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**THE ADAPTION OF THE EDUCATION PROFESSION IN IDENTIFYING
RADICALISATION IN SCHOOLS. A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE and
OBSERVATIONS FROM A COHORT of EDUCATORS and
PREVENT PRACTITIONERS**

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Glossary of Terms

AQ:	Al-Qaeda
CONTEST:	The United Kingdom's counter-terrorism strategy and comprises four strands: Pursue: investigation and disruption of terrorist attacks Prevent: stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism Protect: protective security to stop a terrorist attack Prepare: minimise the impact of an attack and to recover quickly
COVID:	Coronavirus
CTSA:	Counter Terrorism and Security Act
DfE:	Department for Education
DAESH:	Another name for Islamic State: Formed from the initial letters of the group. <i>In Arabic</i> - al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wa al-Sham
DSL:	Dedicated Safeguarding Lead
FOI:	Freedom of Information
IS/ISIS:	Islamic State/Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
NPCC:	National Police Chief Council
OFSTED:	Office for Standards in Education (Department of Education)
OSCT:	Office for Security and Counter Terrorism, now Homeland Security (part of the Home Office)
WRAP:	Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent

Abstract

This thesis examines how the educational profession has adapted to the role of identifying extremism in the classroom. It explores how in a liberal, secular democracy, a security policy, Prevent, has been wrapped in the language of safeguarding and implemented as such. The Prevent duty was made a statutory requirement under the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 in which responsible authorities must have due regard for those at risk of radicalisation. This research explores the lived experiences and assessments of a cohort of Designated Safeguarding Leads and senior school leaders. It further asks a group of Prevent practitioners, whose responsibility it is to investigate claims of vulnerability and concerns of extremism, how they see the adoption of the duty by educationalists. The thesis looks at a portion of the published literature which focuses its attention on Prevent in the classroom, which questions the educational professional about how the policy is working in their school. Through a series of semi-structured questioned interviews, this thesis seeks to understand the feelings of those tasked to have due regard for young people vulnerable to extremism. Finally it asks whether they think the Prevent duty achieves its aims. The analysis of responses indicates a profession comfortable with the Prevent duty and their role within it. It shows how educationalists and practitioners have worked together in understanding each other's perspectives, but feel there is more to do and understand. This thesis concludes that the Prevent duty has been legitimised and normalised into school safeguarding policies. The terminology adopted emulates that of other safeguarding procedures and provides common ground for educator and Prevent investigator. It is now part of every day school life, its effectiveness imprecise and it remains a complex theory in the eyes of educationalists and practitioners.

Chapter 1: Introduction

In June 2021 an eleven year old child was asked by his teacher if they found themselves with a lot of money what would they do? It was reported the child replied, 'give arms to the oppressed'. For this, the child was subsequently reported to Prevent, the Government's counter-radicalisation programme. It transpired the teacher had misunderstood the child, thinking they had said 'arms' when they had actually said 'alms', meaning donating to the poor or needy (Taylor 2021). Warwickshire and West Mercia police received the referral, found there were no grounds to investigate and closed the case. The child's parents sought legal advice from Liberty Law Solicitors on possible legal action against the school and described the impact on the family as significant. This type of incident has not been uncommon during the history of Prevent. In 2016 nursery staff in Luton contacted Prevent after a four year old child was heard to described their art class drawing as a 'cooker bomb', it's later transpired the child had mispronounced the word 'cucumber' (Independent, 2016). The most prominent report of a Prevent-related media moral panic (Lundie, 2019) was again in 2016 and featured a 10 year old Muslim boy who attends a Lancashire school. The boy was reportedly interviewed by police because he had said he lived in a 'terrorist house', resulting in the incident, media reports said, being dealt with as terrorist related. His family later told reporters this was a spelling mistake and he meant to write 'terrace house'. The BBC, who was allegedly the source of the story, was criticised by Lancashire Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) saying the incident had not been dealt with as a terrorist enquiry. The PCC criticised the BBC reporting saying it had not been initiated due to a spelling mistake adding the BBC reporting had damaged community relations (Gani and Slawson, 2016). Details later revealed the case was reported by the school as part of a

wider safeguarding issue and investigated by social workers, but media reporting identified it as the overzealous implementation of the Prevent duty (Lundie, 2019).

Teachers have, for some time, been on the frontline in identifying those on the road to terrorism, including those vulnerable to radicalisation and reporting their concerns to the authorities. Since the introduction of the Prevent duty under the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015, teachers have had a statutory duty to report their concerns that a child in their charge may be vulnerable to extremism (Department for Education, 2015). The duty placed a statutory requirement on 'responsible authorities' to have due regard for identifying those who may be vulnerable to radicalisation. This duty placed the responsibility on schools, the NHS, local authorities, the Criminal Justice System, including prisons and the police, to identify those vulnerable to extremism. Once a concern is identified a referral can then be made to a local Prevent team comprising local authority and police practitioners. This thesis looks at the adoption of the education profession to the Prevent duty and examines some of the opinions, views and feelings regarding the policy. It seeks the views of teachers and Prevent practitioners within the police and local authorities about the Prevent duty's implementation and adaption into an educational setting.

The United Kingdom has been subjected to acts of terrorism for many years. Since the 1960s, conflict in Northern Ireland has impacted on British citizens and property, not just the security forces charged with maintaining the Queen's Peace. Despite this, a single terrorist event in 2005 became the catalyst for a fundamental change of the government's counter-terrorism policy which is still evident today. What was so significant about this

event, and how could it lead to society, in a liberal, secular democracy, being asked to identify their fellow citizens who could be vulnerable to becoming terrorists?

The event was the attack by Islamist inspired extremists on the London transport system on the 7th July 2005, killing 52 people and leaving many hundreds injured (Richards, 2011).

With this single attack came the shock that a group of young men, born and educated in the UK were prepared to kill their fellow citizens, killing themselves in the process, in the name of an extremist ideology little known or understood at the time. This was compounded by a further failed attack 14 days later by another group of young men (Goodwin and Gaines, 2009). The disbelief and shock at these actions left the government struggling to comprehend why this had happened. Were there other extremists, and how could they be identified and stopped? Part of the response was the publication of CONTEST, the UK government's counter-terrorism strategy (Thomas, 2016). This was developed following the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York and other US sites in September 2001, but had not been made public until 2006. CONTEST was formed by four pillars, Protect, Pursue, Prepare and Prevent. Each of the CONTEST pillars (known as the 4 P's) contributed to the overall strategy. They are: to Protect key national services, the public and UK interests overseas; Prepare for the consequences of an attack; Pursue terrorists and those that sponsor them and Prevent terrorism by tackling the radicalisation of individuals (HM Government, 2006).

The Prevent Strategy was the one strand of CONTEST that was described as a 'hearts and minds' approach (DCLG, 2007; English, 2009) which sought to engage with communities,

understand grievance at events occurring on the other side of the world, and identify those vulnerable to being radicalised. At that time, the government argued that radicalisation could lead to terrorism and Prevent would engage with those at risk of getting involved (HM Government, 2006).

Prevent has been accused of fostering social division, undermining civil liberties and has the potential to make terrorism more likely, it was described as failed and friendless (Kundnani, 2009; Thomas, 2010; Vincent, 2018; Panjwani, 2016). Allegations persisted that funding of projects and other community activities favoured areas with higher Muslim populations which only re-enforced the sense of targeting certain communities. Accusations persisted that in return for funding, local community groups would provide information to the police (Birt, 2009; Kundnani, 2009). As allegations continued the government felt the need to specifically reference and discount the claims, suggesting the collection of details on membership, individual's mental health and sexuality as false in the Prevent Strategy 2011 itself (HM Government, 2011). The government publicly declared the risk of terrorism was thought highest from those espousing a violent Islamist ideology, this again placed the spotlight on communities following the Islamic faith (HM Government, 2011).

The Prevent Strategy continued to evolve between 2006 and 2011, reacting to further terrorist events, policy updates and changes in the actual administration of government itself. 2011 saw the publication of a revised Prevent Strategy, which sought to remove the distinction between violent and non-violent extremist views which may or may not lead to violence (HM Government, 2011). This was a significant act by the newly elected coalition

government and marked the departure from a strategy which had previously included community cohesion as well as a security component. There would also be changes to funding with less for communities and a new emphasis on police disrupting the activities of extremists. The intensity of the threat from terrorism and extremism continued to build. In 2014 Peter Clarke, former counter terrorism commander with the Metropolitan Police, was asked to investigate allegations of infiltration by religious extremists into several Birmingham schools. It was alleged Islamist extremists were seeking to gain control of a number of schools by obtaining positions within governing bodies or by becoming staff members. This so-called 'Trojan Horse' plot was confirmed by Clarke, detailing in his subsequent report a 'coordinated, deliberate and sustained action [...] to introduce an intolerant and aggressive Islamic ethos' (Clarke, 2014). There was however no evidence found relating to terrorism, radicalisation or violent extremism (Jerome et al., 2019). The fear that school children could be at risk of extremism from their own staff became a major concern for government and the Department for Education, they would seek legislative remedies to deal with the threat (HM Government, 2015a). In 2015 two major terrorist attacks coincided with the publication of a new counter extremism strategy by the UK government: Tunisia, where 38 people were murdered on the beach, many of them British holiday makers and in Paris, where 17 people were murdered in the Bataclan music venue. It was also reported that 750 UK linked nationals had travelled to Syria and were believed to be active in the conflict there fighting alongside ISIS (HM Government, 2015b). The newly published counter extremism strategy was criticised for the change which reaffirmed the emphasis on combating non-violent extremism. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, a group of elected UK parliamentarians who scrutinise government proposals and policy, said that government policy should aim to tackle extremism that leads to violence and not to

suppress views with which the coalition government disagrees (Parliament, 2016). These changes only added to the arguments that Prevent was the government's 'Islam policy' (Kundnani, 2015).

Perhaps the unintended consequence of these changes was the reluctance of educators to provide open and safe forums for debate and expressions of opinion by students (Lockley-Scott, 2019). These views may be seen as not mainstream political or religious beliefs or those which challenged the government narrative on 'British Values' of democracy, rule of law, individual liberty, mutual respect and tolerance for those with different faiths and beliefs. The term 'British Values' was combined into the definition of radicalisation (Department of Education, 2015). Teachers' requirement to uphold public trust was seen as a professional duty, issues arose however, over the notion of British values which was required to be embedded into school standards and the curriculum (Department of Education, 2014). This was seen by some as a 'blatant reinforcement of teachers as instruments of the state within a liberal democracy' (Lander, 2019, p.275).

By 2015 there was increasing concern by the security services about British citizens travelling to conflict areas in the Middle East, notably Syria, and joining Islamist State or DAESH (HM Government, 2015b). A high-profile case involved three girls from Bethnal Green Academy in East London travelling via Turkey to Syria placed a particular spotlight on the role of schools. The incident raised the question as to how schools could identify those well-adjusted and bright individual students who were vulnerable and stop them from being radicalised. Shamima Begum, the only survivor of the three, is still in a legal battle to come

back to the UK after her UK citizenship was revoked and remains in a refugee camp on the Syria/Turkey border (Peltier, 2021).

The government proposed the next major change to the Prevent Strategy with the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA, 2015) and the inclusion of the Prevent duty (HM Government, 2015c). This now placed a statutory requirement on 'responsible authorities' to have due regard for identifying those who may be vulnerable to radicalisation. This duty placed the responsibility on schools, the NHS, local authorities, the Criminal Justice System, including prisons and the police, to identify those vulnerable to extremism. The duty further required they report their concerns to local Prevent teams based within local authorities and police forces. These authorities would also be required to demonstrate how they were meeting their statutory responsibility through their inspection process, in the case of the education sector to The Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted) and the Department For Education (DfE).

This thesis seeks to understand how a cohort of educational professionals responsible for the implementation of the Prevent duty has adapted to their role working with safeguarding professionals and the police. I have structured this thesis around three questions; How has the teaching profession implemented the Prevent Duty? Is there an understanding of radicalisation? Do those delivering the Prevent Duty believe it works?

The Prevent duty has now been in place since 2015, its purpose, as part of the guidance and legislation relevant to the welfare of children and vulnerable people has been supported and promoted by many who apply the duty within their school. It remains controversial, and commentators continue to highlight its suspected discriminatory nature (Jerome and Elwick, 2019). Whilst this study chooses qualitative methods to analyse its findings, statistics, or rather their absence, play an important aspect of the narrative on the Prevent duty within education. Inconsistency in the availability of Prevent data regarding schools and referrals to Prevent originating from schools has been a major challenge in preparing this thesis. Thornton and Bouhana (2017) argue that evaluation of Prevent programmes has been hampered by issues surrounding data access, they conclude public agencies would be unlikely to provide independent researchers access to data on the basis of national security or protecting individuals' information. This was because there was a concern details of those referred to Prevent or the referrer themselves could be identified, or release of data could hamper a criminal investigation. It was also felt as the programmes had only been running for a relatively short time tracking outcomes would be difficult (Thornton and Bouhana, 2017). Access to Prevent data has been improved by the yearly publication of Prevent referral data by the Home Office, this however remains categorised as 'experimental statistics' and acknowledges a need for greater consistency (Home Office, 2019). Data surrounding the research question remains elusive, figures on referrals from schools has only been made available from March 2020. The impact this has on Prevent transparency and measuring effectiveness is discussed within this study.

In the following study I examine the existing literature surrounding the Prevent duty and the adoption of the Prevent duty by educational professionals. I then analyse the response from a series of interviews from a cohort of 12 educationalists, and 9 Prevent practitioners involved in Prevent referrals and case management. The thesis seeks to establish the experiences, views and opinions of its respondents. At the end, I reflect on where the journey has taken our understanding of the Prevent duty and its role to identify and safeguard those vulnerable to radicalisation in schools.

‘There is little research into teachers’ practices in relation to the Prevent duty, in how schools are generating their own knowledge and discourses in relation to radicalisation and how they are evolving practices designed to ensure their Prevent duty is discharged’ (Bryan, 2017).

It is hoped this piece will add to the understanding surrounding the Prevent duty and its adoption in schools.

In Chapter two, I look at the existing commentary regarding the Prevent duty and its influence on the education profession. I identify the literature which helps shape the analysis of Prevent and its statutory responsibilities. The literature is wide ranging and has been divided into a series of subject areas which are commonly found and discussed in regard to Prevent, which are: Radicalisation; Fundamental British Values; Securitisation and the Suspect Community. This chapter also examines the authors of these texts and the source journals to identify common themes or areas of relevance to the research question.

Chapter three will consider the methodological approach adopted in this thesis and detail the methods used to collect and analyse the data. It will examine the way in which I undertook analysis of the data and coding adopted. Finally the chapter will examine the ethical considerations of undertaking research during the Covid pandemic of 2020 and 2021.

In Chapter four the thesis examines the experience of educationalists and Prevent Practitioners who participated in this research. The cohort of educationalists provide an understanding into how the Prevent duty functioned within their school or college. Prevent Practitioners provide an insight into their lived experience of how they saw the Prevent duty translated into the educational setting.

Chapter five brings this theses to its conclusion. It reviews the Prevent journey undertaken and the lived experience of a group of professionals whose responsibilities are embedded within the Prevent duty. In this chapter I discuss where that journey has brought a cohort of teachers and their colleagues in counter terrorism. Relationships play a key aspect in this final section, from the importance in determining if a student is at risk of radicalisation to what the State expects its educational professionals to do as its statutory duty.

2.0 Introduction

In the previous chapter I introduce the elements which encompassed Prevent and the history of events which has shaped its development, ultimately leading to the development of the Counter Terrorism Security Act (CTSA) 2015. The Prevent Strategy, as part of the UK government's overarching counter terrorism strategy CONTEST, has been referenced by academics and policy commentators since its publication in 2006. In scholastic terms the material has not been available for a particularly long time, nor has the examination of its effects been subject to scrutiny for an especially lengthy period (Thornton and Bouhana, 2017). However, since the defining moments of the 9/11 attacks in the United States and the London bombings of 2005, terrorist attacks, plots and arrests by police have provided a backdrop and contextualisation to analysis.

Reports of extremism, terrorist events and related counter terrorism policy advances have generated academic observation and comment. A number of authors have continued to be prolific in the area since the publication of the Prevent Strategy, such as Kundnani (2009, 2012, 2015), Thomas, Busher and Davies (2010, 2016, 2019). There are also further studies detailing literature with links to extremism and Prevent's impact on educational professionals, authors included Coppock (2014), Bryan and Revell (2006, 2016, 2017), Glees and Pope (2005). There has been significant comment of Prevent linked to social policy; Health-Kelly (2013, 2015), Hickman (2011), Khaleeli and Martin (2017), securitisation; O'Donnell (2016), community cohesion; Mohood (2012, 2017), Jones and O'Toole (2012,

2016), Saeed and Brown and Sian (2015) and democracy; Pantucci (2012, 2013) and Spalek (2008, 2007, 2010).

This chapter appraises a selection of literature concerning Prevent, principally the views and concerns of the education sector in their engagement with the government's Prevent Strategy and specifically the Prevent duty. The duty details how teachers have a responsibility and a legal duty to actively identify children vulnerable to being radicalised. Prevent itself has been widely written about within the terrorism and the social science field and has been described as being a toxic brand, failed and friendless and a policy targeted mostly at Muslims (Thomas, 2010; Kundnani, 2009; Vincent, 2018 and Panjwani, 2016). The benefits of this policy are widely disputed, with much of the literature indicating a corrosive effect on community cohesion through increased mistrust, ethnic tensions and accusations of it doing the work of the radicalisers by increasing antipathy against the state (Busher, Choudhury and Thomas, 2019; Davies, 2015; Durodie, 2015). There are wider implications for the education sector which the literature provides insight into, how for example, the Prevent duty is interpreted and enacted on the front line of the classroom and staffroom. The literature offers some surprising findings from the initial confusion and anger to a resigned acceptance of another Department for Education (DfE) policy prescribed for Head Teachers to enact, with noncompliance could result in a poor Ofsted inspection rating (Busher et al., 2019). That acceptance, willing or otherwise, posed the question how therefore was the Prevent duty impacting on educational professionals, their interaction with students and what active implementation of the duty looked like.

The Prevent duty has two main objectives within the education sector, to identify those vulnerable to being radicalised and how to refer concerns, but also to build resilience within the pupils themselves to extremists mindset through the teaching of fundamental British values (FBVs). The DfE argues this will provide students with the skills to challenge extremist views and for education settings to provide a safe space for debate of radical ideas (DfE, 2015). FBVs are defined as ‘democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect for and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’ (Jerome et al., 2019; Taylor and Soni, 2019; Busher et al., 2019). The definition adopted arose out of the Prevent Strategy 2011, in which the government for the first time defined ‘extremism’. The government argued their knowledge of factors encouraging people to support terrorism had increased and providing greater guidance in the definition of extremist activity would ultimately help combat radicalisation (The Prevent Strategy, 2011).

The literature reports the reaction and criticism among the education profession, teacher trade unions and other commentators to the effect this would have within the classroom. Observers argued Prevent was the ‘securitising’ of education through introducing state prevention strategies, undertaken at an early stage to identify those at risk of radicalisation. Taylor and Soni argued this was making teachers accountable for not just their educational attainment but also their students’ radical thoughts and deeds (Taylor and Soni 2017; Thomas, 2017).

The literature describes how those behind the policy rejected such alarmist claims, advising the Prevent duty was simply an extension of the well worked and recognised safeguarding

practices encompassed within every educational establishment. Safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children (includes everyone under the age of 18) is defined by the Department for Education (2021) as; protecting children from maltreatment; preventing the impairment of children's mental and physical health or development; ensuring children grow up safe and with effective care; taking action to enable all children to have the best outcomes (DfE, 2021).

Safeguarding within a Prevent setting, we were advised, was the same as the work already being undertaken to safeguard students from drugs, gangs, exploitation and neglect, it should not be burdensome (DfE, 2015). Some agree, partly O'Donnell contended that good teaching practice develops the ability for students to build resilience to extremism and to question and critically evaluate, this policy however risked damaging trust and openness by silencing and marginalising students and staff (O'Donnell, 2015).

In addition to the general discourse on how the Prevent duty was undertaken within the educational profession, a body of work was amassed which seeks to examine empirical evidence of the relationship between the objectives of the Prevent duty and the pedagogical setting. Two major examinations of the literature provided by Taylor and Soni in 2017 and Jerome, Elwick and Kazim's in 2019 provide an extensive overview of the available literature at that time. Taylor and Soni scrutinised 7 studies with a broad range of themes and methods covered using qualitative data, they sought to identify significant or reoccurring themes in the literature, which was still growing in complexity and quantity. They concluded radicalisation referred to views not acts and the CTSA 2015 was deterring critical discussions

through fear of villainising and alienating groups within society (Taylor and Soni, 2017). This was then superseded by Jerome, Elwick and Kazim's (2019) study who sought to cover all pertinent material, 27 articles in total, examining the impact of Prevent policy published between 2015 and 2019 involving teachers and students within English schools. They concluded schools could implement the Prevent duty, passing an Ofsted inspection, without ensuring their students actually learn about extremism and terrorism, leaving them unable to understand the incidents of terrorism happening around them (Jerome et al., 2019).

In reviewing the existing commentary and literature, this chapter has also identified a series of articles that directly examine the adoption of Prevent by education professionals, which will be covered later in the chapter. To assist to navigate the literature four topics were identified which emerged as running throughout many of the articles, radicalisation, Fundamental British Values, securitising of education and suspect communities. This thesis will look at each of these themes and how the literature engages, comments or criticises their attempts to safeguard the young people within their care. Before I commence the review of literature the following segment examines the key authors referenced in this chapter.

2.1 The authors and commentators

The sourced literature for this review is a culmination of professional journals, papers and books produced since the first announcement of the government's Prevent Strategy in 2006 to identify those vulnerable to being radicalised and supporting terrorism. The majority of

the material has been written by academic authors writing in educational journals and publications such as Laura Taylor (Associate Professor) and Dr Anita Soni from the School of Education at the University of Birmingham writing in *Pastoral Care in Education*. They conducted a literature review considering the lived experiences of the Prevent strategy in educational settings concluding a culture of surveillance inhibits the creation of safe spaces to debate radical views and may alienate groups who already feel villainised (Taylor and Soni 2017). Writing in the *British Educational Research Journal*, Lee Jerome (Associate Professor of Education, Middlesex University), Dr Alex Elwick (Institute of Education, University College London) and Raza Kazim (Middlesex University and spokesperson for Islamic Human Rights Commission, London) reviewed the impact of the Prevent duty on schools and students through empirical studies published between 2015 and 2019. They concluded the evidence gave support to those critical of Prevent policy, whilst teachers had agency in relation to Prevent they also raised unintended and negative side effects on students (Jerome et al., 2019). More unusual in the literature surrounding Prevent and the pedagogical location is contained within *Critical Studies on Terrorism*. This examined empirical research regarding the acceptance, or otherwise, of the Prevent duty in British schools and colleges. Authors Joel Busher (Research Fellow in the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Associate Professor, Coventry University), Tufyal Choudhury (Associate Professor, Durham Law School, Durham University) and Paul Thomas (Professor of Youth and Policy and Associate Dean, School of Education and professional Development, University of Huddersfield) have written for a number of years on government policy and Prevent's impact on Muslim communities as well as community cohesion, multiculturalism and racism. Their 2019 article provides an explanation for why the educational professional

opposition to prevent has been limited but they identified positive acceptance. (Thomas, 2010; Thomas, 2016; Busher et al., 2019).

It is noteworthy at this stage to highlight the propensity for literature in this field to be concentrated in educational journals even while much of the discourse surrounds mounting securitisation of education within counter terrorism policy. It could be hypothesised the relatively recent inception of Prevent and availability of literature analysis of the Prevent duty are linked. Since its publication in 2015 there has been limited time to examine, consider and review the Prevent duty, while literature surrounding terrorism and extremism is more widely accessible and has been written about for a considerable period of time. The following sections now describe in more detail how the identified literature explains the reactions and experiences of those at the forefront of Prevent duty delivery.

Reviewing this literature has helped develop a series of observations and contributed in identifying keywords and authors to assist analysis, most notably; radicalisation, Fundamental British Values, securitisation and a suspect community. The dialogue surrounding Prevent is relatively new and has been examined by a small number of academics and commentators, who have quickly become specialists in this area of policy, supervising PhDs and contributing to government or Parliament. During that history of commentary a number of events have shaped the published material, which in turn, has identified themes and topics. Those highlighted in this thesis were chosen for comment because of their frequency across the literature and impact they had on the development of Prevent policy and thinking. 'Radicalisation', as a process, has been disputed and discussed in many of the works, it plays a significant part in the fundamentals of the Prevent Strategy

and underpins the policy to identify and stop its progression. 'Fundamental British Values' (FBV) as its own distinct concept became incorporated into the definition of extremism within the Prevent Strategy. There is a requirement that FBV is incorporated into schools who must then demonstrate how effective they are in doing this. Linking this to safeguarding and child welfare resulted in significant commentary by educationists not previously known for discussing counter terrorism policy. This was closely linked to 'Securitisation', of the education sector and the classroom. Commentary certainly believed that this has had a significant impact on the teacher student relationship and the possible accusation of spies in the classroom (Neustatter, 2016). The final area examined in this chapter has seen one community linked to Prevent more than any other and set them apart as a 'suspect community'. Followers of the Islamic faith have been identified by commentators as a group who, like the Irish community in Britain who as a result of the Northern Ireland conflict between the Irish Republican Army and British forces of the 1960's and 1970's, have been linked by nationality or accent to perpetrators of terrorist acts in the UK and abroad. Significant commentary within the literature reviews the impact of Prevent and its duty on school aged children and noteworthy because the observation is repeated up to the introduction of the CTSA 2015 and beyond. It remains significant in Prevent commentary despite the rise in extreme right wing terrorism following the death of MP Jo Cox in 2016.

2.2 Radicalisation

Radicalisation has been discussed in the selected literature as a journey, a process, a concept, a conveyor belt leading to violence or a path undergone by an individual, the wide

range of explanation appears to indicate there is no unanimous agreement in the policy or legislation (Taylor and Soni 2017; Bryan, 2017; Coppock and McGovern, 2014; Kundnani, 2012). It remains a disputed term and this debate is reflected in the literature which sees authors explore how the term has been defined and interpreted. This section looks at articles concerned with education and the teaching profession. It examines how teachers have decoded or understood the principle around radicalisation and what this has meant to their relationship with students, staff and those monitoring their work including the Department For Education (DfE), government and police. Some common themes have been identified which are framed around the UK's Prevent strategy in educational settings with many acknowledging a 'hardening and deepening' approach aimed at British education following the 'Trojan Horse' affair of 2014. This occurred when a number of Birmingham schools with mostly Muslim students were investigated following an anonymous tip off they were being taken over by Islamist extremists (Thomas, 2016). This predicated a media whirlwind and significant government response leading to the Prevent duty's introduction and an increased schools inspection framework to include FBV. (HM Government, 2015a).

The literature is quick to identify the route of the introduction of radicalisation as a concept into educational discourse arising from The Teachers Standards in 2011. This set out a basic framework within which teachers should operate in teaching students and in their personal and professional conduct (Department for Education, 2011). This linked the search for those vulnerable to being radicalised through the teaching of FBV and the statutory duty under the CTSA 2015 to report young people thought at risk. In Panjwanis' (2016) study to better understand Muslim teachers' views of Prevent and FBV, he identified a series of criticisms

which took issue with a government definition of radicalisation as an apparent simple process of ideology and indoctrination but which Panjwani found was seen as comprising a range of 'psychological, socio-economic and religio-political factors' (Panjwani, 2016, p331).

Taylor and Soni (2017) reviewed a series of related articles and summarised that there is no unanimous agreement on the definition of radicalisation. They offered the hypothesis that understanding of the term and the processes involved has developed over time and in response to events. This addresses one of the key tenets of Prevent and the Prevent duty itself, in that teachers are trained and then required to identify those students at risk of being radicalised. No offence may have been committed which the police would traditionally have been interested in, but yet a child or young person raising views which may be seen as non-traditional or extreme would bring them to notice (DfE, 2015). This the authors see as dangerous and limiting freedom of expression, a continual securitisation of educational establishments. Significantly this closes down and makes precarious the space for debate which may challenge extremist ideology or viewpoints (Saeed and Johnston, 2016). It creates an impediment to encourage open discussion on issues surrounding radicalisation, or its causes and appears commonplace with risk-avoidance and an unwillingness to tackle or confront extremist views. This opposition, together with what Saeed and Johnston (2016) identify as a culture of surveillance is disproportionately felt among Muslim students and staff leading to self-censorship and an impact on clubs and societies in higher education settings (Brown and Saeed, 2015).

An area of interest not widely commented upon but highlighted by Revell and Bryan (2016), was the conclusion that teachers not only were now required to deliver FBV but also to be experts in identifying young people at risk of radicalisation for which they would undergo training. The issue of training is not greatly covered by the selected literature. There are references to WRAP (Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent), a 'one-stop shop' of Prevent strategy training delivered to thousands of public sector workers with slight variants if delivered to health, education or policing audiences. Commentators question the appropriateness of WRAP, in its focus on extreme Islamist radicalisation and the incremental effect on Muslims and non-Muslims as well as its effectiveness in spotting extremists (Thomas, 2016; Panjwani, 2016). Training outcomes are measured in recognition of vulnerability and what support looks like rather than a direct correlation between participation in WRAP and extremists identified or referrals made. Bryan and Revell (2021) undertook further research to investigate the way in which school leaders navigate their statutory requirements under the Prevent Duty through the prism of educational leadership styles. They conclude the requirement to promote FBV by government statute ignores the autonomy of school leaders adding tension to the relationship between leader and state authority. Whilst they anticipated resistance to the requirement to deliver FBV they acknowledge enactment and legitimisation of the Prevent agenda as part of school safeguarding practice (Bryan and Revell, 2021).

The literature explores how much of the guidance provided around radicalisation and the Prevent duty, the Teachers Standards and the Prevent Strategy itself, is grounded in the successful delivery of FBV. They argue this will help to identify a vulnerable young person,

disrupt and ultimately mitigate a young person's journey to violent Jihad. Success measures, argue Thornton and Bouhana (2017), remain thin on the ground but yet schools have a vital role to play in a programme which aims to safeguard vulnerable young people, the impact of which, as with radicalisation itself, remains disputed.

2.3 Fundamental British Values

The progression of Prevent has run in parallel with aspects of the Prevent duty within education enshrined by the CTSA 2015 (HM Government, 2015) which have proved equally controversial and generated considerable commentary within the literature identified. This section will review a variety of that analysis and the observations of authors who in the most part stem from a pedagogical background rather than one with a security or terrorism perspective, as is more common within Prevent literature in general.

'Schools and childcare providers can also build pupils' resilience to radicalisation by promoting fundamental British values and enabling them to challenge extremist views. It is important to emphasise that the Prevent duty is not intended to stop pupils debating controversial issues. On the contrary, schools should provide a safe space in which children, young people and staff can understand the risks associated with terrorism...' (DfE 2015, p5)

The literature highlights the legislative path the requirements to teach FBV have followed, most notably since the introduction of the Prevent Strategy 2011 and the associated dialogue raising issue with the policy and its impact on education. This includes teachers trade unions and civil liberty groups which have argued against introduction of FBV within the definition of extremism itself (Revell and Bryan 2018; Panjwani, 2016). Lander argues teaching and the monitoring of students simply made the profession part of the state

apparatus (Lander, 2015) or was in fact the securitising of education by making a relationship between security and education increasingly complex (Davies, 2016). New developments within Prevent were quickly adopted in 2011 by the Department for Education (DfE) issuing advisory guidance through 'The Teachers Standards' (DfE, 2011) that educators must not undermine FBV. Within three years the 'guidance' to support had evolved into the 'instruction' to actively promote FBV. This had specific legislative backing to 'introduce even tougher standards' ensuring schools support FBV and rules to bar individuals involved or linked with extremism from managing or teaching at independent schools. Government argues this would also improve oversight of religious supplementary schools (HM Government, 2013).

Elements of the literature however question the lack of clear definition and clarity of what constitutes FBV, or their relevance (Revell and Bryan 2016; Vincent 2018; Lockley-Scott, 2019). Prevent extending its reach was a theme adopted by Jerome et al., (2019) where they identify how the broader definition of extremism, which includes opposition to FBV meant the Prevent duty and FBV were now intrinsically connected. The impact being, Jerome suggested, was that the teaching profession was being placed under a legal duty with statutory inspection which could result in an unsatisfactory review (Jerome et al, 2019) and the school being placed in special measures. A common theme throughout the literature is the processes by which teachers are being monitored by DfE, Ofsted and the government, the translation of which is felt through the inspection process which was already feared and loathed by many in the sector (O'Donnell, 2015; Lander 2016) .

In a critique of FBV in the classroom, Anna Lockley-Scott (2019) discussed how the role of education had become securitised and should be questioned, not uncommon within the literature, further suggesting this was developed in the wake of the end of multiculturalism. Prime Minister David Cameron believed multiculturalism had encouraged different communities to live separate lives that ran contrary to British values. 'We've even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values' (Cameron, 2011). He called, in a speech at a Munich security conference, for stronger societies and identities with greater muscular liberalism (Cameron, 2011). Community cohesion is a topic picked up by Carol Vincent (2018) when discussing the civic disturbances in Oldham (May 2001), Burnley (June 2001) and Bradford (July 2001) with the recognition by government that multicultural policies had failed and greater social cohesion policies were needed. This had added resonance with the fallout from the Trojan Horse affair in Birmingham where Vincent describes how several schools were accused by government inspectors of being infiltrated by ultra conservative Muslims who sought to introduce a greater Islamic, conservative ethos to the school. This, Vincent and others credit for the expansion of the 'British Values Policy' (Vincent, 2018) of the government with the then Education Secretary Michael Gove promising in Parliament to 'put the promotion of British values at the heart of what every school has to deliver for children' (Hansard, 2014: vol 582, col 266). The response by the government coinciding with the rising media whirlwind only gave further evidence that the British values policies were being primarily and excessively targeted at Muslims. Vincent (2018) references commentators who have also made reference to policy targeting Muslims (e.g. Coppock and McGovern, 2014; Husband and Alam, 2011; Mac an Ghail and Haywood, 2017; Meer, 2010 and Panjwani et al., 2018, to highlight this conclusion. (Vincent, 2018).

In a study examining the acceptance, or otherwise, of the Prevent duty in British schools and colleges by Busher, Choudhury and Thomas (2019) their respondents comprised school staff and Prevent practitioners. The interviewees raised concerns about the stigmatisation of Muslim students as a result of the Prevent duty and increasing the sense of societal division and 'exacerbating more general societal disintegration' (Busher et al., 2019). Concerns raised by interviewees, comprising teachers in a mix of educational settings said it was made increasingly difficult to promote FBV in teaching children from a range of backgrounds, cultures and ethnicities, They highlighted teaching 'values' had always been an aspect of their profession however framing them specifically as 'British' values would, they feared, play into the hands of the extreme right identifying the 'other' as being less British or un-British. In an effort to get around this, respondees to Busher's research discussed how they would refer to school values or universal values instead of FBV regardless of DfE guidance.

Revell and Bryan (2018) argued the Prevent duty together with the active promotion of FBV had transformed the professional role of teachers and specifically in their appraisal (Revell and Bryan, 2018). Despite this being a central tenant of the early 'Teachers Standards' (DfE, 2011), school managements have seen the promotion of FBV as being concerned with students as opposed to appraisal of teachers. This was specifically addressed in Revell and Bryan's (2015) insight into the impact of the duty and CSTA 2015 on the appraisal process of teachers in which they conclude school leaders were unsure how to interpret the 'not to undermine FBV' requirement (DfE 2012b, 14), assisting to generate an air of fear and

ambiguity in their responses (Revell and Bryan, 2016). Vincent (2018) addressed FBV when they examined civic virtue and values teaching in a post-secular world. They conducted 55 interviews within the educational setting highlighting the strong influence religion had on education policy. The views on FBV of respondents differed in the study, from outright strict adherence to less understanding of requirements, the piece noted one response by a school leader who said:

‘I don’t know why you are fussing about... we have laminated all the key words from the British Values document, put them up round the corridors and we are done’
(Quote from respondent, Vincent, 2018. P232).

The literature acknowledges a general acceptance of the Prevent duty but with deep caveats around the impact on students, educators and the relationships between each other. It describes the fear of securitisation of education and teachers becoming an arm of state enforcement or even spies. This brief review of FBV as described in the literature provides criticism of a policy which lacks nuance and whilst obeyed, as it is a legal duty, engenders grave reservations within the teaching profession and leaves the Prevent brand still some way from detoxification.

2.4 Securitisation

Since its first publication, critics of Prevent have raised concerns regarding the relationship between counter terrorism policing and public bodies providing key services and asked to provide police and other government agencies with information about their clients. As early as 2009 Arun Kundnani in his research piece *‘Spooked! How not to prevent violent extremism’*, questioned the role of the educator in providing information to counter

terrorism police regarding the opinions of their students, this he argued would include political and religious views which were not necessarily confined to when a student was at risk of committing a criminal offence (Kundani, 2009).

Securitisation of education as a result of the Prevent duty is widely quoted within the literature with commentators arguing that Prevent has put students and teachers in fear of falling foul of government inspectors or the police should they be heard to make comments which may be viewed as extreme or supporting a jihadi narrative (Kundnani, 2015; Lundie, 2019). This point is taken up by Lynn Davies who argues how, while the Prevent strategy has become entwined with national security policy. Arguing it is wrongly interpreted as draconian or 'Foucauldian surveillance' with a panoptic model of surveillance and it's all-seeing eye, it is not spying in the classroom with teachers part of the security of the state (Davies, 2016, p6). Davies highlights her own experience of attending an Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) briefing on the CTSA 2015 where attendees raised the fears of their students. This was rebutted by the newly issued guidelines to teachers which suggested 'schools should be safe spaces in which children and young people can understand and discuss sensitive topics including terrorism and the extremist ideas that are part of terrorist ideology' (CTSA, 2015, p11). Davies' positive analysis is unusual in the general Prevent duty discourse which is more inclined to equate securitisation with militarisation or a blatant use of teachers as 'state instrument in a liberal democracy' (Lander, 2016, p275). Durodie (2016) recognises the affiliation between security and education has been evident for some time as teachers aware of the risk of inflammatory religious rhetoric have attempted to protect vulnerable students, this association has gained

support within the political spectrum which has translated into government policy over time (Durodie, 2016).

The alternative to securitisation of education is discussed by a number of authors in an attempt to provide government with different options to monitoring and intervention (Thomas, 2016; Vincent, 2018). Jerome and Elwick (2017) suggest that whilst focusing on the individual's vulnerability to extremism and building resistance of a violent narrative, schools are not engaging with key triggers as they see them, factors such as poverty, racism, unemployment or lack of cohesion. This they argue is achievable through an educational response to Prevent, based around political literacy and a better understanding of the discourse within the media to help appreciate the world for the student. The literature however would indicate there has been little encouragement to support this educational or curriculum approach that could help build resilience by the student themselves. This it is argued leaves Prevent leaning towards a securitised agenda with a focus on Muslim youths (Thomas, 2016).

The role of the media is referenced by a number of authors and how they have distorted interpretation of incidents in such a way as to demonise the use of Prevent or indeed use language which unfairly targets Muslims. David Lundie (2019) examined the impact of reporting when a 10 year old boy was alleged to have been spoken with by police without parental consent following a piece of school work where the child had written they lived in a 'terrorist house', when he meant to say terrace. The accompanying moral panic, Lundie said was to have been deliberately distorted and exaggerated as a result of the media coverage.

Yet questions were raised as to the suitability of such reporting by the school authorities under Prevent, how this had been perceived as the child was from a Muslim family and the incident had simply confirmed all the worst fears of those who felt Prevent was seen through a security and surveillance perspective (Lundie, 2019).

The resulting impact on the quality of education may have long term implications, as Farid Panjwani (2016) concluded in his investigation into the views of Muslim teachers on fundamental British values. The teachers themselves felt constrained as the government had, they felt, imposed a security response on the question of how to identify and safeguard those vulnerable to radicalisation. Panjwani argues teachers wanted an educational response to extremism based on academic objectives involving critical analysis. This has been a familiar comment within the literature which recognises the opposing positions of policy makers and educators, with Ofsted inspection monitoring the adherence to a statutory requirement questioned by those administering it within educational settings.

2.5 Suspect Community

Throughout the body of literature, a single group of people is highlighted as being one which is vulnerable to extremism and radicalisation more so than others, those with a Muslim identity. This is hypothesised using the disputed 'conveyor belt model' developed by United States neoconservatives, who advocate conservative ideas and a power through strength mentality (Cavanagh, 2011). The model identifies a process whereby a young person who is groomed and radicalised will eventually move onto terrorism, presupposing

radicalisation always precedes violence (Kundnani, 2012; Heath-Kelly et al., 2019; Jerome et al., 2019). This assumption Thomas (2016) argues, is central to Prevent and was implicit in the 2011 Prevent review which drew up an ill-defined general definition of extremism that placed violent and non-violent extremism together (Thomas, 2016).

There is evidence highlighted by Heath-Kelly (2013) that Prevent and the Prevent duty have viewed young Muslims as 'risky' due to the perceived threat from within their own community and 'at risk' because they are vulnerable to being exploited and groomed by Muslim radicalisers (Thomas, 2016; Heath-Kelly, 2013). There appears to be a view shared by authors that through Prevent the government takes greater interest when Muslim populations and schools are considered (Thomas, 2016; Vincent, 2018).

The counter extremism policies of the state have, argue Coppock and McGovern (2014), given 'legitimacy to unjustifiable regulation and social control of young British Muslims' (Coppock and McGovern, 2014, p252). They discuss in their submission how education bodies are at the forefront of the war on terror. The language used by these authors is emotive, as they set out their concerns around the policies aimed as safeguarding vulnerable young people. The authors remark the disproportionate effect on Muslims and an unstated policy of racial profiling by police and policy makers lead them and others to believe Muslims were the new suspect community (Hillyard 1993, Hickman et al., 2012). The term was coined by Paddy Hillyard's (1993) study into the experiences of the Irish community living in parts of Britain at a time of Irish related terrorism, where an entire community was under suspicion of involvement or collusion in acts of violence. This led to

individuals and communities being identified as 'risky' and the state reacting with a securitisation of that community and the development of legislation which restricted a societal group (O'Donnell, 2015).

There is further acknowledgement in the literature of the perceived disproportionality of the Prevent duty to find a very small fraction of people potentially far down the road of radicalisation that are likely to commit a terrorist act against the actual scale of the threat. Thomas (2016) questions the limited outcomes verses the resulting impact on community cohesion and on individuals subject to Prevent scrutiny and its negative and stigmatising approach (Thomas, 2016).

There is limited reference in the literature to those at risk of being radicalised by extreme right wing ideology, in part this may be due to the limited available data and the protection of information on individuals. This, however, points towards a continued focus on the threat remaining from Islamist extremists who have previously targeted young and vulnerable members from the Islamic faith and those new to the religion. There appears to be a ready assumption that the new suspect community, the enemy within, remains. Elshimi discusses the move away from the narrative established following the September 11th attacks by international terrorism and foreign groups to the threat posed from the home grown bomber (Elshimi, 2017).

2.6 Summary

The Prevent duty embodied in the CTSA 2015 placed a statutory requirement on public bodies to have due regard to those vulnerable to radicalisation, the educational sector has undergone fundamental changes as a result which have not been without controversy. Prevent has been described since its inception as toxic, an anti-Islam policy and a surveillance tool of the state. This short study has reviewed a set of literature which reports the views and concerns of those who have been required to enact the policy. The Prevent duty is a policy whose benefits have been widely disputed with suggested corrosive effects on community cohesion and playing into the hands of the radicalisers.

It is with this backdrop that the literature sought to establish the views from within the education sector, some of which have proved surprising and conflict with so much which has been written about the policy to prevent radical extremism among young people. Concerns were raised that the classroom and teachers were now responsible for their students' attainment but also their radical thoughts and actions, requiring the monitoring and reporting of concerns to the proper authority. This, it was argued, would be using the well worked and recognised practices of safeguarding which were already used to keep students safe from drugs, gangs and neglect (DfE, 2015). The literature however identified a lack of understanding among teachers of radicalisation, in itself a disputed term, together with the debated trajectory of the radicalisation journey.

The literature identified common themes which authors agreed had played a part in the sector's understanding and implementation of the Prevent duty, notably; Radicalisation, Fundamental British Values, Securitisation (of education) and Muslims being a new Suspect

Community. In this short study there has not been space to look in greater detail at aspects of these themes, but it does show the limited discourse surrounding the identification of young people vulnerable to right wing extremism. For the last 17 years of Prevent and 5 years of the Prevent duty much time has been spent identifying Islamist inspired extremism, as it was believed this caused the greatest threat. In 2017/18 referrals to Prevent about right wing extremism had doubled to 18% from the previous year. Security Minister, Ben Wallace said that the Prevent programme was working to identify those vulnerable to all forms of radicalisation and was continually improving which was demonstrated by better referrals (Grierson, 2018). There was also greater focus on right wing extremism following the banning of neo-Nazi group National Action in 2016. Of those right wing referrals 44% of those referrals being provided support through the Channel programme. Channel is a multi-agency approach to protecting those vulnerable from extremism and identifying the most practical assistance. It brings together a range of social, educational, health and police professionals to form a Channel Panel which is chaired by the local authority in which it takes place. It is a key component of the Prevent Strategy and will coordinate Prevent case management (Home Office, 2019).

So far the literature has demonstrated the barriers to implementing a tenet of the government's counter terrorism strategy, which is how teachers have understood and implemented their duty to safeguard young people, and the impact this may have had on the relationships in the classroom and communities beyond. Busher et al., (2019) suggests the introduction of the Prevent duty likely increased public criticism of Prevent, however

the way it was incorporated by schools into business as usual, may well have helped to detoxify the Prevent brand among educational professionals.

There is however missing from the literature analysis on the implications of schools failing to meet the Prevent duty. Whilst the Trojan House affair in Birmingham is the highest profile breach of the duty, there is limited comment on the practical impact on schools and their leaders. The literature recognises the journey Prevent has travelled and how the CTSA 2015 has moved authorities into identifying those vulnerable to extremism rather than looking for supporters of terrorism, this again leaves the question surrounding the understanding of extremism by school leaders and how this influences students. There remains a gap in our understanding of this process which is worthy of further investigation. Lastly the literature is noteworthy for the prominence of its analysis on Islamist based extremism, there appears limited understanding on how schools have addressed the threat of far right ideology in their Prevent duty and the impact on reporting, this is an area likely to generate further discussion as referral rates increase.

The following research will attempt to add to the discussion through a series of semi-structured interviews among a cohort of Dedicated Safeguarding Leads (DSL) with specific responsibility in addition to their teaching role, for safeguarding policy in their school, school leaders and Prevent practitioners. The DSL is the lead point of contact for anyone within the school who has a concern for a child. They will be a senior member of the school staff and are responsible for developing safeguarding training, policy and reporting child protection matters to statutory bodies. The practitioners include police officers from

operational Prevent teams and local authority Prevent coordinators. The research will set out to identify if Prevent's image has led to greater acceptability within the educational setting. The cohort of Prevent partitioners will also help frame the educationalist viewpoint against that of the operational experience when engaged in a referral, the stage at which a teacher may provide details of their concern for a student to the Prevent team. It is six years on from the statutory requirement under the CTSA 2015 being placed on schools and 18 years since the Prevent Strategy was published. In the next chapter of this work, I will review the methodology surrounding the research and analysis undertaken.

3.0 Introduction

The purpose of this research is to understand the views and experiences of a group of educationalists and Prevent practitioners as they meet their obligations under the Prevent Duty. I have structured this thesis around three questions; How has the teaching profession implemented the Prevent Duty? Is there an understanding of radicalisation? Do those delivering the Prevent Duty believe it works?

As such, the methodology of this research is supported by an interpretivist paradigm or basic set of beliefs that guide action (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). The interpretive approach is more focused on meaning and context from the analysis of data as opposed to a positivist approach which recognises only that which can be scientifically verified or logically proved (Anderson, quoted in McGregor, 2019). This chapter will discuss the methodological approach adopted and detail the methods used to collect and analyse the data.

Data collection methods considered for use in this thesis included qualitative and quantitative approaches. A qualitative approach considers the use of observation, interviews, focus groups and listening to the voice of the specialist whose subject is being investigated. Interviews may be constructed using structured or semi structured questions from an individual respondent or a group. Clough and Nutbrown describe data gathered from this approach as 'non data', 'nor numerical in nature', reliant instead on the spoken or recorded word (Clough and Nutbrown 2012). In contrast quantitative research gathers data

translated and expressed in a numerical way. This may include analysis of media coverage, statistical modelling and the use of various databases relevant to the topic (Babbie, 2010 p89).

Due to the restrictions in place by government and the university ethics committee as a result of the coronavirus pandemic in February 2020 the adoption of an appropriate research methodology was reviewed. With social distancing and the unlikelihood of face to face contact with research participants, quantitative methods of data collection needed to be considered. However the review of existing literature had already identified a deficit in available numerical data associated with Prevent participation and results, making analysis more difficult. To undertake a quantitative survey which would provide credible results the study would require a higher number of respondents than may be possible, even using online methods to draw up and distribute. Adopting both approaches in a mixed method approach, using qualitative and quantitative research methods, may provide the best of both methods, the lived experience of respondents, their views and comments along with an element of numerical data collection. Mixed methods research has received considerable academic attention which indicates complexity and disagreement as well as acceptance of its value to research (Denzil and Lincoln, 2011). Authors report mixed methods research has additional complexity with differing definitions of mixed methods depending on what is being mixed and at what stage of the research process the mixing occurs (McGregor, 2019). Hammarbery et al (2015) suggest quantitative research methods are appropriate when factual data are required to answer the research question, opinions, attitudes, views, beliefs. In contrast qualitative methods are used to answer questions about experience, meaning and perspective from the standpoint of the participant

(Hammarberg et al, 2015). This thesis chooses a qualitative approach to achieve its research aim of understanding the adoption of a government policy among a cohort of teachers and practitioners through their views and experiences. To gain that understanding, the breadth of feeling from respondents and to explore themes from the amassed data, it was thought the use of a semi-structured interview would be preferable. It was anticipated this would provide greater confidence in the reported findings through the collection of additional and rich data, additional in the sense answers of participants could be explored. The flexibility of semi-structured interviews enables views to be explored which may not have been considered previously (Bryman, 2016). Nor should the interviewer show any reaction or responses to the contributions. Structured interviews were examined but not chosen as they require participants to answer a series of pre-determined or standardised questions without the ability of myself to probe and explore elements of the response. Ethnographic interviewing was examined but as this is typically concerned with working alongside fieldwork and includes observation in the working environment, as well as interviewing (Mann, 2016) this had to be ruled out due to the time available for research, Covid restrictions in place as well as limitations on access to schools and teachers. The adoption of focus groups was discounted due to Covid restrictions, prohibiting groups of individuals to come together within enclosed spaces. Focus groups may also inhibit participants from contributing depending on the dynamics of its membership, but also the shared experience of potential participants and resulting interaction with others within the group (Gubrium, 2012), was not felt to assist the research question. Having chosen semi-structured interviews, the design of the questions, the size of the cohort to participate in an interview and the online method were then considered.

The research question attempts to understand the adoption of Prevent from within the classroom by those implementing the Prevent duty, whilst providing guidance to colleagues and working with other agencies. Additional depth and context is sought from Prevent practitioners responsible with investigating concerns raised from the classroom. For this reason, participation included those working within schools and colleges who had a specific safeguarding responsibility as a Designated Safeguarding Lead (DSL) with specific responsibility for safeguarding within their school. Prevent has been identified within schools as an aspect of safeguarding and is managed by staff trained in this area. Moffat and Gerard suggests that Prevent is as much a part of teachers' safeguarding work as traditional child abuse concerns referring to an earlier study on the impact of the Prevent duty (Busher et al., 2017, as cited in Moffat and Gerard, 2019).

In the previous section I reviewed the literature which explored the application, effectiveness and legitimacy of the Prevent Duty and how those authors developed their approach and findings. The literature encompassing this review was identified using online Library Search facilities highlighting keywords such as 'education', 'Prevent', 'Prevent Duty', 'schools' and 'counter terrorism'. Results were chronicled in a research journal which enabled coding into particular sections, themes and topics as well as their online locations being documented. Articles identified as providing evidence to this piece were read in full, with a summary analysis added to the research journal providing a resource of 31 articles.

The analysis of the literature identified a number of recurring themes which the authors acknowledged as important to the understanding of the Prevent duty: Radicalisation;

Fundamental British Values (FBV); Securitising (of education) and Suspect Communities (Bryan 2017, Brown and Saeed 2015, Davies 2015, Hickman et al 2011, Jerome et al 2019, Kundnani 2015) were the most common. This provided a route map through the literature, assisting to understand the authors' contribution to the topic through their participants' perspective, or 'emic' as opposed to the 'etic' or outsiders view (Merriam and Tisdell, 2016). Emic and etic are terms originating from the study of linguistics and referred to research that studies cross cultural differences, or in 'etic' where no cross cultural focus exists. The qualitative approach used by the majority of researchers was important to understand what Prevent practitioners knew about the topic and how they saw its implementation in their educational establishment. There appeared limited quantitative analysis apart for data provided by the Home Office used to identify the number of Prevent referrals received by the police. In the early part of the Prevent era such data were difficult to source with academic evaluation limited to data released when public bodies were subject to FOI (Freedom of Information) requests. Attempting to identify Prevent referral data pertinent to the education sector was extremely problematic due to the method by which figures have been reported and the approach adopted by the Home Office in each reporting period which differed. The analysis of such data however provided little in the way of adding to a critical review, nor to provide an indication of what educational professionals or practitioners thought of a policy which had been quoted as a toxic (Kundnani, 2015).

Denzin and Lincoln (2013), when providing observation on the practice of qualitative research, note 'qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them'

(Denzin and Lincoln, 2013, p3). This was the approach used by the majority of academic material referred to in the literature review, with a variety of interviews undertaken with educational professionals with a direct experience of implementing the Prevent duty. This was further enhanced with analysis of how practitioners perceived the policy and its impact, if any, on relations with students and the community. One study which heavily influenced this piece looked at the Prevent Duty in British schools and colleges was Busher, Choudhury and Thomas, (2019) who conducted research, through the use of semi-structured interviews with staff from fourteen schools and Prevent practitioners from eight local authorities, followed by an online survey (n=225). This research provided insight into the views and experiential knowledge, the lived experience, of those delivering the Prevent duty and provided a narrative with depth and richness unavailable from techniques using solely quantitative methods. An online questionnaire was considered as a method of data capture within this study, which could permit distinct areas of questioning linked to knowledge, behaviour, attitudes, attributes and beliefs (Dillman, 1978) of the subjects, but discounted due to the availability of participants to make samples meaningful. Other quantitative methods considered included examination of existing data within the subject space, whilst this may have assisted to build context around the referral process adopted by those implementing the Prevent duty there have been historical issues with the release of suitable data from the Home Office and individual police forces, causing concern over consistent accuracy of statistical analysis over an extended period of time. Whilst this study does provide referral data since the Prevent duty was enacted it does so without further analysis.

3.1 Sampling and Participation

In identifying the participants for this research, it was important to select those with knowledge of the subject area and credibility as a source of information to select an 'authoritative source' (Newby, 2010). I was already familiar with the subject matter and the category of participant required for this research, as an 'insider', i.e. someone part of the community being studied (Gubrium et al, 2012). As such I had access and knowledge of participants within the education community and the Prevent practitioners within policing and the local authorities. Bias as an insider was also considered by myself, mindful of familiarity with participants or professional relationship. Decisions with subject selection was discussed with my supervisor. I avoided use of police devices and emails to contact subjects where possible. I made disclosure to my employer of my actions but retained anonymity for participating subjects. Guidance was provided by my university into the required numbers of research subjects needed. My role as researcher was then to identify and contact a cohort of participants. Differing sampling options were considered. Simple random sampling did not allow for the fact I had personal contact with a number of schools and police officers already and the 'random' selection may not identify these. In addition, the sample required is relatively small and the techniques required to undertake random sampling very complex, given the scale of the possible sample, school teachers and Prevent practitioners in London. Cluster sampling; whilst the participants are selected from systematic and random sampling is again complex and suited more for larger groups.

A method of probabilistic sampling which was identified as suitable for the circumstances, size of participant cohort and time scale was snowball sampling. This is used to identify research participants in more difficult to access groups. With myself as an 'insider' they are able to use their contacts with others to grow the sample size as one participant refers me onto another. This new respondent will be chosen as someone with similar experience and

knowledge, but must still appear credible. This method is also effective when the researcher is familiar, with a good understanding of the research topic and has credibility in the eye of those participating in the research (Newby, 2010). There was also an element of convenience sampling, due to the knowledge and contacts available to me as the researcher. This method does come with reservation and questions of impartiality and credibility (Newby, 2010) however in the circumstances which presented it was able to add to the pool of participants.

3.2 Research Question

For the purpose of this study five question areas were identified which were based on my own understanding, thoughts and background knowledge of the subject. Comparison was made with the themes and analysis from the literature review which assisted to identify the research question (appendix 1). This sought an understanding of the lived experience, to hear the voice of each interviewee all of whom were educational professionals and either senior Designated Safeguarding Lead (DSL) or worked alongside the DSL in a supporting safeguarding role. The questions covered four key areas plus a fifth closing question allowing the interviewee to elaborate on something already mentioned or add a comment on a point not yet referenced. The same five question areas were adopted to seek the views and understanding from Prevent practitioners who will assist DSLs with training but also manage the student referral from a school who has raised a concern. The purpose of the questions needed to help establish the process by which the Prevent duty was interpreted in their establishment and how this was received by the staff, if the policy was universally accepted and if not, how did this manifest itself. To assist the interviewing process probing

questions were also provided to my inventory of questions. This aided with exploring further detail, clarification and explanation (Mann, 2016) or eliciting a response from a participant who may be hesitant in responding due to knowledge or confidence in the topic. In previous dialogue surrounding the Prevent duty the understanding and recognition of radicalisation was an area of extensive debate so it was felt important to explore this with the interviewee. This was an opportunity to examine if the interviewee, as someone trained in the policy delivery, training and analysis believed it would stop a young person from becoming involved in extremism.

This research will look at the five following questions:

- i. Compliance: How is the Prevent Duty applied in the school setting?
- ii. Legitimacy: How have staff responded to the Prevent Duty. Have concerns been raised?
- iii. Radicalisation: Has the Prevent Duty assisted educational professionals in the understanding of radicalisation?
- iv. Effectiveness: Does Prevent stop young people from getting involved in extremism?
- v. Other: Finally would you like to say anything regarding Prevent or Prevent Duty which has not been covered in the previous questions.

3.3 Participants

A cohort of 21 interviewees were identified, 12 educational and 9 Prevent practitioners to participate in semi-structured interviews. Participants were sourced by myself using professional contacts within the local authority, education sector and workplace. The cohort represents a cross-section of schools, primary and secondary, including specialist pupil provision based in London and neighbouring home counties. Prevent practitioners were identified using my professional contacts with permission sought from a senior police officer

within the force concerned for those currently operational officers. In advance each was provided with a participation sheet detailing the nature of the research, confidentiality and ethical considerations, they were also provided with a consent form for their informed written agreement to participate. All respondents were reminded, prior to the commencement of the interview, that information provided was subject to my agreement to confidentiality unless they were to reveal an unlawful act or safeguarding issue placing a person at risk. An anonymised reference number system was devised to enable comments made by respondents to be replicated as part of the analysis. GM, which denoted the initials of myself as researcher was followed by a sequential number, 1, 2, 3 etc (appendix 2). This was not a considered order given to seniority or size of school but only denoted the order in which the interview took place. All educational interviews were concluded before practitioners were then approached. In approaching schools I clarified the requirement to interview senior teachers with experience in either the DSL role or school management. All those who participated confirmed this was the case and had educational experience of between 7 and 30 years, they had also received specific safeguarding training for their specialist DSL role. Prevent Practitioners held experience which varied from Local Authority Prevent practitioner with 10 years' experience to police officers with at least 9 years policing experience and between 3 and 10 years Prevent case management experience.

The process of seeing the world as it is interpreted by the interviewee is a key component of the researcher's skill, making the researcher the primary instrument of data collection and analysis (Merriam and Tisdell, 2016, p15). The process of conducting the interviews using online platforms may have an impact on the ability of the researcher to establish rapport

with their subject. There may also be problems with the communication software or internet connection, which necessitate planning and preparation with testing of the systems before the interview. These additional challenges require the researcher to be patient and allow time for the participant to articulate their thoughts, being conscious of the participants' environment and distractions or disruptions.

3.4 Analysis and coding

Qualitative analysis transforms data into findings, it is not straightforward and is something of a journey. Patton (2002) suggests that no formula exists for such transformation and that the final destination remains unique to the inquirer (Patton (2002) quoted in Mann, 2016). Continuing with metaphors, Seidel (1998) sees qualitative analysis as a symphony based on three notes; noticing, collecting and thinking about interesting things (Seidel (1998) quoted in Mann, 2016). In addition to these descriptions of how the research question is answered, this thesis will also, as the analysis progresses, describe the context around the participant and their unique position or perspective. The interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed using Otter, an online transcription service. Those transcriptions were used for the basis of analysis and to code the response data set. Thematic coding was adopted which links sections of the data or transcriptions by a common theme, allowing indexing into categories and so establishing a framework of thematic ideas (Gibbs, 2007). Vivo coding was further used to highlight significant comments by participants, this was incorporated into the initial analysis and consideration given for inclusion into the analysis of the thesis. A coding research table was drawn up to help identify and interpret patterns in the data, recurring features and observations (appendix 3). Coding was approached as

not just a method to reduce data material, but to take the meaning, thoughts and positions from an evaluation of the data. This was carried out using a manual technique by reading and rereading the data, highlighting relevant material and noting pertinent details on the research table. 'There is something about manipulating qualitative data on paper and writing codes in pencil that give you more control over and ownership of the work' (Saldana, 2009, p. 22). As this immersion into the data progressed the analysis deepened and gradually *saturation* was achieved, meaning new data does not create any new insights (Newby, 2010). During this familiarisation of the interview transcripts checks were made to assess the quality of the data and if responses met the questions posed, noting ambiguous or contradictory statements (Belotto, 2018). Manual coding in this manner was also beneficial of the personal circumstances of the researcher who uses manual and coloured coding to assist understanding in light of an assessment of dyslexia. The coding method must be fit for purpose but also fit for the researcher.

3.5 Ethical Considerations

This research received ethical approval from Canterbury Christ Church University Ethics Committee (appendix 4). There were ethical considerations as this research was being undertaken during the worldwide Covid pandemic of 2020 with severe disruption within the educational sector (Onyeme, 2020). Participants were provided with an information sheet which supplied details of the research being undertaken, its aims and the nature of the research method, namely a one to one semi-structured interview using an online platform (appendix 5). This also advised the subject of their anonymity, confidentiality of the material gathered and data protection considerations under the General Data Protection

Regulation (GDPR). The position and status of myself as the researcher was also made clear to the participant, in that I was a serving police officer working within the Prevent environment. This was repeated prior to the commencement of the interview with a statement regarding confidentiality and anonymity unless a disclosure was made of an unlawful nature or safeguarding of a young person was involved. Once agreement was confirmed each participant was then sent a consent form to review, agree with the terms by signing and returning to me (appendix 6). Due to Covid restrictions all interviews were conducted via online platforms such as Zoom or telephone, recorded and later transcribed for coding and analysis. This method of interview was required by my university ethics committee to ensure compliance with government Covid controls. It should be acknowledged that the use of online interviewing has limitations, in that the interviewer finds it more difficult to gauge body language of the respondent and the use of a pause or silence to encourage the respondent to reflect or consider their answer, proves more problematic and could be interpreted as an internet or connection problem. Using Zoom means the participant may be anywhere, at work, home or elsewhere and distracted. The participant was advised the interview would last up to 50 minutes and they may wish to select a quiet area to enable a candid discussion and to help minimise disruption. The location of interviews varied, between busy offices with colleagues listening, home with children and pets, but mostly included less busy work environments. Interviews were arranged by email or telephone in advance with timing to suit the participant, mostly working hours, 9am to 5pm, however some did prefer weekends and early evenings. At times background noise and disturbance was an issue and made reading the transcription difficult. It was possible to suspend the interview whilst domestic or work matters were dealt with to minimise disruption or allow researcher and participant to refocus. The use of

Zoom enabled the interview to be recorded with the participants consent and transcribed using online platforms. Secondary recording was also made using the 'voice memo' facility for iPhone. This was as a backup and subsequently deleted when primary recording was verified to comply with GDPR principles.

3.6 Thematic Analysis

Thematic analysis is a method of scrutinising qualitative data which requires searching across a data set to identify, analysis and report recurring patterns (Braun and Clark, 2006). It is a way of describing data but also involves understanding the processes of selecting codes and creating themes. Flexibility is a key aspect of this process within a wide range of theoretical and epistemological structures allowing application to a varied range of research questions, designs and sample sizes (Kiger and Varpio, 2020). Braun and Clark (2006) are widely recognised as being instrumental in the development of thematic analysis as a distinct discipline. This has been asserted as an easier introduction to qualitative research and it has been argued it can stand alone as an analytical method and be used as a foundation to other qualitative research methods such as grounded theory (Taylor et al. 2012).

In many interpretivist orientations such as constructivism, thematic analysis can highlight the social cultural and structural contexts that influence individual experiences, enabling the growth of knowledge that is constructed through exchanges between myself as researcher and the research participant revealing the meanings that are socially constructed (Braun

and Clarke, 2006). In addressing this research question I was able to draw on Braun and Clarks six step method of analysis (figure 1.0) which provides a systematic process to travel through the research journey. I have suggested this in a cyclical form as Braun and Clark’s thematic analysis is designed to be recursive, or repetitive, rather than a simple, sequential process. Subsequent steps may prompt the researcher to circle back to earlier stages in light of new data or themes that are worthy of additional investigation (Kiger and Varpio, 2020).




Figure 1.0: Six Steps of Thematic Analysis (Clarke and Braun 2017)

Adopting the six step approach to this research question allowed for the participants from an educational and Practitioner background to offer differing perspectives. This allows the

researcher to then highlight similarities and differences in responses to questions and produce unanticipated insights from the collected data (Braun and King, 2006; King, 2004). Braun and King (2006) however recognise the limitation of thematic analysis and how, the flexibility they argued was a benefit may not be perceived as rigorous in its scrutiny of raw data or is applied too broadly and inconsistently (Braun and King, 2006).

Step 3 'Searching for themes' is a significant aspect of this research piece. Themes may bring meaning and identity to aspects of the data which are recurring and bring together components or fragments of ideas or experiences (Aronson, 1994). Reviewing commentary regarding Prevent policy and the experience of those implementing the duty helped capture repeated concepts on training, referrals to police and adoption of the Prevent duty into the education sector. This was a useful tool to provide detail into the lived experiences of the research participants.

In step 6 'Producing the report' I endeavoured to bring together the themes identified and detail the final analysis. The write up should provide a concise, coherent, logical, non-repetitive and interesting account of the data within and across themes (Braun and Clark, 2006). There is an effort by me to provide the voice of the participants to this research piece. King (2004) suggests that direct quotes from participants are an essential component of the final report and used to aid the understanding of specific points of interpretation and demonstrate the relevance of the themes (King, 2004).

Providing the participant voice is used to give themes emphasis and depth to the following analysis. I was also mindful to establish the fit between respondents' views and my own representation of them within the thesis (Tobin and Begley, 2004).

In the next chapter I introduce analyse of the research data. This will identify themes through the views and expressed experience of participants, educationalists and Prevent practitioners. The chapter will be subdivided into topics based on the interview questions and will provide a narrative on what knowledge is gained, from the acceptance of the Prevent duty to its effectiveness in identifying and supporting those vulnerable to being radicalised or become terrorists.

4.0 Introduction

In the following section I examine the experience of educationalists and Prevent Practitioners interviewed for this thesis. The cohort of educationalists provided an understanding into how the Prevent duty functioned within their school or college. Prevent Practitioners provided an insight into their lived experience of how they saw the Prevent duty translated into the educational setting. Analysis of the resulting discourse was framed around a series of issues: compliance, legitimacy, radicalisation and effectiveness of the Prevent duty. This was developed through my own understanding, thoughts and background knowledge of the subject. Comparison with the themes and analysis from the literature review was then made to arrive at these headings. The following analysis examines these standpoints and endeavours to determine the progress of the Prevent duty in schools since the CTSA 2015. The chapter commences with an overview of thematic analysis and its role within qualitative research.

4.1 Compliance with the Prevent duty

This research set out to understand the position of the Prevent duty within a cohort of London schools educationalists and Practitioners. As addressed in previous chapters research and commentary addresses the contention that Prevent is a disputed and failed policy, identified as a rejected programme by educational professionals. As a result the research questions sought to understand the steps taken within the school environment to comply with a key government objective, integrating Prevent through a statutory duty.

“[...] When the duty first landed I think schools felt put upon and weren't sure how on Earth they were going to weave this into a kind of standard safeguarding approach, it seemed quite alien to them... [...] they were worried about being compliant right in the midst of a crisis if you like.” (GM13)

The crisis of which GM13 referred was the fear that schools could get it wrong and radicalised students not get identified, plus they were under intense scrutiny from government agencies such as Ofsted. The research questions presupposes there are, or would be, issues with compliance of the Prevent duty, in identifying those vulnerable to extremism. Comments made by respondents suggests otherwise, among educationalists at least. Compliance of the Prevent duty was achieved by schools through a range of activities and policies. Educational respondents detailed how school IT systems are able to flag if a young person searched for terms such as 'ISIS', how to make a bomb or Britain First on school provided IT equipment and are able to identify the individual and provide some support (GM06). The use of Prevent risk assessments was referenced which would help identify areas of concern and allow staff to talk through mitigations. This would enable triage of the concern and decide if the DSL or SLT felt it met the referral threshold for Prevent. GM08 highlighted in addition to training, use of an online safeguarding platform to help monitor concerns by staff and a weekly bulletin, they reported being in regular contact with their local authority Prevent coordinator.

The most prominent feature throughout discussions around Prevent duty compliance was training. Educational respondents described their training programmes as mandatory, held at least annually with regular refresher sessions and scrutinised using computer systems. The purpose of such training reinforced the professional responsibility of the Prevent

requirements placed on teachers. Safeguarding training had over a number of years become ingrained in the role of education and schools, reflecting societal changes in how child safety and welfare were fostered. GM01 highlighted how Prevent formed part of their safeguarding policy which had a syllabus of mandatory training and covered a number of topics. All educational respondents were explicit in their resolve that training was the prominent aspect of Prevent within their school and delivered in various formats.

“We train our staff regularly to make sure everyone is aware of what their duties are, what to look out for. Everyone knows the lines of referral. We know who to report to in the local authority and we apply just like any other safeguarding and child protection policies we have, because it’s very much part of child protection and safeguarding here”. (GM10)

Training methods included using internal providers, through the Designated Safeguarding Lead (DSL) whose role it is to coordinate safeguarding of students, or with the local authority, to assist in delivery and expertise. In many schools this would also be supplemented with online materials such as Home Office produced videos. Additional online packages provided to staff would be monitored for compliance which helped with ensuring obligatory training was completed and emphasised the importance of the subject matter. Practitioners agreed training was a fundamental aspect of Prevent duty compliance within schools.

“I think that was the first benchmark of compliance or pretty much everyone put their hand up for it. I don’t think anybody that you know, whether they had objections to Prevent or reservations, they still were very willing to train staff and senior leadership and governors. So there was no issue there”. (GM13)

Delivery of training differed from one school to another, Practitioners explained how they would have attended training previously but there had been a shift away from police

attending. Police attendance and delivery of Prevent was itself controversial as it was undertaken by officers attached to counter terrorism units. Training would gradually be replaced by the local authority being given the principal role for training. GM17 who was involved in Prevent strategy and policy development, described their concern that the police were being used as a training arm of the Home Office. They detailed how numbers of counter terrorism police officers were spending a significant amount of time associated with training and training of education partners. This had exposed a dependency on the use of police to delivery Prevent training.

“I think it just demonstrated through this consultation phase how much of a dependency there was on policing. And my point that I played back to the education sector [...] its very difficult for us to ‘detoxify Prevent’ and to make the case thats it’s not police led when it’s actually police officers doing all the training. [...] we saw very much the status of the Prevent duty as an opportunity for policing to take a step back”. (GM17)

There were reported consequences of this change which, whilst not referenced by educationalists was shared more widely by Practitioners. GM19 highlighted their concern that removing police from the training had an impact on the quality of referrals and opportunities for building trust between educational professionals and the police.

“When I was going into schools and doing training directly I felt like teachers were far more confident in contacting me directly to get advice. And since then, since the training was taken out of our hands I feel the referrals which were coming in weren’t necessarily within the remit [...] which could have been dealt with in different ways. [...] I feel like our job is the sort of, being the face of Prevent and demystifying counter terrorism policing. It showed we were part of the safeguarding process”. (GM19)

Whilst this study was concerned with Prevent among educational professionals, Prevent training was reported to have extended to school support staff, cleaners and caretakers,

seemingly unlike other educational or safeguarding issues which received less attention. This perhaps demonstrated that the Prevent duty had developed and evolved to become embedded in school culture, rather than simply a policy adoption. Training had been developed with the concept that anyone could identify someone vulnerable to radicalisation, not just the teaching staff. This amplified the safeguarding narrative which was promoted and unlike other areas such as knife crime or gang membership was not simply an awareness training exercise but a duty for all.

It was argued that the Prevent duty and safeguarding went hand in hand in the school setting. Indeed one respondent, a Prevent lead in a large London college said 'it's part and parcel of being a teacher now'(GM02). However following Prevents introduction GM02 described 'a lot more hostility towards it (Prevent) and concerns how it would impact on the teacher student relationship, which they had not heard mentioned by staff for quite some time (GM02). Prevent within a safeguarding framework was a common theme among respondents which was repeatedly referenced and linked to training and inherent within the safeguarding policies of the school.

"I think the safeguarding culture has changed hugely in the last few years. We're working together to safeguard children and keeping children safe in education [...] our culture is very much share it." (GM05).

"[...] it's really very much part of child protection and safeguarding here." (GM10).

One respondent from a large London college disclosed what appeared to be a rare occurrence, when a teacher was made aware of a concern for a child and waited until the next day before advising the DSL, this was in contravention of the school's policy on

safeguarding. When asked to explain the delay the teacher said they had battled and struggled with the idea of reporting the child and this had been due to their political views, they didn't believe in the Prevent duty. The school instigated additional training for all staff, reaffirming policy and reporting pathways, they acknowledged this had been a genuine Prevent concern with the matter being dealt with internally before the child becoming a Prevent referral (GM03). This was an infrequent, if honest, occurrence reported among respondents. Rather than dealing with dissent or allegations that the Prevent duty would impact the teacher and student relationship, it was an integral and fundamental aspect of safeguarding.

Training can be seen as the acceptable face of Prevent and the duty, but at some stage, as one Practitioner said, they are going to have to make a referral. Schools' successful adoption of training to fulfil the Prevent duty is not universally accepted, the duty required more to be done despite some entrenched views within the education sector. A Prevent Practitioner said how they understood it was not so straightforward.

“There are schools that don't get it and see it as an imposition, see it as spying not safeguarding and so there's a very, very mixed bag of views [...] I think that's probably down to the level of engagement Practitioners within those schools have rather than a litmus test of the efficiency of the statutory duty itself”. (GM14)

The Practitioner respondents indicated they see the Prevent duty as more than completing training once or twice a year by a school, they are more keen to see knowledge and understanding translated into referrals of those who may be vulnerable. Attendance and participation in the Channel programme was also part of the duty. Channel is the multi-

agency group of professionals from social services, local authority, police, NHS and others, tasked with delivering a support programme for those identified as vulnerable to radicalisation. But yet there is a realisation among those who receive the referral of the difficulties teachers and DSLs face. They indicate how a teacher may see a referral as criminalising a child which may deter a referral ever happening in the first place or worse as a result put them on a police system and accuse them of being a terrorist. This, they argue is a confidence issue and knowledge of the legislation, how Prevents works.

“I think there is a reluctance to refer individuals [...] because of the fear it’s counter terrorism, we’re going to ruin this child’s life [...] they don’t want to give that kid a criminal record. But it’s operated in the pre-criminal space. I don’t think the message really hits home”. (GM15)

Respondents indicated they rarely made a formal referral to Prevent authorities, whilst some could not remember the last time they had made a referral. The general understanding among the educational cohort indicated raising a concern, that a child may be vulnerable to radicalisation, was an infrequent occurrence within their school. The level of educational referrals was referenced by Practitioners on a number of occasions with suggestions as to why this may be low in some areas more than others. Several suggested if a school was not within a Home Office identified ‘Prevent priority area’ they would miss out on additional activity, project funding or support of dedicated Prevent staff within their local authority (Home Office, 2021).

“there is a little bit of a postcode lottery around the depth of understanding of engagement with schools and Prevent within London, which is based on the current prioritisation model that the Homeland Security Group, Office for Security and Counter Terrorism as was known, delivers. [...] I think you’ll find there is a great deal of difference between a school which sits within a Prevent priority area [...] and a school that doesn’t. [...] I think you’d see a very different understanding, engagement, interaction from school to local authority [...] that’s a problem, because as we know extremism doesn’t respect those invisible boundaries”. (GM14)

GM21 also described the benefits for schools in their area as being a 'priority area', one which received additional funding from the Government for Prevent activities and projects:

"I'm in the fortunate position here in [area removed] of having four staff plus me. We're at the high end of staffing levels as you appreciate. So my education officer leads on engagement with schools and education settings across the borough and we run programmes to support those schools [...] we have a big anti-Prevent lobby in [area removed] but that is not reflected in the schools who engage with us [...] because we've built up some trust over a long period of time by working with them". (GM21)

Practitioners also suggested demographics play a role in referral consideration. GM15 argued when talking about terrorism most people in their area think about the Muslim community, ISIS and Al Qaeda. But from their experience the reality of terrorism was quite different and from 2017 there had been a significant increase in extreme right wing activity.

"They don't think about white, supremacist Nazi tattoos and that kind of thing. So I think sometimes this mental block with referrals is as much as well, it's just a white kid, he's not going to be a terrorist. [...] I think that's the trouble with [geographical area omitted] it doesn't have a particularly large Muslim community, so any kind of individual who is quite devout or conservative in their religion is probably more inclined to get referred to Prevent [...] yet most of the work we get on [geographical area omitted] over the last four or five years has been extreme right wing". (GM15)

It was noted that a number of respondents said how other pressing safeguarding concerns were covered in addition to Prevent, gang behaviour being one topical and recurring issue.

"[...] And perhaps as I say, gang radicalisation [...] vulnerable people being targeted by criminal gangs etc. So those issues I think had to be linked in with Prevent to make it, to make people realise the duty was a little broader than they first had in mind." (GM12).

Embedding Prevent messaging around other vulnerabilities such as gangs and grooming was felt to be a useful way to normalise Prevent as part of other risk taking behaviours and received greater acceptance by educationalists generally. DSL's felt this more appropriate and staff were more receptive. Prevent remained the dominant safeguarding issue however which would be emphasised with policy, processes and monitoring by the educational establishment concerned, through Ofsted oversight. Among the cohort of practitioners some view the multi-agency relationship more positively, agreeing that together with the local authority, they are doing a good job in spreading the importance of Prevent, demonstrating a positive buy-in. Non-compliance is more about not understanding the risk posed more than a definite act of refusal to engage.

Less discussed among educational respondents but a feature of practitioners comments was the referral itself. The duty requires responsible authorities to have due regard for those vulnerable to extremism (Department for Education, 2015). Practitioners detail how concerns raised through the referral process can be 'at the shallow end of the spectrum' (GM14) or underdeveloped, in terms of the information available or background to the concern. This, they argue, is evidence of schools getting hold of the issue at an early stage and that they are engaged with the Prevent process. But yet practitioners report a lack of understanding of what it means when the educationalists submit a referral, what the role of the school is and what should be referred. As a statutory referral it will receive Prevent attention and could lead to a home visit by police, something which causes fear and resistance from those raising the concern. Police actions were a recurring theme within the comments by Practitioners and how they work to reassure teachers of their considered and

proportionate response to referrals. GM17 believes there is still a reticence for teachers to report concerns believing this is a part of the conceptual baggage that is associated with Prevent, they don't want to get someone into trouble or that, "it's going to necessitate counter terrorism officers swooping down on their classroom and actually making arrests" (GM17). But they believed this was the perceived reality, the concern of teachers, in making a referral. This was further exacerbated, they felt, by widespread reporting following a 10 year old student making a comment in a classroom saying they lived in a terrorist house. The comment was reported and dealt with by police and social services. It later transpired that the child reported saying they lived in a terraced house. Prevent had not been involved and the reporting by media criticised by the Lancashire PCC who stressed there had been other worrying issues raised by the child's class work not simply a reference to a terraced house and the matter had not been treated as terrorism related (BBC, 2016).

The educational respondents described the methods they use to be compliant with the Prevent duty. They provided a range of systems, policies and duties which are undertaken and incorporated into their safeguarding policies. Training was reported as a significant means of compliance. Educational respondents reported confidence in their procedures in meeting the requirements of the Prevent duty and identifying concerns. Practitioners acknowledged the extensive training being delivered in schools. Police Practitioners were no longer involved in delivering this activity and had raised concerns as to its impact and the quality of referrals. Practitioners doubt that vulnerability to radicalisation is fully understood which can impact on Prevent duty compliance, specifically referrals.

4.2 Legitimacy of the Prevent duty

This topic sought to understand the acceptance of the Prevent duty. It gave respondents an opportunity to explain how this area of government policy was given recognition and enacted in schools. Legitimacy of the Prevent duty appeared from the examined research literature to be a theme which educationalists struggled with in the early stages of the duty. This was a problem for those tasked with ensuring delivery of training and assuring buy in from the education profession. Practitioners relied on acceptance to encourage engagement which would generate referrals of those students thought vulnerable to radicalisation. Rousseau in his work *Social Contract* (1762) argued ‘an essential characteristic of legitimacy was the consent of the parties involved and this remains an essential element of legitimacy’ (Rousseau cited in Mawby, 2013, p. 57). Consent was a term absent in delivery of the Prevent ‘duty’, as this was a statutory requirement placed on responsible authorities under the CTSA 2015. To deviate from the required values enshrined in the CTSA 2015 may be construed as nonconformity by Ofsted who monitor compliance within schools and may necessitate an inspection. As a result I ask are the agents for the Prevent duty, DSL’s and school leaders adopting a moral stance or being pragmatic in what they felt was achievable? Included in participant considerations were the statutory duty, training and the media reporting around Prevent and the CTSA 2015. The discussion throughout this question provided a pathway through implementation and eventual acceptance of Prevent within the educational sector. Strong feelings and views persisted for some time and still do.

“When it came out originally it frightened people because we were talking about abuse and we were talking about different issues in safeguarding and suddenly you’ve got this counter terrorism act [...] So schools jumped on it, were afraid of not being compliant”. (GM05)

“There’ll be staff who question the kind of signs of radicalisation that might be identified by the Prevent team to look out for and we’ve had staff kind of raise the idea that some communities are disproportionately affected by Prevent and that it’s an unfair policy. But what we’ve said to stop this is, you know, it’s a safeguarding responsibility, its your legal duty as of 2015, this isn’t a discussion, it’s a direction and we must safeguard young people like we would anything else”(GM06).

This reaction was mixed with a realisation that some young people were certainly vulnerable to a whole host of influences, including extremism. But as GM13, a local authority practitioner observed:

“Certainly following on from the National Union of Teachers pushback there was a question whether this was, this new duty, was a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Did it need to be a kind of duty that was indefinite? Could it not just be something that maybe teachers needed to be aware of, in the immediate time of DAESH or ISIS? Could they not just raised a concern about a child as they ordinarily would without having the duty behind it? And I think that is where the contention lay originally and then teachers and governors did question the legitimacy”. (GM13)

Pushback from the teachers’ trade unions appeared in the literature to be a significant factor in how the Prevent duty was discussed within education when launched in 2015. It was felt to lack emphasis on racist and far right extremism, but the teachers' union, the NASUWT said it was aware of its own responsibility to ensure its members were aware of the duty placed on them but did not instigate any sort of ban on participation (NASUWT, 2017). Educational respondents in this thesis did not provide a commentary of unions who appeared engaged in Prevent duty training or messaging the faults of the duty. This was observed as being a greater concern to the practitioner. Educational establishments engaged with their trades union and staff association representatives as part of the implementation process of the Prevent duty and found this to be a helpful tool for implementing the duty (GM01).

The State's right to impose a statutory duty on the education sector was a topic taken up by Prevent practitioners as they attempted to put the policy into action and ensure acceptance in schools. They were aware of concerns from teachers not simply with the training or the referral process, but the reported 'chilling effect' Prevent was having on free speech in the classroom (Busher et al. 2020).

"[...] But for teachers, like history teachers in particular, for those sorts of teachers that like to debate and want to question world events and the reasons and the whys, I think they in particular found things quite difficult to question the legitimacy (of Prevent), worried about the longer terms effects of the duty" (GM13).

"[...] one of the biggest concerns for schools is that Prevent could potentially be impacting on that environment of free speech, discussion and healthy debate. I think it's important that they [schools] understand the balance between promoting healthy debate and having views from across the spectrum being a good thing, but making sure that it is healthy and not having a negative impact on any student within the school. Which is where obviously, if it's Prevent related, we would be looking at making referrals and dealing with it". (GM18)

Practitioners detailed the impression left from visits to schools in 2015 which were in predominantly Muslim areas with a majority of Muslim students and staff. When engagement activities such as assemblies and talks were introduced as Prevent they found a reluctance to engage from students and staff.

"When they found out it was Prevent there was almost like, you're spying on the Muslim community, it's not fair, it's not balanced, all you do is look at Islam as terrorists. [...] during the engagement through the methodology we adopted with that did break down a lot of barriers". (GM15)

Educationalists reported initial confusion along with a perception this was an additional burden on the education profession. A link to counter terrorism was said to frighten people.

Practitioners felt this initially led to over reporting of possible Prevent concerns whilst the criteria or threshold was unclear, but reporting was encouraged leaving staff anxious that they were victimising certain communities. By reporting, educational respondents felt it would lead to further stigma reinforcing the narrative that Prevent was relevant for some communities more than others. It was not difficult to see media reporting at the time of the introduction of the Prevent duty adding to anxieties. The British security service MI5 provided information that 600 British extremists were believed in Syria to join ISIS/ISIL, reports focused on males with African or Arabic ancestry (Parker, 2015; Anderson, 2016).

The reported resistance felt by educational professionals indicate that the duty was perceived to focus on certain groups within society. "People were really concerned about the focus on Muslim based fundamentalism and Prevent particularly focused on Islam" (GM10). Home Office Prevent training came in for particular criticism, "There is no diversity in this. It is actually pigeonholing, stereotyping [...] if you are training stereotypes your perceptions will stereotype as well" (GM05).

Something occurred to transform the Prevent duty from a rejected policy with accusations of racial bias to acceptance and active engagement. This may in part be explained by the increasing requirements placed on teachers, "[...] it's not just about teaching kids anymore, they are defacto safeguarding experts" (GM17). "[...] two or three years on and [Prevent] just embeds within the school system and everyone became used to it." (GM06).

Since 2015 there has been a further raft of legislation and guidance for schools to be cognisant in their regard to safeguarding responsibilities. This helped place in context the views from educationalists that Prevent and the language of safeguarding had become commonplace. Safeguarding duties for schools had been set out in section 175 of the Education Act 2002, the Education (Independent Schools Standards) Regulations 2014 and the Non-Maintained Special Schools (England) Regulations 2015 (DfE, 2015). Schools were also required to follow guidance set out in Working Together to Safeguard Children (DfE, 2018). The DfE provided advice for schools on how to prevent and respond to reports of sexual violence and harassment between children (DfE, 2021). Also in 2021 the DfE updated their guidance for schools in Keeping Children Safe in Education (KCSIE) (DfE 2019, 2020, 2021). Schools were asked to identify and report child sexual exploitation (CSE), female genital mutilation (FGM), trafficking and modern slavery, domestic violence, abuse and neglect, gang membership exploitation (which became known as 'county lines') and peer on peer knife crime (NSPCC, 2021). Whilst educationists with DSL responsibilities provided an indication they were mindful of other harms to young people they acknowledged that the majority of formal and mandatory training provided to colleagues was on Prevent. They could point to the range of materials available for training, regular updates provided by DfE and dedicated police and local authority officials with responsibility for engaging with them around Prevent, unlike most if not all other types of harm they also had responsibility for.

The cohort of educationalists spoken with believe the level of training provided is proportionate to the perceived threat and see no contradiction in comparison with other safeguarding issues. An example of such an issue being Female Genital Mutilation (FGM).

FGM has a legal requirement that police are informed if known cases of FGM are identified in the course of a teacher's professional work (Sec 5B (11), FGM Act 2003 as amended by the Serious Crime Act 2015). There was also a keenness within schools to provide an opportunity for students to engage in Prevent issues which may be more controversial by using Personal, Social and Health Education (PSHE).

There was therefore little surprise in comments indicating that DSLs had become more comfortable with the aspect of Prevent which was safeguarding. The language being used described a process of working within a multi-agency team comprising of the local authority, health and police, with which they were familiar. Educational respondents could see how Prevent was very similar to other forms of safeguarding, with case conferences and a multi-agency supporting approach though Channel. The challenge remained however, that despite teachers coming into contact with people from other safeguarding agencies, Prevent was still perceived as being police led. This was despite the Channel panel which was established to manage Prevent cases, being chaired by the local authority (HM Government, 2020). This remains a contested feature of Prevent and argued by those who support Prevent or demand its abolition as instrumental to its existence. But yet as GM16 disclosed, the reason police pulled back from direct training of teachers was to provide separation between police and the education sector. This gap being addressed by Prevent teams within the local authority or increased use of online material rather than delivery by any government body. Practitioners argued the quality of referrals were affected by the distance created between them and schools and they remained uncertain if radicalisation was fully understood. For their part, educationalists were keen to embrace the

safeguarding language of the Prevent duty as the terrorism landscape evolved with an increased threat from other forms not framed within violent Islamist extremism.

Respondents detailed how training has evolved to better reflect a changing landscape of threat particularly from extreme right wing terrorism (McCallum, 2021) which has made the adoption of Prevent and the referral system more palatable to many and an easier 'sell' to teaching colleagues.

"I really feel there has been a shift from looking at fundamentalism or extremism purely on a Muslim. From a Muslim point of view I feel there has been a real shift on to white nationalism and white supremacy fundamentalism"(GM10).

"So they don't see it as anything separate. And they don't see it, as many anti-Prevent people will say, as spying or as targeting particular communities. They've seen it for what it's supposed to be which is a wider safeguarding responsibility and that if someone is vulnerable or potentially vulnerable they say as a way of accessing support" (GM21).

The shift referenced by the educational respondent above is also highlighted by Prevent practitioners through the reported increase in referrals with extreme right-wing ideology. This increase is corroborated with Home Office figures demonstrating there has been a swing in the nature of referrals. In 2019/2020 there were 6,287 referrals to Prevent from all sources. The education sector made the highest number of referrals with 1,950 or 31%. 697 cases were referred to the Channel programme, of which 302 or 43% of cases were referred due to right wing concerns followed by Islamist related radicalisation of 210 or 30%. 127 or 18% came under a Mixed, Unclear or Unstable ideology and 58 or 8% were related to other radicalisation concerns (Home Office, 2020).

The assertion that Prevent is now perceived as a policy that does not target a single community has agreement by participants in this research and led to greater discussion within school safeguarding. This openness has not translated into a significant increase in referrals from among the cohort involved in this research. The hypothesis suggests a greater use of existing support networks by DSLs and school leaders. This was achieved by dialogue within the local authority, internal school triage of cases and discussion with Prevent practitioners out of the formal Channel programme. Practitioners shared their frustration and felt educationalists were reporting concerns at a very early stage or not at all, as GM20 commented, 'I get the sense that some of them feel that they've done it because they have to, because of the Prevent duty and the obligation for them to refer vulnerable individuals' (GM20). The knowledge DSLs and school leaders accumulated through their safeguarding responsibilities was shown as extensive, wide ranging and complex. Practitioner GM21 argued the Home Office would tell them to do lots of work in schools who have made lots of referrals, however they suggest:

"My argument is no, we don't because they understand the process and they understand radicalisation which is why they are making referrals. It's why schools that have never made a referral in its whole history that we probably need to be working with because they clearly don't understand the issues. [...] if it's a fee paying school and a prestigious school, they may see making a referral retruns a negative reflection on the school, possibly which is why they might make any safeguarding referral". (GM21)

There is a strong contention rather than 'not understanding radicalisation' they have developed a keen sense of what is important, critical and likely to result in harm of a child, they understand safeguarding and see radicalisation as an extension of that duty. The result is greater internal discussion and triage of concerns by schools, cautiousness and being mindful of the consequences, as they see it, of a referral to police. Participants in this

research have indicated the Prevent duty is accepted and enacted. Schools see the policy as a legitimate safeguarding policy, one of many they must be mindful of. Consent of the parties involved remains unclear depending on your role within the Prevent duty. The police service also recognise Prevent as a strand of safeguarding within its policy, so this concept may also help embed the idea when working in partnership with others.

4.3 Radicalisation

The literature review in Chapter 2 identified how radicalisation was in itself a disputed term with commentators questioning its interpretation and definition. It seemed to be a blunt tool which lacked nuance. Within the Prevent Strategy the UK government defined extremism as:

‘The vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces’ (UK Government, 2011).

The concept of using ‘radicalisation’ as a method of identifying students vulnerable to becoming terrorists was formally introduced to the educational profession in 2011 through the DfE (Department for Education) Teachers Standards (Department for Education, 2011), before the CTSA 2015 was enacted. This was not something new by the time the statutory duty came into legislation but the importance of the educator’s role was given greater prominence in identifying who may be at risk and vulnerable to the consequences of radicalisation.

This area of the research question sought to establish how the respondents who had become familiar with the Prevent duty over the last six years (2015-2021) viewed their understanding of radicalisation. Could a direct link be made between the Prevent duty in schools and awareness of the process by which a person comes to support terrorism? A definition was not provided to the respondent as part of the question posed.

“[...] staff are more knowledgeable. They can identify signs and they are more alert. [...] it's like educating them, they've got more training and now we make sure that they are all up date with all the training”. (GM11)

“Even academics can't agree what terrorism is or what radicalisation is, how could you expect anybody in society to do that [...] I think when you set it out in relation to a safeguarding framework then people do get it [...] but you probably get more pushback about something like fundamental British values than you would radicalisation. (GM14)

Educational respondents commented how they supposed their staff now, they argued, had a much better understanding of what radicalisation was than a number of years ago. There was no reference by respondents of the DfE Teachers Standards which preceded the Prevent duty.

“Yes, absolutely, [Prevent] needed to be defined and set out a little better [...] I think understanding what situations can lead people to be radicalised was just not understood at all. I think that's different now, over the years it's gotten much better. [...] And I think with that in mind that training has been incredibly eye opening that actually you know, please don't just respond to stereotypes, look at the bigger picture”. (GM12).

Practitioner GM13 said a better understanding (in schools) was attributed to training exercises such as mock Channel panels.

“These were looking at fictional case studies to provide an idea what the process of radicalisation looks like, as well as the path that may take and the influences that can propel them into the CT space [...] they just think, oh they're (students) are saying a few things but they don't understand the journey and how it can escalate very quickly” (GM13).

The use of training was also detailed by Practitioner GM21 who was involved in the delivery of Prevent training in schools in their area and linked this to building trust among school heads and DSLs. Local delivery and perspective were key to the training success:

“We’re much more professional ourselves, we have a much better understanding. [...] we’ve gone away from that awful WRAP training with the Home Office videos, we don’t use them at all. Now we deliver bespoke training, bespoke to the audience with a local perspective backed by academic research and case studies” (GM21).

The Prevent duty was given credit for this evolving situation as it had allowed teachers to discuss the drivers and the vulnerability factors to look out for among their students.

Training also, it was reported, had a direct impact on the ability to examine what it meant for teachers, their responsibilities and requirements under the duty itself, how the school dealt with concerns and the referral process.

“So the Prevent duty enables conversations to happen about radicalisation and all kinds of radicalisation. And that training enables conversations to be had with young people both informally and more formally as part of elements of the curriculum”. (GM04)

The theme of enabling conversations continued by Practitioners, but recognising the terms being used could be confusing, unhelpful and were contested with little empirical basis for their use.

“So I think there is, certainly with the roll out of the Prevent duty, there is now space for the education sector to become more involved in developing their understanding of what radicalisation means and their role withing it”. (GM17)

Not all respondents were in agreement. Whilst it could be possible to assess teachers on their understanding following a specific training session with a knowledge check at the conclusion, one school leader noted:

“Whether it really tests their understanding of radicalisation is hard to say, I think its tests that it (radicalisation) is not just one thing or doesn’t just apply to one particular group and could be in different contexts, whether it really tests how radicalisation might occur, I think is more difficult”. (GM01).

Events played a part of the dialogue, with terrorist acts and arrests being reported in the UK on a steady basis between 2015 and 2021. Together with focused training these events could be the catalyst for a wider discussion around vulnerabilities and safeguarding.

“[...] there is only so much you can do in an hour and 30 minute training session, but actually, you now, hearing about the Manchester bombing and hearing about, you know, the London Bridge attacks and then when they do these biographies in the press, you know these people who were involved and where they grew up and previous incidents they were involved in, I think helps staff [...] so they see the bigger picture”. (GM06).

Respondents also reported a widening of the scope for discussion around radicalisation to encompass other forms of extremism, which may sit outside Prevents remit. When discussing Prevent with their colleagues and especially students, teachers provided examples from a range of ideologies, not simply ISIS/AQ inspired. Violent right-wing attacks had become increasingly common, reported and discussed. Within the UK the narrative around Brexit (the separation of the UK from the European Union following a referendum) had been especially polarised with increased reports of hate crime against those perceived to be non-British (Stop Hate UK, 2017). This atmosphere, together with the then US President Trump styled populism on social media provided an unwholesome environment. Dialogue was peppered with outbreaks of violence such as the widely

reported death of a protester at a Charlottesville anti-right wing rally in the US (BBC, 2017). This culminated in high profile deaths of African Americans by US police, leading to new political and campaigning groups such as Black Lives Matter (Mohdin, 2021). This added to the debate around radicalisation, what it meant and who could or could not be incorporated within its definition.

“We had some members of staff who were victims of hate crime, who were wearing hijabs and you know, were kind of verbally attacked by a passer-by, Brexit, I think, also lead to an emergence of far right extremism. All of it together, I think has helped people understand that Prevent and radicalisation isn’t only about Islam, DIASH and ISIS area, its about anyone who presents with kind of extremist views. That includes the far right” (GM06).

“We’ve done a fair bit of work around the Black Lives Matter and Trump and you know, the kind of acceptance of ideology and stuff that had brought. [...] that’s quite sensitive, you know, the George Floyd stuff with kids, some kids have got some real opinions on that as well. [...] I was joking with my head teacher, like, God, that’s nearly a safeguarding issue, you know, it’s come to something isn’t it, when you’ve got a world leader [Donald Trump] who, you know, having his icon on your teams [class] profile is a safeguarding issue” (GM08).

Cutting through the dialogue was however a clear focus around safeguarding of young people. The evolving and acceptance of the Prevent duty within the educational environment had moved from, it was argued, securitisation of the classroom to the wellbeing of the child, addressing risk from wherever it originated. “[...] one thing they are clear on is that they have a safeguarding responsibility, regardless of what their own moral status is on Prevent [...] that’s the common safeguarding bit of it’s kind of non-negotiable”. (GM06).

Whilst framed around safeguarding the concern for the children within their care was a recurrent theme by respondents within the education sector. This was acknowledged by

Practitioners who understood the process of making a referral of concern for a student was considered and could be difficult. The referrer was mindful of the possible impact to the student and their relationship with a teacher and the school. This had less to do with their understanding of radicalisation and more to do with not wanting to get a student into trouble by reporting them to the police. The educational relationship and its impact has been an underreported aspect of the Prevent duty and requires further examination.

GM16, a Prevent Practitioner noted:

“[...] they’re concerned for their students, you’ve got to remember at the end of the day they’ve seen them from the age of 11 to 15, they’re almost part of the family aren’t they. So they do develop that relationship with an individual and I think sometimes they may feel that they’re going against their student, they’re going against their child. Sometimes teachers think this is going to be with them for the rest of their life and it’s going to get them into trouble”. (GM16)

Perhaps radicalisation is too difficult a concept to understand within a safeguarding context. But yet referrals from the education sector make up over one third of all referrals, followed by police and the local authority. Respondents told me their understanding, and that of their team’s, of radicalisation was good and had improved since the CTSA 2015. It had been an aspect of their training delivery and often referenced with the school environment. The pathways which a person may follow that eventually leads to radicalisation and possible terrorism was less clearly demonstrated by educationalists. Practitioners argued the understanding among the education sector was lacking as a result which had an impact of the quality and detail of the referral. They cited past cases when the referral was regarding a minor comment or action by a young pupil, an overreaction as they saw it or something more contentious which was not referred at all for fear of criminalising a child.

All respondents were familiar with radicalisation, however interpretation and definition differed. Since 2015 that knowledge and familiarisation has increased, events have intervened which have required a broader examination of what radicalisation is and who is at risk. Prevent duty compliance is acknowledged as integral to safeguarding within schools “regardless of what their own moral status is on Prevent. [...] That’s the common safeguarding bit of it, it’s kind of non-negotiable”. (GM06)

4.4 Effectiveness

Previous questions enabled respondents to detail how the Prevent duty was implemented. The question of effectiveness sought to understand if those responsible for implementation, training and referrals believe the Prevent duty stopped radicalisation. This appeared to be the most difficult aspect of the Prevent duty to answer. The majority of respondents qualified their answers by indicating yes, it did work but with exceptions or no, it did not but success was too difficult to quantify. GM14, an experienced Practitioner, detailed how they had seen Prevent interventions work and change lives, with some of those young people go on to help stop others be manipulated and exploited, but they also recognised its limitations.

“Has it been completely effective? No, of course it hasn’t. You know, there’s still people slipping through the net. Some have slipped through the net because they are identified and offered support and the support doesn’t work or is disregarded. [...] I don’t think you can throw a safeguarding strategy under the bus because it hasn’t been able to catch all.” (GM14)

Like so much of Prevent implementation and understanding, identified through the literature review, there were nuances and caveats attached to the success of the Prevent

duty. The complexity of the radicalisation process and how it may present itself was acknowledged by all respondents, teachers and practitioners as being challenging. But there was consensus of the rise in complicated cases. These were individuals thought to be at risk from radicalisation, but this was one of a host of vulnerabilities needing to be addressed.

“It’s quite difficult to give a yes, no answer, I’d have to say yeah, I’m not basing it on one example, but you know there are more than one example of ways in which we’ve followed through the Prevent duty into Channel as well, I would say yes”. (GM01)

“It’s a really difficult question to answer because Prevent is a massively grey area. There is nothing black and white about Prevent. [...] We’re dealing with a lot of hypotheticals and we’re dealing with a lot of subjective opinions on a person’s circumstances. And it’s hard to say what that individual would go on to do even if they go on Prevent or Channel and they have an intervention”. (GM18)

The Prevent duty and its associated work was described as ‘a mechanism that identifies the person’ (susceptible to radicalisation) by DSL GM02. There was recognition however of the limits of the Prevent policy. Whilst lives were changed by interventions, effectiveness and success had been difficult to measure and teachers and practitioners were left wondering had it really worked.

“I think it stops them or potentially stops going too far down the route of violent extremism. It’s a mechanism [...] to in actual fact deal with it [...] Whether it stops them or not, I would say possibly not. It really highlights to people there is a potential issue. [...] And I think I’d be slightly naïve to think that, you know, a couple of meetings with them is likely to change what may well have been quite a considerable period of time in which they’ve been radicalised and also how deep rooted”. (GM02)

“I think we’ve only got to look at things like with the rise in ISIS and a number of, I think it was 500 plus in the end, young people that were prevented from travelling to a war zone”. (GM17)

If a person has a determination to get involved in radicalisation the majority of respondents felt their intervention may have limited, if any, impact on the outcome. However, this was caveated with the view that certain elements of the strategy may help people identified as being on the cusp of radicalisation at least. Respondents discussed how interventions such as mentoring for young people or allowing space for questioning and exploring views was beneficial (GM04). Issues such as mental health, diagnosis and support, were a particular concern, these were complex issues which required professional attention and needed to be unpacked and understood. The ability to identify those at risk was a recurring theme within the education sector which some felt much more comfortable dealing with than others. This was also influenced by the relationship and the experience of the DSL or senior leader dealing, with partners in social services or the police. Respondents detailed how they felt more comfortable when dealing with customary or traditional safeguarding issues in their school. They explained if a threshold was not reached and a referral discontinued or not progressed, they were confident to challenge social services much more readily. This was in contrast with a Prevent referral and not being clear where the threshold for development lay.

“I think some of the things that I would challenge in relation to general safeguarding are quite clear to see. Whereas I think some of the stuff in relation to Prevent, it’s probably not as obvious in terms of what you would challenge or what evidence you could give to support that challenge”. (GM04)

Whilst the Prevent duty was seen as a mechanism to pick up issues and act as a possible deterrent to those targeting or grooming the vulnerable, there were concerns. Some respondents suspected that those same people simply went underground, they acted more covertly and advised those they may be influencing to do the same. “There will be others

who will have made the decision that this is what they're going to do and their reason behind it". (GM05). But when spoken with they say all the right things, offering 'disguised compliance', making the work of the DSL more difficult in establishing grounds for referral and questioning the benefit Prevent may offer (GM05). The voluntary nature of Prevent and how it may offer support to those referred, within the non-criminal space, where no terrorism offence has been identified, has been seen by some as a hindrance to others key to Prevents acceptance.

"After the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris we had a student make a comment saying they deserved it and they had it coming for what they had published. And so we met the family and reported it to Prevent [...] and now that student is not presenting in that way anymore. Now, whether he's not presenting in that way at school only and still holds those views personally, and that might be beyond the school's remit. [...] through that education and collaborative working with (the child's) home we're hopeful, that these kids are one the right path and they choose a more positive path for themselves". (GM06)

Further issue was raised when the outcomes of referrals were unknown, this may have been more common among those which did not meet the threshold for the Channel programme. Meaning once the referral had been received and triaged by police, no CT issues were identified and the case closed. A number of respondents reported frustration that following a referral no information was forthcoming from social services or the police. It was reliant on those who had previously made a Prevent referral, and were familiar with the processes involved to actively seek feedback. This they argued would equip them better to identify vulnerabilities and students on a journey of radicalisation. GM01, a senior school leader, emphasised their role in ensuring they knew what was happening with concerns they had raised and being proactive in speaking to police and others involved, they were clear "Ultimately we are taking about a young person who was within our care, we want to know

what the outcome is, otherwise we don't learn what we can improve or do differently next time". (GM01)

"I can't say the Prevent strategy stops them from doing it (involvement in extremism). [...] just like you put ingredients in a bowl that makes a cake, I can't say that this, as a standalone, is responsible for not letting a young person follow an extremist path, but it will certainly and it has the building blocks in order to pick up someone who might be going down the path in order to help them make better choices". (GM07)

GM17, a Prevent practitioner, spoke about the metrics of success and the difficulty in establishing what effectiveness looked like. Using the analogy of the fire service installing smoke alarms they asked how many fires had that prevented? We don't know, they replied, because the fire had not taken place, adding:

"[...] should that be seen as you know, should you stop doing the activity? Or are there activities actually, that we culturally have to acknowledge that are, that feel like the right thing to do, but we can't necessarily evidence the success of them". (GM17)

The apparent measure able to be counted was the number of Prevent referrals and Channel cases, but data was not readily available nor disclosed by the Home Office until 2019. This does not provide a measure of effectiveness, however discussion among Practitioners talked about the risk that preventing extremism was turning into a volume business with success measured in the number of referrals, 'because we can measure it, it becomes the only measure' (GM17). The concern raised being Prevent and its success could not be measured in such a linear way, how could it show the terrorists that were never created?

"This is a big question for Prevent, how do you monitor something that hasn't happened as a result of your activities? And that's always going to be impossible to answer I suppose". (GM21)

There was no clear theme identified from the dialogue with educationalists and Practitioners in regard to any statistical analysis of success or one which was recognised as validating their views and experiences. The variation and contrast in experience was notable, whether a DSL had made a single referral compared with those within the education sector who had been caught up in a terrorism investigation following a referral. Some of this may be accounted for by geographical and demographical differences, an inner city location compared to a more rural one for example. But as I have seen in previous sections the training provided has been similar, regardless of area and the support provided by local authority and police Prevent teams the same. This may pose a question regarding resources, should the Prevent duty be put into areas where it is needed more? Would this lead to allegations however of targeting some communities more than others and disproportionality of policing response. The available data provided by the Home Office detailing the level of Prevent referrals has greatly improved since 2019 but greater transparency in the breakdown of those figures is needed.

4.5 Additional Comments

The final question provided an opportunity for the respondent to reference any other area of concern. This was provided to the respondent to enable a particular aspect of the Prevent duty, not previously discussed, to be highlighted. This gave a further opportunity for a personal reflection as opposed to the more formal examination of the Prevent duty within the educational setting.

Views expressed varied considerably with some common recognition expressed which suggested a profession that sees safeguarding students as a key, if not *the* most important task. There was criticism too of the way Prevent had evolved since 2015 and the emphasis placed on teachers to bring it all together. Whilst Practitioners suggested they would encourage greater involvement with partners in education and more proactivity from the sector in identifying those at risk.

The view remained that Prevent was reactive to events. Ongoing support for practitioners within the educational safeguarding setting persisted as neither consistent or current. The ability of events across the world to gain a response from young people left educationalists attempting to understand the risk posed. Social media played a part in spreading extreme messaging and left those in Prevent struggling to identify ways to keep their students safe with GM01 feeling they were fighting to keep up.

“[...] If I think about the challenges we face with social media and different types of communication, I think we’re tackling those based on what we’re seeing in front of us, rather than feeling we’re ahead of the game or have been given more recent guidance” (GM01).

Prevent training, respondents observed, with yearly courses and refreshers made the preventing extremism narrative routine and seen within a ‘business as usual’ standpoint. This view presented a risk and a request for greater current and topical training with increased support for those managing and identifying young people vulnerable to radicalisation. Other safeguarding topics were taking precedence, knife crime for example.

“[...] We’re far more engaged with our local police at the moment and are working in partnership with other schools and with the borough more widely around those concerns, than we are around radicalisation”(GM01).

The introduction of the Prevent duty was remembered by many respondents within education who had been in teaching at the time and described the way it was introduced as blunt. However this was also recognised as becoming embedded within safeguarding over the proceeding years. Described as a way of life for schools and teachers there was reassurance it was “[...] a useful tool and very clear for teachers [...]. Whenever we’ve made a referral, I think it’s been dealt with proportionally, sympathetically and unthreatening” (GM02).

There appeared agreement that the implementation of the Prevent Duty remained an evolving process with schools identifying partnerships among other agencies and schools. Respondents suggested how they would fill the void of information and innovation from Prevent governmental bodies by developing their own local groups to share safeguarding best practice and training and seek advice from within their local networks.

A noteworthy conversation started with the respondent (GM07) posing their own question, whether Prevent disproportionately disadvantages some subgroups in society? To which GM07 answered no, however this person did also question how Prevent was executed as opposed to how it was understood.

“[...] if you look at referrals and the vast majority of referrals around Islamic concerns and then the vast majority of those referrals are not being escalated to Channel panel. [...] one could look at the data and say, okay, well you know 100,000 cases

were referred to Prevent around Islamist extremism, only 10% of those cases were seen as valid enough to be heard at Channel. So the other 90% of cases, what happened there? [...] were they targeted because they were Muslim? Or is it work, they are being watched more closely because they are Muslim. [...] So when you see a large proportion of cases that aren't taken up by Channel and so they don't meet the threshold, but you're still getting all these referrals? I guess one could ask why those referrals coming in with such a disproportionate breakdown?" (GM06)

Home Office figures showed there were 6,287 Prevent referrals in the 12 months to 31 March 2020, of which 697 met the threshold to be adopted by Channel. Channel panels 'determine the extent of an individual's vulnerability to radicalisation and whether a tailored package of support is necessary and proportionate to address the vulnerabilities' (Home Office, 2020). There is no published matrix which incorporates this into a form of risk register, it is subjective to the particular panel. Of those 697 which met the threshold, 302 (43%) were related to right wing radicalisation and 210 (30%) were referred for Islamist related radicalisation. 1,928 (31%) of referrals originated from the education sector in that year (Home Office, 2020).

The availability of figures relating to Prevent, its referral data and source of referrals has proved problematic (Figure 2.0). Much of the available data, up to 2017, on Prevent referrals has only been released through Freedom of Information (FOI) requests and been limited in detail. Data provided by the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) under FOI was not officially published government statistics. There was realisation that the lack of information surrounding Prevent was impacting public trust and confidence. Chief Constable Simon Cole, NPCC lead for Prevent, welcomed the publication of Prevent figures in 2017 saying 'transparency is essential' (NPCC, 2017). He believed that effectiveness of Prevent would be improved with greater support from the public, police and public sector workers like education, 'who we are asking to help safeguard vulnerable people from

radicalisation' (NPCC 2017). The data which was provided by the Home Office since has come with a caveat about its quality and reliability (Home Office 2020). Figure 2.0 provides details of available data and is notable for the gaps in information. There has been an absence of Government figures to provide a regular and accurate account of Prevent and Channel referrals. The data is a compilation of UK police forces and local authority submissions and reliant on a common data standard which remains unpublished.

Figure 2.0 Home Office Prevent Referral Data.

Year	Total Prevent Referrals	Total Referrals from Education Sector	Education Sector Referrals adopted by Channel	Total Referrals adopted by Channel programme	Type of Radicalisation: Right Wing	Type of Radicalisation: Islamist
March 2020	6,287	1,928	227	697	302	210
March 2019	5,738	1,887	114*	561	254	210
March 2018	7,318	2,462	*/*	1,314	427	662
March*- 2017	6,093	1,976	*/*	1,146	271	760
March 2016	7,631	2,539	*/*	1,072	189	264
March** 2015	3,994	1,319	*/*	*/*	*/*	*/*

Source: Home Office Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme. England and Wales

Notes:

* Figure relates to Right Wing only, no details provided on other radicalisation types.

** National Police Chiefs Council (2015)

*- Experimental Statistics: Due to the provisional nature of this dataset, these statistics have been designated as Experimental Statistics. It was acknowledged that there was a need for greater consistency in recording referrals across the regions. Work has been undertaken to improve this. (Home Office, 2018)

/ Unavailable/Undisclosed

The sentiment around the notion of a suspect community is certainly not new and referenced in the literature section of this essay. Who that community is and who is the greater suspect also generated further discussion among those who believed Prevent had exaggerated the threat.

“[...] it almost feels like the Prevent agenda has had an impact or almost like an impact on lots of people who felt aggrieved about Muslim fundamentalism and then it's kind of tilted the whole thing on its head. [...] Awareness has been raised about the perceived threat that isn't really there. You know it's heightened everyone's awareness of a threat, but I think is exaggerated. [...] it's also the kind of Prevent mentality has perhaps created because it's created a worry and a concern and a hysteria and people have a perceived threat [...] if you look at it sensibly is not so much there. It's a very rare occurrence”. (GM10)

The education sector standing in for the role of other agencies concerned with safeguarding was a strong theme among respondents. Pressure on public and social services funding and resources had resulted in significant delays in referrals for specialist support such as mental health, learning development and ASD (autism spectrum disorder). This left the schools supporting vulnerable young people until diagnosis and treatment commenced, which could be months or even years.

“[...] I think in an effort to tick a box and I think it's just another requirement that's been put onto schools. And I think that is because those other agencies have disappeared into the ether. [...] So the duties all come onto schools, Prevent is very much like that”. (GM12)

An awareness that change was necessary to Prevent and the Prevent duty was raised by GM13 and not uncommon among Practitioners. They suggested referral guidance required adjustment and that a tier system for triage be introduced, this they explained, was a result

of the unforeseen consequences of the duty. The education sector was encouraged to make referrals where they had identified concerns, however Practitioners shared their concern the ages of those children being referred were increasingly young and they questioned whether this was proportionate. They described how possible ill-informed comments by a child in class could lead to a Prevent referral. "I know the new Channel drop guidance says there is no threshold in terms of age or concern to refer to Prevent, but in my personal opinion and a professional one I would put forward to anyone is, that can't be right" (GM13). The appropriate age at which a young person is suitable for Prevent engagement is discussed by respondents and with varying views, this includes discussion on criminal responsibility, at the age of 10 years old. But yet safeguarding has been addressed at all ages. This theme was continued by GM18, a police practitioner, who expressed frustration that they dealt with a high proportion of people who don't or shouldn't be sat within the Prevent space. They provided the example of mental health vulnerabilities along with referrals from schools. They offered the suggestion that Prevent may not be the best place to deal with those vulnerabilities which have not been judged to have any counter terrorism context.

A return to an emphasis on relationship building and engagement was also one aspect of change GM15 argued was called for, which they described as 'cross pollination within the multi-agency environment' (GM15). Relationships build trust they said which would ultimately result in the right referrals being received and developed. GM19 was also keen to see Practitioners more involved in school training and have regular contact with teachers by going into schools, to break down barriers and be available to handle questions about

concerns or possible referrals. GM19 felt it made a greater difference to DSLs' and schools when they knew who, from the police, would be coming in to speak to a student or their family, understanding it would be sensitively and professionally handled.

More visible leadership from within the education sector, GM17 was keen to see more senior people within the DfE, head teachers and trusts stepping up and be more vocal about Prevent as opposed to leaving it to the police and others "optics and perceptions really do play a huge role in this space" (GM17). The need for other partner organisations to support the Prevent process was emphasised by practitioners. Proactivity in identifying and dealing with an individual's vulnerability was something which GM20 thought lacking by a range of organisations they had experience of. Too much was left for practitioners to deal with, for example, to identify referral pathways with supporting agencies, such as health, education or social services.

There was no shortage of views on Prevent, the Prevent duty and how it had impacted on respondents' respective responsibilities. Providing an open forum at the end of the questioning session helped facilitate some strong opinions on the working relationships across the Prevent scene. As the duty had been embedded and become part and parcel of safeguarding, respondents spoke about their frustrations of the policy and how they interpreted each other's responsibilities. I held a unique perspective as an 'insider' to Prevent and was able to acknowledge the challenges experienced by practitioners and understand the safeguarding pressure experienced by those within the education sector. Recognising potential bias for the same reason of being an insider, I was careful to offer as wide a voice as possible to respondents. For some this was a cathartic exercise and the first

time they were able to give an honest and frank opinion about Prevent outside official confines.

In the last chapter I provide a culmination of views, commentary and analysis from respondents, I will provide a series of conclusions and address how this thesis has responded to the research questions. It will identify the key themes identified through the dialogue with educational professionals and Prevent practitioners and compare this with the existing literature on the subject. The chapter will end with me summarising their experience of this research exercise both as an insider and a qualitative researcher.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

This study set out to examine the adoption of the Prevent duty within the educational sector and explore the lived experiences of a group familiar with its requirements. It posed a set of questions to educationists and Prevent practitioners on the implementation of one strand of the governments' counter terrorism policy, CONTEST, to better understand its influence. I used my insider status to gather a group of 21 respondents which included school leaders, designated safeguarding leads, with specific responsibility within schools for children's welfare, and Prevent practitioners working within a local authority or police environment. The range of experience and understanding of the participants, some only new to Prevent, others with many years of practical involvement provided an authentic dialogue with which this thesis was grounded. The geographical base of participants also played a part in this analysis when the experience of referrals was explored. There was a marked difference in how the risk of radicalisation of young people was interpreted within schools with a less ethnically diverse student population. The research showed safeguarding was still a major consideration and priority, Prevent training was mandatory and comprehensive however the experience of educationalists suggested some areas had less to worry about than others. I was able to acquire a large volume of data which was transcribed into a rich data set of views, opinions and shared experience. The following chapter will set out what was shared and its application to the research question.

Taking previous academic analysis as its starting point this study sought to review where the Prevent journey had reached and compare findings with recent studies in a similar area.

Prevent and the area of academic and therefore evidence based research is relatively new,

it has attracted considerable attention since its publication in 2006 from commentators interested in counter terrorism, safeguarding and human rights. What was notable from the previous dialogue following the introduction of Prevent as a counter terrorism strategy, was the location of published material. Increasingly this appeared in educational journals as opposed to those which focused on terrorism, no less ferocious in its interrogation but still significant. For me as researcher of this thesis, this indicated a growing concern among the education community surrounding the Prevent policy and its requirements. Later the introduction of the Prevent duty, a statutory requirement on bodies including the police, education sector, local authority and health, in 2015 saw an exponential rise in commentary to evaluate Prevent's impact. The literature review in chapter 2 provides an analysis which includes some of the major contributors to Prevent commentary and found views highlighting the impact on certain communities which were affected more than others. Prevent was referred to as a security policy which would have a chilling effect in Britain's classrooms and would result in the criminalisation of young people for their views and thoughts, which their school was required to report to the authorities. But the literature started to note a thawing of the Prevent permafrost in education, with researchers reporting changes in adoption and language. The language used to explain Prevent responsibilities has always been important, as the literature shows, from securitisation to safeguarding the presentation of Prevent now appears softened and unambiguous. 'It's about safeguarding' as the actor in the early versions of the WRAP Home Office funded video presentation said (Home Office, 2011). There are a number of the studies which this thesis found significant in the development of its own research question and I was keen to see if the results could be replicated. Limitations of this study have been discussed in previous chapters, namely its size and insider status of myself as researcher, however the

rich data set assists to reveal the complexities of the respondents' experience. This has been instrumental in establishing a comparison with notable previous works.

The experience from the education sector respondents demonstrates how Prevent has been legitimised and normalised into school safeguarding policies and practice. The terminology used to describe the referral, review and reporting mechanisms adopted mirror those of other safeguarding concerns within schools. Educationalists disclosed it provided reassurance to their profession who have accepted Prevent and the Prevent duty as part and parcel of school life. This has been an important element of Prevent and could be seen as justification for introducing a statutory requirement in 2015. But yet participation for those referred to Prevent and the Channel programme remains voluntary and rests in the 'pre-criminal space'. Those contradictions did provide commentary especially among Prevent practitioners charged with the management of referral cases suggesting it made their role more difficult. I return to this area later in the chapter when discussing the possible impact of the government's Prevent review chaired by David Shawcross.

Schools have developed an extensive programme of Prevent training which runs throughout the academic year and extends beyond the teaching staff to include everyone within the school. This, respondents argued, was a key component of their Prevent compliance in meeting the requirements of the duty. Prevent practitioners have become less involved in this training. Greater use of online materials provided by the Home Office have reduced interaction between Prevent practitioners and teachers. This reduction has led to

allegations by Prevent practitioners of insufficient understanding within the educational setting of Prevent and the management of risk regarding radicalisation.

An essential aspect of the Prevent duty is to raise a concern regarding someone who may be vulnerable to radicalisation. Prevent practitioners believed there is still a reticence for teachers to report a student or colleague. Views persisted this would instigate police actions which would be disproportionate and end with a student or staff member being subject to police investigation or worse, arrest. It was notable how educational professionals addressed this area. I identified how compliance was seen as completing Prevent training and making a referral was not a regular consideration. Making a referral was more likely determined by the existence of local relationships the school had with Prevent practitioners. Regular engagement between either local authority Prevent teams and to a lesser extent police, was a key factor is the school having the trust and confidence in raising a concern. Where this existed schools were more likely to make a referral and have reassurance in how it would be managed. This left the question of what was happening to non-reported concerns? Self-triage appeared the answer, when schools assessed and dealt with the concern without reference to Prevent police or local authority staff. In addition individual educational establishments indicated they did not have anything to report. Prevent respondents did link compliance and the status of the referral with whether a school was within a priority or non-priority funded local authority area. The priority areas provided greater resources, staffing and projects targeted at supporting establishments. The Home Office 'will continue to identify priority areas for prevent related

activity' (Home Office, 2021), however they do not provide a criteria how this status is achieved.

The legitimacy of the Prevent duty was an area the existing literature suggested educational respondents might have struggled with. It was therefore interesting in this thesis to explore how this was now positioned and views were sought from research participants. The right of the State to impose legal requirements on its citizens is not new nor unexpected following momentous events. Publication of the Prevent Strategy came out of a major terrorist attack on the London transport network in July 2005. This study sought the views of respondents on the consent of those required to implement the duty within schools and asked was legitimacy given by the educational sector from a moral or pragmatic standpoint? Themes which developed centred on the perceived targeting of the duty on Muslim communities, this had led to elements of disengagement among teachers. The questioning of Prevent's legitimacy by educationalists was a further cause of alienation with the policy and resulted in accusations of attempting to shut down free speech, discussion and healthy debate. Prevent practitioners found their opportunities for engagement reduced and their role within counter terrorism frightening to people. This estranged relationship experienced by some in policing led to schools preferring to turn to local authority Prevent teams for a multi-agency response instead of policing. Prevent's status within policing remains a difficult concept for educationalists. Despite efforts to widen the gap between police and education with changes to delivery of training and establishment of local authority Prevent education officers, the fear of arrest and criminalisation upon referral persists.

Does the Prevent duty work, is it effective? This question was posed to enable respondents to give a personal as well as a professional view, should they wish. In the majority of responses, respondents believed the Prevent duty and its aims did work, but when asked if it would stop someone, a committed extremist, from going on to commit a terrorist act, there was greater uncertainty. There was an acceptance, among the education cohort with greater experience of the Prevent duty, that what they see of a student in the classroom may not be what that student looks like outside. Practitioners agreed you could not understand fully the life choices and risks a young person was faced with. Disguised compliance was not just a tactic of parents and carers who appear to co-operate with professionals in order to avoid scrutiny of professionals (Reder, 1993).

Among the cohort of respondents most, over 80%, had made few if any referrals to Prevent following concerns being raised about a student. Yet they acknowledged the importance of the Prevent training provided two or three times a year to staff and others within the school. There was no acknowledgement of the possible contradiction of the considerable resources placed into fulfilling the Prevent duty contrasting with the level of referrals submitted to police or local authority Prevent teams. The remaining 20% emphasised how they understood the role of radicalisation, had seen examples of where it had resulted in students going on to commit terrorist acts. They felt making referrals to police or local authority Prevent teams was necessary and part and parcel of safeguarding, it was now part and parcel of being in education.

There are key considerations in understanding the limitations of this research. These are: the size of cohort interviewed, 21 in total; the selection of respondents participating; and the restrictions on me due to the Covid pandemic. The absence of data on Prevent referrals from any sector, but especially education, has been the cause of some issues. Government data, the only holder of such figures, is limited to headline numbers and the granular, detailed analysis is harder to identify. The absence of information surrounding Prevent was recognised as impacting trust and confidence in the policy and acknowledged by the National Police Chiefs Council lead for Prevent Chief Constable Simon Cole. The essential transparency he spoke about in 2017 in regard to available data is only now becoming available with the fullest figures yet for 2020 published. Whilst the intention of this thesis was to seek opinion from practitioners the absence of data and the actual figures surrounding referrals to Prevent within the educational sector is problematic and needs further examination. Despite the general narrative of a sceptical public and those with a vested interest in Prevent, acceptance and normalisation would, in the view of respondents, appear to be here to stay. This sentiment could also be extended to the host of other risk and safeguarding issues schools are required to have regard for including youth violence, county lines grooming, gangs and exploitation (National Youth Agency, 2021).

Practitioners acknowledge many of the schools they work with do make a referral at an early stage of a concern being raised within the school. This, they report, has led to referrals being underdeveloped or at the lower end of a risk spectrum.

The rise of right wing extremism issues in recent years has provided the education setting with the opportunity to highlight the Prevent duty as a policy which is not solely attributed to a single community or religious group. Prevent has been seen by a number of educational respondents as a policy which has targeted Muslims. The rise in right wing concerns have made Prevent's adoption in schools more acceptable. Prevent practitioners also reported an increase in conversations with teachers regarding concerns for those they may traditionally not have seen at risk from radicalisation, white males from suburban, middle class families.

Respondents among schools feel their understanding of radicalisation has been improved since 2015. This they report to being due to training and the experience of dealing with referrals alongside Prevent practitioners. When first introduced the Prevent duty caused some panic in reporting concerns which has subsequently been more measured in recent years. This was in part due to not fully understanding the requirements of the duty at first or wishing to ensure compliance and report to police or the local authority Prevent teams. The journey from raising a concern to making a Prevent referral is varied and differs from school to school, dependent on the confidence in the DSL their relationship with the local authority Children's Services or Prevent coordinator, few actually reported engagement directly with police. Consequences of this means a referral may not reach police for additional scrutiny leaving potential for risk. Data accuracy of Home Office Prevent figures may also be affected as CTPHQ (Counter Terrorism Police Head Quarters) are required to provide referral data submitted by Counter Terrorism Police who receive referrals from schools and others (Home Office, 2021).

What is the future of Prevent and the Prevent duty on schools and colleges? The government has established, after considerable delay, an Independent Review of Prevent, chaired by William Shawcross. This review sought evidence from civil society and will make recommendations on improvements to Prevent in December 2021 (HM Government, 2021). This in itself has been controversial with comments attributed to Shawcross allegedly demonstrating his unsuitability. Human rights groups boycotted the review accusing Shawcross of Islamophobia when he was attributed to have said, 'Europe and Islam is one of the greatest, most terrifying problems of our future' (Dearden, 2021). The role of the independent reviewer is to evaluate the Prevent Strategy, seek evidence from the public and practitioners and deliver a report to Parliament on his findings and conclusions (HM Government, 2019). Many are closely watching the conclusion of this review which may have a major impact on its further acceptance and implementation, even the name itself, which has proved a lightning rod for commentary is an aspect which may change (Busher et al, 2019, Kundnani, 2009, 2012, 2015).

But despite 17 years of Prevent and six of the Prevent Duty the threat, we are told, remains and is here to stay. In his annual threat update MI5 Director General Ken McCallum said,

'This threat has some challenging characteristics: a high prevalence of teenagers, including young teenagers where the authorities' response clearly has to blend child protection with protecting communities' (McCallum, 2021).

Respondents to this research were mixed in their view on what direction Prevent would be going next. Whilst the cohort saw the Prevent duty as embedded with safeguarding

there was no agreed view on effectiveness. This may be a problem for the future as Prevent continues to be absorbed within a wider safeguarding approach, the effectiveness of a targeted support by specialist officers from police and local authority side-lined for greater self-triage. The anti-Prevent lobby which some made reference to is still present and actively promoting their message, highlighting Prevent failures and discrediting a policy which they still persist in calling failed and targeting only one section of the community with a Muslim heritage. Prevent practitioners are more accepting of possible name change to the policy, which may result from the Prevent review. Other changes may be more fundamental. An issue which police Prevent practitioners raised was the voluntary nature of compliance of referral subjects to Prevent and Channel, this would see a major development in the Prevent Strategy. If changed this could have the impact of forcing subjects to engage, it could also have the result that those within education, already sceptical about Prevent's value, decline to refer in the first place.

Prevent and the process to identify extremism and radicalisation is complicated and multifaceted. The methods involved in training and supporting those with a responsibility to deliver the Prevent duty have attempted to professionalise a specific aspect of safeguarding and counter terrorism. Prevent has been accepted by most within education as an understandable response to the threat of radicalisation but has received significant criticism for the way it has been implemented and not welcomed by all. Gauging the success of the Prevent duty remains disputed with no clear agreement of what success looks like. This thesis set out to answer if the Prevent duty had been adopted by the education sector. I spoke to a cohort of educationalists and Prevent practitioners to understand their

experiences and views. This has demonstrated the complexity in understanding and implementation of the duty is still present. The variations in how a referral for a child of concern are made and dealt with differ depending on the area you live and school you attend. Changes in the future may further be made which could alienate the very people Prevent is there to support. Even with an alteration to the name of Prevent, the fundamentals of safeguarding and counter terrorism remain but is still reliant on the trust and confidence of its partners in education.

This thesis has looked at a small cohort of respondents and I acknowledge this is not a truly representative sample of the entire education system of London or those engaged at Prevent practitioners, this was not the intention of the work. I do hope it adds to the considerable dialogue surrounding Prevent as a safeguarding tool and one used to identify young people on the journey of radicalisation, regardless at what point they have reached. There is a need for more research into how educationalists are delivering the Prevent Duty in schools, what support they need and for practitioners to understand what works in acceptance and adoption of Prevent.

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1. How is the Prevent Duty applied in the school/colleges you have worked with and what steps are you aware have been taken by the school/college to assure **compliance**?

(Prompts)

What does the Duty mean to those schools you have knowledge of?

Referral procedure, how is this followed and complied with by staff?

Actions following non-compliance by you?

Training (new staff and refresher for all staff) – taken part?

2. Have any concerns been raised by the schools/college you have had contact with about the Prevent policy or its **legitimacy**?

(Prompts)

Been asked not to speak on Prevent to staff?

Rejected or ignored the policy?

Not said anything and embraced the policy and implementation in the school/college

Developed communication strategy for staff with police?

3. Has the Prevent Duty assisted staff you have worked with in schools/colleges in **understanding radicalisation** and has this changed over recent years?

(Prompts)

Do you feel they know what radicalisation is at present

Is there disagreement or misunderstanding what radicalisation is

Has there been a change in staffs understanding since 2015

4. **Effectiveness**; Does the Prevent Duty as it has been adopted by schools/colleges stop young people from getting involved in extremism? Can you give an example of when this has worked or not worked and the response from staff, parents or students?

(Prompts)

Clarify what your experience of Prevent has been

Making Prevent a statutory obligation since 2015, has this impact on your views or its success

5. **Additional Comments**: Is there anything else you would like to say about Prevent , the Prevent Duty or your experience of it? Or anything I may not have covered?

Anonymised Participant Role Identification

Participant	Role	
GM01	Education-DSL-SLT	
GM02	Education-DSL-SLT	Role Key:
GM03	Education-DSL	Education: Teacher
GM04	Education-DSL	DSL: Dedicated Safeguarding Lead
GM05	Education-DSL-SLT	SLT: Senior school leader
GM06	Education-DSL-SLT	Practitioner: Non-educational professional with a working experience of Prevent and Prevent case management
GM07	Education-DSL	LA: Local Authority (Prevent team)
GM08	Education-DSL	POL: Police Officer (Prevent team)
GM09	Education-SLT	
GM10	Education-DSL	
GM11	Education-DSL	
GM12	Education-DSL	
GM13	Practitioner-LA	
GM14	Practitioner-LA	
GM05	Practitioner-POL	
GM16	Practitioner-POL	
GM17	Practitioner	
GM18	Practitioner-POL	
GM19	Practitioner-POL	
GM20	Practitioner-POL	
GM21	Practitioner - LA	

Appendix 3: Coding Table

MSc Analysis and Code Research Table

Participant	Role	Pre-existing question based topic				Significance	
		Compliance	Legitimacy	Radicalisation	Effectiveness		Commentary
GM001	Education-DSL-SLT						
GM002	Education-DSL-SLT						
GM003	Education-DSL						
GM004	Education-DSL						
GM005	Education-DSL-SLT						
GM006	Education-DSL-SLT						
GM007	Education-DSL						
GM008	Education-DSL						
GM009	Education-SLT						
GM010	Education-DSL						
GM011	Education-DSL						
GM012	Education-DSL						
GM013	Practitioner-LA						
GM014	Practitioner-LA						
GM015	Practitioner-POL						
GM016	Practitioner-POL						
GM017	Practitioner						
GM018	Practitioner-POL						
GM019	Practitioner-POL						
GM020	Practitioner-POL						
GM021	Practitioner-LA						
Role Key: Education: Teacher DSL: Dedicated Safeguarding Lead SLT: Senior school leader Practitioner: Non-educational professional with a working experience of Prevent and Prevent case management LA: Local Authority (Prevent team) POL: Police Officer (Prevent team)		Code: Concern within profession Prevent Training Mandatory Safeguarding reference Online monitoring (compliance) Referral of concern School staff receive training Non compliance Engagement with Practitioner Channel reference Referral quality	Code: Government direction Participation concerns or advice Terrorism terminology Debate curtailed Victimisation Diversity, stereotyping Safeguarding reference Referral of concern Engagement with Practitioner	Code: Teachers Standards Understanding admitted Improved understanding Securitisation classroom Expanded discussion classroom Hate crime	Code: Yes it works No it does not work Don't know Impact of involvement - positive Intervention Comfortable dealing - Prevent safeguarding non-Prevent Referral outcome known	Code: Importance of safeguarding Burden of Prevent Social media challenges Safeguarding - other priorities Implementation - questionable Frustration of relationship No disclosure of concerns	Code: Significant comment "" Key participant Considerable experience of Prevent Unclear Change of Prevent needed Political influence Workload impact

I. Compliance: How is the Prevent Duty applied in the school setting? II. Legitimacy: How have staff responded to the Prevent Duty. Have concerns be raised?
 III. Radicalisation: Has the Prevent Duty assisted educational professionals in the understanding of radicalisation IV. Effectiveness: Does Prevent stop young people from getting involved in extremism?



Mr Gary McGinn

School of Human and Life Sciences

Faculty of Social and Applied Sciences

22nd July 2020

Dear Gary

Confirmation of ethics approval: Doctoral Research Project

Your ethics application complies fully with the requirements for ethical and governance review, as set out in this University's Research Ethics and Governance Procedures, and has been approved.

You are reminded that it is your responsibility to follow, as appropriate, the policies and procedures set out in the [Research Governance Framework](#) and any relevant academic or professional guidelines.

Any significant change in the question, design or conduct of the study over its course will require an amendment application, and may require a new application for ethics approval.

It is a condition of approval that you **must** inform ethics@canterbury.ac.uk once your research has completed.

Wishing you every success with your research .

On behalf of

Faculty of Social and Applied Sciences Ethics Panel

dennis.nigbur@canterbury.ac.uk



Title of Project:

**The adaption of the education profession in identifying radicalisation in schools
through the application of the Prevent Duty – A review of the evidence.**

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION

A research study is being conducted at Canterbury Christ Church University (CCCU) by **Gary McGinn**

Please refer to our [Research Privacy Notice](#) for more information on how we will use and store your personal data.

Background

This research is aimed at collecting the experiences of educational professionals who hold a safeguarding remit within their educational establishments and who have a duty under the Counter Terrorism and Security Act (CTSA) 2015 to safeguard students from extremism. Research will examine how the Prevent Duty, as a requirement of the CTSA, impacts on the role of educator and their decision making process in referring students, thought at risk from extremism, to the authorities.

What will you be required to do?

Participants in this study will be required to be interviewed for between 45 – 60 mins on their experiences of the Prevent Duty. The interview will be recorded and transcribed for analysis, whilst face to face interview is preferred due to current COVID 19 restrictions research may be conducted by telephone or by approved online methods.

To participate in this research you must be:

- An educational professional with safeguarding responsibilities.
- A member of an educational establishment who has provided express permission that staff may participate.

Procedures

You will be asked to participate in an interview comprising of a series of questions around the Prevent Duty.

Feedback

Once the analysis is complete a summary report (this will be made available to all participants) will be finalised, conference papers developed and publications produced.

Confidentiality and Data Protection

The following categories of personal data (as defined by the [General Data Protection Regulation \(GDPR\)](#)) will be processed:

- Contact details of participants.

We have identified that the public interest in processing the personal data is:

- *To assist in contacting with participants.* Personal data will be used *to contact participants*.

Data can only be accessed by, or shared with:

- *Lead Researcher.*
- *Researchers supervisor.*
- *Course Director*

The identified period for the retention of personal data for this project:

- *Personal data will be retained until the completion of the research project to allow for further contact with the participants to confirm feedback and/or circumstances which have led to data not being used or a breach in the data occurring.*

If you would like to obtain further information related to how your personal data is processed for this project please contact Gary McGinn g.mcginn267@canterbury.ac.uk.

You can read further information regarding how the University processes your personal data for research purposes at the following link: Research Privacy Notice - <https://www.canterbury.ac.uk/university-solicitors-office/data-protection/privacy-notices/privacy-notices.aspx>

Dissemination of results

Results will be published in the University library and on the College of Policing research website.

Process for withdrawing consent to participate

You are free to withdraw your consent to participate in this research project at any time without having to give a reason. To do this by contacting the lead researcher at the contact details below.

You may read further information on your rights relating to your personal data at the following link: Research Privacy Notice - <https://www.canterbury.ac.uk/university-solicitors-office/data-protection/privacy-notices/privacy-notices.aspx>

Any questions?

Please contact Gary McGinn, g.mcginn267@canterbury.ac.uk or at School of Law, Criminal Justice and Computing, Canterbury Christchurch University, North Holmes Road, Canterbury, CT1 1QU. Research Supervisor: Dr Paul Swallow paul.swallow@canterbury.ac.uk.

Thank you for your participation.



CONSENT FORM

Title of Project: The adaption of the education profession in identifying radicalisation in schools through the application of the Prevent Duty – A review of the evidence.

Name of Researcher: Gary McGinn

Contact details:

Address: The Graduate College, Canterbury Christ Church University,
North Holmes Road, Canterbury, Kent CT1 1QU

Tel: 0794137****

Email: g.mcginn267@canterbury.ac.uk

Please initial

box

1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason.
3. I understand that any personal information that I provide to the researchers will be kept strictly confidential
4. I understand and consent to this interview being recorded.
5. I agree to take part in the above study.

Participant reference

Date

Signature

Name of Person taking consent
(if different from researcher)

Date

Signature

Researcher
Copies:

Date
1 for participant

Signature
1 for researcher

