an exceptional event in contemporary Algerian history (section 6.3.1.1). Secondly, the 2019 AH is depicted as a movement that falls short of people's expectations (section 6.3.2). This is achieved by presenting the protesters as dissatisfied with the direction their movement has taken (section 6.3.2.1) and portraying the army as an obstacle to democracy in Algeria (section 6.3.2.2), particularly evident in F24's news reports.



## 6.2. Bouteflika's Resignation

The resignation event is covered by all three news outlets in a total of seven reports: one by AJE, two by F24, and four by the BBC. Their analysis unveils three distinct aspects of representation. Each news outlet offers a unique narrative that sheds light on how they perceive the main catalyst behind Bouteflika's departure (Section 6.2.1). Firstly, AJE portrays Bouteflika's resignation as a direct outcome of the mounting pressure from the protesters, emphasising their role in political reform (6.2.1.1). Secondly, the BBC's narrative attributes Bouteflika's resignation mainly to the interference of the Algerian army, overshadowing the protesters' agency (6.2.1.2). Thirdly, F24 depicts Bouteflika's resignation as directly influenced by Gaid Salah, the army chief, positioning him as a key figure in the political landscape (6.2.1.3).

Interestingly, both the BBC and F24 acknowledge the peaceful nature of the 2019 AH movement after Bouteflika's resignation (section 6.2.2). However, they do so with subtle differences in their portrayal of the protesters. The BBC's reports tend to background the protesters in relation to the movement's peacefulness (6.2.2.1), while acknowledging the absence of violence. F24's depiction of the protesters as victims of an unjust political system still persists (6.2.2.2). AJE, on the other hand, represents the protesters as determined to bring about further changes, suggesting that Bouteflika's resignation alone is insufficient (6.2.2.3).

Another notable disparity arises in the representation of Algeria's political scene, both in its future and past, between AJE and F24, on one hand, and the BBC, on the other (section 6.2.3). AJE proposes the establishment of a transitional government as a solution to the political crisis (6.2.3.1). In contrast, the BBC's focus remains on Algeria's historical narrative, representing Bouteflika as a successful leader who effectively shielded Algerians from the turmoil of the "black decade" (6.2.3.2).

F24 represents the transitional period as a source of potential political uncertainty in Algeria's future (6.2.3.3). These varied perspectives raise questions about the differing attributions of agency in relation to the resignation event, presenting a complex interplay between pro-democratic ideals and orientalist tendencies.

### **6.2.1 Bouteflika's Resignation as a Primary Result of the Popular Protests, the Army's Interference, or the Army Chief's Interference**

This aspect of representation delves deeply into how the resignation event is depicted, with each of the three news outlets offering distinct narratives regarding the immediate causes behind it. These varying perspectives serve to shed light on the multifaceted nature of the event itself.

Firstly, AJE places significant emphasis on the role of protests and protesters as the primary catalyst for the resignation. Their narrative suggests that the resignation was primarily driven by the relentless demonstrations and activism on the ground. This portrayal highlights the agency of the people in effecting change. In contrast, the BBC attributes the resignation's agency to the Algerian Army, simultaneously diminishing the role of the protesters in connection to this pivotal outcome. F24 adopts a more specific stance by attributing the resignation directly to the army chief, Ahmed Gaid Salah. Its narrative concentrates on the personal agency of this influential figure, proposing that his interference directly prompted the resignation, similarly understating the agency of the protesters, akin to the approach taken by the BBC.

These distinct narrative approaches are made apparent through the use of different referential and predicational strategies. AJE employs transitive processes to illustrate the tangible actions of protesters and the material impact of their activism. In contrast, the BBC and F24 use verbal processes to describe the decisions and verbal interactions within the Algerian Army, emphasising the role of words and internal deliberations in the chain of events. Such complexity not only underscores the diverse perspectives surrounding the incident and its driving actors and factors, but also emphasises the intricate interplay between pro-democracy ideals and orientalist tendencies. This interplay is entangled with broader political, cultural, and ideological dynamics, further enriching the understanding of the diverse narratives surrounding the event, as illuminated further in the coming sections.

#### **6.2.1.1 Bouteflika's Resignation as a Direct Outcome of the Protesters' Mounting Pressure**

The first macro-strategy that appears to reflect certain pro-democratic stances in the AJE's reports on the resignation is the foregrounding and activation of the protesters in connection to the event. This strategy is effectively realised through circumstantialisation (81) and participation (82), as evidenced through the following examples:

81 ...long-time president Abdelaziz Bouteflika who was pushed out by protesters...(AJE10Dec19).

82. Protesters pushed out Bouteflika earlier this year ...(AJE10Dec19).

In instances 81 and 82, AJE consistently places the protesters at the forefront of the narrative, emphasising their role in Bouteflika's ousting. Even when the protesters are nominalised using the term "protests" in the following instance, the adjective "massive" ensures that their significance is maintained:

83. Algeria's President Abdelaziz Bouteflika has resigned...ceding power in the face of massive street protests against his 20-year rule (AJE3Apr19).

Here, Bouteflika's resignation is depicted as a direct consequence of the eruption of protests. The choice of phrasing, such as "has resigned" and "ceding power", underscores the protesters' influence. Moreover, the use of "massive" intensifies the protesters' role, suggesting that their sheer numbers added substantial pressure to the situation. AJE implies that the peaceful nature of these protests was a significant factor that led the army, represented by its chief, to demand impeachment proceedings.

The army chief, representing the military institution, expresses support for the people and their demands as shown below:

84. "We decided clearly ... to stand with the people so all their demands get fulfilled" (AJE3Apr19).

The use of the personal pronoun "we" and the cognitive mental process "decided" asserts the military's active role in the decision-making process during the protests. AJE highlights that the military institution is not only aware of the people's various demands, including the removal of Bouteflika's political system and the prosecution of those involved in corruption, but also committed to assisting in achieving these goals. This might be an intentional effort to redirect the reader's focus towards the unique aspect of a coalition forming between the Algerian army and the people within this particular movement. This stands in contrast to the events of the so-called "Arab Spring", which often resulted in military coups or foreign interventions in several Arab countries.

As can be seen in section 2.2.2.3, the Arab Spring of 2011 came to be known as the "Arab autumn" due to its disastrous consequences for the region as a whole and the Arab populations in particular (Sidani, 2020, p. 129; Alduhaim, 2019, p. 631). For instance, Egypt's transition from the Arab Spring to the present day has resulted in a new form of dictatorship under

General leadership (Alduhaim, 2019, p. 631). In other countries like Yemen, Libya, and Syria, the aftermath of the Arab Spring was marked by prolonged and devastating civil wars, leading to immense suffering for their populations.

By highlighting the Algerian army's alignment with the people's demands and its willingness to work in a coalition for common goals, AJE may be drawing attention to a potentially more constructive and less tumultuous path for political change compared to the chaotic and often tragic outcomes observed in other Arab Spring-afflicted nations. This framing may be meant to underscore the uniqueness and potential promise of the Algerian situation in contrast to the broader 2010-11 AS narrative.

I would therefore interpret this positive portrayal of the Algerian protesters as being the catalysts behind Abdelaziz Bouteflika's resignation dissected in the AJE's reports based on several reasons. First, it might align with the AJ net's editorial policies, which favours pro-democratic grassroots movements and democratic causes, supporting the protesters in their quest for political change (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2004, p. 319). It may also reflect its commitment to covering underrepresented groups and their movements further emphasising the Algerian protesters' role as part of a grassroots movement advocating for democracy. Additionally, the AJE's coverage seems to be largely influenced by the protests' peacefulness and persistent nature, which garnered its support and sympathy. Importantly, AJE framed the situation as a contrast between the people seeking democratic reforms and an entrenched political establishment, which closed the network's bureau in Algeria since 2004.

#### **6.2.1.2 Bouteflika's Resignation as a Result of the Algerian Army's Interference**

The second macro-strategy found out in the BBC's coverage revolves around the representation of Bouteflika's resignation as a consequence of the Algerian army's intervention, particularly as personified by his chief, Gaid Salah. This strategy is realised by emphasising the role of the army in the verbal processes related to the resignation. Additionally, the BBC employs nominalisations such as "protests", "rallies", and "demonstrations" where the agency of the protesters in the narrative is downplayed. Examples are provided below.

The actor "Algerian army" is activated as a Sayer in the verbal processes "called" and "agreed" and "said" in instances 85 and 86 below.

*85. The powerful Algerian army **had called** for the 82-year-old to be declared incapable of carrying out his duties (BBC3Apr19 (2)).*

86. *It seems the powerful military **agreed**. Its chief, Lt Gen Ahmed Gaed Salah, **said** earlier on Tuesday: "There is no more room to waste time" (BBC3Apr19 (2)).*

In the two excerpts, the BBC activates the Algerian army in relation to the verbal processes “called”, “agreed”, and “said”. This choice of verbs highlights the army's active involvement in the resignation process and suggests that it played a significant role in influencing Bouteflika's decision. Furthermore, The BBC further reinforces the influence of the Algerian army/military by describing it as "powerful" through the adjectival attribute “powerful”. This characterisation enhances the perception of the army as a dominant force in the political landscape, strengthening the narrative of its involvement in Bouteflika's resignation.

Significantly, “the protesters” are referred to through nominalisations like “protests”, “rallies”, and "demonstrations" when reporting on the resignation. This linguistic choice minimises the visibility and agency of the protesters, diverting the reader's attention away from their role in shaping the outcome. Illustrative instances are shown below.

87. *Algeria's President Abdelaziz Bouteflika has resigned after weeks of massive street **protests** (BBC3Apr19 (2)).*

88. *His resignation on Tuesday came after six weeks of anti-government **protests** (BBC3Apr19(4)).*

89. *Algeria’s President Abdelaziz Bouteflika...has announced he has resigned with immediate effect, following weeks of **rallies** and **demonstrations**... (BBC3Apr19 (3)).*

The cumulative effect of these linguistic choices conceals the agency of the protesters in the narrative. By foregrounding the army (85, 86) and using nominalisations (87, 88, 89), the BBC directs the reader's focus towards the actions and decisions of the military, while downplaying the active role played by the protesters in the resignation.

Such representation by the BBC can be linked to Said’s concept of Orientalism, which refers to a Western perspective and discourse that has historically portrayed the East, particularly the Middle East and North Africa, in a way that reinforces stereotypes, exoticises the region, and often serves Western political and imperial interests (Said, 1978). In the context of the BBC's coverage of the resignation event, the reports tend to downplay or negate the agency and autonomy of the protesters by focusing on the actions and decisions of the Algerian army. This could align with an Orientalist narrative, where local voices and actions are often marginalised or rendered insignificant (Sulaiman, 2019, p. 78-80). Additionally, Orientalism often involves

the simplification and stereotyping of cultures and societies in the East (ibid, p. 77). In this case, the BBC's use of nominalisations like “protests”, “rallies”, and “demonstrations” can be seen as a simplification of the complex motivations and aspirations of the protesters. It reduces their actions to mere events without delving into the deeper social and political contexts. Moreover, by emphasising the role of the "powerful military" in the resignation of Bouteflika, the BBC may contribute to an exoticised view of Algeria, where the military is portrayed as a central and mysterious force in the political landscape, overshadowing the local dynamics and complexities of the protest movement.

The analysis suggests that a similar pattern of representation is found in F24's reports on Bouteflika's resignation. However, it is worth noting that while the BBC attributes agency to the "Algerian army" in general terms, F24 attributes it more specifically to its chief, Gaid Salah. This nuance in attribution highlights the difference in how these two news outlets frame the event and assign responsibility within the army's hierarchy.

### 6.2.1.3. Bouteflika's Resignation as a Result of the Army Chief's Interference

The third macro-strategy employed in the coverage of Bouteflika's resignation is centred on portraying the event as a direct outcome of the army chief's intervention, with little to no mention of the protesters. This representation is achieved through the use of temporal complex clauses that construct the resignation as a direct consequence of General Gaid Salah's involvement. Instances are as follows:

*90. Algeria's long-time President Abdelaziz Bouteflika submitted his resignation on Tuesday, **shortly after** the country's **powerful** army chief of staff, Gaid Salah, **demand**ed that he be declared unfit and leave office **"immediately"** (F24 3Apr19 (1)).*

*91. The announcement came **shortly after** armed forces chief Ahmed Gaid Salah **demand**ed the **immediate** launch of impeachment proceedings against Bouteflika (F24 3Apr19 (1)).*

In the provided instances, General Gaid Salah is consistently foregrounded and portrayed as a powerful figure. The use of the verb "demand" to describe his actions signifies his high authority in Algeria. His dominance and influence on the decision-making process are further emphasised by the adjectival attribute “powerful”, which reinforces his stature in the narrative. This portrayal aligns with the image of Salah as a key actor with significant control over political events.

Additionally, the term "immediately" in instance 90 is strategically employed to underscore General Salah's influence and the urgency of his demands. This adverbial choice suggests that his calls for Bouteflika's resignation are not just powerful but also prompt and decisive. It implies that his commands are swiftly heeded, enhancing the perception of his supremacy in the political landscape.

The use of the adverb "shortly" and the time circumstance "after" in instances 90 and 91 underscores the idea of consecutiveness. This linguistic framing suggests that General Salah's demands are closely followed by Bouteflika's resignation, reinforcing the narrative that the army chief's influence directly led to the President's decision to step down.

F24's individualisation of General Gaid Salah might imply that he is the ultimate decision-maker in Algeria, particularly concerning Bouteflika's resignation. This portrayal further strengthens the perception of his leadership and control over the political process, which may align with a broader narrative of military dominance in Algerian politics.

Similar to the BBC's approach discussed in the previous section, F24's coverage employs the nominalisation "protests" to refer to the actions of the protesters as shown below.

*93. Bouteflika resigned in April under pressure from the protests which began in February (F24 10Dec19).*

This linguistic choice downplays the role and agency of the protesters behind Bouteflika's resignation. By using this nominalisation, the narrative shifts focus away from the individuals and their motivations, simplifying the complex socio-political context of the protests. F24's coverage, which seems to be shaped by its colonial history and geopolitical context, may advertently or inadvertently align with elements of Orientalist narratives. This is evident in its emphasis on figures like General Gaid Salah while downplaying the agency of the Algerian protesters in relation to the resignation event. Such a framing could be seen as reinforcing historical power dynamics and perpetuating the position of Western media outlets as interpreters and narrators of events in the East (Sulaiman, 2019, p. 87).

However, it is important to acknowledge that media organisations like F24 and the BBC often have diverse teams and editorial standards, and their coverage can vary widely. While there may be inadvertent Orientalist elements in their reporting, it is not necessarily a deliberate or uniform practice. Media outlets may strive to provide balanced and accurate coverage, and any

resemblance to Orientalism could be a result of unconscious biases, historical legacies, or simplifications in storytelling.

In summary, the analysis of the coverage of Bouteflika's resignation by AJE, the BBC, and F24 has revealed the diverse ways in which a singular event can be portrayed through distinct narrative lenses. It has demonstrated that each news outlet offered a unique perspective on the immediate causes behind the resignation, shedding light on the complexity of the event itself.

AJE's narrative placed significant emphasis on the agency of the protesters, framing Bouteflika's resignation as a direct result of their persistent and peaceful demonstrations (section 6.2.1.1). This portrayal seems to align with some pro-democratic stances dissected in its report which foster grassroots movements seeking political change. Moreover, by highlighting the coalition forming between the Algerian army and the people, AJE suggests a potentially more constructive path for political transformation, setting the Algerian situation apart from the tumultuous outcomes observed in other Arab Spring-afflicted nations. In essence, AJE's representation might be meant to underscore the significance of the Algerian protesters as catalysts for change.

On the other hand, the second macro-strategy found out in the BBC's reports, emphasises the role of the Algerian army, attributing the agency behind the resignation to institutional actions and decisions (section 6.2.1.2). This approach appears to align with elements of Orientalism by marginalising the role and agency of the protesters (Sulaiman, 2019, p. 78-80), focusing instead on the military's involvement in the resignation. Additionally, the BBC's choice of linguistic strategies, such as nominalisations "protests", "rallies", and "demonstrations" (87, 88, 89) and adjectival attributes like "the powerful" (85, 86), reinforces this narrative and positions the military as a dominant force in shaping political outcomes.

F24 took a different path by pinpointing the resignation as a result of the personal agency of the army chief (section 6.2.1.3). This specific focus on an individual actor highlights the significance of his actions in the narrative, positioning him as a key figure in Bouteflika's decision to step down. Its coverage can also be interpreted as reflecting certain Orientalist elements by downplaying the agency of the protesters and emphasising the army chief's influence. Therefore, when dissecting these media narratives, it is essential to recognise not only the immediate socio-political dynamics but also the historical context and cultural perspectives that may shape and perpetuate certain biases, as exemplified by the Orientalist elements in the coverage of Bouteflika's resignation.



## **6.2.2 The 2019 AH as a Peaceful Movement**

The second aspect of representation delves into the noteworthy positive portrayal of the 2019 AH movement as a peaceful endeavour within the reports of both the BBC and F24. This shift in depiction could be attributed to the unexpected outcome of Bouteflika's resignation as an initial response to the protesters' demands. This portrayal is realised through a deliberate omission of references to violence-related transitive material processes, which were prevalent in the articles analysed in the previous chapter (section 5.4). Instead, the reports employ positively denoted attributes to characterise and assess the nature of the protests.

This transformation in representation signifies a strategic choice by both news outlets to emphasise the non-violent aspect of the 2019 AH, likely as a response to the movement's significant impact on Algerian politics. Perhaps by portraying the protests as "peaceful", the BBC and F24 aim to highlight the movement's adherence to non-violent means in pursuing political change. This could in turn align with international norms and values that favour peaceful demonstrations as a legitimate form of civil expression.

However, it is intriguing to note that even in acknowledging the peaceful nature of the 2019 AH, reports by both of the BBC and F24 seems to persist in marginalising and victimising the protesters (sections 6.2.2.1 and section 6.2.2.2). This representation raises questions about the underlying biases or narratives that persist within their coverage. It suggests that while the non-violent character of the protests is acknowledged, other aspects of the protesters' agency, demands, or experiences may still be downplayed or negatively framed. Further exploration of these representations could provide valuable insights into how media narratives may shape perceptions of protest movements and their participants. In contrast, the AJE report actively represents the protesters as instrumental in recent political changes, emphasising their determination to bring about further political reforms (section 6.2.2.3).

### **6.2.2.1 the Protesters are Backgrounded in Relation to their Movement's Peacefulness**

This macro-strategy is particularly evident in the BBC's reporting on the peacefulness of the 2019 AH. The key element here is the backgrounding of the protesters despite acknowledging the peaceful nature of their activities. This is achieved through the use of nominalisations such as "protests" and "clean-up projects", which are further modified with positive adjectival attributes like "peaceful" and "considerate" respectively. An illustrative example is found below:

94. *It (referring to the resignation) followed six weeks of peaceful, but increasingly urgent **protests** across the country, which were characterised by youthful crowds, **considerate clean-up** projects and witty signs (BBC3Apr19 (1)).*

In this instance, the BBC explicitly recognises the peaceful nature of the 2019 AH movement by using the adjectival attribute "peaceful" to evaluate the head "weeks of protests". However, it is important to note that even in acknowledging the peacefulness, the report tends to downplay the active role of the protesters. For instance, the nominalisation "clean-up projects" is employed to describe one of the characteristics of the protests. While the protesters were indeed responsible for organising these clean-up efforts, the choice of nominalisation subtly shifts the focus away from them. Moreover, the use of the adjectival attribute "considerate" in relation to the clean-up projects implies kindness and helpfulness, but it doesn't necessarily attribute this quality directly to the protesters. This kind of positive representation contrasts with a previous report on March 8th, where the term "unrest" was used to refer to the protests, as seen in the instance "a wave of unrest began last month" (BBC8Mar19). This shift in terminology from "unrest" to "peaceful protests" highlights the malleability of media narratives and raises questions about the consistency of the portrayal of the movement.

It is crucial to recognise that while these shifts in representation may not necessarily be intentional, they can still have significant implications. They could inadvertently feed into cultural or structural violence, even if that isn't the intention of the text producers. The contradictory representations within the BBC's reporting suggest that certain ideological influences may seep into the coverage, potentially contributing to the spread of cultural violence through specific news sources.

Furthermore, when the BBC does activate the protesters in relation to peace, it tends to do so within projected clauses, as seen in instance 95 below:

95. *A protester named Abdellah Djelti is quoted as saying, "The good thing is it was very **peaceful**, people were providing water; they were providing food..." (BBC3Apr19).*

This projected clause places the emphasis on the protester's personal experience and perspective rather than presenting it as a direct statement by the BBC. This choice of presentation further underlines the backgrounded agency of the protesters.

Interestingly, in contrast to the BBC's backgrounding of the protesters in relation to peace, F24's reports continue to depict the protesters as victims, similar to their pre-resignation

coverage. This suggests a consistent narrative thread within F24's reporting, where the protesters are portrayed as vulnerable or subjected to unfavourable circumstances. This portrayal of the protesters as victims is explored in more detail in the following section.

### 6.2.2.2 the Protesters as Victims of the Unjust Practices of their Political System

In the context of F24's reporting on the resignation event, there is a notable acknowledgment of the movement's peaceful nature, which aligns with the BBC's coverage. However, it is essential to highlight the distinct narrative approaches taken by F24 on one hand, and the BBC on the other. While BBC backgrounds the protesters in relation to peace and foregrounds them in relation to violence, F24 victimises them by representing the police as a threat to them (5.4.2) and depicting them as receivers of violence “(5.4.3). The sense of victimisation seems to persist in the reports on the resignation where the protesters are portrayed as victims of unjust practices within their political system. This is realised through the adjectival attribute “revolutionary” and the nominalisation “resistance” as evident in instance 96 below:

*96. The Algerian #Hirak is indeed a **revolutionary** movement of a **special kind** marked by **peaceful** resistance, **solidarity** between all demonstrators, **unity** between all #Algerians men/women, from all walks of life and all regions (F24 3Apr19 (1)).*

This passage consists of concise clauses that use positively denoted lexical choices, such as “a special kind”, “unity”, “solidarity”, and “peaceful”. These terms imply an admiration for the protests and emphasise the positive aspects of the movement. However, within this seemingly positive portrayal, elements of victimisation are subtly implied through specific word choices.

For instance, the term “revolutionary” is employed to describe the nature of the AH movement. While “revolutionary” typically conveys a sense of change or transformation, it also carries the implication that such change is driven by a profound dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs. In essence, a revolution often arises when people feel that their situation has become unbearable and that they must rise up against their oppressors to bring about change (Venter and Bain, 2015). The use of “revolutionary” might suggest that the Algerian protesters are pushed to the extreme due to undesirable circumstances, potentially victimising them by highlighting their struggle against oppressive conditions.

Furthermore, the term “resistance” is employed to characterise the nature of the movement as “peaceful resistance”. While “peaceful” implies non-violence, “resistance” presupposes that there is something to resist against. In this context, it implies that the Algerian government

exercises various forms of inequality and oppression, leading the protesters to engage in acts of resistance. By using “resistance”, F24 subtly underscores the idea that the protesters are reacting to perceived injustices, which can be seen as a form of victimisation.

Therefore, while both the BBC and F24 recognise the peacefulness of the 2019 AH movement, F24 adopts a unique narrative approach that portrays the protesters as victims of an unjust political system. This representation is achieved through the use of terms like “revolutionary” and “resistance”, which imply a deep dissatisfaction and the need to resist oppressive conditions. These lexical choices subtly emphasise the protesters' struggle against adversity, adding a layer of victimisation to their portrayal.

### **6.2.2.3 The Protesters are Determined to Make Further Changes**

This macro-strategy revolves around the portrayal of the protesters as determined to make further changes, considering that Bouteflika's resignation alone is not enough. Such representation is found in the reports by the three news outlets. However, while AJE emphasises the prominent role played by the protesters in changing the course of the event through positive possessive relational and material processes, BBC and F24 represent the change as a mere hope in the inner world of the protesters using affective mental processes. This difference is embedded within the projected clauses when quoting the protesters or international actors on their views on the protests.

AJE cites Benjamin Brower, a historian at the University of Texas, who seems applauding the protesters and acknowledging their prominent role in shaping the political event as shown below:

97. “...by the demonstrators in the street who have an **immense energy and momentum** moving into this after six weeks of demonstrations where they've really driven the political events forward in a way that we haven't seen in Algeria perhaps ever” (AJE3Apr19).

In this instance, AJE portrays the demonstrators as the active agents, highlighting their “immense energy and momentum”. This portrayal emphasises their agency in driving political change and determination to instigate others. Benjamin Brower's admiration for the demonstrators and his surprise at their achievements are evident in his use of the adverb "really", and the transitive material process “ve... driven” when referring to “ the political event”.

Additionally, AJE quotes Halima, a 65-year-old protester, to shed light on the presence of senior citizens in the protests and their determination to achieve further political changes:

98. *"In Algiers, 65-year-old Halima said she **intended** to continue to protest until Bouteflika's allies also **stepped down**" (AJE3Apr19).*

The use of the projected clause "she intended...stepped down" suggests a high level of certainty about future political change. Halima's determination is evident through her commitment to "continue to protest" and the time circumstance "until", which underscores her unwavering resolve to achieve their desired political change.

Even the BBC and F24 represent the protesters as determined to continue the protests until they meet their other demands. However, unlike instance 97 in AJE's report, which expresses this using positive possessive relational and transitive material processes, BBC and F24's reports used the affective mental process "want/wanted", which is arguably weaker than "intend". Illustrative instances are provided below:

99. *"They **wanted** a leader who could take them into the future" (BBC3Apr19 (1)).*

100. *"He says the **protesters** do not only want Mr. Bouteflika to go, but the whole system, in particular the government which was only appointed last weekend" (BBC3Apr19 (2)).*

101. *"Bouteflika's departure is no longer enough. We **want** them all to go. We **want** full freedom..." (F24 3Apr19 (2)).*

In these instances, BBC and F24 activate the sensor "protesters", which is grammatically referenced using the pronouns "they and we", in relation to the affective mental process "want/wanted". This choice of words might evoke a sense of victimisation and weakness among the protesters, as the term "want" suggests a desire rather than a determined intention.

I would therefore say that the choice of linguistic processes and expressions in the news reports plays a crucial role in shaping the perception of the protesters' determination. AJE's use of transitive material processes and positive possessive relational processes portrays the protesters as strong and active agents of change, while BBC and F24's use of affective mental processes might convey a somewhat less determined or more passive stance.

In summary, the examination of the portrayal of the 2019 AH in the resignation reports from AJE, the BBC, and F24 has highlighted a second aspect of representation, which centres on depicting the movement as peaceful. This aspect has revealed a complex interplay of representation, highlighting aspects of Orientalism and pro-democracy within the narratives. The BBC and F24 acknowledge the peaceful nature of the 2019 AH when covering the resignation event but seem to employ different narrative approaches. The BBC tends to background the protesters in relation to peace (section 6.2.2.2.1) while foregrounding them in relation to violence (see section 5.4). F24, despite recognising the peacefulness, maintains a narrative thread that might contribute to a negative depiction of the protesters as victims of an unjust political system (section 6.2.2.2). Terms like "revolutionary" and "resistance" subtly emphasise their struggle against adverse conditions.

In both instances, there is an implicit framing of the Algerian protesters that can be interpreted through an Orientalist perspective. In this lens, the MENA region might be perceived in a way that has the potential to reinforce existing stereotypes or biases. Whether these portrayals express concealment or emphasise victimhood, they could influence how Western audiences perceive the MENA region and its socio-political movements, reflecting elements of the concept of Orientalism.

On the other hand, AJE's report stands out for its portrayal of the protesters as active and instrumental in shaping political changes (section 6.2.2.3). This representation aligns with the pro-democracy narrative, emphasising the determination of the protesters to bring about further reforms. The use of positive possessive relational and transitive material processes in instance 97 underscores their agency and commitment.

The choice of linguistic processes and expressions within these reports plays a pivotal role in shaping the perception of the protesters. AJE's emphasis on active, positive agency contrasts with the BBC and F24's use of affective mental processes, potentially evoking a sense of victimisation or passivity among the protesters. Furthermore, the contradictory representations dissected within the BBC's reporting on the first and second events raise questions about the consistency of media narratives and how they can inadvertently feed into cultural or structural violence. F24's persistent portrayal of the protesters as victims may also reflect certain colonial tendencies within its coverage on the 2019 AH during this critical period in the Algerian history.

In a broader context, the coverage of the 2019 AH movement reflects the complexities of media representation, where the choice of words and narratives can significantly influence public

perceptions of protest movements and their participants. These representations not only provide insight into media biases but also contribute to the broader discourse on democracy and Orientalism within the Algerian context. Another significant disparity between AJE, the BBC, and F24 pertains to their orientation towards Algeria's future as compared to its past.

### **6.2.3. Shaping Algeria's Future Post-Political Crisis vs. Glorifying its Past**

This aspect of representation highlights several noteworthy differences among AJE, BBC, and F24. AJE's approach revolves around proposing a democratic transition as a solution to the ongoing political crisis (section 6.2.3.1). This proposition is substantiated through voices cited in its report, emphasising the importance of shaping a democratic future for Algeria. In contrast, the BBC's reports exhibit a distinct focus on Algeria's past (section 6.2.3.2). They portray Bouteflika in a positive light, almost as a saviour of Algeria in previous years. This retrospective approach underscores the achievements or contributions attributed to Bouteflika during his successive tenures, essentially reflecting on Algeria's history rather than its future prospects.

F24, on the other hand, leans towards representing the transitional period as a source of future political uncertainty for Algeria (section 6.2.3.3). This portrayal raises questions about what lies ahead for the country after the political crisis subsides, suggesting that there may be challenges and uncertainties in navigating the path forward. Such differing representations can also be linked to various political, social, and economic factors as will be explained in the subsequent sections.

#### **6.2.3.1 A Transitional Counsel as an Appropriate Solution to End the Political Crisis in Algeria**

This macro-strategy focuses on AJE's proposal of a transitional council as a viable solution to address Algeria's ongoing political crisis. This proposal is embedded within the quotes used in AJE's report, featuring insights from both local and international experts. Notably, political activist Nazim Taleb, representing the Algerian opposition Rachad movement, and researcher Francis Ghiles from the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs contribute to this perspective.

*103. Nazim Taleb... said a transitional council was **necessary** to pave the way for a free and fair election in the country (AJE 3APR19).*

In instance 103, Nazim Taleb articulates the necessity of establishing a transitional council to pave the way for a free and fair election in Algeria. His statement employs the attributive relational process “is necessary”, emphasising the critical nature of this council in achieving the ultimate goal of a free and fair election. This construction implies that Algeria has experienced questionable elections in the past, specifically alluding to the 2014 general elections. During this election, Bouteflika's victory was declared despite his ailing health and absence from personal campaigning. Taleb's proposal thus underscores the need to rectify these past electoral issues and ensure a more transparent and democratic process.

Francis Ghiles expands upon Nazim Taleb's proposition by offering additional recommendations for the composition of the interim council as indicated through the following instance:

*104. Francis Ghiles ...said such an interim council **should include elderly statesmen** who “have **historical legitimacy**” as well as “**younger members of society**, such as human rights lawyers, to create a transitional administration that is credible in the eyes of the millions who have been in the streets for six weeks now” (AJE3Apr19).*

Ghiles suggests that a council should include elderly statesmen who possess "historical legitimacy" and younger members of society, such as human rights lawyers. He introduces his recommendation with the modal verb "should", signalling the importance of his proposal. He then employs the possessive relational process "include" to specify the composition of this council. The actor "statesmen" is qualified by the adjective "elderly" and further elucidated by the clause “who have historical legitimacy”. This implies that individuals with both experience and historical credibility should be part of the council, likely to ensure a degree of wisdom and integrity in its decision-making processes.

Additionally, Ghiles suggests the inclusion of “younger members of society”, specifically citing human rights lawyers. This recommendation implies that those well-versed in legal matters and human rights issues should be part of the transitional administration. It highlights the importance of credibility and expertise in the eyes of the millions of Algerians who have been actively protesting for six weeks. This inclusion of both elderly statesmen and young professionals can be interpreted as a commentary on the existing political landscape in Algeria, where a desire for a well-established institutional democracy with experienced guidance alongside a desire for fresh perspectives is evident.



AJE's reporting showcases the proposal of a transitional council as a means to resolve Algeria's political crisis, as articulated by Nazim Taleb and expanded upon by Francis Ghiles. These recommendations underscore the need for electoral reform and the inclusion of both experienced figures and young voices in Algeria's political future. Furthermore, they implicitly comment on the existing political elite and the desire for change and accountability among the Algerian populace, aligning with the broader context of the ongoing protests.

Overall, AJE's reporting on the proposal for a transitional council and related recommendations can be seen as supportive of pro-democracy ideals, as it advocates for democratic reforms, inclusivity, and accountability in Algeria's political landscape. It reflects the aspirations of those who have been participating in the pro-democracy protests by offering potential solutions that align with democratic principles.

#### **6.2.3.2. Bouteflika as a Successful Leader**

Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 in the previous chapter have addressed the negative representations of Bouteflika as incapacitated and authoritarian, respectively. These shared macro-strategies across the reports of AJE, BBC, and F24 contribute to a negative portrayal of Bouteflika during his fifth term (as discussed under section 5.2). However, a shift in representation becomes evident as the focus turns towards Bouteflika's legacy in BBC reports.

It is worth noting that AJE and F24 maintain a similar perspective in their coverage of Bouteflika, while BBC's representation of him seems to change, presenting a more positive image of him as a successful leader who played a pivotal role in Algeria's history. This shift is achieved through the use of positively connoted language, specifically the material process “had led”, as opposed to the previously used “had ruled”, which had more negative connotations (as discussed in section 5.2.2).

*105. Mr Bouteflika **had led** the country for 20 years... (BBC3Apr19 (1)).*

*106. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika **has led** Algeria since 1999  
(BBC3Apr19 (2)).*

In instances 105 and 106, Bouteflika is referred to formally and functionally, which contributes to a sense of respect and consideration in the representation of his leadership. The use of the honorific title "sir" in instance 103 and the title "president" in instance 104 adds to this positive portrayal.

Crucially, the material process “had led” is employed to describe Bouteflika's tenure, emphasising his role as a leader who guided the country for two decades. This choice of language conveys a sense of accomplishment and satisfaction with his rule, in contrast to the more negative connotations associated with “had ruled”. This shift may reflect a nuanced perspective in BBC's reporting, acknowledging Bouteflika's historical significance in leading Algeria through a challenging period, including the aftermath of a devastating civil conflict.

Such positive portrayal of Bouteflika as a successful leader is reinforced by his letter to the nation released on 3rd April 2019 (BBC3Apr19 (4)). The letter reflects a mix of acknowledgment, regret, and an attempt at reconciliation with the Algerian people. By expressing pride in his contributions while simultaneously admitting to failing in his duty, Bouteflika takes responsibility for his shortcomings. The use of the phrase "To err being human, I ask forgiveness for any failing" (BBC3Apr19 (4)) is a humble acknowledgment of human fallibility, seeking forgiveness from the populace.

Bouteflika's departure from the political stage is portrayed as a choice made without sadness or fear for Algeria's future. This is expressed through the following: “he was "leaving the political stage with neither sadness nor fear" for Algeria's future” (BBC3Apr19 (4)). This may be an effort to assure the public that his resignation is not motivated by personal concerns but rather a response to the widespread anti-government protests that have persisted for six weeks.

The president's expression of gratitude for the "signs of affection and respect" from the people is embedded within the following statement: “the 82-year-old president expressed his "gratitude" for "the signs of affection and respect" from his "dear sisters and brothers”” (BBC3Apr19 (4)). This implies an understanding of the sentiments that led to the protests. Bouteflika also plead for Algerians to remain united and avoid division as indicated in “Mr Bouteflika also "implored" Algerians "to remain united and never succumb to division" after his resignation” (BBC3Apr19 (4)). This suggests an awareness of the need for national cohesion amid a significant political change.

In essence, this shift in representation can be interpreted as the BBC's attempt to present a more balanced view of Bouteflika's legacy, recognising both his flaws and contributions. It showcases the complexity of media narratives and how the portrayal of political figures can evolve within different contexts and timeframes.

### 6.2.3.3 Algeria's Future as Uncertain

This macro-strategy is predominantly found in F24's reports and revolves around the uncertain future of Algeria in the aftermath of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's resignation. F24 paints a picture of ambiguity regarding what lies ahead for the country, emphasising questions and concerns about the transition. Several projected clauses are used to convey this sense of uncertainty, including instances 107, 108, 109, and 110 below:

*107. Algeria is facing a new era after President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's resignation, including **questions** about what happens next for this **gas-rich country** and **key Western ally** in the fight against **Islamist terrorism** (F24 3Apr19 (2)).*

*108. The United States said the future of Algeria was now up to its people.*

As the State's Department spokesman Robert Palladino told reporters: "Questions about how to navigate this transition in Algeria, which is for the Algerian people to decide", (F24 3APR19(2)).

*109. Russia, **a long-time ally of Algeria**, called for a transition without foreign "interference".*

*110. Foreign powers have called for a **peaceful transition** in the North African country, a key partner in the fight against jihadist extremists in the Sahel region (F24 3Apr19).*

In instance 107, the use of "Algeria" as a metonymical reference for its people places the focus on the nation's collective future. The term "questions" is employed as a nominalisation to emphasise the uncertainty surrounding Algeria's path forward. Additionally, the attributes "this gas-rich country and key Western ally in the fight against Islamist terrorism" may suggest a complex geopolitical context, where Algeria's resources and role in counterterrorism efforts add layers of significance to its future.

In instance 108, The U.S. appears to take a reserved stance regarding the situation in Algeria, asserting that it is allowing the Algerians to determine their own future. However, research indicates that just a few days after the start of the 2019 AH, the U.S.-based Centre for Preventive Actions (CPA) urged the U.S. government to take precautionary measures in Algeria to safeguard its counterterrorism interests and regional stability (Porter, 2019).

In instance 109, F24 mentions Russia's perspective as another foreign actor with interests in Algeria. The term "Russia" is used metonymically, possibly to emphasise the significance of

the proposition. Russia is portrayed as the actor issuing a call without specifying the recipient. It is described as a “long-time ally of Algeria”. Notably, Russia expresses opposition to foreign interference in Algeria, despite its prior involvement in military operations in Syria, as mentioned in section 2.2.2.3. Ghiles (2019) points out that Russia may have concerns about potential democratic changes in Algeria, given that Algeria as noted by Ghiles (2019), is considered a major and wealthy arms purchaser from Russia.

In instance 110, F24 refers to “foreign powers”, an anonymous and generalised reference, which is activated as the actor in relation to the verbal process “called for”. However, it does not specify the recipient of this call. The language used is “peaceful transition”, but the sentence lacks further details regarding the specific nature of this transition or how it should be achieved.

Examining Algeria's trajectory through the lens of foreign actors with strategic and economic stakes in the nation may reflect France's concerns regarding a successful democratic transition. Ghiles (2019) suggests that such a transition could potentially reduce Algeria's reliance on French interests, a prospect that raises concerns. These concerns are exemplified by the protesters' calls to sever diplomatic and economic ties with France, a move that could potentially have a negative impact on the French economy, especially given Algeria's status as its second-largest economic partner after China (Kahhal, 2019). Furthermore, it is worth noting that the protesters have voiced their desire to replace French with English as the primary foreign language due to its global prominence (Arab, 2019).

In summary, the examination of AJE, the BBC, and F24's reporting on the resignation has revealed the last aspect of representation which revolves around the imagining of Algeria's political future by AJE and F24 while reflecting on its past by the BBC. AJE's reporting emphasises the need for a democratic transition as a solution to the ongoing crisis (section 6.2.3.1), with voices like Nazim Taleb and Francis Ghiles advocating for inclusive and accountable governance. This could align with the pro-democracy sentiments echoing through Algeria's streets, portraying a media narrative in support of well-established democracy. In contrast, BBC's representation highlights Bouteflika's past achievements, depicting him as a successful leader who guided Algeria through a challenging period (section 6.2.3.2). This shift in perspective acknowledges the complexity of Bouteflika's legacy, reflecting the evolving nature of media narratives within different contexts.

F24's reports predominantly focus on the uncertainty surrounding Algeria's future after Bouteflika's resignation (section 6.2.3.3). These reports underscore the diverse domestic and international interests at play, adding depth to the portrayal of Algeria's transition. Examining Algeria's trajectory through statements from foreign actors with geostrategic and economic interests might reveal potential concerns, particularly from France, about a successful democratic transition. This concern is exemplified by the protesters' calls to sever diplomatic and economic ties with France, which may have economic repercussions for the country (Kahhal, 2019).

To sum up this first part of the chapter, the analysis of the coverage of Bouteflika's resignation by AJE, the BBC, and F24 has revealed the diverse ways in which a singular event can be portrayed through distinct narrative lenses. Each news outlet seems to offer a unique perspective on the immediate causes behind the resignation, shedding light on the complexity of the event itself.

AJE's narrative places significant emphasis on the agency of the protesters, framing Bouteflika's resignation as a direct result of their persistent and peaceful demonstrations. This portrayal seems to align with certain pro-democratic stances identified in its reports on the event and its commitment to covering grassroots movements seeking political change (Aljazeera, 2006). Moreover, by highlighting the coalition forming between the Algerian army and the people, AJE suggests a potentially more constructive path for political transformation, setting the Algerian situation apart from the tumultuous outcomes observed in other Arab Spring-afflicted nations. In essence, AJE's representation seems to underscore the significance of the Algerian protesters as catalysts for change.

On the other hand, the BBC's macro-strategy emphasises the role of the Algerian army, attributing the agency behind the resignation to institutional actions and decisions. This approach appears to align with elements of Orientalism by marginalising the role and agency of the protesters, focusing instead on the military's involvement in the resignation. The BBC's choice of linguistic strategies reinforces this narrative and positions the military as a dominant force in shaping political outcomes.

F24 took a different path by pinpointing the resignation as a result of the personal agency of the army chief, General Gaid Salah. This specific focus on an individual actor highlights the

significance of his actions in the narrative, positioning him as a key figure in Bouteflika's decision to step down. Such coverage also seems to carry certain Orientalist elements realised with downplaying the agency of the protesters and emphasising the army chief's influence.

It is crucial to acknowledge and delve into the significance of the perpetuation of such narratives by prominent media outlets such as F24 and the BBC. Whether this perpetuation is intentional or unintentional, it holds the potential to significantly shape and influence the depiction of actors involved in the 2019 AH, particularly the protesters, as well as their actions. Understanding the implications of these narratives is therefore essential in comprehending the broader impact they may have on public perception concerning the framing of events related to the 2019 AH. In a broader context, this analysis underscores the complexities of media representation and the importance of critical engagement with news narratives to grasp the full spectrum of events and their potential implications.

Moving forward, the examination of the portrayal of the 2019 AH in the resignation reports from AJE, BBC, and F24 has highlighted a second aspect of representation, depicting the movement as peaceful. This aspect has revealed a complex interplay of representation, highlighting aspects of Orientalism and pro-democracy within the narratives.

The BBC and F24 acknowledge the peaceful nature of the AH movement but employ different narrative approaches. The BBC tends to background the protesters in relation to peace while foregrounding them in relation to violence, as evidenced under section 5.4. F24, despite recognising the peacefulness, maintains a narrative thread that depicts the protesters as victims of an unjust political system. Terms like "revolutionary" and "resistance" (96) subtly emphasise their struggle against adverse conditions. In both instances, there is an implicit framing of the Algerian protesters that can be interpreted through an Orientalist perspective, where the MENA region might be seen through a particular lens that has the potential to reinforce existing stereotypes or biases. These portrayals, whether they exhibit nuances or emphasise victimhood, could influence how Western audiences perceive the MENA region and its socio-political movements, reflecting elements of the concept of Orientalism.

On the other hand, AJE's report stands out for their portrayal of the protesters as active and instrumental in shaping political changes. This representation aligns with the pro-democracy narrative, emphasising the determination of the protesters to bring about further reforms. The use of positive linguistic processes underscores their agency and commitment.

The choice of linguistic processes and expressions within these reports plays a pivotal role in shaping the perception of the protesters. AJE's emphasis on active, positive agency contrasts with the BBC and F24's use of affective mental processes, potentially evoking a sense of victimisation or passivity among the protesters.

Furthermore, the contradictory representations within the BBC's reporting raise questions about the consistency of media narratives and how they can inadvertently feed into cultural or structural violence. F24's persistent portrayal of the protesters as victims also reflects an enduring narrative bias within their coverage.

In a broader context, the coverage of the 2019 AH movement reflects the complexities of media representation, where the choice of words and narratives can significantly influence public perceptions of protest movements and their participants. These representations not only provide insight into media biases but also contribute to the broader discourse on democracy and Orientalism within the Algerian context.

Another significant disparity between AJE, the BBC, and F24 pertains to their orientation towards Algeria's future as compared to its past (section 6.2.3). AJE's reporting emphasises the need for a democratic transition as a solution to the ongoing crisis, with voices like Nazim Taleb and Francis Ghiles advocating for inclusive and accountable governance (section 6.2.3.1). This aligns with the pro-democracy sentiments echoing through Algeria's streets, portraying a media narrative in support of democratic ideals.

In contrast, BBC's representation highlights Bouteflika's past achievements, depicting him as a successful leader who guided Algeria through a challenging period. This shift in perspective acknowledges the complexity of Bouteflika's legacy, reflecting the evolving nature of media narratives within different contexts.

F24's reports predominantly focus on the uncertainty surrounding Algeria's future after Bouteflika's resignation. These reports underscore the diverse domestic and international interests at play, adding depth to the portrayal of Algeria's transition. Examining Algeria's trajectory through statements from foreign actors with geostrategic and economic interests may reveal potential concerns, particularly from France, about a successful democratic transition. This concern was exemplified by the protesters' calls to sever diplomatic and economic ties with France, which could have economic repercussions for the country.

Overall, this analysis highlights the dynamic nature of media representations and their alignment with or deviation from the sentiments on the ground. It underscores the significance of media narratives in shaping public perception and international perspectives on Algeria's political future and past.

### **6.3. The First Live Prosecution**

The events surrounding the 9th of December prosecution mark another significant chapter in the context of the 2019 AH, alongside the pivotal resignation of Bouteflika. This particular event is reported on in five reports, encompassing one from the BBC, two from F24, and an additional two from AJE. These reports, spanning the period between the 9th and 10th December 2019, offer varying perspectives on the ultimate phases of the 2019 AH. Analysis suggests two overarching aspects of representation within the narratives of the three news outlets concerning the prosecution's portrayal.

The first aspect, evident across all three news outlets, depicts the 2019 AH positively as partially successful (section 6.3.1). This portrayal centres around the trial proceedings, depicting them as an extraordinary occurrence within the contemporary history of Algeria (section 6.3.1.1). This outlook emphasises the exceptional nature of the trial event, suggesting that it signifies a moment of significant change and progress within Algeria's political landscape.

Conversely, the second aspect offers a more critical evaluation of the 2019 AH, suggesting that it fell short of meeting the populace's lofty expectations (section 6.3.2). This viewpoint is conveyed by portraying the protesters as dissatisfied with the trajectory taken by their movement (section 6.3.2.1). In this narrative, the movement is depicted as having not fully realised its potential for achieving comprehensive political reform.

The second macro-strategy, which is prominently highlighted in F24's reports, presents a rather intricate narrative regarding the role of the Algerian army in shaping the nation's trajectory towards democracy. In this perspective, the Algerian army is depicted as a significant hindrance to the country's democratic progress (section 6.3.2.2). This portrayal might initially appear at odds with another viewpoint, specifically in section 6.2.1.3. In this section, the army chief is portrayed in a more positive light as the primary driving force behind the swift resignation of President Bouteflika.



### 6.3.1 the 2019 AH as Partially Successful

This aspect of representation, found in the reports of the three news outlets (the BBC, F24, and AJE), primarily centres on the positive depiction of the 2019 AH as being partly successful. This portrayal is achieved by highlighting the prosecution event as an exceptional occurrence in the history of independent Algeria, and it is marked by several noteworthy linguistic choices.

#### 6.3.1.1. The Live Prosecution as an Exceptional Event in the History of Contemporary Algeria

This macro-strategy is a common thread in the reports of all three news outlets and paints the 2019 AH as partly successful. This is accomplished by presenting the prosecution event as extraordinary within the context of Algeria's history as an independent nation. Several linguistic options contribute to this representation. This includes positively Denoted Attributes, such as "high-profile", "landmark", and "historic" to underscore the exceptional nature of the prosecution event. Indicative instances are provided below:

*113. Algeria jails two Bouteflika-era PMs in **landmark** corruption trial (F24 10D19 (1)).*

*114. An Algerian court sentenced two former prime ministers to long jail terms Tuesday in the first of a series of **high-profile** corruption trials... (F24 10D19 (2))*

*115. Two former Algerian prime ministers were convicted of corruption-related charges and sentenced to lengthy prison terms in **a landmark** trial (AJE10D19).*

*116. "It is a historic trial", law professor Rachid Lerari said (AJE10D19).*

The use of the adjective "landmark" denotes that the trial is an event of great historical importance and prominence. It implies that this trial stands out as a pivotal moment in Algeria's contemporary history, different from routine legal proceedings. Similarly, "high-profile" emphasises the widespread attention and significance associated with this event, suggesting that it captured the interest of a broad audience, both domestically and internationally.

Another indication of the trial's exceptionality is the repeated use of the expression "it is/was the first time" coupled with the time-related prepositional phrase "since Algeria's independence from France in 1962". Illustrative instances are presented below:

*117. It was the first time since Algeria's independence from France in 1962 that ex-prime ministers were put on trial (BBC10d19).*

*118. It was the first time since Algeria's independence from France in 1962 that former prime ministers have been put on trial (F24 10D19 (2)).*

*119. It is the first time since Algeria's independence from France in 1962 that former prime ministers have been put on trial (AJE9D19).*

*120. it was the first time any prime minister had been tried since independence from France in 1962 (AJE9D19).*

This phrasing emphasises that trying ex-prime ministers in Algeria is surprising and unexpected, given that it had not occurred since the country gained independence from France (e.g., BBC10d19).

AJE specifically highlights the unusual aspect of the trial being televised, which adds to the perception of its exceptionality. This televisual aspect is presented as an attempt by authorities to address protesters' concerns about corruption seriously as shown below:

*121. Unusually, the trial was televised as authorities sought to show the public they are taking protesters' concerns about corruption seriously (AJE9D19).*

The excerpt begins with the adverbial “unusually”. This adverb reinforces the idea that the public trial came as a surprise, especially to the general public. In this regard, Ghiles (2019) writes that the Algerian people were seemingly concerned about whether government officials were genuinely imprisoned, or it was a tactic employed by the military institution to suppress the protests.

The three news outlets report factual information on the corruption charges against government officials and business tycoons, as well as the sentences handed down by the Algerian court. This information is conveyed through a wide range of active material processes such as “has sentenced” (BBC9D19), “face charges”, “has requested”, “convicts” (AJE9D19), “jailed”, “handed”, and “issued”, as well as passive processes like “was sentenced”, “tried on”, and “were accused” (BBC9D19), “were given”, “were convicted” (AJE9D19), “have been in detention” (AJE9D19), “was handed” (F24 10D19 (1)), and “were sentenced” (F24 10D19 (2)). Excerpts illustrating these processes are provided in Table 5 below.

Active Processes	Passive Transitive Processes
<p>An Algerian court has sentenced two former prime ministers to long jail terms amid a huge corruption investigation.</p>	<p>Ahmed Ouyahia was sentenced to 15 years in prison and Abdelmalek Sellal to 12 years.</p> <p>Ouyahia and Sellal were among 19 defendants tried on charges of money laundering, abuse of office, and granting undue privileges in the vehicle assembly industry (BBC10D19).</p> <p>They were accused of abusing authority in a car manufacturing embezzlement scandal.</p>
<p>In all, 19 defendants – two former prime ministers, other prominent former politicians, and automotive industry tycoons – face charges ranging from money laundering to abuse of office and granting undue privileges.</p> <p>Algerian court convicts 2 former prime ministers of corruption...</p> <p>The Algerian prosecutor's office has requested 20-year prison sentences for several former politicians accused of corruption...</p>	<p>Former leaders Ahmed Ouyahia and Abdelmalek Sellal were both given lengthy jail terms on Tuesday [</p> <p>Two former Algerian prime ministers were convicted of corruption-related charges and sentenced to lengthy prison terms in a landmark trial.</p>
<p>An Algerian court jailed two former prime ministers for corruption on Tuesday, two days before a presidential election which protesters want cancelled.</p>	<p>Sellal's son, Fares, a shareholder in a car assembly plant, was handed a three-year jail sentence. Former prime ministers Ahmed Ouyahia and Abdelmalek Sellal, who were both close to the ousted president, were</p>

<p>The court in Algiers also handed 10-year prison terms to two former industry ministers, and sentences ranging from three to seven years to five prominent businessmen.</p> <p>The court also issued a 20-year prison sentence in absentia to former industry minister Abdesslam Bouchouareb, who is abroad.</p>	<p>sentenced to 15 years and 12 years respectively.</p>
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Table 5. The Prosecution Related Processes

The reports cite the defendants in various ways. While the BBC and AJE individualise the two former prime ministers, Ahmed Ouyahia and Abdelmalek Sellal, they refer to the others generically using collectivised references like “defendants”, “businessmen”, and “former politicians and automotive industry tycoons” (AJE9D19). In contrast, F24 focuses on individualising the business tycoons among the defendants. See table 6 below for details:

NEWS OUTLETS	REFERENTIAL/PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES
BBC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• former prime ministers: Ahmed Ouyahia and Abdelmalek Sellal/ allies of long-time President Abdelaziz Bouteflika</li> <li>• 19 defendants</li> <li>• cabinet minister Abdelsalam Bouchouareb</li> <li>• The convicted men</li> </ul>
AJE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ex-PMs<sup>19</sup> defendants - two former prime ministers, other prominent former politicians, and automotive industry tycoons</li> <li>• former Prime Ministers Ahmed Ouyahia and Abdelmalek Sellal/ longtime Bouteflika allies</li> <li>• former Minister of Industry and Mines Abdeslam Bouchouareb</li> <li>• Ouyahia and Sellal, and the other main defendants</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The former president’s jailed brother Said.</li> <li>• former Minister of Public Works and Transport Abdelghani Zaalane</li> <li>• Former industry ministers Bedda and Youcef Yousfi</li> <li>• Many former senior officials</li> <li>• Ali Haddad, a former chief of Algeria’s largest business association</li> </ul>
F24	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• two former industry ministers</li> <li>• five prominent businessmen</li> <li>• former Minister of Energy Youcef Yousfi</li> <li>• Ali Haddad, former head of the FCE/founder and CEO of private construction firm ETRHB</li> <li>• former head of Algeria's main employers' organisation</li> <li>• Sellal's son, Fares, a shareholder in a car assembly plant</li> <li>• former industry minister Abdesslam Bouchouareb</li> <li>• former industry ministers, Mahdjoub Bedda and Youcef Yousfi</li> <li>• Three businessmen who own vehicle assembly plants -- Ahmed Mazouz, Hassen Arbaoui and Mohamed Bairi</li> </ul>

Table 6. List of Referential and Predicational Strategies Used by the Three News Outlets when Referring to the Defendants

As depicted in table 6, all three news outlets mention some of the nineteen defendants in their reports. The way they refer to these individuals sheds light on their different editorial choices. The BBC, for instance, singles out the two former prime ministers while grouping the others together as “defendants” or “the convicted men”. This approach might create a sense of vagueness, potentially implying that all members of the government are corrupt, much like their prime ministers.

On the other hand, AJE and F24 choose to individualise the two prime ministers but also mention other defendants. This approach might convey the idea that the country is striving to uphold a certain level of integrity and accountability. It suggests that it is not the entire government that is corrupt but rather a specific group of individuals.

F24, interestingly, places a particular emphasis on the business tycoons, giving them individual attention. This emphasis on the economic aspect in Algeria's context might be attributed to the significant economic ties between Algeria and France. Kahhal (2019) writes that France is Algeria's second-largest economic partner after China. He further argues that France enjoyed unique economic privileges in Algeria, especially during the Bouteflika era (ibid). He notes that many of the largest French companies investing in Algeria violated the "Algerian Investment Law", which mandates foreign investors to hold only 49% of any investment while allocating the remaining 51% to Algerian investors (ibid). This economic context might suggest that the success of the 2019 AH movement could be viewed as a potential threat to France's interests in Algeria. This point is supported by Kahhal's (2019) statement that protesters demanded the liberation of the Algerian economy from French hegemony, vowing to continue protesting until Algeria's ties with France are severed (Kessar, 2019).

In summary, the first aspect of representation found out in the five reports on the 9<sup>th</sup> of December's prosecution primarily emphasises the 2019 AH's partial success. This portrayal is achieved by framing the live prosecution event as an exceptional occurrence in the history of contemporary Algeria. As shown, the reports employ various linguistic strategies, such as positively denoted adjectival predicates attributed to the prosecution to underscore its exceptional nature. Examples include: "landmark" and "historic" (113, 116). The reports also highlight that it is the first time since Algeria's independence from France in 1962 that former prime ministers are put on trial, emphasising its unexpected and extraordinary nature.

Additionally, analysis shows that the reports differ in how they refer to the defendants, with the BBC presenting a more generic characterisation and AJE and F24 choosing to individualise certain defendants, particularly business tycoons. This distinction suggests varying editorial perspectives on the extent of corruption within the government. Furthermore, the economic context, as outlined by Kahhal (2019), underscores the potential significance of the 2019 AH movement, particularly in relation to France's economic interests in Algeria. The protesters'

demands for economic liberation from French hegemony and their commitment to severing ties with France highlight the broader implications of the movement beyond domestic politics.

However, despite the live prosecution and Bouteflika's resignation, the reports suggest that the 2019 AH movement cannot be unequivocally considered a complete success. The use of the adverb "partly" in describing its success underscores that there were notable setbacks and challenges identified in the analysed reports.

### **6.3.2 The 2019 AH as a Movement which does not live up to the People's Aspirations**

The preceding discussion regarding the first aspect of representation has focused on highlighting the positive elements of the 2019 AH, portraying it as a partially successful endeavour. In contrast, the current aspect delves into presents a more critical view, depicting this movement as falling short of the people's lofty aspirations. It is constructed through two overarching macro-strategies, each underpinned by a multitude of discursive strategies and linguistic categories.

The first macro-strategy revolves around the representation of the protesters themselves as dissatisfied with the trajectory that their movement has taken. This implies that there exists a degree of disillusionment among the participants, suggesting that they did not meet their demands. The second macro-strategy, notably prevalent in F24's reports, is concerned with the adverse portrayal of the army's role in the context of Algerian democracy. This perspective characterises the army as an impediment to the advancement of democratic principles within Algeria. It implies that the military's influence may be hindering the realisation of democratic reforms, thus casting a shadow over the prospects of genuine political transformation in the country.

#### **6.3.2.1 The Protesters are Dissatisfied with the Trajectory Taken by their Movement**

This first macro-strategy significantly contributes to a negative portrayal of the 2019 AH movement, depicting it as falling short of the people's aspirations. It emphasises the protesters' dissatisfaction with the trajectory their movement has taken, especially in the context of almost nine months of weekly peaceful protests. This sense of discontent is presupposed through two key material processes: "have continued" and "have been waging", as exemplified in the following instances:

122. Protesters **have continued** to call for sweeping reforms, accusing leaders of the governing party of widespread corruption and repression ahead of presidential elections (BBC10D19).

123. The high-profile prosecutions have done little to win over the protesters, who **have continued** to take to the streets since Bouteflika's resignation (F24 10D19 (1)) (F24 10D19 (2)).

124. Pro-democracy activists... **have been waging** mass protests to demand its cancellation (referring to the elections) (BBC10D19).

These sentences highlight the persistent nature of the protesters' actions, suggesting that they remain unsatisfied with the status quo despite the initial achievements of their protests. In instance 122, the actor “protesters” is activated in relation to the verbal group “have continued to call for”. This suggests that the protests have been ongoing and that the protesters have been consistently demanding further political reforms, which are decried as “sweeping”. It is activated in connection to the verbal process “accusing”, directed at the objectified entity “the governing party, though responsibility for managing the country's affairs was jointly held by the interim government and the military.

Additionally, the use of the nominalisations “corruption” and “repression”, intensified by the adjective “widespread” (122), may be a form of war journalistic reporting for several reasons. Firstly, this report lacks crucial contextual information, especially concerning the use of the term “repression”. From the sentence, it is apparent that the “leaders from the governing party” are implicated in repressing the underlying objective, which is evidently the protesters. However, it does not explicitly state the primary cause or justification for this repression. This ultimately suggests that the repression may have been arbitrary in nature. In this context, Sotoudeh (2020) attributes the reason behind the repression to charges of undermining national unity by displaying the Amazigh flag.

Instance 123 suggests that despite the unusual and highly significant prosecution, the protesters remain dissatisfied or unimpressed with the actions taken by the authorities. This is implied through the expression “have done little to win over”.

In my analysis of the protesters' role in the prosecution’s reports, it becomes evident that their influence on Bouteflika’s resignation is still downplayed or overlooked. This is particularly noticeable in the BBC and F24’s instances provided below:

125. *since Mr Bouteflika was forced out of office (BBC9D19).*



*126...after long-time president Abdelaziz Bouteflika resigned in the face of mass protests in April (F24 10D19 (1)).*

The use of the passive voice in the BBC's statement "since Mr. Bouteflika was forced out of office" removes agency from the protesters and implies that the resignation happened on its own without clearly identifying the actors responsible. This could align with the Orientalist approach of downplaying the role of non-Western actors in shaping their own destinies (Sulaiman, 2019, p. 79).

In instance 126, the use of terms like "mass protests" instead of explicitly mentioning "protesters" or "demonstrators" by F24 can be seen as a form of backgrounding, where the individuals involved in the protests are obscured or made less prominent. This aligns with the Orientalist tendency to view people from non-Western regions as a homogenous mass rather than distinct individuals with agency (Sulaiman, 2019, p. 81).

In sum, the analysis of the protesters' dissatisfaction with the trajectory taken by their movement sheds light on the portrayal of the 2019 AH in the media. This macro-strategy, evident through the use of specific linguistic choices, contributes significantly to a negative representation of the movement, suggesting that it falls short of meeting the people's aspirations. Through the examination of various instances, it becomes clear that the protesters' dissatisfaction is a recurring theme. The persistent nature of their actions, as demonstrated by phrases like "have continued to call for" and "have been waging", indicates that they remain unsatisfied with the status quo, even after months of weekly peaceful protests.

Additionally, the use of intensified nominalisations such as "corruption" and "repression", combined with the adjective "widespread" (122), raises questions about the framing of these issues. It suggests that there might be a tendency towards sensational or war journalistic reporting, particularly when crucial contextual information is lacking. This lack of context can lead to a perception of arbitrary repression, potentially obscuring the underlying reasons behind certain actions.

Furthermore, the portrayal of the protesters in the media, as exemplified by instances from the BBC and F24, reveals how their role in shaping significant political events is sometimes downplayed or obscured. The passive voice used by the BBC in the statement "since Mr. Bouteflika was forced out of office" (125) and the use of the nominalisation "mass protests"

(126) instead of explicitly naming "protesters" by F24 may reflect an Orientalist approach, diminishing the agency of non-Western actors in influencing their own destinies (Sulaiman, 2019, p. 79).

In essence, the protesters' dissatisfaction with the trajectory of their movement, as depicted in media discourse, highlights the complexities of representing social and political movements. It underscores the importance of critically analysing linguistic choices and media narratives to understand how certain perspectives and agendas are conveyed, ultimately shaping public perception of events and actors.

### 6.3.2.2 The Algerian Army as an Obstacle to Democracy

Another significant macro-strategy contributing to a negative portrayal of the 2019 AH, suggesting that it does not meet the people's aspirations, is F24's depiction of the army as an obstacle to democracy. This portrayal becomes apparent through the use of the verbal process 'has rejected.' An illustrative instance is provided below:

*127. The military high command...**has rejected** the demands of protesters and civil society for sweeping reforms" (F24 10D19 (2)).*

In this instance, F24 appears to place blame on the military institution for obstructing the path to democracy. It may suggest that the army is resistant to the possibility of democratic change in Algeria, though it showed fear of a genuine democratic change in the country, as discussed in more detail in section 6.2.3.3. The activation of the army in relation to the material process "has rejected", alongside the goal "the demands", could imply that the army is unwelcoming of change. Moreover, the inclusion of the adjectival attribute "sweeping" before the head "reforms" presupposes that the issues stemming from Bouteflika's rule in Algeria run deep, necessitating comprehensive reforms across various aspects of the country. Notably, the instance does not specify the types or areas of reforms but instead refers to them generally as "reforms".

Another significant example that portrays the army as an impediment to democracy is its activation as a sensor in the mental process "has paid little attention", as shown in the following statement:

*128. **It has paid little attention to popular calls to replace the constitution** that served to legitimise Bouteflika's grip on power (F24 10D19 (2)).*

In this case, “the army”, referred to with the pronoun “it”, is depicted as indifferent to the “popular calls” for constitutional change. The use of the material process “replace” in connection with the goal “the constitution” implies that the army holds some responsibility for drafting or supporting the existing constitution. The latter is further described with the two material processes “serve to legitimise” and the goal “Bouteflika's grip on power”, suggesting that the army played a role in supporting Bouteflika during his four successive terms in power.

However, it is worth noting that this overall negative portrayal of the army as an obstacle to democracy overlooks the significant role it played during the protests. As mentioned in section 2.2.2.3, the military assisted the protesters in pressuring Bouteflika to step down from office and in prosecuting those involved in corruption (Grewell, 2021, p. 105). Nevertheless, the protesters remained dissatisfied with these outcomes, as discussed in the previous section. They further demanded the removal of the military from power and the establishment of a transitional government. It is noteworthy that, considering the regional context, many Arab states that witnessed the establishment of transitional councils, including Libya, Yemen, and Sudan, have experienced significant challenges and instability. These transitions often led to foreign interventions, military conflicts, or political turmoil. Therefore, in the Algerian context, it could be argued that the military, which F24 portrays as an obstacle to democracy, acted diligently to prevent Algeria from descending into further political crisis, which could escalate into a civil war.

The portrayal of the army as an obstacle to democracy in F24's reporting, while overlooking its role in maintaining stability and preventing foreign intervention, highlights the complexity of assessing the military's role in the 2019 AH. I would therefore underscore the need to consider both the domestic and regional contexts when evaluating the actions and impact of key actors in complex political situations.

To sum up this second part of the chapter, section 6.3 delves into the portrayal of the 2019 AH movement in media reports, focusing on the first live prosecution and the perspectives of various news outlets. It becomes clear that there are two overarching aspects of representation concerning the prosecution's portrayal.

The first aspect, which is evident across all three news outlets (BBC, F24, and AJE), depicts the 2019 AH positively as partially successful. This portrayal highlights the trial proceedings

as an extraordinary event in Algeria's contemporary history. The reports use linguistic strategies such as positively denoted adjectives like "landmark" and "historic" (113, 116) to emphasise the exceptional nature of the prosecution event. The use of phrases like "the first time since Algeria's independence from France in 1962" (117, 118, 119) underscores the unexpected and extraordinary nature of the trial. However, despite these positive aspects, the reports suggest that the 2019 AH cannot be unequivocally considered a complete success, a point further discussed under the second aspect of representation.

The second aspect presents a more critical evaluation of the 2019 AH, suggesting that it fell short of meeting the populace's lofty expectations. This viewpoint is conveyed by portraying the protesters as dissatisfied with the trajectory taken by their movement (section 6.3.2.1). The reports highlight the protesters' persistent actions, such as "have continued to call for" (122/123) and "have been waging" (124), indicating ongoing dissatisfaction despite months of peaceful protests. Additionally, the reports differ in how they refer to the defendants, with the BBC presenting a more generic characterisation and AJE and F24 individualising certain defendants. This distinction might suggest varying editorial perspectives on the extent of corruption within the government. F24 also emphasises the role of business tycoons among the defendants, which may be influenced by economic interests.

Furthermore, F24's reports depict the Algerian army as an obstacle to democracy (section 6.3.2.2), suggesting that it rejects the demands of protesters for sweeping reforms and pays little attention to calls for constitutional change. However, it is important to reiterate that this portrayal overlooks the significant role the military played in assisting the protesters in pressuring Bouteflika to step down and prosecuting corrupt individuals.

Consequently, the analysis of media reports on the 2019 AH highlights the complexities of representing a social and political movement. It underscores the importance of critically examining linguistic choices and media narratives to understand how different perspectives and agendas are conveyed. As has been demonstrated through my analysis in chapters 5 and 6, the portrayal of the movement is influenced by various factors, including the portrayal of key actors, the framing of issues, and the broader domestic and regional context.

#### **6.4. Summary of the Chapter**

In conclusion, Chapter 6 has continued the analysis of media representations of the 2019 AH through the portrayal of two key developments: Bouteflika's resignation (section 6.2) and the first live prosecution of officials from his political regime (section 6.3). The chapter builds upon the findings from the previous chapter, which has highlighted the consensus on the legitimacy of the AH as a movement against Bouteflika's fifth term bid while revealing varying perspectives on the protesters and their actions.

The chapter is divided into two main sections, each addressing a specific event. The first event, Bouteflika's resignation, is examined through the lenses of AJE, the BBC, and F24. Critical analysis has demonstrated that these news outlets presented distinct narratives regarding the main catalyst behind Bouteflika's departure. AJE emphasised the agency of the protesters and their role in pressuring Bouteflika to resign, aligning with a pro-democratic viewpoint (section 6.2.1.1). The BBC attributed the resignation primarily to the Algerian army's interference (section 6.2.1.2), while F24 focused on the army chief Gaid Salah's involvement (section 6.2.1.3). The portrayal of the AH's peacefulness post-resignation also varies among the outlets, with the BBC backgrounding the protesters' role (section 6.2.2.1), F24 emphasising their victimhood (section 6.2.2.2), and AJE highlighting their determination for further change (section 6.2.2.3). Additionally, the chapter has explored the depiction of Algeria's political landscape, with AJE advocating for a transitional government (section 6.2.3.1), the BBC framing Bouteflika as a successful leader (section 6.2.3.2), and F24 expressing concerns about political uncertainty (section 6.2.3.3).

In the second section which was dedicated to the live prosecution of officials, a positive portrayal of the AH as a successful movement is evident across all three outlets (section 6.3.1). They depict the prosecution as an extraordinary event in Algerian history (section 6.3.1.1). However, there is also a critical evaluation of the AH, portraying protesters as dissatisfied with the direction of their movement (section 6.3.2.1). The role of the army is highlighted as potentially obstructive to democracy, particularly in F24's reporting (section 6.3.2.2).

Overall, Chapter 6 has further examined the complexities of media representation, highlighting the evolving discourse surrounding key events in the 2019 AH movement. It has underscored the persistence of pro-democratic and orientalist tendencies in reporting and their impact on public perception of the movement and Algeria's political future.

As I have previously argued, the aspects of pro-democracy and orientalism dissected in the analysed reports can be explicitly correlated with the concepts of Peace/War Journalism respectively. In the subsequent chapter, I will delve into a detailed examination of this correlation by analysing the textual findings from the two data chapters and interpreting them within the adapted model of P/WJ.

# Chapter 7

## Discussion

### 7.1. Introduction

This chapter seeks to address the overarching research question regarding the representation of the 2019 AH by AJE, the BBC, and F24 in their web-based reports spanning nine months of weekly protests from 22<sup>nd</sup> February to 10<sup>th</sup> December 2019. The specific aim is to assess the extent to which the three news websites adhered to a more or less peace journalistic perspective in their comprehensive representation of the 2019 AH. This evaluation is conducted by interpreting the CDS textual results presented in chapters 5 and 6, using the adapted model of P/WJ explained in Chapter 4 (section 4.7).

It is crucial to emphasise that P/WJ's models, such as Galtung's, were primarily designed by peace researchers to analyse reports on war situations (Nohrstedt and Ottosen, 2011, p. 235). Instances include interstate wars such as Afghanistan and the U.S (Ottosen, 2010) or civil wars like the 2011 NATO and U.S military intervention in Libya to overthrow its ex-political regime (Mensah, 2015). The model's related terminology describes violent conflicts such as "war", "weapons", "glory, damage to structure", "killed, wounded, and material damage" (Galtung, 2006, p. 1), and appears incompatible with cases of predominantly peaceful conflicts, such as the 2019 AH.

The study claims originality by suggesting theoretical adjustments to the model to maintain its applicability not only to the case of the 2019 AH but also to any other news reports on controversial issues, whether local or international. The adjustments are based on McGoldrick and Lynch's framework to P/WJ (2000), Herbert's ideas on conflict analysis (2017), and Chouliaraki's analytics of mediation (2006). Originality is also claimed by using the adapted model as a supplement to CDS and an interpretative framework of its textual findings. This lies in establishing a link between the tenets of P/WJ model and CDS linguistic categories, especially the ones proposed by Van Leeuwen (2008), Halliday and Matthiessen (2004), and Reisigl and Wodak (2001).

The data analysed in Chapter 5 suggests a consensus among the three news outlets concerning the legitimacy of the 2019 AH against Bouteflika's fifth term. Such agreement is established through the presentation of contextual details on Bouteflika contributing to a negative representation of him as incapacitated and authoritarian (section 5.2). This representation may

suggest their commitment to thorough and comprehensive reporting, as outlined in their editorial guidelines. However, the critical analysis of the discourses surrounding the protesters and their protests across the reports on the three event suggests interesting disparities between AJE, on one hand, and the BBC and F24, on the other.

Analysis undertaken in chapters 5 and 6 suggests that AJE's reports seem to exhibit certain pro-democratic tendencies, realised by a positive representation of the protesters as in control of their movement and responsible for its outcomes. BBC and F24's reports, by contrast, appear to carry certain orientalist elements, achieved by dehumanising and victimising the protesters and attributing the movement's main outcomes to other actors. The two ideological representations are further underpinned by interpreting the CDS textual findings of chapters 5 and 6 using the adapted model of P/WJ. Interpretation suggests that AJE's reporting on the 2019 AH seems to be closer to PJ, which could reinforce the pro-democratic tendency dissected in its presentation of the protesters and their protests. On the contrary, the BBC and F24's reporting on the movement appears to lean more towards WJ, potentially reflecting certain orientalist tendencies. This is explained in detail under the following items.

- PJ as Context-Oriented vs Decontextualisation (section 7.2)
- PJ as People/Human-Oriented vs Dehumanisation (section 7.3)
- WJ as Propaganda-Oriented (section 7.4)
- PJ as Solution-Oriented vs WJ as Problem-Oriented (section 7.5)

## **7.2 PJ as Context-Oriented vs Decontextualisation**

This tenet is thoroughly explored under section 4.7.1. It aims to unravel the conflict's context by exploring its formation, parties, goals, and issues (Galtung, 2006, p. 1), or in Herbert's terms "conflict profile", "actors", and "trends" (2017, p. 12). The provision of contextual details on a given conflict aligns with PJ, as it not only makes the conflict transparent (Galtung, 2006, p. 1) but also assists the audience in comprehending it (Peleg, 2007, pp. 4-5). This in turn may contribute to the de-escalation of cultural violence, potentially resulting in the misinterpretation or oversimplification of the event's dynamics. The data suggests that AJE's approach leans towards peace-oriented reporting, evident in its provision of more nuanced and detailed contextual information on the AH's profile and trends. In contrast, the BBC and F24's reports offer fewer contextual details, raising concerns about a potentially partial understanding of the



2019 AH. This limited understanding may contribute to the escalation of cultural violence, where misunderstandings or misrepresentations of the conflict's complexities could foster tensions and perpetuate a cycle of cultural discord.

### 7.2.1. The Conflict's Profile

The data presented in section 5.2 suggests that all three news outlets shed light on the political context leading to the emergence of the 2019 AH. This focus is primarily on the portrayal of Bouteflika as an authoritarian president for two decades (section 5.2.2) and as incapacitated to carry out his presidential duties due to health and age issues (section 5.2.1). Within the political profile of the 2019 AH, the analysed data indicates that AJE reveals the identity of the figure running Algeria during Bouteflika's absence. In contrast, the reports from the BBC and F24 appear to exercise reservation in this regard.

In their twenty-one reports on the initial event, the three news outlets collectively emphasise political corruption by referring to "Said". Said is Bouteflika's brother, widely believed to have been the decision-maker in Bouteflika's absence since 2013 (Volpi, 2020, p. 13). Notably, AJE is the sole news outlet that individualises Said, identifying him as "the president's younger brother and special adviser" (AJE3Mar19). F24 mentions him using the refrain "no to Bouteflika and no to Said" (F24 23F19) without explicitly identifying who Said is. The BBC, on the other hand, conceals Said's identity by using the expression "those close to him" through the projected clause "...those close to him are doing what they will behind his back" (BBC3Mar19). In addition to identifying Said as "the president's younger brother and special adviser" (AJE3Mar19), AJE aligns with Volpi's perspective on Said's role in the Algerian political scene, as evidenced by the following instances.

*109. Protesters also chanted slogans against the president's brother, Said, who opponents say is running the country from behind the scenes (AJE28Mar19).*

*130. On Tuesday, the young protesters chanted slogans against the ailing leader and his brother Said, a presidential adviser seen by many as having major political influence (AJE5Mar19).*

As can be seen, Said's role in Algeria is stated overtly through activation in relation to the transitive material process "...is running the country ..." (AJE28Mar19) and the possessive relational process "...having major political influence" (AJE5Mar19). Thus, divulging the

identity of Said as an integral part of the political profile that catalysed the 2019 AH could potentially contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of its political context. When Said's agency is concealed or mentioned only within a slogan without additional details, it introduces ambiguity and vagueness. This lack of specificity may undermine the reliability of and objectivity within the news reports. This shortfall leaves the audience with incomplete information, impeding their capacity to develop a nuanced and accurate understanding of the unfolding events.

It can be argued that Peleg's assertion, suggesting that providing the context of conflicts aids the audience in forming their own judgments, holds merit to a certain extent. A critical discourse analyst should scrutinise not only the contextual elements presented but also how they are presented, with a keen focus on the news source delivering the information. Notably, F24, considering France's colonial history in Algeria, stands out as the sole outlet whose reports underscore economic issues, specifically unemployment and the prosecution of business tycoons, and recall socio-political events including the 1980 Berber Spring. All are integrated into the economic and social profiles of the 2019 AH. This distinctive approach raises questions about the underlying motivations and potential implications of such emphasis.

F24's coverage of the AH's commencement delves into the economic struggles faced by Algerian youth, with instances highlighting the challenges of finding employment and alarming statistics indicating high unemployment rates among Algerians under 30.

*131. Many young people struggle to find jobs (F24 5Mar19).*

*132. More than a quarter of Algerians under 30 are unemployed, according to official figures (F24 23F19).*

*133. Calls to demonstrate have resonated with young Algerians, many of whom struggle for employment in a country where half the population is under 30 (F24 1Mar19 (2)).*

Initially, when analysing F24's reports on the eruption event, these instances have been interpreted as components of the economic profile contributing to the emergence of the 2019 AH. However, upon closer examination of F24's reports on the subsequent prosecution event, a notable shift in focus becomes apparent. The economic aspect takes centre stage, foregrounding detailed accounts of the sentences and fines imposed on imprisoned business figures. Interestingly, this emphasis persists despite the reports primarily revolving around the imprisonment of two ex-prime ministers.

Considering the historical economic ties between Algeria and France, where the latter held a significant position as the second most important economic partner during the Bouteflika era, unique economic privileges were extended to France (Kahhal, 2019). Ghiles (2019) suggests that French companies were involved in corruption, providing contracts that contributed to the enrichment of Bouteflika's associates. A nuanced perspective suggests that this emphasis on the economic side may reflect French concerns regarding the security situation in Algeria. This concern arises from the realisation that a genuine democratic transition in Algeria might pose a threat to French economic stability, particularly as some protesters demanded the liberation of the Algerian economy from French hegemony (Kahhal, 2019; Kessar et al, 2021)).

Turning to the coverage of the Berber Spring, F24 stands out by explicitly addressing this historical event, quoting a professor who draws a connection between the 2019 AH and the 1980s Berber Spring as stating the following.

*134. “There is a massive strike by students... I've never seen anything like it since the 1980 Berber Spring”, a professor told AFP (F24 5Mar19).*

The professor's identity in this quote is somewhat obscured by a generic reference to her role as “a professor”, a departure from the news outlet's usual practice of identifying sayers by name. The instance shows that the professor draws a notable comparison between the 2019 AH and the 1980 Berber Spring. This comparison, while highlighting potential similarities, also underscores key differences between the two movements. While the 2019 AH unfolded nationwide, the Berber Spring was localised in the eastern region of Tizi Ouzou (Aitel, 2016, p. 64). Moreover, while the 2019 AH's primary catalyst was political, demanding the removal of Bouteflika's political system, the 1980 Berber Spring was principally driven by social factors. Protesters urged the then Algerian government to recognise the specificity of Berber culture and language as integral components of Algerian identity (Aitel, 2016, p. 64). The professor's quote is followed with a brief definition of the Berber spring as the following excerpt shows:

*135. She was referring to a weeks-long uprising demanding cultural rights for Algeria's Berber community, who long fought for greater recognition for their customs and ancient language overshadowed by Arabic culture (F24 5Mar19).*

The professor's quote and subsequent definition of the Berber Spring indicate an ongoing conflict between the Berber community and the Algerian government, predating the 1980 events. Additionally, the portrayal downplays the state's efforts to preserve the specificities of

the Berber language. Notably, in 2003, Bouteflika issued a presidential decree incorporating Berber as a national language in the constitution (Boudhen, 2017). Another significant milestone occurred on February 7, 2016, when the Parliament passed a constitutional amendment recognising the Berber language as the second official language in Algeria (ibid).

Recalling the issue of the Berber Spring during the 2019 AH protests, as highlighted by F24, introduces an additional layer of complexity. This emphasis might potentially shift the trajectory of the 2019 AH from being perceived solely as an anti-government movement to evolving into an ideological conflict within the same populace. The intricate nature of the Algerians' demands, such as challenging the dominance of the French language and calling for the severance of economic ties with France, further complicates the situation. Kessar et al. (2019) argue that F24's emphasis on the Berber Spring and related issues may signify the influence of France's colonial ideology, rooted in a historical strategy of divide and rule.

### **7.2.2 The Conflict's Dynamics**

When delving into the contextual elements of the conflict, the second crucial aspect involves examining its dynamics or “current trends” (Herbert, 2017, p. 12), specifically focusing on the locations of violent clashes. Notably, a discernible pattern emerges in the reporting perspectives, with AJE adopting one stance and the BBC and F24 presenting somewhat a different one. AJE's reports on the 2019 AH commence by situating the events in an “open space” (Galtung, 2006, p. 1), meticulously disclosing the precise locations of the violent confrontations between the police and the protesters. In contrast, the reports from the BBC and F24 often lack or provide minimal contextual details, framing the protests as occurring in a more ambiguous “closed space”. This is achieved by either omitting crucial details about the clash locations or using the broad prepositional circumstance “in Algiers”, except in a few instances where they specify “the presidential palace”. For instance:

*136. Security forces fired tear gas at protesters in the Belcourt neighbourhood on the city's Mediterranean shore (AJE1Mar19).*

*137. Police used tear gas and water cannon to discourage the protesters from reaching the heavily guarded Constitutional Council office (AJE3Mar19).*

*138. Police fired tear gas on Friday afternoon to block a protest march on the presidential palace, prompting demonstrators to throw stones in response (AJE23F19).*

As evident from the three instances, AJE's reports meticulously specify the locations where instances of violence occurred during the protests, including notable landmarks such as the "Presidential Palace", the "Belcourt neighbourhood", and the "Constitutional Council office". This explicit detailing suggests that the incidents of violence were relatively few compared to the prevailing atmosphere of peace. This implication aligns with the pro-democracy sentiment, indicating that non-violent activities predominantly characterised the protests. The focus on peaceful demonstrations underscores the protesters' commitment to democratic values, including the right to peaceful assembly and protest, as well as the pursuit of their cause through civil means. The rarity of violent incidents, as documented by AJE, underscores the movement's dedication to the democratic ideals of civil discourse and nonviolent dissent.

Contrarily, as discussed earlier, the BBC and F24's instances provide minimal or no contextual information when representing the clashes between protesters and security forces. The analysis in Chapter 5 uncovered that this approach involves framing the protests as if they were unfolding in a vague "closed space" (Galtung, 2006, p. 1). More specifically, the reports employ material and existential processes to convey the occurrence of violent actions while omitting crucial contextual details regarding their specific locations. The frequent use of the circumstance "in Algiers" further contributes to this lack of specificity. Such a representation might create a negative perception of the protests as predominantly violent throughout Algeria, thereby potentially fostering a negative image of the Algerian protesters. The instances below provide further illustration of this decontextualised reporting approach.

*139. Police fired tear gas at protesters in the capital, Algiers (BBC1Mar19).*

*140. police used tear gas to disperse crowds in the capital (F24 23F19).*

*There are other instances where the location of violence is suppressed as shown below.*

*141. police firing tear gas over a crowd that ran to escape (F24 23F19).*

*142. Police sprayed tear gas, brought in a water cannon, and rounded up several people as shopkeepers pulled down their shutters, an AFP journalist said (F24 24F19).*

The four instances, characterised by the use of vague descriptions and the omission of specific locations, may contribute to a skewed portrayal of the 2019 AH as predominantly violent, thereby obscuring its peaceful aspects. This selective framing might echo elements of Orientalism, where regions and cultures are often oversimplified or misrepresented (Sulaiman, 2019). In this context, the lack of precision in describing locations and the emphasis on violence may perpetuate stereotypes and contribute to a distorted narrative reminiscent of Orientalist tendencies, reinforcing preconceived notions about the MENA region as inherently tumultuous.

In summary, this section has elucidated the first two tenets of P/WJ model, specifically, PJ as context-oriented vs Decontextualisation, in connection to the data presented in Chapter 5. It has demonstrated that AJE's reports offered more contextual details compared to the BBC and F24 when addressing the movement's political profile and dynamics. While exploring the political landscape of the 2019 AH, AJE explicitly identified Said as the influential figure in Algeria during Bouteflika's absence. In contrast, the BBC and F24 backgrounded Said by using the attribute "close to him" (BBC3Mar19) or referencing him in the refrain "no to Bouteflika and no to Said" (F24 23F19).

Regarding the economic and social dimensions of the 2019 AH, F24 appears to be the lone news outlet emphasising issues such as unemployment, the prosecution of business tycoons, and recalling events from the 1980s Berber Spring. As mentioned earlier, presenting the economic context might signify French concerns about their interests in Algeria, particularly as some protesters' demands included severing economic and diplomatic ties with France. Moreover, introducing the issue of the Berber Spring in the context of the 2019 AH might be viewed as unnecessary, given potential differences in the two movements' demands and scalability. Addressing this issue during the protests could shift the 2019 AH's trajectory from a grassroots movement to an ideological conflict among the same people.

Examining the dynamics of the 2019 AH, AJE's reports provided contextual details on the precise locations of violent confrontations between protesters and police, potentially indicating less intense violence. In contrast, the BBC and F24 reported on these incidents as if they were occurring in "a closed space", offering fewer or no contextual details on where the confrontations took place. Therefore, the provision of more contextual details by AJE aligns its representation closer to PJ, contributing to a more objective reporting. It allows audiences to grasp the intricacies of the situation. This comprehensive approach enables viewers to form a

more informed judgment about the events. Conversely, the limited contextual details in the reports from the BBC and F24 position their representations closer to WJ, contributing to a potentially more biased portrayal of the events. This lack of contextual information can lead to a less comprehensive understanding of the conflict, which might influence audiences' perceptions of the protests as more violent than they may actually be.

### **7.3 PJ as People/human-Oriented vs Dehumanisation**

As discussed in section 4.7.2, the concept of PJ as People/Human-oriented extends beyond merely revealing the identity of social actors in conflict zones, as highlighted by Galtung (2006, p. 1). It also involves activating these actors in relation to transitive material processes, emphasising their active roles in the conflict dynamics. This nuanced approach to PJ becomes particularly evident when incorporating the voices of individuals directly involved in the conflict, quoting their perspectives on the ongoing events, and detailing the mechanisms they employ to navigate and cope with the situation (McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000). These crucial features are prominently observed in the AJE's reports. AJE's commitment to People/Human-oriented journalism aligns with certain democratic ideals that underscore the importance of popular control, civil liberties, and the safeguarding of human rights and dignity, as articulated by Beetham (1998, p. 21). By prioritising the inclusion of diverse voices and perspectives, AJE's reporting contributes to a more comprehensive and empathetic understanding of the conflict, emphasising the agency and experiences of the individuals involved.

On the other hand, dehumanisation, exemplified as a form of WJ, is apparent in F24 and the BBC's reports where the portrayal of the protesters is mostly characterised by their activation in relation to negative predicates and backgrounding in connection to positive ones. Furthermore, this dehumanising narrative is reinforced by selectively quoting protesters solely on their emotional responses (McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000). This approach can be indicative of certain orientalist stances, drawing from Said's (1978, p. 38) critique, which tends to construct protesters evaluatively as 'irrational' and 'childlike'.

### **7.3.1 Positive Material Processes and Referential Strategies vs Negative Material Processes and Referential Strategies.**

As discussed earlier, AJE's reports on the three events demonstrate a commitment to People/Human-oriented journalism (PJ). Notably, the portrayal of protesters in relation to the 2019 AH reflects a human-centred approach, realised by positive transitive and intransitive material processes and referential strategies. In contrast, the BBC and F24's reports predominantly exhibit dehumanisation of the protesters, with this representation appearing to evolve across the three events.

It is essential to observe the nuanced changes in the representation of protesters from the first to the second and third events. The human-centred approach, dissected in the AJE's reports, is noteworthy for its consistent portrayal of protesters as active agents in control of their movement. This portrayal reflects a determination to effect political change, illustrated through transitive material processes like "...will keep up the pressure..." (AJE9Mar19) and "...have defied large contingents of riot police... resumed mass demonstrations" (AJE8Mar19). Additionally, the positive representation of the 2019 AH as predominantly peaceful is underscored by expressions such as "unprecedented largescale grassroots movement" (AJE3Mar19) and "mass democratic celebration" (AJE8Mar19) (section 5.3.3). These linguistic strategies contribute to presenting a more nuanced and balanced view, countering potential biases that may be present in the narratives presented by the BBC and F24. This positive representation persists throughout the unfolding events. In the coverage of Bouteflika's resignation, AJE continues to portray protesters as resolute in their pursuit of further changes (section 6.2.2.3). Positive predicates like "...have an immense energy and momentum... they've really driven..." (AJE3Apr19) convey the idea that the resignation is perceived as a step within a broader movement for change.

Crucially, AJE actively positions the protesters in relation to Bouteflika's resignation as the primary outcome of the 2019 AH (section 6.2.1.1). The report frames this event as a direct consequence of the protesters' mounting pressure, realised by activation by circumstantialisation and participation in relation to the transitive material process "pushed out". Instances such as "...long-time president Abdelaziz Bouteflika who was pushed out by protesters..." (AJE10Dec19) and "Protesters pushed out Bouteflika earlier this year..." (AJE10Dec19) highlight the protesters' pivotal role. The use of the term 'massive' in "...ceding



power in the face of massive street protests against his 20-year rule” (AJE3Apr19) further underscores the scale and impact of the protests.

Conversely, the dehumanisation of protesters seems to be present in F24 and the BBC’s reports from the inception of the movement. Despite activation in relation to transitive material and verbal processes suggesting peacefulness (“marched, rallied, chanted...”), certain dehumanisation patterns are discernible. In F24’s reports on the start of the 2019 AH, the portrayal of the youth and protesters as victims of Bouteflika’s political system emerges (section 5.2.3). The struggle, particularly regarding unemployment, is accentuated through activation in relation to the material process “struggle”, evident in instances such as “many of whom struggle for employment...” (F24 1Mar19 (2)) and 'many young people struggle to find jobs' (F24 5Mar19).

Furthermore, F24’s reports employ a victimisation narrative by portraying the police as adversaries threatening protesters’ lives (5.4.2). This is achieved through a stark contrast, depicting the protesters’ peacefulness through intransitive and verbal processes and the police’s violent actions through transitive material processes. Instances illustrating this narrative include.

*143. Regime murderers”, groups of flag-waving demonstrators chanted as riot police used tear gas to try to prevent them from reaching key central locations in Algiers, several independent news outlets reported (F24 1Mar19 (1)).*

*144. Two days later hundreds of protesters rallied in Algiers, but they were met by a heavy police deployment and tear gas (F24 26F19).*

*145. At the faculty of journalism some 500 students protested on campus, while another demonstration took place at the school of medicine, also in Algiers, with police blocking them inside the university grounds (F24 24F19).*

Amidst the unfolding events of the 2019 AH, vivid scenes of tension and protest emerge in F24’s reports. The portrayal of protesters and their encounters with authorities is marked by explicit tones. In instance 143, the charged atmosphere is captured as groups of flag-waving demonstrators in Algiers chant, “Regime murderers”, while facing the deployment of riot police and tear gas, as reported by several independent news outlets (F24 1Mar19 (1)). This vivid depiction illustrates the intensity of the clashes between protesters and security forces, setting the stage for a complex narrative.

Two days later, the persistence of protests is evident as hundreds rally in Algiers (instance 144). However, the scene is marred by a heavy police deployment and the use of tear gas, underscoring the ongoing challenges faced by demonstrators (F24 26F19). Additionally, at the faculty of journalism and the school of medicine in Algiers, students stage protests, only to be met with police blocking their movements within the university grounds (F24 24F19). These instances highlight the diverse locations and demographics involved in the protests, emphasising the widespread nature of the movement along with the protesters' peacefulness as opposed to the police perpetrated violence.

Victimisation of the protesters is a recurrent theme in F24's reports, manifesting through the representation of protesters as direct recipients of violent police actions (section 5.4.3). This is achieved by passivating the protesters, positioning them as goals in both active and passive direct material processes. For instance, "...after Algerian police briefly detained several journalists..." (F24 1Mar19 (1)) exemplifies this victimisation by showcasing the protesters as targets of police actions. Moreover, placing protesters as recipients in indirect material processes, as seen in "police firing tear gas over a crowd that ran to escape" (F24 23F19), and depicting them as actors in intransitive material processes indicating helplessness, such as 'try to force their way' and "ran to escape", further contributes to the victimisation narrative.

Interestingly, F24's initial dehumanising tone in reports on the 2019 AH's commencement, often realised through victimisation, undergoes a transformation to exclusion and backgrounding post-Bouteflika's resignation. Exclusion is evident in the representation of the resignation event as a consequence of the army chief's interference. Temporal complex clauses construct the resignation as a direct outcome of Salah's intervention (section 6.2.2.3). For instance:

*145. Algeria's long-time President Abdelaziz Bouteflika submitted his resignation on Tuesday, shortly after the country's powerful army chief of staff, Gaid Salah, demanded that he be declared unfit and leave office "immediately" (F24 3Apr19 (1)).*

*146. The announcement came shortly after armed forces chief Ahmed Gaid Salah demanded the immediate launch of impeachment proceedings against Bouteflika (F24 3Apr19 (1)).*

This pivotal moment marked a significant turn of events in the 2019 AH, reshaping the political landscape. In the BBC's reports on the first event, dehumanisation is overtly evident through the negative portrayal of both the protesters and their demonstrations. A detailed examination

in Chapter 5 brings to light the depiction of the 2019 AH as predominantly violent (section 5.4). This portrayal is accomplished explicitly by casting the protesters in a negative light, framing them as initiators of violent actions against security forces (section 5.4.4). The protesters are specifically labelled as “stone-throwing” (BBC8M19) and activated in relation to the violent material process “threw stones”. Importantly, the protests are characterised using the noun “unrest”, predicated by the hyperbolic expression “a wave of” through the expression “a wave of unrest” (BBC8M19), creating a narrative that evokes a negative sense of violence and disorder.

The dehumanisation of the protesters in the BBC’s reports appears to persist as events unfold, albeit in a more covert manner. This is accomplished primarily by backgrounding the protesters in relation to the peacefulness of the 2019 AH (section 6.2.2.1) and its main outcomes, particularly Bouteflika’s resignation (section 6.2.1.3). This is realised through nominalisation, which tends to conceal the agency of the protesters in relation to the positive aspects of the 2019 AH. Instances illustrating this strategy include [...].

*147. It (referring to the resignation) followed six weeks of peaceful, but increasingly urgent protests across the country, which were characterised by youthful crowds, considerate clean-up projects and witty signs (BBC3Apr19 (1)).*

This covert dehumanisation, through downplaying the protesters' agency and contributions to the positive aspects of the movement, adds another layer to the BBC's representation, potentially shaping audience perceptions with a more biased narrative. The protesters are further marginalised in the BBC's reports concerning Bouteflika’s resignation, as the agency for this significant development is ascribed primarily to the army. This is evident in the instance, “The powerful Algerian army had called for the 82-year-old to be declared incapable of carrying out his duties” (BBC3Apr19 (2)). By highlighting the army's role in calling for Bouteflika's incapacity, the reports subtly shift the focus away from the agency of the protesters in influencing political change.

Moreover, backgrounding is notably present in the use of passive voice and agent deletion in the instance, “since Mr Bouteflika was forced out of office” (BBC9D19). This construction effectively removes the explicit mention of an agent, downplaying the active role of the protesters in the resignation. By employing such linguistic strategies, the BBC's reports indirectly convey a narrative that positions the army as the primary driving force behind Bouteflika's departure, minimising the protesters' agency in this crucial outcome.

These instances of backgrounding, coupled with passive voice constructions, contribute to a nuanced form of dehumanisation in the BBC's portrayal of the 2019 AH. By obscuring the agency of the protesters and framing the army as the decisive actor, the reports potentially create a distorted narrative that diminishes the active role of the people in shaping the political landscape. This subtle manipulation of language underscores the impact of framing strategies on shaping public perceptions of complex events, emphasising the need for a critical analysis of media representations to unravel underlying biases and perspectives.

### **7.3.2. Projected Clauses/verbiages**

The second distinctive feature indicative of peace-oriented journalistic stances is the inclusion of voices from the conflict zones, granting protesters the opportunity to express their perspectives. This characteristic is evident across reports from the three news outlets, particularly in their coverage of the first and second events. However, evaluating the peace or war orientation of these perspectives requires an analysis of the embedded transitive processes within the projected clauses.

Peace-oriented clauses are expected to embody positive material, relational, and cognitive mental processes, reflecting the protesters' mechanisms and awareness of the movement's dynamics. In contrast, war-oriented clauses are characterised by negative tones, reflecting the protesters' emotions, such as hopes, fears, and worries, typically realised through affective mental processes. This nuanced analysis reveals that peace-oriented clauses are more prevalent in AJE's reports on the first and second events, while war-oriented clauses are more characteristic of F24 and the BBC's reports.

AJE's reports take a human-oriented approach by individualising protesters through the use of their first names or full names and highlighting their professions or affiliations, such as "Habib, a 30-year-old entrepreneur", or "Nazim Taleb, a political activist from the Algerian opposition Rachad movement" (AJE3Mar19). The verbiages of the quoted protesters in AJE's reports align with the principles of PJ, emphasising the importance of understanding the mechanisms adopted by individuals to navigate the conflict. The quoted clauses also reveal the protesters' political awareness and their interpretations of the political status quo in Algeria as the following instances show.

148. *“This letter shows that Bouteflika is not willing to step down”, Habib, a 30-year-old entrepreneur in Algiers, said. “We, the people, will answer to his letter by massively and peacefully taking the streets (AJE3Mar19)”.*

149. *Abderrahmane, a computer engineer who lives in Blida, agreed.*

*“The content of this letter does not meet the population’s expectations”, he said. “The Algerian people are aware and have not forgotten Bouteflika’s promise made in 2012 ... when he said that his generation should leave the power to the younger population. We are still waiting for him to keep his promise” (AJE3Mar19).*

*“150. These demonstrations showed that the Algerian population is not naive. We do not believe President Bouteflika when he says that he is ready to step down in the near future. It is a new manoeuvre of the regime to find a way to buy time”, Reda Boudraa, deputy leader of Rally for Democracy and Culture (RDC), a secular opposition party, told Al Jazeera (AJE3Mar19).*

These peace-oriented clauses contain relational processes like “aware” and transitive processes such as “shows” and “answer... by massively and peacefully taking the street”, reflecting a constructive and informed perspective.

Contrastingly, the BBC’s reports, while also quoting protesters in their articles on the first and second events, employs a dehumanising tone. The dehumanisation in the first event's reports is partially related to the way the speakers are referred to — not by personal names but by their functions, “protester, witnesses”, or gender, “woman”. This might insinuate that it pays attention to the message more than on who conveys it. More importantly, the content of their verbiages could be another form of dehumanisation as they either revolve around the violent confrontations between the protesters and the police (instances 151, 152) or depict the troubled inner state of a woman protester (instance 153). Examples are shown below.

151. *Security forces cordoned off Algiers' May 1 Square during the protest, witnesses told local media (BBC22F19).*

152. *Witnesses said there were injuries on both sides (BBC1Mar19).*

153. *“Twenty years are enough”, said one woman, quoted by AFP (BBC1Mar19).*

In instances 151 and 152, the choice of language and framing strategies emphasises the confrontational aspects of the protests, contributing to a narrative that may be interpreted as portraying the protesters in a less favourable light. By focusing on the security forces cordoning

off Algiers' May 1 Square and highlighting injuries on both sides, the reports create a sense of conflict and equivalence between the actions of the protesters and the security forces. This framing can potentially overshadow the broader context of the protests, diminishing the agency of the protesters and framing them as subjects of control rather than as participants in a peaceful demonstration advocating for change. The use of phrases like “witnesses told local media” and “witnesses said” in instances 151 and 152 introduces an element of subjectivity, as the information is mediated through the lens of unnamed witnesses. This lack of specificity about the sources and their perspectives may contribute to a narrative that lacks transparency and raises questions about the objectivity of the reporting.

Moreover, the choice to report on injuries on both sides without providing context or details about the nature of these injuries may lead to a perception of symmetry in the use of force, potentially obscuring the power dynamics at play. This framing strategy can inadvertently contribute to a narrative that downplays the peaceful intentions of the protesters and emphasises the confrontational elements of the protests.

In instance 153, the quoted statement, “Twenty years are enough”, captures the discontentment of a woman protester, but the choice of this particular quote without additional context may oversimplify the motivations and concerns of the protesters. The emotional tone expressed in the phrase “twenty years are enough” conveys a sense of frustration and anger, potentially framing the protester as emotionally charged rather than highlighting the nuanced reasons behind their activism. The attribution of the quote to AFP adds a layer of authority to the statement but also raises questions about the selection of quotes and sources. Without a diverse range of perspectives and voices, the reporting may risk presenting a skewed or one-dimensional view of the protesters and their grievances.

In the reporting on the second event, the BBC’s reports individualise the quoted protesters by providing their full names, such as “Abdellah Djelti” and “Nourhane Atmani”. However, despite this seemingly personalised approach, the analysis suggests that the perspective remains dehumanised as the protesters are quoted solely on their feelings (McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000). This framing strategy, focusing on emotions rather than broader perspectives or actions, may contribute to a reductionist view of the protesters. Indicative instances are presented below.

*154. “The past couple of weeks have been causing me, and thousands of other Algerians, a lot of anxiety and anger”, she says (referring to a*

*protester called Nourhane Atmani, 19,). “So today, waking up knowing our efforts didn't go to waste definitely felt liberating. We've been waiting for this moment for a long time”.*

When Mr Bouteflika first came into power in 1999, the country was in the midst of a bloody civil war that had started in December 1991 and would continue until early 2002. He was largely credited with eventually restoring peace to the nation (BBC3Apr19 (1)).

*155. He (referring to a protester called Abdellah Djelti) says it felt “so good” ... “The good thing is it was very peaceful, people were providing water, they were providing food...” (BBC3Apr19).*

Instance 154 presents the emotional perspective of Nourhane Atmani, a 19-year-old protester, through the affective mental process “have been causing me” and the nominalised affective mental processes “anxiety and anger”, intensified with the qualifier “a lot of”. By emphasising the emotional turmoil experienced by the protester, the reporting tends to centre on individual feelings rather than providing a comprehensive understanding of the protester's motivations, demands, or the broader socio-political context. This narrow focus on emotions can be seen as a form of dehumanisation, reducing the protester to a vessel of feelings rather than an active participant with agency and distinct perspectives.

In contrast, instance 155 captures the sentiments of Abdellah Djelti, who describes the experience as “so good” and emphasises the peaceful nature of the protests. The positively denoted attributes “good” and “peaceful” contribute to a narrative that appreciates the positive aspects of the protests. While this instance might seem less dehumanising on the surface, it is important to note that focusing solely on positive emotions may still oversimplify the complex motivations and diverse experiences of the protesters. By highlighting the emotional satisfaction and the peaceful nature of the protests, the reporting may inadvertently contribute to a narrative that overlooks the multifaceted nature of the demonstrations and the protesters' varied concerns.

Moreover, the juxtaposition of these emotional quotes with a historical note about Bouteflika's role in restoring peace in the nation during the civil war (instance 155) introduces an additional layer to the framing. While this historical context is relevant, its placement alongside emotional quotes could be interpreted as a strategic effort to shape the narrative around the protests. The comparison with the civil war, where Bouteflika is credited with restoring peace, might subtly influence the audience's perception of the protests, framing them against a historical backdrop of conflict resolution. In other words, by juxtaposing emotional quotes from current protesters

with a historical note about Bouteflika's positive role in resolving past conflict, the media outlet may seek to shape how the audience views the current protests. The comparison to a historical period marked by a conflict and Bouteflika's credited role in restoring peace creates an implicit association between the past and present situations. This association could subtly suggest that the protests, despite any emotional expressions, may be viewed in the context of a broader narrative of stability and resolution that Bouteflika supposedly brought to the nation in the past. Similarly, F24's reports exhibit dehumanisation through projected clauses that reflect protesters' mixed feelings of fear and dissatisfaction. While including their voices, the reporting revolves around the protesters' emotions, deviating from PJ's recommendation to focus on adaptive mechanisms and potential solutions. Illustrative instances are provided below.

*156. "In order to avoid any confrontation with the police, the students of several faculties (of the University of Algiers) decided to rally on campus", said Raouf, a student doing his master's in journalism who declined to give his surname.*

*157. FRANCE 24's Franco-Algerian journalist Meriem Amellal said: "The most important thing for protesters today is to repeat the episodes of last Friday: They want the demonstrations to be peaceful, that's the most important thing for them".*

*158. Amellal said she had spoken to some protesters ahead of Friday's march and that they had insisted that "we must show to the world that Algerian people are not violent, that we want to get rid of the regime peacefully".*

*"Some of them told me that they are afraid that the demonstrations will descend into violence. They are afraid that the regime will organise a chaos to stop the electoral process, to declare a state of emergency and that they will keep President Bouteflika in power".*

The three instances provided (156-158) demonstrate this emphasis on emotions and fears, indicating a potential limitation in offering a comprehensive understanding of the protesters' motivations and strategies. Raouf's statement (Instance 156) reveals a strategic adaptation by the students to avoid confrontation with the police by rallying on campus. However, the analysis points out that the emphasis on Raouf's fear from the security forces reflects a focus on emotions rather than a deeper exploration of the students' adaptive mechanisms. This may contribute to a reductionist view, as it highlights individual emotions without fully capturing the complexities of the students' strategic decisions.



Furthermore, Meriem Amellal's statement (Instance 157) emphasises the protesters' desire for peaceful demonstrations, indicating a positive perspective. However, the analysis points out that the report mainly captures the protesters' mixed feelings of hope, worry, and fear about the future of their country. The use of affective mental and relational processes such as “want” and “are afraid” suggests an emotional focus, potentially overlooking the protesters' strategic considerations and broader perspectives.

Overall, the analysis suggests that F24's reporting, like the BBC's, leans towards emotional aspects rather than exploring the adaptive mechanisms and broader perspectives of the protesters. This aligns with the critique based on PJ principles, which advocate for a more nuanced understanding of conflicts by focusing on the strategies individuals or groups use to cope with the situation and their proposed solutions (Galtung, 2006, p. 1).

In summary, the section has suggested that AJE's representation of the 2019 AH exhibited pro-democratic elements through its people/human-oriented approach. The positive activation of protesters, emphasising their determination and involvement in the movement, aligns with democratic values. Phrases such as “democratic celebration” (AJE8Mar19) and “Unprecedented largescale grassroots movement” (AJE8Mar19) reflect a positive view of the protesters' engagement, emphasising a commitment to democratic principles such as freedom of assembly and expression. Moreover, the representation of protesters in relation to Bouteflika's resignation, with the use of transitive material processes like “pushed out/was pushed out”, underscores the agency of the people in influencing political change. This aligns with democratic ideals of people's participation in governance and their ability to shape political outcomes through peaceful activism.

In F24's reports on the first event, dehumanisation was evident through the victimisation of protesters, portraying them as recipients of police violence. This victimisation can be seen as devaluing the agency and autonomy of the protesters, potentially reinforcing an Orientalist perspective where the “Other” is portrayed as passive and in need of external intervention (Sayid, 1999). Similarly, The BBC's representation, especially during the first event, employed negative labels like “stone-throwing” and framed the protests as “unrest”. These portrayals contributed to a potentially biased narrative that could be associated with Orientalist tendencies. The use of such descriptors may evoke perceptions of disorder and chaos, aligning

with historical Orientalist tropes that depict certain societies as inherently tumultuous and in need of external control.

The analysis of projected clauses further highlighted potential Orientalist influences. F24's clauses, emphasising protesters' mixed feelings of fear and dissatisfaction, may inadvertently contribute to an Orientalist portrayal by focusing on emotions rather than broader perspectives or actions. This aligns with Said's notion of Orientalism, where the “Other” is often depicted as emotional, irrational, and in need of external guidance. In the same sense, The BBC's use of nominalisations like “anxiety and anger” in reporting protesters' feelings could reinforce a narrative that positions the protesters as emotionally charged and potentially irrational. This aligns with Orientalist stereotypes that portray certain populations as volatile and unpredictable.

#### **7.4 WJ as Propaganda-Oriented**

WJ, as described by Galtung (2006), operates with a “propaganda-oriented” approach, concentrating on the observable consequences of a conflict, particularly the tangible and material repercussions such as casualties, injuries, and infrastructure damage. In the context of the 2019 AH, WJ may involve presenting statistical data related to its casualties, encompassing figures for those detained, arrested, and injured due to clashes between protesters and the police, a perspective evident in the reporting of all three news outlets. This emphasis on numerical representation is named by Van Leeuwen (2008, p. 38) “aggregation”, encompassing also definite or indefinite quantifiers which serve as either numeratives or heads of nominal groups. Indicative instances are presented below.

*159. **Seven** protesters and **more than 50** officers were injured with **45** people arrested” (BBC1Mar19).*

*160. Local reports said **nearly 200** people were detained by the security forces (BBC5Mar19).*

*161. **More than 40** people arrested in protests against President Abdelaziz Bouteflika seeking a fifth term (AJE23F19).*

*162. **About a dozen** people were wounded in sporadic clashes with police, the AFP news agency reported (AJE1Mar19).*

*163. **Dozens of** people were detained in Friday's protests for "public disorder" and other acts of alleged violence (F24 28F19).*

*164. A photographer and journalist from local media were briefly detained by police and removed from the protest area before being released, an AFP journalist reported (F24 1Mar19 (2)).*

However, as argued in Section 4.7.3, relying solely on aggregation may not be sufficient to assert that a particular news outlet's perspective qualifies as WJ when reporting on conflict casualties, as this approach only provides insight into the dynamics of the conflict. According to Foley (2021), propaganda in news discourse can manifest through various mechanisms, including selection, omission, and contradiction. In addition to these, I propose considering Reisigl and Wodak's concept of intensification as an additional mechanism for detecting propaganda of violence in news reports, especially in coverage of predominantly peaceful conflicts. Upon analysing the data for these linguistic mechanisms, the findings reveal that they are predominantly employed in the news articles of BBC and F24. This observation could serve as another indication of the negativity embedded in their reporting on the 2019AH.

#### **7.4.1. Selection**

Firstly, on the process of news selection, Schudson (1995, p. 14) argues that while news stories typically need to answer the five journalistic questions about the main event or action, which are what, who, why, where, and when, processes of “presences” and “absences” are often involved in the selection of what becomes news. With presences and absences, it could be meant which actions/actors are included/excluded and how they are presented. An instance on this is the BBC's backgrounding of the massive participation of women in the 8 March's protests although presenting this piece of news might give a positive impression about the protests as being peaceful. The process of news selection can also be realised by Fairclough's foregrounding and backgrounding of clause complex where focus on the theme of violence is made despite of its rarity.

The three news websites issued reports on the 8th of March's protests. However, while AJE and F24 highlight the women's presence in their international day, the BBC's report glosses over the event by focusing merely on violent confrontations between the protesters and the police and used negatively charged terminologies, such as “stone-throwing” to label the protesters and “wave of unrest” when referring to the protests. In fact, prominent newspapers such as the Washington Post acknowledged the fact that the percentage of women participating in the street demonstrations was remarkably high, namely in their international day. It drafted

an article on this occasion intitled “Women are deeply involved in the Algerian protests — on International Women’s Day, and all the time” (Tripp, 2019, p. 1). This huge participation might be among the reasons which contributed to its peacefulness and can be regarded as an exceptional event because such activities were historically reserved to men only (ibid). Therefore, absences and presences of certain events realised by backgrounding the role of women during the 8 March’s protests and reporting on previous violent confrontations instead can be a form of propaganda of violence in Algeria.

The second element, which might relate to the property of selection, was Fairclough’s foregrounding and backgrounding of the clause complex or simply how information presented. An example on this is the following.

*170. Security forces in riot gear fired tear gas to block a march on to the presidential palace in the capital, Algiers. But protests in the rest of country passed off peacefully (BBC22F19).*

Fairclough relates the system of independency and the ordering of clauses to achieving an effect of backgrounding and foregrounding. In other words, information in the main clause “violent clashes” is foregrounded whereas the one provided in the subordinate clause “peace” is backgrounded. Using such informational structure could be meant to shift the reader’s focus to violence by positioning the process “fired tear gas” in the clause initial. Such thematic focus could therefore lead to a negative depiction of the 2019 AH as dominantly violent and reinforce a certain orientalist representation of the Algerian protesters as “undeveloped” and “unchanging” (Said, 1978).

#### **7.4.2 Omission**

The second property which can be employed to display a propaganda of violence is “omission”. It seems similar to the feature of absence decorticated above. However, the latter is dealt with as part of news selection and was more concerned with which events are absent such as the participation of women on the 8<sup>th</sup> of March’s protests. “Omission”, nonetheless, may be concerned with passives, namely in violence related processes or when reporting on violence. This includes passive agent deletion, the use of nominalisations, and utterance autonomisation as indicated in the following excerpts:

*171. Dozens of police vehicles that **had been deployed** in the morning at the Grand Post Office square (F24 8Mar19).*

172. ...they were met by a heavy police deployment (F24 26F19).

173. According to authorities seven protesters and more than 50 officers were injured with 45 people **arrested** (BBC1Mar19).

As can be noticed, emphasis in the first two instances is placed upon the police presence whereas attention in the last instance is drawn to the victims disregarding who caused harm to whom. Instances on objectivation might be the following: “utterance autonomisation” when reporting on the injured people. One indicative example is provided below:

174. According to **a police toll**, 56 police and seven demonstrators were hurt, and 45 arrests were made in the capital, AFP reported (F24 1Mar19 (1)).

Van Leeuwen (2008) states as among the main effects of impersonalisation is that the text producer aims at adding negative connotations to the action, such as the use of the objectivation “unrest” and the instrumentalisation “stone-throwing protesters” which might justify the use of violence by the security forces as a solution to maintain order. In addition, impersonalisation can lend impersonal authority or force to an action or quality of a social actor (Van Leeuwen, 2008). This could be noticed in the case of utterance autonomisation, where “social actors are represented by means of reference to their utterances” which should, in the case of WJ, centre around the representation of violence. It can eventually add more credibility to the reported event, such as “according to a police toll” and “AFP reported” in instance 174 above.

### 7.4.3 Contradiction

The third property which can be employed for propaganda purposes is contradictions. According to de Marneffe et al (2008) “contradictions have the potential to highlight areas of contention and differences among positions” (p. 1). Findings of chapter 5 reveal striking asymmetries between the BBC and F24 on the one hand and AJE on the other. The two Western news outlets represent the 2019 AH as dominantly violent (section 5.4) while the Arab one portrays it to be dominantly peaceful (section 5.3). One of the remarkable instances between the BBC and AJE is the two contrasted opposites realised by the negatively connoted reference “a wave of unrest” by the BBC and the positively connoted one “mass-democratic celebration” by AJE on the 8<sup>th</sup> of March’s reports when referring to the protests. Another instance of contradiction in the BBC reports lies in the use of the negatively connoted reference “a wave

of unrest” (BBC8Mar19) before Bouteflika’s resignation, and the positively denoted attribute “peaceful” in “weeks of peaceful...protests” (BBC3Apr19) afterwards.

#### 7.4.4 Intensification

Last but not least, Reisigl and Wodak’s (2001) “intensification” can be considered as another mechanism for propaganda of violence when reporting on the 2019 AH, namely in its start. It is found mostly in the BBC and F24’s reports on the first event. It is realised mostly through hyperbole. Instances from the two news outlets are as follows:

*175. A wave of unrest began last month after Mr Bouteflika announced he would seek a fifth term in office (BBC8Mar19).*

*176. ...more than 50 officers were injured...(BBC1Mar19)*

*177. Dozens of police vehicles that had been deployed in the morning at the Grand Post Office square (F24 8Mar19).*

*178. Security forces arrested more than 40 people after that protest (F24 1Mar19).*

The utilisation of specific expressions in the provided excerpts, such as “a wave of”, “more than”, and “dozens of”, contributes to a potential dramatisation of the security situation in Algeria, thereby portraying the protests as more inclined towards violence than peaceful demonstrations. The inclusion of these expressions is noteworthy due to their inherent effects on the interpretation and framing of the described events. In instance 175, the phrase “a wave of” introduces a sense of intensity and widespread disturbance, potentially amplifying the perceived turbulence of the protests. Similarly, in instance 176, the use of “more than” serves to emphasise the magnitude of the reported injuries, creating an impression of a significant and severe impact on law enforcement. Instance 177 employs the term “dozens of”, which implies a substantial number of police vehicles. This choice of expression may contribute to an impression of a large-scale security response to the events, reinforcing the notion of heightened tension. Furthermore, in instance 178, the use of “more than” again underscores the scale of the law enforcement response, suggesting a notable number of arrests following the protest.

These expressions, when employed in contexts related to violence, have the potential to influence the readers' perception by qualifying and modifying the epistemic status of the presented propositions. As discussed by Reisigl and Wodak (2001, p. 81), such linguistic

choices not only modify the writers' expressiveness but also enhance their persuasive impact on the audience. The repeated use of these expressions in violence-related contexts may contribute to a narrative that emphasises the turbulent nature of the protests, shaping the readers' understanding and interpretation of the events in Algeria during this period.

In summary, this section has meticulously explored how the representation of the 2019 AH by the BBC and F24 at its outset can be interpreted as having a propagandistic orientation towards violence. This representation was discernible through the application of four distinct mechanisms: selection, omission, contradiction, and intensification. The first mechanism, selection, became evident in the BBC's report issued on the 8th of March, where the significant presence of women in the protests was downplayed. This choice, whether advertent or inadvertent, contributed to the overall negative portrayal of the 2019 AH as being characterised by violence rather than peaceful demonstrations. The second mechanism, omission, manifested prominently in the extensive use of passive constructions when reporting on violent incidents. This linguistic choice added a layer of ambiguity and obscures the agents involved in violence, potentially influencing perceptions of the events.

The third mechanism, named contradictions, was observed in the portrayals of the 2019 AH as dominantly violent in the accounts of both the BBC and F24 (section 5.4), in contrast to AJE's more positive portrayal emphasising its predominantly peaceful nature (section 5.3). A notable instance of this contrast is found in the opposing references of "a wave of unrest" by the BBC and the positively connoted "mass-democratic celebration" by AJE in their reports on the 8th of March protests. The fourth mechanism, intensification, was expressed through the use of hyperbolic expressions in violence-related descriptions, such as the term "a wave of" and numerical aggregations like "more than" and "dozens". These expressions contributed to amplifying the perceived intensity of the violence, potentially shaping the audience's understanding of the events.

It is essential to highlight that this negative representation was specific to the initial stages of the movement and underwent a notable shift after the resignation. This transformation in portrayal may be rooted in an orientalist perspective, wherein the 2019 AH was initially perceived through a lens akin to the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, with an expectation of an inevitable ending or failure. As elucidated earlier, the negative depiction underwent a transformation, portraying the movement as peaceful after Bouteflika's resignation and emphasising the legal proceedings as an exceptional event in contemporary Algerian history.

This evolution in representation underscores the dynamic nature of media narratives and their potential to be influenced by broader socio-political contexts.

### **7.5 PJ as Solution-Oriented vs WJ as Problem-Oriented**

As seen previously, section 6.2.3 has delved into how AJE and F24 envision Algeria's future amidst the ongoing political crisis, with a notable difference in their perspectives. Both news outlets suggest a transitional period as a potential resolution, yet AJE positions it as a solution, while F24 depicts it as a problem. In stark contrast, the BBC takes a different approach, paying tribute to Bouteflika by portraying him as a successful leader (section 6.2.3.2). Regarding Algeria's path out of the political crisis, AJE's report draws on expert opinions, featuring insights from political activist Nazim Taleb of the Algerian opposition Rachad movement and researcher Francis Ghiles from the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs. Taleb advocates for a transitional council as a necessary means to pave the way for a free and fair election in the country (AJE3Apr19). The use of the relational process "is necessary" emphasises his belief in the council as an indispensable mechanism to achieve the broader goal of democratic elections.

Ghiles further expands on Taleb's proposition, offering detailed recommendations for the composition of the interim council. He suggests including "elderly statesmen who have historical legitimacy" and "younger members of society, such as human rights lawyers, to create a transitional administration that is credible in the eyes of the millions who have been in the streets for six weeks now" (AJE3Apr19). Ghiles' emphasis on historical legitimacy for elderly statesmen and the credibility associated with the younger generation, particularly human rights lawyers, reflects a nuanced understanding of the political landscape. The proposal implicitly critiques the current authoritarian system in Algeria, emphasising the absence of youth from political leadership roles.

This vision of a transitional council proposed by AJE aligns with the principles of institutional democracy, wherein the transition serves as a systematic and procedural approach to address the political crisis. The emphasis on historical legitimacy and credibility in Ghiles' recommendations underscores the importance of institutionalising democratic processes, moving beyond a mere change in leadership to establish a governance structure that is perceived as legitimate by the populace. In this context, the proposal not only addresses the immediate need for a transitional period but also resonates with the broader democratic ideals



associated with institutional governance. AJE's inclination towards proposing solutions in the framework of institutional democracy could reflect its mission as a prominent news outlet in the Arab world advocating for democratic change in autocratic regimes (Eliades, 2006, p. 2). The network's commitment to democratic values, despite facing resistance from authoritarian governments, reinforces the link between its editorial stance and the promotion of institutional democracy. This connection becomes particularly salient as Algeria navigates its political future in the wake of the ongoing crisis.

While AJE proposes the establishment of a transitional council as a constructive solution to the crisis, F24 portrays this transitional era as a source of uncertainty and potential challenges. F24 introduces the post-Bouteflika era with a sense of apprehension, using the nominalisation "questions" in the statement:

*181. Algeria is facing a new era after President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's resignation, including questions about what happens next for this gas-rich country and key Western ally in the fight against Islamist terrorism (F24 3Apr19(2)).*

This construction evokes a nuanced sense of worry and wariness over Algeria's future, leaving the nature of this transition undefined. The report then highlights three different perspectives on this transitional phase. The first, attributed to the United States, adopts an open-ended approach, emphasising that the future of Algeria is now in the hands of its people:

*182. Questions about how to navigate this transition in Algeria, that is for the Algerian people to decide (F24 3APR19(2)).*

This portrayal seems to suggest a degree of trust in the Algerian populace to shape their own destiny. The second perspective, articulated by Russia, calls for a transition without foreign interference as the following shows:

*183. Russia, a longtime ally of Algeria, called for a transition without foreign 'interference' (F24 3Apr19).*

This stance underscores the importance of internal autonomy in the transition process while maintaining the historical relationship between Algeria and Russia. The third perspective, encapsulated under "foreign powers", advocates for a peaceful transition in Algeria, positioning the country as a key partner in the fight against jihadist extremists in the Sahel region (F24 3Apr19). Despite expressing a desire for a peaceful transition, the portrayal

introduces an element of uncertainty and external influence, contributing to the ambiguous picture of Algeria's political future.

Notably, instance 181 associates Algeria with oil and terrorism, suggesting concerns over potential instability. This association, particularly with the Sahel region, hints at broader geopolitical anxieties, particularly in Europe and France. The fear of Algeria undergoing a trajectory akin to some Arab countries post-Arab Spring poses potential threats to Europe's security and hydrocarbon stability. This geopolitical reading highlights the interconnectedness of Algeria's political landscape with global concerns.

In contrast to AJE and F24's forward-looking analyses, the BBC adopts a retrospective lens, portraying Bouteflika positively as a successful leader who steered his country away from a turbulent past (see section 6.2.3.2). This reserved position may stem from a historical colonial perspective, considering Algeria as a special French reserve (Hamouchene et al, 2014). By emphasising Bouteflika's success in overcoming a “bloody decade”, the BBC's portrayal reflects a narrative that, intentionally or unintentionally, aligns with historical colonial viewpoints, adding an additional layer to the complexities of media representations.

In summary, the section has explained the last tenet in P/WJ model, which is PJ as solution-oriented vs WJ as problem-oriented. It shed light on the different perspectives of AJE, F24, and the BBC regarding Algeria's future amidst the ongoing political crisis. On one hand, AJE and F24 acknowledged the necessity of a transitional period as a resolution to the political crisis. The BBC, on the other hand, recalled Algeria’s past with terrorism, portraying Bouteflika as a successful leader who helped in its eradication. Such portrayal and framing of this phase unveil nuanced ideological underpinnings and geopolitical considerations.

AJE, in proposing the establishment of a transitional council, positioned this as a constructive solution to the crisis. Drawing on insights from political activist Nazim Taleb and researcher Francis Ghiles, its vision aligned with the principles of institutional democracy. Taleb's advocacy for a transitional council was framed as “necessary” for achieving free and fair elections. It emphasised a systematic and procedural approach to address the political crisis. Ghiles' recommendations further underscored the importance of historical legitimacy and credibility, emphasising a nuanced understanding of the political landscape and implicitly critiquing the authoritarian system. AJE's inclination towards proposing solutions within the

framework of institutional democracy might be reflective of its mission to advocate for democratic change in autocratic regimes, reinforcing a link between its editorial stance and the promotion of democratic ideals.

Conversely, F24 portrayed the transitional era with a sense of apprehension, using the nominalisation "questions" to evoke a nuanced sense of worry and wariness over Algeria's future. The three perspectives highlighted in its reports, originating from the United States, Russia, and unnamed "foreign powers", introduced an element of uncertainty and external influence. In contrast to these forward-looking analyses, the BBC adopted a retrospective lens, portraying Bouteflika positively as a successful leader who navigated his country away from a turbulent past. This reserved position may be rooted in a historical colonial perspective, considering Algeria as a special French reserve. The BBC's portrayal, intentional or unintentional, aligns with historical colonial viewpoints, adding a layer of complexity to media representations.

## **7.6 Summary of the Chapter**

To conclude, this chapter has thoroughly addressed the overarching research question, examining the representation of the 2019 AH by AJE, the BBC, and F24 in their web-based reports spanning nine months of weekly protests. The specific aim is to assess the extent to which the three news websites adhered to a peace journalistic perspective in their comprehensive representation of the 2019 AH. It has interpreted the CDS textual findings obtained in chapters 5 and 6 based on the adapted model of P/WJ. Interpretation has revealed that AJE maintained a more peace-journalistic perspective in its overall representation of the 2019 AH, which could reflect certain pro-democratic tendencies especially when representing the protesters and their protests. On the contrary, the BBC and F24's reporting seemed to be closer to WJ which might reflect certain orientalist tendencies when portraying the protesters and their protests dynamics.

First, interpretation of the data based on PJ as context-oriented vs decontextualisation (section 7.2) has suggested that AJE provided detailed contextual reporting on the movement's profile and dynamics comparing to the BBC and F24. The three news outlets reported on political corruption in Algeria by representing Bouteflika as incapacitated and authoritarian. However, while AJE delved deeper by stating explicitly the identity of Said who was the effective runner of Algeria during Bouteflika's absence, the BBC and F24 backgrounded him by using the

attribute “close to him” (BBC3Mar19) or by mentioning him in the refrain “no to Bouteflika and no to Said” (F24 23F19). As part of the economic and social profiles of the 2019 AH, F24 was the only news outlet which highlighted the issues of unemployment and the prosecution of the business tycoons and recalls the event of the 1980’s Berber Spring. As has been mentioned under section 7.2.1, presenting the economic context might reflect the French worry about its interests in Algeria, namely as the protesters demanded cutting the economic and diplomatic ties with France. Moreover, raising the issue of the Berber Spring in the context of the 2019 AH might be considered unnecessary as the movements were likely different in terms of demands and scalability. In addition, recalling this issue during the protests in Algeria might change the 2019 AH’s trajectory from an anti-government grassroots movement to an ideological one between the same people.

On the conflict dynamics, AJE reported on the protests as if they are taking place in an “open space” by revealing the exact whereabouts of the violent confrontations which might suggest that violence was less intense. Conversely, the BBC and F24 reported on them as if they are taking place in “a closed space” by omitting contextual details, namely on where the confrontations took place. Therefore, the peace-oriented representation dissected in the AJE’s reports made the conflict more transparent by disclosing the main political realities concerning its profile and dynamics. By contrast, the war-oriented representation made it secret and opaque by providing a partial rendition of the movement. This might draw a negative image on the movement as dominantly violent unlike its reality on the ground.

Second, interpretation of the data based on PJ as people/human-oriented VS dehumanisation (section 7.3) has demonstrated that AJE’s representation, which is dissected as aligning towards prodemocracy, was people/human-oriented. It was first realised by positive material processes such as “...will keep up the pressure...” (AJE9Mar19), “...have defied large contingents of riot police ... resumed mass demonstrations...” (AJE8Mar19) and referential strategies including “democratic celebration” (AJE8Mar19) and “unprecedented largescale grassroots movement” (AJE8Mar19). Furthermore, AJE activated the protesters in relation to Bouteflika’s resignation through the transitive material process “push out”. By contrast, F24 and the BBC’s reports showed certain orientalist tendencies which contributed to a dehumanising representation of the protesters. When reporting on the 2019 AH’s start by F24’s reports, the protesters were mostly victimised. The police were depicted as their enemy and in turn they were represented as receivers of the police violent actions (sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3). Concerning the BBC’s reports on the first event, the protesters were represented as the initiator

of violent actions against the police and described negatively as “stone-throwing” and their protests as “unrest” (BBC8Mar19). On the second event, the protesters were backgrounded in relation to Bouteflika's resignation. While the BBC ascribed the agency to the army, F24 represented the resignation as a direct outcome of its chief's interference. Such representation might reinforce an orientalist representation of the Algerian protesters which tends to associate them with negativity (violence) and dissociate them from positivity.

Even when analysing the projected clauses employed by the three news outlets in their reports, interpretation has revealed almost a similar perspective. The AJE's employed projected clauses reflected the protesters political awareness, expressed through the attribute “aware in addition to cognitive mental processes such as “shows that” and material process massively and peacefully taking the street”. Conversely, the BBC and F24's projected clauses seem to be war oriented as they centred on the representation of violence as was the case with the BBC in instances 151 and 152 and the protesters feelings instead of their mechanisms to cope with the protests. This was expressed by the BBC through the nominalisations “anxiety and anger “predicated with the hyperbole “a lot of” (instance 154) and by F24 through the repetition of the affective mental process “want”. This might result in an orientalist representation of the protesters as “irrational and devoid of energy and initiative... and childlike” (Said, 1978, p. 38).

Third, interpretation of the data based on WJ as propaganda-oriented (section 7.4) has shown how and why the BBC and F24's representation of the first event was characterised as propaganda-oriented using the four mechanisms of selection, omission, contradiction, and intensification. The first, selection, was found in the BBC's report which was issued on 8 March where the remarkable presence of women in the protests was glossed over while emphasising violence. This eventually added to the negative representation of the 2019 AH as violent. The second, omission, was remarkable in the intensive use of passive constructions when reporting on violence. The third, contradictions, lied in the BBC and F24's representation of the 2918 AH as dominantly violent (section 5.4) unlike the AJE's positive portrayal as being dominantly peaceful (section 5.3). One of the noticeable instances between the BBC and AJE was the two contrasted opposites realised by the negatively connoted reference “a wave of unrest” by the BBC and the positively connoted one “largescale grassroots movement” by AJE when referring to the protests. The fourth, intensification, was expressed by hyperbolic expressions in violence-related processes such as “a wave of”, “more than” and “dozens”. It is worth noting that such negative representation was specific to the first event, and yet changed after the

resignation. It could reflect the Western media's orientalist perspective which considered the 2019 AH as one of the Arab Spring uprisings that would end or fail. As noted above, the negative representation has apparently turned positive by representing the movement as peaceful after the resignation (section 6.2.2), and that the prosecution is one of the movement's successes and an exceptional event in the history of the contemporary Algeria (section 6.3.1.1).

Fourth, interpretation of the data based on PJ as solution-oriented vs WJ as problem-oriented has indicated that AJE proposed the creation of a transitional council and suggested some criteria. This may reflect its mission to criticise the Arab authoritarian systems, aiming to propose alternatives for the benefit of the people. F24, by contrast, reported on the transitional period as a problem which might reflect France's worry over the security situation in Algeria. Perhaps it was aware that instability in Algeria might threaten the geopolitical stability of Europe in terms of security and hydrocarbons. The BBC, however; refers to Algeria's past by representing Bouteflika as a successful leader who rid his country of the terror of the black decade. Such reservation to address Algeria's future could relate to a past colonial perspective which considers Algeria as a special reserve of France (Hamouchene et al, 2014).

This chapter significantly contributes to the scholarly discourse by meticulously examining the nuances of media representations, providing a refined understanding of how news outlets strategically navigate their reporting on predominantly peaceful conflicts. The utilisation of the adapted P/WJ model emerges as a crucial tool, shedding light on the inherent complexities present in the coverage of the 2019 AH. This adaptation proves to be instrumental, offering a refined framework that accommodates the unique dynamics of contemporary and controversial issues in news reports not necessarily war situations.

## Chapter 8

### Conclusion

#### 8.1. Introduction

This study has conducted a critical analysis of the discourses presented on the news websites of AJE, the BBC, and F24, focusing on the 2019 AH. As an Algerian researcher specialising in CDS, my objective has been to unveil asymmetrical representations that downplayed the role of protesters and underrepresented the movement's notable peaceful nature. The study has adopted a perspective staunchly aligned with democratic principles, actively opposing any orientalist biases. This approach is characterised by a commitment to democratic values and principles while firmly rejecting orientalist tendencies that may perpetuate stereotypes or misrepresent Eastern cultures and societies. As clearly articulated in chapter 1, the study does not seek to pass judgment on news outlets. Rather, it seeks to shed light on the nuanced impact of linguistic choices, whether intentional or unintentional, within their reports. The emphasis is on understanding how these choices may contribute to variations in representation, fostering an awareness that encourages refined journalistic practices and enhances the overall objectivity of news content.

The study's primary objective has been to analyse the news reports from the selected outlets concerning their representation of the 2019 AH. This overarching objective has been fulfilled by exploring the main similarities and differences in their portrayal of the movement's key events and identifying the possible latent ideological underpinnings behind these portrayals. The key events were as follows: the movement's eruption on 22nd February 2019 as a reaction to Bouteflika's fifth-term candidacy announcement, Bouteflika's resignation on 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2019, and the first live prosecution of business tycoons and government officials from Bouteflika's regime on 9th December 2019. Ultimately, the study has established the extent to which the three news websites maintained a peace journalistic stance in their overall representation of the 2019 AH. Therefore, the main argument that this chapter presents is that the AJE representation of the movement appears to be closer to PJ, potentially reflecting certain pro-democratic perspectives. Conversely, the BBC and F24 representations seem to be closer to WJ. This might indicate certain orientalist tendencies.

Section 8.2 below addresses the research questions and the methodology adopted to answer them. Section 8.3 provides further ideological reflections on the BBC, F24, and AJE representation of the 2019 AH, starting with the BBC (section 8.3.1), F24 (section 8.3.2), then

AJE (section 8.3.3). Section 8.4 highlights the study's limitations and gives suggestions for future research. Finally, section 8.5 sheds light on this study's empirical, theoretical, and methodological contributions.

## **8.2 Research Questions and Answers**

The study has aimed to answer the following two main questions.

- RQ1: How is the 2019 AH portrayed by AJE, BBC, and F24 to their global audiences?
- RQ2: To what extent do AJE, BBC, and F24 maintain a peace journalistic perspective in their depiction of the 2019 AH?

To answer the first main question (RQ1), the following two subsidiary questions have been asked.

- RQ1.1: What are the primary similarities and disparities in how AJE, BBC, and F24 portray the key events of the 2019 AH?
- RQ1.2: What discernible ideological representations can be identified within the news reports published by AJE, BBC, and F24 concerning the key events of the 2019 AH?

The research has examined thirty-three reports focusing on three pivotal events: the initiation of the 2019 AH on 22nd February 2019, President Bouteflika's resignation on 2nd April 2019, and the initial live prosecution of business tycoons and government officials associated with Bouteflika's regime for corruption on 9th December 2019. These reports, spanning from 22nd February to 10th December 2019, encompassed twenty-one articles covering the first event, seven articles addressing the resignation, and five articles concerning the prosecution.

To address the research questions, the study has employed an eclectic approach, integrating Fairclough's Dialectical Relational Approach (DRA) (1995a; 2003; 2010) and Reisigl and Wodak's Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) (2001b; 2009; 2017), as detailed in sections 3.2.6.1 and 3.2.6.2. For a meticulous micro-linguistic analysis of actors and their actions, the study utilised KhosraviNik's textual analytical framework, specifically focusing on social actors and social actions (2010a). In the initial phase, the study examined the use of Reisigl and Wodak's Referential Strategies (2001b) and incorporated elements from Van Leeuwen's Social Actor Model (2008). In the subsequent phase, which centred on social action, the study



scrutinised Reisigl and Wodak's *Predicational Strategies* (2001b), emphasising Halliday's *Transitivity from Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG)* (Halliday, 1994; Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004). The responses to the first main question and its two subsidiary questions were provided in chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 has focused on the representation of the first event, the initiation of the 2019 AH on 22nd February 2019. Chapter 6 has delved into the reports on the second and third events: Bouteflika's resignation on 2nd April 2019 and the first live prosecution on 9th December 2019.

As outlined in section 4.6, the analysis organisation has involved identifying micro-linguistic options employed by the three news outlets to represent actors and actions. These have been subsequently grouped based on similar discursive functions under Unger's "macro-strategy" (2013). Similar macro-strategies were categorised under common aspects of representation. Following the described methodology, findings in chapter 5, on the analysis of the reports related to the 2019 AH's start, have suggested three aspects of representation. The first revolved around the representation of the 2019 AH as a legitimate action against Bouteflika's fifth term. It has been identified in the reports of the three news outlets. It was realised by linguistic choices which contributed to a negative representation of Bouteflika as incapacitated and as authoritarian. Such representation might reflect the international news websites' attempts to commit to their journalistic values. These values prioritise factual reporting and include the provision of essential contextual information, especially when dealing with sensitive topics like the 2019 AH. This adherence to factuality and contextual depth in their reporting suggests a commitment to delivering comprehensive and balanced news coverage which help the reader to form an idea about the conflict. It is important to acknowledge that the BBC and F24's portrayal of Bouteflika's rule as authoritarian and the Algerian political system as undemocratic should be viewed within the broader context of historical legacies of colonialism and Western perceptions of Algeria as part of the 'Orient'. Western media outlets like the BBC and F24 which belong to previous colonial powers, Britain, and France, may carry the historical burden of colonialism, which could in turn shape their coverage of Algeria. Their portrayals are not just about institutional democracy but might be intertwined with complex historical and geopolitical factors, including representing colonial powers' perspectives and Western interests in the region. AJE's perspective may be influenced by broader regional dynamics and its mission to amplify underrepresented voices.

In scrutinising the portrayal of the protesters and their demonstrations, it has been evident that distinct perspectives have emerged in the reports of the three news outlets. AJE's viewpoint inclined towards a more pro-democratic position, portraying the protesters positively as determined agents of political change, with a particular emphasis on the peaceful nature of their weekly demonstrations. These macro-strategies, as outlined under section 5.3, collectively presented the 2019 AH as predominantly peaceful during its initial sixteen days.

In contrast, the analysed reports from the BBC and F24 exhibited certain orientalist features, manifesting in a negative portrayal of the protesters and their weekly protests. F24 depicted them as victims, while the BBC characterised them as prone to violence. Consequently, section 5.4 outlined a negative representation of the 2019 AH as predominantly violent, a portrayal influenced by specific macro-strategies employed by each outlet. F24's reports heightened the visibility of police presence during protests, positioning the police as adversaries to pro-democratic protesters and framing the protesters as direct targets of police violence. Meanwhile, the BBC's reports framed protesters as instigators of violence against the police, presenting an overall atmosphere of protests skewed towards violence rather than peaceful pro-democratic dissent.

Moving forwards, during the resignation event, these distinctive perspectives seemed to persist, with each news outlet maintaining its unique narrative within three distinct aspects of representation (section 6.2). AJE presented the resignation as a direct result of mounting pressure from pro-democratic protesters, while the BBC attributed it primarily to the intervention of the Algerian army. F24, in contrast, linked the resignation directly to the actions of the army chief, Gaid Salah.

Interestingly, both the BBC and F24 acknowledged the peaceful nature of the 2019 AH after Bouteflika's resignation (section 6.2.2). However, their perspectives differed in highlighting the role of pro-democratic protesters. The BBC marginalised the protesters concerning the peaceful nature of their movement, while F24 depicted them as victims of an unjust political system. AJE, on the other hand, depicted the protesters as resolute in their pursuit of further changes, asserting that Bouteflika's resignation was insufficient. Another asymmetry in representation emerged regarding perceptions of Algeria's political future versus its past (section 6.2.3). AJE and F24 proposed a transitional government as a future solution to the political crisis, emphasising pro-democratic ideals, whereas the BBC focused on Algeria's past, portraying Bouteflika as a successful leader who rid the nation of the terror of the black decade.

F24 represented the transitional period as a future political uncertainty in Algeria, highlighting potential challenges to pro-democratic aspirations.

Alongside the pivotal resignation of Bouteflika, the events surrounding the 9th of December prosecution marked another significant chapter in the context of the 2019 AH. The analysed reports offered varying perspectives on the ultimate phases of the 2019 AH. Analysis has suggested two overarching aspects of representation within the narratives of the three news outlets concerning the prosecution's portrayal. The first aspect, evident across all three news outlets, depicted the 2019 AH positively as partially successful (section 6.3.1). This portrayal centred around the trial proceedings, depicting them as an extraordinary occurrence within the contemporary history of Algeria. This outlook emphasised the exceptional nature of the trial event, suggesting that it signified a moment of significant change and progress within Algeria's political landscape. Despite the ostensibly "remarkable" achievement of the protesters, their pivotal role in instigating significant political change continued to be downplayed, and their commitment to peaceful means was still overlooked. Conversely, the second aspect offered a more critical evaluation of the 2019 AH, suggesting that it fell short of meeting the populace's lofty expectations (section 6.3.2). This viewpoint was conveyed by portraying the protesters as dissatisfied with the trajectory taken by their movement. In this narrative, the movement was depicted as having not fully realised its potential for achieving comprehensive political reform.

The second macro-strategy, which was prominently highlighted in F24's reports, presented a rather intricate narrative regarding the role of the Algerian army in shaping the nation's trajectory towards democracy.

RQ2: To what extent do AJE, BBC, and F24 maintain a peace journalistic perspective in their depiction of the 2019 AH?

Addressing this research question has necessitated the adoption of Galtung's P/WJ model (2006) as an interpretative framework for the CDS textual findings. The utilisation of Galtung's P/WJ model represents a significant theoretical and methodological contribution within the scope of this study (details are presented in section 8.5). A detailed exploration of this research question is conducted in chapter 7, wherein the CDS findings from chapters 5 and 6 have thoroughly been interpreted through the prism of the four major tenets encapsulated within the model. Interpretation has indicated that AJE's coverage of the 2019 AH aligned more closely with PJ, a tendency that could have bolstered the pro-democratic inclination discerned in its portrayal of the protesters and their demonstrations. Conversely, the reporting by the BBC and

F24 on the movement seemed to veer more towards WJ, potentially reflecting certain orientalist tendencies identified when presenting the protesters and their protests.

- PJ as Context-Oriented vs Decontextualisation: as discussed in section 7.2, an examination of the data has suggested that AJE has demonstrated a distinct characteristic by providing in-depth contextual reporting on the profile and dynamics of the 2019 AH in comparison to the BBC and F24. While all three news outlets covered political corruption in Algeria, portraying Bouteflika as incapacitated and authoritarian, AJE delved further by explicitly identifying other political factors. The BBC and F24 appeared to exercise caution in their reporting, addressing political issues implicitly and withholding explicit identification of certain political factors and actors.

Regarding the economic and social profiles of the 2019 AH, F24 uniquely emphasised issues such as unemployment, the prosecution of business tycoons, and evoked the events of the 1980s Berber Spring. As noted in section 7.2.1, all these elements were integrated into the economic and social profiles of the 2019 AH. Yet, this distinctive approach prompted questions about the motivations and potential implications, especially given France's historical role as a colonial power in Algeria.

In terms of conflict dynamics, AJE portrayed the protests as occurring in an "open space" by disclosing exact locations of violent confrontations, suggesting lower intensity of violence. Conversely, the BBC and F24 depicted the protests as happening in a "closed space" by omitting contextual details, such as the specific locations of confrontations. Consequently, AJE's peace-oriented representation contributed to a more transparent understanding of the conflict, revealing essential political realities about its profile and dynamics. In contrast, the war-oriented representation by the BBC and F24 rendered the conflict more secretive and opaquer, providing a partial account of the movement. This approach may have contributed to a negative perception of the movement as more predominantly violent than it actually was on the ground.

- PJ as People/Human-Oriented vs Dehumanisation: interpretation of the data in section 7.3 has suggested that AJE's reporting tended to align more with People/Human-oriented journalism. This commitment was reflected in the activation of the protesters in relation to transitive material and positive relational processes as well as positive attributes when referring to the protesters and their movement, emphasising their active roles in instigating the main movement's political outcomes. These outcomes included Bouteflika's resignation, and the arrest and prosecution of government officials and

business tycoons associated with his regime. The nuanced nature of this approach has become particularly apparent when incorporating the voices of activists directly engaged in the conflict, quoting their perspectives on ongoing events, and detailing the mechanisms they employ to navigate and cope with the situation (McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000). This was realised through activation in relation to transitive material and cognitive material processes. By prioritising the inclusion of a diverse range of voices and perspectives, AJE's reporting fostered a more comprehensive and empathetic comprehension of the conflict, highlighting the agency and experiences of the actors involved. Such an approach resonates with specific democratic principles that emphasise the significance of popular control, civil liberties, and the protection of human rights and dignity (Beetham, 1998, p. 21).

On the contrary, the dehumanisation aspect, as a form of WJ, was conspicuously present in the reports from F24 and the BBC. In these instances, the depiction of the protesters was characterised by their association with negative predicates, indicating a sense of victimhood or danger. This was expressed through violence-related material and affective mental processes along with negatively denoted and connoted attributes when referring to the protesters and their movement. The protesters were also relegated to the background in connection to their movement's peacefulness and main outcomes. The dehumanising approach was further strengthened by the selective quoting of protesters, focusing either on their involvement in violent confrontations with the police or their emotional responses (McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000). These emotions were mostly expressed through cognitive mental processes. Such an approach raised concerns about potential orientalist perspectives, as critiqued by Said (1978, p. 38), which tended to construct protesters in an evaluative manner, portraying them as "irrational" and "childlike" or in need to external intervention. This framing may contribute to a distorted understanding of the protesters and reinforce negative stereotypes that undermine their agency and the legitimacy of their grievances.

- WJ as Propaganda-Oriented: interpretation of the data in section 7.4 has shown that this characteristic was prominently utilised, particularly in the news articles of BBC and F24. The perspective of "propaganda of violence" was realised through a spectrum of linguistic mechanisms, comprising selection, omission, and contradiction. I have also advocated for the incorporation of Reisigl and Wodak's notion of intensification as an additional analytical tool for identifying instances of propaganda of violence in news

reports. Selection involved highlighting instances that portrayed the protesters as being perpetrators/subjects of violence while downplaying actions that depicted them in a more peaceful or justified light. Another linguistic tool was foregrounding violence while backgrounding peace in a single juxtaposing sentence, contributing to a predominantly violent atmosphere. Omission, on the other hand, involved leaving out pertinent information that could offer a more balanced or nuanced perspective. It was mostly realised by nominalisations and passive-agent deletion namely in relation to violence-related processes. Furthermore, contradiction was realised using inconsistent pieces of information, fostering confusion, or fortifying negative perceptions. Intensification involved magnification or exaggeration of certain elements in the narrative, contributing to the propagation of a more aggressive or confrontational representation. This was expressed through hyperbolic expressions in relation to violence and numerical aggregations, which contributed to amplifying its perceived intensity. The four strategies become particularly pertinent in the context of reporting on conflicts that are predominantly peaceful.

- PJ as Solution-Oriented vs WJ as Problem-Oriented: interpretation of the data in section 7.5 has revealed distinctive approaches taken by the three news outlets. AJE, in its commitment to a mission that critiques Arab authoritarian systems while proposing alternatives for the people's benefit, advocated for the establishment of a transitional council along with specific criteria. This indicates a proactive stance, aligning with the solution-oriented nature of PJ. Conversely, F24's coverage depicted the transitional period as a problem, possibly reflecting France's concerns about the security situation in Algeria. It suggests an awareness that instability in Algeria could pose threats to the geopolitical stability of Europe, particularly in terms of security and hydrocarbons. This perspective aligns with the problem-oriented nature of WJ, where challenges and threats take centre stage. The BBC, taking a different approach, harked back to Algeria's past, portraying Bouteflika as a successful leader who eradicated the terror of the black decade. This reserved approach in addressing Algeria's future could be indicative of a historical colonial perspective that views Algeria as a special reserve of France (Hamouchene et al, 2014). This historical lens might influence the BBC's reluctance to engage extensively with Algeria's future trajectory.

### **8.3. Further Ideological Reflections on The BBC, F24, and AJE Representation of the 2019 AH**

To the best of my knowledge, this study stands as the pioneering endeavour to conduct a critical linguistic analysis of news reports from AJE, the BBC, and F24 concerning the 2019 AH. The findings of this study have brought to light potential ideological representations embedded within the news discourses of the three news outlets in their portrayal of the movement's actors and actions. Beyond serving as a valuable resource for critical analysts, this study extends its significance to journalists and news editors, urging them to engage in reflective considerations regarding the content of their news reports prior to publication. In the subsequent three sections, I delve deeper into contextualising the findings, aiming to offer a more comprehensive understanding of the distinctive representation strategies employed by each news outlet individually. Finally, I aim to articulate my conclusive claims regarding the ideological stance of each outlet concerning the 2019 AH as a whole.

#### **8.3.1. The BBC**

The BBC's representation of the 2019 AH seemed to align closely to WJ perspectives, potentially indicative of certain orientalist tendencies. In my analysis, I have highlighted the BBC's initial portrayal of the 2019 AH as exhibiting a bias towards violence, depicting protesters primarily as a threat and their movement as unrest. This dehumanising representation persisted, minimising the protesters' contribution to the movement's peaceful nature and positive outcomes during subsequent events, such as the resignation and prosecution. Such framing limits the perceived possibility of positive change and reinforces pre-existing biases. This tendency could be interpreted through the lens of negative ideology, which involves the use of language to frame events, groups, or individuals in a negative light, often reinforcing existing power structures and social inequalities.

The association of the AH with violence in the BBC's coverage could be influenced by the broader context of civil wars in the MENA, particularly in Syria, Libya, and Yemen, following the so-called Arab Spring of 2011. The unexpected success of the AH in achieving significant political change, including the removal of President Bouteflika and the arrest and prosecution of corrupt figures, may not have aligned with the preconceived narratives influenced by these regional conflicts. Moreover, the underrepresentation of the 2019 AH by the BBC, as compared to other international news outlets like AJE, raises questions about the potential existence of a

colonial perspective within the British media. Researchers like Hamouchene et al. (2014) argue that Algeria is barely addressed in the British media, reflecting a colonial lens that perceives Algeria as a special French reserve. This underrepresentation might reinforce the notion of a media landscape that may not fully engage with the diverse narratives emerging from the African continent, further perpetuating existing power dynamics.

In light of this, the BBC's claim of maintaining impartiality in news reporting comes under scrutiny. While the British news outlet asserts its commitment to impartiality, the negative framing of the 2019 AH raises questions about the potential influence of implicit biases on journalistic practices. Maintaining impartiality requires not only avoiding explicit biases but also addressing the subtle ways in which negative ideologies can shape narratives and perpetuate inequitable perspectives. The media's role in constructing narratives should be continually examined to ensure that it contributes to a more nuanced and equitable understanding of global events.

### **8.3.2. F24**

Similar to the case of the BBC, F24's predominant perspective when reporting on the 2019 AH was claimed to be closer to WJ. As argued in the findings' chapters, such negative portrayal might carry implications that align with certain orientalist tendencies, potentially influenced by Algeria's historical status as a former French colony. The initial event reports exemplified this orientation, as F24's reports seemingly victimised the peaceful protesters by depicting the police as enemies and the peaceful protesters as subjects of police violence. Furthermore, the overall representation in subsequent reports tended to background the protesters in relation to the movement's primary outcomes. This overall framing, which could reflect certain negative ideologies, might serve to dehumanise the protesters, painting them as recipients of violence rather than active agents in a movement for change. It reinforces existing power dynamics, potentially hindering the recognition of the protesters' agency and the legitimacy of their cause.

The influence of contextual factors on F24's representation further underscored the potential impact of negative ideology. Socially, the concurrent Yellow Vests movement in France, portrayed as violent by French media, may have contributed to F24's predisposition to frame the Algerian protests in a similarly negative light. This transference of negative framing from one social context to another perpetuates an overarching negative ideology that can lead to social inequalities in how protests and movements are perceived and understood.



Politically, the strained relations between Algeria and France, exacerbated by the protesters' calls for cutting diplomatic ties, likely played a role in shaping F24's negative representation. Historical sensitivities, including France's attempts to erase war memories and reluctance to acknowledge its crimes in Algeria, contributed to a backdrop of negative framing that aligns with an orientalist perspective.

Economically, the demonstrators articulated a demand for the cessation of French economic dominance over the nation. In this context, Kahhal (2019) asserts that during the tenure of Bouteflika, France enjoyed economic advantages not afforded to any other country. He highlights that a significant number of prominent French corporations investing in Algeria contravene the provisions of the "Algerian Investment Law," which stipulates that foreign investors should possess only 49% of any investment, with the remaining 51% designated for Algerian investors (*ibid*). Additionally, economic analysts contend that French economic investments in Algeria are consumer-oriented, focusing on ventures such as yogurt and mayonnaise companies, in contrast to its investments in Morocco, which predominantly revolve around the automotive industry (Maghreb Voices, 2017). Maghrib Voices (2019) discloses that France dominates the Algerian economic markets, boasting an annual revenue of 5,000,000,000 Euros, with a total of 6000 French companies exporting their products to Algeria.

### **8.3.3. AJE**

The findings of the present study regarding AJE's coverage of the 2019 AH resonate with the argument put forth by Kessar and her colleagues (2021) concerning the outlet's positive portrayal of the movement. I posit that AJE's perspective in reporting on the 2019 movement aligns notably closer to the principles of PJ. This alignment may be indicative of specific pro-democratic inclinations asserted by the AJ Network, of which AJE is a constituent. This broader network is recognised for its rigorous critique of Arab authoritarian regimes and its advocacy for Arab populations to embrace democratic ideals. Additionally, the positive representation of the AH by AJE could be viewed as consistent with its overarching mission which aims to "give [a global] voice to untold stories, promote debate, and challenge established perceptions" (Aljazeera, 2006).

The notion of challenging established perceptions is particularly pertinent, reflecting AJE's commitment to setting out "a different news agenda" compared to Western news outlets such

as CNN, BBC, and Fox News (Gunawardene, 2007). This divergence from mainstream Western perspectives is intricately linked to an anti-orientalist approach, an endeavour to present news from a non-Western viewpoint, challenging prevailing narratives. However, it is crucial to note that such a positive representation is not uniformly characteristic of AJE. At times, the outlet's coverage is influenced by geopolitical factors, as illustrated by Khatib (2013, p. 428). He criticises AJE and its counterpart, AJA, for selective coverage during the 2010-11 Arab Spring, emphasising uprisings in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria, while allocating limited coverage to the Bahraini uprising. Khatib attributes this selectivity to Qatar's foreign policy towards the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, suggesting that Qatar refrains from encouraging rebellion against GCC members, even if it disagrees with one of them. This stance is believed to stem from a perception that any political change affecting one of the GCC monarchies might jeopardise the geopolitical stability of the Arab Gulf as a whole.

In this context, the positive representation observed in AJE's coverage aligns with van Dijk's concept of positive ideology. Despite instances of selectivity, the overarching commitment to challenging established perceptions and providing an alternative news agenda underscores the complexity of AJE's journalistic approach, reflecting a nuanced interplay of editorial principles, geopolitical considerations, and anti-orientalist perspective.

In summary, the overall analysis underscores the imperative for media entities to subject their narrative construction to rigorous scrutiny. They should actively confront biases and endeavour to cultivate a more objective portrayal of global events, closely tight with the PJ's principles particularly in contexts laden with geopolitical sensitivities.

#### **8.4. Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research**

It is worth noting that the detailed linguistic analysis has raised the following issues. First, the detailed textual analysis of social actors and actions was confined to the clause level. Data has required a detailed manual analysis, which made it hardly adaptable to a large collection of news articles. However, these issues were limited and did not undermine the study's claims made from the analysis. The study has relied on separate grammatical choices and has categorised them systematically. It has interpreted the textual findings using the adapted model of P/WJ where it could incorporate the analysis of the content of long statements to make certain claims on the representation. By situating the linguistic choices in the socio-political context and interpreting the results based on the adapted model of P/WJ, analysing a limited

number of texts has revealed certain ideological representations embedded within the three news outlets' discourses on the 2019 AH.

To better understand the implications of this study's results, future studies can cover its questions and aims from a multimodal perspective. They can analyse the accompanying captions to find out the extent to which the results of the semiotic analysis match those of this study. Moreover, to analyse the discursive practices which was beyond the scope of this study, researchers are encouraged to undertake ethnographic studies where they can visit AJ, the BBC, and F24's newsrooms to watch closely the influencing factors of the news production on Algeria. Finally, future CDS research on any discursive event are encouraged use the adapted model of Galtung to interpret their textual findings. It is worth noting that the conceptual link made to CDS is based on this study's results and adopted methodology. The model can be further enriched based on other methodologies. Future research can also investigate the possibility of applying the model on semiotic data.

### **8.5. Empirical, Theoretical, and Methodological Contributions**

This study represents a ground-breaking effort in the realm of critical linguistic analysis, specifically focusing on news reports surrounding the 2019 AH movement from three major news outlets: AJE, the BBC, and F24. By undertaking this examination, the study pioneers an exploration into the potential ideological representations embedded within the news discourses of these outlets, shedding light on how they portrayed the movement's actors and actions. The empirical contributions of this study have become evident in its unveiling of distinct patterns in the portrayal of the 2019 AH across the analysed news reports. Notably, the positive representation observed in AJE's coverage, juxtaposed with the negative portrayal in reports by BBC and F24, has been empirically demonstrated. A crucial revelation is the potential origin of this contrast, as the analysis has suggested, may emanate from an anti-orientalist perspective inherent in AJE's reporting. This perspective challenges the entrenched assumption that democracy is an exclusive Western construct, only achievable under Western guidance. The study has established that this perspective seemed integral to AJE's reporting since the inception of the movement. It notably acknowledges the adaptability of democratic principles across diverse cultures, a key empirical finding that contributes to the broader discourse on democracy and challenges prevailing Western-centric narratives. This perspective goes beyond the mere coverage of events, underscoring the necessity for a more inclusive and culturally

sensitive approach to the promotion and implementation of democracy. This empirical foundation establishes a fundamental basis for subsequent investigations within the discourse on the influence of media in shaping perceptions of democracy across varied cultural contexts.

The significance of this study goes beyond being a valuable resource for critical discourse analysts. It actively engages journalists and news editors, urging them to undertake reflective considerations before publishing news reports, particularly those pertaining to social movements. This call for reflection is intricately linked to the study's theoretical contribution, which has involved refining Galtung's P/WJ model (2006) to suit the unique context of the 2019 AH.

The adaptations seek to enhance the model's applicability by accounting for the specific dynamics observed in the portrayal of the movement by the three news outlets. The adapted model has incorporated elements from McGoldrick and Lynch's framework (2000), Herbert's ideas on conflict analysis (2017), and Chouliaraki's analytics of mediation (2006). It goes beyond a mere theoretical choice, signalling a shift in perspective which prompts a re-evaluation of existing journalistic models in light of empirical realities. This shift is particularly crucial in the context of the AH, offering a framework that extends beyond traditional war scenarios to address socio-political movements, both local and international. The study, thus; serves as a catalyst for a more reflective and context-sensitive approach within the field of journalism.

Methodologically, this study has showcased that P/WJ can function as an effective complementary framework to CDS. While previous discussions often framed CDS as a potential supplement to P/WJ, this study has presented a reversal of perspective. The adapted P/WJ model, explicitly linked to CDS analytical categories, elevates the analytical depth and rigor of CDS, offering a novel approach to comprehending the nuanced nature of media representation. This effectiveness is not merely asserted but demonstrated through the empirical findings presented in chapter 7. The chapter illustrates how the adapted model aids in interpreting and understanding the discursive representations within the news outlets' reporting on the 2019 AH. This adds a practical dimension to the CDS methodological framework of this study. It provides tangible evidence of the utility and relevance of the adapted P/WJ model in dissecting and interpreting the complex discursive landscape of media representations. This not only strengthens the methodological framework of the study but also

offers a replicable approach for future researchers examining media narratives in different contexts.

### **8.6. Concluding Note**

In conclusion, this study has delved deep into the discourses of AJE, the BBC, and F24, unravelling nuanced representations of the 2019 AH. It has not only shed light on the potential ideological underpinnings within the news reports but has also prompted a critical reflection on the impact of linguistic choices on the portrayal of social movements. The findings challenge media entities to confront biases, cultivate objectivity, and embrace a more inclusive and culturally sensitive approach to reporting. This research extends beyond theoretical contributions, offering practical insights for journalists and news editors to foster refined journalistic practices. By adapting Galtung's P/WJ model and linking it explicitly to CDS analytical categories where possible, this study advocates for a more reflective and context-sensitive approach within the field of journalism. The empirical revelations and methodological innovations of this study pave the way for future research endeavours in understanding media narratives across diverse contexts.

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## List of Appendices

### Appendix A: Peace/ War Journalism Frameworks

#### Appendix A.1. Galtung's Model

PEACE/CONFLICT JOURNALISM	WAR/VIOLENCE JOURNALISM
<p>I. PEACE/CONFLICT-ORIENTED</p> <p>explore conflict <u>formation</u>, x parties, y goals, z issues general "win- win" orientation</p> <p>open space, open time; causes and outcomes anywhere, also in history/culture</p> <p>making conflicts transparent</p> <p>giving voice to all parties; empathy, understanding</p> <p>see conflict/war as problem, focus on conflict creativity humanization of all sides; more so the worse the weapons <u>proactive</u>: prevention before any violence/war occurs</p> <p>focus on invisible effects of violence (trauma and glory, damage to structure/culture)</p>	<p>I. WAR/VIOLENCE-ORIENTED</p> <p>focus on conflict <u>arena</u>, 2 parties, 1 goal (win), war general zero-sum orientation</p> <p>closed space, closed time; causes and exits in arena, who threw the first stone</p> <p>making wars opaque/secret</p> <p>"Us-them" journalism, propaganda, voice, for "us"</p> <p>see "them" as the problem, focus on who prevails in war dehumanization of "them"; more so the worse the weapon <u>reactive</u>: waiting for violence before reporting</p> <p>focus only on visible effect of violence (killed, wounded and material damage)</p>
<p>II. TRUTH-ORIENTED</p> <p>expose untruths on all sides</p>	<p>II. PROPAGANDA-ORIENTED</p> <p>expose "their" untruths help</p>

uncover all cover-ups	"our" cover- ups/lies
<p>III. PEOPLE-ORIENTED</p> <p>focus on suffering all over; on women, aged, children, giving voice to the voiceless</p> <p>give name to all evil doers focus on people peacemakers</p>	<p>III. ELITE-ORIENTED</p> <p>focus on "our" suffering; on able-bodied elite males, being their mouthpiece</p> <p>give name of their evildoer focus on elite peacemakers</p>
<p>IV. SOLUTION-ORIENTED</p> <p>Peace = non-violence + creativity</p> <p>highlight peace initiatives, also to prevent more war focus on structure, culture the peaceful society</p> <p>aftermath: resolution, re- construction , reconciliation</p>	<p>IV. VICTORY-ORIENTED</p> <p>peace = victory + cease-fire</p> <p>Conceal peace-initiative, before victory is at hand focus on treaty, institution the controlled society leaving for another war, return if the old flares up</p>

## Appendix A.2 McGoldrick and Lynch's Framework to Peace War Journalism

1. AVOID portraying a conflict as consisting of only two parties, contesting the same goal(s). The logical outcome is for one to win and the other to lose. INSTEAD, try to DISAGGREGATE the two parties into many smaller groups, pursuing many goals, opening up more creative potential for a range of outcomes, and ask yourself – who else is involved?
2. AVOID accepting stark distinctions between 'self' and 'other'. . Both key justifications for violence. INSTEAD, seek the 'other' in the 'self' and vice versa. If a party is presenting itself as 'the goodies', ask questions about how different its behaviour really is to that it ascribes to 'the baddies' – isn't it ashamed of itself?

3. AVOID treating a conflict as if it is only going on in the place and at the time that violence is occurring. INSTEAD, try to trace the links and consequences for people in other places now and in

the future. Ask: Who are all the people with a stake in the outcome? What are they doing to influence the conflict? Ask yourself what will happen if...? What lessons will people draw from watching these events unfold as part of a global audience? How will they enter the calculations of parties to future conflicts near and far?

4. AVOID assessing the merits of a violent action or policy of violence in terms of its visible effects only. INSTEAD, try to find ways of reporting on the invisible effects, e.g., the long-term consequences of psychological damage and trauma, increasing the likelihood that those affected will be violent in future, either against other people or, as a group, against other groups or other countries.

5. AVOID letting parties define themselves by simply quoting their leaders' restatements of familiar demands or positions. INSTEAD enquire deeper into goals: How are people on the ground affected by the conflict in everyday life? What do they want changed? Is the position stated by their leaders the only way or the best way to achieve the changes they want? This may help to empower parties to clarify and articulate their goals and make creative outcomes more likely.

6. AVOID concentrating always on what divides the parties, the differences between what they say they want. INSTEAD try asking questions which may reveal areas of common ground and leading

your report with answers which suggest that some goals may be shared or at least compatible.

7. AVOID only reporting the violent acts and describing 'the horror'. If you exclude everything else you suggest that the only explanation for violence is previous violence (revenge); the only remedy, more violence (coercion/punishment). INSTEAD show how people have been blocked and frustrated or deprived in everyday life as a way of explaining how the conditions for violence are being produced.

8. AVOID blaming someone for 'starting it'. INSTEAD try looking at how shared problems and issues are leading to consequences which all the parties say they never intended.

9. AVOID focusing exclusively on the suffering, fears, and grievances of only one party. This divides the parties into “villains” and “victims” and suggests that coercing or punishing the villains represents a solution. INSTEAD treat as equally newsworthy the suffering, fears and grievances of all sides.

10. AVOID ‘victimising’ language like “devastated”; “defenceless”; “pathetic”; “tragedy” which only tells us what has been done to and could be done for a group of people (by others). This disempowers them and limits the options for change. INSTEAD report on what has been done and could be done by the people. Don’t just ask them how they feel, also ask them how they are coping and what do they think? Can they suggest any solutions?

11. AVOID the imprecise use of emotive words to describe what has happened to people. INSTEAD, always be precise about what we know. Do not minimise suffering but reserve the strongest language for the gravest situations or you will beggar the language and help to justify disproportionate responses which escalate the violence.

12. AVOID demonising adjectives like “vicious”, “cruel”, “brutal”, “barbaric”. These always describe one party’s view of what another party has done. To use them puts the journalist on that side and helps to justify an escalation of violence. INSTEAD, report what you know about the wrongdoing and give as much information as you can about the reliability of other people’s reports or descriptions of it. If it is still being investigated, say so, as a caution that the truth may not yet be known.

13. AVOID demonising labels like “terrorist”; “extremist”; “fanatic” or “fundamentalist”. These are always given by “us” to “them”. No-one ever uses them to describe himself or herself and so for a journalist to use them is always to take sides. They mean the person is unreasonable so it seems to make less sense to reason (negotiate) with them. INSTEAD try calling people by the names they give themselves. Or be more precise in your descriptions.

14. AVOID focusing exclusively on the human rights abuses, misdemeanours and wrongdoings of only one side. INSTEAD try to name ALL wrongdoers and treat equally seriously allegations made by all sides in a conflict. Treating seriously does not mean taking at face value, but instead making equal efforts to establish whether any evidence exists to back them up, treating the victims with equal respect and the chances of finding and punishing the wrongdoers as being of equal importance.

15. AVOID making an opinion or claim seem like an established fact. (Osama bin Laden, said to be responsible for the attack on New York....”) See also “thought to be”; “it’s being seen as” etc. INSTEAD tell your readers or your audience who said what. (“Osama bin Laden, accused by

America of ordering the attack on New York....”) That way you avoid implicitly signing yourself and your news service up to the allegations made by one party in the conflict against another.

16. AVOID greeting the signing of documents by leaders, which bring about military victory or ceasefire, as necessarily creating peace. INSTEAD try to report on the issues which remain and which may still lead people to commit further acts of violence in the future. Ask - what is being done to strengthen the means on the ground to handle and resolve conflict non-violently, to address development or structural needs in the society and to create a culture of peace.

17. AVOID waiting for leaders on ‘our’ side to suggest or offer solutions. INSTEAD pick up and explore peace initiatives wherever they come from. Ask questions to politicians, for example, about ideas put forward by grassroots organisations. Assess peace perspectives against what you know about the issues the parties are really trying to address, do not simply ignore them because they do not coincide with established positions. Include images of a solution, however partial – they may help to stimulate dialogue.



## **Appendix B: Titles of and Links to the BBC's Reports**

### **Appendix B.1. The First Event (The Protests' Start as a Reaction against Bouteflika's Fifth Term in Power)**

Titles	Codes	Links
Algerians protest against Bouteflik a's bid for fifth term	(BBC22 F19)	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47339414">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47339414</a>
(2019)Algerian students protest against Bouteflik a's fifth term bid	BBC27F19	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47382028">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47382028</a>
Algeria protests: Thousands denounce president's bid for fifth term	(BBC1Mar19)	<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-47420485">https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-47420485</a>



Algeria protests: President confirms fresh poll bid despite rallies (BBC5Mar19)		<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47432723">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47432723</a>
Algerians gather in largest protest against Bouteflika	(BBC8Mar19)	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47496856#:~:text=What%20happened%20on%20Friday%3F,suspended%20ahead%20of%20the%20rally">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47496856#:~:text=What%20happened%20on%20Friday%3F,suspended%20ahead%20of%20the%20rally</a>

## Appendix B.2. The Second Event (Bouteflika's Resignation)

Titles	Codes	Links
Young Algerians on the man in power for their entire lives	<i>(BBC3Apr19 (1))</i>	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47801258">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47801258</a>
Abdelaziz Bouteflika: Algerian leader resigns	<i>(BBC3Apr19 (3))</i>	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47795108">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47795108</a>

Abdelaziz Bouteflika: Algerian leader resigns amid protests	(BBC3Apr19 (2))	<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47795108">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47795108</a>
<b>Bouteflika asks Algerians for 'forgiveness'</b>	<b>(BBC3Apr19 (4))</b>	<b><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47808950">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47808950</a></b>

### Appendix B.3. BBC's Reports on the Third Event (the Live Prosecution)

Title of the Report	Report's Code	Link to the Report
Algeria jails two former prime ministers ahead of election	BBC9D19	<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-50728562">https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-50728562</a>

## Appendix C: Titles of and Links to the AJE's Reports

### Appendix C. 1 The First Event (The Protestors' Start as a Reaction against Bouteflika's Fifth Term in Power)

Titles	Codes	Links
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Algerians protest against Bouteflika's bid for fifth term	(AJE22F19)	<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/2/22/algerians-protest-against-bouteflikas-bid-for-fifth-term">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/2/22/algerians-protest-against-bouteflikas-bid-for-fifth-term</a>
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Algeria: Dozens arrested in protests against Bouteflika	(AJE23f19)	<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/2/23/algeria-dozens-arrested-in-protests-against-bouteflika">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/2/23/algeria-dozens-arrested-in-protests-against-bouteflika</a>
Algeria: Thousands expected to take part in anti-Bouteflika march	(AJE28F19)	<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/2/28/algeria-thousands-expected-to-take-part-in-anti-bouteflika-march">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/2/28/algeria-thousands-expected-to-take-part-in-anti-bouteflika-march</a>
Algeria: Tens of thousands protest president's bid for fifth term	(AJE1Mar19)	<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/1/algeria-tens-of-thousands-protest-presidents-bid-for-fifth-term">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/1/algeria-tens-of-thousands-protest-presidents-bid-for-fifth-term</a>
Bouteflika confirms bid for fifth term amid ongoing protests	(AJE3Mar19)	<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/3/bouteflika-confirms-bid-for-fifth-term-amid-ongoing-protests">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/3/bouteflika-confirms-bid-for-fifth-term-amid-ongoing-protests</a>
Bouteflika's offer fails to appease Algeria's protesters	(AJE4Mar19)	<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/4/bouteflikas-offer-fails-to-appease-algerias-protesters">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/4/bouteflikas-offer-fails-to-appease-algerias-protesters</a>
Armed with memes, Algerian students join anti-Bouteflika protests	(AJE5Mar19)	<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/5/armed-with-memes-algerian-students-join-anti-bouteflika-protests">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/5/armed-with-memes-algerian-students-join-anti-bouteflika-protests</a>

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Algerians mobilise for mass anti-Bouteflika protests	(AJE8Mar19)	<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/9/algerians-mobilise-for-mass-anti-bouteflika-protests">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/9/algerians-mobilise-for-mass-anti-bouteflika-protests</a>
Algeria protests grow as Bouteflika adamant on fifth term	(AJE9M19)	<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/videos/2019/3/9/algeria-protests-grow-as-bouteflika-adamant-on-fifth-term">https://www.aljazeera.com/videos/2019/3/9/algeria-protests-grow-as-bouteflika-adamant-on-fifth-term</a>

### Appendix C.2. The Second Event (Bouteflika's Resignation)

Title	Code	Link
Algeria's Abdelaziz Bouteflika resigns after mass protests	(AJE3Apr19)	<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/4/3/algerias-abdelaziz-bouteflika-resigns-after-mass-protests">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/4/3/algerias-abdelaziz-bouteflika-resigns-after-mass-protests</a>

### Appendix C.3. The Third Event (The Life Prosecution)

Titles	Codes	Links
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Algerian court convicts 2 former prime ministers of corruption	(AJE10D19)	<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/10/algerian-court-convicts-2-former-prime-ministers-of-corruption">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/10/algerian-court-convicts-2-former-prime-ministers-of-corruption</a>
Algeria seeks heavy sentences for ex-PMs accused of corruption	(AJE9D19)	<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/9/algeria-seeks-heavy-sentences-for-ex-pms-accused-of-corruption">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/9/algeria-seeks-heavy-sentences-for-ex-pms-accused-of-corruption</a>

## Appendix D. Titles of and Links to F24's Reports

### Appendix D.1. The First Event (The Start of the Protests as a Reaction against Bouteflika's Fifth Term)

Titles	Codes	Links
'No to Bouteflika,' chant Algerians protesting his bid for fifth term	(F24 23F19)	<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190223-algeria-protest-bouteflika-election-bid">https://www.france24.com/en/20190223-algeria-protest-bouteflika-election-bid</a>

Fresh protests against fifth term for Bouteflika in Algeria	(F24 24F19)	<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190224-algerians-protests-against-5th-term-bouteflika-presidential-election">https://www.france24.com/en/20190224-algerians-protests-against-5th-term-bouteflika-presidential-election</a>
Thousands of students join Algerian protests against Bouteflika's bid for a fifth term	(F24 26F19)	<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190226-thousands-algeria-students-protest-bouteflika-5th-term-president-elections">https://www.france24.com/en/20190226-thousands-algeria-students-protest-bouteflika-5th-term-president-elections</a>
Algerians throng the streets for 'Million Man' anti-Bouteflika march	(F24 1Mar19 (1))	<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190301-algeria-protests-anti-bouteflika-braced-million-man-march-press-freedom">https://www.france24.com/en/20190301-algeria-protests-anti-bouteflika-braced-million-man-march-press-freedom</a>
Thousands protest Algeria president's fifth term bid	(F24 1Mar19 (2))	<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190301-thousands-protest-algeria-presidents-fifth-term-bid">https://www.france24.com/en/20190301-thousands-protest-algeria-presidents-fifth-term-bid</a>



Fresh protests break out as Algeria's Bouteflika submits re-election bid	(F24 3Mar19)	<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190303-algeria-bouteflika-election-protests-resume">https://www.france24.com/en/20190303-algeria-bouteflika-election-protests-resume</a>
Algerian students say 'No' to Bouteflika fifth term	(F24 5Mar19)	<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190305-algerian-students-say-no-bouteflika-fifth-term">https://www.france24.com/en/20190305-algerian-students-say-no-bouteflika-fifth-term</a>
Hundreds of thousands of Algerians protest against Bouteflika's fifth term bid	(F24 8Mar19)	<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190308-algeria-transport-algiers-protests-bouteflika-candidacy-election">https://www.france24.com/en/20190308-algeria-transport-algiers-protests-bouteflika-candidacy-election</a>

### Appendix D.2. The Second Event (Bouteflika's Resignation)

Titles	Codes	Links
Algeria's Bouteflika ends 20-year rule after weeks of protests	(F24 2Apr19)	<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190402-algeria-army-chief-staff-salah-bouteflika-resign-immediately">https://www.france24.com/en/20190402-algeria-army-chief-staff-salah-bouteflika-resign-immediately</a>
With Bouteflika swept away by protests, Algeria looks to next steps	(F24 3Apr19)	<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190403-bouteflika-resignation-algeria-bensalah-protests-president-oil">https://www.france24.com/en/20190403-bouteflika-resignation-algeria-bensalah-protests-president-oil</a>

### Appendix D.3. The Third Event (The Live Prosecution)

Titles	Codes	Links
Algeria jails two Bouteflika-era PMs in	(F24 10D19(1))	<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20191210-algeria-jails-two-bouteflika-era-pms-in-landmark-corruption-trial">https://www.france24.com/en/20191210-algeria-jails-two-bouteflika-era-pms-in-landmark-corruption-trial</a>

landmark corruption trial		Two Algeria ex-PMs get heavy jail terms in graft trial
Two Algeria ex-PMs get heavy jail terms in graft trial	(F24 19D19 (2))	<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20191210-two-algeria-ex-pms-get-heavy-jail-terms-in-graft-trial">https://www.france24.com/en/20191210-two-algeria-ex-pms-get-heavy-jail-terms-in-graft-trial</a>

