

Th' Unconsidered Soldier'
Horace Vere and the genesis of the British military, 1565-1635

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Abstract

This thesis provides the first scholarly assessment of the role of Horace Vere, 1st baron Tilbury, as a major progenitor of the English and later British army. As commander of the English land forces in the Low Countries for 30 years Horace Vere made a considerable contribution to the organisation, training and discipline of the English military during their transition from a mediaeval conscript force to a highly trained, professional fighting army. Set against the backdrop of both the Dutch wars of independence and the advent of the Thirty Years War, Vere's 'Compendium of the Art of War', produced between 1611 and 1614 was one of the earliest drill manuals in English. A comprehensive guide for officers and men the Compendium covered most aspects of infantry training especially regarding the use of firearms in the field but it also encompasses supply, encampment and logistical matters.

Significantly too, Vere's long period of successful command attracted a large number of young men to serve and learn under his tutelage. Many of these men later went on to become leaders themselves during the English Civil Wars and then to establish the first permanent, standing, early modern British army with unbroken links to today's military.

Horace Vere was also a notably pious Puritan at a time when religion loomed large and he was an active and influential supporter of many radical divines when such support was not without its dangers and disadvantages. In addition, though Vere began life as a commoner his ascent to high command heralded the first time that someone not of noble birth actually led an officially sanctioned independent English force in the field.

Horace Vere has been overlooked for too long. This thesis redresses that omission.

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Abbreviations

Add. Mss.	Additional Manuscripts.
APS	The American Philosophical Society
BL	British Library
CSP	Calendar of State Papers
JBS	Journal of British Studies.
JEccH	Journal of Ecclesiastical History.
JMH	Journal of Modern History.
MoAS(W)	Memorials of Affairs of State, Winwood
NA	National Archives.
ODCC	The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church.
ODNB	Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.

1. Introduction

This thesis will examine the life and legacy of Horace Vere, his remarkably long career as a soldier, the impact of his profound faith and modest temperament upon his military calling and how he was perceived contemporaneously. Horace Vere played an important part in the transformation of the English military from an individualistic, sharp edged metal force to a cohesive gunpowder based military. His was a significant role in the early and continuous development that led to today's army and this remains, as it always has been, his legacy.

The objective of this thesis is to record, discuss and explain that achievement in an accessible and usable way for future scholarly use, bringing together known and previously unused material to demonstrate Horace Vere's significant contribution to both military and social British history.

Horace Vere is important because of the influence that he had upon:

1. the English and later British military establishment,
2. the many civil war commanders who grew up in his long military shadow. A point made by David Lawrence in his 2009 book *The Complete Soldier*.¹
3. the beginning of meritocracy in English military service, and
4. the start of a less self-aggrandising and importuning approach to advancement, now relying on evidential ability and a modest character.

This work will discuss why Vere should be regarded as a progenitor of the early modern English army. From the start of his military career in 1590, aged 25, up until the taking of Maastricht in 1632, Horace Vere was involved in numerous military actions including seaborne assaults, impetuous charges and retreats, triumphant victories, enervating defeats and numerous sieges as both besieger and besieged. He was wounded at least four times, including one injury that made him lame, and he played an active and leading role in military matters at a time when advances in gunpowder technology were forcing a concomitant response in battlefield management and in defensive architecture.

As commanding general of the English troops in Dutch pay for 30 years, from 1605 until his death in 1635, he had to surmount all the impossibilities of materiel and manpower supply that the age engendered, all the while remaining true to his religious faith at a time when such devotion was at best difficult and at worst dangerous. He

¹ David Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier: Military Books and Military Culture in Early Stuart England, 1603 – 1645*, (Brill, 1962), p.101.

fought no major battles as commander-in-chief and his unavoidably lengthy absences from England increased his susceptibility to the vicissitudes of early modern politics, yet Horace Vere was lauded in his day as the premier English soldier. Famous, celebrated poetically and sought after as a guide and trainer of militarily aspirant young men, his accomplishments were nevertheless largely forgotten in the maelstrom of the British Civil Wars, which is why he has remained largely overlooked, unstudied and 'Th' Unconsidered Soldier'².

Yet, set consistently against the backdrop of the Dutch struggle for independence in the century after 1548, and the first half of the Thirty Years War, Horace consistently proved his martial and diplomatic aptitude throughout a career which lasted until he was almost 70 – a considerable age for the times.

Between 1621 and 1623 Vere held the Lower Palatinate for more than two years despite commanding a paucity of English troops. During this time, with little help, he delayed the much larger Imperial and Spanish armies who might otherwise have marched north west and overwhelmed, or severely compromised, the emergent Dutch State. Whilst in the Palatinate he was starved of money and information, beset by disease and suffered the deprivations of a much more numerous enemy yet he demonstrated a singular generalship. Indeed his ability to maintain a credible force in being at all, whilst deserted by his allies, isolated and constantly bereft of money to pay his troops, highlights his military and management skill as well as his diplomatic capability in a role many saw as crucial in the struggle against Catholic hegemony and the survival of the nascent Dutch Republic³. Crucially too, throughout his career as chief of the English forces in Dutch pay, a number of later civil war leaders served under his command, thus creating a link between Vere's 'art of war' and the battles, sieges and military organisation of the English civil wars. A link that continued on to the creation of the post-civil war permanent standing army and ultimately to today's military.⁴

Horace Vere was 'the leading English captain of his age'.⁵ An essential part of the link between mediaeval methods of war and the first permanent, professional, gunpowder armies in England which arose out of the civil wars and which were largely

² William Shakespeare, *Two Noble Kinsmen*, 1.2.31.

³ Adam Marks, 'England, The English and the Thirty Years War (1618-1648)', Unpublished Ph.D., Thesis, (St Andrews, 2012), p.70. Marks argues that, if held, the Palatinate could split the so called Spanish Road route for troops and that whilst Spanish and Imperial forces were engaged there they could not be deployed against the United Provinces. A view supported by Christopher Durston, *James I*, (London, 1993) p.49, and by Dr David Trim in his DNB entry for Horace.

⁴ Ismini Pells, 'Professionalism, Piety and the Tyranny of Idleness: Life on Campaign for the English Regiments in Dutch Service, c.1585-164', Early modern British and Irish Seminar, Trinity hall, Cambridge, October 2012., p4

⁵ Andrew Hopper, *Black Tom, Sir Thomas Fairfax and the English Revolution*, (MUP, 2007)

built by men who learnt their craft in the early 1600's under his command.⁶ Surpassing the earlier achievements of his better known brother Francis he was, in his day, the best known and most admired English military leader. A junior member of a cadet branch of the noble House of De Vere and the great-nephew of John De Vere, the 16th earl of Oxford, Horace fought exclusively in Europe, mainly in the Low Countries or in the Palatinate and almost entirely in the service and pay of the United Provinces of Holland, but he always fought in the service of the Protestant faith of which he was a devoted disciple.

He left no memoirs or diaries, but he did leave over 130 letters and other documents including his 'Compendium', one of the earliest drill manuals in English, which promulgated, re-enforced and provided a script for the ongoing evolution of gunpowder war that some call the 'Military Revolution (see below page 14). Vere's drill manual 'A Compendium of the Art of War under Sir Horace Vere' written between 1610 and 1614, pre-dates the 1623 Dutch *Instructions for Musters and Armes*, which came to be seen as something of a standard work yet the 'Compendium', taken as a whole, covers a wider range of military matters though it concentrates principally upon the infantry.⁷ It is not a basic introduction to the art of warfare, like many other contemporary publications aimed at those contemplating or starting out on a military career. It assumes a degree of knowledge about how an army is formed (i.e. Infantry, cavalry, pikes, muskets et al, with companies, regiments etc.) and unlike some contemporary manuals contains no diagrams of the various postures and positions for holding and using the different weapons. It is a set of instructions given by Horace Vere for the guidance and observation of his officers, men who would have been familiar with these basics, instructing them how to organise and manoeuvre men en mass in battle.⁸ This was important not only because of the need for English troops to operate smoothly alongside their Dutch allies but also in order to professionalise and modernise the English military.

Vere's faith was a major part of his life and he was a noted patron and promoter of Puritan, often radical, preachers and clerics throughout his life which underpinned, confirmed and defined his religious doctrine. Celebrated and acclaimed in his lifetime, he was given a state funeral when he died in 1635 when he was interred in Westminster Abbey in the tomb of older brother Sir Francis. During the struggle of the

⁶ Anne Curry, *The Hundred Years War*, (Oxford, 2002). p. 92. Professor Curry's assertion that the English army during the 100 years' war was 'essentially an English standing army' is certainly valid but my contention is that Vere's soldiers were the beginning of a continuous force that can be traced through the civil wars and on to today's modern British Army.

⁷ NA, SP9/202/1. *Compendium of the Art of War under Sir Horace Vere*. See Appendix 1.

⁸ Ibid., see page two where the compendium says 'An extract of Discipline of a Company of Foot given out by Sir Horace Vere an[no dominie] 1611 to all his captains'

United Provinces of Holland to gain and then retain their independence from Hapsburg Spain (1548 – 1648 with a 12 year truce between 1609 and 1621) the brothers played a leading role (between 1585 and 1635) in the continuing English military and diplomatic involvement in that struggle. Notably, Francis and Horace were the first commoners to lead 'official' English troops, i.e. those directly in the pay of the Monarch, and Horace was the first to do so independently.

Francis has enjoyed some recent recognition and re-examination.⁹ Horace, however, has been side-lined and largely forgotten. In part this happened because of the enormous upset to the political, cultural and military establishment of the British Civil Wars. Yet Horace was a significant military leader at an important time in the development and professionalisation of the English military and it will be argued in this thesis that he was more important than Francis, or any of his contemporaries, as a vigorous even vital link in the continuing chain of British commanders in Europe. This was because of his long years of enduring influence on the large number of young Englishmen who served under him in the early years of the Seventeenth Century, men who later became major military and political figures on both sides during the English Civil War.

The English relationship with continental armies, especially the Dutch, constituted 'an apprenticeship in arms' that lasted for over one hundred years. And Horace was both apprentice and latterly apprentice master for forty-five of these years.¹⁰ Dr. Ismini Pells calls Horace and Francis 'the most celebrated commanders of the English forces in the Netherlands'.¹¹ Dr Pells supports the view that Horace Vere has been largely ignored as a major influence on Civil War leaders through his military ability and, specifically, his creation and maintenance of a 'nursery' for developing soldiers. This nursery provided an ongoing and increasingly professional military establishment, often used by Elizabeth, James and Charles for their own purposes yet, after 1598, it was largely paid for by the United Provinces of the Netherlands.¹² This was in effect a permanent, standing, English army funded by the Dutch Republic!¹³

Thus trained it was they, men like Thomas Fairfax (who later married Horace's daughter Anne), the Earls of Essex, Warwick and Peterborough, Phillip Skippon and

⁹ Tracey Borman, 'Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands, a re-evaluation of his career as sergeant major-general of Elizabeth's Troops'. Unpublished Ph.D., (University of Hull, 1997).

¹⁰ Roger B Manning, Styles of Command in Seventeenth Century Armies, *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 71. No. 3 (Jul., 2007). pp. 671-699

¹¹ Ismini Pells, 'The legacy of the Fighting Veres in the English Civil War', in I. Pells, (ed)., *New Approaches to the Military History of the English Civil War: Proceedings of the First Helion And Company 'Century of the Soldier' Conference*, 2015, (Solihull, 2016), pp. 77-100. .

¹² Ibid., p.77.

¹³ Ismini. Pells, *Philip Skippon and the British Civil Wars: The 'Christian Centurion'* (Routledge, forthcoming). Ch.2, p.1. I am grateful to Dr. Pells for sight of an advance copy.

possibly most significantly George Monck (who gained his first military experience in Horace Vere's regiment), who reached senior positions in the parliamentary and royalist forces and then began to establish the organisation and structure of the subsequent, and first continuous permanent, standing British army which we still see to this day. Clements Markham, who wrote the first biography of the Veres, is right to insist upon their impact and lasting impression upon succeeding generations of fighting men.¹⁴ An insistence supported by Dr Pells in her forthcoming book.¹⁵

Yet little work, scholarly or otherwise, has been carried out to discover just what Horace Vere's contribution to the development of the English and later British military tradition has been. There has been even less examination of Vere's Puritan beliefs yet since his strong Protestant piety underpinned and permeated his long military career any examination of the man must consider how his faith influenced and motivated his actions and how it was perceived and received by his contemporaries.

Clement Markham's *The Fighting Veres* is an uncritical and adoring portrayal of the two brothers which lacks scholarly rigour but up until the end of the twentieth century this work was the major, almost the sole, non-primary source of information regarding both Francis and Horace. Then in 1998 Tracey Borman produced her thesis on the military life of Francis Vere and the politico military environment in which he operated.¹⁶ As Borman states in her Introduction '*The Fighting Veres* has enjoyed a place in historiography that has remained largely unchallenged.'¹⁷ Borman's work has now superseded Markham's almost obsequiously romantic account of the older brother and this thesis will similarly contribute a scholarly appraisal of the career of Horace.

Francis Vere was at least twenty five years old when he went to join the English contingent in the Low Countries in December 1585 after the signing of the Anglo-Dutch treaty of Nonsuch in August.¹⁸ But there is some doubt about the ages of the Vere brothers. No official record of their births exist but the *Biographia Britannica* entry for Francis states that he went to aid the Dutch with the Earl of Leicester in December 1585.¹⁹ Following the Treaty of Nonsuch Elizabeth appointed her favourite, Robert Dudley 1st Earl of Leicester, as commander of the English troops sent to assist the Dutch. Leicester was more than willing to take on the role, as he wrote in a letter of

¹⁴ Clements R. Markham, *The Fighting Veres. Lives of Sir Francis Vere and Sir Horace Vere*, (Boston and New York, 1888). pp. 382, 456.

¹⁵ Pells, *Philip Skippon and the British Civil Wars*, Ch. 2, p.22.

¹⁶ Borman, 'Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands', Introduction.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁸ Simon L. Adams, 'The Protestant Cause', Unpublished D.Phil. Thesis, (Oxford, 1977), p. 5. The treaty was, in fact, four separate agreements.

¹⁹ *Biographica Britannica, or the lives of the most eminent persons who have flourished in Great Britain and Ireland From the earliest down to the present Times*, Bayle ed, Vol. 6, (London, 1763). p. 406. This is in effect an early Who's Who. It does give references, though not always with today's academic rigour.

August 1585 to Francis Walsingham, then Elizabeth's secretary of State.²⁰ Leicester was one of the leaders of a group later called 'political Puritans' who wanted England to adopt a more assertively Protestant foreign policy. According to research by Hugh Dunthorne their 'first priority was that England should involve itself openly in the wars of the Low Countries.'²¹

The treaty of Nonsuch and Leicester's appointment were a definite high point for this group and for Leicester who was a strong and vociferous advocate of English involvement which he justified as being a godly cause. But even before Nonsuch there had been tacit, if unofficial, support for the Dutch, not just among those with the power to promote political Puritanism at the highest level, but also amongst a 'broad consensus' within the country. Simon Adams has shown that there was a strong Protestant commitment amongst many of the minor nobility and gentlemen who volunteered to fight under Leicester and later commanders.²² A considerable number of these men, including Horace Vere, were known to have patronised leading Puritan divines, some of whom were distinctly radical and vocal in their desire to see England offering military support to the wider Protestant church in Europe. (See Ch 2 re Horace Vere's patronage).

As a young man Horace must have been aware of some of these old soldiers returning from their adventures in Europe in the later years of the 16th century and writing plaintively of the danger to England, and to the Protestant faith, if the Dutch cause were lost and Spain should triumph. In 1597 Geoffrey Gates, citing the harsh cruelty of the Duke of Alva (and the Inquisition) as he attempted to crush the Dutch rebellion, called the Duke 'the dreadful and renowned chieftain of the papists' and demanded a better trained English military force able to resist the Spanish. Gates wanted an immediate improvement in military capability which he saw as the only way to avoid the destruction and overthrow of the English church and civil liberties.²³ In Gates' view if persuasion or preaching could not reform the 'evils and outrages of the wicked; then must the sword of violence be put in execution, by the hands of them that are able and skilful to ... bring to obedience the disordered multitude'.²⁴ This was a

²⁰ Adams, 'The Protestant Cause' p. 48.

²¹ Hugh Dunthorne, *Britain and the Dutch Revolt 1560-1700*, (Cambridge, 2013), p.25.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 56,57

²³ Geoffrey Gates, *The Defence of Military Profession, Wherein is eloquently shewed the due commendation of martial prowess, and plainly proved how necessary the exercise of armes is for this our age*. (London,1579), p.13.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.10. Gates was not alone in this view. Other old soldiers wrote similar treatises, William Blandy wrote about the central role of the soldier in keeping order at home and protesting against external threats in *The castell, or picture of policy shewing forth most lively, the face, body and partes of a commonwealth.*, (London,1581), p.12. Thomas Churchyard lauded the efforts of men who had already served or were still serving the Dutch cause and by extension the Protestant English cause too, see *A lamentable, and pitifull Description of the*

powerful incentive for pious young men like Horace Vere since it gave them both a reason and a justification to fight.²⁵

Other publications which mention Horace Vere include the *Biographica Britannica*. The entry for Horace says that Francis took him at the end of 1583 to the service of the States of Holland when he [Horace] was then in the twentieth year of his age, (which fits, more or less, with Horace's accepted birth date of 1565) and that Francis was then thirty-one.²⁶ But if this is so then Francis was born in 1552/3 and not 1560 as Clements Markham claims.²⁷ Francis Vere's tomb in Westminster Abbey, and the records kept in the Abbey Library, indicate that Francis was 54 years old when he died which would suggest the earlier birthdate and one might suppose that those who buried him would have known his true age. As well, a 1583 military journey was possible, since English volunteers had been flocking to the Dutch cause since 1572, but this does not fit the generally accepted birth date for Francis.²⁸ Yet this 'accepted' date rests entirely upon Clements Markham, who is mute on his source of this information. It seems likely that the *Biographia Britannica* entry for Horace simply confused the date of the treaty of Nonsuch, which was actually signed in 1585, and if so then it may also be in error about the birthdates of the Vere brothers though the date on the tomb is compelling additional evidence. And thus the possibility does exist that Horace first went to the Dutch wars seven years earlier than had previously been accepted.

Borman's thesis has shed considerable light upon Francis Vere and his career as commander of the English troops in Holland. Francis had certainly begun his martial vocation quite early, seeing service in France and Poland before embarking with the Earl of Leicester in December 1585, but Borman's examination of Francis Vere's early introduction to the military arts was hampered by a lack of extant specific evidence and one of her sources, Clements Markham's *The Fighting Veres*, is sadly lacking in modern scholarly rigour. His narrative descriptions of the early years of both brothers are almost entirely bereft of any checkable references and yet, in lieu of any other source, successive generations of historians have used Markham as a major

wowfull warres in Flanders (London, 1578) and *A generall rehearsal of warres called Churchyardes choise wherein is five hundred severall services of land and sea as sieges, batailles, skirmishes, and encounters*, (London, 1579).

²⁵ Ismini Pells, 'Professionalism, Piety and the Tyranny of Idleness: Life on Campaign for the English, Regiments in Dutch Service, c.1585-164', *Early Modern British and Irish Seminar*, Trinity hall, Cambridge, October 2012., p. 9. Dr Pells suggests that 'Most English soldiers serving in the Netherlands believed they were serving in an honourable cause. A protestant crusade.'

²⁶ *Biographica Britannica*, Vol. 6, see n.18, p. 4006.

²⁷ Clements Markham, *The Fighting Veres*. p. 22.

²⁸ Roger B. Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army 1585-1702*, (Oxford, 2006). p. 28.

foundation when writing about either brother. Markham himself based much of his narrative on the military autobiography of Francis Vere, written between 1604 and 1609 (when Francis died) but not published until 1657. In his *Commentaries of the Divers Pieces of Service*, Francis Vere set out his military memoirs.²⁹ This work is a self-serving, if not entirely biased version of the martial engagements in which Francis fought, and it gives little credit for tactical or strategic success to anyone but Francis Vere himself. Markham seems to have accepted the veracity of the *Commentaries* without question but Dr. Borman shows that, unsurprisingly, though Francis was a skilled and brave soldier and an astute commander, he was not the infallible military genius his *Commentaries* suggest. What Markham does though is to highlight the prominence and success of the Vere brothers as early modern military innovators, role models and publicly acclaimed figures.

There are no extant primary sources for the childhood of the Vere siblings. Clements Markham claims that 'old Sir William Brown' introduced Francis, Horace and their brother Robert 'to the art of warfare', but he gives no further information as to who this person was.³⁰ A probable candidate is the Sir William Browne, who, as an experienced soldier had gone with Leicester to the Low Countries in 1585. Browne served in the Low Countries and was made Lieutenant Governor of Flushing where he died in 1611.³¹ But this Sir William Browne was barely two years older than Francis (if we accept Francis's 1560 birth date - though three years younger if the earlier birth date for Francis is correct) and Browne's origins are in Derbyshire.³² Nevertheless all the Veres considered Sir William as a paternal influence, addressing him in letters as 'kind father' and concluding as 'your most affectionate kind loving son', an unlikely term of address for a man of a similar age.³³ Certainly such training, drawing on the experience of older and more experienced men had always been a feature of the early life of most young men of the Veres' class and social position. But as the complexity of warcraft grew during this period the need for those who were expected to command soldiers to have a thorough understanding of their profession became compelling.

So during this early part of his career Horace Vere found himself in the middle of the transit from warfare based upon individual combat and the longbow to the use of coordinated gunpowder weapons. These changes, sometimes dubbed the 'Military

²⁹ Sir Francis Vere, *The Commentaries*, (Cambridge, 1657).

³⁰ Clements Markham, *The Fighting Veres*, pp. 23-24.

³¹ Adams, 'The Protestant Cause', p. 62. Browne went to the Low Countries with Leicester as a Lieutenant in the company of Robert Sidney.

³² A view supported by Edmund Lodge in his *Illustrations of British History, Biography and Manners, in the reigns of Henry 8th, Edward 6th, Mary, Elizabeth and James I* Vol. 11 (London, 1838), p. 574. *Biographia Britannica* says that Horace 'was probably initiated therein by Sir William Brown', Vol. 6, see n.18p. 4000.

³³ NA, Prob 11/37/222; CSP, *Foreign Series, Elizabeth*, Vol. 21, part 4, p. 37.

Revolution', had already begun to transform warfare when Vere first took up arms and he was himself to play a role in the further development of this new style of combat, particularly with the production of his 'Compendium'. Some discussion of the 'Military Revolution' as it relates to Vere and his part in the Dutch fight for independence is therefore highly relevant to this thesis.

Maurice of Nassau led the Dutch in their struggle against their erstwhile Spanish overlords from 1585 till his death in 1625 and thus was Horace Vere's chief for 35 years.³⁴ Maurice understood that in the face of the experienced Spanish armies he needed to match them militarily, or at least find ways of avoiding defeat, if Dutch independence and religious freedom was to be achieved.³⁵ Ultimately it was this avoidance of defeat, rather than a clearly won war that forced the Spanish to accept Dutch independence. Maurice took inspiration for a new approach to military organisation from classical Rome, in what some historians consider to have been an important part of the so called 'Military Revolution'.³⁶ Maurice left no stone unturned in his search for a successful re organisation of the nascent Dutch army and he 'embraced every branch of the military art' from engineering to drill to finances appointing Simon Stevin – formerly Maurice's mathematics and fortifications tutor - as Quartermaster general of the army to professionalise and supervise 'the whole machine'.³⁷ Vere served under Maurice's command for 35 years until Maurice's death in 1625, working closely with him on numerous campaigns absorbing and learning from the changes and advances that Maurice introduced and passing many of them on to his own English forces in his *Compendium*.³⁸ As part of the Dutch army Vere would not have remained as general of the English troops for so long had he demurred. Both Vere's example and the many years of involvement that he, and those he commanded, experienced under the Dutch shaped and developed what was the first early modern English standing army so that in the English civil wars and in the establishment of the army that evolved from them the influence of Vere persisted. This is the true measure of his importance as the progenitor of the modern British army.

³⁴ Maurice of Nassau (14 November 1567 – 23 April 1625) was stadtholder of all the provinces of the Dutch Republic except for Friesland from 1585 until his death. Before he became Prince of Orange upon the death of his eldest half-brother Philip William in 1618, he was known as Maurice of Nassau.

³⁵ Weigley, *The Age of Battles*, p.27.

³⁶ Roberts, 'The 'Military Revolution', 1560-1660' in Rogers (ed), *The 'Military Revolution' Debate*, p.14. Roberts claims that Maurice found the 'inspiration' for his changes in the structure of the Dutch infantry formations in *De Re Militari (The Military Institutions of the Romans)* written in 390 A.D by Flavius Vegetius Renatus. See Weigley, *The Age of Battles*; pp. 5-6. Jan Gleason, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe; Spain, The Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States, 1500-1660*, (London, 2002), p.159.

³⁷ Christopher Duffy, *Siege Warfare, the Fortress in the early modern world 1494-1660.*, (London, 1979), p. 81.

³⁸ NA, SP9/202/1, *Compendium of the Art of War under Sir Horace Vere*.

There can be no dispute that substantial changes in military thinking, deployment, weaponry, tactics and static defence occurred, at least in the case of the English, between Bosworth in 1485 and Edgehill in 1642. Discussion has arisen, and still does, however, when military historians describe these changes as a revolution spanning a much shorter time frame within the 167 years that separate these two battles. It is not the purpose of this thesis to consider the 'Military Revolution' debate in detail, but given that Horace Vere's martial career spanned the final quarter of this period some discussion of the main aspects of the debate are relevant, especially those that Vere was himself involved with, namely siege warfare and the increasing use of firearms in battle.

The term 'Military Revolution' refers to proposed substantial changes in military organisation, finance, and administration between 1550 and 1660. These changes included the rapid development of handheld firearms; the use of infantry to deliver a greater and faster rate of fire; better and more effective artillery; the consequent development of new defensive structures - the so called '*trace Italien*' construction - designed to withstand canon bombardment using an interlocking wall protruding at angles; much larger armies using centralised training and deployment methodology; standardisation of weapons so as to facilitate common drill and training systems; and improvements in financial organisation enabling more efficient procurement and payment systems.³⁹

The concept of a 'Military Revolution' was first introduced by Michael Roberts, then Professor of Modern History at Queen's University, Belfast, in a now famous lecture given in January 1955. Roberts argued that Maurice, referring back to the methods of the Roman legions, 'relied upon a multiplicity of small units ranged in two or three lines, and so disposed and armed as to permit the full exploitation of all types of weapon'.⁴⁰ This new (or revised) approach to warfare was an attempt to solve the 'perennial problem of ... how to combine missile weapons with close action; how to unite hitting power, mobility and defensive strength.'⁴¹ Collaborating with his cousins, William Louis and John, Maurice worked to increase the impact and effective power of his troops on the battlefield by enabling more of his soldiers to fire at the same time and by developing a way of producing a rolling, or continuous, system of volley firing.⁴²

³⁹ John Childs, *Warfare in the Seventeenth Century* (London 2001), pp. 16-17. Clifford J. Rogers, 'The 'Military Revolution' in History and Historiography' in Rogers (ed), *The 'Military Revolution' Debate*, pp. 2-5. and Weigley, *The Age of Battles*, p. 4-6. For a more detailed discussion of the financial imperatives associated with the 'Military Revolution' see Glete, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe*, pp. 42- 45.

⁴⁰ Michael Roberts, 'The 'Military Revolution'', p. 14.

⁴¹ Ibid., p.13.

⁴² Ibid., p.14.

The origins of this tactic are surveyed at length in Geoffrey Parker's discussion of the military revolution in his (originally 1988) book *The Military Revolution* in which Parker suggests that its European birth was as the child of William Louis of Nassau 'who saw the critical link between massed infantry firepower made available by sixteenth century technology and Roman close order drill.'⁴³ Professor Parker argues that 'volley fire was invented twice in the sixteenth century; in Japan during the 1560's and in the Dutch republic in the 1590's.'⁴⁴ And Geoffrey Roberts considered that these reforms were later enlarged and embellished by the Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus to create an even greater offensive capability.⁴⁵

Thus Horace Vere, taking command of a company within the Anglo Dutch army for the first time in the mid 1590's, would have been right at the centre of these important developments and would have wanted to adopt such new and exciting advances if only to show his Commander in Chief Maurice and his immediate boss, brother Francis, that they had chosen the right man. This was especially so since before Maurice captains and generals did not train their soldiers, who were expected to learn singly from older warriors, but Maurice's' close order drill needed a high degree of unit training.⁴⁶ 'To be an officer in the States Army...required that one take on the duties of managing and training soldiers on a daily basis'⁴⁷

The implications of this new approach were profound, requiring not only a greater level of discipline in the field but an improvement in the standardisation of weapons and ammunition. This was because more precise control of the whole army, and a commonality of its tactical methodology, now became supremely important. This necessity for greater discipline on the battlefield was achieved through the introduction of coherent, coordinated and rapid manoeuvre when in action, while utilising both standardised training manuals and weaponry as the basis for detailed, refined and repetitive drill.⁴⁸ This greater discipline was a requirement that led inevitably and inexorably to the rise of professional standing armies because of the time and money it took to train new soldiers in the precise manoeuvring needed to deliver these new tactics on the battlefield. The introduction of massed, handheld, firearms in the field had rendered the skilled archer obsolete, together with the requirement for his many years of practice because though an accomplished archer could fire ten arrows a minute

⁴³ Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution. Military innovation and the rise of the West 1500-1800.*, 19th ed. (CUP, 2016), pp. 19, 161.

⁴⁴ Geoffrey Parker, 'The Limits to Revolutions in Military Affairs: Maurice of Nassau, The Battle of Nieuwpoort'. In *The Journal of Military History*, Vol .71, No 2 (Apr., 2007). pp. 331-372.

⁴⁵ Roberts, 'The Military Revolution', p.14.

⁴⁶ Roger B Manning, 'Styles of Command in Seventeenth Century Armies', *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 71. No. 3 (Jul., 2007). pp. 671-699.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.675

⁴⁸ de Groot, *Dutch Armies of the 80 years' war*. Vol 1, p,16.

compared to just one shot from an early sixteenth century arquebus in several minutes, untrained men could learn to use a firearm in a few hours at most compared to the 'many years and a whole way of life... needed to produce a competent archer.'⁴⁹

Nevertheless these new Maurician methods re-introduced the need for long hours of practice, as it became necessary for musket men to train together, rather than as in the past with archers, who had developed their skills in relative isolation. Such organised and massed training required homogeneous weapons systems too, if commands were to be uniform, and thus centralised and standardised control of weapons, units and armies became inevitable.⁵⁰ Vere's Compendium reinforces these points by detailing and describing not only the co-ordinated movements of the men but also the required standardisation of their weapons.

Individual regimental or company commanders many of whom were, in the late 16th century, still amateurs now needed to control their soldiers in identical ways using the same commands and needed thus to be brought under a common discipline if the army was to function as a co-operative and interdependent unit. As Roberts put it, 'officers became not merely leaders but trainers of men [and] diligent practice in peacetime, and in winter became essential; and drill, for the first time in modern history, became the precondition of military success'.⁵¹ The new defensive methodology that had arisen as a solution to the power of the canon to destroy medieval walls was also a major factor in Vere's career since most of his campaigning involved him as the besieged or the besieger. Thus as much of the English civil war comprised seige warfare the experience of Vere, transmuted through the many men who served under him and later led troops in the civil war, played an important part in that conflict.

This 'Military Revolution' concept, refined most notably by Geoffrey Parker, describes the mutually sustaining relationship between the new professionalism needed to deliver these tactical changes and the rise of a more permanent military force nurtured and controlled by the state.⁵² Parker views the 'prodigious increase in the scale of warfare', in particular the substantial growth in the size of armies, as a significant reason to support this aspect of Roberts' ideas, though he expresses doubts about other facets of the theory, mainly over the length of time that these changes took to occur and his view that Spanish forces had themselves been instrumental in introducing change. But

⁴⁹ Parker, *The Military Revolution. Military innovation and the rise of the West* ., p.17.

Surprisingly too the cost of fitting out a musketeer was if anything less than the cost of a mediaeval archer, see I.I.A Thompson, 'Money, Money, and yet more Money', in Rogers (ed), *The 'Military Revolution' Debate*. p. 280.

⁵⁰ Glete, *War and the State*, pp. 45,46.

⁵¹ Roberts, *'The Military Revolution'*, p.15.

⁵² Jeremy Black, 'Military Revolution?', *Military Change and European Society 1550-1800*, (London, 1991), pp. 1-6. Black discusses the theory of the 'Military Revolution' and its objections and amendments.

Parker also points out that the financial aspects of funding a large military force, an essential aspect of the Military revolution, were 'perfected... by the Dutch' whose troops, unlike those of the Spanish, never mutinied for lack of pay.⁵³

Parker summarises Robert's 'Military Revolution' theory by saying '...even this [i.e. Parker's] extended examination has failed to dent the basic thesis.'⁵⁴ Simon Adams offers limited support for the idea arguing that while there was little growth in field armies within Rogers' period up to the start of the Thirty Years War there was thereafter 'a dramatic increase in projected overall establishments' which 'may have had a revolutionary impact.'⁵⁵

Roberts views have not met with uncritical acceptance. Richard W. Stewart in his study of the English Ordnance Office suggests that 'it is too early to talk of any revolution in tactics and weaponry [in this period] such as occurred in the mid-seventeenth century.'⁵⁶ Clifford J Rogers argues for marginal gain interspersed with more rapid development which he calls 'punctuated equilibrium' - a term he attributes to Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldridge in 1972.⁵⁷ This is an argument that finds support from Russel F. Weigley who contends that 'technological change [at least] was decidedly incremental.'⁵⁸ Weigley does accept that the United Provinces, in 'recapturing the discipline and professionalism of the legions ...share with [Gustavus Adolphus] considerable claim to ... the first modern army'.⁵⁹ However John Childs rejects the term revolution unilaterally. Professor Childs argues that the changes in military materiel, organisation and structure that occurred between 1450 and 1700 were gradual, incremental and cautious - 'evolutionary, not revolutionary'.⁶⁰

Other eminent scholars express a similar view. David J. Parrot writes of his 'reservations about the concept of a 'Military Revolution' in the period 1550-1660', focusing on what he calls 'little evidence' to support the idea of sudden improvements in weapons or army structure.⁶¹ However, Parrot also asserts the 'overwhelming superiority

⁵³ Geoffrey Parker, 'The 'Military Revolution'- a myth?' in Rogers (ed), *The 'Military Revolution' debate*, (London, 1995). p. 48.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 49.

⁵⁵ Simon Adams, 'Tactics or Politics?' in Clifford Rogers (ed), *The 'Military Revolution' debate* (Oxford, 1995). p. 258.

⁵⁶ Richard W. Stewart, *The English Ordnance Office; A Case Study in Bureaucracy*, Studies In History;73, (London,1996), p.147.

⁵⁷ Clifford J Rogers 'Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War' in Clifford Rogers (ed), *The 'Military Revolution' debate*, (Oxford, 1995). p. 77 and .f. p.93.

⁵⁸ Weigley, *The Age of Battles*, p. xv1.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 9.

⁶⁰ John Childs, *Warfare in the Seventeenth Century*, (London, 2001), p.17.

⁶¹ David A Parrott, 'Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years War', in Clifford Rogers (ed), *The 'Military Revolution' debate*, (Oxford, 1995), pp. 245-246.

of the defensive' in his discussion of strategy and tactics, citing the 'almost total disappearance of set-piece battles in the Netherlands in favour of protracted sieges'.⁶²

Indeed Christopher Duffy argues that the eighty years' war of liberation in the Netherlands 'was of first importance in the history of fortress warfare with the development of the new shapes of fortification and the elevation of the siege attack to the status of a science'.⁶³ Its importance to Maurice is clear since in January 1600 he established a 'chair of surveying and fortification at Leyden University' to which aspirant engineers attended in some numbers'.⁶⁴ It is likely that some of Vere's officers were among them.

The significance of fortification in the Netherlands was in direct ratio to the number of such structures since the consequence of a lost battle was thereby reduced 'because the (many) neighbouring fortresses halt the victors and provide a refuge to the vanquished, saving them from being totally ruined'.⁶⁵ However, geographical factors also played a major defensive role. Much of the countryside was made up of wetlands, dykes, waterways and uneven terrain which made access, investment and supply difficult for attacking armies. Even when a fortress or town was taken, holding onto it required a degree of local self-sufficiency in men and materiel beyond that of more traversable terrain where supply and re-enforcement were much easier to obtain. Horace Vere was thus active at an unusually potent time in the development of defensive works.

He was also intimately involved in the development of volley fire, that continuous, rolling barrage which allows single shot firearms to be used en masse to deliver a constant fusillade. The manoeuvre that allow this, the Countermarch, is a complicated exercise, especially when being deployed by a large number of men and particularly so when performed in the heat of battle. Only collective, continuous and well organised drill can produce an efficient action and much of the Compendium devotes itself to this very art.

The Compendium describes in close detail how the troops should be controlled using what Vere calls *bringers – up, middlemen and leaders* [my italics] whose tasks are to organise and arrange their fellow soldiers in ranks and files.⁶⁶ Crucially these are the men who are also tasked with the Countermarch, that is taking the men who have just fired their weapon back behind the other ranks so that they can reload their guns and

⁶² Ibid., p.239.

⁶³ Christopher Duffy, *Siege warfare, the Fortress in the early modern world 1494-1660.*, (London , 1979) p. 58. By the end of the Low Countries war in 1648 almost no major settlements there remained without these new defensive structures though the financial cost was enormous. And see Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution. Military innovation and the rise of the West.* P.12.

⁶⁴ Duffy, *Siege warfare*,, p.81.

⁶⁵ Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution. Military innovation and the rise of the West.* p. 167.

⁶⁶ NA, SP9/202/1, 'Compendium of the Art of War under Sir Horace Vere'.

then await their turn to fire again. Geoffrey Parker ascribes Maurice's adoption of these tactics to the influence of Willem Lodewijk, Maurice's old professor at Leiden who advocated an adaption of Roman and Greek drill and manoeuvre in order to extend and increase the firepower of the new gunpowder weaponry.⁶⁷

In the heat of a battle, as David J Parrott explains, 'these exercises depended less upon the officers than upon the experienced veterans, soldiers who were placed in the ... important positions in each line... to ensure that the inexperienced recruits executed orders and held their positions'⁶⁸ These men were not officers but seasoned veterans whose proven coolness and clear thinking in battle would calm and inspire the newer recruits around them.

The importance of constant practice drills in ensuring complete familiarity with the entire process is apparent and the minute detail of Vere's Compendium is designed to ensure this. It is thus extremely likely that these drills took place regularly throughout the year. Vere's compendium brought what was in effect an English standing army into line with continental best practice honed by years of fighting alongside innovators such as Maurice and against the Spanish tercios whose own 'Military Revolution' is attested by Professor Parker.⁶⁹

Roger B. Manning, in his survey of the origins of the British Army, mentions the 'Military Revolution' on only four occasions and seemingly accepts the term as a useful time-mark in his discussions - without questioning the terminology.⁷⁰ And since these changes did happen the debate thus hinges upon philological definitions and considerations of time. Childs' argument that revolutions are 'sharp, sudden events' is itself unsatisfactory since the word 'sudden' can imply a different timespan depending upon the circumstances and the subject matter.⁷¹ Warfare is as old as human history and in such a context, 150 years may be considered 'sudden' whereas in the compass of an early modern historian, working in a timeframe of perhaps 300 years such a period is lengthy indeed.

It may be better to eschew either approach and simply say that these military developments were inevitable (since they happened) and that their introduction occurred where and when they did because circumstances had reached an exact confluence of technology, financial acumen, desirability, opportunity and need. To which Parker adds a geographical dimension in surveying developments outside Europe and in respect of

⁶⁷ Geoffrey Parker, 'The Limits to Revolutions in Military Affairs: Maurice of Nassau, The Battle of Nieuwpoort'. In 'The Journal of Military History', Vol. 71, No 2 (Apr., 2007). pp. 331-372.

⁶⁸ Parrott, 'Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years War', in Clifford Rogers (ed), *The Military Revolution debate*, p. 229.

⁶⁹ Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution. Military innovation and the rise of the West*. p.72

⁷⁰ Roger B. Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms*, pp. 163;167;180 and 196.

⁷¹ Weigley, *The Age of Battles*, p.17.

volley fire, particularly the Japanese experience.⁷² Maurice's military organisational reforms were neither totally unique nor novel, and may have acquired an over significance simply because the Dutch, a previously unregarded military power, were able to prevent the Spanish, the premier military power in Europe, from re-asserting their control and so military historians have been arguing over his contribution for some time.

Clearly though the mass use of firearms by itself opened up possibilities that were simply not available to earlier ages. This democratisation of offensive capability was then greatly enhanced if soldiers could learn to operate, in concert, at a word of command. This in turn required 'a new standard in the training and discipline of the ordinary soldier....The army ..was [then] no longer a collection of ...individuals. It was an articulated organism of which each part responded to the impulses from above'.⁷³ Indeed 'gunpowder and all the war techniques associated with it became significant only with the existence of discipline'.⁷⁴ There is thus a sense of inevitability about these developments given that 'the importance of drill and discipline can hardly be denied'.⁷⁵

Revolution or evolution, Maurice's innovations necessitated and spawned the publication of a growing number of complementary military manuals in Europe, demonstrating that contemporaries felt that war had changed enough to warrant their production. Vere's 'Compendium' was clearly needed to help standardise troop handling amongst the English especially as Vere's forces were part of Maurice's army and Vere was bound to ensure that his men could operate seamlessly with others.⁷⁶ The Compendium was thus both an acceptance and a recommendation of these new tactics and since its originator was both highly respected and applauded as a war leader its proven veracity was understood.

This understanding now included a range of subjects that were largely new - such as the co-ordinated use of firearms and the deployment of cannon on the battlefield and in sieges, as well as how to effectively make camp and feed an army for months on end.⁷⁷ This was not simply leadership, but management and it thus became more and more important to commission officers from the ranks of the able and not just the noble.

⁷² Parker, *The Military Revolution. Military innovation and the rise of the West*., Ch 4.

⁷³ Roberts, 'The 'Military Revolution' 1660', in Rogers (ed), *The 'Military Revolution' Debate*, pp.15-15.

⁷⁴ Max Weber, *From Max Weber, Essays in Sociology*, (eds). H.H Gerth and C. Wright Mills, (New York, 1946), pp. 256-7.

⁷⁵ 't Hart, *The Dutch Wars of Independence*, p. 59.

⁷⁶ NA,SP9/202/1. 'Compendium of the Art of War'. This is a detailed document running to 38 separate pages and describing how the individual rank and file of a company should be handled. See Appendix 1.

⁷⁷ Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier*, pp. 20-21.

British volunteers had been serving in the Netherlands since 1572 when following the initial success of the 'Sea Beggars' at Brill English, Welsh and Scots adventurers, together with other nationalities, began to arrive in the United Provinces to 'strengthen the uprising.'⁷⁸ In reality though, direct, official, British military involvement only became a permanent feature of the conflict from 1585 onwards and a growing number of men of noble ancestry or the sons of gentlemen volunteered to fight, many of them taking along a train of servants and retainers. Such a familial pedigree gave them a special, but sometimes awkward place in the English companies since many of these men were, in effect, supernumeraries fighting alongside the ordinary soldiers but often with one eye on an officers' post.⁷⁹ Competition for these commissioned roles, when they became available, thus grew considerably with any increase in the numbers of such young gentlemen.

But as Francis Markham observed in 1622, 'They [gentlemen volunteers] receive no pay so they passe no musters, nor are they tied to any strictnesse of any particular dutie, but as free and noble gentlemen may bestow their houres in any honourable fashion' and these 'voluntaries may challenge ... the most honourable and principal places in Battell'.⁸⁰ All well and good, if there were only a few such 'gentlemen', but a considerable headache when, as in the early years of the Dutch wars, the number of such 'Voluntaries' became excessive. According to Francis Markham, they often caused great disorder, being 'foes to discipline', unwilling to accept direction from anyone, and 'showing neither wisdom, order nor discretion'.⁸¹ Such behaviour was of course the antithesis of how an army must be organised if it is to have any success, especially at this time against the formidable *Tercios* of the Spanish army, when a new and more disciplined approach to soldiering was required.⁸² The problem was clearly serious because Markham goes on to add that some

⁷⁸ Dunthorne, *Britain and the Dutch Revolt*, p. 64. Edward Cheyney, *A History of England*, Vol.1, (New York, 1914), pp. 191,192. Several bodies of English troops shipped out to assist the Dutch at this time, most of them sailing to Flushing. The Sea beggars were Dutch pirates, named thus by the Spanish. Brill is the English name for the Dutch seaport of Den Breille.

⁷⁹ Adams, 'The Protestant Cause', pp. 256 – 258.

⁸⁰ NA, SP9/202/1. 'Compendium of the Art of War'. p. 13.

⁸¹ Francis Markham, *Five decades of the Epistle of Warre*, (London,1622), p. 2. Francis Markham was a soldier, author, translator and historian who served with many of the notable military figures of the day.

⁸² The word *Tercio* probably derives from the fact that by the mid-16th century Spanish infantry units usually comprised about three thousand men. The theme of '3' also appears in the fact that this unit had three main components, Pikes, Arquebuses and Muskets and that a Spanish army of the time was often made up of three of these units. See Russel F. Weigley, *The Age of Battles, The Quest For Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo*, (Indiana, 1991), p. 7. And see; Ignacio J.N. López, *The Spanish Tercio, 1536–1704*, (Oxford, 2012).

commanders 'had to forbid the enlistment of any such 'voluntaries' without the general's special licence.'⁸³

The exact status of these men could also be uncertain. 'Voluntaries', as Francis Markham calls them, going to fight for a foreign power in a foreign land, were often ill-regarded by contemporaries, particularly if they appeared to make fighting their profession and there 'is a strong body of evidence that [there was] prejudice against soldiers of fortune' in the early modern period, as there is today.⁸⁴ 'Yet', as David Trim points out, in respect of the Dutch wars, 'they neither thought of themselves, nor were they thought of by contemporaries, as mercenaries.'⁸⁵ Dr Trim discusses this nomenclature in some detail in his 2002 thesis, making the essential point that perceptions of war and of those who fight in them may have radically changed since the early Seventeenth Century, but that even today there are some circumstances in which a mercenary might be considered rather more than simply someone who goes to war for pecuniary reasons. In the early modern period too, it is helpful to distinguish between the ordinary soldier and the great lord whom he may have followed into combat. The tenant, servant or retainer of a nobleman may have had little choice about following his master into battle, whatever his own views might have been.

The Dutch Wars also threw up religious conviction as a driving force for military service and certainly there were many who, for this reason, flocked to join the Puritan champion Leicester when he went to the Netherlands in 1585. It is unlikely then that many of the young men who followed him thought of themselves as mercenaries, even though their motives may not all have been purely religious. As well, many of these men funded themselves, so they could not be accused of fighting for money. Dr. Trim argues plausibly that the subject of mercenaries and/or voluntaries is far too complex to be described in simplistic terms when applied to a particular time period or conflict, and he ends his discussion of the topic by saying 'The bitter condemnations by contemporaries of mercenaries were not applied to the English and Welsh soldiers in French or Dutch service at the time and should not be now'.⁸⁶ As Adam Marks contends 'The consistent loyalty of many British soldiers to the Protestant cause... imply they were more than disciplined mercenaries'.⁸⁷

Just how these men were regarded by contemporaries and how they were expected to conduct themselves can be discerned in the writing of an exact

⁸³ Francis Markham, *Five Decades* p.19. And Manning, *An Apprenticeship in arms*, p.33.

⁸⁴ David J. B. Trim, 'Fighting 'Jacobs Wars. The Employment of English and Welsh Mercenaries in the European Wars of Religion: France and the Netherlands', 1562-1610. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, (Kings College, University of London, 2002). p. 72.

⁸⁵ Trim, 'Fighting 'Jacobs Wars', p. 59.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 94.

⁸⁷ Marks, 'England, The English and the Thirty Years War...', p. 43.

contemporary of Horace Vere, Francis Markham. He was a soldier for 'thirtie and odd years', a committed Calvinist and an author of some authority concerning the Dutch wars in which he served, under Francis Vere (and others) intermittently, between 1590 and 1610.⁸⁸ His *Five Decades of Epistles of Warfare* published in 1622, gives his soldier's insight into the structure and organisation of armies of the day. His work is a useful source of detailed information regarding the composition of early modern armies, and in particular, the ranks in use and their responsibilities. Francis Markham also suggests the three motivational imperatives and qualities he sees as being inherent in the make-up of all soldiers. These, he declares, are good fame, honour and wealth. Fame he describes as being true, properly deserved fame based upon real and substantial achievement, not stolen or 'arrogated by power from other men's bloody sweats', a fame 'which should be thrust upon the soldier rather than assumed'; it is an achievement that may be 'reached for but not snatched'.

Honour, likewise, should not be sought but earned, according to rank, and bestowed 'according to the pleasure of the Prince', whilst wealth is a necessary adjunct to the soldier's profession since it allows men to fight and be maintained as soldiers, for 'without [wealth] a soldier can neither perform nor continue in his calling'. He also describes what he sees as the justification for war, his ultimate argument being that in the last analysis, only the sword, under God, can remedy wrongs and restore rights. He then concludes that although 'the fittest man to make soldier is a perfit Gentleman; yet in respect multitudes compound armies, and that gentlemen are not of that infinite increase in all parts to supply them; I must affirm ...that whose great minde soever carrieth him to the imbracing of this noble profession, whatsoever his birth be; and though his imployment may rest at the lowest degree of fortune; yet... equal justice should allow him the style and title of gentleman of the company'. But crucially he goes on to say that the soldier also needs the 'bulwarke of pietie and religion to find security in only pure and noble reasons to fight'.⁸⁹

When considering military leaders Francis Markham insists that a captain (the commander of a company) should be a 'Gentleman both of blood and qualitie' and that his company should include 'a full two hundred...besides the great officers' [of the company] and that the company should be divided into two equal parts, one of pikes and one of muskets. As his deputy, the Captain appointed a lieutenant with an 'Ensigne' as third in command.⁹⁰ The word Ensign can be used to describe both a flag and what is now the most junior British commissioned officer, more usually known as a

⁸⁸ Francis Markham, *Five Decades*, p. 2.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 10, 15 – 17, 23 – 24.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

Second Lieutenant.⁹¹ Francis Markham gives a good description of the office of the Ensign of his time. 'He shall be armed at all peeces from the mid-thigh upward with a fair Sword by his side, and his captain's colours or *Ensigne* in his hand'. He is 'the first great officer of a private company: [that is the first officer rank above that of sergeant] he hath the guard of his captain's colours and therein is trusted with his honour and reputation.' This trust centres around the care and carrying of the colours, the way in which they must be handled, and the absolute necessity of protecting and preserving them as a rallying or assembly point for the troops in his company and, Markham adds, 'the more ragged and tattered they are, the more noble they are'.⁹²

Below the Ensign, but still regarded as officers at that time, were three or four sergeants, several corporals and also drummers, fifers and quartermasters.⁹³ As officers gained command of larger units, even whole armies, they tended to retain their own company though it might often be larger [perhaps by 50% with an extra sergeant or two] than those commanded by others.⁹⁴ In these circumstances a Lieutenant Colonel would be appointed to command the company whilst the actual commander was away. It was frequently this, now more senior commander's, company that traditionally held most of the young gentleman volunteers.⁹⁵ The company was the main building block of the infantry and it was grounded on the paternalistic, feudal idea of the Captain as the father of his troops, with the right and the duty to be both a stern disciplinarian when necessary, but also to be 'sweete and temperate amongst them' instructing them 'not as men teach dogs, or Bear-wards apes with bits and blows' but with all the 'pleasing language that nature, art or study can produce'.⁹⁶ Since many companies in the English forces in the United Provinces included servants, retainers or workers from his estate, such a fatherly emphasis on the role of captain fitted well with contemporary notions of societal hierarchy.⁹⁷

Private Life

Far more is known about Horace Vere's military life than about his own private affairs the main elements of which are as follows. He remained a bachelor until 1607 when, during truce negotiations between the Dutch and the Spanish he returned to England, aged 42, to marry Mary Hoby, nee Tracy, the youngest daughter of Sir John Tracy of

⁹¹ Bouko de Groot, *Dutch Armies of the 80 years' war 1568 – 1648, Vol 1*, (Oxford, 2017), pp. 11 – 12.

⁹² Francis Markham, *Five Decades*, Markham's chapter on The Office of the Ensigne gives a brief history of the rank as well as its duties. pp. 73-76.

⁹³ de Groot, *'Dutch Armies of the 80 years' war*, p. 12.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p.18.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p.19.

⁹⁶ Francis Markham, *Five Decades*. p.136.

⁹⁷ Adams, *The Protestant Cause*, p 50.

Toddington, Gloucestershire. Mary, a widow of 26 was born in 1581 and her first marriage, at the age of nineteen, was to William Hoby of Hailes in Gloucestershire, but he died less than three years later. This union produced two sons, both of whom died young, Philip (1617) and William (1623). Horace and Mary were married in October 1607, the same month that the now retired Francis Vere married Elizabeth Dent. Horace took Mary back to the Netherlands, via Rochester, in the summer of 1608.⁹⁸ Mary went on to have six children with Horace. The eldest two, Elizabeth and Mary, were born in the United provinces. Then Katherine, Anne, Dorothy and Susan were born in London, the last two in 1616 and 1620. Since the two eldest girls had been born abroad, their English citizenship had to be affirmed by Act of parliament in 1624.⁹⁹

Outstanding legal issues that concerned the will of Mary's previous husband, Sir John Hoby, required some legal action too and in late 1608 Horace Vere wrote to [probably Sir Julius Caesar] thanking him for agreeing to assist Mary in the matter, which was due to be heard by the Lord Chancellor.¹⁰⁰ Horace copied his letter to Mary's brother, Thomas Tracy, who 'wilbe an umble suitor to your honnor, who is able to yeald your honnor an account of the state of the business.' Mary's two sons from that previous marriage would no doubt also have had some interest in this disposal. Vere suggests that 'his lordship I hope (by the means I have made to him by honourable friends of myne) will sett down sum indifferent course to be observed betwixt me and the executors that wee may not be a further trouble one to the other'.¹⁰¹ There is no extant information regarding what this 'trouble' may have been.¹⁰²

Meanwhile, after 60 years of inconclusive warfare and with both sides in need of respite, negotiations between the Dutch and the Spanish for some sort of temporary cessation of hostilities were now well advanced and within a year of Horace's return to the Low Countries a twelve year truce was signed, in April 1609. The truce only applied to Europe whilst in the far east, and in the Americas, the conflict between the Spanish and the Dutch continued.¹⁰³ Less than four months later, another singularly important event occurred when on August 28th Francis Vere died. We know that Horace as well as several other veteran Low Countries English commanders were present at the

⁹⁸ NA, SP14/35/13. John Chamberlain to Dudley Carleton, 7th July 1608.

⁹⁹ Markham, *The Fighting Veres*, p. 381.

¹⁰⁰ This was Thomas Egerton, 1st Viscount Brackley, known as 1st Baron Ellesmere,

¹⁰¹ NA, SP14/36/285, Horace Vere to (possibly Sir Julius Caesar who was Chancellor and Under Treasurer of the Exchequer from 1606 to 1614. His daughter had married Francis Vere.) and to Mr Thomas Tracie 6th October 1608. I have been unable to trace the names of the executors.

¹⁰² Probably legal wrangling's about Hailes abbey which after the suppression of the monasteries came to the Tracy family. Mary's marriage to William Hoby may have resulted in some claim by that family over the Abbey lands.

¹⁰³ Marjolein 't Hart, *The Dutch Wars of Independence, Warfare and Commerce in the Netherlands, 1570 – 1680*, (London, 2014), p. 25.

funeral, which took place the next day, though there is no record of Horace's return to England at that time.¹⁰⁴ It may have been that Francis had been ill and Horace, having heard of the illness, had simply come to visit his older brother and mentor. Clements Markham proposes that Francis died 'suddenly' but the presence of many old comrades and subordinates at his funeral, so soon after his death, suggests otherwise since many of them were still serving soldiers in the Low Countries.¹⁰⁵ In any case with the Truce now in place, Horace and Mary would have had both opportunity and leisure to return to England where they had a house in the parish of St. Bartholomew the Great, near St Pauls and Smithfield market.¹⁰⁶

Francis left Horace a share in the Jamestown settlement in America. Jamestown, in the Colony of Virginia, was the first permanent English settlement in the Americas.¹⁰⁷ It was considered a rather fashionable investment at the time and as the shares were quite widely spread there was little risk to any one individual.¹⁰⁸ Investors were almost exclusively Protestant and included George Calvert, John Ogle, Edward Conway (who had married Mary Vere's sister), Edward Cecil and Ralph Winwood.¹⁰⁹ Re-investment in the colony continued and over 450 investors, including some of the London Guilds and several aristocratic women, risked over £2500 altogether in 1619/1620. Horace Vere ventured £121 but most investors chanced less than £20.¹¹⁰

Horace's marriage to Mary established a partnership of piety which proved to be both long lasting and influential in the number and the profile of those 'divines' or clerics whom the couple supported and endorsed. [see chapter 2]. Both at home in England as parish incumbents, and in the Low Countries as chaplains to Horace's troops, Mary and Horace sponsored and promoted more than a score of these men and influenced many others. These were preachers who were often seen by senior

¹⁰⁴ The record of Francis and Horace's burials appear in the Westminster Abbey Burial Register in the Abbey archives but no reference number. There is no record of the erection of monuments at this period and the actual date is not known. All arrangements would have been between Francis' widow, who put it up as the inscription records, and the sculptor (thought to be Isaac James). The Abbey has no papers about the making of the tomb.

¹⁰⁵ Clements Markham, *The Fighting Veres*, p. 360. Markham says the death was sudden on the [rather uncertain] grounds that Francis was conducting business at Portsmouth, where he was governor, less than two weeks before his death.

¹⁰⁶ Clements Markham, *The Fighting Veres*, p. 381.

¹⁰⁷ Karen Ordahl Kupperman, *The Jamestown Project*, (Harvard, 2007), p.192.

¹⁰⁸ Adams, 'The Protestant Cause', p.179.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p.180-181. These were men closely tied to Horace either militarily or familiarly. Ogle and Cecil served under Vere's command. Conway was Vere's deputy Governor in the Brill, Winwood was English agent to the States-General between 1603 and 1612 and Secretary of state and Privy Councillor from 1614 until his death in 1617. Calvert was a politician who became Secretary of State in 1619 and later converted to Catholicism. But this was almost certainly in the mid 1620's and at the time of these investments Calvert was an aide to Robert Cecil, who was an ardent opponent of Catholicism. If Calvert had had sympathies for the Catholic Church at this time he certainly hid it well.

¹¹⁰ *A declaration of the Colonie and Affaires in Virginia: By His majesties Council for Virginia, 22 January 1620*, (London, 1620).

Church of England figures as radicals, many of them having been forced to leave England in the face of the established Church's often violent reaction to their preaching. After Horace's death in May 1635, Mary continued to support and sponsor such men right up until her own death on Christmas Eve 1670 in her 90th year.¹¹¹

Financial matters played an important part of their married life and in 1623 Mary wrote to her brother-in-law Sir Edward Conway, now the Secretary of State, regarding another business interest. This time concerning patents for making glass with sea coal that had been the prerogative of her brother Thomas and was worth £200 per annum. Mary asked for this case to be heard by the Earl Marshal in council.¹¹² Conway accordingly wrote to the Earl Marshal about the matter in March of the same year.¹¹³

In January 1623 Horace and Mary had attended the wedding of his friend Robert Harley to Brilliana, Edward Conway's daughter, and then suffered the loss of their youngest daughter Susan aged just 4, and barely a year later of Horace's oldest brother, John Vere.¹¹⁴ John Vere had remained at home with their mother Elizabeth (nee Hardekyn) at the family home of Kirby Hall in Essex, acting as an agent for Francis, Robert and Horace when they were away soldiering. John continued to reside in Kirby after his mother died (1617) and though he and his wife had no children of their own, John fathered an illegitimate son who was also named John. This John Vere served under Horace and rose to become Sergeant Major General under his uncle. Knighted in 1607, he died in 1631.¹¹⁵ His son Edward also joined Horace in the low countries, gained the rank of Lieutenant and died at the siege of Maastricht just a year after his father, in 1632.¹¹⁶

Horace himself died in May 1635 at the age of 70, after a comparatively long life.¹¹⁷ Yet despite his contemporary fame and military longevity little has been written

¹¹¹ NA Prob 11/338/214. In her will Mary left a number of benefactions. Interestingly she left 'unto my loving grandchild, Horatio, Lord Townshend, the picture of my late dear husband, Horace, Lord Vere, deceased, in my great parlour, and the pictures of all my Lord Vere's officers and captains (full-length portraits, probably by Ravesteyn) in the said room or elsewhere in my house called Kirby Hall, to be delivered to his Lordship or whom he shall appoint immediately after my decease.' The pictures, commissioned by Horace Vere, remained in the family until the early 20th century when they were sold off or otherwise dispersed. The independent US art historian Barry Tsirelson is engaged in tracking down the paintings and their locations.

¹¹² *CSP Domestic, James, 1623*, Mary Vere to Conway, Feb 13 1623. p. 491. At this time the Earl Marshal was Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel and Surrey.

¹¹³ *CSP, Domestic, James, 1623*, p. 509. Conway to the Earl Marshal, 3 March 1623.

¹¹⁴ Clements Markham, *The Fighting Veres*, p. 421.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 384.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 422-423.

¹¹⁷ His five surviving daughters all married well; Elizabeth, the eldest, became the Countess of Clare; Mary became Lady Townshend/Countess of Westmoreland; Katherine married Oliver St John and after his death Lord Poulett. Anne became Lady Fairfax and Dorothy became Mrs Wolstenholme.

about him as a soldier. In the next section this thesis will review the key primary and secondary texts that touch upon his career.

Primary Sources and Historiography

Fifty-one letters written by Horace between 1620 and 1623 are currently lodged in the British Library.¹¹⁸ In this series Horace was writing mainly to William Trumball, and to George Calvert.¹¹⁹ Vere's letters exclusively concern military, financial and diplomatic issues mostly touching the Palatinate campaign and have not been previously examined systematically. A further 80 or so documents held at the National Archives are letters written by Vere, also mainly during the Palatinate campaign, though some date from as early as 1598 and as late as 1633.¹²⁰ Again, the letters cover mainly military and diplomatic matters and include few personal matters. Addressed to a wide range of individuals and also unstudied they add more depth and substance to Horace's character and shed light on many of the military and political issues of the day. They show Horace's even tempered mentality whether discussing battles, lack of funds, lack of information or individuals. Of course, as Richard Evans has pointed out,

'historians cannot recover a single, unalterably 'true' meaning of a dispatch simply by reading it; on the other hand, we cannot impose any meaning we wish onto such a text either. We are limited by the words it contains, words which are not, ...capable of an infinity of meaning. And the limits...are set... by the original author' and the wider context within which the words are written.¹²¹

But Horace's letters, limited as they are in uncovering personal detail, provide a useful insight into his military situations especially regarding his time in the Palatinate. In the circumstances the fact that they survived at all is quite surprising since Vere was, for much of the campaign, cut off and besieged and also, as James Daybell informs us, 'Letters in the early modern period were normally treated as ephemeral'.¹²² Phillip West concurs 'recipients kept them ... with no more care than they did most early modern papers'.¹²³ All of Vere's surviving letters were sent to officials and this was why they were retained.

¹¹⁸ BL, Trumball papers, Add. Mss. 72315, (1620-1622).

¹¹⁹ Respectively; Envoy from James I and then Charles I at the Brussels Court of Archduke Albert of Austria, ruler of the Habsburg Netherlands; Principal Secretary to the Privy Council N.A. SP84/83; SP84/127; SP84/101; SP84/74; SP84/75; SP84/82; SP84/136; SP84/103.

¹²¹ Richard Evans, *In Defence of History*, (London, 1997). p. 106

¹²² James Daybell, *The Material Letter in Early Modern England, manuscript Letters and the Culture and Practices of Letter writing, 1512-1635*, (Palgrave, 2012), p. 190.

¹²³ Phillip West, 'Epigrams and the Forest', in *The Oxford handbook of Ben Jonson*. (Ed). Eugene Giddens., Literature, Literary Studies – 1500 to 1700. Online Publication date Jan 2019.

Also at the NA is the 'Compendium' a treatise which runs to 40 pages and covers a wide range of military matters.¹²⁴ (App.1). It is one of the earliest drill manuals in English, though never published, and was probably inspired by previous continental works on the military arts such as Maurice of Nassau's *The Exercise of Arms for Calivers, Muskets and Pikes* (1607) which became the standard Northern European handbook on infantry training.¹²⁵ The 'Compendium' was produced initially in or around 1611 though some parts of the document refer to later actions and events, including the 1614 phase of the Cleves-Julich war. It contains detailed instructions concerning not only drill but also descriptions of and instructions for the proving, size and weight of muskets and of powder, shot and match.¹²⁶ Details of how a camp is to be set out and the relationship of the soldiers to the many civilians who marched and lived with the army are also included, as are the orders of march.

The fact that Horace Vere issued these instructions presupposes that he may not have been content with the way that things were being done at the time and wanted to improve the efficiency and organisation of his troops. He may also have been introducing a new or revised system, possibly conforming with the way in which Dutch troops were drilled since Vere's English troops were, of course, part of Maurice of Nassau's larger allied force.¹²⁷ Indeed, page seven of the manual states that 'The Form of Exercising of a company of foot (was) translated out of the Dutch by his Excellency's order and confirmed by my council the 26th of December 1612 s.v.'

The 'Compendium' gives detailed instructions in the use of pikes and muskets en masse and similarly meticulous [and complex] directives regarding skirmishing, the distances between ranks and files, and the exact words that officers must use when directing their men. But the 'Compendium' is more than a simple drill manual, it covers most aspects of military life from the proving of new muskets, the amount of powder and shot to be used, manoeuvring, the roles of civilians, the layout of a quarter [camp], the order of march and the role of the quartermaster who is to 'look out for ammunition, bread and powder & match & bullets' with a special order that the match [the fuse used to ignite the powder in the musket] 'be not wasted in the tying of boordes' [boards]. This last to prevent the soldiers using the expensive match as cord or string when assembling their cabins in camp 'for the carrying is very chargeable.'¹²⁸

¹²⁴ NA SP 9/202/1 A Compendium of the Art of War Under Sir Horace Vere.

¹²⁵ Geoffrey Parker, 'The Limits to Revolutions in Military Affairs: Maurice of Nassau, The Battle of Nieuwpoort'. In *The Journal of Military History*, Vol .71, No 2 (Apr., 2007). pp. 331-372. And see Sarah Fraser, *The Prince who would be King, The Life and Death of Henry Stuart*, (London, 2017), p.98.

¹²⁶ 'Proving' means testing the musket to ensure it works properly. This was not always done and old or badly made firearms could be more dangerous to the wielder than to the enemy.

¹²⁷ They were not all English but included men from a wide variety of nationalities.

¹²⁸ NA SP9/202/1 'A Compendium of the Art of War'. p.13.

The 'Compendium' tells us that a musket weighed 13-15 pounds (and was four feet long) and with the rest (on which the musket was laid when shooting), match, powder, shot and bandolier a musketeer had to carry about 25 pounds weight plus his bread and other victuals and necessities and in addition about 20 pounds weight of armour.¹²⁹ Instructions are set out so as to avoid disorder when on the march and to maintain discipline. And here the instruction to 'have the old men placed in the rear' is not a concession to age, it is done to 'keep them from straggling' and with the same sentiment in mind 'the beer must be sold upon the march as it is sold in the quarter [i.e. at the same price as in the camp] 'if not to take such as will serve the troops cheapest or else they will set their own prices'.¹³⁰

Lengthy instructions are given regarding sentries – the watch - who are sternly reminded that swapping duties is a punishable offence. Whilst for practical, rather than compassionate, reasons 'the sentinel [is] to stand but two hours at the most'.¹³¹ Punishments are only fleetingly referred to but the words used are quite chilling 'a provost marshall goes also out with his executioner to punish any soldier that he finds as to give the frappado (a stick to hit or beat men] or to whip boys of the horsemen'.¹³² Interestingly too, 'The Colonels company [usually up to twice the size of the others] is upon the right hand & his outermost file to be all gentlemen in the right hand; for there they guide all the ranks of the division & are ready for to be in the front when the troop hath order to charge upon the right hand'.¹³³

The 'Compendium' also gives details of the numbers of infantry and cavalry in the order of battle before Rees [during the 1614 fighting around Cleve-Julich] with the numbers of men in each of the regiments. Also of interest are the detailed instructions for the setting up of a camp, with precise measurements regarding the distances between cabins and tents. There are also directives for the digging of a latrine (at least 200 feet in the rear) and that 'it must be digged very deep' as well as for constructing wells, and clear orders that the sale of beer and victuals must be contained within one area.

The 'Compendium' is a set of instructions covering the wide range of issues that affected and governed military life both on and off campaign just before the upheaval of the English Civil Wars. It must have influenced those who were subject to its regulations and thus, by inference, also affected the early organisation of the civil war armies. Henry Hexham, who later wrote three influential military instructional manuals,

¹²⁹ Ibid., p.1.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p.14.

¹³¹ Ibid., p.19.

¹³² Ibid., p.19.

¹³³ Ibid., p.21.

admitted the debt he owed to both the Veres in military matters.¹³⁴ Hexham was a long standing member of the Veres' military circle.¹³⁵ He would certainly have been aware of Vere's 'Compendium' and may even have had a hand in its composition. The first printed manual of arms in England, *Instructions for Musters and Armes*, ordered by the Privy Council, was not available until 1623 and it owes some of its content to the 'Compendium' and to Horace Vere's attempts to modernise and professionalise his troops.¹³⁶ In particular both use the same set of orders for mustering and presenting weapons, the way in which troops are moved around and the set distances between ranks and files. This is unsurprising since Cecil, Vere and Edward Conway were 'influential in shaping military policy and went on to advocate the introduction of...[this].. drill manual'.¹³⁷ Vere's 'Compendium' is much longer than the 1623 Privy Council version and covers a wider range of subjects, being concerned not only with drill. The later 1631 Privy Council edition gives more information about how soldiers, especially musketeers and pikemen, should stand and includes a number of drawings to aid learning. David Lawrence does not mention the 'Compendium' in his otherwise excellent book but this may be simply because the 'Compendium' was never printed or published and may have been used exclusively by men in service in the Netherlands and it is in any case only fair to note that the 'Compendium' itself borrows from earlier Dutch works. Nevertheless its importance and relevance to the beginnings of English battlefield organisation is profound.

Military treatises had been produced in Roman times, 'over sixty-seven such works were issued in Venice between 1492 and 1570' whilst 'almost sixty' had been published in the Low Countries between 1567 and 1621 some of which were translated into English.¹³⁸ David Lawrence states that between 1603 and 1645 'Englishmen penned over ninety books on military subjects' and though not all of them were manuals the 'Compendium' was thus not unique, though its connection to the foremost English soldier of the age must increase its cachet.¹³⁹ Francis Vere also had an interest in military books and treatises and he donated a number of military (and other) tracts to Thomas Bodley's new library at Oxford in the early years of the seventeenth century as his military career was coming to an end.¹⁴⁰ It is not known how long these works had

¹³⁴ Henry Hexham, *A True and Historicall Relation of the Bloody battell of Nieuport in Flanders* (Delft, 1641), dedication.

¹³⁵ Lawrence *The Complete Soldier*, (2009), p.104.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.15.

¹³⁸ Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier*, p.7.

¹³⁹ Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier*, p.1.

¹⁴⁰ *Bod. Lib*, Bodleian Benefactors List, 44-46. Registrum Donatorum (the first volume of the Benefactors' Registers covering 1600 -1688 at Library Records b. 903). Francis was one of the first donors in 1598, and followed his £100 present then with regular donations in the

been in Francis's possession, though some of them were published at the start of his military career, but it is documented that Francis was a devotee of Caesar's commentaries – which may be why he entitled his own military memories as he did.¹⁴¹ Francis's benefaction is not surprising, since Bodley had served as a diplomat in the Low Countries 'during the period that [Francis] Vere was establishing his reputation' and given Francis Vere's donations it is clear that the two men were friends.¹⁴² One may wonder why brother Horace, was not the recipient of this wealth of military knowledge, unless he too owned a similar collection. In any case Horace, who at the very least would have been aware of his brother's library, may thus have been sufficiently influenced by Francis's' apparent interest in martial manuscripts to create, or cause to be created, his own version just a few years later.

Horace Vere's 'Compendium' is clearly a response to the need for greater military discipline on the battlefield and elsewhere. It fits well within what was a growing library of military books engendered by the evolving use of firearms.¹⁴³

Other primary sources

Before his death in 1609 Francis Vere wrote a biographical account of the Dutch campaigns in which he fought between 1585 and 1604. Although not published until 1657 by William Dillingham *The Commentaries* give a detailed account of the Dutch wars, from Francis's perspective, between 1585 and 1609.¹⁴⁴ Francis mentions his younger brother Horace infrequently though approvingly, and describes military actions in which Horace took part which is helpful as a reference and comparator to other reports but he gives no biographical or character description. *The Commentaries* present a picture of Francis Vere as a brilliant and perceptive strategist whose ideas and plans were inevitably adopted by the leadership of the United Provinces. However, as Tracey Borman suggests, *The Commentaries* is at 'best self-congratulatory and at worst so boastful as to be implausible'.¹⁴⁵

following ten years, as well as further gifts of books in 1602, 1607, and 1609, (Letters of Sir Thomas Bodley, Oxford, 1926), p. 168. Vere is listed in the Benefactors' Register for the years 1602, 1606, 1607, 1608, and 1609. I am grateful to Oliver House, Superintendent, Special Collections Reading Rooms, Weston Library, Bodleian Libraries, Oxford, for this information.

¹⁴¹ Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier*, p.100.

¹⁴² Ibid., pp.97- 98.

¹⁴³ Roberts, 'The 'Military Revolution', 1560-1660' in Clifford Rogers (ed), *The Military Revolution Debate*.

¹⁴⁴ Vere, *The Commentaries*. Dillingham was a Latin poet, anthologist and a moderate Presbyterian. See W. H. Kelliher, 'Dillingham, William (c.1617–1689)', ODNB, (2004).

¹⁴⁵ Borman, 'Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands'. p.144.

Jan Janszn in his *Triumphs of Nassau*, written in 1613, paints a different picture regarding Francis's contribution. In this book, translated into English via a French version, it is Maurice of Nassau who is credited with the principal military genius.¹⁴⁶ The truth almost certainly lies somewhere between these two extremes. Janszn mentions Horace Vere in passing but the real value of his work for this present study, as with *The Commentaries*, is in giving contemporary accounts of the early conflicts in which Horace fought. These, together with other broader outlines of the various campaigns in which he was involved, help to give substance to Horace Vere's early military background. However, both *The Commentaries* and the *Triumphs of Nassau* must be read cautiously and as part of a wider appreciation of the events they portray and the actions of those involved. Janszn's description of the battle of Nieuwpoort however (see page 103) refers directly to Horace Vere's important role and gives credit to him for his use of artillery and his leadership skills at a time of great difficulty. Janzen's account, coming from a Dutch admirer of Maurice, adds weight to Horace Vere's reputation as a good war commander.

For Horace Vere's later career the work of Arthur Wilson is useful. Wilson was the earl of Essex's secretary for several years, going on campaign with him including to the Palatinate in 1621 under Horace Vere's command. Wilson's *History of Great Britain, being the Life And Reign of King James The First*, was published in 1653, the year after Wilson's death.¹⁴⁷ An unfashionable historian now his *History* is devoid of references or other scholarly rigour but Wilson was nevertheless a contemporary of Vere and accompanied him to the Palatinate, writing extensively about that campaign. There has been little else written regarding this expedition but we do have a number of Horace Vere's letters from that time and in actions mentioned by both men Wilson's account appears to corroborate Vere's version and is thus less questionable.

For any non-military biographical detail the first extant information comes from Thomas Fuller (1608 – 16 August 1661) an English churchman and historian. In his *Worthies of England*, published in 1662, Fuller says that both Vere brothers were born in Essex but suggests that several different places had been assigned by different authors as their place of birth.¹⁴⁸ These are the family home at castle Hedingham in north-east Essex, four miles west of Halstead; Colchester and also Tilbury-juxta-Clare a village also in north-east Essex. When Horace was ennobled he took the title of

¹⁴⁶ Jan Janszn, *The Triumphs of Nassau*, Translated out of French, (London, 1613).

¹⁴⁷ Arthur Wilson, *The History of Great Britain, being the Life and Reign of King James The First*, (London, 1653).

¹⁴⁸ John Freeman (ed.), *Thomas Fuller, The Worthies of England*, (London, 1952).

Baron Vere of Tilbury which slender evidence may suggest that it was in Tilbury that he was born, since no record of his birth is now extant.¹⁴⁹

Fuller tells us that Francis's fiery spirit and rigid nature 'did not over-value the price of men's lives to purchase a victory' whereas Horace had 'more meekness and as much valour as his brother; so pious, that he first made peace with God before he went out to war with man'. It was said of him 'what is said of the Caspian sea, that it doth neither ebb nor flow; observing a constant tenor, neither elated nor depressed with success'. Fuller also says that Horace was 'loved by the soldiery'.¹⁵⁰ As a contemporary of Vere Fuller was writing at a time when many people would have had personal knowledge of him and thus Fuller's evaluation must be given serious consideration. Certainly Horace Vere's popularity with his soldiers is well attested.

A '*biography of the noble families of Cavendishe, Holles, Vere, Harley, and others*' was printed in 1752. The work of Arthur Collins (1681-1760) it was written, in his own words, because of 'an innate desire to preserve the memory of famous men.' Collins seems to demonstrate 'an adulation of birth and rank', an affectation which comes across in his work, which must therefore be considered with caution.¹⁵¹ It contains some additional biographical detail about Horace and his brothers but again draws heavily on the (already suspect) *Commentaries*.¹⁵² It does provide background information about Horace Vere's wider family but there is no new material about the man himself. Entries in *Biographia Britannica* give information about Horace relating to his military career but also, like Fuller, regarding his character and religious persona.¹⁵³ This shows Horace Vere to have been respected and admired by his soldiers but the work provides little evidence for its assertions.

None of these works focus primarily upon Horace Vere but their contributions provide some useful material in the construction of a more detailed assessment of his life. Much of that material finds its way into the *The Fighting Veres*, the only major work dedicated to the Veres. Published in 1888 and ostensibly devoted to both Sir Francis and Horace the book offers only a quarter of its 460 pages to the younger brother.¹⁵⁴ There is no serious attempt to examine their birth or early years and there are few supporting references, yet Clements Markham is frequently quoted in other works as

¹⁴⁹ The Essex record office holds all the parish registers for the county. There is a gap in the entries around this period. Tilbury Juxta Clare was part of the De Vere estate. Ecclesiastical records are equally barren.

¹⁵⁰ John Freeman (ed.), *Thomas Fuller, The Worthies of England*, pp.179 -180.

¹⁵¹ Cecil R. Humphrey-Smith, 'Collins, Arthur (1681/2 – 1760)' ODNB, (2004).

¹⁵² Arthur Collins, *A Historical collection of the Noble families of Cavendishe, Holles, Vere, Harley*, (London,1752).

¹⁵³ *Biographica Britannica*, Vol. 6, see n.18 p. 400 – 411.

¹⁵⁴ Markham, *The Fighting Veres*.

the prime authority, probably because there is so little else to fall back upon.¹⁵⁵ Markham's book itself draws heavily on *The Commentaries*, on Wilson and on the *Biographia* though he is sparing in his attributions. Markham is eulogistic in his uncritical acceptance of Francis Vere's version of events whilst recognising the merit of the less self-aggrandising approach of Horace. Several successful military and political events described by Sir Francis in the commentaries as being uniquely attributable to him have been shown, by Dutch and other sources, to be at least questionable and in some cases clearly heavily embellished.¹⁵⁶ Markham is also blatantly anti-Jacobean though he is an avowed supporter of the Protestant cause and his failure to recognise that relations between Francis Vere and the Dutch were not always cordial is a major flaw, especially as Horace was demonstrably able to keep on good terms with Maurice and later Dutch leaders.¹⁵⁷ Markham's considerable bias and his antipathy towards James I require the reader to weigh his words and ideas carefully.

More recently a number of PhDs have added to our knowledge and understanding of both the religious and military events of the period. Simon L. Adams unpublished D.Phil. thesis (1973) provides a valuable discussion of the influence of the religious revolution on English politics between the years 1585 – 1630 an almost exact match for Horace Vere's life. At a time when the new Protestant religion was actively splitting into fresh variants, Adams work offers religious reasons as 'the leading motive for English intervention on the continent.'¹⁵⁸ This certainly meshes well with Horace Vere's clear religious motivation which Adams notes and emphasises. However he also shows that neither Elizabeth I, nor James I was particularly sympathetic to political Puritanism or to positive action in Europe in its defence.¹⁵⁹ Indeed at the time of the Palatinate crisis the English clergy were specifically told not to preach the war as 'one of religion.'¹⁶⁰ Nevertheless, Adams argues clearly that it was at this time that religion first became a major factor in European warfare and Horace Vere's known piety, allied to his military reputation, argues strongly that for him the Palatine war was an important religious confrontation. Adams asserts that whilst zealots in England pressed for religious wars, they did not associate such action with political change (which in the main they, and Horace Vere, would have deplored) whereas Elizabeth and James 'had a far greater sensitivity to the revolutionary potentialities of these aspirations'¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁵ Markham was hampered by the lack of extant birth records either in civil or ecclesiastical repositories.

¹⁵⁶ Tracey Borman, 'Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands', pp. 15 – 19.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹⁵⁸ Adams, 'The Protestant Cause': Abstract, p. 1.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 296.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

Adams also sheds light upon the Puritan character of Horace and his 'permanent feud' with Edward Cecil over military and social advancement.¹⁶² These two aspects relate directly as Adams asserts that Vere's patronage clearly favored those whose religious beliefs were aligned with his own.¹⁶³ Which supports the proposal that Vere approached all military action from a religious perspective. Adams' discussion of political Puritanism in the army is particularly helpful too as it concerns not only the appointment of preachers to Vere's and to other regiments, but also because it demonstrates that the army in the Low Countries, under Vere's control, was able to protect 'radical divines' who had often been deprived of their livings in England.¹⁶⁴ This military/religious independence persisted until the early 1630s when King Charles appears to have acceded to Archbishop Laud's pressure and, with Vere's death in 1635, the radical preachers lost the protection of the army and were dispersed, many seeking a fresh start in New England.¹⁶⁵

Also valuable in trying to determine the political and military role of Horace is David Trim's work.¹⁶⁶ This is because Trim discusses the character and political background of the British soldier in the European wars of the late 16th and early 17th Centuries. His references to Horace Vere are descriptive rather than analytical but he provides useful material regarding the overall position and status of English and other British troops in Europe at the time. The relationship of Vere, and other gentleman volunteers, to the English monarch, the States of Holland and the wars in general are well observed providing a soundly developed context to the early part of Horace Vere's military career. Taken together with Francis Markham's work on the nature and role of individual ranks within the Allied army [see p 24] it is an excellent appreciation of the role and expectation of such young gentleman generally as they served in the allied forces. The work of Adams and Trim complement and embellish each other in Vere's respect and provide essential background to this present work.

David Trim also wrote the DNB article on Horace, but this is founded largely on *The Commentaries; The Historical collection of the Noble families of Cavendishe, Holles, Vere, Harley (et al)* and Markham.¹⁶⁷ The article also exposes the severe lack of extant early biographical detail for both Horace and Francis.

¹⁶² Cecil was the Grandson of Elizabeth's great Minister Lord Burghley.

¹⁶³ Adams, 'The Protestant Cause', p.439.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., App. 2.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 447.

¹⁶⁶ Trim, 'Fighting Jacobs Wars.' p.194 – 198.

¹⁶⁷ David J B Trim, 'Horace Vere (1565-1635), ODNB, (2004).

In 1999 Dr. Trim also published a brief interpretation of five letters written by Horace Vere to Prince Henry via the Prince's Secretary, Andrew Newton.¹⁶⁸ Henry offered his patronage to Horace Vere as a way of obtaining first-hand accounts of the Cleves-Julich affair from the pre-eminent English general on the spot.¹⁶⁹ The letters cover military and political concerns, and are useful in shedding light on these issues from the point of view of the senior English general on the spot. In particular these letters give strong evidence that Vere was not actively engaged in the conflict and thus indirectly confirm Vere's pious approach to warfare. (see pp. 36, 143). However, Trim's work concentrates mainly on Horace Vere's military and diplomatic roles. He says little or nothing about Horace's life away from the battlefields of both Europe and the Jacobean court or about his religious character though close examination of one of these letters can be interpreted as strong evidence of Vere's religious belief. (see p.43)

Tracy Borman's unpublished doctoral thesis concentrates on the life of Sir Francis Vere. It discusses in detail the causes and origins of the English involvement in the Dutch wars of liberation after the treaty of Nonsuch in 1585.¹⁷⁰ Borman re-examines Francis Vere's role in the conflict and is able to show that though Francis was clearly a competent and respected leader he was not the almost infallible and far sighted commander that his own commentaries (and Markham) would imply.¹⁷¹ In this Borman tends to support Jan Janzsen's position. Borman sheds light on the political realities of the wider English involvement in the Dutch rebellion showing how relations between various court officials and favorites severely nuanced the political and financial aspects of Elizabeth 1's policy towards both the Dutch and the Spanish. Overall Borman's thesis provides an excellent framework to Horace Vere's early military career though he plays a very minor role in Borman's evaluation of the older brother.

A recent appraisal of the English relationship to the Thirty Years War is to be found in Adam Marks' unpublished thesis of 2012.¹⁷² Marks' asserts that there has been a 'lack of any serious work on the English abroad during the early modern period'.¹⁷³ This is a little disingenuous given David Trim's work, but Marks does expand the discussion beyond the mere military and he sets out to refute the view held by some Historians that 'few Englishmen chose foreign mercenary service as a means of migration'.¹⁷⁴ Complementing the work of Adams and Trim, if obliquely, Marks' focus is

¹⁶⁸ . David Trim, 'Sir Horace Vere in the Rhineland, 1610-1612' *Historical Research*, vol.72, no. 179, (October 1990). Dr Trim discusses the relationship of Vere to Newton and his position as chief officer of the English regiments in Dutch pay at this time.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 345.

¹⁷⁰ Borman, 'Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands,'.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., pp. 187 – 190.

¹⁷² Adam Marks, 'England the English and the Thirty Years War'.

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 22.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 23.

on the wider involvement of the English in the European conflicts of the early Seventeenth Century. He notes, crucially, that Stuart political and military policy was inextricably linked to Elizabethan strategy, flowing from it rather than adopting any radical new stance. Elizabeth and James certainly shared an antipathy for expensive, dangerous and unpredictable diplomatic and military engagement in Europe, which was evidenced by their lack of continuous overt support for such adventures. Marks' discussion of the Bohemian/Palatinate crisis covers the wider religious, financial and diplomatic issues well but scarcely mentions Horace or indeed any of the other major military figures involved though he is right to allude to the close relationship that Horace had developed with the Dutch leaders as being an important element in the structure and organization of the English forces serving the United Provinces, demonstrated by the 'Compendium'. Marks recognizes Vere's military skill and leadership whilst he was in the Palatinate stating that to hold the country 'for so long was a significant military achievement' which between 1620 and 1622 prevented Spinola from attacking the United Provinces directly thus giving the Dutch more time to meet the Spanish challenge.¹⁷⁵ This direct endorsement of Vere's significance is almost unique but is clearly part of Marks' overall view that English involvement in the continental struggle was both widespread and important.

Marks emphasises the importance and status of Horace Vere, as an English General in Dutch pay, when he relates that following Vere's death in 1635 'the Dutch used this moment to re order some of the conditions on which English service was based' despite the objections of the remaining English Colonels.¹⁷⁶ Marks also stresses the importance of Vere and the English contingents both at the sieges of s'Hertogenbosch (1629) and Maastricht (1632). In both actions, where English losses were severe, Horace Vere commanded the English forces which bore the brunt of the attack and suffered the highest casualties. Clearly Vere, as the longstanding leader of the English troops in Dutch pay, knew and understood the nature of sieges from every perspective and those who flocked to serve under him did so because of his knowledge and ability in such circumstances. In particular at Maastricht, where 'The victory was secured by an English assault' Vere was the dominant commander, despite being in his late-sixties.¹⁷⁷ This success in particular was a crucial English contribution to the Thirty Years War as it separated Westphalia from Brussels (the capital of the Spanish

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 104.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 85.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 83.

Netherlands).¹⁷⁸ This is further evidence of the importance of Horace Vere (and his English troops) in helping to secure recognition of Dutch independence.

Other Sources

Seven years after Horace Vere's death a collection of seventeen elegies in his memory were collected by R. Badger for Christopher Meredith, who published them in London and dedicated them to Lady Mary Vere, Horace's widow.¹⁷⁹ Some of these poetic appreciations may have been written before 1642, though as many of the elegists were still quite young in that year it is more likely that they were written in or just before the year of their publication. The elegies are interesting in their own right because of the light they shed on how Vere as a soldier, a champion of Protestantism and an important figure in early modern English military, religious and social history was seen by contemporaries. (see Chapter 5).

The website *House of Vere.com* contains information about the De Vere and Vere families. There is a short paper within the website which concentrates on Horace.¹⁸⁰ However much of the information is not attributed and that which is comes mainly from *The Commentaries* of Sir Francis and from the Trim DNB article.

The Inns of Court are the four legal societies having the exclusive right of admitting people to the English bar. They were involved in drawing up some of the original legal agreements underpinning the financing, management and staffing of the Jamestown Settlement in the first decade of the Seventeenth Century. In particular the Middle Temple (one of the Inns) has a document approving the appointment of Sir Francis as an honorary benchman (that is a Barrister) in 1603 at the same time as Sir John Frobisher and Sir Francis Drake, both of whom were involved in the English settlements in America.¹⁸¹ Horace became a part of the Jamestown project in 1609, when he inherited his brother's interest but there is no record of him in MT records.

C.V Wedgwood gives an excellent, if dated, narrative background to the Thirty Years War in her eponymous 1938 book.¹⁸² Balanced, inclusive, self-assured, even patronising at times Wedgwood lays out this complicated and often confusing conflict in an accessible way. Her references to Horace are few and are in no way sufficiently analytical, but Wedgwood's integrity and balanced approach, supported by other

¹⁷⁸ NA SP84/144/ f233v; Henry Hexham, Hendrik Hondius and Christopher Lloyd, *A journall, of the taking in of Venlo, Roermont, Strale, the memorable seige of Mastricht, the towne & castle of Limburch*, (1633), pp. 35-40.

¹⁷⁹ *Elegies celebrating the Happy memory of Sir Horatio Veere' Baron of Tilbury, Colonell Generall of the English in the United Provinces and Mr. of the Ordnance in England, etc.'* (London, 16/7/1642).

¹⁸⁰ House of Vere, www.houseofvere.com/Horacevere.php.

¹⁸¹ Middle Temple Library, Admissions Book, MT1.MPA/MT.PA/3.

¹⁸² C.V Wedgwood. *The Thirty Years War*, (London, 1938).

writers, contrasts greatly with Clement Markham's and thus whatever she does say can be treated with much less caution. Wedgewood provides context to Horace Vere's latter military career despite failing to recognise Horace Vere's contribution in delaying the advance and deployment of Spanish and Imperial troops against the Dutch

Geoffrey Parker's analysis of the logistical and economic issues that affected the Spanish attempt to retain, and then subsequently to recover, its lost Dutch provinces in the one hundred years after 1567 highlight the immense difficulties that the Spanish had in moving troops effectively to the Low countries.¹⁸³ Parker shows in particular that all of the combatants in this conflict found finances to be the single biggest obstacle in attempting to achieve their military and political aims. This is a frequently corroborated fact in Horace Vere's letters from the Palatinate wherein he describes the effects of a severe lack of funding for his troops, which Parker's work contextualises. Even Spain, the richest and most powerful state of the day had to declare itself bankrupt more than once and was frequently plagued by mutinous troops demanding pay that was often months if not years overdue.¹⁸⁴ Time and again, the temporary bankruptcy of the Spanish Crown and the concomitant subsequent difficulties in raising fresh loans caused the failure of its military operations whilst the Dutch, by acquiring collective responsibility for war loans, secured against future taxes and high rates of interest, had little difficulty in securing credits both from domestic and international investors.¹⁸⁵

After the English troops came under Dutch control in 1598 they benefitted greatly from this regularity of pay. Yet in the Palatinate 23 years later, now acting directly for the English crown, Vere's troops were constantly in arrears of pay which in itself caused considerable difficulties for Vere. (see pages 168-170). Both Elizabeth and James faced similar problems to the Spanish crown and both were reluctant to use their comparatively meagre resources to support their troops.¹⁸⁶

A more recent publication, *'The Thirty Years War; Europe's Tragedy* by Peter Wilson re-examines the conflict from a historical context, setting the loss of life and devastation the war caused in central Europe alongside the Holocaust in its comparative scale and contemporary effect.¹⁸⁷ Wilson's holocaustic descriptions are buttressed and supported by Horace Vere's letters which frequently refer to the devastation and destruction of the conflict. But Wilson's discussions of the strategic

¹⁸³ Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659*, (CUP, 1972), pp. 109 - 117.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., pp. 157-176.

¹⁸⁵ Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution. Military innovation and the rise of the West*. P. 63.

¹⁸⁶ G. Parker, *The Army of Flanders*; p. 124-130. And see Trim 'Fighting Jacobs Wars', p. 210.

¹⁸⁷ Peter Wilson, *The Thirty Years War; Europe's Tragedy*, (Harvard, 2009). And see Alec Ryrie *Protestants, The Radicals who made the Modern World*, (London 2017), p. 94.

and tactical manoeuvrings in the early years of the war barely mention Horace or his importance in holding up the Spanish for nearly two years and at one point he mistakes Horace's rank.¹⁸⁸ However, the book does give an excellent overview of the war and thus helps to contextualise Horace's role.

David Lawrence's *The Complete Soldier* examines the military culture of the reigns of the first two Stuarts.¹⁸⁹ It also presents and discusses the military writing of the era though fails to mention Horace's drill manual, possibly because Horace's work was not published. However, Horace and Francis Vere are mentioned as influential and competent military commanders, Horace especially as 'the patron to a generation of soldiers, many who were to become significant figures in the English Civil War'.¹⁹⁰ Lawrence attributes Horace Vere's enduring influence to his longevity and his friendship with the United Provinces ruling Nassau family. But whilst Lawrence, understandably given his focus, makes no mention of Horace Vere's religious motivation it is clear that this was a major, possibly *the* major influence upon Horace. Given his ability to successfully ride the political vicissitudes of the day and remain in good standing with both the Dutch and three successive English courts it is even more notable that throughout his ascendancy he never compromised his religious beliefs. Nowhere is this better evidenced than in his choice and prolonged patronage of radical divines – clergymen whose livelihood and personal freedom was often under threat from both the established Church of England and frequently the King. Before turning to Vere's military career therefore it is important to examine his selection and sponsorship of these men both in the United Provinces and at home in England. This will help determine Horace Vere's religious persona, provide a backdrop to his military career and help to explain his actions.

¹⁸⁸ Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy*, p. 332.

¹⁸⁹ Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier*, p.100.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.101.

2. Circles of Divinity

The purpose of this chapter is simply to try to establish what Horace Vere's doctrinal position was, what did he actually believe, at least for the second, more public part of his life? This is important because Vere's religious stance helped determine his actions which in turn influenced and affected many others. In Horace's case, the term Holy Warrior sums up, in just two words, the major loci of his life

Even in a more religiously nuanced age Horace Vere, together with his equally devout wife Mary, was regarded by his contemporaries as particularly pious. Letters, dedications, poetic appreciation and elegies, written both before and after his death, attest to this fact. But in an age when religion was undergoing considerable change, and new variants of the Protestant faith were emerging, the definition of piety, at least at the point of observation, became both confused and contentious.¹⁹¹ As Nicholas Tyacke proposes, 'In Elizabethan and early Stuart England religion bulked large' and toleration of religious diversity was not only rare, but could be dangerous as Puritans, Calvinists and later, Arminians, competed for authority in the English church and state.¹⁹² Understanding Horace Vere's doctrinal position will thus help us to understand his character and his reaction to life events.

Background

Horace Vere grew up in the embryonic Protestant environment of Elizabethan England. He was the grandnephew of John De Vere, the 16th Earl of Oxford, who had supported Mary Tudor in her accession to the throne in 1553. John subsequently assisted in the prosecution, and execution, of a number of men and women suspected of heresy against the Catholic church. However, following John's death, the Earldom passed to his only son, Edward, the 17th Earl, who was Horace Vere's first cousin once removed. Edward, then just 12 years old, was raised as a Protestant, firstly, in the household of William Cecil, Elizabeth's secretary of State, and subsequently in the household of Sir Thomas Smith, an early convert to Protestantism, who had been prominent at the court of Edward 6th, whom he served as Secretary of State.¹⁹³ He was a friend of Cecil, and though a Protestant he seems to have favoured moderation in religion.

This dichotomy of religious background within the De Vere family may have been finally settled, pragmatically, with the long Protestant reign of Elizabeth. During

¹⁹¹ Andrew Foster, *The Church of England 1570-1640*, (London, 1994). pp. 42 - 43.

¹⁹² Nicholas Tyacke, *Anti-Calvinists, The rise of English Arminianism c1590 – 1640*, (Oxford, 1990), pp. 4, 246.

¹⁹³ Alan H. Nelson, *Monstrous Adversary: the life of Edward de Vere, 17th Earl of Oxford*, (Liverpool, 2003), p. 25.

Horace's early years, the threat of a Catholic resurgence, epitomised by the living presence of Mary Queen of Scots, (executed in 1587) was ever present, but the defeat of the Armada in 1588 must have boosted the confidence of English Protestants, and the belief that theirs was the true religion. Horace's early environment was likely to have lead him towards one or another of the Protestant streams, though we have no direct evidence as to just what his religious influences might have been at the time. Had he been born a Catholic, he may have taken that older, more doctrinally established, route to what he saw as salvation, and that may have made it easier to understand his true religious feelings. As a Protestant, it is more difficult to get a clear-cut picture of exactly what his spiritual beliefs were, especially given the fluidity of Protestant religious thought at the time. And although Horace left over 130 letters, he at no point, in any of them, gives a specific indication of his religious principles. There are only a few occasions in his letters when he touches upon religion and belief and these are all, with just one exception, simply when in closing, Horace requests God's blessing, or approval, upon the recipient of the communication. The single exception appears in a letter Horace wrote to William Trumbull, who was from 1605 to 1625 secretary to the royal envoy, and then the envoy to the Brussels court of Archduke Albert of Austria, joint ruler of the Habsburg Netherlands between 1598 and 1621 with his wife Isabella Clara Eugenia, daughter of Phillip II of Spain.¹⁹⁴

Vere's communication, which is largely a military report, was written on 16 Nov 1621 from the Palatinate. Horace ends this letter by saying that he knows nothing of events in England, and that he hopes for news of a truce in the Palatinate soon 'which I beseech God may be for the good of his church and the upbringing of his majesties children'.¹⁹⁵ [Vere is referring here to The King of Bohemia]. This is the closest expression we have of any direct recognition of such sympathies on Vere's part, in this case ostensibly supporting the Calvinist doctrine of Frederick, the Elector Palatine and deposed King of Bohemia.¹⁹⁶ Thus, without any first hand evidence, the strongest contemporary, if circumstantial, indication of Vere's religious beliefs comes from a range of other sources. These include Vere's sponsorship of preachers; written dedications; and his family and friendship group. Poetic acclaim he received both before and after his death is discussed in chapter 5. .

We do not know if Horace Vere's religious belief came to him fully formed, in some moment of revelation, or if, having been born into a Protestant family, he grew

¹⁹⁴ Adams, 'The Protestant Cause', p.179. Adams calls Trumbull 'a pronounced Puritan'.

¹⁹⁵ BL, Add, Mss 72315, f135, Vere to Trumbull, Nov 16 1621.

¹⁹⁶ John Reeve, 'Sir Dudley Carleton and Sir Thomas Roe: English Servants of the Queen of Bohemia and the Protestant International during the Thirty Years War'. *Parergon*, 32, Number 3, (Perth, 2015), p.3.

into his adult convictions both psychologically and emotionally. It is certainly true that, at this time, many young men of his class set out for Europe, as he did, to fight for their religion. Other young men, seeking adventure, fame, fortune or simply escape from problems at home volunteered for different reasons.¹⁹⁷ We do not know the exact nature of Horace's religious philosophy in 1590, when he joined his brothers in the United Provinces, though he must have had some Catholic antipathy. But by the time he had risen, in 1607, to command large numbers of men, his religious standpoint is more discernible, as contemporaries, through their written work, both directly and indirectly, begin to give an increasingly sharper focus to Vere's spiritual beliefs. Certainly by the early 1620s he was noted for his piety and the religious values he encouraged in his family.¹⁹⁸

Personal feelings, empathies, and the effects of life events are not fixed or constant now, nor were they in the past. So we cannot assume that the written words of anyone, at any given time, and which we can only interpret subjectively, necessarily reflect the actuality then, before or later. Margaret Griffin rightly emphasises the difficulty any historian faces in examining 'evidence' from the past, 'consciously or unconsciously, historians frequently fit their methodologies to their own preconceived teleological purposes'.¹⁹⁹ Thus, attempting to fit Horace Vere into one particular theology is beset with difficulties, especially given the uncertain provenance of his early years, and the fact that many of the English men and women who influenced Horace spent much of their lives, like he did, in the spiritual climate of the United Provinces.

It is not the intention of this thesis to try to ally Vere to any specific brand of Protestantism Puritanism or Calvinism, the more especially since such definitions have changed over time, and many noted historians have themselves explored and described the difficulties of such definition. In addition there were clearly degrees of Puritanism, including those who rejected the book of common prayer, those who rejected certain church ceremonies such as baptism and the wearing of the white surplice and those who saw Bishops as the epitome of the antichrist.²⁰⁰

However I will define Horace Vere as a Puritan for the purpose of this Thesis, even though there is no instance of anyone calling him a Puritan (or a Calvinist), or indeed anything else, though belief was central to his life and influenced his behaviour.

¹⁹⁷ Dunthorne, *Britain and the Dutch Revolt*, p. 74 - 77.

¹⁹⁸ Elisabeth Bourcier, *The Diary of Sir Simonds D'Ewes 1622 – 1624*, (Paris, 1974). p.178 Diary entry, 31 December 1622. D' Ewes is interested in the possibility of a 'match' with one of Vere's daughters 'for ... their religious bringing up'.

¹⁹⁹ Margaret Griffin, *Regulating Religion and Morality in the Kings Armies, 1639-1646*, (Brill, 1957), p. xxxi.

²⁰⁰ Patrick Collinson, 'The Jacobean Religious Settlement: The Hampton Court Conference' in Howard Tomlinson, (ed)., *Before the English Civil war; Essays on Early Stuart politics and Government*, (London, 1983, p. 29.

However that definition itself requires explanation which this chapter is intended to provide. However, such labels are not always helpful given the definitional difficulties they present both then and now especially since the evidence we do have about Vere's religious views, his doctrinal stance if you will, is indirect and circumstantial. Fortunately, the sheer volume of this evidence, recorded across the reasonable time frame of more than thirty years, buttresses the credibility of the conclusions that are reached, without needing to assign him precisely to any particular religious group.²⁰¹ This is important, given the considerable disagreements, even during Vere's lifetime, about the religious definition of a Puritan or a Calvinist. Indeed, contemporaries argued that their meaning and characterisation changed as the early years of the Seventeenth Century progressed.²⁰² As Nicholas Tyack puts it 'To some extent Puritanism has always existed in the eye of the beholder.'²⁰³ Whilst Christopher Durston and Jacqueline Eales declare that 'Nor is it possible to draw a straight and unbroken line between Puritans and non-Puritans' [amongst Protestants]. Durston and Eales also argue that the dynamics of Calvinism, as an essentially oppositional movement, 'gives it a fluidity unsuited to precise definition.'

By placing the emphasis on individual faith rather than on the collective autocracy of the Catholic religion, Protestants came to see religious practice as a matter of personal conviction.²⁰⁴ Fractionalism was thus inevitable. Patrick Collinson's opinion that time, place and circumstance inevitably determine religious classification, essentially supports and sums up this view.²⁰⁵ To which may be added G.E. Aylmer's opinion that Puritanism was essentially a state of mind.²⁰⁶

Some historians have argued that Puritanism can be equated with a belief in the doctrine of predestination, but others have expressed serious reservations about this view. Predestination may be claimed as one of the central principles of 'Calvinism' but, as Menna Prestwich and Patrick Collinson argue, it was Calvin's successor, Theodore de Bèza, who 'emphasised the doctrine of double predestination and made it the core of reformed [Calvinist] orthodoxy'²⁰⁷ This is a claim supported by Richard Stauffer who, whilst acknowledging that the concept occupies 'no negligible place' in

²⁰¹ Catherine K. Riessman, 'Narrative Analysis', J.F. Gubrium and J.A. Holstein, Sage, (eds), *Handbook of Interviewing*, (London, 2001). p. 33. Riessman calls this 'Correspondence'.

²⁰² Patrick Collinson, 'England and International Calvinism 1558-1640' in Menna Prestwich, (ed), *International Calvinism 1541-1715*, (Oxford, 1985), p. 215.

²⁰³ Tyacke, *Anti-Calvinists, The rise of English Arminianism c1590 – 1640*, p.186.

²⁰⁴ Ryrle, *Protestants, The Radicals who made the Modern World*, p.10.

²⁰⁵ Christopher Durston and Jacqueline Eales, 'Introduction: The Puritan Ethos, 1560-1700'. In Durston and Eales (eds), *The Culture of English Puritanism* (London, 1996), pp. 6-7, 3, 4.

²⁰⁶ G.E. Aylmer, 'The Puritan Outlook' *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Vol.36, (London, 1986), pp.2-3.

²⁰⁷ Prestwich, *International Calvinism*, p.13.

Calvin's thought, argues that it is not the central tenet of Calvin's writings.²⁰⁸ Double predestination implies both God's forgiveness of original sin, and election [to a guaranteed place in heaven] as a sign of God's favour, but Calvin did not 'give priority to any particular doctrine' because he saw all scripture as an equal truth.²⁰⁹ Patrick Collinson however, argues that because mainstream English non-conformists were tolerant, or at least accepting of bishops, whereas their European counterpart churches were not, English Puritans had an essential difference per se.²¹⁰ He cites the opposition of Archbishop Whitgift to Puritanism whilst 'express[ing] ...regard for Calvin'²¹¹ But even Collinson admits that 'the extent to which English Protestantism in the age of its maturity can be properly called Calvinist is one of some delicacy and difficulty.'²¹² He goes on to say that by the turn of the Sixteenth/Seventeenth Century, non-conformism was a broad and loose alliance of many different thoughts and ideas, located in several countries of Western Europe, all sporting subtle and not so subtle variations on the Calvinist theme, with the Church of England occupying a 'floating anchorage within the Calvinist sphere, not necessarily agreeing or complying with all of the doctrinal 'truths' held elsewhere, and occasionally moving to a new, if not distant, anchorage as new helmsmen were appointed'.²¹³

Thus English Puritan theology varied with time, place and personality. Nevertheless, despite this difficulty of definition, 'militant Protestants believed that the true Church knew no boundaries: an internationalist perspective that imbued within its adherents the belief that Protestants everywhere needed to protect one another, to take up arms in each other's defence and to attack their common enemies.'²¹⁴ Which is exactly what Horace Vere set out to do in 1590. Whatever his precise motives were at the time, this was an early indication of his desire to aid his Dutch co-religionists.

So within this complex, changing and sometimes dangerous environment, how can we get closer to Horace's real religious stance? We know that he allowed his regimental preachers to depart from using the authorised prayer book, and to conduct services in line with non-conformist orthodoxy, whilst other commanders, like Edward Cecil, had always conformed.²¹⁵ We know too that the absolute keystone of the non-conformist church was the preacher, whose status and position was paramount, and the importance of these men to Horace Vere, when on campaign or in garrison, is

²⁰⁸ Richard Stauffer, 'Calvin', in *I C (P)*, p. 34.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p.37.

²¹⁰ Friso Wielenga, *A History of the Netherlands*, (London, 2012), p. 55.

²¹¹ Collinson, 'England and International Calvinism 1558-1640' in *I C (P)*, p. 213.

²¹² *Ibid.*, p. 214.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

²¹⁴ Jason White, *Militant Protestantism and British identity, 1603-1642*, (London, 2012), p.3.

²¹⁵ Adams, 'The Protestant Cause' p. 447.

clear. Thus, in Horace's 'Compendium of the Art of War', when he regulates the layout of the camp [Fig 1], the preacher is placed in the centre and tops the list of those who are also positioned there.²¹⁶ These others are the Sergeant Provost, the quartermaster and the wagon men. Together supplying food and discipline for the body and the soul.




Fig 1 Typical Plan of the Layout of an Army camp as prescribed by Horace Vere. 1612

We also know that Horace and Mary sponsored other Puritan divines at home, both in the Netherlands and in England. So, whilst we can never know precisely what Horace's views were [and of course they may have changed, subtly, over time] these actions and the views of his contemporaries, friends and family must supply some compelling clues. The Veres were part of a complex web of sponsorship and religious and familial linkages, towards if not at the very top, of contemporary society and fortunately, unlike Horace, many of those in this circle of divinity left forthright declarations of their

²¹⁶ NA, SP9/202/1, 'A compendium of the Art of War', p.32.

doctrinal belief. These, taken together, constitute persuasive and convincing evidence of Vere's religious principles.

This evidence may usefully be divided into three groups. Firstly, we have ample evidence of Horace's appointment and sponsorship of preachers, both to his troops and at home. These were men whose views are established through their printed sermons, and other writings, and the views of those who in turn opposed or supported them; secondly, there are the numerous books, sermons and other publications that were dedicated to Horace and Mary; and finally, we have the known religious attitudes of Horace's friends and family, derived from their written works and letters. All of which leads to an efficient and sufficient conclusion which is beyond reasonable doubt.

Patronage

Horace and Mary Vere were notable patrons and employers of preachers. A practice which began as Horace rose to a senior command position. Until he took command of his own company in 1595, Horace would not have had the authority to appoint anyone, other than a personal clergyman. All companies and regiments of soldiers would have had, as they do today, a chaplain or preacher as an integral part of the unit.²¹⁷ His job was both to preach the word of God to the troops and to act as a source of spiritual, moral and personal guidance for the common soldiers, as well as for their commanders for whom the preacher was also often a personal or family chaplain. Although it is likely that the religious views of these men played an important part in some commanders' decisions to employ them, other influences must have been important. Whilst paying lip service to religious observance in a much more overtly faith-laden age, commanders would have varied in their insistence upon the particular doctrine of their preachers, though accommodating powerful patrons at home must have become irresistible at times.

Another factor was pay. At this time, it was rare indeed for troops to be paid on time and in full, so appointing an extranumerary, non-combative, preacher was almost a luxury.²¹⁸ But many of the available preachers came from a group that had been driven out of their livings in England because their unbending doctrinal position had

²¹⁷ Not constituted as part of the army establishment till 1796 the RACHD's motto is 'In this Sign Conquer' referring to the cross seen in the sky before the Battle of the Milvian Bridge by the Roman Emperor Constantine I st in 312 AD. The motto is part of the chaplains headress badge and British chaplains claim an ancestry back to this battle. <https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/30103483>.

²¹⁸ On the constant lack of funds see NA SP84/74/ letters to Sir Dudley Carleton on 16th, (f52) and 18th (f65) May and to Sir Francis Nethersole 11th (f152) June 1621, and also on the 18th (f103) May 1621, and to Secretary Calvert on 16th (f155) June 1621 and on 23 (f85) May 1621. Spanish troops were also often without pay, see Parker, *The Army of Flanders* pp.133-156.

become untenable at home following the 1604 Hampton Court Conference. This three day meeting did not lead to the decisive Puritan success that some had hoped for. In fact, the anti-Calvinist position was comprehensively aired there for the first time.²¹⁹ King James attempted to ensure an irenic outcome, seeing a differentiation between moderate and radical non-conformists, and generally seeking uniformity and inclusivity, providing his own position was not challenged, directly or indirectly. But despite the King's attempts to find an acceptable conformity, there were many clerics whose views were still seen as too extreme, and who were soon afterwards forced out of their livings. Unable to find employment at home, many of these men went to the Low Countries where their religious views found a more agreeable reception. Thus, these men could be employed cheaply. As Keith Sprunger puts it 'The company of early seventeenth century religious exiles in Holland reads like an honor roll of radical Puritanism'.²²⁰ For Horace Vere, it seems likely that he would have had a clear idea of exactly what sort of divine he wanted to preach to his troops. He had a wide choice but the first of these preachers that we can identify was John Paget.²²¹

Horace Vere, and his colleague in arms Sir John Ogle, employed Paget as a chaplain, just after he arrived in the Netherlands, early in 1605. Paget was a young preacher who had developed his non-conformist ideas and skills at the Calvinist breeding ground of Trinity College Cambridge in the last years of the sixteenth century. Here, he came under the influence of Thomas Cartwright's controversial legacy. In 1569, Cartwright had been appointed Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity at Cambridge and though he had been forced out of the post in 1570 by John Whitgift who was then Vice Chancellor, Cartwright had left a strong Puritan heritage. He espoused reformed presbyteries and a much looser form of church government, with local congregations assuming almost all supervisory roles, but he never embraced the separation of state and church.²²² Nevertheless it was exactly this sort of quasi-separatist dilution of power that found ill-favour with King James, who saw it as the first step towards a challenge to his own authority.²²³ After getting his MA at Trinity College, Paget had become rector of Nantwich in 1598, but in January 1605 he was ejected from this living for his non-conformity following the Hampton Court Conference and, like many others in a similar position, Paget migrated to the more welcoming religious milieu of the United Provinces. Horace Vere must have been aware of Paget's notoriety at home but he still employed the man at what was a critical time. Francis Vere was in the process of

²¹⁹ Tyacke, *Anti-Calvinists*, p. 9.

²²⁰ Keith L Sprunger, *The Learned Doctor William Ames*, (Oregon, 1972), p. 212.

²²¹ Keith L. Sprunger, 'Paget, John', *ODNB*, (2004).

²²² Patrick Collinson, 'Cartwright, Thomas' (1534/5–1603), *ODNB*, (2004).

²²³ Patrick Collinson, 'The Jacobean Religious Settlement: The Hampton Court Conference', in *Before the English Civil War*; Tomlinson, (ed). p. 45.

leaving his post as head of the English forces and Horace was one of the contenders for the position.

When Horace returned to England in 1607 (to marry Mary), Paget left his regimental duties to become the 'founding pastor' of the English reformed church in Amsterdam.²²⁴ He held this position for over thirty years. John Paget refused to use the English prayer book, and he opposed the established Church of England's ceremonialism too, but Paget also opposed the separatist movement and made efforts to reduce the growing sectarianism amongst the English churches in the Netherlands. He wrote a number of books opposing separation, and justifying the presbyterian approach. In 1618, for example, he wrote *An arrow against the separation of the Brownists*, opposing the separatist ideology of the group named after the dissenter Robert Brown, who, like Paget, had been influenced in his nonconformity by Thomas Cartwright at Cambridge.²²⁵

Paget's non-separatist view must have chimed well with Horace, if only because as a prominent soldier, not wanting to antagonise the King, it is hard to see how a man otherwise known to be as pious as Vere would have continued to sponsor and employ him.

At about the same time that Paget joined Vere's troops, Dr John Burgess arrived in the United Provinces where he preached regularly at the Hague and became attached to Vere's regiment.²²⁶ In three of his later letters from the Palatinate, Horace Vere, uniquely, gives prodigious praise and recommendation to Burgess, who like Paget was seen by the church at home in England as a religious controversialist.²²⁷ Burgess had been imprisoned briefly by King James in 1604 for his religious views following the Hampton Court conference.²²⁸ He was then reprimanded by the Bishop of London, Richard Bancroft, for his failure to subscribe to the thirty-nine articles of the established church.²²⁹

On his appointment as Archbishop of Canterbury in August 1583, John Whitgift had utilised these thirty-nine articles in an attempt to bring into line nonconformists who were unwilling to follow the doctrine of the Elizabethan Church of England. Whitgift had gained a reputation as a man who had no love of the Puritans even before his appointment by Elizabeth. He used, in particular, three of the articles to attack and

²²⁴ Keith L. Sprunger, 'Paget, John', ODNB, (2004) p.1.

²²⁵ John Paget, *An arrow against the separation of the Brownists*, (Amsterdam, 1618), p. 1.

²²⁶ Sprunger, *The Learned Doctor Ames*, p. 30.

²²⁷ NA, SP84/101/273. NA, SP84/101/279. The 16th and 19th July 1621. Horace Vere to Sir Dudley Carleton.

²²⁸ Wilson, *The History of Great Britain*, p.11.

²²⁹ F. L. Cross and E. A. Livingstone (eds), *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, (Oxford, 2005), p.1622.

essentially trap recalcitrant clergy. If they subscribed, then they could be turned out of their living for not carrying out their ministry as the articles prescribed. If they failed to subscribe then the same fate awaited them. These three articles read as follows: -

‘That her Majesty, under God, hath, and ought to have, the sovereignty and rule over all manner of persons born within her realms....either ecclesiastical or temporal, soever they be. That the Book of Common Prayer, and of ordering bishops, priests and deacons, containeth in it nothing contrary to the word of God....and that he himself will use the form of the said book prescribed in public prayer and administration of the sacraments, and none other. That he alloweth the book of Articles, agreed upon by the archbishops and bishops of both provinces, and the whole clergy in Convocation holden at London in the year of our Lord God 1562....and that he believeth all the Articles therein contained to be agreeable to the word of God.’²³⁰

Although soon released from imprisonment, Burgess was, because of his failure to conform to the articles, deprived of his living on January 16th 1605.²³¹ Archbishop Bancroft also made efforts to suppress religious dissent abroad, writing to Ralph Winwood in February 1605 about ‘many dangerous books and Pamphlets in English’ and asking him to ‘deal with the States, not only for the stay of the said books In Amsterdam, but likewise for the supressing and restraining of all such English Books.’²³²

When Bancroft died in late 1610, ‘only a handful of dioceses had not lost clergy through deprivation, most for inconformity and most in the southern province.’²³³ After the first year however, Quintrell suggests that the rate of deprivation slowed, as James took less interest in the matter, and in any case the bishops varied greatly in their enforcement.²³⁴ But Burgess’ failure to conform set him at the more extreme end of the Puritan spectrum, which in turn indicates Horace Vere’s own predilection; especially given the highly supportive letters he later wrote to Carleton praising Burgess.²³⁵

Nevertheless, despite the King’s irenic focus, James did not forgive Burgess.²³⁶ Nine years later, in 1613, the King was still angry enough to ban him from preaching in London.²³⁷ Yet Horace Vere, whose letters seldom betray his precise views, employed

²³⁰ The History learning Site; <http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/tudor-england/the-three-articles/> (accessed 15 August 2017).

²³¹ B.W.Quintrell, ‘The Royal Hunt and the Puritans’, 1604–1605’ *JEH*, Vol 31, (1980), p. 50.

²³² Ralph Winwood, *Memorials of Affairs of State, In the Reigns of Q. Elizabeth and K. James Vol.2, (London, 1725)*, p. 195.

²³³ Quintrell, ‘The Royal Hunt,’ p.41.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

²³⁵ NA, SP84/74/273-275-279 Vere to Carleton, 16th and 19th July 1621, OS.

²³⁶ Kenneth Fincham and Peter Lake ‘The Ecclesiastical Policy of King James 1’, *Politics and religion in the Early Seventeenth century: New Voices*, *JBS*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Apr, 1985), p.178.

²³⁷ Tyacke, *Anti-Calvinists, The rise of English Arminianism c1590 – 1640*, p.148.

him twice, and is almost ebullient in his praise of 'The Good Dr. Burgess', whom he must have known had upset both the King and more than one bishop. Despite Vere's diplomatic and interpersonal nous he was clearly unwilling to compromise his religious beliefs. In 1611 Burgess had qualified MD at Leiden University, just a few miles from the Hague, writing a still extant thesis on Cholera.²³⁸ The role of an army preacher, at least whilst the soldiers were not in the field, was not especially onerous, consisting of an evening prayer and a sermon of indeterminate length which was not compulsory for the men.²³⁹ Thus divines like Burgess would have had plenty of time for writing and other study.

Shortly after Burgess qualified at Leiden, the Veres, Ralph Winwood and other prominent patrons including the Countess of Bedford [Lucy Russell, née Harington], obtained a licence for him to preach in England again and in 1612 Burgess was practicing as a medical Doctor in London where he successfully treated Russell. Lucy Russell was a devout Calvinist and sponsored several Calvinist poets and writers. She was also a noted patron of the arts, frequently appearing in court masques, which is rather at odds with a Calvinist outlook.²⁴⁰ But as a confidante of Queen Anne, she had considerable influence. Ralph Winwood too was a prominent figure at the time. He was a convinced and confident Calvinist, writing in his will of Christ's death being 'sufficient for the sins of the whole world and efficient for his elect, in the number of whom I am one by his mere grace' ²⁴¹

Mary Vere and Elizabeth Winwood (nee Ball) were also close friends, having met when Mary went to the Low Countries with her new husband Horace in 1607. Elizabeth Winwood had married Ralph in 1603, which is when he became the English resident at the Hague. Of the close friendship of Mary and Elisabeth, John Chamberlain wrote 'for these three ladies must not stirre one without the other'.²⁴² The third Lady was Alice Burlacy (nee Ravis), the wife of Sir John Burlacy, who was Vere's deputy.²⁴³ Later, back in England when Mary was expecting her fourth daughter, Anne, at home in Chiswick, Chamberlain wrote that 'Lady Winwood was there two or three days the last weeke at her labor.'²⁴⁴

²³⁸ Elizabeth Allen, 'Burgess, John (1563-1635)', ODNB, (2004).

²³⁹ Sprunger, *The Learned Doctor Ames*, p. 35.

²⁴⁰ Norman E McClure, (ed), 'The letters of John Chamberlain', Vol.2, APS, (Philadelphia, 1939), Chamberlain to Carleton, 22 Feb. 1617, p. 54.

²⁴¹ Tyacke, *Anti-Calvinists, The rise of English Arminianism c1590 – 1640*, (Oxford, 1987), p. 89. Winwood was a devout Calvinist who certainly saw himself as one of the elect, as this statement shows.

²⁴² McClure, (ed), 'The letters of John Chamberlain', Vol.1, APS, p. 305.

²⁴³ Terry Clavin, 'Borlase, Sir John (c.1576–1648)', ODNB, (2004).

²⁴⁴ McClure (ed)., *The Letters of John Chamberlain*, Volume 2, APS, Issue 2, p. 512.

Significantly too Ralph Winwood was a friend of George Abbot, appointed Archbishop of Canterbury in March 1611. They had been students together at Oxford.²⁴⁵ Such a powerful connection was, it seems, sufficient to overcome even the antagonism of the King as long as Burgess did not preach in London and in the end Burgess returned home to conform sufficiently to be given a post at Lichfield Cathedral. He returned to Vere for just one year between July 1620 and July 1621 and clearly made a good impression. In July 1621 Vere wrote to Dudley Carleton, then Ambassador to The Hague, about ‘...the departure of this worthy man’ who ‘hath taken great pains among us. I hope with him good success, many of us being much troubled for his departure. His own virtue and words do sufficiently recommend him to your honour. You cannot bestow your favours upon a person that will better deserve them.’²⁴⁶ Burgess died in 1635.

Along with Sir Dudley Carleton, Winwood was a close friend of Vere. All three were frequent correspondents and it must be the case that Burgess was discussed between them and that the religious views of all three overlapped.²⁴⁷ That said, Carleton was the cousin of the Calvinist Bishop, George Carleton, who was one of the English representatives at the Synod of Dort, a national council that took place in 1618-1619 in the town of Dordrecht in the Netherlands.²⁴⁸ This council was called to settle an issue that had just been brought up in the Dutch churches, concerning the spread of Arminianism. After Jacob Arminius died, his followers objected to the teachings of John Calvin and Theodore Beza. These Arminians published their problems with Calvinism in a paper called The Remonstrance of 1610 which taught that salvation was possible for all who would have faith, together with the equal danger of not gaining such grace. The supporters of the ideas listed in this document were called Remonstrants. Those who followed the teachings of John Calvin, holding to a predestinarian doctrine, became known as Contra-Remonstrants.

Following the departure of Burgess in 1611, Horace employed William Ames as his army preacher. Ames, born in Ipswich in 1576, came from significant Suffolk stock. He was the son of a merchant who had married into another commercial family, but William and his sister Elizabeth were still quite young when both their parents died.²⁴⁹ The two orphans were brought up by their mother’s brother, likewise a prosperous

²⁴⁵ M. Greengrass, ‘Winwood, Sir Ralph (1562/3–1617)’, ODNB, (2004), p. 1.

²⁴⁶ NA, SP84/101/273. NA, SP84/101/279. The 16th and 19th July 1621. Horace Vere to Sir Dudley Carleton.

²⁴⁷ Dudley Carleton had been implicated in the Gunpowder plot because of his association with Francis Norrys whose house had been sublet to Thomas Percy, one of the plotters.

²⁴⁸ *CSPD, James 1, 1609*, p.120, Oct. 22 1609.

²⁴⁹ Keith L. Sprunger, ‘Ames, William (1576–1633)’, ODNB, (2004).

merchant, at nearby Boxford, also in Essex.²⁵⁰ The family home of the Veres, at Castle Hedingham, is about 13 miles from Boxford, and it is probable that the Veres, though occupying a much higher station in life than the Ames family, would have been aware of the families, especially if they shared a common non-conformist belief. The town of Boxford itself was, at that time, something of a non-conformist stronghold and it is not unreasonable to suggest that Elizabeth and Williams' uncle, Mr Snelling, was of that persuasion too.²⁵¹ Certainly it was here that young William was moulded, by his own admission, into a Puritan nonconformist life.²⁵²

This conviction was reinforced and hardened whilst the young Ames was at Christ's College Cambridge (1593/4 – 1610), then a stronghold of non-conformity, and in particular by William Perkins, a fellow of the college.²⁵³ Ames later wrote that Perkins 'stirred them up effectually to seeke after Godliness... that they might promote true religion'²⁵⁴ Ames became a charismatic preacher and an out and out non-conformist, taking with him a number of other young men.²⁵⁵ Ames was particularly opposed to Sunday games, and what he saw as holiday frivolity, but in 1609/10, a new College master, Valentine Carey, later Bishop of Exeter, was appointed.²⁵⁶ Carey, under instruction to restore religious conformity, pushed Ames to extremes in his preaching and teaching, and in January 1610 Ames left the college following severe censure from the Vice Chancellor's Court which stopped just short of expulsion. The official record of the condemnation states that Ames was suspended from all teaching and from all degrees which had been, or might be, awarded. This penalty was ostensibly given for Ames' equating card playing with abusing 'the word or sacraments.' Ames left the University and the college voluntarily, but was clearly not welcome there.²⁵⁷

Falling foul of George Abbot, then bishop of London, Ames could not secure a position at home, so in 1610/11 he went to the Netherlands. Ames joined Vere in 1611, at the latter's invitation, and stayed with him until 1619. He simultaneously acted as Minister to the small, expatriate, non-conformist English community in The Hague and as spiritual counsellor to the Vere family in succession to John Burgess. It was during

²⁵⁰ Sprunger, *The Learned Doctor*, p.10.

²⁵¹ Keith L. Sprunger, 'Ames, William (1576–1633)', ODNB, (200).

²⁵² W. Ames, *Reply to Dr. Morton's Generall Defence*, (London, 1622), p. 27.

²⁵³ Perkins was a 'moderate' Calvinist, believing in double predestination but also opposing separatists and non-conformists.

²⁵⁴ Ames. *Conscience with the power and cases Thereof*. (np 1639) To The Reader, Sprunger, *The Learned Doctor Ames*, p. 13.

²⁵⁵ Sprunger, *The Learned Doctor Ames*, pp.16-17.

²⁵⁶ Ames had hoped to be appointed as College master himself.

²⁵⁷ Sprunger, *The Learned Doctor Ames*, p.14.

this period of attachment that Ames married Elizabeth, a daughter of Burgess, though she died, certainly before 1618, and Ames remarried.²⁵⁸

The place of the Protestant preacher or chaplain within the army had not been clearly established until 1586 when Leicester went to the United Provinces, and it appears that the use of the Church of England prayer book there was a gradual imposition.²⁵⁹ However during his time with Vere's regiment Ames used this prayer book selectively, often improvising and preaching his own message now that he was free from the restraints, as he saw them, of the liturgy and sanction of the English Church hierarchy.²⁶⁰ Horace must have been happy with what Ames was doing and saying, since Ames' entire ministry and employment rested firmly upon Vere's authority, so we must conclude that the two men were pretty much united doctrinally.

This affinity is further enhanced because at the same time as his ministry to Vere and his troops, Ames also published, in 1611, a highly inflammatory book entitled *Puritanismus Anglicanus*.²⁶¹ Co-authored with William Bradshaw the main point of the tome was that no congregation should be subject to any ecclesiastical jurisdiction 'save that which is within itself.'²⁶² This was a direct refutation of the authority of Bishops, and argued the need for a form of independency or semi-separation. Under this system, members of the congregation could delegate their powers to pastors and elders, retaining that of excommunication, but with no clergyman holding civil office.

This was inflammatory stuff and Archbishop George Abbot, unsurprisingly, wanted Ames 'punished and removed' which he made clear in a letter to his old University friend Ralph Winwood, then Ambassador to the United Provinces, on the 12th March 1611. Archbishop Abbot was consecrated to the see of Canterbury on 4th March 1611, so he must have felt strongly about Ames, because he wrote the letter to Winwood just eight days later. His letter describes Ames as having 'laden the Church and State of England with a great deal of infamous contumely'; so that if he were here among us he would be so far from receiving Preferment, that some exemplary punishment would be his reward'. Abbot tells Winwood that he has written to Vere, asking that Ames be removed from his post, hints that Royal displeasure may have been incurred, and asks Winwood to assist in removing Ames 'as privately and

²⁵⁸ Adams, 'The Puritan Cause', p.441.

²⁵⁹ Griffin, *Regulating Religion*, p. 8.

²⁶⁰ Sprunger, *The Learned Doctor Ames*, p.31.

²⁶¹ W. Ames, *Puritanismus Anglicanus, Fresh suit against human ceremonies in God's worship. Or a triplication unto D. Burgess his rejoinder, for D. Morton*, the first part, [Amsterdam, 1633). Ames translated Bradshaw's original version into Latin. Bradshaw was an English Puritan strongly opposed to church 'ceremonies' but he was not a separatist and held that the king as 'the archbishop and general overseer of all the churches within his dominions' had the right to rule and must not be resisted except passively.

²⁶² Sprunger, *The Learned Doctor Ames*, p.100.

cleanly... as the matter will permit.' Abbot even hints that he hopes to find what he calls a 'remedy' for other radical English preachers in 'Zealand.'²⁶³

But Horace Vere's patronage and support (no doubt with Winwood's help) was, at this time, enough to resist or reassure, the Archbishop, and this again points strongly toward an affinity of Horace's views with those of Ames. It also demonstrates the relative freedom from supervision that English preachers in the United Provinces enjoyed at this time, as well as the real authority of Vere. As Keith Sprunger writes in his biography of Ames, 'In spite of pressure from the English Government to remove Ames, Sir Horace kept Ames with him several years. To the Puritans Sir Horace in those years could be counted upon as an ally who would 'as well wrestle with God, as fight with men.'²⁶⁴ Also, Horace was well known and well-liked by Maurice of Nassau, the effective ruler of the Netherlands, and an ardent Calvinist.²⁶⁵ The support of Maurice, even if only tacit would have been beneficial to Horace in resisting pressure from England.

However, in the longer term, Ames' pen proved mightier than Vere's sword. Despite some abatement of Ames's strident opposition to the English church hierarchy a succession of anti-Arminian and pro-Calvinist tracts appeared under Ames' authorship. Growing pressure from England, which by now included direct opposition from King James, finally prevailed, and in 1619 Ames had to leave his regimental post.

It seems that Ames' success as an outspoken supporter of the Calvinist line at the synod of Dort, led him to apply for a professorship at Leiden. In doing so Ames crossed a line with King James, who opposed the appointment and exerted pressure via Carleton, on the Dutch, to deny Ames the post.²⁶⁶ Thus drawing royal attention upon himself, the pressure upon his position increased and he was forced to step down as Vere's chaplain. It may, of course, just be possible that Ames's strident and oft declared opposition to Bishops, and by inference, church and maybe royal authority, finally pushed Horace towards a stance he was unable, or unwilling, to support. So Ames may well have been sacked, as Dudley Carleton suggests in his letter to Sir Robert Naunton,

'Our usual preacher here Mr Ayme is suspended by Sir Horace Vere and is now gone to LEYDEN, where he sues to be received as professor... But unless he can as well clear himself of that, which is now laid to his charge, I have laid a block in his way, having defired one of the new curators of that university not to admit any of his

²⁶³ Winwood, *Memorials*, Vol.3. p.346. George Abbot to Sir Ralph Winwood, March 12, 1611.

²⁶⁴ Sprunger, *The Learned Doctor Ames*, p.32.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

²⁶⁶ Thomas Phillips, (ed), *Letters from and to Sir Dudley Carleton during his embassy in Holland, from January 1615/16, to December 1620*, 2nd ed., (London,1775), p. 390.

majesty's subjects to those public places, without foreknowledge of his majesty's pleasure'.²⁶⁷

Ames did not get the Job and Horace may thus have been forced to dismiss him, though his leaving might have been by mutual agreement. Ironically it was at about this time that 'Vere's regiment abandoned the C of E prayer book'.²⁶⁸

Ames had opposed the Arminian faction at Dort and in particular, their belief in free will and the possibility of earthly redemption. He strongly supported the strict Calvinist line of Predestination, as many of his articles and books firmly assert. At Dort, the rigid Calvinists gained the ascendancy, and Ames' well known, even outspoken, backing for their cause gained him support.²⁶⁹ It is then a little curious that Ames fell afoul of James, who had seemed to endorse the Calvinist victory at the Synod. Indeed, James had caused to be published, also in 1619, *A Meditation upon the Lord's prayer* in which the King specifically attacked what he saw as the 'errors of Arminianism'. However, in the same publication, James also attacked what he called the 'extremities of some Puritans' – focusing particularly upon their anti-Episcopalian stance. This must have been the first stirring of what later became a 'second thought' by James about the denunciation of Arminianism at Dort. Certainly, within three years, he was backtracking to the extent that he banned all popular preaching about predestination and other, central, Calvinist doctrines.²⁷⁰

James' *Basilikon Doron*, his instructions to Prince Henry about how to be a King, made it clear that he saw the Church of England as 'filling the Space between Rome and Geneva' between the pride and error of popery and the arrogance and extremism of the Puritans.²⁷¹ Much of James' response to religious matters can be found in that statement.

Ames spent the rest of his life working and teaching in Europe.²⁷² Thus it was that he went to Rotterdam, where he hoped to establish a college for likeminded students. However he died shortly after arriving in 1633. In his honour, John Burgess, Ames erstwhile father in law, wrote the dedication to a previously unprinted work of Ames entitled *A fresh suit against Human Ceremonies in Gods worship*. Published posthumously in 1633, this is a lengthy attack upon the use of relics. Despite their earlier doctrinal disagreements when Burgess had conformed enough to be accepted

²⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 390.

²⁶⁸ Ismini Pells, 'Professionalism, Piety and the Tyranny of Idleness, p.12.

²⁶⁹ Keith L. Sprunger, 'Ames, William (1576–1633)', ODNB, (2004). Ames described himself as a Puritan 'of the *rigidest sort*', a phrase he took from William Bradshaw's 1605 book '*English Puritanism*'.

²⁷⁰ Tyacke *Anti-Calvinists, The Rise of English Arminianism c1590 – 1640*, pp.101-103,

²⁷¹ Richard Cust, *Charles 1, A Political Life*, (Harlow, 2005). p.13. *Basilikon Doron* is a treatise on government written by King James in 1599.

²⁷² Keith L. Sprunger, 'Ames, William (1576–1633)', ODNB, (2004).

back in England, there was a clear empathy between the two men. Burgess's dedication speaks tenderly of 'the never enough lamented death of my deare friend.'²⁷³

Clearly, Ames's religious opinions must have been close to those of the Veres, and it seems unlikely that Ames would have remained in post for over eight years had there been any major disagreement in doctrine. Like Burgess before him, William Ames remained in contact with Mary Vere even after he was no longer acting as regimental preacher. Writing from The Hague on October 12th 1619, Ames thanked Mary for her 'kindnesses' and enjoins her to 'use all diligence for the stirring up, confirming and increasing the grace of God in yourself.'²⁷⁴

It can therefore be said, with some assurance, that Mary and Horace's views about the organisation of the church, basic but central non-conformists ideas about predestination, and opposition to Bishops, or indeed any supra-congregational authority barring the King, were closely aligned to Ames' ideas, of which we have ample direct proof in his writing and his sermons. As well, Vere must have spurned separation, like Ames, whose close collaboration with Bradshaw and his exchange of views with John Robinson, the leader of the separatists in Leiden, give us firm direction on this point.²⁷⁵ In essence, Ames was a semi-separatist who saw the Church as a loose grouping of independent congregations. Still functioning under royal authority, but allowing no direct, outside, control of day to day organisation and doctrine, these congregations would have contact with each other, and would share most aspects of their religious approach. Whilst we cannot be sure of Vere's precise view regarding the issue of separation it seems likely, based upon his support for Ames, that whilst he stopped short of denying the King's authority over the Church, his otherwise Presbyterian view did not support the role of Bishops.

We should contrast Ames, however, with the next of Vere's regimental preachers, John Hassall. A fellow of New College Oxford, he became minister of Burton upon Trent in 1601 and following clerical posts in Lichfield and Norfolk he was installed into the third prebend (or precentor's prebend) of Norwich Cathedral in December 1615.²⁷⁶ Hassall was also chaplain to Lord Paget (4th Baron Paget of Beaudesert). Paget had served on the Cadiz expedition in 1596, where he may have

²⁷³ W. Ames, '*A fresh suit against Human Ceremonies in Gods worship*', 1633, dedication L1.

²⁷⁴ B.L. Add. Mss, 4275, f 8.

²⁷⁵ Keith Sprunger, 'John Robinson (1576 – 1625)', ODNB, (2004). Robinson was the pastor of the 'Pilgrim Fathers' before they left on the Mayflower. An early leader of the English Separatists he is regarded (with Robert Browne) as one of the founders of the Congregational Church.

²⁷⁶ *British History Online* <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/topographical-hist-norfolk/vol3/pp617-671> . (Accessed 28 Aug 2017). Francis Blomefield, 'The city of Norwich, chapter 40: Deans, Vicars-General, or Chancellors, Archdeacons, Commissaries, Officials, and Prebends', in *An Essay Towards A Topographical History of the County of Norfolk: Volume 3, the History of the City and County of Norwich, Part I* (London, 1806), pp. 617-671.

become acquainted with Horace Vere. Paget was also a sponsor of the Virginia company and it was probably through Paget that in 1617, Hassall was appointed as a preacher to Vere in the Netherlands, a post he filled until 1625.²⁷⁷

It was during his time in the United Provinces that Hassall secured for himself the approval and patronage of Elizabeth, the exiled Queen of Bohemia, and daughter of King James I. It was through her good offices that Hassall obtained the deanery of Norwich in 1628. Clearly an ambitious man, Hassall was, like Ames, a friend of William Bradshaw whose Calvinist views stopped just short of outright church separation. However, once in post at Norwich, Hassall '*changed with the times*' as his DNB article says.²⁷⁸ Hassall thus came into line with William Laud's growing pre-eminence. Laud was an autocrat who favoured strict Episcopalian church government, promoting church ritual and prayer in line with the new King, Charles's I's, views.

So Hassall either changed his formerly hard line Calvinist views, or subordinated them to ambition, and he reformed the cathedral and diocese accordingly, in line with the growing strength of Laudian dogma. If he thought that this would improve his chances of further advantageous preferment, he was sadly mistaken, and he gradually sank into obscurity and destitution, especially after 1649 when cathedral deans (and other posts) were abolished under the Commonwealth.²⁷⁹ He died in poverty in 1654, leaving his family so poor that one of his own daughters was maintained by the parish.²⁸⁰

The next preacher Horace employed to serve his troops was Obadiah Sedgwick, though he seems to have been with Vere for a comparatively short time between 1628 and 1629. A native of Wiltshire, Sedgwick matriculated from Queens College Oxford in June 1619 aged 19. He then went to Magdalen Hall, where he graduated BA in May 1620, advancing to MA in January 1623. He joined Vere following a spell as Tutor to Matthew Hale, the noted post Restoration Judge.

Whilst with Vere, Sedgwick corresponded with John Davenport and became involved in a group of like-minded reformist ministers. After his return to England, he then became curate and lecturer at St Mildred's in Bread Street, London.²⁸¹ He quickly became a popular preacher, attracting a large following, but his Puritan views and anti-Episcopalian stance caused him to incur the displeasure of the royalist, William Juxon,

²⁷⁷ The Virginia Company was actually two joint stock companies licensed by James I in 1606. For a definitive account see Kupperman, *The Jamestown Project*, pp.190 – 193.

²⁷⁸ Ian Atherton, 'Hassall, John (bap. 1571, d. 1654)', ODNB, (2004).

²⁷⁹ April 1649: *An Act for abolishing of Deans, Deans and Chapters, Canons, Prebends and other offices and titles of or belonging to any Cathedral or Collegiate Church or Chapel within England and Wales*.

²⁸⁰ Ian Atherton, 'Hassall, John (bap. 1571, d. 1654)', ODNB, (2004).

²⁸¹ Barbara Donagan, 'Sedgwick, Obadiah (1599/1600–1658)', ODNB, (2004), p.1.

who had been appointed bishop of London in 1633 in succession to his friend, William Laud. Eventually Juxon suspended and censured Sedgwick for his extreme Puritan views. Juxon went on to hold important civil posts as well as his ecclesiastical ones; he was Lord High Treasurer of England and First Lord of the Admiralty, between 1636 and 1641. At the Restoration he became Archbishop of Canterbury. Sedgwick became less controversial in his later years however receiving gifts from the exiled King and Queen of Bohemia (whom he may well have met) and he died in 1658, a comparatively wealthy man.

Sedgwick's well-known 1638 sermon, 'Military Discipline for the Christian Soldier,' is an exhortation to honourable and just war.²⁸² Dedicated to the colonels and captains of the London Artillery Company, Sedgwick identifies with his congregation, talking of 'our honourable profession' and signing off the dedication 'in soldierly comradeship', clearly recalling his time with Vere. His opposition to the separatists and to bishops fits neatly into the mould of Vere's previous preachers and the way Sedgwick aligns his message with circumstances and situations that military men can identify with is clearly well thought out.

In contrast Stephen Goffe died a Catholic. Yet he too served as a preacher to Horace Vere's troops. Goffe's father, also Stephen, was another of those non-conformists preachers who were deprived of their livings following the Hampton Court conference. This elder Stephen Goffe had been one of the supposed thousand signatories to the Millenary petition which had been the genesis of the conference.²⁸³ Thus the younger Stephen, born in 1605, was probably brought up in a strict Puritan household. He went up to Merton College, Oxford, where he gained his BA in 1624 and then his MA at St Alban Hall [a constituent part of Merton College] in 1627. He was ordained by William Laud, then Bishop of London, who also made him his chaplain.

Shortly thereafter, Goffe left for the Low Countries to become Vere's chaplain, probably between 1630 and 1632. Presumably his non-conformists credentials were sufficient at that time for Vere to take him on and he may also have had the support of Sir William Boswell, who was secretary to Dudley Carleton at the Hague and also a friend of Mary Vere.²⁸⁴ Boswell supported Carleton's opposition to arminianism and later cooperated fully with Laud's insistence on the introduction of the English prayer book amongst the English troops in Dutch pay. Despite this Boswell was knighted by Horace Vere in 1633.²⁸⁵

²⁸² Obadiah Sedgwick, *Military Discipline for the Christian Soldier*, (London, 1639).

²⁸³ Thompson Cooper, Rev. Jerome Bertram, 'Goffe, Stephen, (1605–1681)', ODNB, (2004).

²⁸⁴ NA, SP84/139/131, Lady Vere to Boswell, 11 May 1629.

²⁸⁵ Alan Stewart, 'Boswell, Sir William (d. 1650)', ODNB, (2004).

When Boswell succeeded Carleton as Ambassador to the United Provinces in 1632 he enthusiastically carried out Laud's instructions to harry and deter the exiled English Puritans in Holland. Before Laud, similar attempts had been made to curb and control these men, but some in the English church hierarchy, including King Charles, thought they were 'well berid of them'.²⁸⁶ Laud, however, recognised that many of these expatriate divines had for some time now been preaching unhindered to the many thousands of English and Scots soldiers serving the Dutch. Such a body, now radicalised in the eyes of many, would be more than capable of staging a serious challenge to the orthodoxy at home, were favourable conditions to occur.²⁸⁷ Laud eventually succeeded in enforcing the use of the English prayer book amongst these troops in 1635, but only after Vere's death²⁸⁸

In 1632 Goffe wrote to Henry, Earl of Dover, in a rather triumphalist manner explaining that, ordered by Horace Vere, he (Goffe) had begun to 'read the prayers of the Church of England, which gave great contentment to [Vere's] regiment.' This was certainly a departure from the practice of Goffe's predecessors and the enthusiasm of its reception by Vere's men may not have been as fulsome as Goffe boasts, but this is clearly a report likely to have pleased Laud. Goffe goes on to say that the various dissenting English and Scottish ministers in the Netherlands had tried to get Goffe's pay revoked by the United Provinces in 1633 but that Vere himself had intervened and Goffe had promised 'not to do anything against the peace of the Netherlands Church, [and] the payment had resumed'.²⁸⁹ Despite this Goffe tells the Earl that he [Goffe] was 'determined to continue to read prayers whether the 30 shillings was paid or not'.²⁹⁰

Vere's intervention must only have come because of his perceived need to conform himself to the prevailing orthodoxy, i.e. the growing strength of the Laudian party which was clearly backed by the monarchy. Just a few days later Vere had himself written to Secretary John Coke about Goffe and the adverse reception he had had amongst the expatriate divines in the United Provinces. In his letter Vere acknowledges a previous correspondence from Boswell which apparently expressed the King's pleasure at Vere and his regiment for using the Book of Common prayer.

But it seems that following complaints from other clerics, the Dutch Council of State required assurances regarding the nature of Goffe's ministry. Goffe was able to reassure them, and the Council agreed to resume the payment of his stipend. However, Vere then continues,

²⁸⁶ Sprunger, *The Learned Doctor Ames*, p. 212.

²⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 226.

²⁸⁸ Adams, 'The Protestant Cause', p. 446, and Sprunger, *The Learned Doctor*, p. 226.

²⁸⁹ Sprunger, *The Learned Doctor Ames*, p. 239.

²⁹⁰ *CSPD, Chas 1, 1631-33*, pp. 525-553. Goffe to Henry, Earl of Dover.

‘For many years I have had no minister but such as have been conformable to our church, but their practice has been *according to the church here* [my italics]. When I was governor of Brill, his late Majesty instructed me that the preacher of the garrison was to conform himself to the church government of the States here, and this has been the practice for the most part since I have known these parts. Some of my countrymen here have not been altogether conformable to our church, but their carriage has been so peaceable, I think your honour may doe a work of charity, to passe bye them favorable, so long as there carriage be such as yt ought to be’.²⁹¹

This was a clever defence by Vere to any possible accusations against him of inconformability. He is simply saying that his preachers had always adhered to the Dutch church, as King James had instructed him. We know that Vere’s previous preachers had, up to Goffe’s appointment, all been considered radicals back home in England. They would hardly have travelled to the United Provinces in the first place had that not been the case, and whilst in Dutch territory their preaching and ministry conformed, for the most part, to the Dutch church. Vere too must have had a great empathy with the Dutch church. He had after all devoted his military life to preserving and sustaining it and the preachers he appointed to serve his troops quite often took on a secondary role preaching in local Dutch churches. Thus over the years as Vere rose to prominence in the Low Countries his religious identity helped shape and determine that of his Dutch surroundings just as he and Mary must have been influenced in turn.

Certainly worship had ‘generally followed the example of the Dutch reformed Church’ following the favoured approach of Leicester which had then ‘set a precedent for worship in the English regiments’.²⁹² However Vere was always prudent enough to refrain from specific endorsement of practices that he knew would cross the line back home in England.

And so when Vere, continuing his letter, admits that ‘some of my countrymen here have not been altogether conformable to our church’ he is careful to generalise his comments rather than to discuss his own preachers. In the early years of the Seventeenth Century ‘Puritan religious and intellectual deviations caused little commotion’ in the United Provinces.²⁹³ The Dutch did not seem to trouble themselves

²⁹¹ CSPD, *Addenda, Chas 1, 1633*, pp. 445-451, Vere to Secretary Coke.

²⁹² K. L. Sprunger, *Dutch Puritanism: a history of English and Scottish churches of the Netherlands in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries* (Leiden; 1982), pp 369-70.

²⁹³ Keith L. Sprunger, *Dutch Puritanism, A History of English and Scottish Churches of the Netherlands in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*. (Oregon, 1982), p. 6.

with 'points of religion' and the British Church in the United Provinces was able to be a social, economic and political entity, as much as it was a religious foundation.²⁹⁴

However back in England by the late 1620s Laud was a prominent and influential church leader, much inclined towards episcopatism and the Arminian doctrine. We know that Goffe worked with Laud to persecute non-conformists, helping to enforce the use of the prayer book amongst all the English troops in the United Provinces.²⁹⁵ All of which reminds us that the religious flux of the day could, and did, allow individuals, even from strict religious beginnings, to change their views and their affiliation especially when personal advantage might accompany such a change. Goffe's early influences and experience may have put him, literally, into the same religious and military camp as Vere, but Goffe was clearly not of the same, fixed, spiritual mind that epitomises most of Horace Vere's other employed chaplains and preachers. Furthermore, Goffe's 1649 admittance into the Catholic church estranges him from Horace Vere's religious persona even further.²⁹⁶ Goffe epitomises the way in which life's experiences shape and change attitudes and convictions, and his decision to make such a dramatic religious change points to the growing possibility of acceptance of diversity in religion. It may also have been the case that patronage proved irresistible for him, as Arminianism grew in strength and senior figures (and hence patronage) in both church and state inclined away from Calvinist orthodoxy.

From the list of radicals he employed it is clear that Horace Vere had sufficient personal prestige and authority to resist, for a time, the will of the Archbishop of Canterbury and he was able, in religious matters, to largely tread his own path.²⁹⁷ To help round out this divine picture however we must now turn to the views of those who dedicated books and other missives to both Horace and Mary.

Dedications

It was a common practice at the time to dedicate written works to prominent figures, especially those who might have assisted or supported the author, or who might be flattered into so doing. Such a dedication of itself presupposes that the dedicatee has some power, influence or other worthy quality in the eyes of the dedicator. For Horace, given his prominent military, social and religious standing, certainly after 1606, when he assumed command of all English troops in Dutch pay, such dedications were not rare. Mary Vere, also noted for her piety and support of

²⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 8.

²⁹⁵ Adams, 'The Protestant Cause', p. 447.

²⁹⁶ Thompson Cooper, Rev. Jerome Bertram, 'Goffe, Stephen, (1605–1681)', ODNB, (2004).

²⁹⁷ Simon Adams supports this view 'The ... army in the United Provinces'... particular status afforded it considerable independence', 'The Protestant Cause. p. 171.

radical preachers likewise attracted a number of dedications which is a testament to her pietical standing given her otherwise non-noble status.

The earliest known dedication to Horace comes in 1604, from one W. Traheron, (about whom there seems to be no extant additional information, but who MAY have been the father of the Metaphysical poet Thomas Traherne (1636 or 1637 – 27 September 1674). This dedication is not of a religious nature concerning itself with a history of Roman Emperors.²⁹⁸

The next sequential dedication to Horace comes from Henry Hexham; one of Vere's longest serving officers. Born in England, Hexham spent much of his life, like Horace Vere, in Holland and the Low Countries.²⁹⁹ He originally served Francis Vere, first as a page at a young age, but after 1606 when Francis was more or less forced to retire, Hexham became attached to Horace, serving him as quartermaster and later reaching the rank of captain. Hexham wrote a narrative about the Siege of Ostend, in which both Francis and Horace were engaged and this narrative was later appended to Francis Vere's 'Commentaries'.³⁰⁰ Hexham knew both the Veres well having served with Horace, often in the front line, for almost all of Vere's military life as well as during Horace's Governorship of the Brill.

Hexham's dedication covers his translation of a work by the Dutch Protestant theologian, John Polyander Van Den Kerckhove, who was Professor of Divinity at Leyden.³⁰¹ In 1610 Polyander, as he is best known in English, had written a refutation of the work of [an unnamed] member of the Catholic Augustinian order in Liege. In 1611, he wrote a lengthy riposte to an epistle written three years earlier by the also unnamed Catholic canons of St Marie. Both these works (and others, most notably the ideas of Gerard Mercator, the famous mapmaker) were translated into English by Hexham.

Polyander's 1610 work *The refutation of an epistle written by a certain Doctor of the Augustins order within the city of Liege* is dedicated by Hexham as the translator

²⁹⁸ W Traheron's translation is of a work by Pedro Mexía, *The historie of all the Roman emperors beginning with Caius Iulius Caesar, and successiueely ending with Rodulph the second now raigning*. STC (2nd ed. 1604), 17852 .

²⁹⁹ A. F. Pollard, rev M.R. Glozier, 'Hexham, Henry (1585-1660)', ODNB (2004). Hexham published and translated a number of Protestant tracts, adding further weight to his own Puritan credentials and thus Vere's.

³⁰⁰ Sir Francis Vere, *The Commentaries*, (Cambridge, 1657).

³⁰¹ Henry Hexham, *A disputation against the adoration of the reliques of saints departed wherein nine palpable abuses are discouered, committed by the popish Priests in the veneration thereof. Together with, the refutation of a lesuiticall epistle, and an index of the reliques, vvchic euery seuenth yeere, are shovvne at Avvcon in Germanie unto the superstitious people and pilgrimes*, compiled by the canons of S. Maries Church, (an. 1608). *By John Polyander Professour of Diuinitie in the Vniuersitie of Leyden in Holland.*, at Dordrecht: Printed by George Walters, (Anno 1611).

solely to Horace Vere.³⁰² Hexham's translation of Polyander's *A disputation against the adoration of the reliques of saints departed in 1611* is dedicated solely to Mary Vere. In the dedication to the *Refutation* Hexham calls Vere his 'best lord' and praises his 'unstained Godliness.' He then apologises for not seeking permission to dedicate the translation, but assures himself that it will be acceptable, 'because it is done by one of your companie and in the towne of your garrison where it was also penned ... by me that have devoted myself unto your service.' Most tellingly, Hexham had not bothered to seek permission from his chief (Vere) for this dedication. This is a clear indication that Hexham knew Vere would approve, and support, both his dedication and the opinions he translated.

Hexham says that Polyander's treatise is 'not unworthy a noble patron ... [and] zealous lover of that truth which this author maintaineth and [you] have with losse of blood and hazard of life, defended with your swords, what this man [has] by his pen'.³⁰³ Immediately after this dedication is a short recommendation of Polyander's treatise by John Burgess, 'Preacher to the English at the Hague in Holland'. This was the same John Burgess who was forced out of his English living following the Hampton Court conference and who later, twice, became one of Vere's army preachers. (p. 50) Burgess 'confesses to have encouraged the translator of this present treatise', because of the 'popish writers ... who provoke ... a counter poyson' and he says the treatise has found favour amongst the Dutch and French Calvinist churches.³⁰⁴

Polyander's long discourse repeats, and then attempts to refute, the words of the 'Doctor of Augustins' and he starts by saying that non-believers are wiser then the papists who 'instead of addressing themselves to the only God Almighty... they implore the aide of the dead',³⁰⁵ and that they 'depend upon the Traditions of their Teachers' rather than 'read the holy Scripture.' Polyander's arguments discuss such issues as whether or not the saints can be properly invoked on behalf of the living, or can be mediators between men and God and he asserts that only Jesus Christ can be a mediator, and he scorns the idea that the saints, or any of the dead, can offer intercession. The Doctor of Augustins argues at one point that the Catholic church is the only true church because 'could it be possible that the ... Church be in error for a thousand and so many years?' which is a rather circular argument.³⁰⁶ Polyander asks the Catholics to prove what they say, because there are no proofs in the Bible

³⁰² Henry Hexham, *The refutation of an epistle written by a certain Doctor of the Augustins order within the city of Leige together with the arguments, which he hath borrowed from Robert Bellarmine, to proue the inuocation of Saints*. (London, 1610).

³⁰³ Hexham *Disputation*, dedication, L. A3-A4.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, L. 4-5.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. B1.

³⁰⁶ Hexham *Disputation*, dedication, p.15.

regarding the intercession of the saints, or of any mention of purgatory. Finally, Polyander touches upon predestination saying ‘that the zeal and charity to the glory of God...are vertues proper ... only to the elect and children of God’.³⁰⁷ Hexham’s closeness to and knowledge of Vere leaves little doubt that the views Polyander expresses are close to those of Vere.

In the *Disputation*, dedicated to Mary, Hexham writes that the dedication brings husband and wife together because of his dedication to Horace in the *Refutation*.³⁰⁸ In this second dedication, Hexham refers to what he calls ‘popish iugling [juggling]’ which ‘cannot be unknown to your Ladyship.’ This is a reference to the infamous Hailes Abbey Holy blood, of which Mary would have been well aware. ‘This ‘Holy’ blood, which had been kept at Hailes Abbey from 1270 up to the dissolution, had been a great attraction for pilgrims; helping to enrich the Abbey for many years until the last Abbot, probably under pressure, admitted that it was actually duck’s blood, constantly renewed.’³⁰⁹ After the dissolution, the abbey lands were acquired by the Tracy family, of which Mary Vere (nee Tracy) was a member. This relic trickery explains Hexham’s dedication.

In the introduction of his work, Hexham tells us that he has made the translation so ‘that the graue and learned men of our nation may see, that the Ministers of other reformed churches, marche pouldron to pouldron with them vnto the Lords combate’, which indicates this is a non-conformist tract.³¹⁰ Polyander’s *Disputation* is a detailed and rather superior supplication against the worship and invocation of saints and relics. 154 pages long, it re-affirms the usage of ‘poyson’ to refer to Catholic doctrine and describes how, at the Reformation, many relics were found to be fabricated from the bones of ‘beasts, [from] bricke, sprigges of trees...and many other trifles.’³¹¹ This exposure of false and fantastical relics was common across the whole Protestant world, and such revelations cannot have done anything but harm the Catholic Church, just as the Blood of Hailes must have done.³¹² The *Disputation* alternates between derision of these false objects of reverence, and utter condemnation of the Roman Catholics who promote and prolong the veneration of such things. And who, worst of

³⁰⁷ Ibid., p.116.

³⁰⁸ Hexham,, *Refutation*, dedication, L. A.3.

³⁰⁹ Nicholas Vincent, *The Holy Blood* (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 136-191,197,198. At its height the Abbey was attracting over £1,000 p.a from the relic but this had fallen to less than £20 by the end of the 15c.

³¹⁰ Hexham, *Disputation*, dedication, p.1. A *pouldron* is armour worn on the upper arm.

³¹¹ Ibid., p.43.

³¹² For example, relics at Canterbury Cathedral described in the 1315/16 Inventory include; the dust from which God made Adam; the rock from which Christ ascended to heaven; the beard of St Peter and a feather from the Archangel Gabriel.
J. Wickham Legg, W.H. St John Hope, *Inventories of Christchurch Cathedral Canterbury*, (Westminster,1902). pp. 55-96..

all, foist the entire concept upon their poor, ignorant, congregations whom Polyander is not afraid to call 'Idiots'.³¹³ Polyander points out the absurdity of three separate towns claiming the body of one saint and several examples of two towns claiming another. Polyander is careful though to disassociate the early church fathers from his condemnation of the Catholic Church and its veneration of relics. He says that none of these 'godly men' made any record of setting aside as 'holy' the wide variety of objects associated by the Catholic Church with Christ, the Virgin Mary, and other venerated persons. These include girdles, sheets, blood and a whole host of other personal possessions and body parts.³¹⁴ Hexham must have been sure that Horace and Mary opposed the veneration of saints and relics as Polyander did. Of all the dedicators and preachers supported and sponsored by the Veres, Hexham probably knew them best, and what is more he owed his position to Horace, which makes it all the more unlikely that he would have risked such dedications had he not been absolutely sure of his man (and woman). He remained in Dutch service until his death in 1650.

Possibly the most favoured of all the preachers supported and sponsored by the Veres was Nicholas Byfield, who was also the most prolific dedicator of works to them. Byfield went up to Oxford (Exeter College) in 1596, and though he did not graduate, his Puritan convictions led him nevertheless to the ministry. He then served the people of Chester, first as a much respected preacher, and from 1608 as curate, despite opposition from the Bishop of Chester, George Lloyd. Lloyd opposed Byfield's strident Calvinism, but he remained tolerant, possibly because of Byfield's popularity. Then, in 1615, Horace Vere (no doubt with Mary's concurrence) offered Byfield the preferment of the Vicarage at Isleworth in Middlesex, where he remained until his early death in September 1622, aged just 43. Byfield died from a kidney stone of 'enormous proportion,' which must have tormented him for many years, but which failed to prevent him becoming a notable and much admired preacher.³¹⁵

Byfield was also a prolific author, and the publicist of his own sermons, and other texts, often with the encouragement of the Veres. Several of his works were frequently re-published after his death.³¹⁶ The Veres continued as patrons to Byfield, and indeed his whole family, taking one of his ten children into the Vere household, though we do not know in what capacity. This close interest, right on the door of the Veres, must indicate a strong and enduring affinity of religious views.

After his death, Byfield's wife Elizabeth published *A Commentary or, Sermons upon The Second Chapter of the First Epistle of Saint Peter* written by her late husband

³¹³ Hexham, *Refutation*, p. 59.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.146-8.

³¹⁵ Bryan W. Ball, 'Byfield, Nicholas (1578/9–1622)', ODNB, (2004).

³¹⁶ Nicholas Byfield, *The Rules of a Holy Life*, (London, 1619), dedication, p. A6.

and printed in 1623.³¹⁷ The *Commentary*, dedicated by Elizabeth to both Horace and Mary, is a message of thanks for the Veres 'kindnesses, which, while my husband lived, you did to him and his, and since his death you continue to do to such as he hath left behind him'.³¹⁸ Elizabeth also thanks the Veres for 'tak(ing) into your family a childe of his [Nicholas Byfield's] body' and she thanks God for keeping Vere safe during his recent time in the Palatinate.

Sermons upon the Ten First verses of the third chapter of the first Epistle of St. Peter, Being the last that were preached by the late Faithfull and painful minister of God's word, Nicholas Byfield was published in 1626 by William Gouge, the London clergyman and author. Gouge had been briefly imprisoned in 1621 for publishing a book seen as an attack on the monarchy and the traditional view of the Sabbath.³¹⁹ Gouge was only released after he recanted.³²⁰ He was minister and preacher at St Ann's, Blackfriars, for 45 years from 1608 and a member of the Westminster Assembly from 1643.³²¹ In his dedication to Horace and Mary of Byfield's *Sermons upon the Ten First verses* Gouge, who was known to both the Veres, writes of 'your honours mutuall affection, and sincere and sweet conversation and carriage one towards another.' The *Sermons* largely concerns itself with marriage and the relationship between husband, wife and God.

Byfield's sermon expounds at great length about marriage and its duties, a subject close to Gouge's heart, and a possible reason for its being published by Gouge, who was himself the author of a book on domestic responsibilities, which, unusually for the age, encouraged love matches.³²² It was not until after the Restoration that the absolute authority of parents over the marriage partners of their children began to erode.³²³ However, earlier pre-war Puritan handbooks of domestic conduct, like Gouge's, had pointed out [the rather obvious fact] that if a couple at least liked each other at the start there was much less chance of divergence and adultery later on. Gouge's dedication of *The Sermons*, dated January 25th 1625, is to both Horace and Mary.

³¹⁷ Not 1 Peter 3 in 1626 as listed in Bryan W. Ball's otherwise excellent DNB entry. The sermon was based upon 10 Peter 3 and is dedicated by William Gouge to both Veres.

³¹⁸ Nicholas Byfield, *A Commentary or Sermons upon The Second Chapter of the First Epistle of Saint Peter*, (1626), dedication, A.4.

³¹⁹ Sir Henry Finch, *Calling of the Jews*, (London, 1621). The book predicts that the Jews will (soon) establish a worldwide earthly empire, which is why James took offence.

³²⁰ Christopher Hill, *Society and Puritanism*, (London, 1964), p.196,

³²¹ The Westminster Assembly of Divines (1643 to 1653) was a council of theologians (or 'divines') and members of the English Parliament appointed to restructure the Church of England.

³²² Nicholas Byfield, *Of Domesticall Duties, eight treatises.*, (London, 1622).

³²³ Antonia Fraser, *The Weaker Vessel; A woman's lot in 17th Century England*, (London, 1984), p.10.

Another of the many posthumous publications by, and on behalf of, Nicholas Byfield is *The Principall Grounds of Christian religion*, published in 1625 by W.C. and printed by I.L. for Ralph Roundthwaite, who seems to have been responsible for the printing of many of Byfield's sermons and treatises. Several of Byfield's works give a clear indication of his strong Calvinist beliefs, but in this document, sub-titled *Briefly and plainly propounded by way of question and answer for the instruction of the younger sort*, Byfield is much more precise about the fundamentals of his religious views. He speaks of the revelation 'unto God's elect all trueth necessary to their salvation,' he proclaims that 'men in every age who are Gods elect, [are] gathered by the power of Christ & separated from the world by the sincere protection of true religion' and of those 'whom he predestined ... That all the Godly shall reign with Christ in unspeakable glory and eternal happinness in heaven'³²⁴

This is extremely potent and telling proof, albeit by extension, that both the Veres were devout believers in predestination. Their sponsorship and patronage of Byfield, together with their taking in of one of his children, must point to a close union of ideas and doctrine. This is especially true, since this example of patronage was in London, with all the proximate pressures of church hierarchy and crown and not in the Netherlands where Vere was of singular stature and largely beyond the reach and interference of even the Archbishop of Canterbury.

One of the best known of those divines who dedicated works to the Veres was Richard Sibbes DD. Born of artisan stock there is uncertainty about his actual birth year but he did attend St John's College, Cambridge, matriculating in 1595 and gaining his BA in 1599. Sibbes became a fellow of the college in 1601, gaining his MA the following year. Ordained in March 1609, he became a well-known and widely praised preacher and was appointed as public lecturer at Holy Trinity parish church in Cambridge where he was so well received that a 'new gallery needed to be built to accommodate his listeners.'³²⁵ In 1617 he was also appointed preacher at Grey's Inn in London, one of the Inns of Court which trained and shaped young barristers, and it was probably here that his reputation found an audience of sufficient stature to bring him to the notice of those in power beyond the church.

Sibbes was a friend of John Pym, the English parliamentarian and leader of the Long Parliament. Pym was a lawyer, and he and Sibbes may have first met at one of Sibbes lectures.³²⁶ Certainly, in the early 1620s, Sibbes was a member of an influential

³²⁴ Ibid., pp.10,12, 21.

³²⁵ Mark E. Dever, 'Sibbes, Richard (1577?–1635)', ODNB, (2004), p. 2,

³²⁶ Christopher Hill, *Society and Puritanism in Pre-Revolutionary England*, (London, 2018), p.173. The two men were both associated with the law. See Christopher Hibbert, *Cavaliers and Roundheads, The English at War, 1642-1649*, (London,1993), p. 22.

group of London preachers which included William Gouge, Thomas Gataker, and John Davenport, all of whom were part of the Vere sponsorship group, which cooperated closely with other similar groups within the non-conformist network. But Sibbes was, in the end, a more circumspect soul.³²⁷ After an earlier refusal, Sibbes did subscribe to, and sign, the three articles as recorded in the Cambridge University Archives. He was also one of the feofees for impropriations, as was Davenport and he and Sibbes collaborated in editing a number of sermons.³²⁸

The feofees were a London based group, established to buy up land rights that allowed them to appoint Puritan preachers of their choice.³²⁹ Since the feofees were, in effect, a perpetually renewing body they could maintain their choice of parish incumbent indefinitely, and thus ensure that as many pulpits as possible were available to spread the Godly word. Active between 1625 and 1633 they were formally associated as a committee to buy up and dispense patronage of impropriated parish livings and tithes to create new preaching appointments in the Church of England. The group attracted large donations, from 75 persons in total, and they began acquiring impropriations in April 1625 (Dunstable) and then spread as far as York and Pembrokeshire.³³⁰ Problems sometimes arose when sitting incumbents held a doctrine that the feofees disliked, but in these cases bribery was sometimes effective as a means of freeing up the incumbency.³³¹ Indeed, financial matters came to be one of the major objections to the group, with the accusation that they had benefited, personally, from the income of the parishes they controlled. This was a normal occurrence amongst private landholders, of course, but was not seen as proper by the church authorities who opposed the feofees. John Davenport strongly denied benefitting at all from his role as a feoffee complaining, in a letter to Mary Vere, that he was in fact 'out of purse, in myne own particular for the advanceem[en]t of it'³³²

Charles I and the rapidly rising Laud (at the time Chancellor of Oxford, as well as bishop of London) took an increasingly hostile view of the feofees, seeing them as both 'encroaching on the royal prerogative and the rights of bishops' and, in time, disposing of more preferments than the Church of England.³³³ Lay ownership of what had been monastic and church benefices had, it was thought, deprived the Church of considerable income even before the 1620s and feofees generally were banned under

³²⁷ Dever, 'Sibbes, Richard (1577?–1635)', ODNB, (2004), pp.1-2,

³²⁸ Isabel Calder, *Letters of John Davenport*, (Yale, 1937), p. 2.

³²⁹ Ethan W. Kirby, 'The Lay Feofees: A Study in Militant Puritanism', *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 14, No 1., (Mar, 1942), pp.1-25. Impropriations are ecclesiastical properties and livings in lay hands.

³³⁰ Kirby 'The lay Feofees', p. 9.

³³¹ Ibid., p. 15.

³³² Calder, *Letters of John Davenport*, p.39.

³³³ Kirby, 'The lay Feofees', p.13.

the provisions of the Hampton Court conference of 1604. However, that ruling was not enacted until Archbishop Laud's appointment in 1633 when the group were forced to disband, though it took until the 1640s for the matter to be finally settled by Parliament³³⁴

Sibbes most famous work *The Bruised Reed and Smoking Flax* published in 1630, is dedicated to both Veres.³³⁵ It is a collection of sermons that Sibbes apologises for as being 'long since preached'. In the dedication Sibbes praises Horace as one whom 'the world hath a long time taken notice of.., in whom both religion, and military imployment, meekness of spirit, with height of courage, humility with honour, by a rare and happy combination have met together' and 'shewed that piety can enter into tents & follow after camps.'³³⁶ This underscores Vere's pietic approach to soldiering which was both uncommon and well known. Sibbes suggests in the dedication that the Veres still have religious battles to fight, to rescue a church that has come under the power of Christ's enemies. This may refer to the growing ascendancy of Arminian thinking in England, symbolised by what came to be called the Durham House group, following the appointment of Richard Neile to the see of Durham in 1617, though similar concerns must have been held regarding the wider European situation.³³⁷

Neile's elevation, together with that of Lancelot Andrewes to Winchester in 1618, and George Montaigne to London in 1621, signalled an increase in the speed of what had been a slow shift towards an Arminian viewpoint.³³⁸ Christopher Hill certainly thought so, writing in his *Society and Puritanism* that even 'By the 1590s theological unity and respect for Calvin were declining among English Protestants.'³³⁹ The Durham House group included William Laud, who had been a former chaplain to Neile. Laud, bishop of London from 1628, grew in power and influence, eventually replacing George Abbot as Archbishop of Canterbury in 1633. Laud certainly opposed Calvinism, which he saw as being in opposition to prevailing Church hierarchy and uniformity, and he was particularly opposed to the separatism espoused by some non-conformists, which threatened his position at the apex of the religious hierarchy.

The Bruised Reed and Smoking Flax is a collection of Sibbes' sermons, in which the reed and flax of the title refers to the weakness of God's Children, and the necessity of humility in order to receive the blessings of God.³⁴⁰ The work has been

³³⁴ Ibid., p. 23-24.

³³⁵ The title is taken from *Isiah* 42.3.

³³⁶ A view echoed in the elegies written after Horace Vere's death.

³³⁷ Tyacke, *Anti-Calvinists*, calls this 'the first organised opposition to English Calvinism', p. 123.

³³⁸ Ibid, p.114, Montaigne had been Chaplain to Robert Devereux, 2nd Earl of Essex, on his expedition against Cadiz in 1596. Horace Vere also served in this expedition where he was knighted by the Earl.

³³⁹ Hill, p.167.

³⁴⁰ Isaiah 42:3 and quoted by Jesus in Matthew 12:20.

reprinted continuously since 1630, with the last edition appearing in 1998. In the sermons, Sibbes gives advice on how best to live, worship and find the correct path to the Lord. He does not condemn the questioning of the Christian, indeed he praises it since 'nothing is so certain as that which is certaine after doubts... it is a witty thing to be a Christian' he asserts, since by tackling one's own doubts, one is the more able to counter the doubts of others.³⁴¹ Sibbes writes of 'the Godly souls' and the 'Covenant of Grace' but he also makes the interesting statement that 'None are damned in the Church, but those that will', and that damnation awaits those 'who will not meet Christ in the ways of Mercy,' hardly the staunchest of predestinarian Calvinist views, unless Sibbes is restricting his words to the Godly alone, but it does conform with his earlier exhortations to be kind to the weak and to look to one's own faults.³⁴² Sibbes also, towards the end of his long sermon, states that 'Sahtans [sic] malice is especially against the most religious and manly resolutions' a reminder to those who consider themselves to be pious that it is they who are subject most to Satan's hatred, but Sibbes also declares that even the weakest soul and the most sinful can expect God's help, even if there is only 'a little truth of grace'.³⁴³

But it is on the last pages of *The Bruised Reed and Smoking Flax* that Sibbes makes his attack upon the then doctrine of the Church of England 'And for the present fate of the Church we see now how forlorne it is' and 'God will not suffer Antichrist and his supporters to revel and russle in the Church as they doe. but he is confident that Christ will conquer all. Sibbes' true colours then emerge as he praises Luther but also praises Luther's repenting of his errors, and in effect calls for unity amongst all, opposing the separatist tendency of other preachers.

The dedication points strongly to Sibbes' Puritan leanings and his posthumously published later works indicate that this was so.³⁴⁴ Despite this, Sibbes had written in the *Bruised Reed*; 'Ambitious men study accommodation of themselves to the humours of those by whom they hope to be raised' and so in this way, apparently, Sibbes managed to avoid losing any of the several academic and clerical posts that he held by what seems to have been the (prudent) method of conforming, maybe just enough, to whatever the itself changing Church of England required of its priests.³⁴⁵ This is epitomised by Sibbes comment in the *Bruised Reed*, 'New Lords, new laws', which

³⁴¹ R Sibbes, *The Bruised Reed and Smoaking Flax*, (London, 1630), pp. 68-69.

³⁴² Unless Sibbes here defines the 'Church' as comprising only the elect as some Calvinists argued.

³⁴³ Sibbes, *The Bruised Reed and Smoaking Flax*, pp. 326-334.

³⁴⁴ Tyacke, Nicholas, *Aspects of English Protestantism, c. 1530–1700*, (Manchester, 2001), pp. 121-123.

³⁴⁵ Dever, Mark, *Richard Sibbes*, (Macon, 2000), pp. 396–413.

may have summed up his employment methodology.³⁴⁶ Richard Sibbes was clearly not brave (or convinced?), enough to defy his religious or political masters during his lifetime, but all the evidence points to a man of decidedly strong Puritan views. Perhaps his dedication to the Veres stemmed from an admiration for those who were both believers, and achievers, for the faith.

The next author to consider is William Crosse who had been chaplain to Sir John Ogle between 1620 and 1624, and thus would certainly have known and met Horace. In 1625, Crosse wrote a lengthy poem entitled 'Belgiaes troubles and triumphs' which discusses the last four years of war in the Netherlands.³⁴⁷ Published in two parts, Book two is dedicated to Horace Vere and his brother-in-law, Edward Conway. Crosse's work is more of a history than a poem, but it is valuable because Crosse was an eye-witness to the events he describes, and because of the content of his descriptions of 'The Conspiracies of Barneveldt's two sons, and other Arminians against the Prince of Orange.'³⁴⁸ Crosse describes an assassination attempt by two of the sons of Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, former leader of the United Provinces, whose support for Protestant toleration of the Arminian doctrine led to his execution in 1619. Crosse says

'Thus was the plot; four assassines designed for this black deed, were solemnly combin'd by mutual vowes, and interchanged oaths... To pistoll Maurice, Henricke, and the rest of the Nassanian flocke; this being confest By two Conspirators, the Prince straight hies From Risiwicke to the Hague, and there descres In an Arminian house foure of this crue, Whose malice did great Nassaws death pursue'.³⁴⁹

Vere and the house of Nassau had worked together closely and harmoniously for many years and such a conspiracy would have been deplored by Horace. Crosse equates the plot with Arminian design and the dedication of his work to Horace Vere points to Vere's opposition to Arminian theology. In 1623 Secretary Conway wrote to Calvert ordering the arrest of one of Barneveldt's sons still, apparently, at liberty.³⁵⁰

The next dedication comes from Thomas Gataker, rector of Rotherhithe from 1611 to 1642, and a close contact (and cousin) of Vere's good friend (and nephew-in-law) Sir Robert Harley.³⁵¹ Gataker dedicated the second edition of his *A Good Wife God's Gift: and a Wife Indeed* to Robert and Brilliana Harley.³⁵² It had been their

³⁴⁶ R Sibbes, *The Bruised Reed*, pp.11,40,103.

³⁴⁷ William Crosse, *Belgiaes Troubles and Triumphs*, (London,1625).

³⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 39.

³⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 59.

³⁵⁰ CSPD, *James I*, 1623, p.509. Conway to Calvert, 3 March 1623.

³⁵¹ Adams, 'The Protestant Cause', p. 317.

³⁵² They married in 1623, just after Horace had returned home from the Palatinate.

wedding sermon.³⁵³ Gataker was one of a growing number of independently paid for lecturers in London from the end of the 16th century.³⁵⁴ His publication, *The joy of the Just with The signes of such Discourse Tending to the Comfort of the Dejected and afflicted; and to the Triall of Sinceritie*, was produced in London in 1623 and dedicated to Horace and Mary Vere, whom Gataker describes as ‘persons for place and Pietie so eminent.’³⁵⁵

The *Joy of the Just* is a longer version of an earlier sermon which purports to offer comfort, encouragement and a doctrinal discussion of the Glory of the Kingdom of Christ. It is a ‘... sorry present (though coming somewhat late) to welcome your returne home from your late imployment abroad.’³⁵⁶ The text refers to the ‘Godly’ being ‘received into special grace and favour with God’ and assures them that ‘None but the Godly have good or just cause to rejoyce’ because they have ‘a twofold cause to rejoyce... in regard of present grace and ... their hope of future glory.’³⁵⁷ This refers to double predestination, which is the forgiveness of original sin and election into eternal glory and it places Gataker firmly at the heart of contemporary Puritan doctrine.

Gataker asserts that ‘The godly therefore are girt about...with Gods favour and ...girt about with joy.’³⁵⁸ Gataker’s allusions to the ‘Godly’ in his tract are too numerous to count but the essence of his long sermon appears to be to advise the ‘Godly’ that, since they are of the elect, this alone should provide them with all the joy they need. Whatever the trials and privations they face in life, the hardships and the pleasures of this world are nothing compared to the joy to come.

Gataker was also a member of the Westminster Assembly (1642) where, unlike Harley, he supported episcopacy.³⁵⁹ He also opposed the introduction of the Solemn League and Covenant and the trial of Charles I.³⁶⁰ Gataker’s dedication of *The Joy of the just...* to Horace and Mary Vere came in 1623, with Vere recently home from his unsuccessful defence of Mannheim in the Palatinate. At this time, Church of England

³⁵³ Thomas Gataker, *A Good Wife God’s Gift: and a Wife Indeed: Two marriage Sermons*, (London, 1624), L, E and D.

³⁵⁴ H. G. Owen, ‘Lectures and Lectureships in Tudor London’ in *Church Quarterly Review*, Jan-March, (1961), pp. 67-68.

³⁵⁵ Thomas Gataker, *The joy of the Just with The Signes of such Discourse Tending to the Comfort of the Dejected and afflicted; and to the Triall of Sinceritie*, (London, 1623), p. A 2.

³⁵⁶ This is Vere’s return from the Low Countries, (January 1623), following his unsuccessful defence of Mannheim in the Palatinate.

³⁵⁷ Thomas Gataker, *The joy of the Just*, p.5.

³⁵⁸ Ibid., p.7.

³⁵⁹ Brett Usher, ‘Gataker, Thomas (1574-1654)’ ODNB, (2004).

³⁶⁰ Solemn League and Covenant, (1643), was agreement between the English and Scots by which the Scots agreed to support the English Parliamentarians in their disputes with the royalists and both countries pledged to work for a civil and religious union of England, Scotland, and Ireland under a Presbyterian-parliamentary system; source: <https://www.britannica.com/event/Solemn-League-and-Covenant-England-Scotland-1643> (accessed 5th October 2017).

orthodoxy was still largely Calvinist. But by the early 1640s the tone had changed. Was Gataker simply bending with the prevailing orthodoxy during his time as part of the Westminster Assembly? Or is it possible, even with Horace long dead, that Gataker knew that Mary Vere, and her circle of divinity and influence, of which Gataker was one, would have also supported the King, if not episcopacy? Gataker may well have met Horace and Mary at the wedding of their niece Brilliana to Robert Harley.³⁶¹ The most famous living soldier of his time, he would have been a prominent and respected wedding guest. Gataker must have known, or believed, that the Veres' religious views were close to his own.

And it may have been this pious fame that emboldened Thomas Barnes, who was a preacher, and the incumbent minister at Saint Margaret's Church in New Fish Street London, in the early years of the 1620s.³⁶² Barnes wrote a number of religious tracts, and included amongst them is *Voxbelli or an Alarm to Warre*.³⁶³ This publication is unlike Barnes's other works, since it is an out and out call for a religious war. Published in 1626 it is dedicated to 'Right Honourable, Sir Horatio Vere, Knight, Baron Tilbury.' Vere was ennobled in July 1625, so Barnes was probably hoping to gain the attention and support of the already famous, but now Lord Vere for his cause.³⁶⁴ There is no record of the two men ever having met, but Barnes must have been aware of Vere's martial exploits, and the way in which Barnes addresses Vere in his dedication, suggests that Barnes was also well aware of Horace's religious views.

The dedication begins with an apology for seeking war, which Barnes knows is a 'mischief and a misery,' it goes on to describe the atrocities and evils of armed conflict. But he excuses himself by saying that the call is God's, not his, and that it is this that has emboldened him to 'crave your Honours patronage for these few papers'... 'nothing [else] but partly your love to Christ his cause, as you are a Beleever: and partly your place in God's field, as a warlike commander.'

Voxbelli asserts that 'a lawful warre is to bee preferred before an unlawful peace'.³⁶⁵ And Barnes declares that seeking and promoting war, 'bloud and blowes', as he calls it, makes him fearful to suggest the idea but 'when I considered that there are Canaanites to be smitten at home, Christians to bee succoured abroad, I took heart to venture to this field' though he quickly points out his own inadequacy as 'weaknesse to wield my weapon as I should' ³⁶⁶

³⁶¹ Brilliana Harley, nee Conway.

³⁶² The church was the first to perish in the Great Fire of 1666 and was not rebuilt. The Monument stands on the site today.

³⁶³ Thomas Barnes, *Voxbelli or an Alarm to Warre*, (London, 1626).

³⁶⁴ The object of which was the prosecution of religious war in Europe.

³⁶⁵ Barnes, *Voxbelli*, p.2.

³⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 2-3.

Barnes lists five 'just causes' for war:- Monstrous Pride: Insolence against God: Insulting over the Church: Tumultuousness and Rebellion: False-heartednesse. The last of which is defined as 'pretences of unity, and yet practice of enmity'³⁶⁷ Barnes argues that there is a duty to wage a just war, indeed that not to do so is tantamount to sin, even if mortal law disagrees, because 'The Gospel itself is a law' (a very Puritan mantra). He goes further, by saying 'how worthy of blame all those bee who take on, and cry out against **us** [bold in the original], that are Gods messengers...for speaking... in the terrible language of the law'.³⁶⁸ *Voxbelli* continues to argue for [just] war throughout its 41 pages. Barnes claims that the Pope and the Turk are equall in evil, calling them both antichrists. But he seems to say that the Pope's evil arises principally because he claims to have 'superiority above all princes' which argument was specially deplored by King James. Indeed, Barnes claims that of the two, Pope and Turk, the Pope is the worst, going on to advance many reasons why this is so.³⁶⁹ The argument thus is that to make war on such evil is not only necessary but holy.

Barnes criticises those 'yonguelings' who go to war with no 'licence' and just for the adventure, but he takes care to exclude the 'Voluntaries' and those that 'have a call.' This exclusion is just as well, because his dedicatee Horace had previously, in April 1610 described himself as a Voluntary in a letter to Andrew Newton, a gentleman of his Highnesses bedchamber when Horace was attending upon the Prince of Orange rather than taking an active part in the Cleave-Julich war.³⁷⁰ Vere says in his letter 'It is the first time I was a voluntary since I was of the profession'.³⁷¹ Barnes calls Vere a 'religious commander' and suggests that, under the command of such a man, impressing the bad (i.e. the wicked and evil) into military service is lawful, because in any fighting that takes place both the wicked enemy and our own evil men will be punished with death; 'The Lord smiteth one wicked man by the hand of another'.³⁷² In that way the punishment of war will fall on the evil more than upon the just.³⁷³ Barnes is, however, careful to point out that this rule applies only to the 'Common Soldiers.' He ends his plea by contending that Vere 'could never stirre in more needful time'³⁷⁴

³⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 29, 30.

³⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 5.

³⁶⁹ Ibid., pp.12,13,14.

³⁷⁰ The War of the Julich Succession was a conflict over the right of succession to the United Duchies of Julich-Cleves-Berg. It lasted between 10 June 1609 and 24 October 1610, resuming in May 1614 and finally ending in 13 October 1614.

³⁷¹ Koninklijke Bibliotheek, 72D, 32 04B 01 04, Horace Vere to Andrew Newton, April 1610. In this instance Vere is simply stating that he had no official rank or posting but was acting only as an advisor to Maurice.

³⁷² Barnes, *Voxbelli*, p.16.

³⁷³ Trim, 'Fighting Jacobs Wars', p. 69. Dr Trim suggests that as known criminals, vagrants and other unemployed men were usually conscripted, in some places this was seen as a useful method of 'social cleansing'.

³⁷⁴ Barnes *Voxbelli*, p.40.

Family and Friends

More strong evidence of Vere's religious orientation comes in the form of Horace's personal associations and through the connections of his wife Mary. The Tracys were notable Calvinists, and it is unlikely that Horace, who when he married Mary was 36 years old, a war hero and a senior officer in Dutch service, would have wed a woman whose views on religion were at any distance from his own. Both Mary and Horace sponsored non-conformists clergy throughout their lives and after Horace's death Mary continued in that role as an influential and admired family advisor. Mary established herself as a well-respected matriarch, both within her wider family and beyond, corresponding with many 'godly' ministers and others, and she was the subject of several dedications in her own right, as well as those she shared with her husband.³⁷⁵

Mary sponsored 'equally radical preachers' including Samuel Bamford and John Davenport.³⁷⁶ Bamford was a graduate of Emmanuel College Cambridge early in 1616, and proceeded to his MA in 1619. He was chaplain to the Veres at their house in The Hague in the late 1620s and he took a consistently hard line against the established church in England, in particular putting his own interpretation on the liturgy and opposing the use of the established prayer book. He later married Elizabeth, daughter of Nicholas Byfield, one of whose siblings had been accepted into the Veres' household, a marriage which reinforced an affinity with the Veres' religious outlook. But Bamford's persistent opposition to the orthodoxy of the Laudian establishment was only maintained through the support of the Dutch Reformed Church, and when in 1635 he returned to England, to see the newly widowed Mary Vere, he was arrested.³⁷⁷ Though he was detained for some months, he subsequently skipped bail and returned to the Netherlands, where he continued to defy the English Church until 1650 by when conditions had changed and he was able to return to London, there accruing a 'Godly' reputation. Bamford's strident opposition to the prevailing orthodoxy of the English Church, whilst retaining the support and friendship of the Veres, further reinforces their hard line Puritan identity.

Another of Mary Vere's preachers was John Davenport. He was at Magdalen College Cambridge (a well-known Puritan stronghold at the time) for two years after 1615, but he left before graduating, becoming a chaplain in Durham before transferring to the St Lawrence Jewry parish in London in 1619. His effectiveness there as a

³⁷⁵ Jacqueline Eales, 'Vere, Mary, Lady Vere (1581–1671)', ODNB, (2004), p.1. And see Jacqueline Eales, 'An ancient mother in our Israel': Mary, Lady Vere (1581–1671) in Elizabeth Scott-Baumann and Johanna Harris (eds), *The Intellectual Culture of Puritan Women, 1558–1680* (Basingstoke, 2010).

³⁷⁶ Adams, 'The Protestant Cause', p. 442.

³⁷⁷ Francis J. Bremer, 'Davenport, John (bap.1597–1670)', ODNB, (2004).

preacher carried him to the Vicarage of St Stephen's in London, though the intervention of the Veres, their brother-in-law Edward Conway (then Secretary of State) and others within the Vere's pietical circle was required.³⁷⁸ This was because of the opposition of George Montaigne, then Bishop of London, who was a staunch Arminian. King James had asked Montaigne to find out what sort of preacher Davenport was, possibly because of the 'common and mean people' that supported him. Whereupon Mary Vere and Conway represented Davenport as being 'the acme of conformity' and he was thus duly inducted as vicar at St Stephens³⁷⁹.

Davenport joined with Richard Sibbes and William Gouge in favouring support for Protestant clergy displaced by the war in the Palatinate, This support must have been heightened by news reports of the removal from office of Protestant preachers following the Imperial conquest of the Palatinate which told that 'the Jesuits who now at *Heidlebergh* take upon them to be ministers will not baptise any one childe before the Parents have reconciled themselves unto the Church of Rome'.³⁸⁰

Davenport's frustration at the failure of both James I and Charles I to intervene militarily in defence of Protestant Europe, was a constant irritant. Davenport was clearly well liked and supported by Mary to whom he wrote often, sometimes mentioning affectionately other divines in the Vere circle like Obadiah Sedgwick and Samuel Bamford.³⁸¹ However, following the accession of Laud as Archbishop of Canterbury in 1633, Davenport found himself an outcast, and went into hiding, but he maintained his correspondence with Mary reassuring her that he was 'willing to lye and dye in prison, if the cause may be advantaged by it.' Yet, in the same letter he says 'I doe not censure those thast doe conforme (nay I account many of them faithful, and worthy instrum[en]ts of Gods glory.... But my light [is]different)'.³⁸² Then, following Horace's death on May 2nd 1635 Davenport wrote to Mary, on July 21st, offering his condolences in a lengthy letter praising Horace's devotion to his religious beliefs and how he 'knytt mine heart unto him' in regard to all his pious actions. Davenport also gives us more detail about Horace in both life and death, comforting Mary that Horace died quickly and not after a 'sensible decay...which might have come to be burthensome to himself and uncomfortable to your ladyship.' But Davenport also makes the curious comment that 'he died ... of a vomitt, which he could never beare'.³⁸³ It seems odd that this old

³⁷⁸ Ibid., p.1.

³⁷⁹ Calder, *Letters of John Davenport*, p.2. letter from Davenport to Mary requesting this help, p.19.

³⁸⁰ Anon, 'Our Last Weekly Newes'; Published by Nathaniel Butter, Nicholas Bourne, 12th September 1623. p. 9.

³⁸¹ Calder, *Letters of John Davenport*, pp. 29, 31.

³⁸² Ibid., p. 39.

³⁸³ Ibid., p. 58. An emetic.

soldier who had seen many a gory death, and been wounded himself several times, should be so squeamish? But it gives a rare personal glimpse into the life of this long overlooked soldier. Horace died whilst at dinner, with his friend Sir Henry Vane. The description of his death suggests some sort of stroke or heart attack.³⁸⁴

Most tellingly regarding his relationship and religious affinity with the Veres, Davenport's son (also John, baptized in April 1635 at the Hague) was left in the care of Mary Vere as John senior and his wife, Elizabeth, left for the new world in 1637, with the child scarcely 2 years old.³⁸⁵ This younger John Davenport was apparently safely reunited with his parents in the New World two years later.³⁸⁶ Davenport continued to write to Mary whilst he was in the new world, dying there in 1670.³⁸⁷

Many of Horace's closest friends and associates were also staunch Puritans. Of particular note was Vere's long and close relationship with Sir Robert Harley MP, who became a nephew by marriage in July 1623, when he married Sir Edward Conway's daughter Brilliana. Harley was a self-confessed Puritan, taking a noted anti-Catholic and later also anti-Arminian line. As an MP he opposed Laudian ecclesiastical innovations. Tellingly, Harley was in charge of The Long Parliament Committee for the Demolition of Monuments of Superstition and Idolatry, and presided over the destruction of religious art and architecture during the 1640s. It is unlikely that Vere and Harley would have become or remained on such good terms had the two men not been of similar mind. This is borne out by Harley's 'dropping' the friendship of another gentleman, Sir Edward Herbert, who had disagreed with his religious view. Herbert had been a soldier in the United Provinces and was almost certainly known to Horace Vere.³⁸⁸ He was something of a religious philosopher, and an early deist, which may have been the reason for Harley's disapproval.

Harley did maintain friendly relations with other relatives who occupied a less radical position than himself, and who stayed within the bounds of the established church, though he distanced himself from his Catholic relations. Thus, whilst Horace Vere's own correspondence sheds little direct light upon his true feelings, we can look to what Harley wrote to Vere, as an indicator of how both men saw their religious position.

The lack of a precise definition of what was a Puritan seems to have prompted the Puritan Harley to draft a letter to his close friend and future relative by marriage,

³⁸⁴ Clements Markham, *The Fighting Veres*, p. 453.

³⁸⁵ William Steven, *The History of the Scottish Church, Rotterdam* (Edinburgh, 1832), p. 310; Calder, *Letters of John Davenport*, p. 75.

³⁸⁶ Calder, pp. 75-76.

³⁸⁷ Francis J. Bremer, 'Davenport, John (bap.1597-1670)', ODNB, (2004). p. 2.

³⁸⁸ 1st Baron Herbert of Chisbury (or Chirbury), KB (1583 – 1648).

Horace Vere, in February of 1621, concerning the 'Character' of a Puritan.³⁸⁹ Harley's letter to Vere was prompted by the expulsion from the House of Commons of a member who had opposed a bill that was to restrict allowable Sunday activities. Harley wrote

'one Shepard, a lawyer, made an intemperate speech against a bill which was to restrain the profanation of the Sabbath, and inveighed with some bitter words against Puritans, saying there were many snares to catch poor Papists, but not so much as a mousetrap to catch a Puritan, whereupon the House put him out: and because I think the Parliament will not proceed to define a Puritan, I take the boldness to present you with his character.'³⁹⁰

Harley felt that no official 'character', or definition, of what defined a Puritan would be forthcoming from the House, so he drafted one himself and addressed it to Horace. This is highly significant, since it suggests a clear alignment of the views of both men. Harley would never have written such a detailed description and definition to anyone, unless he was sure they would agree with him.

Harley's Character is comparatively brief but he makes some telling points about what he considers makes a Puritan: 'Indeed, he thinks a L [ord] B [ishop] is a fallacy, well connected to the abuse [he] receives'. Thus Church hierarchy beyond the actual local congregation is not approved of, though Harley wisely makes no comment about the King's position in all this. Puritans of Harley's stamp strongly advocated, even insisted upon, preaching ministers. He pointedly asserts that 'He thinks a dumb Minister is a drie Nurse'.

This was because they saw the 'dropping of the word' as it was often called, as the most important part of any church service. The words in the Bible, and a lengthy exposition and explanation of them, were central to Puritan beliefs. Harley himself controlled the appointment of preachers at several parishes in Herefordshire, and he made sure that they were all Puritan divines

Harley continues; 'A non-resident is a profane wretch.' Preachers must be in situ and multiple benefices and livings are to be deplored. And Harley disagrees with the making of the sign of the cross at Baptism, being 'utterly ignora[n]t when that Ayeriall sign made on the forehead wilbe op[er]ative to produce the promised effect'. But Harley ends with defiance or disdain, rather than definition, when he says 'The world speakes ill of hym & misname hym because they know hym not, but he little cares for the barking of the Doggs, he is suer to be welcome to the M[aste]r of the

³⁸⁹ J. Eales, 'Sir Robert Harley, K. B., and the 'character' of a Puritan', *British Library Journal*, 15, 1989, pp.134-157.

³⁹⁰ *Historical Manuscripts Commission, Manuscripts of the Duke of Portland, at Welbeck Abbey, Vol 3, (1582 – 1700), (H.M.S.O., 1891-1931), p.13.*

house.’ Jacqueline Eales interpretation of this document, which was clearly, as she wrote, a ‘rough note’ to a close friend, establishes Horace Vere within the confidently Puritan circle of divinity that saw the defence of religion (as they defined it) as a fundamental part of their belief, both at home and abroad. It is noticeable though, that Harley makes no mention of predestination in his note.³⁹¹ It is odd that such a core principle of the Calvinistic faith merits no comment at all. Did this omission arise because Harley thought it so fundamental a principle that it did not need repeating? Or was this one area of disagreement, or debate, between close friends who were soon to be relatives by marriage?

Notwithstanding this, the likelihood of Horace’s affinity to these detailed views of Sir Robert seem compelling. Thus, predestination aside, it would be perverse not to align Vere closely with Harleys ‘Character’ and this would strongly suggest that Vere considered himself to be a Puritan even if the exact definition of that word, at that time, may have been fluid. Collinson’s comment about ‘floating anchorages within the Calvinist sphere’ (p. 46 above) would seem to be particularly apt and in the absence of any better definition or declaration from Vere himself the label of Puritan is useful shorthand for what would otherwise be a long descriptive list with many exclusions.

Edward, 1st Viscount Conway, came from a family of wealthy Warwickshire landowners. His military career spanned the same period as that of Horace Vere and the two men had served together as early as 1596 during the raid on Cadiz. Conway was himself succeeded by Francis Vere as Governor of the Brill and then Horace was appointed in place of his brother in 1609. Conway espoused the Protestant convictions of Brill, hence the unusual name of his daughter, Brilliana, who was Harley’s third wife. Brilliana was herself a devout Calvinist, leaving many informative and often religiously impassioned letters as verification. She was an assiduous and well informed correspondent, writing especially to her husband when he was at Parliament during the 1620s and 1640s, and to her son Edward when he was at Oxford where her disapproval of Laudian doctrinal policy in church services and her opposition to episcopalianism are well attested. But Horace wrote to Harley in August 1626 saying ‘I doe love my nevew and neece Harley most affectionatlie’.³⁹² And because Brilliana and husband Robert have left us a sufficiency of proof of their Puritan beliefs this ‘affection’ must also imply a strong indication of Horace’s views.³⁹³

³⁹¹ Tyacke, *anti-Calvinists*, p. 250. Calvin did not put unequal stress upon this aspect of his teaching, but it remains a crucial tenet. The elect cannot fall from grace whilst the unelect can never attain it.

³⁹² BL, Add Mss 70001, Vere to Harley, 25th August 1626.

³⁹³ Jacqueline Eales, ‘Sir Robert Harley (1579-1656)’, ODNB, (2004).

Conway was 'an enthusiastic Protestant' who held several senior government posts.³⁹⁴ He was returned as an MP several times and in the House showed himself to be a strong advocate of Protestant, religious based, foreign policy. Later Secretary of State and Lord president of the Privy Council, Conway's appointment to the Governorship of Brill, his marriage to Dorothy, sister of Mary Vere, and his daughter's marriage to Harley, are all strong pointers to Conway's earnest Puritan beliefs. The familial link between Vere and Conway, reinforced as it was by the two men's military brotherhood, was sustained and succoured by their shared religious principles.

Another of Horace Vere's frequent correspondents, and co-religionists, was Sir Dudley Carleton, Ambassador to the Netherlands between 1616 and 1625. Mary Hervey tells us that 'an intimacy had sprung up' between Vere and Carleton at this time.³⁹⁵ Writing to Vere in October 1617, Carleton refers to Horace and Mary's recent return to London 'where... I may have the contentment of resuming our wonted correspondence.' Carleton notes that 'our differences in religion [the rising tide of Arminianism] .. since they are stept out of the Church into the State, and from pennes to arms have made a great noise in the world... And I am as little pleased myself to be thus printed and translated, as you will see by the enclosed'³⁹⁶

Carleton is referring to the address he had recently (October 6th) given in his official capacity to the Assembly of the Lords the Estates Generall of the United Provinces of the Low Countries. Carleton's speech had attacked the 'Schismatical Doctrine of Arminianism' calling it 'evil', and condemning those who 'having wedded his [Arminius's] particular opinions... have gone about to introduce them by cunning force into the public churches after his death.' In his letter Carleton calls these people Remonstrants, the name by which they soon became known, and he highlights what he calls the 'choice points of predestination... which were too high and too dark for the capacitie of the common people.'³⁹⁷ Carleton's condemnation of Arminianism accompanies his 'recommendations' from King James, that the States convene an international Synod to remedy the 'evil' of Arminianism. The synod (of Dort) duly took place the following year and was attended by Carleton's uncle George Carleton, Bishop of Llandaff, as one of the English representatives.

³⁹⁴ Sean Kelsey, 'Conway, Edward, first Viscount Conway and first Viscount Killultagh (c.1564–1631)', ODNB, (2004).

³⁹⁵ Mary F. S. Hervey, *The Life, Correspondence & collections of Thomas Howard Earl of Arundel*, (Oxford, 1921), p.133.

³⁹⁶ Correspondence of Thomas Howard, earl of Arundel, Dudley Carleton to Horace Vere, Autograph Letters, Arundel castle, No.222, quoted in Mary F. S. Hervey, *The Life, Correspondence & collections of Thomas Howard Earl of Arundel*, p.133.

³⁹⁷ Speech of Dudley Carleton, Ambassador for King James to the United Provinces, *Touching the discord and troubles of the church and policie, caused by the Schismatical Doctrine of Arminius*, October 6, 1617, (London, 1618).

In his letter, Dudley Carleton is clearly dismayed at the publicity his words have had 'but nothing in this theme can escape the presse.' Carleton closes by asking Vere to deliver the French copy (of his speech) to Lord Arundel and to 'entreat his Lordships protection thereof; which it will have need of if these Arminians have so strong patrons in our court as they would persuade the world.' All of which shows the religious affinity of Carleton and Vere and Carleton's fears over the rise of Arminianism and its effect not only on the Church but on the English polity. His anti-Arminian speech at Dort 'was rooted in personal conviction as well as diplomatic duty' and his support for the exiled King and Queen of Bohemia, who shared his house after their flight from Bohemia, was a religious as much as a personal responsibility.³⁹⁸

In a letter to Elizabeth of Bohemia about the religious exodus to the new world Carleton wrote 'our godly people, who weary of this wicked land are gone (man, woman and child) in great numbers to seek new worlds'.³⁹⁹ But Carleton was also a pragmatist. His lengthy tenure in the Low Countries and his diplomatic and political experience, together with his comparative lack of significant influence, gave him a realistic outlook, and this must have chimed well with his friend, and correspondent, Horace Vere, whose own broad experience taught him a similar lesson in the art of the achievable.

Conclusion

Despite having no record of Horace Vere's early views on religious matters, his doctrinal position began to emerge as his status in the English forces in the United Provinces grew. It is from this time on that contemporary social awareness of Vere began to produce a growing volume of written assessments of his religious character. And it is largely from these assessments that it is possible to construct a circumstantial, but nevertheless compelling, portrait of Horace Vere's spiritual views. This evidence, though indirect, has the 'quality of quantity'.⁴⁰⁰

As he became senior enough to be able to employ army preachers these men were often those who had been forced from their livings in England because of their strong and outspoken non-conformists principles. Principles which they were unwilling to sublimate to their livelihood in England despite King James' accommodating attempts at conciliation. Thus Vere's predilection for men of a strong Puritan outlook becomes quite apparent. As his prestige, both in the Low Countries and at home, grew

³⁹⁸ John Reeve, 'Sir Dudley Carleton and Sir Thomas Roe: English Servants of the Queen of Bohemia and the Protestant International during the Thirty Years War'. *Parergon*, Vol 32, No 3, (Perth, 2015).

³⁹⁹ NA, SP81/36/fol.113v, Carleton to Elizabeth, 28 Nov 1630.

⁴⁰⁰ Possibly from Marxist Philosophy and wrongly attributed to Stalin.

he was able to sponsor and employ men like Ames and Burgess, who faced persecution in England and who certainly would not have been able to preach there without strong opposition, censure and even imprisonment, from both church and State establishment.

In the United Provinces however, even in the cautionary towns, which were ostensibly under English protection, Vere's authority and prestige was such that he was able to defy the wishes of even the Archbishop of Canterbury. Indeed it was not until Vere died, in 1635, that the English Church was able to enforce the use of the English Prayer book amongst the English troops in Dutch pay.⁴⁰¹ Vere's close working relationship with Maurice of Nassau, the de facto ruler and military leader of the United Provinces for most of Vere's military service there, is another indicator of Vere's religious stance, in particular as it relates to the Arminian assassination attempt on Maurice.

Vere's continuing high status as a military hero and pious soldier was also sufficient for him, alongside his wife Mary, to sponsor radical non-conformist preachers like Byfield, who had been censured by his Bishop. Other radicals, like Sibbes, Crosse and Gataker all dedicated religious works to Horace, and in doing so made the association of their predestinarian and other non-conformists views with Vere, who would not have allowed the dedication had he (or Mary) found the doctrine offensive. As well, Vere's support for Paget, a man who wrote in opposition to separatist views, must support the interpretation that Vere was not in favour of the complete separation of individual churches but that he favoured a semi-separatist approach, with local congregations taking responsibility for their own organisation and management. Working with but not controlled by other likeminded churches their authority would be circumscribed only by the authority of the King.

Henry Hexham, who knew Vere well, did not even feel the need to ask permission to dedicate to the Veres a translation of Polyander's works, which derided and ridiculed the use of relics and the possibility of the intercession of saints. Polyander also emphasised the bible as the only real source of spiritual guidance. This was a similar view to that held by William Ames, possibly the most radical of Vere's Army preachers. In his *Puritanismus Anglicanus*, Ames makes the case for the supreme authority of the bible, 'that the highest and supream office and authority of the pastor, is to preach the gospel solemnly and publickly to the congregation, by interpreting the written word of God.'⁴⁰² This linked well with the strong predilection of both Veres for charismatic preachers, 'dropping the word' from the only book that really mattered. It is

⁴⁰¹ Adams, *The Protestant Cause*, p.147, and Sprunger, *The Learned Doctor*, p.249.

⁴⁰² Dr. William Ames, *Puritanismus Anglicanus*, (London,1611), p.10.

another strong indication of Horace's position and his likely view of how churches should be used to promote and explain the word of God.

In addition, Vere's close personal affinity with Conway, Carleton and Harley, men who readily expressed their Puritan views, establishes Vere firmly in that circle of religious influence and attribution. Harley's *Character of a Puritan*, sent as a rough draft, indicates not only a high degree of assumed empathy but also a high level of trust and this is the closest it is possible to get to actually labelling Vere's religious views – he was a Puritan despite that affixation being susceptible to many definitions.

It is singularly important to acknowledge the influence of Mary Vere upon her husband and interesting to note that much of the religious approbation that Horace attracted came after their marriage. Indeed the earliest commendation that we know of came barely two years before their wedding, when Horace and Mary may already have had some level of attraction for each other. Mary's first husband, Sir William Hoby, had died in 1602 and thus although we have no strong evidence of Horace's religious views before 1605, we also have no evidence of any great epiphany either, so it is possible even likely that his attachment to Mary, a young widow with two sons, was based in part on her Puritan affiliations. Certainly her family had strong Puritan leanings, and it may just be that Horace, a battle hardened and frequently wounded veteran, found Mary's faith as beguiling as her other qualities. It is interesting to note also that there is no evidence of Vere's Puritan leanings before the time that he first became acquainted with her thus her influence upon his own faith may have been profound.

The available evidence for Horace Vere's religious belief and motivation may rightly be considered purely circumstantial. But this evidence is consistent, comprehensive, manifold and enduring. So, taking all the evidence into account it would be perverse to conclude anything other than that Horace Vere was a staunch predestinarian, loyal to his King, who believed in limited congregational semi-independence, the primary if not exclusive role of preaching and the redundancy, even blasphemy, of relics and saintly intervention. He was not a separatist, but probably tolerated rather than approved of Bishops. He was undoubtedly driven by his beliefs to fight for the Protestant cause as he saw it. His longevity as a soldier goes some way to proving this since he fought against the Catholic hegemony for as long as he was able when many of his contemporaries did not. Even more telling is the way in which he was selective in his campaigning, always striving to fight against the Catholic enemy in the Protestant cause and not seeking advantageous command in other theatres of war.

As a young man Horace would have been aware of old soldiers returning from their adventures in Europe in the later years of the 16th century. Some of whom wrote plaintively of the danger to England, and to the Protestant faith, if the Dutch cause was

lost and the Spaniards should triumph. Geoffrey Gates, citing the harsh cruelty of the Duke of Alva (and the Inquisition) as he attempted to crush the Dutch rebellion, called the Duke 'the dreadful and renowned chieftain of the papists' and called for a better trained English military force able to resist the Spanish. Gates called for an immediate improvement in military capability as the only way to avoid the destruction and overthrow of the English church and civil liberties.⁴⁰³ In Gates' view if persuasion or preaching could not reform the 'evils and outrages of the wicked; then must the sword of violence be put in execution, by the hands of them that are able and skilful to ... bring to obedience the disordered multitude.'⁴⁰⁴

The next chapter will discuss Horace Vere's early military service in the light of his growing stature as a pious and respected soldier, and the emergence of his reputation as a deeply religious, brave, principled, esteemed, even loved commander. Furthermore as he rose to higher military command his appointment of company and regimental chaplains fixed him in a revelatory light as an outstanding soldier driven by his Puritan belief.

⁴⁰³ Geoffrey Gates, *The Defence of Military Profession, Wherein is eloquently shewed the due commendation of martial prowess, and plainly proved how necessary the exercise of armes is for this our age.* (London, 1579), p.13.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid, p.10. Gates was not alone in this view. Other old soldiers wrote similar treatises, William Blandy wrote about the central role of the soldier in keeping order at home and protecting against external threats in *The castell, or picture of policy shewing forth most lively, the face, body and partes of a commonwealth.*, (London, 1581), p.12. Thomas Churchyard lauded the efforts of men who had already served or were still serving the Dutch cause and by extension the Protestant English cause too. *A lamentable, and pitifull Description of the wowfull warres in Flanders* (London, 1578) and *A generall rehearsal of warres called Churchyardes choise wherein is five hundred severall services of land and sea as sieges, batailles, skirmishes, and encounters*, (London, 1579).

Campaign sites in the United Provinces



3. The Serving Soldier 1: The Sword Under God

This chapter will examine the early military career of Horace Vere as he rose to lead the English forces in Dutch pay in 1605. Comparisons with the ascendancy of his predecessors in that role, including brother Francis, will enhance understanding of Horace Vere's character and aptitude for command in the diplomatic, political and military milieu of the time from the beginnings of official English state sponsored intervention in Dutch affairs facilitated by the Treaty of Nonsuch in 1585. The early actions in which Vere was engaged demonstrate his personal bravery and his growing tactical awareness. The chapter will also begin to explore Horace's relationships and rivalries with other military, diplomatic and establishment figures at home and abroad.

The Treaty of Nonsuch was the first time that the English Crown had taken an official interest in the Dutch struggle for independence, despite the growing economic importance to England of the continued commercial freedom of the Low Countries.¹ The Nonsuch treaty was partly a reaction to the 1584 Treaty of Joinville, agreed between Philip II of Spain and the Catholic League, in which Philip II promised to finance the League.² The Nonsuch agreement formally committed Elizabeth to providing financial and direct military assistance to the United Provinces [UP]. In return the Dutch agreed to temporarily surrender control of two towns and a fortress to the English Crown in lieu of payment. These were the towns of Brill, [Den Brill in Dutch], an important seaport in the western Netherlands at the mouth of the New Maas, and Flushing, now called Vlissingen, which is in the south-western Netherlands on the former island of Walcheren. Strategically located between the River Scheldt and the North Sea, Flushing has been an important harbour for centuries. The fortress was the castle of Rammekens, a stronghold near the mouth of the former Welzinge canal, which gave access to the harbour of Middelburg, a few kilometres east of Vlissingen. Governorship of these two important places, known as the Cautionary Towns, and the fortress, became important and profitable sinecures from this time on until they were handed back to Dutch control in 1616.

Francis Vere was in the force that Leicester assembled in late 1585 to assist the United Provinces in the relief of Antwerp, which was at the time besieged by the Spanish. He is listed amongst the senior officers of Leicester's command in 1587.³ But Antwerp fell to the Duke of Parma before Leicester was able to help and in the end his

¹ Borman, 'Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands', p. 38.

² www.tutor2u.net/history/reference/treaty-of-joinville-1584, accessed Jan 2018. The treaty of Joinville was directed against Elizabeth and the Protestant religion in general. Its aims were the overthrow of the English Protestant State. Signed in secret its existence and objectives were soon discovered and probably contributed greatly to Elizabeth's volte-face in moving from neutrality to active support for the Dutch.

³ NA SP84/40/131.

short term in the United Provinces was not a success.⁴ His acceptance of the post of Governor-General of the United Provinces, offered by the Dutch, infuriated Queen Elizabeth who had expressly forbidden it and his expedition quickly deteriorated into a military and political failure which also ruined the Earl financially.

Leicester's tenure as Governor General ended ignominiously in February 1587.⁵ By this time the fledgling alliance had been sorely tested by the earl who, as an enthusiastic Protestant made much of this aspect of the alliance to the chagrin of many of the Dutch who were more interested in the political and economic issues.⁶ This situation was not assisted by Elizabeth who 'seemed unwilling to honour her agreement with the Dutch, particularly relating to the pay of her contingent' which caused mutinies, resentment and disruption not entirely all of Leicester's making.⁷ But despite his failure in the United Provinces Leicester's death in September 1588 was a considerable setback for the cause of militant Puritanism in England and saw the beginning of a reduction in its 'aristocratic core'.⁸

Leicester was succeeded, rather reluctantly, as commander of English troops by Peregrine Bertie, 13th Baron Willoughby, a cousin by marriage of Francis and Horace.⁹ Willoughby had far less political stature than Leicester and his appointment was as Lieutenant General of troops, whereas Leicester had been Governor General.¹⁰ But just as Leicester had discovered, the political and diplomatic complexities of the post were profound and the personal financial cost of the post was dire, the more especially as Elizabeth continued to prevaricate and to starve the troops of pay and supply.¹¹ Unable to repair the Anglo Dutch relationship that had been damaged by Leicester, Willoughby himself did not enjoy good relations with the Dutch.¹² His appointment strictly forbade him to get involved in political matters, unlike Leicester, but

⁴ He was there from late December 1585 to February 1587.

⁵ Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms*, p. 35.

⁶ Roy C. Strong, J. A. van Dorsten, *Leicester's Triumph*, (Oxford, 1964) p. 75 and Derek Wilson, *Sweet Robin: A Biography of Robert Dudley Earl of Leicester, 1533–1588*, (London, 1981), pp. 294–295. Adams, 'The Protestant Cause', p. 81.

⁷ Borman, 'Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands', p. 89.

⁸ Adams, 'The Protestant Cause', p. 107.

⁹ H. Brugmans (ed), *Correspondentie van Robert Dudley Graaf van Leycester en andre (documenten betreffende zijn Gouvernement-General in de Nederlanden, 1585)-* [Correspondence of Robert Dudley Earl of Leycester and other documents concerning his Governor Generalship in the Netherlands, 1585- 88], Vol 1, (Utrecht, 1931), Commission for Lord Willoughby, 4/14 December 1587, p. 361-2.

¹⁰ Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms*, p. 30.

¹¹ Adams, 'The Protestant Cause' p. 210. Adams details the way in which the cost of war in this period was more often than not borne by individual commanders, many of whom were financially crippled by the expense.

¹² 't Hart, *The Dutch Wars of Independence*, p. 20-21. Leicester's centralising policies were fundamentally opposite to the Dutch tendency towards a more negotiated approach to government which led inevitably to conflict and disagreement on a number of points.

Willoughby resented the subservience of his post compared to that of the Earl. Nevertheless, the removal of Leicester did improve relations for a while, and the relationship was enhanced when the Dutch, under the terms of the Treaty of Nonsuch, were able to assist Elizabeth during the crisis of the Armada in 1588.¹³ But the thaw in relations was brief. When the States asserted their right to determine the limits of Willoughby's authority at the end of 1588, animosity broke out on both sides and this was exacerbated in 1589 when the city of Geertruidenberg was betrayed to Parma by its English garrison.¹⁴ Outright opposition to Willoughby from Dutch leaders such as Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, who was from about 1586 the de facto leader of the States-General, implied that Willoughby had assisted in the betrayal of Geertruidenberg and this finally damaged the relationship terminally.¹⁵ Willoughby's reduced authority had not prevented political and diplomatic disputes and so when Willoughby was allowed to give up the post in 1589, citing its ruinous cost, he was succeeded in August 1589 by Sir Francis Vere.¹⁶

This was a quite remarkable appointment. The treaty of Nonsuch had specified that the post should be given to a 'person of quality,' clearly with Leicester in mind.¹⁷ When he failed to make his mark the appointment of Willoughby, who was the holder of an ancient if rather junior peerage, promulgated that sentiment.¹⁸ But Francis Vere was a different proposition. Though he was the grandson of one of the premier noble families in England – the Earls of Oxford - Francis was still a commoner. Indeed, it was not until 1588 that Francis was even knighted, by Willoughby, on the field of battle. His appointment as Willoughby's replacement signalled the first time that a commoner had been appointed to command English troops in the field. And when Willoughby was relieved of his command a number of other senior military figures were also withdrawn, including John Norris and John Burroughs, both of whom who later served with distinction in the Palatinate. Norris in particular might have expected to succeed Willoughby had he remained in the Low Countries. Thus Francis was fortunate that other men, equally if not more qualified, were not there to challenge his appointment.¹⁹

¹³ Borman, 'Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands', p. 98.

¹⁴ Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477–1806*, (Oxford, 1995), p. 130. The city was not recaptured until 1593.

¹⁵ Hugh Dunthorne, *Britain and the Dutch Revolt 1560-1700*, (Cambridge, 2013), pp. 36-38. Following the revolt of the northern provinces they began, in the 1580s, to be referred to as the United Provinces and their government as the States-General.

¹⁶ Clements Markham, *The Fighting Veres*, suggests that despite pawning all his wife's jewels and mortgaging his land, Willoughby was still £4,000 in debt when he left office. p.137.

¹⁷ Adams, 'The Protestant Cause', p. 49.

¹⁸ Borman, 'Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands', p. 84.

¹⁹ Clements Markham, *The Fighting Veres*, p.142.

The choice of Francis seems to have been a purely practical decision based upon his already significant military experience, though his familial relationship with Willoughby must have helped.²⁰ There were certainly other men who might have filled the position and who had sufficient patronage to gain the post, and it may well have been simply that Francis was in the right place at the right time. The Queen certainly looked favourably on him and that, together with Willoughby's endorsement and Elizabeth's desire to lower the profile of her commander in the Low Countries, was probably enough. Following the apparent political failure of both Leicester and Willoughby, and the financial drain of the position, it might even be that other possible candidates were not overly keen to take on the role. In late 1589 then, Francis was appointed as head of the English troops serving with the Dutch, but at a still lower diplomatic/military level than both his predecessors since he was given the rank of Sergeant-Major General.

This was yet another step down in prestige for Elizabeth's representative in the Low Countries, but Francis was a proven soldier with practical experience in the Dutch wars; and although he was a mere knight, he did have an excellent family pedigree, and more importantly he seemed to enjoy the confidence, even the friendship, of the Dutch leaders especially their military leader Maurice of Nassau.²¹ Unlike the more political roles envisaged for Leicester and even Willoughby, Elizabeth clearly saw Francis's appointment as strictly military, and this requirement is set out firmly in the communication between her Privy Council and the States General, wherein Francis Vere's role is defined as follows: 'in the absence of the rest of the chief officers...we do likewise require you to give straight chardge and commandente unto all the said captens and souldiers in the absence of the Governour and other chief officers.'²² There is no mention of the political role that Leicester and Willoughby had been expected to fill. Even Vere's command of the troops only extended to when they were in the field, since the Governors of the Cautionary Towns retained command of their garrisons. Still, despite these limits, this was a considerable promotion for Francis Vere and it was unprecedented in that he was not of noble status. So his appointment, either by design

²⁰ D. J. Trim, 'Bertie, Peregrine, thirteenth Baron Willoughby of Willoughby, Beck, and Eresby (1555–1601)', *ODNB* (2004). Willoughby was the husband of Francis Vere's cousin, Lady Mary Vere. [Not Mary Tracy who married Horace Vere and thus later became Lady Mary Vere].

²¹ T'Hart, *The Dutch Wars of Independence. Warfare and Commerce in the Netherlands 1570-1680* (London, Routledge 2014), p.21. Maurice of Orange (14 November 1567 – 23 April 1625) was stadtholder of all the provinces of the Dutch Republic, except for Friesland, from 1585 until his death in 1625. Before he became Prince of Orange, upon the death of his eldest half-brother Philip William in 1618, he was known as Maurice of Nassau.

²² *Acts of the Privy Council*, XV111 ,pp. 6-7; ARA, Lias. Eng., 5881 L, Walsingham to States General, 7 August 1589.

or through happy circumstance, met with satisfaction on all fronts.²³ Vere was delighted by his rapid rise, the States-General were no longer troubled by what they had come to see as over-mighty English lords, and it suited Elizabeth to reduce the apparent importance of her support for the revolt by giving command to a far less politically significant figure.²⁴

Arrival

A few months later, early in 1590, Horace Vere arrived in the United Provinces to begin his association with the conflict to which he devoted most of his adult life. There is no extant information as to what Horace had been doing up until this point, but as a young gentleman he was not alone in going off to the Dutch wars. English 'volunteers' had been fighting in Europe for a variety of causes for many years but the beginning of the Dutch struggle for independence from Spain, bearing as it did the growing undertone of a religious war, had widened the scope for morally justified conflict considerably.²⁵

Francis Vere remained at the head of the English troops for 15 years, not without internal and later Dutch opposition, retiring from the post in 1604 when James I made peace with Spain. By this time, internal tensions that had developed in his command and within the English ranks had become serious, while at the same time Francis's initial good relations with the Dutch had come under considerable strain. The reasons for this centred first on the transfer of responsibility for the English troops pay from the English Crown to the States-General of the UP in 1598, and second, the truce that Vere negotiated at the siege of Ostend. When the Treaty of Nonsuch was renewed and amended by the Treaty of Westminster in August 1598 the Dutch agreed to assume responsibility for the payment of all English troops in Dutch service. Payment for the 1150 troops in the Cautionary Towns was included, as long as England continued the war against Spain.²⁶

This transfer of authority and control suited Elizabeth, not only because it removed a considerable financial burden, but also because it aided her attempts at reconciliation with Spain, though somewhat ironically it actually allowed an increase in

²³ Borman, 'Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands', p.125.

²⁴ Ibid., pp.112 -113. Elizabeth's attitude towards the Dutch revolt was ambivalent. Welcoming her co-religionists support against the Catholic Spanish threat she nevertheless saw the Dutch overthrow of their monarch and their new oligarchical government model as unnatural and abhorrent.

²⁵ Whitney Smith, the originator of the term Vexillology (the study of flags) suggested that the modern significance of flags, as a national standard or symbol, dates from the Dutch revolt against Spain. 'For the first time it was not a state or monarch being symbolised, but a people, a language, a culture and a cause. *The Economist*, December 10th 2016, p. 84.

²⁶ Winwood, *Memorials of Affairs of State, Vol.I, (London, 1725)*. Abstract of the State of Debts of the United Provinces, p. 351. At this point the UP owed King James over £818,000.

the number of English troops, since the Dutch were able and willing to pay for them and Elizabeth did not forbid them to go. Theoretically too, as Francis Vere had a lesser rank than either Leicester or Willoughby, the transfer of authority that went with this financial arrangement was easier, since Vere was used to taking military orders from Prince Maurice, albeit grudgingly on occasion. But Francis did not seem to grasp that with this transfer of financial responsibility, the States would also expect to have a much greater say in the internal administration of the troops under his command.²⁷ After a number of instances where Vere felt his authority had been wrongly challenged by what he saw as Dutch interference, he spoke directly to the States General in 1603, and managed to persuade them that his internal authority over the English troops should be maintained, as long as it remained within the 'lawes and ordinances of the Provinces.'²⁸ Unsurprisingly Maurice, as overall commander of the allied forces (and there were many other nationalities under his command) was not in favour of what amounted to a diminution or restriction of his authority.²⁹ By this time the overwhelming majority of the allied army were Dutch nationals whereas, as recently as 1586, almost a third of the force was made up of Britons.³⁰

With such considerations in mind and with his domestic forces now, in 1603, making up 80% of his army, Maurice was in a much stronger position to demand full control of those under his command.³¹ Thus Francis Vere's diplomatic victory at his meeting with the States-General in 1603 came at the high price of deteriorating goodwill betwixt the States, Maurice and himself.³² Francis Vere's reputation too, had come under scrutiny following his actions at the siege of Ostend between 1601 and 1602. By this time, Vere's relations with Maurice had begun to worsen, exacerbated by disagreements over strategy and tactics during and after the victory at Nieuwpoort in July 1600 (see p. 103), and particularly over how to relieve the siege at Ostend. Appointed as garrison commander in the city, and after calling for more troops and a re-supply of materiel from the States-General, neither of which were seemingly forthcoming, Vere found himself under severe pressure from the Spanish, who had substantially reduced the defences of the town.³³

²⁷ Borman, 'Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands', p. 233.

²⁸ NA, SP84/62/292, Francis Vere to Cecil, 6 Feb 1603.

²⁹ de Groot, *Dutch Armies of the 80 years' war*, pp.19-20. Between 1588 and 1607 the Dutch army had grown from 19,000 to 55,000 men.

³⁰ Dunthorne, *Britain and the Dutch Revolt*, p. 67.

³¹ Borman, 'Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands', p. 233 f. And see de Groot, *Dutch Armies of the 80 years' war*, pp. 19-20.

³² Arthur Collins, *A Historical collection of the Noble families....*, Browne to Sidney, June 5 1602, p. 255.

³³ NA SP84/61/313 An anonymous report from Ostend details the available garrison strength at this time. From an original force of 6000 English only 2440 effectives were now available

Despite this real situation, the external view of the defender's position, certainly from within England, was rather more positive and Vere's defence of the city was reported in glowing terms 'such has come out of Ostend very lately ... that they wanteth not anything fit for the defence thereof and that all victuals are plentiful.... Sir Francis Vere giveth the enemy daily so much to do and keepeth him so well occupied that he knoweth not well which way to turn'. This came from a printed Coranto, or early newsletter, translated out of the original Dutch and of a type that was already becoming commonplace.³⁴

But this sort of positive reporting might have led to the view that Francis's position was more comfortable than it actually was, especially in light of what happened next. In late December 1601 Vere seems to have tricked the Spanish into agreeing to a truce and exchanging hostages for its duration while talks about a possible capitulation ensued. But while he entertained his Spanish 'guests' lavishly on Christmas Eve, Francis ordered secret and urgent repairs to the defences be carried out at the same time. Then during that evening 1,000 reinforcements arrived by sea together with the much needed supplies. At this point Vere informed the Spanish that he no longer wanted to parley and the hostages on both sides were returned though the Spanish were understandably furious.³⁵ But the Spanish had themselves been accused of a similar ruse in 1572 when Alva was investing Flushing.³⁶

However the States-General took the view that Vere had been on the verge of surrendering the town and would have done so had not the relief party arrived. In his *Commentaries* Vere maintained that the whole business was always a device designed to buy time to rebuild the shattered town defences; this is confirmed by one of his captains, Sir John Ogle, who wrote at length about the affair and who was himself one of the exchanged hostages. In discussing the events which led up to the situation, Ogle makes the entirely reasonable point that by its nature such a stratagem had to be kept secret except from a few senior commanders (including Horace Vere), and he dismisses

with only another 2040 Dutch, French, Scots and Walloons making a total of 4480 men. The report talks about 'weak' and 'feeble' companies, some with only 40 men (from a more normal 160 - 200).

³⁴ *News from Ostend, 'The oppugnation and fierce siege made by the Archduke Albertus' translated from f the Dutch*, (London, 1601), p.11.

³⁵ This stratagem is described in an addendum to the *Commentaries* of Francis Vere written by Sir John Ogle and attached by the publisher William Dillingham. Dillingham dedicated the work to Horace Townshend, a nephew by marriage of Francis. Dillingham explains in his introduction that he had access to copies of the 'Commentaries', which were in the possession of Phillip Skippon, Lord Fairfax, the Earl of Westmorland and the Earl of Clare.

³⁶ Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms*, p. 30.

any suggestion that Francis Vere was planning to surrender.³⁷ Jan Janszn, the Dutch biographer of Maurice, concedes that when news of the parley became known, it was the rumour of capitulation that 'was so confidentially believed, as in the courts of France, England, that the states of Holland and Zealand, nothing was known to the contrary, till they received letters from General Vere.'³⁸ A lengthy and detailed French report of the siege, translated by Edward Grimeston, makes it clear that the truce and subsequent discussions were a ruse by Francis Vere, simply to win time.³⁹ However Janszn also reported that a large number of English soldiers were permitted, by Francis Vere, to have 'slipt away' to England despite their being in good health.⁴⁰

It is certainly true that the scions of noble families in Scotland and France, as well as from Holland and England, flocked to the place to learn the art of war under so distinguished a veteran. But some of these young men came to Ostend not for discipline but for diversion and Francis Vere, considerably annoyed at their attitude, took no pains to conceal how much he deprecated their presence.⁴¹ The large number of 'gentlemen' volunteers amongst the English in the early years of the Dutch wars who, as Hexham noted, were 'foes to discipline' must have initially hampered progress towards cohesion and the rise of promotion through merit. Conspicuous among them was the Earl of Northumberland who having objected to serving under his social inferior, left in high dudgeon, and later challenged Francis to a duel (though he was obliged by the Queen to withdraw his challenge).⁴² The severity of Vere's discipline possibly had something to do with the reports from Janszn as Francis Vere may have felt that such men as the Earl were unsuitable soldiers, especially in the extremities of the siege.

But the Ostend business further soured relations between Francis Vere and the States-General, as well as those with Maurice. Consequently, by the time that the new English King, James, had negotiated peace with the Spaniards at the Treaty of London in August, 1604, Francis, probably anticipating James' actions, had already stood down

³⁷ See Ogle's addendum to the 'Commentaries.' And see Hexham, *A true and Historical relation of the Bloody Battell of Nieuport in Flanders*, (Delft, 1641), pp. 15 – 28 for an account of Francis Vere's actions at Ostend which supports the deception as an honourable tactic.

³⁸ Janzsen, *The Triumphs of Nassau*, p. 125-7. I cannot trace any such correspondence but opinion in England was clearly much more positive. Sir Dudley Carleton, writing to John Chamberlain on January 5th 1602 says that 'we at court extol Sir Francis Vere for beating the cautious Spaniard at this own weapon', 'Only to beguile the Archduke' *CSPD, Elizabeth, 1602*, p 143.

³⁹ Edward Grimestone, *A True History of the Siege of Ostend and what passed on either side from the beginning of the siege to the yielding up of the town*. (London, 1604), pp. 96 – 100. Jean François Le Petit in '*Historia Belgica nostri potissimum temporis*' 1609. (Also translated by Grimeston), (London, 1627), suggests that Francis Vere was certainly contemplating surrender and only called off the truce because the relief force arrived.

⁴⁰ Janzsen, *The Triumphs of Nassau*, pp. 128-129.

⁴¹ Weigley, *The Age of Battles*, p.27.

⁴² David J.B. Trim, 'Vere, Francis' (1560-1609)', *ODNB*, (2004).

from command of the English field forces and returned, notwithstanding his retention of the Governorship of the Brill, to private life.⁴³ David Trim suggests that Francis was 'more or less forced into resignation.'⁴⁴ David Lawrence's view that he 'left the Netherlands angered and frustrated by the way that he and his men were being treated by their Dutch allies' suggests that Francis was badly treated but in truth he was unwilling to accept the new political reality of growing Dutch control and King James' rapprochement with the Spaniards.⁴⁵ In addition according to Borman, during his period as commander of the English troops in Holland, Francis had 'managed to alienate most of [the influential men he served with] at one time or another.'⁴⁶ It is worth noting that despite James' reputation for military timidity, or at least antipathy, his treaty with Spain was a real victory for English diplomacy. James made no significant concessions, retained the cautionary towns and trade with the United Provinces, continued recruitment to the English forces there and gained access to the Mediterranean markets.⁴⁷

The Ascendancy of Horace

When Francis retired from active command, his younger brother Horace had already seen 14 years' service and had risen to the command of a company and then a regiment.⁴⁸ Francis had brought out younger brother Robert in early 1589 and Robert in turn had, in the following year after visiting home, returned to the Netherlands with Horace, the youngest of the siblings. Robert was already leading a cavalry squadron by this time, but Horace was placed in Francis's own infantry company, where there would have been a number of other young gentlemen volunteers.⁴⁹

In an age when there was no real distinction between noble rank and the status of an officer, there were many 'gentlemen' and sons of noble families occupying

⁴³ This treaty amounted to recognition by Spain that restoring the Catholic supremacy in England was no longer possible. The treaty formally renounced the English Crown's support for the Dutch rebels. In practice though, since the Dutch were now paying the English soldiers fighting under their flag, this disavowal meant little in practical military terms and James did not stop English volunteers from continuing to assist the States-General. Immediately after the Gunpowder plot, James did ban English volunteers going to fight for Catholic Spain.

⁴⁴ Trim, 'Sir Horace Vere in Holland and the Rhineland...' p.336.

⁴⁵ Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier*, p.100.

⁴⁶ Borman, 'Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands,' p. 208.

⁴⁷ S.J. Houston, *James 1*, (London,1995), pp. 67-68.

⁴⁸ The company was the basic building block of the army, as it is today. It had emerged from earlier, less well defined bodies after about 1570. Consisting of around 150 – 200 men it was commanded by a captain who had a lieutenant as his second in command. English soldiers came to form themselves into such companies as they came more and more under the control of the States-General and Maurice. See de Groot, *Dutch Armies of the 80 years' war*, Vol 1, pp.11-12.

⁴⁹ British History Online, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-cecil-papers/vol5>, pp.509-537.(accessed 5 March 2019). Robert Vere was killed in action in 1595 at Wesel. According to George Gilpin, 'In cold blood.' See Clements Markham, *The Fighting Veres* p.157.

leadership positions as well as those serving as ordinary soldiers.⁵⁰ As David Trim has pointed out, many of the companies of soldiers who embarked for the Netherlands in the late 16th and early 17th centuries were made up of close knit groups of the tenants, friends, kinsmen and servants of the great lords who usually commanded and employed them.⁵¹ This made recruitment easier than the more normal method of impressment, sometimes of serving prisoners, and it had two other clear advantages. Firstly, desertion from such closely affiliated groups was dramatically reduced, whereas impressed men frequently absconded at the earliest opportunity.⁵² Secondly, fighting alongside men whom you had known, often since childhood, provided an instant esprit de corps that might otherwise take many years, and campaigns, to establish. In addition although losses from war and from illness might take a disproportionate toll upon men from one town, district or county, it was much easier to fill those ranks from the same location, especially when abroad, than attempting to recruit unknowns whose motivation would probably be suspect.

Horace's first military action may have been in 1590 at Breda, a fortified town in the southern part of the Netherlands, located in the province of North Brabant at the confluence of the rivers Mark and Aa. Captured by Parma in 1581, the town was subsequently strongly fortified by the Spanish, but in February 1590 70 men from Maurice's forces were secreted in boats delivering peat to the city.⁵³ Once inside, the soldiers overcame the guard on one of the town gates and threw it open, whence Maurice's cavalry charged into the town. There is no mention of Horace in any of the accounts of the subterfuge or the ensuing taking of the city, but it is possible that he was present since Francis Vere entered the town soon after the cavalry and brother Horace was part of Francis's company.⁵⁴ So this may have been Horace's first taste of action. Shortly thereafter a relief force sent by Parma was repulsed by Maurice just outside

⁵⁰ Trim, 'Fighting 'Jacobs Wars' p. 258.

⁵¹ Ibid. pp. 260-261.

⁵² There were regular impressments of 'idle and dissolute persons' throughout this period. In March 1601-2 such a warrant, aimed at raising more men for the Low Countries service, was sent to the High Sherriff of Norfolk by Secretary Robert Cecil and other members of the Queens council. It required the 'apprehending of all rogues, vagabonds, idle, dissolute, and masterless persons to be sent over for service in the Low Countries.' BL Add Mss, 265, f.304/305. And see Charles Dalton, *Life and Times of General Sir Edward Cecil, Viscount Wimbledon*, (London, 1885), p. 80 - 81 regarding the high desertion rates.

⁵³ Janszen, *The Triumphs of Nassau*, pp. 49 – 50.

Janszen's description of this action is clearly the basis for Markham's account, though Janszn ascribes the idea to Maurice whereas *the Commentaries* suggest it was Francis's idea.

⁵⁴ Clements Markham, pp. 163,164.

Dunkirk. Francis Vere was present, and was wounded and it may be that Horace was also involved.⁵⁵

Maurice and Francis Vere were then involved in a series of more minor actions, which involved the reduction of a number of castles as a preparation for the assault on Zutphen, a town located in the province of Gelderland about 30 km north-east of Arnhem, on the Eastern bank of the river IJssel. Taken by the Spanish in 1587 through the treachery of the English commander, Rowland York, Zutphen was recovered by Maurice in May 1590, also by the use of subterfuge when several of his troops dressed as local people (Janszn calls them Boors), distracted the guards, and seized the gate of the city's fort.⁵⁶ More troops, who were waiting for this ruse to play out, were now able to swiftly come in and take the stronghold. Maurice then besieged the town and bombarded it so severely that after negotiation the garrison surrendered. Janszn notes that there were only some 600 defenders and that the circuit of the walls of the town was too large for such a small number of soldiers to hold, the more especially since the walls had been severely damaged by Maurice's guns. Maurice allowed the garrison and 'such burghers as were willing to be gone free liberty to do so,' Janszn here calls Francis Vere 'a gallant souldier, and more favoured of the Low-Countries than all other strangers whatsoever'.⁵⁷ Again there is no record of Horace being involved in any of these actions, but it seems likely that he would have been present for all, or most of them, as part of his brother's company.

Clements Markham next mentions Horace at the siege of Steenwyck, about 100 km north east of Amsterdam. Horace Vere was definitely engaged in the fighting here as part of a contingent of around 1300 English soldiers commanded by Francis which helped to take the City. The Spanish garrison there surrendered on July 5, 1592 but the besieging allied army took considerable casualties with around 600 men killed or wounded, a quarter of them English. Francis was wounded again, for the third time, and Horace was also injured here, possibly for the first time in his career.⁵⁸ He learned the role of a soldier and officer quickly, because in June 1594 Francis asked Lord Burghley to grant Horace the command of a company, following the death of Sir Edward Brook at the siege of Groningen.⁵⁹ Shortly after this promotion Horace wrote to Essex, who must have had a hand in Horace's advancement, in what is Horace's first extant letter,

⁵⁵ Janssen, *The Triumphs of Nassau*, p. 52.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁵⁸ Clements Markham, *The Fighting Veres*, p. 184, Cheyney, *A History of England*, Vol. 1, p. 296.

⁵⁹ NA SP84/74/115, Francis Vere to Lord Burghley, June 1594.

thanking him for 'those graces by your favour' and promising he 'will endeavour to continue with my best and most affectionate service'.⁶⁰

To become Captain of a company was the first and in many ways the most important command post of the time. Francis Markham, whose varied career as a soldier, erstwhile lawyer and committed Calvinist brought him into contact with Francis Vere and probably Horace too, is better remembered as an author writing on the subjects of war and honour.⁶¹ He says of the commander of a company that he 'is the highest of all private commanders and yet the lowest of all that command in chief' and that he can 'create inferior officers', but that the rank of captain is derived 'from the king himself or from his especial authority granted to generals, lords of the privy council, governors of garrisons, Viceroy or presidents of countries or else to lords lieutenants of shires,' hence the need for Francis Vere's letter to Burghley.⁶²

Several authors next mention Horace in connection with the raid on Cadiz, which took place in June and July of 1596. Under the joint command of the Earl of Essex and Lord Howard of Effingham, who had commanded the English fleet that fought off the Armada in 1588, the Cadiz expedition included many famous names, including Walter Raleigh and Francis Vere. In his *Commentaries*, Francis Vere says that he visited England for instructions on the expedition, to which he was ordered to bring 2,000 of his troops. As these men were by now the most experienced soldiers that Elizabeth had, deploying them on such a hazardous venture improved the possibility of a positive outcome. Indeed the expedition met with some success; a large amount of gold was taken with the city, Francis Vere received £3,635 in person from the ransom of a number of prominent locals, and several Spanish ships were sunk or scuttled.⁶³

The location of the city, on a narrow isthmus, made it vulnerable to a determined attack from the sea and this geography also made escape for the city's citizens particularly difficult given the maze of small and narrow streets in the old town. Although the Spanish treasure fleet, which had been the main object of the attack, was not taken the overall financial cost of the raid to Spain was large and may well have contributed to the bankruptcy of the Spanish crown - not for the first time - that occurred later that same year. Cadiz itself was burnt by the English and, combined with the destruction of many churches and the loss of treasure, it took years for the city to recover. The English force retired from Cadiz after a few days, probably because they

⁶⁰ British History Online, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-cecil-papers/vol5/pp508-537>.

Horace Vere to the second Earl of Essex, 31 Dec 1595/10 Jan 1596 SN. Shortly before Essex was appointed to lead the Cadiz expedition of 1596.

⁶¹ David J.B. Trim, 'Vere, Francis' (1560-1609), ODNB, (2004).

⁶² Francis Markham, *Five decades*, p.134.

⁶³ Janszn, *The Triumphs of Nassau*, p. 79. Clements Markham, *The Fighting Veres*, p. 234f.

were not strong enough to resist Spanish relief forces that were already on their way. Horace was certainly present at this action because, as Clements Markham and others noted, he was knighted by Essex whilst in the City.⁶⁴ Janszn says that Essex 'made about 50 knights' before the raiding party departed.⁶⁵ No detail concerning the reasons for Horace's knighthood are extant.

The following year and back in the Low Countries, Francis Vere led a large force of English and other allied troops at the battle of Turnhout, under Maurice's overall command. This was a considerable victory for Maurice, in particular for his use of cavalry using shorter rifles [carbines] and pistols, rather than lances. Though Francis Vere was prominent in the fighting and received praise from Queen Elizabeth herself, there is no mention of Horace being at the battle. *Biographia Britannica* reports Horace Vere as being 'sick at the Hague' in 1597, though there is no further information about the nature of his illness.⁶⁶

Two years later, at the siege of Rhinebeck, Janszn notes that Horace Vere was given command of 'thirteen English ensigns' under the command of Count William of Nassau, brother of Maurice, and this represented a further, important, promotion for Horace. Although companies were the basic unit of military organisation larger formations, known as regiments, were routinely put together as required for specific operations and campaigns. They were usually formed from two or more companies and so could be substantial units. But regiments – and their commanders, usually designated colonels - were ad hoc rather than permanent establishments in the Dutch army until about 1605.⁶⁷ Nevertheless a brevet appointment as a colonel at this point represented a significant advancement for Horace. Because brother Francis was in command of the English it is of course possible to see a nepotistic hand in such a promotion, but this possibility must be balanced against Francis's known penchant for self-aggrandisement. A trait that might not allow him to bestow such a command unless he felt it might be creditable to himself. Also, Maurice was in overall command and it is unlikely that a soldier of his calibre and experience would countenance such an important role for someone he did not respect.

The next extant sequential reference to Horace is in the *Biographia Britannica* and Clements Markham's *Fighting Veres*. Both refer to a letter from Sir William Brown, sent on July 2nd 1599. Browne, in turn, refers to a letter he had had from Francis Vere concerning the action that took place around the city of Bommel in May and June of

⁶⁴ Clements Markham, *The Fighting Veres*, p. 233.

⁶⁵ Janszn, *The Triumphs of Nassau*, p.79.

⁶⁶ *Biographia Britannica*, p. 4006.

⁶⁷ De Groot, *Dutch Armies of the 80 years' war*, vol 1, pp.18-19.

1599. The Spanish had attempted to capture the city by siege whilst the States – General tried hard to defend the place. Like many cities and fortified places Bommel's defences had been updated in line with the new trace *italien system* or bastion fort which was a defensive response to the growing power of canon fire. Such walls were normally pentagonal or hexagonal, a concomitant response to increased canon power. These upgraded defences enhanced the difficulties that attacking forces faced.

Francis Vere's letter states that:-

'on June 24, by break of day, there was a half-moon [a military defensive position in the half moon shape, usually consisting of a ditch and ramparts with stone outworks if available] made in the upper part of Bommel's-h'aart, right against the island Voorn, not a league from a fort the enemy was building, who, about seven of the clock in the evening, gave a very hot assault upon it for near an hour'...'In the half-moon was Sir Horace Vere, and four companies of his regiment, with some French soldiers, who defended it with great valour, repulsing the enemy, who left behind them on the place eighty men; and, as reported by their own men, they lost at least 500 men in the assault'...'Our nation,' continues Sir Wiliam. 'gained reputation, though they escaped not shot-free; Captain Upchart being slain, and several officers wounded.'⁶⁸

Here Horace Vere demonstrated again not only his own personal courage but his leadership skills as he commanded not only English troops but other nationalities as well. The assault and siege were both repulsed and the Spanish were forced to withdraw. Francis's letter clearly shows that Horace had again been given command of a regiment. Janszn also names Horace Vere as the commander of a regiment at this action, which included his own company of 200+ men (probably enlarged now to reflect Horace's newly elevated position), together with seven additional companies commanded by, amongst others, Edward Cecil, Thomas Morgan and Thomas Knollys.⁶⁹ The experience gained by such promotions, even temporary ones, was important for Horace when in 1604 Francis Vere 'retired' and a new general was needed to command the English forces.

Francis Vere mentions Horace infrequently in his *Commentaries*. Although his younger brother had been with Francis since 1590 and had clearly been engaged in several actions, including two where he is mentioned by Janszn and others, it is not until ten years later, at the Battle of Nieuwpoort in July 1600 that Horace makes his first

⁶⁸ *Biographia Britannica*, p. 4006 f.c. and quoted in Charles Dalton, *Life and Times of General Sir Edward Cecil*, Vol 1 (London, 1885), June 2019, p.143. Dalton sources this letter to Harl. Mss. 3638, fol.107.

⁶⁹ Janszn, *The Triumphs of Nassau*, p.111.

appearance in his brother's narrative. Maurice had been ordered by the States General, against his will, to advance to Dunkirk to try and take the city. This was mainly because Dunkirk sheltered a large number of pirates from the Spanish Netherlands who harassed and disrupted both Dutch and English trade. Maurice approached from the north keeping Ostend at his back but he only reached as far as Nieuwpoort, about 30Km north east of Dunkirk.

In 1641 Henry Hexham, born in 1585, published a report of the 'Bloody Battel of Nieuwpoort' at which he was present, aged just 15 and serving as a page boy to Francis Vere. Hexham describes both the Veres as being in command of regiments that were in the vanguard of Maurice's army, Francis Vere's regiment containing 13 companies including one led by Sir John Ogle, and Horace Vere's regiment of 11 companies. The two regiments included 1600 English soldiers though Hexham, in listing the company commanders, names several Dutch and French captains so the overall number of troops was much higher.⁷⁰ In the main body, or 'Bataille' as it was called, both Edward Cecil and Francis Vere led horse troops, their infantry under the command of a Lieutenant Colonel.⁷¹ The Dutch had been somewhat encouraged to attack because elements of the Spanish army had mutinied, not for the first time, over their lack of pay, and it was hoped the Spanish would be unable to muster an effective opposing force.⁷²

This did not prove to be the case though, and initially the Spanish had some success. Hexham describes the Spanish as advancing close by the shoreline with the incoming tide, forcing some of their companies to climb the sand hills so that they faced the right of Maurice's army. On this wing of Maurice's forces neither side was initially able to obtain a clear advantage, but on Maurice's left wing the veteran Spanish *Tercios* eventually began to prevail against the English, driving them out of their positions. It was at this point that Francis Vere, despite being wounded and having had his horse fall on him, came upon Horace who had gathered three hundred men together around two cannon. Francis notes in his commentaries that, 'despite being unhorsed' and 'sore wounded' 'I found my brother Horace and the most of the officers

⁷⁰ In Francis Vere's regiment were Captains; Taxleis; Denise; Daniel Vere; Homewood; Hammond; Ogle; Tyrol; Fairfax, Sr. Calisine Brock; Foster; Garnet and Holcroft. In Horatio Vere's regiment are, captains Sutton; Sir Thomas Knowles; Purton, Monsi Cicel [Cecil]; Monsi Morgan; Monsi Metkerck; Scot; Vavoufour; de Caine Hartwirscon and Denby.

⁷¹ Hexham, *A true and Historical relation of the Bloody Battell of Nieuport in Flanders*. (Delft, 1641). p.1.

⁷² Geoffrey Parker's chapter on Mutiny in *The Spanish Road 1567–1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' Wars*, Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History, (Cambridge, 1972) explains how and why mutinies occurred with such regularity in the Spanish armies. Essentially these troops were fighting far from home, billeted amongst a hostile population, often driven with violence to attack, starved of supplies and almost always months, if not years in arrears of pay. p. 157 – 176.

that were living with some three hundred foot. I made them stand'.⁷³ The cannon were then loaded with musket balls and, according to Hexham,

'my lord Horace Vere commanded the Canoniers to give fire upon the enemy... which being discharged in the midst of them, and so neere together with a traine of some barrells strown in the sand [filled with explosives and shrapnel], which was also fired, made great slaughter and lane [that is a line of destruction in the enemy forces] amongst the enemies horse and foote'

Once again Horace demonstrated his courage under fire, leading a great charge of the English, accompanied by Maurice's small cavalry reserve which was now unleashed. Even the veteran Spanish soldiers had had enough by now and began a retreat which turned into a rout, or, as Hexham puts it 'they never turned their faces anymore'.⁷⁴

Meanwhile on the right wing, the Dutch cavalry finally managed to overcome their Spanish counterparts and were able to outflank the Spanish infantry which was unable to hold its position and fled. Parker suggests that the 'Counter-march of the Dutch' infantry played a major role in the victory too though he freely admits that 'no account of the battle specifically mentions the Dutch Counter-march'.⁷⁵ Parker's assumption that this was the only way in which Maurice's musketeers could have maintained a sufficient rate of fire to force the Spanish 'into confusion' is supported by the Dutch historian J. P. Puype though Vere's commentaries suggest that the terrain (sand dunes and an incoming tide) meant that such manoeuvres were 'utterly taken from us'. Parker dismisses Francis Vere's view on the grounds that Vere had been seriously wounded but Vere's account (see above) refutes this.⁷⁶

Given the earlier stalemate on Maurice's right wing it is not unreasonable to suggest that Horace Vere's defeat of the Spanish elite troops on the left of Maurice's line was a turning point in the battle. An anonymous report of Horace Vere's actions that day [2nd July 1600] states that 'he carried it so well, that concerning the fortune of the daie, there is much attributed to his valour'.⁷⁷ Together with a small number of Dutch cavalry, Horace proved able to rout the elite infantry *Tercios* of the Spanish

⁷³ Vere, *Commentaries*, p.103. Janszn, p.113.

⁷⁴ Hexham,, *A true and Historical relation of the Bloody Battell of Nieuport* pp. 8,11, 5,16,202, 1. The use of musket bullets with canon was recorded poetically some years later. William Cross, who had been Chaplain to Ogle, wrote in 1625 'Those foul-mouthed canons, which at Newport's field Inforced the Albertine Regiments to yield'. William Crosse, *Belgeaes Troubles and Triumphs*, (London,1625).

⁷⁵ Geoffrey Parker, *The Limits to Revolutions in Military Affairs: Maurice of Nassau, The Battle of Nieuwpoort*. In 'The Journal of Military History', Vol .71, No 2 (Apr., 2007). pp. 331-372.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Anon, *The battle fought between count Maurice of Nassau, and Albertus arch-duke of Austria*, (London,1600). p. 4.

army, whose dominance of the battlefield had previously been unchallenged. Spanish losses in the battle were great but more importantly a high proportion of those Spanish casualties, coming from elite units, were irreplaceable. Nonetheless the Dutch suffered heavy casualties too. Maurice's new infantry tactics had come under severe pressure in the battle and had by no means proved decisive but Maurice did demonstrate that, on this occasion, his forces were now on a par with the Spanish. A fact that Don Luis de Velasco, who served in the Spanish Army of Flanders for 30 years and later commanded forces independently in the Palatinate, observed in admitting how much the Dutch troops had improved since Alva's time.⁷⁸ Paradoxically, the high losses suffered by both sides at Nieuwpoort led henceforth to a greater concentration on sieges.

In Janszn's account of the battle, he reports that 'Sir Horace Vere charged with six English Ensigns' who then took a stand near their own ordnance, which drove off the Spanish with shot. However, they [the Spanish] regrouped and resumed their assault until Francis Vere attacked with his companies 'upon the enemy who fled' and were subsequently routed by Maurice's cavalry.⁷⁹ Charles Dalton, a 19th century historian and geographer who wrote books on military history as well as geographical treatises criticises Francis Vere's account [in the *Commentaries*] of this battle because, he says, Francis 'takes the whole credit of defeating the [Spanish] army of 10,000 men with just 1600 English troops'.⁸⁰ It's certainly true that in his *Commentaries* Francis Vere fails to mention any other English officers, except his brother Horace, and Sir Robert Drury, who rescued Francis from the battlefield when Francis's horse was shot and pinned him to the ground. And yet a number of English captains and other officers were creditably involved in the battle. Janszn names Ogle, Tyrell, Fairfax, Brook and others alongside Francis and Horace. Even Sir John Ogle, who was present when Francis was downed and also helped to extricate him from under his horse, did not warrant a mention by Francis.⁸¹ Ogle's own account of the battle, which is appended to Francis Vere's *Commentaries*, gives high praise to Horace saying that he rallied the English troops, including Francis Vere's own company, to attack the Spanish which action with assistance from the Dutch cavalry, 'caused them [the Spanish] to scatter and break'. William Camden, in his *Life of Queen Elizabeth*, says of the victory at Nieuwpoort that 'among these who deserved the first commendation, were Sir Francis

⁷⁸ Geoffrey Parker, 'The Limits to Revolutions in Military Affairs: Maurice of Nassau, The Battle of Nieuwpoort', in 'The Journal of Military History', Vol. 71, No 2 (Apr., 2007), pp. 331-372.

⁷⁹ Janszn, *The Triumphs of Nassau*, p.114.

⁸⁰ Dalton, *Life and Times*, Vol 1, p. 52.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

Vere and Sir Horace Vere.⁸² But it is clear that the arrival of Maurice's cavalry played a significant part in the victory too, both in assisting the Vere brothers and in overcoming the Spanish on the allied right wing.

This defeat showed that the Spanish could be beaten in the field but although the battle of Nieuwpoort was a clear victory for Maurice, it achieved little other than this.⁸³ With his lines of communication now thinly stretched he was, despite the victory, forced to retreat to Ostend because of the high number of 'prisoners and wounded men'...and ... 'that all victuals were lost in the battle'⁸⁴ Francis Vere claims in the *Commentaries* that most of the allied losses were amongst his own English troops and that had the cavalry arrived sooner such losses might have been lessened. He also claimed that he asked Maurice to send in his cavalry several times before it was eventually dispatched.⁸⁵ Francis Vere's account, largely supported by Janszn, is also given credence by another Dutch historian, Anthony Duyck, later a senior Dutch politician, who served on Prince Maurice's staff and was with him on campaign between 1591 and 1602. His *Journal of the Dutch wars of liberation* describes the action at Nieuwpoort, and gives full credit to both Francis Vere and to Edward Cecil, but does so for their tactical part in the wider strategic generalship of Maurice.⁸⁶ Francis was injured again in the battle of Nieuwpoort receiving two wounds in the leg, though he remained on the battlefield. At this point, according to Duyck, Colonel Horace Vere's company contained just 150 men.⁸⁷

The Nieuwpoort conflict seems to have drained the financial resources of the States-General to such a degree that they attempted to 'reduce the foreign cavalry and infantry' not yet in garrison, but Maurice opposed this and managed to retain most of the troops. The list of retained horse troops and infantry companies includes a foot company attributed to Edward Cecil, with similar attributions to both Horace and

⁸² William Camden, *Annales rerum Anglicarum et Hibernicarum regnante Elizabetha*, Vol 4, (London, 1629), p. 624. Translated into English by Thomas Browne in 1629.

⁸³ Herbert H. Rowan, *The Princes of Orange*, (Cambridge, 1988), p. 40. Rowan says that Maurice won 'a tactical victory' but that the Spanish gained the 'strategic triumph', p. 40.

⁸⁴ Janszn, *The Triumphs of Nassau*, p 114.

⁸⁵ Vere. *The Commentaries*, p.101, and see Dalton, *Life and Times*, p. 25. Maurice had committed most of his cavalry elsewhere, retaining only a small reserve. It was this force which he eventually released to support the English on his left flank.

⁸⁶ Duyck, Anthonis, *Journaal van Anthonis Duyck*, (1591-1602), Vol 2, The Hague: Department of War. (1862) p. 674.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol 2, p. 737. 150 men would normally comprise a smallish company but Horace was commanding a regiment of at least 700 men at the start of the battle and Duyck may mean regiment when he writes company.

Francis.⁸⁸ Showing that some of the senior infantry officers also command cavalry whilst their foot companies were then led by a lieutenant colonel.⁸⁹

Horace can next be traced at the siege of Ostend where, following the deception of the Spanish by Francis Vere at Christmas 1601 Hexham reports that

'the Archduke made a general assault on the town, when Sir Horace Vere's station was to maintain the Sand-hill, and defend the breach; Sir Charles Fairfax [Uncle of Lord Thomas Fairfax who later married one of Horace's daughters] 'being under him, with only twelve weak companies, whereof some had not above ten or twelve men... Yet it was performed with the loss of a few men in repulsing the enemy by a stratagem ... The soldiers by order falling flat on the ground, the enemies shot flew like hail over their heads, which saved the lives of many men.'⁹⁰ And when the Spaniards were climbing up the breach, they tumbled down among them much combustibles that were provided to impede them; the fight continued there hotter and hotter for the space of above an hour, and they were so bravely repulsed, that they could not enter a man. In this general assault, the Archduke lost above two thousand men'.⁹¹

Since Horace was here in command of 'twelve weak companies' he was still acting as a regimental commander, but now Grimeston calls Horace the 'Lieutenant General' of the English which suggests that he was operating as deputy to his brother.⁹² Horace's elevation is also recorded in a collection of 'sundry letters and advertismants' collated into a printed newssheet, or Coranto, back in London, 'Sir Horace Vere having command in his brothers absence [Francis had been hit in the head by splinters resulting from a cannon shot and was temporarily evacuated out of the city], upon Tuesday 9th August, offered skirmish to the enemy which was long & fiercely continued on both sides'⁹³ Grimeston's translation also records three separate occasions during 1601 when, defending Ostend, Horace Vere came close to death himself. Firstly, on 11th August his servant was slain, then on 31st August a captain who was inspecting troops alongside Horace was shot dead and on December 7th Horace's secretary had his leg shot off and 'died shortly thereafter'. But Horace did not escape the conflict at Ostend unscathed. During the defence of the breach he was wounded in

⁸⁸ Dalton, *Life and Times*, p. 60.

⁸⁹ Ibid., pp. 60 – 61.

⁹⁰ A trick that was at least as old as the Roman empire.

⁹¹ Henry Hexham in his continuation of Francis Vere's *Commentaries of the Divers Pieces of Service* p. 170 – 173. Hexham was present at the Siege of Ostend. See *Biographia Britannica*, p. 4006. See Janszn, p 130.

⁹² Grimestone, *A True History of the Siege of Ostend*, pp. 10, 20, 90.

⁹³ Anon', *Further Newes of Ostend Wherein is declared such accidents as have happened since the former Edition, diligently collected out of sundry letters and advertisements, as have been from Zeeland, Callice, and other places, lately received*. (London, 1601), p. 7. Corantoes included a wide range of information, much of it taken from reports, letters and eyewitness accounts of merchants, diplomats and returning soldiers.

the leg himself. This is probably the injury that made him somewhat lame or of halting step for the rest of his life. This lameness is referred to by several of his elegists. (See Chapter 5).

After this bloody episode and following the repair of the walls Francis and Horace left the city on March 7th 1602 as part of the regular circulation of troops in the city by the States-General, though the siege continued until September 1604. Francis and Horace then returned to England, where Francis attempted to recruit volunteers for the United Provinces army, but by this time his position as commander of the English forces in Dutch pay, and Elizabeth's principal soldier/envoy in the Low Countries, was under scrutiny by the Dutch. Horace spent some time in England before returning to Flushing in early June 1603, probably having needed time to recover from the wound to his leg.⁹⁴ But by October 1603 Horace was back in action at Balduke in North Brabant, North West of S'Hertogenbosch, where he and Maurice were attempting to prevent the fort at Dentrum from falling into Spanish hands. Loss of this defensive work would have imperilled Maurice's supply line and his link with a large force of Spanish mutineers. Vere wrote to Cecil 'the enemy found it reasonable to leave the prosecuting what he had begun, and about 9 of the clock we might see them retire their artillery.. the place had been of great consequence to the enemy, separating us from the mutineers'.⁹⁵ In the end Balduke remained in Dutch hands.

Allied military operations are always prey to misunderstandings and disagreements and although Clements Markham's asserts that Maurice and Francis 'were always on good terms' in fact, according to Dalton, Francis Vere had never liked Maurice.⁹⁶ This was because Maurice was always the supreme commander and according to Dalton Francis's 'haughty spirit could ill brook control from anyone'.⁹⁷ Certainly by 1600, Maurice seems to have excluded Vere from some of his campaigns which suggests a further or growing estrangement.⁹⁸ But deteriorating relations with Maurice and the States General over the control of his troops, and the Ostend matter, contrasted ironically with the fact that, as Tracy Borman emphasizes, 'the charge most frequently railed against [Francis Vere by Elizabeth] was that he had contravened

⁹⁴ *Biographia Britannica*, p. 4006.

⁹⁵ British History Online, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-cecil-papers/vol15/pp253-277>. Horace Vere to Cecil, October 5th 1603.

⁹⁶ Clements Markham, *The Fighting Veres*, p 378.

⁹⁷ Dalton, *Life and Times*, p.128. Dalton quotes a letter from Sir William Browne, who knew Francis well. Browne reports to Sir Phillip Sydney on 20th November, 1602 that Vere failed to salute Maurice when their carriages passed each other then sent a message apologising, saying the coach passed on his blind side to which Maurice replied that it was a blind excuse. Clements Markham, in *The Fighting Veres*, refutes this saying that Sir William was given to spreading unauthenticated and improbable gossip' pp. 338-9.

⁹⁸ *CSPD, Elizabeth, 1600*, p. 415, Carleton to Chamberlain, 29 March 1600.

specific orders from England', because he favoured the Dutch cause over and above English interests.⁹⁹ Borman points out that on numerous occasions Francis Vere had failed to do exactly as Elizabeth had instructed him. This was particularly the case when she ordered him to supply troops for other ventures. In addition, Vere's enemies at court - most notably Sir Thomas Knollys who had argued with Vere in 1599 - were in a position to denigrate him to the Queen in person, whereas Vere himself had to rely on his letters, which invariably passed through the hands of others before they, or an interpretation of their contents, reached Elizabeth.¹⁰⁰

In the light of this fact alone it is remarkable that he managed to retain his dominant position amongst the English troops for so long. Certainly Queen Elizabeth seemed to regard him highly throughout her reign though it is curious that she declined to elevate him to the nobility, claiming that his endeavours had already elevated him above a peerage.¹⁰¹ Indeed, despite his achievements, Elizabeth had as recently as 1597 rejected Francis Vere as Governor of the Brill, in part because he was 'not of noble rank' as Manning suggests.¹⁰² But Elizabeth had proved reluctant to create new aristocracies throughout her reign, adding just one to the nobility in her last thirty years.¹⁰³

In March 1604, Francis Vere resigned his position as head of the English troops in Dutch pay, (Dr. Trim calls it a 'constructive dismissal') though he retained the Governorship of the Brill until his death in 1609.¹⁰⁴ Francis had by this time served in Holland for almost 20 years, had been wounded several times and conceivably felt that, with the accession of James, the total supremacy of Maurice of Nassau as commander in Chief and the likelihood of an English treaty with Spain that would end the war, the time was right for him to retire.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁹ Manning, *An Apprenticeship in arms*, p. 26.

¹⁰⁰ British History Online, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-cecil-papers/vol9/pp29-72>, (accessed 5 March 2019). The argument concerned the loss of Knollys command and the removal of his troops to Francis Vere's direct authority. Horace was involved as a representative of Francis. Knollys wrote to Cecil that Francis Vere was 'so great and so addicted unto the States that he maketh small account of anything set down by your lordship'. See Borman, 'Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands', p. 239 -240.

¹⁰¹ Sir Robert Naunton in his *Fragmenta Regalia* (originally published in London in 1641 and reprinted several times) says that 'I find not that he came much to the court, for he lived most perpetually in the camp, ... but no man had more of the Queens favour' p. 50. The fact that Francis was included in Naunton's list of courtiers and favourites (There are less than thirty of these and they include men like Leicester, Burghley and Sidney) is highly indicative of his status. Naunton was an MP and later Master of requests and Court Wards under James I.

¹⁰² Manning, *An Apprenticeship in arms*, p. 26.

¹⁰³ Borman, 'Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands', p. 206.

¹⁰⁴ Trim, 'Fighting Jacob's Wars', p.190.

¹⁰⁵ CSPD. *James I, 1604*, pp. 68, 69, Carleton to Chamberlain, Jan 15 1604. Francis had demanded the absolute command of all the English troops in Holland. After discussion about this issue the Privy Council wrote to Winwood expressing the view that Francis was

Thus far a lifelong bachelor, Francis shortly thereafter in 1607 married Elizabeth, the 16yr old step - daughter of his friend Sir Julius Caesar.¹⁰⁶ Francis was by this time a hero at home. King James may have reached an agreement with the Spanish at the treaty of London in 1604, but this did not prevent him from honouring Francis Vere upon his retirement from 20 years of fighting against them in the United Provinces. James made him Governor of Portsmouth 'and other profitable offices in the vicinity' despite the active interests of others who sought that lucrative appointment.¹⁰⁷ James also rewarded other English officers who had served in the Netherlands and, remarkably, he managed to achieve his alliance with Spain without withdrawing English assistance from the Dutch. Even more surprisingly the Spanish were not only aware of this contradiction but were prepared to allow it. With the death of Phillip 2nd in 1598 and a growing realisation that the war was unwinnable, the Spanish were beginning to accept the inevitable.

But Francis only enjoyed his new, largely civilian, status for two years, dying in August 1609. Buried the next day [29th August) in the presence of Horace and other soldiers who had served under him, he was given an elaborate funeral and rests in a grandiose tomb in Westminster Abbey. Borman considers Francis Vere to have been a 'capable soldier' but argues that 'the role he played in the Dutch war has been exaggerated' largely because of Clements Markham's uncritical acceptance of the veracity of Vere's own *Commentaries* and the lack of any subsequent, scholarly appraisal until her own study'.¹⁰⁸

Meanwhile Ostend was still, in early 1604, holding out against the Spanish besiegers, now led by the Marquis Ambrogio Spinola in his first role as a military commander. Born in 1569 Spinola was exceptionally rich and proved to be an outstandingly talented general, despite having had little previous military experience. Originally from Genoa he largely financed his armies out of his personal fortune and he proved to be one of the Spanish crown's greatest generals. Coming to the Low Countries in October 1603 Spinola renewed the Spanish efforts to take Ostend. The States - General, hoping to break the siege and retain the city, prepared a large force under Prince Maurice to move southwards in an attempt to recapture the Flemish port

'unreasonable' and 'unthankful'. See Ralph Winwood, *Memorials of affairs of State, In the Reigns of Q. Elizabeth and K. James, Vol.2, (London, 1725), p.10.*

¹⁰⁶ Chancellor and Under Treasurer of the Exchequer from 1606 to 1614 he was appointed to the Privy Council in 1607 and Master of the Rolls in 1614, an office which he held till his death in 1636.

¹⁰⁷ Trim, 'Fighting Jacob's wars', pp.189, 297.

¹⁰⁸ Borman, 'Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands', p, 258. Borman's Thesis discusses Francis Vere's contribution in the light of how he was seen by contemporary and later Dutch historians contrasting views.

of Sluys (Sluis), which the Spaniards had taken in 1587, and thus outflank Spinola. Sluys was a more important prize even than Ostend because of its fortifications and maritime importance, but there were also other important diplomatic considerations at work. Henry IV of France had for some time been promising to declare war on the Spanish, but was insisting that the States-General should seize the Flemish ports so as to strengthen his hand.¹⁰⁹ In addition Oldenbarnevelt was by this time aware that the death of Queen Elizabeth in March 1603 had brought in a new English monarch, James I, whose view of the Dutch wars was even less sympathetic than Elizabeth's lukewarm support.¹¹⁰ Even though, as Adam Marks writes, 'both monarchs gave overt and covert assistance to their European allies'.¹¹¹ By giving free rein for the recruitment of troops by the Dutch and others and by allowing the raising of (non –parliamentary) funds for such expeditionary forces, both Elizabeth and James supported opposition to Spain and the wider Hapsburg Imperium whilst appearing, officially at least, to be at best ambivalent. Oldenbarnevelt feared (rightly as it turned out) that James would seek a peace treaty with Spain, a peace which might then deny the Dutch access to the Brill and to Flushing, since these were in English hands as part of the Treaty of Nonsuch. For the Dutch, these were important economic and military ports. If Ostend fell, as seemed likely at the time, and if use of the two cautionary towns were then also denied to the States-General, the capture of Sluys was critically important.

On April 27th 1604 therefore, Maurice landed almost 20,000 allied troops on the island of Cadzand, which lies directly opposite Sluys. Horace Vere, John Ogle and Edward Cecil led the English contingent under Maurice's overall command, with Horace as the senior colonel but not (yet) appointed as general of all the English troops. There were several forts and a small settlement on the island, all of which Maurice captured within a few days thus securing an ideal base from which to mount an assault on the city itself. Nevertheless the reduction of Sluys was no easy task. Strong defences built in the new trace italienne style by Maurice's father, William the Silent, compounded an already challenging terrain of canals, waterways, swamps and dykes which in turn were made even more difficult to surmount by the tide which covered and then uncovered a myriad of fords, pathways and safe passages.¹¹² In

¹⁰⁹ Henry's support for the Dutch concerned Elizabeth who mistrusted his motives. She was worried that he might come to dominate the Dutch and thus reduce her influence and disrupt England's vital trade routes.

¹¹⁰ William Hunt, 'Spectral Origins of the English Revolution: legitimization Crisis in early Stuart England', in (eds), William Hunt, Geoff Eley, *Reviving the English Revolution: Reflections and Elaborations on the Work of Christopher Hill*, (New York, 1988), p. 318.

¹¹¹ Marks 'England, the English and the Thirty Years War, p. 39.

¹¹² Edward Belleruche, *The Siege of Ostend; Or the New Troy, 1601–1604*, (Harvard, 1892) pp. 69–71.

addition to this Spinola had flooded much of the land that surrounded that port. Maurice's plan was to control the lesser ports around Sluys before laying siege to the city itself.

With help from a local, Maurice managed to negotiate the treacherous terrain and advance toward the city. His forces met little resistance and after capturing fortresses along the way they reached IZsendike, a well-fortified town about 10 miles from Sluys which soon surrendered. Following this success, Maurice drove on, gathering supplies and plunder from the surrounding countryside. Local people thus had to endure the deprivations of both foe and friend, a common feature of warfare right up until modern times; a practice which recurred throughout Horace Vere's military career and against which he both lamented and fought.¹¹³

Spinola, who as well as trying to reduce Ostend, was also fighting against some four thousand of his own men who had mutinied over lack of pay, nevertheless took the initiative and attacked Cadsland in an attempt to capture Maurice's stores and munitions, the largest part of which had been left at his thinly defended base on the island. Crucially Maurice's garrison [of probably Scottish troops] managed to drive Spinola's men back into the sea.¹¹⁴

This was an important, even critical phase of the campaign, for if Maurice had lost his depot he would almost certainly have had to retreat and logistically he would not have been able to attack again for many months, probably not until the next year. By then, we now know, Spinola would have captured Ostend and defeated the mutineers, thus freeing up several thousand soldiers that he could use to oppose Maurice. Had this happened the entire course of the war may have moved irretrievably away from the Dutch. But despite Spinola's difficulties the Spanish commander had still, by mid-May 1604, managed to assemble a force of 2,000 men to oppose the Dutch advance.

On May 16th, a sharp cavalry engagement put Maurice's men at a disadvantage till Horace Vere, leading some English companies, 'charged with such resolution that he drove the enemy back' killing 423 and capturing as many prisoners, with many more drowning.¹¹⁵ Sir John Ogle, who was leading a company under Horace Vere's command, reported in a letter to Cecil that Horace organised pikes and musketeers, under Charles Fairfax and Ogle himself, to carry out this action and that the States-

¹¹³ Dalton, *Life and Times*, p.114.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.114, f.2.

¹¹⁵ NA. SP84/64/143 Winwood to Henry Percy, 9th Earl of Northumberland, May 20th, 1604. See Dalton, *Life and Times*, pp.109–111.

General 'gave the honour' of this achievement to the English.¹¹⁶ Captain Roger Williams, writing to Sir William Browne on May 23rd, praises Horace Vere for his actions that day saying 'we are all exceedingly bound to Sir Horace Vere' and that 'his care is much of us and our loves must be as great to him'.¹¹⁷

The following day, on May 17th, Horace Vere wrote to Robert Cecil, then Secretary of State.¹¹⁸ After describing the easy taking of the fort of St. Claire, Vere tells how the Spanish apparently gave up prepared positions that were 'so advantageous for them. That they might have made resistance many days'. This allowed Maurice's forces to get close enough to Sluys to enable the 'planting of our ordnance' enabling the army to 'be very offensive unto the town before it be long'. Despite this, a direct assault on Sluys remained difficult even though it was 'of no great strength' because 'the sea and the drowned lands about it, make the seat of it very strong.' Vere describes the arrival, in three different tranches, of the 2,000 Spanish reinforcements and goes on to say that 'The country is very low and even at spring tides it is for the most part under water, that it yields no manner of means to fortify itself. To bring materials to raise forts will require much time and a greater force than we presently have' Vere explains that the Archduke Albert, was planning to 'undertake the regaining of those places that the States are become masters of'.¹¹⁹ Vere also reports that more troops 'as may be spared out of the garrisons' have been sent for to add to Maurice's army.¹²⁰

This letter is dated [i.e. written] 17th May 1604. Yet in Vere's letter is no mention of the previous day's important engagement or indeed Horace's own highly praised part in it.¹²¹ It may have been that the date was wrongly appended to the letter, but it might also be an example of Vere's extreme modesty. The events mentioned in the letter suggest that new style dating is appropriate.

¹¹⁶ British History Online, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-cecil-papers/vol16/pp79-99>. (Accessed 5 March 2019), Ogle to Cecil, May 9th, 1604.

¹¹⁷ Captain Williams to Sir William Brown, May 23rd, 1604 in *Sidney's Memorials*, p. 289 and in *Biographia Britannica* p.407.

¹¹⁸ British History Online, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-cecil-papers/vol16/pp99-120>. (Accessed 5th March 2019). Sir Horace Vere to Lord Cecil, 17 May 1604. King James I raised Robert Cecil to the Peerage, on 20 August 1603, as Baron Cecil of Essendon in the County of Rutland, before creating him Viscount Cranbourne in 1604, and then Earl of Salisbury in 1605.

¹¹⁹ The Archduke was supplanted as military commander by Ambrosio Spinola in mid-1604 but he remained as Governor General of the Spanish Netherlands until his death in 1621.

¹²⁰ British History Online, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-cecil-papers/vol16/pp99-120>. (Accessed 5 March 2019). Horace Vere to Lord Cecil, 17 May 1604. Sir William Browne and Sir John Ogle also wrote to Cecil about the action on May 18th and 21st.

¹²¹ Yet the letter was going to the Secretary of State, second only to the King in importance and influence.

Further Spanish attempts to impede Maurice's forces were brushed aside and Maurice's naval blockade thereafter prevented the re-supply of Sluys, so that it became simply a matter of time before the city fell unless Spinola could find a way to break through on land. This Spinola failed to do, despite several further attempts, and in mid-August 1604 he removed his forces so that he could renew his ongoing assault upon Ostend, which fell to him on 20th September, when the remaining defenders were finally forced to surrender. By this time only a few English soldiers remained in the city.

They had been commanded by Sir Charles Fairfax, who was killed just three days before the document of surrender was signed.¹²² It has been estimated that 90,000 - 100,000 people lost their lives during the 4 years of the siege, many from disease. Janszn puts the figure at 80,000.¹²³ Reporting the loss of the city to Robert Cecil, now Lord Cranbourne, Ralph Winwood wrote 'There were in the town at this Capitulation 1600 men and 400 women besides children'.¹²⁴ And although the Spanish army under Ambrosio Spinola succeeded in capturing the town, their losses, according to contemporary accounts, in men (60-70,000) and in money made the victory Pyrrhic.

But Sluys had surrendered to Maurice a month earlier, on August the 22nd, following which success Maurice sent 1,000 men, made up of many nationalities, to bolster the garrison at Ostend which by now was an almost uninhabitable pile of ruins, but the reinforcements proved insufficient. Following these two debilitating actions when, effectively, Ostend was swapped with much loss of life for Sluys, the Dutch slowly began to form permanent regiments from the English troops.

These bigger formations had always been a feature of the allied army but they had usually only been organised occasionally, when a larger coherent formation was required, and were then broken up when the occasion had passed. But the continual growth of the allied army under Maurice did eventually necessitate a more structured command hierarchy, especially after 1596 when the Dutch standing army was increased to 12,000 men. This reorganisation included the first permanent foreign regiments, one of them under Francis Vere.¹²⁵ This regiment contained the companies of Edward Cecil, John Ogle and Horace Vere as well as Francis's own company. As

¹²² Edward Cecil to Robert Cecil, 10th June, 1604, *Cecil papers, Hatfield, Vol. 14*, 105/101 in Charles Dalton, *'Life and Times of General Sir Edward Cecil'*, pp. 114 - 116.

¹²³ J. L. Motley, *History of the United Netherlands from the death of William the silent to the Synod of Dort, Volume 4*. (Oxford, 1869). pp. 199-200. Janszn gives more detail about the rank and numbers of those who died - including 1,196 women and children, and gives a total of 79,961 'unto which the sick, and wounded...may be added', p. 135. Modern estimates suggest that around 60,000 Spaniards and 30,000 Anglo Dutch died, see Jacob Field, Britannica Online, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Ostend> Jan 8, 2019; Accessed 22/1/2019.

¹²⁴ Ralph Winwood, *Memorials of Affairs of State, In the Reigns of Q. Elizabeth and K. James (London, 1725)*, p. 30.

¹²⁵ De Groot, *Dutch Armies of the 80 years'*, p. 19.

the numbers increased within the army as a whole (by 1600 there were 35,000 men – by 1607 55,000 men) there was a commensurate rise in the numbers in the English regiment.¹²⁶ Subsequently then, as Francis departed, pressure grew to form further English regiments thus introducing a permanent level of control between the company commander and the army commander. Additional regiments meant additional senior positions so that as early as March 1603/4, in a letter to Dudley Carleton then secretary to the English ambassador to France, Ralph Winwood remarked that Sir Edward Cecil, Sir John Ogle and Captain Sutton [who had been acting as Lt. Colonel to Horace] were all ‘suitors for Colonells.’¹²⁷ The men named in Winwood’s letter were the more senior company commanders, men who had already led regiments on a brevet basis and who now felt they should be given the permanent promotion. Winwood also wrote to Cecil, on March 21st saying that, following Francis Vere’s departure, the States-General did not ‘have purpose to resolve in what manner the English troops shall be disposed, until they see the ... end of the siege of Ostend’. But ‘they resolve to make no general, Sir Horace Vere, as colonel, for the present shall have command of the troops’.¹²⁸

It is clear that this was not a straightforward matter, not least because the possibility of advancement prompted the senior English captains to redouble their attempts to persuade powerful patrons to intercede on their behalf. Ogle in particular seems to have bombarded his benefactor Robert Cecil, [created Viscount Cranbourne in Aug 1604] with letters begging for Cranbourne’s intercession with the States-General who, as paymasters, were now the ultimate font of advancement.¹²⁹ At the same time, Cranbourne’s nephew Edward Cecil was continuing with his suit for a colonelcy.¹³⁰ Yet Horace Vere himself may have delayed this process. The proposal for additional regiments clearly had the support of Cecil and Ogle but Ogle claimed, in a letter to Cranbourne, that Horace Vere was opposed to the idea since as Ogle suggested, this would diminish Horace’s authority over the entire English force, an authority that he had enjoyed since his brother’s departure.¹³¹ In October 1604 Ogle, writing to Cranbourne, stated that ‘Sir Horace Vere works with his best friends underhand, that there may not be any dealings of thees troops into formed regiments, bycause it would somewhat

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 20.

¹²⁷ NA, SP84/64/118, Winwood to Dudley Carleton, March 21, 1603/04. The word Colonel probably derives from the Spanish Cabo de Colonell – the head of a column. See Weigley, p. 9.

¹²⁸ British History Online, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-cecil-papers/vol15/> pp99-120. (Accessed 5 March 2019), Winwood to Cecil, March 21, 1604.

¹²⁹ NA, SP84/65/33-40-42-94, 1605. Ogle to Cranbourne.

¹³⁰ British History Online, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-cecil-papers/vol15/> pp99-120. (Accessed 5 March 2019). October 1603. Edward Cecil to Robert Cecil, March 30th 1604.

¹³¹ NA, SP84/64/201 Ogle to Cecil October 20th 1604. And see Dalton, *Life and times*, p. 121.

diminish his greatness and absolute command that he now hath over the troops general'.¹³²

Horace Vere's opposition is also noted in a letter to Ralph Winwood from Henry Howard, the Earl of Northampton and a Privy Council member, who had married Vere's great aunt Frances De Vere. Howard calls Horace his cousin in the letter (as was normal at the time for a distant relation) but he was, in fact, Horace's great uncle – in - law. 'I have of late (good Mr Winwood) very earnestly moved Sir Noell Caron [agent of the States-General in England] that he would be a Means to the States on the Behalf of my honourable Cousin, Sir Horace Vere, that the Power of his present Command over the English in their Service, might by some special Commission from them, be established unto him. Herein Sir Noell being assured that my Kinsman doth neither arrogate nor affect any further Authority than the same he now enjoys'.¹³³ Northampton goes on to say that the division into regiments might reduce that authority and honor that 'he hath so long exercised',¹³⁴

Horace's opposition could be explained as concern on his part that, having been the effective commander of all English troops since the departure of his brother Francis, (and the lieutenant-general for some time before that), the formation of regiments might remove much of his authority and at the same time elevate rivals with powerful friends at home for the overall command. But the influential authority of the English to nominate men to positions of command and prominence in the English forces in Maurice's army had been waning for some time, and became even more heavily discounted when the Dutch began paying these troops. And, as Maurice and the States General began to more fully integrate the English and other foreign soldiers into the Dutch Army, they came to 'exercise full control over the English companies in their employ'.¹³⁵ So it was that when, in 1604, Francis retired from active command it was Horace who was chosen [by the Dutch] to be the senior of the four Colonels who would then command the now permanent regiments of English forces under the overall command of Maurice.

The Dutch initially seem to have resolved not to 'bestow the title of General upon any other' though Horace had already been acting as overall commander in his brother's absence.¹³⁶ The States-General nonetheless did decide that Horace would

¹³² NA. SP84/64/202, Ogle to Cecil, 20 Oct. 1604.

¹³³ NA, SP84/64/111 James, 9th Feb, 1604, Earl of Northampton to Winwood. Northampton was a distant cousin of Horace. He wrote to Winwood informing him that he, (Northampton) had dispatched Sir Noel Carron to plead with the states-general to enlarge and regularise Horace's command of the troops.

¹³⁴ Winwood, *Memorials of Affairs of State*, V.2 , pp.46-47.

¹³⁵ Trim, 'Fighting Jacobs Wars', p.191.

¹³⁶ Dalton, *Life and Times*, p 121.

have the 'power to command over them all....until [The States-General] shall otherwise advise, which perhaps wilbe about michelmas [late September], or the next spring' and for this extra responsibility Horace's pay was to be doubled [from £30 to £60 per month].¹³⁷ Ralph Winwood, writing from The Hague, wrote on April 24th 1605 to Cranbourne [Robert Cecil] that 'The English troops are now devyded into regiments'.¹³⁸ Vere, Ogle, Cecil and Sir Henry Sutton were all approved as colonels of Regiments by the States – General in May 1605. Up until then Sutton had been acting as Lt Colonel to Horace Vere.¹³⁹ And if Horace had been opposed to the new regimental structure, the longer term affect upon his own authority was probably for the good, because shortly after this, and despite the clear antipathy that had existed between Francis and Maurice the States-General appointed Horace as the permanent overall commander of all English forces, in place of his brother Francis.¹⁴⁰ It is almost certain that Maurice would have had a major say in this appointment if only because a leader of Maurice's astute military mind would want men of proven ability as his lieutenants.¹⁴¹

This delay in Horace Vere being appointed as the permanent overall commander may have been the result of Francis Vere's uneasy relationship with Maurice and with the States - General and their desire to avoid giving any one Englishman the sort of power that Francis (and his predecessors) had enjoyed, the more especially since the Dutch were forming an ever larger percentage of the allied army.¹⁴² But Horace was clearly a different proposition to his more self-promoting older brother and he undoubtedly enjoyed an excellent relationship with Maurice which had been built up over his years of service to the Dutch cause.¹⁴³ Also, with the rise of the regimental structure, the army commander Maurice would have needed one person to lead all the English troops and to ensure that they followed Dutch orders without having to deal with several commanders, all of whom would have been attempting to lionise their own position. Thus, at the end of 1605, Vere commanded an establishment of about 6,700 men divided into four English and Welsh regiments, though there were

¹³⁷ <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/currency-converter> According to NA historical currency converter £60 per month in 1600 equates to around £8,272 today, about £100,000 P.A. This is roughly equal to the salary of a modern (2018) Brigadier.

¹³⁸ NA, SP84/65/12, Winwood to Cranborne, 24 April 1605.

¹³⁹ Dalton, *Life and times*, p 122.

¹⁴⁰ Edward Cecil, later Lord Wimbledon, was the grandson of Elizabeth 1's great Minister, lord Burghley.

¹⁴¹ Ismini Pells, 'Professionalism, Piety and the Tyranny of Idleness, p.14.

¹⁴² British History Online, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-cecil-papers/vol16/> pp99-120. (Accessed 5 March 2019). This was in Oct. 1603. <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-cecil-papers/vol16/pp37-48>. (Accessed 5 March 2019). But Winwood wrote to Cecil on March 30th 1604 that the States General were 'sorry... for the departing of Sir Francis Vere' and they 'acknowledged his long and worthy service'.

¹⁴³ Tracey Borman, 'Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands', p. 264.

other nationalities within the ranks; about 55 companies in all with each company having a complement of around 110 men, though Vere's company was almost 200 strong. Dr Adams estimates that though the English establishment was reckoned at about 6,700 men, actual extant figures show they only numbered some 4,210 infantry. If the cavalry are included, the total strength was around 5,000 men.¹⁴⁴ In the same year the total strength of the States Army was about 48,000 men, thus Vere's command comprised only around 10% of the entire allied force.¹⁴⁵

In September of that year Maurice attacked Spinola's forces at Mulheim on the Ruhr in North Rhine-Westphalia.¹⁴⁶ Horace was commanding the English soldiers in Maurice's army. His forces included the regiments of Cecil and Ogle, together with a Scottish company. Spinola was attempting to outflank Maurice by threatening Coevorden and Lingen on the German border and attempting to move into northern Holland towards the important city of Groningen. With superior numbers Spinola awaited Maurice's forces at Ruhort, where the Ruhr meets the Rhine. Then, thirteen Kilometres further upstream on the Ruhr at Mulheim, Maurice saw his chance to attack what he thought was a weak point in the Spanish line, at a place called Broek Castle. Following some early success Maurice's cavalry led by the young Prince Frederick Henry, Maurice's half-brother and heir, was forced back by Spanish horsemen and Spinola, now advancing from his base in Ruhort and outnumbering Maurice, was able to threaten the States-General's troops in the rear.¹⁴⁷

Seeing the danger and sensing that his men were panicking, Maurice began to organise an orderly retreat when Horace Vere, who with his men had been in the main body of Maurice's army, asked Maurice to allow him to attack. Once granted permission, Vere and his men forded the Ruhr and though outnumbered forced the surprised Spaniards back, thus allowing Frederick Henry to retreat and Maurice to re-order and reform his disheartened cavalry. Vere, having been assisted by a French company, realised that he had achieved his objective in providing relief for Frederick Henry, and so began to re-cross the river back to the main army.

But with Frederick Henry's cavalry now safely escaping despite a severe mauling, the entire Spanish force turned to attack Vere's isolated troops. Vere, with some sixty of his best men, guarded the crossing so as to allow the bulk of his forces to

¹⁴⁴ Adams, 'The Protestant Cause,' p. 337.

¹⁴⁵ Dunthorne, *Britain and the Dutch Revolt*, p. 67. And see de Groot, *Dutch Armies of the 80 years' war*, Vol 1, pp. 19-20.

¹⁴⁶ NA, SP84/65/100, Salisbury to Edward Cecil, October 1605. Cecil was not present himself as this letter demonstrates.

¹⁴⁷ In 1625 Frederick Henry succeeded Maurice as stadtholder of the five provinces of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Over Ijssel and Guilders as well as commander-in-chief of the Dutch States army and the Dutch navy.

get back safely to the other bank. Suffering heavy losses, the small force was soon overwhelmed and most of this rear-guard were killed. Vere's horse was shot under him, but the wounded animal was able to carry Vere back across the Ruhr to the comparative safety of the main body of the army.

Though Vere's gallant bravery saved the States' army from complete annihilation this was still a defeat for Maurice. Sir John Throckmorton, the Lieutenant Governor of Flushing at the time, wrote to Robert Sidney, Viscount Lisle, on October 5th praising Horace Vere's actions on that day. He wrote that despite being deserted by the Dutch cavalry, Vere was still able to 'repulse the enemy and retire in good order in the rear of the Dutch whom he had saved.'¹⁴⁸ Certainly there seems to have been general agreement that the English and Scottish troops that Vere had led that day saved the Dutch army from disaster. In a book published in 1614, two years after his death, Meteren, the Flemish Historian, asserted that Vere's troops 'saved the Dutch army' and this was endorsed by Spinola himself.¹⁴⁹ Emanuel van Meteren, born in 1535, also served as the representative of the Traders of the Low Countries in London from 1581 so was well placed to understand and comment upon bilateral issues. He was born in Antwerp and was himself an important figure in commerce and politics as well as a respected historian. Had Maurice suffered a major defeat that day, losing the bulk of his army or at least its overall cohesion, Spinola may have been able to follow up his victory to the severe detriment of the Dutch cause.

Horace Vere's prompt action at Broek was 'veritably Horatian conduct' according to David Trim.¹⁵⁰ Crucially too the bravery of Vere and his soldiers that day strengthened the already strong ties of respect between him and the House of Orange.¹⁵¹ But generally, 1605 was not a good year for Maurice militarily, as several other defeats followed. Spinola was now threatening to regain large amounts of territory north of the major rivers and this added to Maurice's already significant concerns over casualties and sickness amongst his army as he went into winter quarters in November of that year. One small gain did emerge later in 1605 when Francis Vere returned to the Netherlands, in December, to resume his Governorship of the Brill. James wrote to the States General telling them that Francis had his full support and 'all the marks of favour that could be made visible' and at the same time

¹⁴⁸ NA, SP84/66/34, Throckmorton to Sidney, October 5th 1605.

¹⁴⁹ Emanuel van Meteren, *History of the Netherlands and its neighbouring wars*, (Amsterdam, 1614), p.116.

¹⁵⁰ Trim, 'Fighting Jacob's wars'. p.191.

¹⁵¹ Clements Markham, *The Fighting Veres*, p. 378. Trim, 'Fighting Jacob's wars', p.192.

Robert Cecil wrote to Winwood emphasising the King's support for Francis and instructing him to relay this to the States.¹⁵²

This English insistence upon support indicates that Francis's position in the United Provinces was not as secure as it had been and that he had left under something of a cloud. Returning at this time though, he brought with him what must have seemed like good news [for the States-General] from King James. This was the King's decision to prevent any of his subjects from volunteering to join the Spanish forces.¹⁵³ Surprisingly, up until this point Englishmen and Scots had been as free to go to Europe to fight for the Catholic forces as they had been to join the Dutch. James may well have had this change of heart as a result of the shock of the still recent gunpowder plot and the knowledge that Guy Fawkes had fought for the Spanish.¹⁵⁴ James had, after all, grown up in an environment where there was constant danger and he had survived many assassination attempts already. He had initially 'responded energetically' to the gunpowder plot, executing 20 Catholics who were involved or who refused to swear allegiance to him, but his anger was as ever short lived and he did not initiate an anti-Catholic pogrom, distinguishing the plotters from the 'blameless' Catholics who remained 'good and faithful subjects.'¹⁵⁵

There is no record of Horace being involved in any of the actions or sieges that took place in 1606 though English forces were certainly engaged. But no decisive encounter took place despite great efforts on both sides to make a significant gain. Another mutiny amongst Spinola's troops severely depleted his army whilst Maurice, advancing towards the Spanish held town of Groll and seeking to take advantage of Spinola's troubles, found that he was unable to progress because of the bad weather in October of that year.¹⁵⁶ By now though Spinola and the Spanish had other, growing, concerns. Spinola had been supplementing the Spanish financial war effort personally for some time, but losses in his Italian holdings combined with another severe financial crisis for the Spanish crown made raising and supporting armies in the low-countries financially ruinous.¹⁵⁷ This, combined with the military impasse, indicated that restoring

¹⁵² Winwood, *Memorials of Affairs of State*, Vol.2,p.176.

¹⁵³ Dalton, *Life and Times*, p.130.

¹⁵⁴ Dunthorne, *Britain and the Dutch Revolt*, p. 68. Secretary Robert Cecil pushed this legislation rapidly through parliament following the discovery of the origins of the plotters.

¹⁵⁵ Thomas Cogswell, *James I, The Phoenix King*, (St. Ives, 2017), p. 39.

¹⁵⁶ Dalton, *Life and Times*, p.132. The summer in that year was exceptionally wet.

¹⁵⁷ To continue with the war in Flanders, Spinola mortgaged his entire fortune to secure a loan from his bankers to the Spanish Government. Never repaid, he was financially ruined. *Encyclopædia Britannica*, January01,2019. :<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ambrogio-di-Filippo-Spinola-marques-de-los-Balbases>; Access Date: February 27, 2019.

the Dutch provinces to Spanish control, despite almost 40 years of conflict, was clearly as distant a possibility as ever.¹⁵⁸

The mutual exhaustion and relative stalemate of the two sides now led both to begin considering some sort of truce, though there had been a growing enthusiasm for a respite from the fighting for some time with Spinola himself as a leading advocate. He knew that 'Spanish finances could not possible support the strain of further campaigns'.¹⁵⁹ Tentative negotiations throughout 1606 resulted in more serious discussions in early 1607 when the Spanish asked for an Armistice, which after lengthy debate, was arranged on April 24th.¹⁶⁰ Over the next two years a more permanent cease-fire was negotiated and after some initial disagreement a twelve year truce was agreed on April 9th 1609. Phillip III, who had succeeded his father Phillip II in September 1598 was initially determined to defeat the Dutch but he was forced, partially by continuing financial crises, to agree to the lengthy truce. Indeed King James conveyed his view to Phillip of Spain that Phillip 'had not carried himself with so much sincerity as was expected, and had rather dificulted than advanced the business'.¹⁶¹ Some of the Dutch states also required considerable reassurance before they ratified the settlement.

The wording of the treaty itself was abstruse. The Dutch version stated, more or less, that the independence of the Republic had been recognized whilst the French text suggested that the Republic would only be treated as if it were independent for the duration of the truce.¹⁶² But the reality of the situation was an acceptance by the Spanish that they could not force the Dutch to revert to their previous status as a mere province of Spain. It was the recognition of a fact that many had accepted 30 years earlier. Most importantly though, all hostilities would cease for twelve years and the two parties would exercise their sovereignty in the territories that they controlled on the date on the agreement.

¹⁵⁸ Rowan, *The Princes of Orange*, p. 44.

¹⁵⁹ Christopher Duffy, *Siege warfare, the Fortress in the early modern world 1494-1660.*, (London , 1979). P.89.

¹⁶⁰ Both sides were suffering. The Dutch had lost several important towns to Spinola but were still able to maintain an increasingly competent military force in the field and they had had some success in sieges. Importantly too Dutch merchants, having established trading posts in the far East were now threatening to extend the fighting there to a trade war, significantly reducing Spanish income. On the Spanish side, financial problems, always a major issue, now forced Phillip IIIrd to default on loan repayments. It was clear by this time that neither side was able to deliver a decisive blow to end the war.

¹⁶¹ Winwood, *Memorials of Affairs of State*, Vol.2, p.13. Letter from Charles Cornwallis to the Lords of the Council, 13 the April 1609. Cornwallis was the Ambassador to the Spanish Court.

¹⁶² Wielenga, *A History of the Netherlands*, p. 40.

Horace's early career must have benefitted greatly from the influence, patronage and example of Francis. Whatever martial and diplomatic gifts Horace possessed, his route to overall command might have been blocked at an earlier stage without his older brother's example and support and there is no reason to believe that they did not share a familial and filial empathy which may have been enhanced (or otherwise) by the time they served together as soldiers. A few clues to that relationship are in a letter that Francis wrote to Ralph Winwood in April 1606, regarding the besieging of Sedan by the French King Henry 4th. Francis devoted half of this (short) letter to a plea on behalf of Horace

'I do long for my brother's arrival, and marvell not a little of his so long stay in England, being a month since he wrote me he was coming over. I do conceive his absence, wants your favourable assistance, in supporting the remainder of his poor fortune which else may turn to his great hindrance, you are so noble, wise and just, that of your own instinct you will not be wanting in what is fit for you to do, both in regard of the publick service and him, and therefore it is needless to add any intreaty of mine, only thus much I avow, to be thankful to you for any good office you shall afford him'.¹⁶³

At this time Horace had already been appointed as overall commander of the English forces in Dutch pay and Francis was now simply Governor of the Brill. Horace had clearly been in England for some time which seemed to annoy or irritate Francis, but he does seem to be lobbying on his brother's behalf. There is no indication of exactly what constituted Horace's 'poor fortune' or the 'great hindrance' it might afford, especially coming so soon after Horace's encouraging appointment to lead the English forces under Maurice, though the suggestion of a 'good office' may indicate a need for material wealth. But overall the letter shows that Francis, despite his own loss of command, was willing to petition on behalf of his brother. This is all the more remarkable, as Horace was now overall commander of the English troops and he thus had some call on the garrisons of the cautionary towns. The letter may of course simply be evidence of a mellowing with age on Francis's behalf, now that the cares of command had concluded, but it may also be evidence of a genuine affection and regard.

Certainly had some other notable military leader, feasibly a member of the nobility, taken over from Willoughby, Horace may never have had the chance to demonstrate his talent. That said the States General were by 1605 long persuaded of the need for ability to trump nobility when appointing officers. This was a route they

¹⁶³ Winwood, *Memorials of Affairs of State*. Vol 2, p. 207.

were originally forced to take when, following the arrival of the Duke of Alva in 1572 to suppress religious and political dissent, a large number of aristocrats were either executed, exiled or forced to flee from the United Provinces. These were men who would otherwise naturally have been appointed as officers in the embryonic Dutch army.¹⁶⁴ Their absence put pressure on the States General to find suitable candidates for those roles. Almost inevitably a meritocracy of sorts was instigated and as the army grew in size and professionalism so did the officer corps and the number of its non-noble recruits which led to a growing democratisation of the Dutch officer class though this caused some problems with the arrival of the 'English aristocrats (who) found it difficult adjusting to the bourgeois values of a mercantile society' led by the nobility but 'obey(ing) the commands of the States General.'¹⁶⁵

But in time this nascent meritocracy may have assisted both Vere brothers to gain acceptance in the Dutch army and to rise so high, given their relatively low social status.¹⁶⁶ Horace would of course have been long exposed to the evolving administration and societal organisation of Maurice's army and he must have been familiar with these arrangements.

As the second commoner to command an English field army (though under the overall command of the Dutch) Horace took over from his brother fully understanding his position vis-a vis his King and his Dutch employers. Horace Vere's relationship with Maurice, and with the States-General, began well and seems to have continued well throughout his lifetime. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, the Dutch leaders and the English crown had almost twenty years of experience with the military and diplomatic minefield of their alliance. As Adams shows, there was considerable uncertainty and confusion regarding the extent and limit of Leicester's authority in the Netherlands and this was particularly true regarding religion.¹⁶⁷ A confusion that Willoughby's appointment and time in office hardly eased. Francis Vere had lasted longer, partially because of his military accomplishments and the fact that he was a career soldier and not simply a courtier but even his fit within the emerging Dutch national model was never an easy one. Meanwhile, the ascendancies of Leicester, Willoughby and Francis Vere had gradually, rather unknowingly and often uncomfortably, made the initially enthusiastic but largely untrained and un-blooded English volunteers blend into the growing, developing and rapidly modernising Dutch army. As this process matured the Dutch and their English comrades grew to become

¹⁶⁴ Russel Weigley, *The Age of Battles*, p.10.

¹⁶⁵ Roger B Manning, *Styles of Command in Seventeenth Century Armies*, *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 71. No. 3 (Jul., 2007). pp. 671- 699.

¹⁶⁶ Glete, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe*, pp.155-158.

¹⁶⁷ Adams, 'The Protestant Cause', pp. 50-61.

professional and competent soldiers, equal in prowess to the Spanish *Tercios* who hitherto had been the dominant military force in Europe and beyond. And as Jan Glete argues, this success stemmed not only from the military maturing of the Dutch, especially under the leadership of Maurice, but also from the Dutch political system itself which ‘...[was] ... a straighter and more successful road to the efficient fiscal-military state than monarchic absolutism’ such as was embodied in the Spanish Empire.¹⁶⁸ The rapid development of the Dutch political-financial system, seen as ‘a miracle’ by the rest of Europe, underpinned the success of its armed forces’.¹⁶⁹ Such a rapid evolution, despite the difficulties and disagreements of Horace’s three predecessors with the States-General and with Maurice, had come to demonstrate that this was primarily a Dutch struggle which must be managed under Dutch control, the more especially as the percentage of Dutch troops grew in relation to those of other nations.

Secondly, the States-General were, after 1598, paying the English troops, which gave them an economic pre-eminence already well established when Horace took over. And it was of course the States-General that appointed Horace as overall commander in late 1605/6, whereas his three predecessors were all appointees of the English crown. Crucially too, it was not only the English colonels whose appointments were decided by the States-General. Following the fall of Francis Vere, even company commanders could now only acquire their commissions from the Dutch, and the States-General’s encroachment on what had initially been an almost solely English preserve was enlarged further to include junior officers, as well as routine legal matters and the audit of company accounts.¹⁷⁰ Thus, whilst the need for patronage and sponsorship had not ceased, patrons now had to persuade the Dutch, and those who wanted such preferment increasingly tried to find influential Dutch personages to press their claims. This is not to say that Horace Vere had no power of patronage, but that that power now stemmed in large measure from the trust and confidence that the States-General, and Maurice, felt able to bestow upon him.

Evidence of this state of affairs is succinctly demonstrated in Vere’s own hand just a few years later in 1612, when Vere wrote to [almost certainly] Andrew Newton about an appointment in his [Vere’s] regiment. Newton had been tutor to Prince Henry, the heir to James’ throne, since the boy was five years old and Newton was an important member of the young Prince’s court until Henry’s early death in 1612 and like many of those close to the Prince he was, like Horace Vere, a devout Puritan. By the

¹⁶⁸ Glete, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe*, p.141.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p.154.

¹⁷⁰ Trim, ‘Fighting Jacobs Wars’, p.191.

time of Vere's letter Henry had established a network of correspondents, especially amongst military men, who kept him informed about diplomatic, military and political developments at home and abroad.¹⁷¹ Clearly Henry was already trying to exercise influence and patronage as the letter demonstrates. Vere had promised Sir Thomas Dutton a post, but was all too aware of the limitations that constrained him. Vere's letter indicates that he had been unaware of the Prince's wish that 'his Hyghnes' [Prince Henry] has recommended a Mr More for 'repectible usadge'.¹⁷²

Vere wrote;

'I stood ingaged to Sir Thomas Dutton, (who as you know was put from his cumpanie) and soe I have recommended him...when I may doe it without doinge wronge.' Vere then asked Newton 'how I shall govern myself in the behalf of the gent: as anie place shall becum voyde. I have dun my best to make him knowen to the princypall persons that govern here [Vere is writing from the Hague]. Sum experience I have of there unwillingness to admit of anie that have not served them sum tyme into anie place, and I shall lose much of there good oppinion if I presse them therein, ...I doubt of my own power when the opportunie shallbe offered, how farr I may use His Hyghnes [Prince Henry] name I would gladlie be directed by you'.

Vere asked Newton to make sure to tell the Prince under 'what lymitations I doe exersyse that command I have under the States.' He goes on to explain that 'If tymes were more active and there were more use of me, the States would think yt good to give way unto me in a suit of this nature sumtymes.' Vere explained too that he is writing to a friend [Newton] 'in whose trust I am most confydent'.¹⁷³ As if this were not awkward enough, Vere made it clear that the States General would have the final say because he doubts his own power, given *the limitations of his command under the States* [my italics]. If it were a time of war, Vere suggests that the States would 'give way unto me' in such a matter, though even this condition is qualified by the word 'sumtymes.' But Vere's patronage was still considerable, he was able to assist Edward Conway's son Edward (the Second Viscount Conway) to the command of a company

¹⁷¹ Fraser, *The Prince Who Would Be King*, pp. 24,33,54.

¹⁷² NA SP84/67/78.21 It seems that Horace got his way because Dutton, knighted in 1603 and a court favourite, was found a place in Vere's command whereas there is no record of a Mr More's appointment. Dudley Carleton clearly helped in this matter as Vere wrote to him saying 'I have let Sir Thomas Dutton know the good success your lordship hath had in this business', NA SP84/74/165 Vere to Carleton, 9th November 1616. Sir Edward Cecil had written to Henry, Prince of Wales on July 29th 1610 complaining about Dutton's attitude and his abuse towards Cecil. Dutton later killed his Colonel, Sir Hatton Cheeke, in a duel for which misdeed he lost King James's favour and, with Maurice's agreement, had been deprived of his command of a company under Cecil.

¹⁷³ Kaninklije Bibliotheek, 134.C.18b, Horace Vere to Andrew Newton, gentleman of his Highnesses bedchamber, 29th Sept. 1612.

in 1614, despite the King having awarded the post to 'a Scot', as reported by John Chamberlain in a letter to Dudley Carleton in January 1614, but as late as 1618 Vere was finding these 'limitations' a problem.¹⁷⁴ Writing to Dudley Carleton he asks for help in appointing new captains because 'the states of Holland make difficulties to present these two gentlemen that I have taken the boldness to recommend to your lordships favour. They are in my judgement fit men to succeed their captains'.¹⁷⁵ Overall Horace Vere clearly knew his place and how best to keep it, which is a strong indication of his perceptive and realistic personality.

Thirdly, we have strong evidence that Horace's character was radically different to the men who preceded him as generals of the English. Leicester was a senior English aristocrat who expected to conduct not just war, but diplomatic and political administration in his own way. As events proved this was bound to create friction. Leicester was also a poor or disinterested organiser, allowing internal disorder within his own ranks to significantly restrict any possibility of success. Willoughby took his place reluctantly, resented the reduction in authority his appointment to the post brought, and almost bankrupted himself whilst trying to please Elizabeth and the States-General. Even Francis was never quite able to balance the conflicting needs of his monarch and his Dutch paymasters and he resented the increased authority of the Dutch after 1598. Tracy Borman's assessment of Francis is that though he was brave, talented and tactically astute he was also 'ambitious, arrogant, and above all self-congratulatory'.¹⁷⁶ But according to Clements Markham, Horace was an 'extremely modest' man, who ruled those under him by kindness rather than by severity', soldiers 'stood in awe' of the 'stern, self-asserting' Francis whilst they 'loved Sir Horace'.¹⁷⁷

Thomas Fuller, a near contemporary, described them thus saying that Francis was 'of fiery spirit and rigid nature not over-valuing the price of men's lives to purchase a victory' whereas Horace 'had more meekness and as much valour as his brother, so pious that he first made his peace with God before he went out to a war with man.' Fuller describes Horace further, 'had one seen him returning from a victory, he would, by his silence, have suspected that he had lost the day; and had he beheld him in retreat he would have collected him a conqueror, by the cheerfulness of his spirit'. Sir Francis, Fuller claims, was the more feared, Sir Horace more loved, by the soldiery.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁴ CSPD, *James 1, 1613/14*, p. 220, John Chamberlain to Dudley Carleton, Jan 5 1613/14, and in Dr Thomas Birch, *The Court and Times of James I*, London 1848, Vol 2, p. 289.

¹⁷⁵ NA SP84/83/104, Vere to Carleton 27 March 1618. I cannot ascertain the identities of either of these men.

¹⁷⁶ Borman, *Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands*, p. 33.

¹⁷⁷ Clements Markham, *The Fighting Veres*, p. 365.

¹⁷⁸ Freeman, (ed), *Thomas Fuller, The Worthies of England*, pp.179-180.

Even Charles Dalton, who wrote an admiring account of the life of Sir Edward Cecil, a long-time rival of Horace for military office, commented upon Horace Vere's 'retiring disposition, and modest opinion of himself'.¹⁷⁹ More evidence of this aspect of Horace's character appears in the *Biographia Britannica*. After leaving Ostend, Horace went to the Hague to join Maurice and shortly thereafter, in August 1603, he was able to defuse a dangerous situation which had developed between French and English troops. Sir William Browne wrote that a Frenchman argued with an Englishwoman selling firewood and 'because she would not let him have it for the money he proffered he snatched the wood from her'. This caused a nearby Englishman to intervene at which the Frenchman ran him through with his sword. The altercation resulted in a deadly brawl wherein around 30 soldiers, on both sides, were killed and many more were wounded. Then, with the French troops in great danger of an even more severe loss of life from the now enraged English, it was reported that whilst Prince Maurice was unable to stop the violence, Horace Vere succeeded, 'so greatly did they [the English soldiers] honour and love him'.¹⁸⁰

Ben Jonson's epigram (see p.198) is further evidence of Horace Vere's harmonious and conciliatory nature, whilst the twenty plus elegists who dedicated their poetic acclaim to Horace after his death also spoke about his calm, unruffled demeanour, his modesty, his tender heart and his intimate knowledge of the men who served under him.

Contrast these tributes with a quote from Sir Roger Williams, a well-known and admired contemporary fellow commander of Horace, who, talking about a servant of his who had been seriously wounded remarked 'if he dies, it makes no great matter. He was a lackey of mine, which carried my headpiece.'¹⁸¹ Yet this was the same Roger Williams who had praised Horace for his care for his men saying that 'his care is much

¹⁷⁹ Dalton, *Life and Times*, p. 322. Dalton was a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society, and an Hon. member of the Royal United Service Institution and Royal Artillery Institution.

¹⁸⁰ *Biographia Britannica*, p 4007. The incident that started the fighting is described in detail by Sir William Browne writing to Robert, Lord Sidney. *Sidney's memorials*, Vol 2, p. 174.

¹⁸¹ R. B. Wenham, *After the Armada: Elizabethan England and the Struggle for Western Europe 1588-1595* (1984), p. 437, quoted in Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms*: p. 7. Sir Roger Williams served the Protestant cause, fighting against the Spanish in several theatres of war. Robert Dudley, 1st Earl of Leicester said that as a soldier he was 'worth his weight in gold'. Williams was also an acknowledged military theorist, in his *Actions in the Low Countries*, a survey of weapons and methodology used in the United Provinces, he advocated the use of firearms over the longbow. Williams also advocated the modernisation of Britain's armed forces. See his *A Briefe Discourse of Warre*, (London, 1590).

of us and our loves must be as great to him'¹⁸² In the late sixteenth century, English officers were often indifferent about the welfare of the men who served under them.¹⁸³ Vere was clearly an unusual (and shrewd) commander in showing such concern for his soldiers though one of his predecessors as commander of the English forces in the Dutch Army, Peregrine Willoughby also had a reputation for looking after his men.¹⁸⁴

When Francis Vere stepped down from command the Dutch war of liberation had reached the point where it had become obvious to many, if not most, that Spain could not win. The possibility, longing even, for a decisive battle which might determine the entire course and outcome of the conflict had long since evaporated and in any case such an outcome occurs only rarely in any historical conflict with 'the power of decision.. resting... 'in a single day'¹⁸⁵

In the end, the Spanish lost their Dutch provinces because they could not marshal sufficient resources to defeat and then permanently overawe the rebels. As early as 1573 the then Spanish Commander in the Netherlands, the Duke of Alva, conceded in a letter to Phillip II that 'you cannot conceive the number of troops that is required to invest a position in this country'.¹⁸⁶ The Spanish simply could not marshal enough soldiers, for long enough, to capture and then occupy for any length of time, the recalcitrant Dutch towns and cities which were themselves gradually adopting the new defensive structures needed to combat improving artillery and offensive methods. Sickness, mutiny and desertion on an enormous scale also had a considerably deleterious effect upon the available manpower.¹⁸⁷ The Spanish empire needed to deploy troops in many places around the globe and like empires before and after, in the end, this socio-financial struggle proved to be its nemesis.¹⁸⁸

Geoffrey Parker makes this point well ' 'Habsburg Spain was by no means the last imperial power to ruin itself by waging a war abroad which it could not manage to win but could not bear to abandon'.¹⁸⁹ And the root of this failure was economic. Despite the riches of the new world there was never enough Spanish coin to meet the needs of its empire. Quite apart from the Spanish inability to put enough armed feet on the ground in enough places and for long enough to make a real difference, a lack of

¹⁸² Manning, *An Apprenticeship in arms*, f. p. 28n. See above p.113.

¹⁸³ Roger B Manning, *Styles of Command in Seventeenth Century Armies*, *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 71. No. 3 (Jul., 2007). pp. 671- 699.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ Weigley, *The Age of Battles*., pp. XII –XII.

¹⁸⁶ Cited in 't Hart, *The Dutch Wars of Independence*, p.15.

¹⁸⁷ Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, pp. 177–189. See Barbara Tuchman, *The March of Folly*, (New York, 1984) for perhaps the best discussion of such irrationality throughout history.

¹⁸⁸ Dunthorne, *Britain and the Dutch Revolt*, p. 90.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. xv.

funds to pay the soldiers that were there was also a frequent problem which not only hampered the Spanish cause but obliquely assisted the Dutch rebels.¹⁹⁰ More than once Spanish troops not only refused to fight unless they were paid, but actually rebelled. In 1576 for example mutinous unpaid Spanish troops sacked Antwerp, already in Spanish hands, at a cost of some 8,000 lives and this so-called 'Spanish Fury' strengthened further the resolve of the rebels in the seventeen provinces to take fate into their own hands.¹⁹¹ Folly of this sort was not a feature of the armies of the United Provinces according to Marjolein t Hart. Dutch soldiers 'did not earn more than their counterparts elsewhere but they received their money reliably and in a steady pattern...(this) regularity of pay fostered and underpinned cohesion in an army where [at least up until the 1590s] over half the troops came from outside the republic'.¹⁹² Nevertheless taxes in the United Provinces rose by 50% in the 1620's in order to pay for the increasingly costly defensive and offensive operations.¹⁹³

Enormous loans taken out by the Spanish state to shore up its finances were often underwritten by the wealth expected to arrive each year from the Americas, but all too frequently this treasure was overvalued, or lost to the buccaneers of England, Holland and other nations.¹⁹⁴ Spain defaulted on several of these loans, in effect a kind of bankruptcy, which made raising funds even harder. But although the more astute Spanish leaders recognised these implacable econo-military facts early on in the Dutch conflict, they were unable, or unwilling, to act accordingly.¹⁹⁵ Ironically, the Netherlands was an increasingly wealthy economic region, and its loss was a further blow to the almost permanently economically challenged Spanish crown.¹⁹⁶ In many respects the Spanish continued the fighting for so long simply to avoid humiliation.¹⁹⁷

Rivals

When Horace became commander of the English forces serving in the Dutch army his naturally self-effacing, even tempered, approach stood within a role that was now much

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 40-41.

¹⁹¹ t Hart, *The Dutch Wars of Independence*, p.18.

¹⁹² Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁹³ Peter Limm, *The Dutch Revolt*, (London, 1989), p. 80.

¹⁹⁴ Niall Ferguson, *The Ascent of Money*, (London, 2008), pp. 26-27. Ferguson makes the additional point that the influx of silver and other bullion from the New World devalued the metal which added to Spain's problems.

¹⁹⁵ Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, p. 114. As early as 1574 Phillip was advised by Don Luis de Requesens that 'there was not enough time or money in the world to reduce by force the twenty – four towns that have rebelled in Holland'. Forty-five years later another Spanish policy advisor repeated the same lament 'We cannot by force of arms reduce those provinces to their former obedience', G. Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, (London, 1977), p. 264.

¹⁹⁶ Wielenga, *A History of the Netherlands*, p.14.

¹⁹⁷ Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, p. 113.

more specifically defined and understood by the States-General and the English court. Horace must have seen and learned from the way in which his brother had run things that a different approach was more likely to achieve success, an approach that wore and adapted well within an army that had become more confident and assured under the overall command of Maurice, one of the great military innovators of the period.¹⁹⁸

Horace's appointment was not a straightforward affair. There were others who felt they deserved the top job. One of the new colonels of the English regiments was Sir Edward Cecil, the grandson of Lord Burghley Elizabeth's principal minister, and the nephew of Robert Cecil, Burghley's son and successor as principal advisor to the Queen and later to James I'.¹⁹⁹ Like Horace, Edward Cecil was a career soldier. Born in 1572 he served with the English forces in the Netherlands after 1596 and wrote frequently to court describing military actions in which he and the English had been involved. His father, Sir Thomas Cecil had been a volunteer aboard the English fleet that fought the Spanish Armada in 1588 and thus in an age where patronage counted for much when it came to honourable or lucrative appointments, Edward Cecil was blessed with familial support at the highest level. He was given his own company of foot in 1599 and he fought at Nieuwpoort and Ostend alongside Francis and Horace.²⁰⁰ In a letter to Sir Robert Cecil on the 13th July 1599, Edward Cecil asked for his uncle's support in gaining command of the English cavalry, which he says Sir Francis Vere has promised him if he [Edward Cecil] 'compounds with Sir Ni-parker, and if it would please yr. Lo. to lay out the munny, he himself [Sir Francis] would bring it to pass.'²⁰¹ In April of 1600, with strong support from Sir Francis Vere, Edward Cecil got his troop of horse having paid £500 'retiring money' to Sir Nicholas Parker in an embryonic foreshadowing of the purchase system.²⁰²

Cecil and Horace Vere were natural competitors for military honours and their rivalry was a background factor to their martial careers. But it was Horace who gained the vacant overarching position as general of the English troops serving in Maurice's army. Nevertheless Horace's appointment was resented by Cecil, the more so because had patronage been the sole prerogative of the English, rather than the Dutch, there is

¹⁹⁸ Roberts, 'The 'Military Revolution' 1560–1660' in Clifford Rogers, *The 'Military Revolution' Debate*, p. 14.

¹⁹⁹ Edward Cecil, 1st Viscount Wimbledon. He served at Nieuwpoort and Ostend and later led the English contingent in the War of the Jülich succession, at the siege of Juliers in July and August 1610. He was also an MP (elected in 1601 for Aldborough).

²⁰⁰ Dalton, *Life and Times* pp. 38-39. Letter to Sir Robert Cecil, his Uncle, who was at the time Elizabeth's, Principal Secretary of State, thanking him for the 'extraordinary favour'.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p 31.

²⁰² British History Online, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-cecil-papers/vol16/> pp99-120. (Accessed 5 March 2019). 6 & 8 Feb 159. Sir Thomas Knollys had asked the Earl of Essex for Parker's troop but Francis Vere favoured Edward Cecil. This may have been an additional reason for Knollys dispute with Francis.

every likelihood that Cecil might have gained the nomination. Adams says that 'throughout the period... Sir Horace Vere was the dominant figure... [and that Cecil] regarded [Vere] as blocking his advancement.'²⁰³ In addition Vere was certainly motivated in part by his devout Puritan nature whereas Cecil was an out and out professional soldier.²⁰⁴ So it was at this time that the rivalry of the two men for high military command stirred an ill feeling between them that was to last for a number of years.

It was a rivalry that may have been exacerbated by wider family disagreements. The head of the De Vere family Edward the 17th earl and Horace's cousin had died in 1604 at the age of 54.²⁰⁵ Much had been expected of him as a young man. He had served in the Low Countries under Francis and Horace after having been educated at the home of Lord Burghley (Cecil), whose daughter Anne he married. However, on hearing of Anne's pregnancy whilst he was travelling in Europe in 1575, Edward decided that the baby (a daughter named Elizabeth) was not his and he and Anne were then estranged for several years.²⁰⁶ Edward De Vere also proved to be a poor financial manager despite having a healthy income.²⁰⁷ Queen Elizabeth herself admonished him for being a 'spendthrift' though she was of course of a rather miserly disposition herself. But over the years Edward sold off his inheritance to cover his debts, and when he died his eleven year old heir Henry, the 18th Earl, was left practically destitute and is recorded as living with his mother in Camden Row in Westminster.²⁰⁸ Francis Vere must have had some sympathy for the boy because he asked that, after his own death, his pension be paid to Henry and this was granted by the King in October of the same year.²⁰⁹ The estrangement and Edward's inability to live within his means, both surely an embarrassment to Burghley, probably helped fuel an antagonism with the Cecil family which may later have exacerbated the rivalry for top military posts between Edward Cecil and Horace.

There is more evidence of a familial antipathy in a letter Burghley wrote to Edward de Vere in 1587 in which Burghley expresses astonishment at the content of a letter from the earl of Oxford alleging that Burghley had not assisted Edward's advancement. Burghley writes 'I have at all times... had your lordship in remembrance

²⁰³ Adams, 'The Protestant Cause', p. 438.

²⁰⁴ Adams, 'The Protestant Cause', p. 440.

²⁰⁵ Edward De Vere was a noted author and poet of his day.

²⁰⁶ Daphne Pearson, *Edward de Vere (1550–1604), The Crisis and Consequences of Wardship*, (Ashgate, 2005), p. 50.

²⁰⁷ Estimated at around £1m per annum in modern value. See Pearson, *Edward de Vere (1550–1604)*, p. 44.

²⁰⁸ Wilson, *The History of Great Britain*, p.161. Wilson says he 'squandered away a Princely Estate',

²⁰⁹ CSPD, *James I, 1604*, p.155. Oct 6th 1604.

tobe used in honourable service, then I must content myself with the wrong you do me in noting me as you do very roundly, that you find yourself by me little strengthened in estate and nothing in friendship.²¹⁰ Thus following Francis's departure in 1604 Edward and Horace entered a period of disagreement which lasted 'for many years'.²¹¹ When most if not all high office, both civil and military, depended upon rank and patronage it was inevitable that rivalry should often lead to enmity, especially when that rivalry was continuous, prolonged and enlarged by family complications.

However, after fourteen years' service in the Dutch and Protestant cause Horace Vere had demonstrated his considerable ability as a fighting front line soldier. At the same time he was beginning to demonstrate leadership skill which, combined with his bravery at Ostend, Steenwyck, Bommel, Nieuwpoort, Sluys and Broek Castle attest to exactly the sort of ability that Maurice would have found desirable in his senior officers. The leadership, both tactical and strategic that he demonstrated in those places, for example at Nieuwpoort when he rallied and then led soldiers under severe pressure from the highly professional Spanish, revealed an astute awareness that Vere was able to transform into successful action. At Broek castle Vere's adroit and immediate assessment of the possibility of rescuing Henry, persuading Maurice to allow him to try and then succeeding against all the odds shows an awareness, coolness and quick thinking aptitude that made him stand out from his fellow officers. His actions at Bommel meanwhile showed his competence and understanding of siege warfare, Vere was an all-round soldier, able to charge and attack when it was needed yet also able to hold on in a stubborn defence.

Such astuteness, under fire and *in extremis* must have weighed heavily with Maurice and the States-general when they were considering whom to appoint to lead the English in their pay whilst on a personal level Horace's easy going and amenable nature would have been a considerable relief following Francis' prickly and self-important personality. Nevertheless when Horace was appointed as the senior of the four colonels in Dutch pay, following his brother's departure in 1604, Cecil was also a candidate for the overall command. But despite his considerable support at home the final decision on such matters rested with the States-General and Cecil's disappointment at what he saw as a snub to his honour and prestige began a military lifetime of rivalry with Horace. The culmination of this rivalry and its place in the career of Horace Vere is discussed in the next chapter which will consider Vere's military career from 1605 to 1632 when he last served as the senior English soldier in Dutch pay at the siege of Maastricht, before his retirement to England and his death in 1635.

²¹⁰ BL, Lansdowne 103/38, ff. 91-2.

²¹¹ Dalton, *Life and Times*, p.329.

Campaign Sites in the Palatinate



4. The Serving Soldier 2: When shall we fight?

This chapter will focus on Horace Vere's military career after 1605. During this period he was to become the most famous and respected soldier in England as his reputation was enhanced in the Low Countries, the Palatinate, at Breda, Hertzogenbosh, and at Maastricht whilst a veritable cast list of later senior civil war commanders served under him in what was described as 'England's foremost military academy'.¹ The chapter will include his rivalry with Edward Cecil, Vere's campaign in the Palatinate as an independent commander, his later service in the Thirty-Years War, and his inclusion as part of the senior military establishment in England. Yet despite this blossoming of his military career there is also ample evidence of Vere's piety, turning down the chance of command when he did not see the campaign as part of the fight against Catholic hegemony and Protestant error.

The majority of Vere's extant letters date from his time in the Palatinate and mainly concern military and diplomatic matters. These letters, dating from early 1621 to late 1622, provide a considerable insight into Vere's defence of the Palatinate.

These letters invariably display the proper social nuances of the day, with terms of address and spacing showing the correct deference when required and in then positioning his signature either in the centre of the paper (for those of equal rank) or on the right for those in loftier positions whilst adding appropriate subscriptions as occasion demanded such as 'your most humble servant to command' for his superiors and 'your loving and/or faithful friend' for equals². Correspondence was subject to extreme uncertainty in the middle of a war zone and Vere's letters sometimes reflect this when he is unsure if his letters have reached their addressee or if long awaited instructions have been sent. This uncertainty was the norm in the relatively stable postal world back in England so the uncertainties of the continent during a war were considerable.³

Although initially operating in the Palatinate alongside others with forces large enough to challenge the Spanish and Imperial armies his command was, by early 1622, reduced to just a few thousand troops. Consequently he was forced to defend only the towns of Heidelberg, Mannheim and Frankendale, where new, more modern, defences had been constructed. Vere's letters illuminate his management of this defence and his concerns regarding a wide variety of issues including finances, morale,

¹ Hopper, *Black Tom*, p.16. Hopper calls Vere's company 'essentially England's Foremost military academy'.

² James Daybell, *The Material Letter in Early Modern England*, manuscript Letters and the Culture and Practices of Letter writing, 1512-1635, (Palgrave, 2012), pp. 91 -94.

³ Daybell, *The Material Letter in Early Modern England*, p. 47. Daybell's book specifically excludes International Correspondence (see p. 14) though he does include a few such examples, p.46

troop numbers, diplomatic complexities and the behaviour of the enemy. But Vere was also involved in several other engagements during this 30 year period though he left few extant letters from these times and thus constructing a cohesive narrative of these actions rests with the words of others.

For most of those ensuing 30 years Vere's rivalry with Edward Cecil permeated the consideration of senior military appointments within the English establishment and though Horace Vere almost always found favour this was, on some occasions, despite powerful and well placed opposition. Since for most of this time Vere was absent from England his achievements are all the more notable.

The Twelve Year Truce

The Twelve Year truce between the Dutch and the Spanish was signed in April 1609. The agreement only applied to Europe whilst in the far east, and in the Americas, the conflict continued.⁴ But with the signing of the truce the States-General were anxious to reap some sort of financial reward and one aspect of this was a desire to decrease the number of troops in their pay by reducing the size of individual companies. The reductions seemed initially to have been unevenly applied with the French apparently taking smaller cuts, which caused considerable argument and complaint from the English. However it transpired that the French companies were to be allowed a larger establishment because the French government were now paying directly for the surfeit.⁵ Given that there was no suggested reduction in the number of officers, and that the four English colonels themselves were granted additional numbers for their own companies, the matter was resolved fairly amicably, and this sort of reduction would in any case have been fairly easy to deliver, given the constant loss to death, sickness and desertion even in an army not currently engaged in conflict. But English commanders still remained unhappy with this diminution of their forces, so painfully and slowly nurtured over the previous 24 years and which were now as professional and disciplined an army as any in Europe. In the end the States agreed to maintain the English forces at an establishment of 5,000.⁶ This was just a few hundred less than that agreed in 1605 and the actual numbers were of course always below this figure.

When Horace assumed command of all the English forces in Dutch pay his brother Francis, under whose leadership Horace had served for 15 years, was still

⁴ 't Hart, *The Dutch Wars of Independence*, p. 25.

⁵ Winwood, *Memorials of Affairs of State*, Vol. 3, pp.17-18.

⁶ NA, SP84/66/218, 20th May 1609. There is no signature on the letter but it is endorsed 'Mr Turner, from the Hague'.

living and was still Governor of the Brill. But his death in 1609 was the final coming of age for Horace who may have felt that he was now free to operate in his own way. David Trim argues that Horace's authority, under Dutch control, was considerably less than that of his brother.⁷ But since Leicester all subsequent English commanders had operated with a declining level of autonomy as the Dutch political, military and financial position had enlarged. Horace Vere's well attested unfluctuating temperament certainly allowed him to encompass this diminution in overall authority, even if it were not all that he would have liked. But he realised that the power of his position rested on his own relationship with Maurice and with the States-General, and though he had less authority and fewer powers of patronage than any of his predecessors, he maintained his position for almost thirty years, which was 10 years longer than the tenures of all of his forerunners combined.⁸

Although the truce removed much of the immediate purpose of the English troops, there were still important issues to consider. In particular the Governorship of the Brill that had now, with the death of Francis, become vacant. The first English governor of the Brill (jointly with Lord Burgh who died the following year) from January 1586 to September of the same year was Thomas Cecil, father of Edward Cecil, half-brother to Robert Cecil Earl of Salisbury now (1609) Secretary of State.⁹ But Thomas fell out with Leicester, resigned his post at the Brill and later took part as a volunteer captain in the English fleet opposing the first Spanish Armada.¹⁰ He was succeeded as Governor by Edward Conway, 1st Viscount Conway and husband to Dorothy Tracy, the sister of Mary Vere. Francis Vere had then been appointed Governor in 1598 with Conway reverting to his Lt. Governor. This was a lucrative sinecure but it was also an important strategic post since the garrison there formed part of the English military contingent, and the income from the city's trade and commerce was a significant part of the Dutch ongoing repayment to England for the military assistance afforded under the treaty of Nonsuch. Francis's death had also vacated the post of Governor of Portsmouth, and these positions now became the subject of the usual lobbying for favour, attracting a great deal of interest from men who may have felt that they had a legitimate claim to such a preferment. One of these men, Lord Arundel of Wardour had asked for either post in consideration not only of his merit but also for the '£18,000 spent in the service of King James and Mary, Queen of Scots'. But Arundel was a

⁷ Trim, 'Sir Horace Vere in Holland and the Rhineland', pp. 343-344.

⁸ Borman, 'Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands', p. 257, f.4.

⁹ NA SP84/40/132.

¹⁰ David Loades, *The Cecil's, Privilege and Power behind the Throne*, (NA, 2007), p.178.

Catholic, he had served in the army of the Holy Roman Empire, been briefly imprisoned by Queen Elizabeth, and had come under suspicion following the Gunpowder plot¹¹.

A more likely candidate was Sir Edward Cecil.¹² Like Horace, Edward Cecil was a career soldier, ambitious and eager to achieve independent command, though his personality was quite the opposite of Horace Vere's calm retiring disposition. Even Charles Dalton, who wrote the only extant biography of Edward Cecil, described his subject as 'a man who chafed under all control, And whose aim in life was to get to the top of the military ladder' ... 'his haughty and independent spirit made him slow to recognise the fact that a soldier, however high his rank, has many masters, and must give place to his senior officer'.¹³ He had already been given a senior post as part of Francis Vere's command when Francis was at his height of his power and influence. At that time Francis Vere's approval was vital for Englishmen who wanted an officer's role in the Dutch wars. Still, as David Trim points out, Edward Cecil's advancement owed much to Francis Vere's own need at that time to maintain good relations with the powerful Cecil family.¹⁴

Edward Cecil was a respected military commander with impeccable Protestant family connections and he now desired one or other of these vacant posts and lost little time in applying via his father to his uncle for preferment. Thomas dutifully wrote to his brother just three days after Francis Vere died, begging Salisbury to grant either The Brill or Portsmouth to Edward 'whereby you shall not only bynd hym in cheanes of love and trew respect to doe you service, but herby advuance the honour of yor house'; the letter was delivered personally to Salisbury by Edward Cecil himself who clearly felt that he deserved one of these sinecures and that his familial relationship would warrant his serious consideration.¹⁵ Nevertheless, despite Edward having the support of his father, and in an age when nepotism counted as the highest endorsement, Horace Vere was, on October 18th 1609, appointed Governor of the Brill in succession to his brother and spent much of the next four years there.¹⁶

¹¹ Dalton, *Life and Times*, Vol 1, (London, 1885), p.151.

¹² Edward Cecil, 1st Viscount Wimbledon (29 February 1572 – 16 November 1638). He served at Nieuwpoort and at Ostend and later led the English contingent in War of the Jülich succession, at the siege of Juliers in July and August 1610. He was also an MP (elected in 1601 for Aldborough).

¹³ Dalton, *Life and Times*, Vol 1, p.176.

¹⁴ Trim, 'Fighting Jacobs Wars,' p.182.

¹⁵ Dalton, *Life and Times*, p.151.

¹⁶ Winwood, *Memorials of Affairs of State*, Vol 3, pp. 77, 80.

He retained the post until the cautionary towns were finally restored to the Dutch some seven years later.¹⁷ The English crown and Horace continued to benefit from their usage until May 1616 when, for a payment of £250,000, they were returned to Dutch control.¹⁸ The Brill was essentially an English sinecure so if the final choice of Governor rested solely with Robert Cecil then the appointment adds further to the merit and reputation of Horace Vere.¹⁹ Dalton writes that 'It speaks well for Lord Salisbury's upright and fair dealing that he did not show favour to his own family', at least on this occasion.²⁰ But there is evidence that Salisbury was indeed under some pressure, from a royal personage close to home. On the 6th September 1609, just a week after Francis died, Ralph Winwood writing from the Hague about a number of matters concerning the truce, ended his letter by making a plea that the Lieutenant Governor of the Brill, Sir Edward Conway, be appointed to the Governorship.²¹ Salisbury replied to Winwood some 12 days later saying 'no man should have been more glad to have furthered him than I should ... for his dessert, which ought most to carry the stream of all men's voyces especially such as are of my condition' but Salisbury goes on to say that he is constrained because 'the Princes highness [Henry] has declared himself for his worthy brother-in-law'.²² Conway's brother in law being Horace Vere.²³ Henry was barely fifteen at the time, but was already trying to get involved in matters of state at the highest level, asking his father's representatives abroad to 'acquaint me further' with 'observations of that state'.²⁴

David Trim suggests that Horace Vere's appointment to the Governorship of the Brill may have had a religiously inspired motive. Arminianism had gained a foothold in the town and Vere, as a soldier and a devout and pious Puritan, would therefore be ideally suited to counter this movement.²⁵ The teachings of Jacob Arminius, which assert that election is conditional upon faith in Christ, as opposed to the Calvinist doctrine that election is pre-ordained, had begun to spread across the United Provinces in the early years of the Seventeenth Century and came to a head in 1610 when a

¹⁷ *Biographia Britannia*, p. 4008. And see Winwood, *Memorials of Affairs of State*, Vol 3. pp.22-28. Letters from Robert Cecil and the Privy Council explain the detail of the negotiations and tell Winwood how and what to relay to the States General etc.

¹⁸ Harris, William, *An historical and critical account of the lives and writings of James I and Charles I and of the lives of Oliver Cromwell and Charles II*, (London,1814), p.196. This is around £33,000,000 today, apparently considerably less than the actual debt. James was only persuaded to accept the £250,000 because, as usual, he was short of money. See Dalton, *Life and times*, p.239.

¹⁹ Trim, 'Fighting 'Jacobs Wars''. p.193.

²⁰ Dalton, *Life and Times*, p.155.

²¹ Winwood, *Memorials of Affairs of State*, Vol 3, p. 64.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 70.

²³ Lawrence *The Complete Soldier*, p.108.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.45. In this case Sir Charles Cornwallis, the Ambassador in Madrid.

²⁵ Trim, 'Sir Horace Vere in Holland and the Rhineland', p. 342.

number of clerics and other academics presented what became known as the 'Remonstrance of the Arminians' to Oldenbarnevelt. This Remonstrance declared five main points of belief which disagreed with the central points of Calvinism, asserting that election is conditional upon faith in Christ, and that God elects to salvation those He knows beforehand will have faith in Him, rather than the Calvinist position which is that election is pre-ordained and that faith or good works among the living cannot affect this. In 1610 the Remonstrants, seized control of Utrecht and had increased their strength in the Brill, the town which Horace Vere had so recently taken over as Governor.²⁶ The States-General sent troops to retake Utrecht and Maurice then nominated Sir John Ogle to be Governor of the town. It is this use of troops to suppress what was in effect an internal religious revolt that Vere refers to in his letter of the 8th April in that year 'After the ten cumpanies were cum into the towne that were there unto destined, the people were required to lay downe there armes and to cease there watch, whereat they were much troubled and did oppose yt'. The letter explains that the troops of the States-General were to remain in the town until order is restored and the 'people have a right understanding of their duties' when the 'cumpanies wilbe withdrawn and soe they shall injoy there former lyberties'²⁷

Prince Henry was a strong advocate for a militant, Puritan, Protestant faith as well as being a keen student of military and diplomatic matters so his interest in the appointment to the Brill may have had a double intent. The prince would certainly have been keenly interested in the career of such a powerful Protestant as Horace Vere, especially in his position as the premier English soldier in Europe. Likewise, Horace Vere would have been keen to build a relationship with the prince, upon whose young shoulders was already being built hopes of a more assertive English Protestantism, just as the similar hopes that had presaged James' enthronement were being slowly dashed. Henry had certainly tried hard to encourage and promote this image, he had wanted to lead the English troops in the Julich-Cleves war, which also broke out in 1610, himself but had not even been allowed to cross the channel. Two years later Robert Sidney, Viscount Lisle, Governor of Flushing since 1588, promised the young prince command of 'the next company [to fall vacant in the Flushing garrison].' though whether the King would have permitted this seems unlikely.²⁸ But these and many

²⁶ 't Hart, *The Dutch Wars of Independence*. Leicester made Utrecht his seat of government in 1585/6 after purging the town of its too religiously liberal (for Leicester's hard line Calvinism) town council. Which may have been one reason for this Arminian uprising 20 years later. p. 20.

²⁷ Koninklijke Bibliotheek, 134.C.18, Horace Vere to Adam Newton, 8th April 1610.

²⁸ Fraser, *The Prince who would be king*, p. 223.

other such hopes and plans were cut short as the 'glamorous' Henry died aged just 18, and much mourned, on the 6th November 1612.²⁹

In his letter to Adam Newton on 8th April 1610 from The Hague, Horace Vere thanks Prince Henry for his 'most gracious message .. by the hands of Sir Henry Payton' and asks that 'God graunt that I may have abyllitie to doe His Hyghnes service'. The message from the prince is not extant but Horace's answer indicates that Henry had opened or continued a dialogue with Horace of the sort that concerned political and military affairs.³⁰ Given Henry's interest in military matters and Horace Vere's position as 'England's most popular and respected soldier' it would have been odd if the young Prince had not sought to tie Vere into his growing circle of military informants and patronage, which included Cecil and Conway.³¹ Thus Henry's intervention in the appointment of Horace to the Brill, just a few months earlier, may well have been the beginning, or the precursor of this relationship, for Vere's letter goes on to give some detail of the military and political situation at the time and he concludes 'with the offer of my service, if you can find ought worthie the remembrance of me to our most excellent master.'³²

So that possibly for both military and religious reasons, Edward Cecil, not a notably pious man, was not chosen. Edward Cecil was not appointed to the role of Governor of Portsmouth either, and neither was Lord Arundel.³³ Winwood wrote to Salisbury on Oct 10th reporting that 'Sir Horace Vere doth propose shortly to go into England, to acknowledge to his Majestie, the prince and the Lords, his dutifull Thankfulness for this favour, beyond his Expectation' and Winwood goes on to say that 'he [Horace Vere] hath prayed me to assure your Lordship that he will have a respectful Regard to Sir Edward Conway; [whose candidature had been rejected] for whose contentment he will willingly communicate with him, be it Honour or Profit, that the Government of the Brill shall bring with it.'³⁴ This was to be a rare visit home, since Horace was subsequently out of England for most of the rest of King James' reign. Meanwhile Conway and Vere, who were of course brothers in law, agreed a mutually acceptable way forward together, signing an agreement to that effect, yet Conway did ask Winwood to try to obtain 'some Mark of Favour' for him 'whereby the world may

²⁹ Richard Cust, *Charles 1, A Political Life*, (Harlow, 2005), p. 2.

³⁰ Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier*, (2009), p.108. And see Winwood, *Memorials of Affairs of State Vol 3, (London 1725)*, Letter from Prince Henry to Sir Charles Cornwallis then Ambassador to Spain and from 1610 treasurer of the of the Princes household.

³¹ Trim, 'Sir Horace Vere in Holland and the Rhineland 1610 – 1612', p. 345.

³² 1. Koninklijke Bibliotheek, 134.C.18, Horace Vere to Adam Newton 8th April 1610.

³³ *CSPD, James I, 1609*, p. 551, Oct 16, 1609. The Earl of Pembroke was made Keeper and Captain of the town of Portsmouth. Arundel was a Catholic which may not have helped his cause though he nominally abandoned that creed when appointed to the privy Council.

³⁴ Winwood, *Memorials of Affairs of State*, Vol. 3, p. 82.

take notice that he was not for his unworthiness put by the Government of the Brill.³⁵ This agreement sets out a financial arrangement whereby Vere paid Conway £400 yearly if he and his company remain at the Brill. This was reduced to £300 yearly if Conway left or was ordered away by the King and if Conway died then £200 yearly went to his sons.³⁶

The Cleves-Julich War

The ambitious Edward Cecil did secure an important command during the Cleves-Julich war. This was a dispute over the right of succession to the United Duchies of Jülich-Cleves-Berg following the death, in March 1609, of the childless Duke Johann Wilhelm. The dispute involved the Holy Roman Emperor and a number of other prominent European leaders because the Duchy was strategically important. Close to the Spanish road, the Spanish Netherlands and the Holy Roman Empire it offered one of the easiest crossing points of the Lower Rhine and it also had a buoyant economy. Religious issues were important too since rival claimants espoused Calvinist and Catholic sympathies. These issues made the crisis an important matter for the Dutch and for the English, and King James was asked to support the Protestant candidates. But the Emperor acted swiftly and installed his candidate Leopold, the Prince-Bishop of Liege, within the Duchy prompting France and the United Provinces to send forces there to help drive Leopold out.³⁷

James, not the most warlike of Kings, did on this occasion agree to send 4,000 English troops to assist, though these men were not new troops, but were detached from the English regiments in the States service (and pay).³⁸ This was a sensible approach since these men were experienced soldiers well used to warfare. The alternative would have been to impress men from England with the resulting high desertion rate and the almost certain lack of any military training or discipline. James did agree to meet the salary costs of these troops until they returned to their normal duties in the United Provinces.³⁹ James thus felt entitled to appoint the commander of these troops and his choice fell upon Edward Cecil, who assumed command on April 5th 1610.⁴⁰ There is no evidence that Horace Vere sought this appointment.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 84.

³⁶ NA, SP103/36/125 Articles concluded between Sr Horace Vere knight, governour of His Maj. Towne of the Briel; & Sr Edward Conway knight, lieutenant governour of the same.

³⁷ Dalton, *Life and Times*, p.156.

³⁸ Winwood's *Memorials*, iii. p 121. Winwood to Salisbury. 20th Feb 1609/10.

³⁹ Dalton, *Life and Times*, p.161, and see Winwood's *Memorials*, Vol 3, p.144. The Privy Council wrote to Winwood on March 3rd authorising Cecil's appointment.

⁴⁰ Dalton, *Life and Times*, p.160. There appears to be no record of Cecil applying for this post.

The conflict lasted between 10 June 1609 and 24 October 1610, resuming in May 1614 and finally ending on 13 October 1614. Cecil was ordered to the Hague to make the necessary arrangements and he left England in early April 1610. James addressed a letter to the States-General saying that Cecil had been chosen for the command because of *'le regard de sa qualitie et de la maison don't il est issu, comme pour son experience et de la prevue qu'il a donnee de sa devotion nau bien de vostre cause.'*⁴¹ Cecil had leave to commandeer 4,000 men from the English forces in the United Provinces which he did in consultation with Horace Vere, John Ogle, Ralph Winwood and others, stripping nine companies from Vere who presumably had little choice in the matter if he wanted to stay on good terms with the Cecil's and with the King.⁴² Of course, Cecil's force was a minor adjunct to the larger Dutch force (of 16,000) headed by Maurice and 9,000 French troops who joined up with their Dutch and English allies to besiege the fortified town of Julich (Gulich in German).

Horace Vere, writing to Andrew Newton in April 1610 [one of his military missives destined for Prince Henry] says 'The Frantes [French] are on their way and wee expect their coming to Gulyke [Julich] sum few days after our arrivall'.⁴³ Vere goes on to say that he expects the Princes of the Protestant Union, a military alliance of Protestant rulers in the Empire, to oppose the Emperor's forces 'that they... will keep them from annoying us' and he also reports that 'The Archduke says hee will not meddle, hee suffers our shipping that transport our munitions of war, and victuall to pass quietlie'.⁴⁴ Vere's declaration that the Archduke was not interfering with the passage of munitions etc. infers that the Spanish, or at least the Hapsburg Netherlands Spanish, had no great interest in supporting the Imperial Hapsburg interest in the developments in Cleve-Julich.

Under the overall command of Maurice, Cecil took a leading role in reducing the town, which surrendered on 1st August 1610 and passed into Dutch hands. The conflict is notable for the use that Maurice made of the engagement to experiment with alternative fighting formations, and although these formations were not a regular feature of Dutch arms on later battlefields the use of such organisational structures and, importantly, the drill and commands that they required, were effectively the death knell for medieval man-to-man combat and the beginning of 'undiscriminating slaughter at a distance'.⁴⁵ Whilst such developments, often considered part of the

⁴¹ Ibid., p.162. 'In respect of the quality of the House that he comes from, and for his experience and the attention he has given in his devotion to your cause.'

⁴² Winwood, *Memorials of Affairs of State, James Vol 3*, p.121.

⁴³ Ibid., f76. Trim's paper notes that Vere 'has adopted a typically Dutch spelling for 'French'.

⁴⁴ Koninklijke Bibliotheek 72D32 04B 01 04, Horace Vere to Adam Newton; 10th April 1610.

⁴⁵ 't Hart, *The Dutch Wars of Independence*, p. 64.

'Military Revolution', took on a gradually evolving track in most of Europe these changes were, for the Dutch, more revolutionary.⁴⁶

Despite the fact that 900 of his own men were part of Cecil's army, Horace Vere took no part in the conflict at Julich in 1610 as an active commander, but he was certainly there.⁴⁷ On 28th June Vere wrote [probably to Adam Newton] 'His Excellencie (Maurice) is going into the parts where our armie meets;. He speaks as if hee meant to be a looker on in this action of great consequence. Hee commands me to wayt upon him, by which I shalbe the better inabled to lett you know what passes.'⁴⁸ And a month later, Horace says 'His excellencie [Maurice] hath desired me to wayte upon him which I wold not refewse, yt is the first time that I was a voluntarie synce I was of the profession'.⁴⁹ This is an interesting and revealing statement because it sheds light upon Vere's perception of his role in Dutch service compared to his role at Julich. David Trim's discussion of the value of the terms *voluntary* and *mercenary*, in contemporary and in modern parlance, identifies the difficulty in ascribing a particular definition of either term without close reference to the prevailing conflict and to the motivation, rank and character of the soldier in question.⁵⁰ Applying Dr Trim's arguments to Horace Vere we can see that in this letter Horace Vere clearly identifies himself as a voluntary soldier for 'the fyrst tyme'. He is present at the conflict at the express request of his superior in Dutch service, but he did not see himself as operating in the same capacity as when he was fighting for Dutch political and religious freedoms in the Low Countries, which he had been doing for over twenty years.⁵¹

But when the conflict flared up again in 1614 things were somewhat different. The Dutch had sent troops to Julich earlier in the year, ostensibly to prevent bloodshed between local rivals to the Duchy.⁵² But this was interpreted by the Spanish as a violation, or impending violation, of the twelve year truce and so Spanish forces were once again mobilised after five years of inactivity. This time Spinola was involved and he brought his army into the conflict with the initial intention of taking back Julich for the

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 64.

⁴⁷ Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier*, p. 79.

⁴⁸ Koninklijke Bibliotheek, 72.D323-4(i), Horace Vere to Adam Newton 28th June 1610.

⁴⁹ Koninklijke Bibliotheek, 134.C.18, Horace Vere to Adam Newton, 22 July 1610. Vere's status as a 'voluntary' is confirmed in a letter sent by Sir William Browne to the Viscount Lisle on 22nd July 1610. *Report on the Manuscripts of Lord De Lisle & Dudley*, Vol.11 (London, 1934), p.211. Browne writes 'Sir Horace Vere is a voluntary, well cherished by the chief, and I think reserved for som busy time; his patience giveth all men heare free passage to good manners and civility'. Vere is also here affirming the profession of a soldier.

⁵⁰ David J. B. Trim, 'Fighting Jacobs Wars'. p. 72. Francis Markham also gives an outline of contemporary thinking about mercenaries and voluntaries. See above, pp. 12-14.

⁵¹ Vere writes on two occasions that he is present at the request of his superior. If he was already part of the army such requests would have been unnecessary and superfluous.

⁵² Peter Wilson, *The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy*, p.253. (see F.142).

Catholic Church. Julich was strongly fortified, but this was a much more serious threat to the Dutch position than the conflict in 1610 when only the fate of the Cleves-Julich succession was really at stake. Now Spinola was prosecuting a much more aggressive and dangerous campaign which might give considerable advantage to the Spanish when the twelve year truce ended. Commanded earlier in the year by the Holy Roman Emperor Matthias to retake Aachen for the Catholic faith, Spinola was now besieging this city when Maurice moved to intercept him taking with him Horace Vere who was once again commanding the English forces in Dutch service with Cecil reverting to his previous position as colonel of one of Vere's regiments. As well as the overall command Vere led 19 companies of his own.⁵³

Spinola was nonetheless able to prevent Maurice from relieving Aachen and the city, which lacked modern defences, fell quickly followed by a number of other smaller but strategically important places including, Nuys, Mulheim and Wesel.⁵⁴ The two armies did actually face each other between Rees and Xanten, close to Wesel, with Vere's English troops in the vanguard of Maurice's 13,000 men.⁵⁵ But no actual fighting took place and a truce brokered by the English and French ambassadors was agreed with both sides promising to return to barracks. Although Julich had been retained the loss of Aachen, and the other places captured by Spinola, significantly improved the Spanish position strategically and the campaign was seen as a limited Spanish victory since as a result Spain gained important territory, taking more than 60 towns and cities, including the vital Rhine crossings of Wesel, Orsoy and Rheinberg effectively providing the potential for Spanish and Habsburg armies to outflank the Dutch when the 12 year truce expired in April 1621.⁵⁶

Clements Markham makes no mention of Horace at the Cleves Julich war or indeed the war itself and Dalton, in his life of Edward Cecil, does not mention Horace as being in attendance there either. It is possible though to discern much about the character of Horace from the simple statement in his letter to Newton of July 1610, one of the few in his letters where he gives some indication, albeit obliquely, of his motivation and character. In Horace's eyes, and in the eyes of many of his contemporaries and most of his countrymen, the Dutch struggle most definitely was a religious war, a crusade even, and thus Horace did not see himself as a mercenary or

⁵³ Henry Peacham, *A most true relation of the Affaires of Cleve and Gulich as also of all what hath passed this last summer* (London, 1615). p. 6 - 10. And see Robert Boothe, *A Relation of all Matters passed, Especially in France and the Low Countries, touching the causes of the warre now in Cleveland*, (London, 1614), p. 43.

⁵⁴ Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier*, pp. 79-80.

⁵⁵ NA SP9/202/1 'A Compendium of the Art of War'. p. 21.

⁵⁶ Peter Wilson *The Thirty Years War*, p. 254. Wilson says that this Spanish Intervention 'significantly enhanced its strategic position'.

voluntary when he was fighting for the Dutch, as his words plainly declare. Adam Marks makes this point in his 2012 thesis, 'many contemporaries viewed the term mercenary as insulting, lending further significance to the distinction between professional soldiers who fought for principle and mercenaries who did not.'⁵⁷ It may even be the case that when the command of the English contingent at Julich in 1610 was originally touted, Horace was not minded to seek the post to which Edward Cecil was then appointed. At the time, Horace was the commander in chief of all the English forces in Dutch pay and had been so for four years. Cecil was one of his subordinate commanders. When the Anglo-Dutch army marched to the conflict in the Rhineland it was under Dutch overall command and it was thus likely that had Vere wanted to take command of the English troops, Maurice would have supported such an appointment, as he had done before. Tellingly too even though Cecil was appointed as the chief of the English forces on this occasion, when Maurice took overall command of the allied army he wanted Horace at his side, as he had been in so many conflicts previously.⁵⁸

And so in this single sentence, wherein Horace describes himself as a voluntary 'for the fyrst tyme', it can be argued that the depth of Horace Vere's religious motivation is demonstrated. Horace Vere allowed many of the men from his own company to march under Cecil's banner, but it would have been extraordinary for him to march too - as a subordinate to Cecil. Vere was later to write as much from the Palatinate in 1620 'but there should be the same respect given to him [Cecil] by my officer as by himself and others was given to me. I remayne still in the same minde, it would be to much to my disgrace if yt should be otherwise.'⁵⁹ Vere did not seek command because he did not feel the same level of commitment to the disputed succession of Julich that he saw in the Dutch fight for political and religious freedom. Cecil, on the other hand, was clearly simply eager to achieve command, as his biographer noted.

The Dutch struggle, though economically and politically as well as religiously motivated, carried with it the spiritual aspirations of Protestants across Europe and particularly in England. Had the Dutch failed to survive as an independent nation it is clear that the Spanish would have swept away their Protestant polity along with the political one leaving England in renewed religious and military peril. Horace Vere devoted much of his adult life to fighting (and no doubt praying) for the success of the Dutch revolution and through that the survival, growth and security of the Protestant cause in Europe. Nevertheless, by not commanding the English forces at Julich, Vere must have realised (and been concerned) that Cecil had the opportunity to

⁵⁷ Marks, 'England, The English', p. 41.

⁵⁸ Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier*, p. 79.

⁵⁹ NA SP84/101/138, Vere to Carleton, 6th June 1621.

demonstrate his prowess in the top job in an increasingly professional army. It cannot have escaped Vere's attention that Cecil might thereafter be a rival for command after the Julich business was ended.

The dispute over Julich did not serve to break the 12 year truce and Horace Vere was not actively engaged in any military action for six years. But he was busy both as Governor of the Brill and as general of the English forces in the Low Countries – often visiting the Hague, Leyden and Utrecht. In 1616 the Dutch paid King James £250,000 to return the cautionary towns to Dutch control.⁶⁰ Vere was compensated for his loss of the lucrative post of Governor of the Brill with a lifetime pension of £1,000 p.a – equivalent to around £125,000 p.a today.⁶¹ This handsome sum was to be further enhanced by £200 pa after the death of lady Burgh [a lady in waiting to Elizabeth, Electress of the Palatine, daughter of James I] together with a promise of the reversion of the mastership of the ordnance.⁶² This sinecure was held by George Carew, (1st Lord Carew, 1st Earl of Totnes) between 1608–1629 so Vere had to wait for 13 years before he could enjoy the honour, worth £150 p.a. at the time, equivalent to around £19,000 p.a today. Following the return of the cautionary towns to Dutch control in September 1616 Vere returned to England and met with Winwood whose wife was ill.⁶³ A year later, still in England, Vere wrote to Carleton to tell him that Winwood was himself now 'dangerously ill' of a burning ague'.⁶⁴ Winwood died that same day and just one day later Vere wrote to the Earl of Arundel soliciting his help in obtaining the now vacant Secretaryship for Carleton.⁶⁵ Carleton was closely aligned with Vere in religion so that this lobbying reinforces their spiritual connection and is a sure sign of affinity even though Carleton was not, on this occasion chosen. He had to wait until 1628 before his appointment to that office.

Vere also visited Spa where he took the waters, initially not without some adverse effects but ultimately to his great benefit, according to Carleton who was appointed as ambassador to the Hague in 1616 and who became a friend, a frequent correspondent, and an important contact for Vere, especially during Vere's time in the

⁶⁰ *CSPD, James, 1616*, p. 368.

⁶¹ *CSPD, James I, 1616*, p.425. See NA Currency Converter, latest available data, accessed on January 5th 2019.

⁶² *CSPD, James I, 1616*, p.364. Chamberlain to Carleton, April 30, 1616. She was the wife of Thomas Burgh, 3rd Baron Burgh, who had been joint Governor of the Brill with Thomas Cecil.

⁶³ *CSPD, James I, 1616*, p. 394, 19th Sept 1616. Vere to Carleton.

⁶⁴ *CSPD, James I, 1617*, p. 491, Vere to Carleton, 27 October 1617.

⁶⁵ *CSPD, James I, 1617*, p. 490, Vere to Arundel 28 October 1617. Arundel was a Privy Councillor.

Palatinate.⁶⁶ It is at the end of 1616 when Vere writes his first extant letter to Carleton, on a number of topics. Vere congratulates Carleton on the success of his business (probably the return of the cautionary towns to Dutch control) and commiserates with Carleton about the Dutch tardiness in paying the troops 'the capt[ains] have much to do to keep their companies fair not withstanding that they are duly paid'.⁶⁷ Written from Isleworth in Middlesex the letter demonstrates that Vere was at home in England. It was at this time that Nicholas Byfield was given the preferment at Isleworth and, a little later that one of Byfield's children was taken in by the Veres.

Despite the external peace, Dutch internal religious strife had continued to cause disruption and violence in Utrecht and elsewhere. It centred around the doctrinal disputes between the Arminian Remonstrants and the by now orthodox Calvinist position of the States-General. Oldenbarnevelt had taken a conciliatory position in this dispute but his support for religious toleration was opposed by Maurice whose hard line Calvinism followed the direction of the States-General. Oldenbarnevelt had supported the recruitment of a number of militia units, ostensibly to quell the riots that were occurring in several towns as a result of the religious disputes. But Maurice felt that this was a direct threat, both to the States-General and to his military command, and he marched towards Utrecht with every intent of crushing the uprising by force should that become necessary.⁶⁸ In the end Maurice's arrival (and probably his reputation as a first rate general) was enough to persuade most of the rebels to concede.⁶⁹ The Remonstrants were thus unable to oppose Maurice's forces when he appeared with his army (and several deputies from the States-General) outside Utrecht and the town was easily occupied by Maurice's forces. Oldenbarnevelt and some of his supporters were arrested at the end of August that year.⁷⁰ They were then tried in February 1619, before being sentenced to death in May, and executed on May 13th 1619.⁷¹

⁶⁶ Lodwick Rowzee, Dr of Physicke, *The Queenes Welles, A Treatise of the nature and vertues of Tunbridge Water*, (London, 1632), p.18 where the good doctor describes his time at the first siege of Gulich with Horace Vere.

⁶⁷ *CSPD, James 1, 1616*, p. 394, 19th Sept 1616. Vere to Carleton.

⁶⁸ Maurice became Prince Maurice of Orange in 1617 when his elder brother Phillip, who had been in Spanish captivity, died.

⁶⁹ *Letters from and to Sir Dudley Carleton, Knt., During his embassy in Holland, from January 1615/16 to December 1620*, 3rd Edition, (London, 1780). Carleton wrote to Secretary (Robert) Naunton 'By a messenger dispatched expressly unto me by Sir Horace Vere from Utrecht... the wise and resolute course the prince of Orange hath taken with the new levies of that town, whom he hath disarmed without blood'. This would seem to prove that Vere was in Utrecht at the time although Clements Markham, *The Fighting Veres* p. 272 argues that he was not.

⁷⁰ *Letters from and to Sir Dudley Carleton, Knt., During his embassy in Holland, from January 1615/16 to December 1620*, 3rd Edition, (London, 1780). Sir Edward Vere wrote to Naunton in August 1618 describing the arrest of Barneveld, pp. 283/4.

⁷¹ *Biographia Britannica*, Compiled by Henry Brougham, Dr. John Campbell, William Harris, Philip Morant, William Oldys and Mr. Hinton, (London, 1780), Vol 6, pp. 4008.

Horace Vere marched with Maurice to Utrecht and his involvement in this essentially internal Dutch power struggle was as part of the army that Maurice used to cow the Arminian faction and destroy Oldenbarnevelt's power.⁷² Maurice then progressed throughout Holland, overawing the Arminian faction, with Horace Vere and the English soldiers operating as usual under Maurice's overall command. Clements Markham clearly found the entire affair distasteful and claims that 'Sir Horace Vere, as a military commander, simply obeyed orders' whilst Sir John Ogle who was Governor of Utrecht at the time, demurred and was relieved of his post which was then, in July 1618, given to Horace Vere.⁷³ Ogle was at this time still a member of the English force under Vere's command. As such he remained Vere's subordinate so the entire episode must have been awkward to say the least especially as, once again, it was Horace who came out on top. Ogle thereafter returned to England and did not return to serve in the Low Countries again.⁷⁴

Clements Markham's unease at Vere's role in the crushing of Oldenbarnevelt and the Arminian uprising stems from his unbridled admiration for the Veres per se, which is evident throughout his book. It is true that the Veres had worked closely with Oldenbarnevelt in the past, but in truth we have no direct knowledge of Horace Vere's actual feelings about the entire affair. We do know that Vere was a pious and practicing Puritan. In light of this it is not fanciful to argue that he may have seen in the growing support for Arminian theology a challenge to his own essential spiritual beliefs and was thus ready to assist Maurice and the States-General, respectively his commander and his employer, in reducing this threat to the Dutch/Calvinist state that he had helped to protect and nurture for 25 years. We know too that Horace Vere's character eschewed the sort of proud disdain that had characterised all of his predecessors as commander of the English forces, and that he understood well the precariousness of his position should he find himself out of favour with the Dutch and which in this case would have meant, at the least, declining to march with Maurice. In addition he knew too that his friend Dudley Carleton had been instructed by King James to oppose Barneveld so that in this instance losing favour with the States-General meant losing favour with his English masters too, which fate certainly befell Ogle.⁷⁵ King James was concerned that these Dutch disputes might spread to England and with them the heresy of

⁷² *Biographia Britannica*, Vol 6, p. 4008.

⁷³ Markham, *The Fighting Veres*, p. 392.

⁷⁴ David Trim 'Ogle, Sir John (1569-1640)', ODNB, (2004).

⁷⁵ King James was clearly angry at Ogle's stance in favouring the Arminian position. Buckingham wrote to Carleton in October 1617 'his majesty is sorry he (Ogle) should... favour the Arminians and hath written to assure you that whatsoever hopes he may frame to himself there, he hath no hopes at all here, neither in his majesty nor any other.' Dalton, *Life and times of Cecil*, p.249f.

Arminianism.⁷⁶ Writing to Dudley Carleton Sir Thomas Lake, James' secretary of State, said, 'we are afreyd [the] sickness ...may slip over to England'.⁷⁷ And there is little doubt that the Oldenbarnevelt affair loomed large in English society too, not just in court circles.⁷⁸ Evidence of this is the *Tragedy of Sir John Olden Barnevelt*, a play staged at the Globe theatre in 1619 which can only have been written and performed so quickly because of contemporary societal interest in the Dutch disputes.⁷⁹ Fortunately, the loss of life associated with the fall of Barnevelt was comparatively slight and whether Vere's stance on this issue was pious, pragmatic or personal he clearly did not suffer for it.

Vere's views on all things military were also in demand at home as a senior member of the military establishment and he was in London again in February 1619, reporting on the exercising of the Militia in the Artillery garden.⁸⁰ Later in the same year and reflecting his status he was at Chatham, with the Lord Admiral (Buckingham), inspecting the fleet there.⁸¹

The Palatinate Expedition

Although the 12 years truce between Spain and the Netherlands had thus far held, despite the Cleves-Julich affair, another more serious and far reaching dispute was about to unfold in the Palatinate which was 'to be the issue that dominated English foreign policy for the next twenty years'.⁸² The Palatinate was an ancient, scattered territory centred around the Rhine, its major towns included Heidelberg, Mannheim and Frankenthal. [see map page 133]. Its fragmented nature was due to the practice of dividing land between heirs but the hereditary position of Elector [of the Holy Roman Empire] Palatine had been in existence since the early 14th century. This was one of the seven electoral positions tasked with selecting a new Emperor whenever the incumbent died.⁸³ Calvinist since the 1530s and originally granted religious freedom by the Emperor Rudolph in 1609 the electorate passed in 1610, to the 14 yr old Frederick

⁷⁶ Eric Platt, 'The Courses and Consequences of British Involvement in the Dutch Political and Religious Disputes of the early Seventeenth century', Unpublished PhD, (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2010). p.341.

⁷⁷ NA, SP/84/77/210, Lake to Carleton, 13/23 June 1617.

⁷⁸ Platt, 'The Courses and Consequences of British Involvement,' p.324.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 329.

⁸⁰ CSPD, *James 1*, 1619, p.16, Petition from the Citizens of London, Feb 1619.

⁸¹ CSPD, *James 1*, 1619, p.68, Chamberlain to Carleton, 31 July 1619 in Birch, *The Court and Times of James I*, Vol 2, p.183. Buckingham had bought the position for £3,000 plus £1,000 PA.

⁸² Cust, *Charles I A Political Life*. p. 5.

⁸³ There were three ecclesiastical electors and four lay electors. From the early 14th Century up until the Thirty Years War these were: The Archbishop of Mainz; The Archbishop of Trier; The Archbishop of Cologne; The King of Bohemia; The Count Palatine of the Rhine; The Duke of Saxony; The Margrave of Brandenburg.

V following the death of his father. Raised as a devout Calvinist, his mother was Louise Juliana of Orange-Nassau, the daughter of William the Silent, thus Maurice of Nassau was Frederick's uncle.⁸⁴

In 1611 the neighbouring state of Bohemia came under the control of Matthias', brother Rudolph. At his coronation in Prague in May 1611 Matthias swore to uphold the rights of the Protestant church granted by his brother. But a year later Emperor Rudolph died and Matthias was elected in his place. Almost immediately the new Emperor reneged on his sworn religious toleration and began to bear down upon Protestant communities within the empire. As Matthias, now 55 years old, was childless he in turn came under pressure from the Catholic church to name an heir to the Bohemian throne. Dynastic and religious jealousies played a part and Matthias named Archduke Ferdinand of Styria. Ferdinand was strongly averse to the Protestant faith and had persecuted Protestants in his own lands.⁸⁵ It is perchance therefore surprising that the States of Bohemia accepted him in 1617 as their King in place of Matthias.⁸⁶ But inevitably Ferdinand's enthronement led to religious persecution in Bohemia. This in turn led to the States of Bohemia complaining to Matthias about Ferdinand's actions, but Matthias backed Ferdinand and accused the Bohemian deputies of rebellion. So in May 1618, triggered by the notorious defenestration of Prague when the Emperor's councillors were thrown out of a window, the Protestant estates of Bohemia rebelled against their Catholic King Ferdinand and deposed him, triggering the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War.⁸⁷ The Palatine elector Frederick was then 22 years old and the leading Protestant in the Empire, and he was now asked by the Estates of Bohemia to assume the crown of Bohemia. Frederick was hesitant and sought the advice of his friends and advisors but their counsel was conflicting.⁸⁸ Frederick's mother, Prince Maurice's sister, was opposed and warned Frederick of the dire consequences of accepting the Crown, but this angered her brother Maurice who was in favour.⁸⁹ King James was reluctant to advise either way though his subjects seem to have been wholeheartedly in favour of Frederick taking the crown.⁹⁰

⁸⁴ Cust, *Charles I A Political Life*, pp. 4-5.

⁸⁵ Peter Wilson, *The Thirty Years War*, pp. 71-73, and Dalton, *Life and Times of General Sir Edward Cecil*, p. 293.

⁸⁶ Dalton, *Life and Times*, p. 294.

⁸⁷ Anon, 'A Coranto Relating Divers Particulars Concerning The Newes Out of Italy, Spaine, Turkey, Persia, Bohemia, Sweden, Poland, Austria, the Palatinates, the Grisons, and divers places of the Higher and Lower Germanie, (London, 1622), p. 5. This Coranto describes the execution of many Bohemian Lords and other citizens directly and indirectly involved in 'putting out of the Emperour, from being King of Bohemia'.

⁸⁸ Brennan C. Pursell, *The Winter King, Frederick V of the Palatinate and the Coming of the Thirty Years' War*, (Aldershot, 2003) p. 51.

⁸⁹ Dalton, *Life and Times*, p. 307.

⁹⁰ Cogswell, *James I*, p. 65.

But on August 26 the estates of Bohemia elected Frederick as King of Bohemia anyway. He accepted the offer and was crowned on 4 November 1619 as Frederick I. Vere wrote to Carleton in October asking for news of the coronation.⁹¹ For Vere the election of a Protestant champion to the Bohemian throne was significant since this would give four of the seven electoral positions to the Protestant cause and the Hapsburgs 'might lose control of the Imperial crown, for a Protestant elector in Prague would... create a Protestant majority in the electoral college'.⁹² The estates of Bohemia chose Frederick in preference to other possible candidates because he was the leader of the Protestant Union, the Protestant military alliance founded by his father ostensibly to defend Protestant rights, and because they hoped for the support of Frederick's father-in-law, James I of England.⁹³ Both of which hopes proved to be fanciful illusion.

The position with King James was complex, but in the end just as disappointing for Frederick. James' daughter Elizabeth had married Frederick in London in 1613 when they were 16 years old. Elizabeth herself had advised Frederick that her father would support his ascent to the Bohemian throne, though she had no direct evidence to support that view.⁹⁴ She was the second heir to the English monarchy with only her young, unmarried and delicate brother Charles between her and the crown, thus the possibility of her becoming Queen was hardly fanciful, and had she succeeded to the English throne, things may have gone more favourably for Frederick.⁹⁵ But James was horrified at the idea of Frederick's consecration as King of Bohemia.⁹⁶ He even claimed that he had no knowledge of the event.⁹⁷

James had been against the idea from the start, in part because he was hoping to arrange a dynastic marriage for Charles with the Spanish which would bring with it a large dowry, despite the fact that such a match was 'deeply unpopular in England'.⁹⁸ But he also saw that the cost of supporting Frederick would be ruinous financially and

⁹¹ *CSPD, James 1, 1619*, p. 82; Vere to Carleton. October 2nd.

⁹² Thomas Cogswell 'England and the Spanish Match' in Richard Cust and Ann Hughes (eds.), *Conflict in Early Stuart England*, (Harlow, 1989), p. 113.

⁹³ Amongst their descendants were the Hanoverian Kings of England.

⁹⁴ Peter Wilson, *The Thirty Years War*, p. 284. Cicely Veronica Wedgwood, in her magisterial book *The Thirty Years War*, p. 91, declares that Elizabeth's attitude was clearly in favour of her husband accepting the Bohemian crown and that she was openly contemptuous of Ferdinand.

⁹⁵ Nadine Akkerman (ed), *The Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart, Queen of Bohemia, Vol 1, 1603–1631*, p. 16.

⁹⁶ Wedgwood, *The Thirty Years War*, p. 90.

⁹⁷ Pursell, *The Winter King*, p. 74. It is certainly true that James was asked his opinion, both by Frederick and by Elizabeth. Elizabeth (in her letter to Buckingham) asked the Duke to tell her father that Frederick would not make a decision until he had James' advice.

⁹⁸ Cust, *Charles I, A Political Life*, p. 32.

militarily.⁹⁹ James was also averse to the idea of Kings being appointed and deposed at the whim of the people.¹⁰⁰ He believed that the appointment of a monarch was a divine act, not human, and as it was thus ordained by God, no human agency had any authority or relevance and could certainly not depose or elect a King.¹⁰¹ Clements Markham is utterly contemptuous of James' inaction 'he cared as little for the great cause as he did for his unfortunate daughter'.¹⁰² But James had advised against Frederick taking the crown at the start.¹⁰³ He was realistic enough to see that maintaining Frederick on the Bohemian throne would be all but impossible, given the financial and military muscle that was soon to oppose him. James was also aware of the activation of that muscle, having been advised by Carleton in June 1620 of Spinola and Velasco's mobilisation.¹⁰⁴ And so it proved, Frederick's brief reign as de facto King of Bohemia ended with his defeat at the Battle of White Mountain on 8 November 1620 – a year and four days after his coronation. The princes of the Protestant Union refused to help Frederick keep Bohemia, in fact they quickly shied away from any confrontation at all with the Empire and the Habsburgs.¹⁰⁵ Meanwhile the Emperor immediately ordered that all of Frederick's hereditary lands should now be confiscated and to that end a Spanish army, under Spinola, should march from Brussels to conquer the Palatinate itself.¹⁰⁶

After the defeat at the White Mountain the Imperial forces invaded Frederick's Palatine lands and he had to flee his ancestral home, hastening first to Silesia, where he asked for the backing of the Silesian Diet, in accordance with their promise as part of the Protestant Union, and then when this was only offered in the most lukewarm of terms Frederick left, 'the remnants of his influence departing with him'.¹⁰⁷ Silesia then submitted to the Emperor and as Brennan C Pursell says in *The Winter King* 'From that

⁹⁹ Cogswell, *James I, The Phoenix King*, p. 66. See Akkerman (ed), *The Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart*, p. 38.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 65. Wilson, *The History of Great Britain*, writes that James 'would by no means countenance such a Precedent as should give them [the people] power to dispose of the royal dignity, at their pleasure, and upon every change of humor, for so he might shake his own foundation'.

¹⁰¹ John Guy, *Tudor England*, (Oxford, 1988), p.369–370. This authority, dating back to Constantine's conversion and oversight of the fledgling Christian Church, had been formalised under the Tudors.

¹⁰² Clements Markham, *The Fighting Veres*, p.397.

¹⁰³ Houston, *James I*, p.73.

¹⁰⁴ Dudley Carleton to the King, June 14th, *Letters from and to Sir Dudley Carleton, Knt., During his embassy in Holland, from January 1615/16 to December 1620*, 3rd edition, (London, 1780), p. 473. Luis de Velasco y Velasco, 2nd Count of Salazar, 1st Marquis of Belvedere, was a Spanish military commander during the French Wars of Religion and the Eighty Years' War.

¹⁰⁵ The Union declared its neutrality in the conflict between Frederick and the Catholic League in the 1620 Treaty of Ulm and was dissolved the next year.

¹⁰⁶ Clements Markham, *The Fighting Veres*, p. 396.

¹⁰⁷ Pursell, *The Winter King*, p.125.

point on the last adherents of the Bohemian rebellion would be its King and Queen, the members of their court, and the detachments of armed forces still loyal to them'¹⁰⁸ Frederick and Elizabeth finally found refuge in the Hague with his uncle Prince Maurice and Frederick lived the rest of his life in exile with his wife and family, mostly at The Hague. He died in Mainz in 1632.

There had been concern in Madrid about the imperial invasion of the Palatinate since it was thought this might finally provoke James into military action from his almost continual pastime of hunting.¹⁰⁹ But the Spanish also saw that the Lower Palatinate sat astride the Spanish Road, and possession of this region would greatly improve the logistics of supply for the Spanish when the twelve year truce was ended.¹¹⁰ James had realised all along that to recover the Palatinate, let alone Bohemia, would be all but impossible militarily and so he attempted to find a diplomatic solution, insisting that Frederick sign a truce whilst these negotiations were proceeding.¹¹¹ Peter Wilson calls James 'complacent, pompous and escapist,' but in this case he was more the pragmatist since the simplistic religious terms in which 'most Britons saw continental affairs' were divorced from reality.¹¹² When James finally agreed to countenance military assistance for his beleaguered son-in-law it was merely by allowing Frederick's Ambassador Count Dohna to raise public money for the defence of the Palatinate.¹¹³ Originally aiming for 4,000 men, in the end only enough money to send 2,250 had been collected by early 1621, James refusing to allow the city of London to contribute. James had hedged his bets by allowing the Spanish to raise troops in England to fight for the Catholic cause and he had agreed to sell English ordnance to the King of Spain - having been told that the cannon were to be used against the Mediterranean corsairs.¹¹⁴ These policies had unfortunate outcomes, such as that reported by Edward Cecil to the Earl of Middlesex in 1622 'When I was at Bergen it grieved me to see English colours carried against English colours and that his majesty should lose his subjects' blood in both ways'.¹¹⁵

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p.125.

¹⁰⁹ Cogswell, *James I, The Phoenix King*, p.62.

¹¹⁰ Houston, *James 1*, p. 74.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 38,

¹¹² Peter Wilson, *The Thirty Years War*, p.286.

¹¹³ Wilson, *The History of Great Britain*, p.135. Wilson says that 'one regiment of foot was extorted from him by importunities'. Essex had raised 250 men for the expedition.

¹¹⁴ Simon Adams, 'Spain or the Netherlands? The Dilemmas of Early Stuart Foreign Policy' in Howard Tomlinson, (ed), *Before the English Civil War*, (London,1983), p 85. See also *CSPD James 1, 1624*, p. 267, Warrant to Lord Vaux to take troops to serve the King of Spain June 5th 1624.

¹¹⁵ Dalton, *Life and Times*, Vol 2, p. 7. Dalton suggests that many of these troops were unaware that they were expected to fight against the Dutch and their own countrymen and when they arrived in the Low Countries many of them refused to fight and subsequently deserted.

There was certainly strong vocal support in England for the Protestant cause and some recruits were easy to obtain for what many saw as a religious crusade, with a large number of gentlemen volunteering. However there was not the same enthusiasm amongst the lower classes with the effect, as Adam Marks notes, that 'there were too many officers resulting in men holding voluntary posts but not enough soldiers'.¹¹⁶ In July 1620 John Chamberlain wrote 'and whereas they thought they should have been oppressed with followers they are fain to send far and near into the country to make up their numbers.'¹¹⁷ And of course there was inevitably a dispute over who should command the troops going to the Palatinate.¹¹⁸ Once again Edward Cecil pressed for the post gaining the support of Buckingham and James, and for a time Cecil thought he had been appointed. Meanwhile, as Dalton wrote, Vere's 'retiring disposition, and modest opinion of himself, made him refrain from petitioning for a command for which he was so eminently qualified.'¹¹⁹ But since Count Dohna had raised the money the final choice remained with him and with Frederick and Elizabeth.

They had initially wanted the Earl of Southampton, but James saw the Earl as being too close to the crown - he was a privy councillor- and he forbade it.¹²⁰ So, as Thomas Roe declared in a letter to Elizabeth of Bohemia, despite lobbying from 'none worthy of any hope but hath declared and stood up for himself', Dohna chose Horace Vere, with the full support of Frederick and Elizabeth.¹²¹ This appointment reflected well on Horace Vere's reputation as a military man but also on his character as a modest and unassuming individual, a combination almost unique in the age in which he lived. Vere accepted the appointment, it was for him the chance to have an independent command, to fight against the Catholic religion he scorned and to restore a Protestant leader to the throne of Bohemia. But Cecil was 'deeply mortified' and felt he had suffered a great disgrace, which was made the worse because Cecil had

Nonetheless amongst these men there must have been some, many even, whose faith was fervent enough (as was Vere's) to persuade them to overcome any such patriotic feelings.

¹¹⁶ Marks, 'England, The English', p. 45.

¹¹⁷ John Chamberlain to Dudley Carleton, July 8th 1620 in Birch, *The Court and Times of James I*, London, 1828, p. 204. Accessed on-line January 2019.

¹¹⁸ Vere does not appear to have lobbied for the post. And see Dalton, *Life and times of General Sir Edward Cecil*, p. 322.

¹¹⁹ Dalton, *Life and Times of General Sir Edward Cecil*, p. 322. NA,SP 84/95/247, Vere to Carleton, June 14 1620. See the letter of Sir Thomas Roe to Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia in Akkerman (ed), *The Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart, Vol 1*, p. 246.

¹²⁰ Adams, 'The Protestant Cause' p. 301-302. See SP81/17/223v Nethersole to Buckingham and SP84/100/203.

¹²¹ Akkerman (ed), *The Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart, Vol 1*, p.246.

communicated to his friends that he had the appointment and no doubt felt thus able to promise them favourable appointments in turn.¹²²

In a replaying of history the heir to the throne, Charles, supported Vere's cause just as Prince Henry had done regarding the Governorship of the Brill. Writing to Buckingham in 1621 Charles explained that Cecil had written to him urging the King's entry into the war for the defence of the Palatinate. Charles then continued 'Now, in earnest, I wish the gentleman [Edward Cecil] well, but yet I would not have Sir Horace Vere (who hath endured such misery, and so good service there) either to be discouraged or disgraced; therefore I think the King shall well employ Cecil, but I would not have him come over the other's head'.¹²³ Charles had emerged somewhat from his more normal inscrutability to champion military intervention in the Palatinate.¹²⁴ He was effectively supporting Vere to be the commander of the Palatine relief force, again in preference to Cecil, just as Prince Henry had done over the governorship of the Brill.

Cecil blamed Dohna for denying him the command, and he and the ambassador exchanged acrimonious words in person before Horace and Cecil departed for the Low Countries. Despite the sympathy that James and Buckingham had for Cecil's situation, Cecil was ordered to apologise. Since this command did not reach Cecil before he left for Holland it was left to Dudley Carleton to enforce the King's will. Cecil clearly had little choice and through Carleton replied that he '...doth humbly ask pardon of his majesty, and of the ambassador'.¹²⁵ Naunton later wrote to Carleton that the King was satisfied with Cecil's expression of regret.¹²⁶ Cecil also apologised via Secretary of State George Calvert.¹²⁷

At this time too Carleton tried to reconcile Cecil and Vere. Their differences had stretched back to the time immediately after Francis Vere's departure and had certainly come to the attention of Prince Maurice who now asked Carleton to try to bring the two men to a better understanding.¹²⁸ Carleton had originally asked Buckingham to intercede, but Vere and Cecil had left for Holland before the Duke could take any such steps, and so it was left to Carleton to try to patch up the differences between two warriors who were probably the most famous English soldiers of their day. The fact that

¹²² CSPD, *James 1, 1620*, p.159. Woodward to Windebank. And Dalton, *Life and times*, pp. 322-323.

¹²³ Lawrence *The Complete Soldier*, p.131. Adam Marks suggests that Charles was actively supporting Cecil for the command in the Palatinate but the letter Charles wrote to Buckingham makes it clear that Charles wanted Vere to remain in command.

¹²⁴ Richard Cust, *Charles I, A Political Life*, p.10.

¹²⁵ NA SP 84/96/35, Carleton to Naunton, July 17th 1620. Sir Robert Naunton was Secretary of State at the time. See Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier*, p.131.

¹²⁶ NA SP84/96/97, Naunton to Carleton, 10th August 1620.

¹²⁷ NA SP84/96/32, Cecil to Calvert, 17 July 1620.

¹²⁸ NA SP84/95/21, Carleton to Buckingham, 10th June 1620.

so many prominent persons saw this reconciliation as an important and desirable prospect demonstrates not only the veracity of the ill feeling between the men (at least on Cecil's side) but also the importance that senior figures placed upon a reconciliation, especially their overall commander Prince Maurice, on the eve of a dangerous and difficult expedition. Carleton appears to have fulfilled his commission. Writing to Chamberlain in early August 1620 Carleton says 'I have the contentment of having done a goode worke the day before his Excellency's departure, in making friendship after long and many differences betwixt Sir Horace Vere and Sir Edward Cecil... which was a troublesome piece of worke, and of many days continuance, but ended happily, and they.. dined with me, and drank one to the other kindly'.¹²⁹ In the longer term though there is evidence that this reconciliation was at best temporary. Writing to Carleton from the Palatinate less than a year later it is clear that Vere still had doubts and suspicions about his rival

*'I doubt not but Sir Edward Cecil will cum into these partes if there be warres, he pretended the last yeare to have the command of the troupes but he would have yt in other terms than I had yt and would not be contented otherwise. I thought I had yielded to enough but there should be the same respect given to him by my officer as by himself and others was given to me. I remayne still in the same minde, it would be to much to my disgrace if yt should be otherwise.'*¹³⁰

Cecil did not march to the Palatinate with Vere's tiny army and he did not go later either. Instead he was given command of the English troops in the States pay - replacing Vere - which may have ameliorated Cecil's disappointment. Vere wrote to Calvert to say that 'I have written to Sir Edward Vere [Horace's nephew who was commanding Vere's companies in his absence] that he shall conform himself to what his Excellency shall require concerning General Cecil's command of the troops'.¹³¹

Cecil was the next senior officer after Vere so this 'promotion' was to be expected, but even in these circumstances there was room for lingering irritation on Vere's part. He wrote to Carleton 'I am (as I told yr Lordship), willing that hee should have as much [authority] as was exersysed by me, and to have more is more than hee in reason can expect; but for anything I can perceive his Excellencie is desirous that sutch a kinde of autoritie should be practised by him, as was never yielded to me'.¹³² In 1622 Cecil was again demanding more authority than his employers, the Dutch, were willing to give. He wanted the Governorship of Bergen as well as overall command of

¹²⁹ NA SP84/96/88, Carleton to Chamberlain, 8th August, 1620.

¹³⁰ NA SP84/101/138, Vere to Carleton, 6th June 1621.

¹³¹ NA SP84/101/85, Vere to Calvert, 23 May 1621.

¹³² NA SP84/96/113a, Vere to Carleton 8th August 1620 .

all the English and Scottish troops and the right to fill appointments as they arose.¹³³ The Dutch demurred and in the end Bergen went to Colonel Charles Morgan, another experienced veteran of the Dutch wars, but his authority remained as limited as Vere's.

So having accepted the appointment to command the expedition to the Palatinate and taken leave of King James on July 9th 1620, Horace Vere set sail from Gravesend on the 22nd accompanied by a small array of professional, experienced veterans and a great number of young gentlemen and nobles.¹³⁴ The task ahead of them was immense. Dudley Carleton wrote to King James on June 14th 1620 advising him of the 'great levies' made by the Emperor, the King of Spain, the Pope and the Catholic league of Germany and that they were now ready 'to enter action'. Spinola marched towards Germany on the 8th August with 20,000 foot and 4,000 horse while Don Luis De Velasco [with 18,000 men] 'is to wait upon the States Army, in case it should draw to a head upon Spinola's marching'.¹³⁵ At the same time the Princes of the Protestant Union, in compliance with their promise to defend the Palatinate had gathered a force under the Marquis of Ansbach at Oppenheim on the left bank of the Rhine.¹³⁶ The Union had a force of around 22,000 men but they were reluctant to fight, and when Spinola advanced they retreated towards Worms.

To make matters worse Vere's tiny English army was poorly equipped. Carleton wrote to Naunton again on August 3rd;

'The new English troops commanded by my lord general Vere begin to rise this day out of there several garrisons, where they have lain thus long for want of good arms [weapons], those which were provided them by such as were put in trust being unserviceable; and now I have procured them to be well and sufficiently furnished out of the estates [of the United Provinces], magazines, with all other helps fit their journey; which as yet we cannot here conceive with what safety or expedition they can make

¹³³ Dalton, *Life and Times*, p. 24.

¹³⁴ Clements Markham quotes Arthur Wilson as saying 'This regiment was the gallantest for the persons and outward presence of men that in many ages hath appeared either at home and abroad', *The Fighting Veres*, p. 398. See Arthur Wilson, *The History of Great Britain*. Wilson writes in his introduction that the words are all his and that he expects dissention from others but that his 'work is apparently known or easily discovered... I have made truth my aim,' Introduction, A3. Markham takes much of his narrative tale of the Palatine expedition from Wilson.

¹³⁵ *Letters from and to Sir Dudley Carleton, Knt., During his embassy in Holland, from January 1615/16 to December 1620*. 3re edition, (London, 1780), Dudley Carleton to the King, June 14th 1620, p. 473.

¹³⁶ In February 1608, at the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire six Protestant princes formed the Protestant Union as a defensive alliance. This provoked the counter alliance of the Catholic League (1609) under Duke Maximilian I of Bavaria. Peter Wilson, *The Thirty Years War*, p.327. The Protestant Union finally collapsed in May 1621.

into the Palatinate, the Marquis Spinola being before them with one army, and Don Lewis De Velasco in the way with another'.¹³⁷

Carleton was concerned about Vere's small force even before they set out, and his comments about the quality of the weapons is an indictment of the arms procurement and storage system in England, which was the responsibility of the Ordnance office. In the same letter Carleton also refers to the lack of pay for the English troops who are 'in three months arrearage', a forewarning of the pay problems to come.¹³⁸

The starting of war in the Palatinate and wars' return to Europe more generally was encouraged poetically too. A popular ballad of the day entitled 'Gallants to Bohemia' encouraged young 'gallants' to join the regiment being raised to fight there and in the Palatinate. The ballad makes specific reference to 'the Veeres'

In fair Bohemia now is sprung
A service which look'd for long
Where souldiers may their value trie
When cowards from the field will flie
It never shall of us be said
That English captaines stood afraid
Or such adventure would refraine
Then let us to the warres again
The Norrises and noble Veeres
And Sidnies famous yeares;
The Willoughby and worthy Gray,
That served still for royall pay:
Made England famous every-where,
To such as did their fortunes heare;
Then let us not at home remaine,
But Bravely to those warres againe.¹³⁹

This sort of 'heroic and glamorous language' is typical of the 'two to three hundred military titles [of ballads] published between 1639 and 1695.'¹⁴⁰ Angela

¹³⁷ *Letters from and to Sir Dudley Carleton, Knt., During his embassy in Holland, from January 1615/16 to December 1620.* 3rd edition, (London, 1780) Forgotten Books, Carleton to Naunton 3rd Aug 1620, p. 485.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 485.

¹³⁹ J. V. Polišens, 'Gallants to Bohemia', in *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 25, No. 65, (Apr, 1947), pp. 391- 404.

McShane looks at the range of such works and revisits the 'heroic and glamorous language' of seventeenth century recruitment and retention that produced hundreds of such ballads and other musical and poetic works.¹⁴¹ Although, as McShane notes, few of these from before 1639 are now extant, in the main they seem to urge young men to 'replace family ... ties with an untrammelled loyalty to the crown, nation or cause'.¹⁴² But McShane points out that 'our knowledge of rank and file recruitment is ... restricted by the nature and limitations of the surviving sources.. and finding the voices of common soldiers is problematic'.¹⁴³ Certainly there was perceived to be a great distinction between the upper and lower classes in their motivation to fight, as the names in the ballad would suggest. No one was celebrating the often pressed rank and file.

Such prose supplemented the growth too of the beginning of a rudimentary and limited ongoing war reporting in England. Fuelled by a growing rate of literacy, especially in the capital, 'from 1620 onwards London was in regular receipt of rich and varied reports covering diplomatic, military and mercantile news from across Europe' and beyond.¹⁴⁴ Thus Horace Vere's progress and campaigns in the Palatinate were, probably for the first time, consistently reported to the general public in a way that had never been the case before. These Newsletters (Corantos) were initially often just a single or double sheet, circulated by London booksellers or publishers.¹⁴⁵ They usually consisted of letters purportedly or actually received from correspondents in various cities and towns across Europe and beyond, and initially such reports were often simple translations of Dutch originals.¹⁴⁶ The noted contemporary correspondent, John Chamberlain was himself a prolific writer of newsletters.¹⁴⁷

These publications made little or no attempt to analyse the information received and their reliability was suspect, but they did allow some access to regular foreign news by ordinary people for the first time. So when Horace Vere set out to protect the Palatinate he did so as the first English general to fight in Europe whose actions were

¹⁴⁰ Angela McShane 'Recruiting Citizens for Soldiers in Seventeenth English Century Ballads', *Journal of early Modern History* 15, (Brill, 2011) 105 -137. See Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier*, p.73.

¹⁴¹ McShane 'Recruiting Citizens for Soldiers', p.105.

¹⁴² Ibid., p.108.

¹⁴³ Ibid., p.112.

¹⁴⁴ Jayne E. E. Boyes, *London's Newspapers and the Thirty Years War*, (Suffolk, 2011), p. 61.

¹⁴⁵ These were men like Nicholas Bourne, Nathaniel Butter and Thomas Archer, all publishers/printers and stationers at the time. The correspondents themselves were rarely named, though the name of one Dutchman (Boer) named Broer Iron does occur more than once. The word Corantoe evolved from the French *Courante* - a fast dance.

¹⁴⁶ Richard Cust, 'News and Politics in Early Seventeenth-Century England', *Past and Present*, No 12, 112 (London, 1986), 60-90, p. 62.

¹⁴⁷ Daybell, *The Material Letter in Early Modern England*, p. 71.

regularly – if not necessarily accurately - reported directly to the ordinary citizens back home despite often successful attempts at censorship by the King.¹⁴⁸ This was hardly the harsh light of today's all-encompassing news coverage, but it was a beginning and the reports of Vere's gallant stand against the overwhelming forces opposed to him helped, despite the ultimate defeat, to cement and embellish his already celebrated reputation whilst at the same time indirectly reminding readers that the country and the King had done little to support his endeavours. As Richard Cust maintains 'by the 1620's, if not before, the circulation of news had become an integral part of the political process, something which politicians had to make allowances for, and which they appreciated could substantially affect public attitudes.'¹⁴⁹ These reports help supplement Vere's own letters in an often mutually supporting way.

Leaving Wesel on the 25th August and crossing the Rhine on a bridge of boats, he headed for Worms.¹⁵⁰ Horace Vere was attempting to join forces with Ansbach, but since his small force lacked mounted troops he was escorted to this juncture by Dutch cavalry under the command of Count Henry of Nassau.¹⁵¹ The route taken seems to have been southeast via Cologne and Metz before reaching camp at Bensheim, about 18 miles northeast of Worms. From here Vere wrote to William Trumbull, the English agent at the Archduke's court in Brussels, describing his journey.

'When I took my leave of the Prince of Orange at his camp near Weasell accompanied with Count Henry and 33 troupes of horse to conducte my foote companies we marched through the Archbishoprikes of Colon and Triers [both imperial electors and both part of the Catholic League] never hearing of any encounter of an enemie till we came near Metz.'¹⁵²

But Arthur Wilson says that when the army was close to Coblenz a bullet from the town passed close to Vere, hitting another gentlemen on the elbow, but Vere makes no mention of this in any of his letters.¹⁵³ However Wilson's account is corroborated in a *Coranto* which reports that 'The Towne of Coblins showed us their good will in shooting with Musquits at us, but our far distance kept us from hurt, though some were hit with fowling bullets'.¹⁵⁴ Vere continued 'where the Marquis Spinola came forth to have met us but by his ill success in advancinge and our own prosperous

¹⁴⁸ Boyes, *London's Newspress*, pp. 64-65.

¹⁴⁹ Cust, 'News and Politics', p. 73.

¹⁵⁰ About 200 miles, it took almost a month. See I.B. 'Certaine letters declaring in part the passage of affaires in the Palatinate, from September to this present moneth of April', (Amsterdam, 1621) p.2.

¹⁵¹ He was the grandfather of William 3rd of England.

¹⁵² BL, Add. Mss 72315, f108, 1620-1622, Vere to Trumbull 18th October 1620 OS.

¹⁵³ Arthur Wilson, *The History of Great Britain*, p. 137.

¹⁵⁴ I.B. 'Certaine letters declaring in part the passage of affaires in the Palatinate, p.1. These were probably pellets rather than a single bullet.

proceeding we escaped on another and arrived safely with our force in the Palatinate'.¹⁵⁵ Wilson suggests, plausibly, that Henry of Nassau with his knowledge of this region was able to outwit Spinola who, finding himself on the wrong side of the Rhine, lost men and equipment in attempting to cross the river and intercept Vere's tiny army and subsequently withdrew, enabling Vere and Henry to ford the river Main on September 24th and thus make liaison with 1500 German horsemen sent by the princes of the union.¹⁵⁶

Vere's letter goes on to say that when Spinola marched to Metz, apparently to liaise with Velasco's troops, Ansbach advanced towards him whilst Vere waited to see what might happen, watching for 'an opportunitie to give him a blow.' Vere describes 'the townes in these partes [as] of no strength' and thus an army that is 'master of the field' is to be preferred' [as opposed to an army equipped for a siege]. We then get a rare insight into Vere's own feelings as he goes on to say 'if we prove so happie as to overcome, all the countrie were recovered, and the poore inhabitants delivered from their miserable thralldom, God in his good time will find deliverance' and finally in his letter from his camp in Bensheim, Vere records the moment when 'a messenger came out of England' with the news 'that his majesty [King James] was pleased graciously to declare himself for the defence of the Palatinate. I never saw more joy in the faces of men than I did at that time, and generally it hath put a great deal of cheerfulness into the armies'.¹⁵⁷ This joy was because James had affirmed in late 1620 that if he could not peacefully restore the Palatinate then 'my crown and blood and the blood of my son shall not be spared for it'.¹⁵⁸

But just a month later the army's cheerfulness suffered a severe setback when news of the White Mountain defeat reached them. Vere wrote to Trumbull that 'We received letters not long since from Bohemia where we understand the Kings armies hath received an ill encounter by that of the emperor and that the town of Prague is lost' ... 'the frost and snowe hath forced us to garrison'... 'I winter in Frankendall'.¹⁵⁹ Vere and the remaining Palatine forces loyal to Frederick occupied the three main Palatine strongholds of Mannheim, Frankenthal and Heidelberg. Wilson says that Vere commanded in Mannheim, the defences of which had recently been modernised in line with the *trace italien* style, whilst his Serjeant-Major, Burrows, was in charge at Frankenthal with Sir Gerard Herbert commanding in Heidelberg. Vere's experience of

¹⁵⁵ BL, Add. Mss 72315, f108, 1620-1622, Vere to Trumbull 18th October 1620 OS.

¹⁵⁶ Wilson, *The History of Great Britain*, p.137.

¹⁵⁷ BL Add Mss 72315, f108, 1620-1622, Vere to Trumbull 18th October 1620 OS. See CSPD. James 1, 1621, p. 313, Locke to Carleton 24 Nov 1621.

¹⁵⁸ Paul Hughes and James Larkin, (eds.), *Stuart Royal Proclamations: The Royal Proclamations of King James I*, (Oxford, 2011), p.39. Durston, *James I*, p.49. And Cogswell, *James I*, p.68.

¹⁵⁹ BL Add Mss 72315, f109, 1620-1622, Vere to Trumbull, 22 November, 1620, OS.

siege warfare would have been of immense value in establishing defensive lines and guarding against enemy attack in each of these strongholds, the more especially since so many of his soldiers were inexperienced volunteers.

At this point too, on the 29th of October, Prince Henry and his cavalry, which had escorted Vere's tiny infantry force to the Palatinate, returned to Holland leaving Vere and his small army to their fate.¹⁶⁰ The Dutch were reluctant to send many troops to the Palatinate, for with the 12 year truce now close to expiration they were fearful of Spanish aggression closer to home. Vere had by then already attempted to engage with the enemy, writing to Trumbull sometime after the 28th of October 1620 (but before his letter of the 22nd November), and reporting that having linked up with the princes of the Union 'we have daily marched from place to place attending the proceedings of the enemy. The 3 of October we marched towards Altzis, a town the enemy posseseth, whereupon the Marquis Spinola drew his forces from Openhem to have relieved it', but Vere was simply attempting to lure Spinola and so 'bent his course' towards Oppenheim at which Spinola drew up his forces so that 'we could not assault him but with great and apparent disadvantage' and the day being 'thus far spent' Spinola managed to withdraw into the town under cover of darkness.¹⁶¹ Vere then says that 'since then both day and night as occasion has required we have weighted upon him to make him know that we dare and desire to fight with him whenever his courage shall serve him to present the occasion'. Vere closes by thanking Trumbull for the letters he has sent and ends saying 'pray excuse my not writing you, I have been in continuell motion since my coming into these parts'.¹⁶²

Vere's next letter to Trumbull, written on the 16th December, starts with a plea that was to become a recurrent theme. 'Sir, I know you cannot but have an account of such thinges as pass in these parts in more certayntie than you have them from me, in regard that I live apart from the generall accounting soe am a straunger for the most part to such news as there is.'¹⁶³ Many of Vere's letters from the Palatinate reveal a similar lack of intelligence about not only the enemy but also about the intentions of those he is attempting to help.

¹⁶⁰ BL Add Mss 72315, f109, 1620-1622, Vere to Trumbull, 22 November, 1620, OS.

¹⁶¹ Wilson, *The History of Great Britain*, p.138. Wilson says that Ansbach was reluctant to fight, despite Vere's pressing him to attack, Ansbach arguing that if they did so they may come under fire from cannon in a nearby fort. To which Vere was famously reported to have said 'When shall we fight then, if we shun the cannon?', p. 139. Before this action Dr Burgess, who accompanied the English army as chaplain is said to have greatly encouraged the troops.

¹⁶² BL Trumbull Papers Add Mss 72315, f111, 1620-1622, Vere to Trumbull, 16 December 1620, O.S.

¹⁶³ BL Trumbull Papers Add Mss 72315, f111, Vere to Trumbull 16 December 1620, O.S. Louis V of Hesse-Darmstadt was the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt from 1596 to 1626 and a supporter of the Emperor. A Landgrave was roughly equivalent to an English Marquis/Duke.

He reports on what he does know of the enemy's movements and hints that he will be taking offensive action in early 1621, 'The Bishop of Spires [Speyer], [a member of the Catholic league] hath fortified his horse .. it doth muche terrify the people of the Palatinate, the next spring there wilbe sum course taken to ease them of that grieve.' Vere also reports that 'A Langrave of Hessen & Darmstadt [is with the] Princes of the [Protestant] Union it is sayd to require the princes from the emperor to desist from giving ayd to the king of Bohemia, I believe they have given him noe satisfaction in his demaundes.' Vere also speculates that Frederick [The Elector Palatine and ousted King of Bohemia] has 'an army of 28 thousand men'. But Vere was sadly mistaken on both these points. In May of 1621 the Protestant Union did not renew its charter and effectively disbanded, complying with the Emperor's wishes, meanwhile Frederick's support had dwindled considerably as many of those who had joyfully proclaimed him in 1619 now tried to save their own lands and positions and so aside from the few troops still loyal to him in the Palatinate – mostly already under Vere's command - he had no army to speak of at all.

Spinola offered Ansbach a two month truce at the end of February 1621, on condition that Ansbach and the Protestant Union did not assist Frederick if he failed to make peace with the Emperor, and the treaty of Mainz was duly signed to that effect on 12th April 1621 with the members of the Protestant Union blaming James' unwillingness to support them militarily as the reason they refused to fight on, though James had always refused to 'undertake religious politics'.¹⁶⁴ Vere wrote to Trumbull in Brussels about this truce in March/April 'I was this day at Worms to see the Marquis of Ansbach whome I found gone to Bensham in the Bergstrate to conclude (as was told me) a Truce for twoe monthes... and am in daily expectation to heare what wilbe there resolved on'.¹⁶⁵ The next month the Union formally dissolved itself leaving the few remaining Palatine troops and Horace Vere's tiny force as the only bulwark against total Spanish and Imperial dominance. This must have been a harsh blow to Vere who was now facing an overwhelmingly larger enemy force on his own. James was able to negotiate a three month truce in the Palatinate but this only allowed Spinola to return to the Spanish Netherlands with a large part of his army where he was thus able to menace the Dutch now that the 12 year truce was at an end.¹⁶⁶

Velasco still remained in the Palatinate with almost 20,000 Spanish troops, at least double the number that Vere had under command [Frederick had given Vere overall command of all the allied forces in the Palatinate]. These were an estimated 5-

¹⁶⁴ Adams, 'The Protestant Cause', p. 255.

¹⁶⁵ BL Add Mss 72315, f114, Vere to Trumbull 29/19 March/April 1621.

¹⁶⁶ Pursell, *The Winter King*, pp.134 -135.

6,000 Palatine soldiers including Vere's 2,000, and the remnants of Sir Andrew Grey' and Sir John Seton's troops who had previously gone to assist the Bohemians [probably less than 1,000 men by now] plus a small number of Dutch companies too.¹⁶⁷ In mid-May Vere wrote 'I am labouring to put the troops in readiness to go into the field. I think I shall be able ... to bring three thousand of his Majesties subjects that are of the trained companies into the field'¹⁶⁸ But these men were now clearly heavily outnumbered and Vere would have realised that he had no hope of winning a pitched battle without help. Vere would at least have had a group of officers reporting directly to him and providing him with what we might today call a 'general staff' to assist in planning. Prince Maurice certainly had a staff of sorts though we know little about them.¹⁶⁹ However, Vere's Compendium offers strong clues to Vere having a staff that conforms to what we know about such organisations from the records of contemporary commanders. Vere mentions several specific posts therein including a provost marshall, sergeant major general and QM general. (see App. 1)

Vere wrote to Trumbull on May 19th 1621 'our truce is at an ende, wee have sayd it would be renewed for one month but as yet there is noe confirmation thereof.. our greatest trouble heere is how to discharge the country of certain troopes of horse of the princes of the Union that will not depart the country till they have satisfaction of what is due to them'.¹⁷⁰ These two issues were to be a common theme of Vere's letters from the Palatinate; lack of information about what is going on and the ravages of the soldiery on both sides in the conflict, who plundered and despoiled indiscriminately. Vere wrote to Carleton in May 1621 'The chief busyness that is in handling is how to discharge the cuntrie of two thousand horse of the union that remain yet unpaid. The most of the late twentie thousand poundes that is sent out of Inghland is that way employed which falls out ill for us, ourselves being the less thereby'.¹⁷¹ Later in the same month, writing this time to George Calvert, Vere complains 'our wants of money are very great which is the cause that our faults are more than otherwise they would

¹⁶⁷ I. B. *Certaines letters declaring in Part The Passage of Affaires in the Palatinat*. Letter dated 29 Jan 1620. This letter from 'I. B' reports from Frankenthal that there have been many mortalities amongst the troops and that some have run away 'yet they are filled up with such, as have come from under Colonnell Gray and others have come to us out of Bohemia.' Gray had taken some 2500 men to Bohemia in August 1620 having raised £64,000 in public subscriptions. Peter Wilson, *The Thirty Years War*, p.286. Gray joined Seton's smaller force in Prague alongside Mansfield's men. They suffered heavy losses in Bohemia. Marks, 'England, The English', p. 92.

¹⁶⁸ NA SP84/96/103, Vere to Nethersole, 18th May 1621.

¹⁶⁹ Martin Van Creveld, *Command in War*, p. 35.

¹⁷⁰ BL Add Mss 72315, f115, Vere to Trumbull 19th May 1621. These horseman were the remnants of Ansbach's army. Disbanded and unpaid they sought redress by terrorizing the populace.

¹⁷¹ NA SP84/101/52, Vere to Carleton, 16th May 1621.

be, I humbly entreat your honour that you would be pledged to be a suitor to his majesty on our behalf.' The faults Vere mentions refer to the fact that Vere's own cavalry (that is the remaining Palatinate cavalry that he now commanded) 'is not altogether free in the same kind and for the same reason.'¹⁷² In other words they are prone to prey upon the same poor locals that they are supposed to be defending. Vere made it clear that want of money is the reason for this.¹⁷³

Frederick was now advised by Britain and Denmark to make peace as best he could, and accept that Bohemia was lost. He had few resources, was living in exile and had not as yet lost his position as elector but he refused to compromise and though he did seek peace with Ferdinand his conditions were unrealistic. He demanded full religious liberty, the clearance of all his debts and even that Ferdinand refund all of Frederick's Palatine military expenses; all impossible demands when he had almost no material bargaining assets and had lost any real hope of meaningful military support. Ferdinand had placed him under an Imperial ban on January 29th 1621, and this paved the way for the confiscation of all his lands and titles, an eventuality which finally occurred in 1623.¹⁷⁴ But none of these misfortunes and setbacks appear to have ever made Frederick countenance abandoning what he saw as his legal claim to Bohemia and his seeing it as a matter of religion. He continued to try to raise money and troops to assist him in recovering his kingdom, his electorate and in what he saw as furthering 'The Protestant Cause' in Europe.

To this end he urged Protestant States to join him in opposing the Habsburg Emperor and the Spanish. More practically he procured the aid of the maverick mercenary Count Mansfield whose career was one of fighting for the highest bidder.¹⁷⁵ Mansfield had previously fought against imperial troops and then made peace with the Emperor, and he did not assist Frederick at the battle of the White Mountain. Nevertheless Frederick then enlisted him to command his army in Bohemia, recruiting many of the men disbanded by the Protestant Union and in May 1621 Mansfield took position in the Upper Palatinate, successfully resisting for some time the efforts made by the Imperial general Tilly to dislodge him.¹⁷⁶

Vere wrote from Frankenthal to Robert Naunton in early March 1621 that he was expecting his Dutch companies to be reinforced and that 'neyther are wee (the

¹⁷² These men were the remnants of Frederick's own cavalry. Vere took none to the Palatinate.

¹⁷³ NA SP84/101/138, Vere to Calvert, 23 May 1621.

¹⁷⁴ Peter Wilson, *The Thirty Years War*, p.315.

¹⁷⁵ Wilson, *The Thirty Years War*, says 'his motives were unclear and his actions duplicitous' p.325.

¹⁷⁶ Edward Cust, *Lives of the Warriors of the Thirty Years War* (London, 1865), p. 70. Tilly was Johann Tserclaes, Count of Tilly who commanded the Catholic League's forces in the Thirty Years' War.

English I meane) soe weake as is generally believed' and he mocked the Imperial and Spanish forces as 'building castells in the aire as yf victory were theire handmaide'. He was 'in daily expectation of supply owt of England'... and expected 'comfortable newes from thence'.¹⁷⁷ Regarding the troops, Vere wrote to Carleton in June that 'I have sume 2600 foot and betwixt 7 and 8 score horse... I fynd them exceedinglie well-disposed to go into the warre'.¹⁷⁸

In early June 1621 Vere seems to have at last been told that the truce had been extended. His letter to Trumbull acknowledges this, but makes a thinly veiled complaint about the delay, his being informed of it, and its consequences, [Though the post may of course simply have been lost] 'The receipt of yours advertising me of a further suspension of the truce till the 20/30 of this present obligesh me to reckon it amongst your other favours, yet not recyving it from Heidelberg in such tyme as was requisite I was something troubled how I should carry myself, desiring to advance the service of this place, & yet not offend the intentions of eythor their Majesties' and he goes on to say that 'the country people... through their grievous oppressions grow desperate'.¹⁷⁹

Two weeks later Vere writes to Trumbull again, thanking him for his letter of the 23rd June which had apparently told Vere that the truce had been extended now till July 5th, a fact that Vere had to confirm by sending an emissary to Cordova. Vere then complains (with some reason!) 'we have it [the proclamation of the truce] by no other way but as I have told you. I think it were fit and reasonable that we should have knowledge given before the expiration of the truce' and he mentions once again the 'much hurt to the poor people by these continual incursions'.¹⁸⁰ The truce was extended again, to the 20th July, which Vere acknowledges in his letter to Trumbull of the same date. But clearly Trumbull, or some other more senior personage had taken exception to Vere's earlier complaint so in this letter Vere, having noted the extension of the truce adds 'I understand by what you write that you have done yt by the commandment of his Majesty, of my part I will not fayle to yield all umble obedience thereunto.'¹⁸¹

Meanwhile, James continued to try to solve the Bohemian/Palatinate crisis diplomatically despatching John Digby, 1st Baron Sherborne, to the Emperor to seek terms. James wanted a full pardon for Frederick in return for his renunciation of the Bohemian throne. Digby arrived in Vienna in early July 1621 and there seemed to have

¹⁷⁷ NA SP84/100/ 231, 3/13 March 1621, Vere to Secretary of State Robert Naunton.

¹⁷⁸ NA SP84/101/150, Vere to Carleton 11th June 1621.

¹⁷⁹ BL Add Mss 72315, f116, Vere to Trumbull 6/16 June 1621.

¹⁸⁰ BL Add Mss 72315 f118, Vere to Trumbull 28th June 1621.OS.

¹⁸¹ BL Add Mss 72315,f119, Vere to Trumbull 20th July 1621. OS.

been some initial success in the talks.¹⁸² Then came news of Mansfield's invasion of the upper Palatinate, and the subsequent mobilisation of imperial forces to counter Mansfield's move.

Digby's mission was thus fatally undermined, not only by Mansfield's actions, but also because other Protestant forces had attacked imperial territory. Under Frederick's orders the Landgrave of Jagerndorf had invaded Moravia and Silesia whilst at the same time Bethlen Gabor, the Transylvanian Protestant prince, had attacked and defeated an Imperial army, then threatened Vienna itself. Vere wrote to Calvert confirming this news, which must have given Vere a considerable boost, 'The Duke Depoone [Deux-Ponts - Count Palatine John II of Zweibrucken] sent me word yesterday that Bethlem Gabor had wholie defeated the Armie that was before Neuhausen... and is goinge one towards Vienna'.¹⁸³ Meanwhile Vere had lodged some of his troops on land subject to the Bishop of Spires, claiming it was necessary to relieve 'the poor country people here'.¹⁸⁴ Brennen Pursell states in *The Winter King* that Vere 'claimed that the Duke of Zweibrucken and the council of Heidelberg ordered him to move his men there'.¹⁸⁵ However the Bishop

'refusing to give quarter [that is lodging] notwithstanding that...[he] had notice given him, sent his commissary to command them by provoking the soldiers in beginning to shoot hath been forced with some blows, whereupon the Bishop may peradventure make a great alarme without cause. And this much I hope first to advertize you of desyring you to stop such [underlined in the original] false reports as may be made.'

Vere also notes the success of Jagerndorf and of Gabor but insists that whilst he is still in a state of truce he 'deign[s] to be delivered of this uncertain estate' and requests some 'absolute direction what I should trust to'.¹⁸⁶ A Coranto with a report dated to mid-September 1621 reports that 'Generall Veere sent a Trumpet to the Bishop of Spiers' arguing that he [Vere] had been forced to act as he did because of Don Cordoba's incursions into the Palatinate which had denied Vere access to resources.¹⁸⁷ But Vere's move – an English general apparently undermining his English King's diplomacy - may have been the final straw for Digby's mission. And so because

¹⁸² Newes from the Low Countries M.H. July 29th 1621. There appears to have been the possibility of delay to this mission because of the Emperors preoccupation with Hungarian affairs.

¹⁸³ BL Add Mss Vol 101, f317 Vere to Calvert, 26 July 1621. Zweibrucken is about 120 Kilometres WSW of Mannheim.

¹⁸⁴ BL Add Mss 72315, f118 Vere to Trumbull, 9th August 1621.

¹⁸⁵ Pursell, *The Winter King*, p.141.

¹⁸⁶ BL Add Mss 72315, f118, Vere to Trumbull, 9th August 1621.

¹⁸⁷ *Corant or Weekly Newes from Italy, Germany, Hungaria, Polonia, Bohemia, France and the Low Countries*, 14/9/1621 (London, 1621). P.1

of these incursions and because of Ferdinand and Frederick's 'competing, conflicting, and contradicting notions of imperial justice ... Digby's embassy had been doomed... from the beginning'.¹⁸⁸ Thus, by the end of September, with the Upper Palatinate firmly in imperial hands Digby returned to England where he later commented in Parliament 'I observed how bravely Sir Horace Vere and Captain Borough had behaved themselves of late in the Palatinate; and that, by the wisdom and valour of Sir Horace, Heidelbergh was kept from the enemy, being a Place of small strength; Mannheim, a very strong Town; Frankendale. Which had endured a Month's siege, and Worms; which is the present state of the Palatinate'.¹⁸⁹

For Vere, finding sufficient resource to feed and maintain even his small army, especially whilst in garrison, may have given him little alternative but to encroach upon the Bishop's lands, especially since he was as usual severely short of money. In May Vere had written to Sir Francis Nethersole, who was secretary to the exiled Queen of Bohemia, complaining about the poor exchange rate he was suffering at the hands of the locals and the fact that his soldier's pay was 'in such money as the people of the town refuse it'.¹⁹⁰ The increasing inflation in the Palatinate and elsewhere is mentioned in *Coranto*es back in England 'all things here are very deare, one pound of flesh, that here before hath cost 14 pence is now sold for 25' and the same article reports the increase of the plague too.¹⁹¹ Other reports indicate that local citizens were now refusing payment in anything but 'rickes Dollars and Golde'.¹⁹²

On his way to see Ferdinand, Digby had lodged in Frankenthal for one night and this was recorded by Vere 'My Lord Digby did Frankenthal the honour to lodge with us one night, .. I was at Heidelberge [about 25 miles away] I used such diligence that I met with his lordship before he came into the towne where I gave him the best entertaynment [lodging] that I could.' Vere then reports that the Duke Deux-Ponts and two of Frederick's councillors, a Mr Deplesis and Mr Poule, met with Digby and had 'much discussion' to which Vere was invited, though 'wanting languages' he 'did not well understand all that passed'.¹⁹³ Just a few days later, in mid-June 1621, Vere wrote to Carleton complaining again about the lack of money to pay the troops and the poor

¹⁸⁸ Pursell, *The Winter King*, p.144.

¹⁸⁹ Parliamentary History of England, Vol 5, p.485. And in 'Stuart dynastic policy and religious politics, 1621-1625', in M.C. Questier, (ed). *Camden fifth series* vol.34 (Cambridge, 2009), p.23. Digby was a Catholic so his endorsements and his later donation of plate to Vere's cause (see p 170) is all the more noteworthy.

¹⁹⁰ NA SP84/96/103, Vere to Nethersole, 18th May 1621.

¹⁹¹ *Corant or Weekly Newes from Italy, Germany, Hungaria, Polonia, Bohemia, France, and the Low Countries*. N. B. October 11, 1621. P. 1-2.. Out of the Dutch Copy.

¹⁹² Anon. *Good Newes from Alsasia and the Palatinate, the fifth of June; The abstract of three severall letters*. (London, 1622), p.14.

¹⁹³ BL Add Mss 72315.Vol 101 f. 157, Vere to Carleton 16/26 June 162 OS. These were probably Volrad von Plessen and Andreas Pawel, two of Frederick's advisors.

exchange rate he is getting for the little money he has which, he writes, is not 'according to the establishment made ' and he writes too of the depredations of the Spanish and the lack of information he is getting regarding the prolongation or otherwise of the truce.¹⁹⁴ Later that month Vere writes in similar vein to Calvert. Vere had received a 'gracious letter' from Frederick for which Vere expresses thanks, saying that he is taking good care of the King's brother [who was serving with Vere] but complaining yet again about 'the wronges done to the people of the countrie' by the Spanish soldiers despite persistent promises from Gonzales. Yet it was not only the enemy who caused such harm, Mansfield's men in particular were notorious for such depredation 'robbing, ransacking and burning of houses'.¹⁹⁵

Yet again, in June 1621, Vere writes 'There is great complayning for want of monie'.¹⁹⁶ In early July Vere's exasperation reaches [for him] new heights. Puzzling once more over whether or not a truce was in force or not, Vere tells Carleton that two runaway soldiers have informed him that the truce is indeed extended to the end of July [which it was] and then goes on to say;

'I thinke myself to be somewhat in a hard condition that I should be made soe much a straunger to these thinges that inform the busyness here. I think your lordship cannott but fynd it straunge that the enemy should publish a truce in his quarter and that I can cum to the knowledge thereof by no other way but by runaways that cum from the enemy'.¹⁹⁷ [Though as Martin Van Creveld points out deserters were often a 'commanders source of enemy intelligence'].¹⁹⁸

And again to Calvert on the 12th July '[The enemy] have received latelie three score thousand poundes which makes them speake very big'. He reports that it is 'common speech' that the enemy intend to go on with the war.¹⁹⁹

Indeed the truce was now finally coming to an end and Vere writes to Calvert that he has not heard from anyone for some time and is now fearful that if hostilities are resumed 'without giving some content [i.e. pay] to [the] troops ...we shall fall into disorder... These littell troopes that we have doe decrease dailie [with sickness and desertion] and our enemy doth increase'.²⁰⁰ To make matters worse, by the Spring of 1621 Vere had lost more than 300 men to 'a Contagious fever, which as our wine and drunkennesse thereby abounded, did increase both in quantitie of infection and

¹⁹⁴ BL Add Mss 72315.Vol 101, f 185, Vere to Carleton, 22 June 1621 OS.

¹⁹⁵ *Corant or Weekly Newes from Italy, Germany, Hungaria, Polonia, Bohemia, France, and the Low Countries*, June 6, 1621. (London, 1621). p. 1.

¹⁹⁶ BL Add Mss 72315.Vol 101, f 197, Vere to Calvert, 29th June 1621 OS.

¹⁹⁷ BL Add Mss 72315.Vol 101, f 248, Vere to Calvert, 7th July 1621.

¹⁹⁸ Martin Van Creveld, *Command in War*, (Harvard, 1985), p. 22.

¹⁹⁹ BL Add Mss 72315.Vol 101, f 265, Vere to Calvert, 12th July 1621.

²⁰⁰ BL Add Mss 72315.Vol 101, f 335, Vere to Calvert, 29th July 1621.

mortalitie of disease'. The soldiers' discipline too was far from ideal 'Our troupes have bin very disorderly and vile in pillages and quarrelling amongst themselves' and Vere and his officers were 'not... able to stem the current yet have we by God's mercie much prevailed of late'.²⁰¹

Vere's perpetual money problems received some relief with the arrival of Digby on the 29 Sept/9th October 1621 on his way to Brussels from his failed diplomatic mission to the Emperor. Vere reports this to Carleton two weeks later, saying that Digby 'taking into consideration the extremitie of our wants.... left in money, plate & other ornaments according to valuation 38923 thousand pounds [probably £38,923] but will come much short. This subvention came very opportunely to keep us alive, & but alive in expectation of further supply'.²⁰²

But now the war was coming to Vere in earnest as the Spanish moved towards Vere's forces.²⁰³ Mansfield was chased out of the Upper Palatinate in early October by superior numbers on the Imperial side as Tilly and his paymaster Maximilian took control and Mansfield retreated towards Mannheim where Vere's forces had established themselves.²⁰⁴ Tilly was now able to march into the Lower Palatinate where, over the winter months of 1621/2, he tried to wrest Heidelberg and Mannheim from Vere's men. The harsh treatment Tilly meted out to the local people is reflected in Vere's letter to Carleton in early October describing his growing concern at the actions of Spinola who was demanding succour and support for his troops in Munster, and for 'so long together in the neutral countrys near the Palatinate'.²⁰⁵ This march was reported in England 'Tilly...,who newly returned from being fleshed with the blood of innocents, as sparing neither man, woman nor child, in certain villages betweene *Heidelberg & Manheim* [italicised in the original]'.²⁰⁶

Vere describes the large amount of oats, hay and straw that were being demanded of the people of the area 'wherein if they should fail they would soon be visited by his horse'.²⁰⁷ There were reports too of a plague of red mice 'that bee great hurte to the

²⁰¹ I.B. 'Certaine letters declaring in part the passage of affaires in the Palatinate. Amsterdam, April (London 1621).p. 6.

²⁰² NA SP84/103/59 Vere to Carleton 11/21 October 1621.

²⁰³ *Corant or Weekly Newes from Italy, Germany, Hungaria, Polonia, Bohemia, France, and the Low Countries*. (London, 1621). p.2.

²⁰⁴ Maximilian was the Duke of Bavaria and a founder member of the Catholic league.

²⁰⁵ NA SP84/103/73, Vere to Carleton (at the Hague), 10th October 1621.

²⁰⁶ *The King of Bohemia's Welcome to Count Mansfield, and into the Palatinate*: Faithfully taken out of the letters of best credit', 1622, p. 12.

²⁰⁷ NA, SP84/103/73. Horace Vere to Dudley Carleton (at The Hague) 10th October 1621. With winter now approaching the amount of grass and fodder easily available to large numbers of cavalry horses would have been diminishing hence Spinola's threats. An average cavalry horse weighing 500-600KG would require feeding (around 3-5% of body weight each day) a mixture of hay and straw plus cereal twice a day if it was to remain useful as a cavalry

come on the land and in the Barne' which would have exacerbated the situation.²⁰⁸ To make matters even worse there was a particularly hard winter 'the Palatinate hath beene subject to such frost and snow, that the *Rhene* [italicised in the original] hath beene frozen 7 or 8 weeks together'. The particularly inclement weather caused military problems too 'by reason of which uncertainty of weather many projects were disappointed, and diverse excursions being made, the souldiers returned without effecting their purposes; yet did *Generall Veere* overslip no opportunitie, which either led to annoy the enemy, or relieve his friends.' [Italicised in the original].²⁰⁹

Spinola now returned to the Spanish Netherlands with part of the army leaving Don Gonzalo Fernandez de Cordoba in command of the remaining Spanish forces in the Lower Palatinate to assist Tilly.²¹⁰ But Tilly's forces were weakened by sickness and the enforced detachment of some of his men elsewhere and Vere was able for the time being to defend his three strongholds. One of the newsletters circulating in England reported it thus

'As for our English Companies, they are thus divided: Noble Captaine Borroughes, is for his good service governor of Franckendale, where he now is with my Lord of Essex,. Sir Garret Herbert, [is] in Heidelbergh. My Lord Generall Vere himselfe, [is] in this strong Towne of Manhem,. Colonell Grayes regiment is with Count Mansfield.' [Italicised in the original].²¹¹

Vere wrote to Dudley Carleton (with copies to Frederick and Count Mansfield) in October 1621

'with many particulars of our hard condition & amongst others of the entire course cut of betweene this town [Mannheim] and Frankendalle which hath been ever

mount. To provide enough energy to make them fast they would also need oats and barley plus large amounts of water. In addition these horses would be susceptible to a number of equine illnesses such as hoof infections and colic and they were prone to tetanus from cuts, grazes and battle wounds. Even today, with modern medicine, racehorses frequently succumb to these sorts of ills. (Source, Dr. Gemma Lambie - BVSC, CERT AVP (EM), MRCVS, advanced practitioner in equine medicine, Fellowes Farm Equine Clinic, Huntingdon).

²⁰⁸ *Corant or Weekly Newes from Italy, Germany, Hungaria, Polonia, Bohemia, France, and the Low Countries*, (London, 1621). p.1.

²⁰⁹ Anon 'More newes From the Palatinate and More comfort To every true Christian, that either favoureth the cause of Religion, or wisheth well the King of Bohemia's proceedings. According to faithfull and honest letters, sent ouer since the beginning of March, and now published for the satisfaction of every true English heart. (162) p 8. This particular newsletter complains that Corantes are so translated out of the Dutch and so obsequious to the original that there is little talk of English exploits, scarcely mentioning 'General Veere' at all.

²¹⁰ Gonzalo Andrés Domingo Fernández de Córdoba (31 December 1585 – 16 February 1635) was a Spanish military leader.

²¹¹ Anon. *More newes from the Palatinate the second time imprinted* June the 5. (London 1622). And see Steve Murdoch, Alexia Grosjean, (eds) *Alexander Leslie and the Scottish Generals of the Thirty Years War, 1618-1648*, p.30. Gray's force contained 'some 1,500 Scots and 1,000 - Englishmen who travelled to support Frederick two months before Vere's force.

since streightly beleaguered. The defenders have held here to extraordinary well acquit themselves & have by sallies and otherwise made the enemy feele their heavy hands. They have disputed the least piece of ground tenable.' He goes on to praise 'my sergeant major [general - Sir William Burroughs]' but, noting the loss of the Upper Palatinate and the imposition of Catholic garrisons by the Duke of Bavaria, adds 'In the meantime our misery is great [and we are] amidst so many afflictions your lordship can better apprehend'.

But Vere also reports, more optimistically, on a skirmish along the Rhine where his men had some success in forcing the enemy to retreat, and that Mansfield was now endeavouring to march towards the besieged Frankenthal. Vere ends his letter by saying that 'I hope within two days to march to the secour of our friends at Frankendall.'²¹² Given the small numbers of troops available to Vere, such a march could only have been contemplated because of Mansfield's promise of help. Vere acknowledges this in his letter to Calvert of the 17/27 October 1621

'My last unto your honour being of the 13th of this present carryed the assurance I then had received of the Count Mansfield's arrivall with his forces to our secours & our intention to joyne in the disasseiging this place... But the enemy, advertised of our coming, rise on Sunday night in greate haste leaving us only the paynes to pursue him... He made such extraordinary spede that he left ... many sicke soldiers in his trenches to the mercy of the town soldiers. His works offensive & the towns defensive made in so short a tyme do witness the diligence of both sides, they of the town not having as yet lost any outworks made before the siege beganne. The governour, Captain Burroughs hath gained much honour in this defence'.²¹³

The Spanish had battered Frankenthal for four weeks with little success and following that, with the use of outworks, had attempted to storm the town but been driven back with considerable loss, losing 3000 men with little gain and then being forced to retreat with the arrival of Mansfield and Vere.²¹⁴

On the same day Vere wrote again to Calvert.

'Frankandall is by our forces united now disasseiged. To this worke wee came on Monday having the night before passed over a part of our army, but the enemy dislodged the same night in grate haste. We pursued them till 2 houres in the night beyond Wormbs but came still short soe as some few prisoners & wagons were only taken & pillaged...I must not forgett to make honourable mention of the Gouvernour,

²¹² NA SP84/101/74, Vere to Carleton 11/21 October 1621.

²¹³ NA SP84/101/74, Vere to Calvert 17/27 October 1621.

²¹⁴ Anon. *Newes from the Palatinate A true and comfortable relation of the wonderfull proceedings of Count Mansfield, from his first comming into the Palatinate, until this present moneth.* (London, 1622), pp. 4-5.

Capt. Burroughs my sergeant major, for he hath behaved extraordinarily well in the defence. His brother, his Ensigne, Capt [William] Fairfax & his brother [John] are slain, Capt. Fairfax by a greate shot in his thigh'.²¹⁵

Fairfax, having lost his leg to a cannon shot was recorded in a Coranto in England as saying 'Ah gentlemen I have lost my legge, I have lost my legge; but be you not discomforted, but fight, fight brave Englishmen, for all my heart shall be with you all'.²¹⁶ It is unlikely that Fairfax made such a statement at such a time but the report was clearly aimed at morale, promoting and advertising the bravery of the English troops. William and John Fairfax were sons of Sir Thomas Fairfax who had served with Francis Vere and was the grandfather of the Parliamentary General Thomas Fairfax, who himself joined Vere's company in the Spring of 1629 aged just 17.²¹⁷ Even with their success in disasseiging Frankenthal, Vere and his small force had gained little more than a temporary breathing space and as he and his men sat out the winter they must have known that the next spring would bring a renewed offensive from the Spanish and the Emperor. If Vere achieved little else other than garnishing his already golden reputation, he had denied the Hapsburgs possession of the Lower Palatinate for the time being.²¹⁸

Vere's success had heartened Frederick, and he joined Mansfield's somewhat reduced forces in late April 1622, which Vere reports in a letter to Calvert.²¹⁹ In this letter Vere heavily criticises Tilly 'The baron Tilly goes on in blocking up Heidelberg & executing all manner of cruelties upon such as fall into his hands sparing noe quality, age or sex'. Vere also reports that Gonzales [Cordoba] is constructing a bridge at Oppenheim 'having given order that 200 carpenters shall as this day attend that service there. The general report is that he intends to besiege Frankendalle'.²²⁰ Later that month, Vere related to Calvert the adventures of Frederick in coming to Frankenthal disguised as a merchant, despite having been stopped at one point by enemy soldiers. Frederick's 'wonderful and dangerous journey' was reported in England as the result of a number of factors regarding religion, the cruelty of the Spanish troops and the need for Frederick to be seen leading the fight.²²¹

²¹⁵ NA SP84/107/103, Vere to Calvert 17/27 Oct 1621.

²¹⁶ Anon. *The Certaine News of this present week. Continued from Rome, Naples, Genoway, France, the Low Countries, the Palatinate, and many other places*, (London 1621), p. 14.

²¹⁷ Clements Markham, pp. 412-413.

²¹⁸ CSPD, *James I, 1621*, p. 313, Locke to Carleton, 24 November 1621.

²¹⁹ BL Add Mss 72315, Vol 101 f 146, Vere to Calvert 8th April 1622.

²²⁰ BL Add Mss 72315, Vol 101 f.143, Vere to Calvert 12th April 1622.

²²¹ Anon, *The King of Bohemia's Welcome to Count Mansfield, and into the Palatinate: Faithfully taken out of the letters of best credit*, (London, 1622), p.11.

Vere goes on to say 'I hope my Lord Chichester's coming will not be long after him' and that 'We are ready for action'.²²² Vere was referring to Arthur, 1st Baron Chichester, who had been appointed to oversee King James' interests in the Palatinate. Despite his (probably sensible) aversion to military action in its defence, James had agreed to raise an army of 8,000 infantry and 1600 horsemen to be sent to the Lower Palatinate.²²³ Indeed Parliamentary plans to prepare forces for the relief of the lower Palatinate costing £900,000 had been in train.²²⁴ Before this proposal could be fully debated though, James quarrelled with the House of Commons over the issue of free speech and promptly dissolved the assembly. This dissolution seriously weakened England's bargaining position by ensuring that threats of military force could not be backed up in practice. The Palatine crisis had revived anti-Catholic feeling in England and increased the clamour for action. But this 'empty rhetoric of armed intervention in the Palatinate was preferable to the enormous cost of actually taking a military initiative'.²²⁵

Thus, although Chichester did travel to the Palatinate, in early June 1622, he came without reinforcements. He did bring much needed cash to help pay Vere's troops, who were by now many weeks in arrears, but the money he did bring was wholly insufficient especially since English pounds had been depreciating alarmingly in the Palatinate for some time. A year earlier, when he was in much less dire financial straits, Vere had written to Francis Nethersole 'The last twentie thousand pounds that was sent by his Majesty out of England is put out at such rates that is straunge'... 'the last weekes' pay was in such monie that the people of the towne refuse it. If this not be redressed your lordship cannot be here great compliants of us.'²²⁶ A year later, local trades people were clearly heavily discounting the English money of this now isolated force. Chichester also brought instructions to Frederick from James, who wanted the Elector and erstwhile King of Bohemia to give up all attempts to recover his lands by force and submit entirely to James' will. Through Chichester, James applied further pressure to the recalcitrant Frederick, demanding his obedience (to eschew any further conflict) and threatening to order Vere to withdraw all his forces unless Frederick did as

²²² BL Add Mss 72315 Vol 101 f147, Vere to Carleton 14/24 April 1622.

²²³ Pursell, *The Winter King*, p 168. Pursell is unable to substantiate this report directly but he suggests that Nethersole and Gondomar, the Spanish Ambassador to James, were aware of it. And see NA, SP 80/5/ f. 148, 8/18 May 1622, Simon Digby to Calvert wherein Digby tells Calvert that Vere had been granted a commission to raise an army by King James. Chichester had certainly been appointed to the post and a Council of war had been established which initially calculated that a much larger (and thus more expensive) force would be required.

²²⁴ David Thomas, 'Financial and Administrative Developments', in Howard Tomlinson, (ed.), *Before the English Civil War*, p.116.

²²⁵ S. J Houston, *James I*, (London, 1995), p.77.

²²⁶ NA SP84/101/103, Vere to Nethersole, June 1621.

James wished. At the same time Vere was to command all British subjects to no longer fight in Frederick's cause, if Frederick did not obey.²²⁷

But hearteningly for Frederick other Protestant allies had now emerged. The first of whom was Christian the Younger of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, titular Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg. Still in his teens, hostile to the Catholic church and an admirer of Elizabeth the now exiled Queen of Bohemia, he raised an army of 10,000 men in early 1622, to fight for the Protestant cause, marching south to join Mansfield's forces and causing great devastation as he did so. He had raised a large force with little money and so, as they marched, Christians' men looted and robbed. Catholic Churches in particular were stripped of all their gold and silver ornaments whilst Christian extorted vast sums from bishops and priests.²²⁸ At the same time George Frederick, Margrave of Baden-Durlach, though in his sixties, also now declared himself for Frederick. A devout Calvinist, he was worried by the arrival of the Spanish on the Rhine and he was able to raise an army of 11,000. Together with Mansfield's nominal 20,000 men Frederick now had the potential to put 40,000 men into the field. Christian's forces were though still separated by some distance from Mansfield and the Margrave and they marched to complete a juncture.

Mansfield was, as usual, looking for the best advantage he could find for himself and his soldiers and was engaged in talks with the Spanish. He was bargaining for the withdrawal of his army but these negotiations were interrupted by the unexpected arrival of Frederick.²²⁹ Mansfield now postponed his negotiations and, in late April 1622, crossing over onto the right bank of the Rhine he and the Margrave, joined by Vere, managed to prevent Tilly linking with Cordoba's forces inflicting losses on the Imperial general at Mingolsheim, south west of Wiesloch. This rare victory was recorded in England as a wonderful precursor to 'some violent course of glory, if the Emperour doe not speedily send more forces'²³⁰

However, instead of pressing on and attempting to destroy Tilly's army, Mansfield waited for Prince Christian's forces to join up with him and this allowed Tilly and Cordoba to converge. Mansfield had waited for Christian because he needed the booty that Christian had accumulated during his tumultuous march in order to help pay Mansfield's troops. But in early May Tilly defeated the Margrave and essentially

²²⁷ Pursell, *The Winter King*, p.177.

²²⁸ Peter Wilson, *The Thirty Years War*, p.333.

²²⁹ Anon. *Good newes for the King of Bohemia? or, A certaine relation of the last and great overthrow, given by the Duke of Brunswicke to the Bishop of Cullen*. Sent of purpose by a person of account the eight day of April, and now published the seventeenth 1622, p.7.

²³⁰ Anon, *Three Great Overthrowes' one in the Palatinate, against Monsieur Tilley, the Duke of Bavaria's generall: given by the king of Bohemia himselfe, being in person in the same battell, with Sir Horatio Vere*. (London,1622), p.18.

destroyed his army as a cohesive unit. At the same time King James had ordered Frederick, who was now at Frankenthal, to desist from any further conflict and await the outcome of new peace negotiations then underway in Brussels.²³¹ Duke Christian's army finally reached the River Main, close to Mansfield's forces, but Tilly too had been reinforced and on June 20th he destroyed Christian and Mansfield's combined forces at Höchst on the Main. Frederick now left the Palatinate, partly because he feared being caught by Tilly, but also because supplies within Vere's command were now so low that there was simply not enough to support the remnants of Mansfield's army as well as Vere's garrisons. Frederick had realised that 'the Countrey was not able to sustaine his Forces, called a Counsell of Warre, and resolved to depart'.²³²

The Margrave now disbanded his remaining troops and sought pardon from the Emperor whilst Frederick, pressured by King James who was still seeking a diplomatic solution, was obliged to cancel Mansfield's contract and Vere was left with barely 9,000 men spread across the three towns to resist Tilly and the Spanish.²³³

With Mansfield's dismissal and the effective neutralisation of Duke Christian and the Margrave of Baden, Frederick was left with no appreciable army save Vere's small garrisons holding Heidelberg, Mannheim and Frankenthal. Mansfield had always been an unreliable ally. He was liable to change sides if offered enough inducement and his troops exacted terrible despoilment on the local populace.²³⁴ And these depredations were not confined to the lands of his enemies; they were also ruinous to the districts he was commissioned to defend.²³⁵ His horseman ravaged and sacked the countryside indiscriminately especially in the winter months when supplies were scarce. For many ordinary people peace, whoever won, was preferable to the terrors of war.

²³¹ Pursell, *The Winter King*, p.173.

²³² Anon. *A tru[e] relat[ion] of the pro[cee]dings of the Bavarian and Spa[nish] forces before the city Heydelburgh having very strongly besieged it*, (London, 1622), p.10.

²³³ Anon, *The Entertainment of Count Mansfield, and the Duke of Brunswick, into the service and pay of the Duke of Bulloigne, being both dismissed by the King of Bohemia*, (London, 1622), p. 8. This same Coranto also states, in a report dated 3rd August that it is the intention of the imperial and Spanish forces to 'imblock or besiege Frankenthal, Manheim and Heidelberg', p.10.

²³⁴ Olli Bäckström, *The German Military Entrepreneur Ernst von Mansfeld and His Conduct of Asymmetrical Warfare in the Thirty Years War*, Pro Gradu Dissertation 2011 (University of Helsinki, 2011), p.26.

²³⁵ Wedgewood, *The Thirty Years War*, p.139. Frederick accompanied Mansfield's troops for a short period but he found the depredations of the soldiers among his own people just too much to bear. 'There ought to be some difference made between friend and enemy, but these people ruin both alike, lamented Frederick.' He parted company with Mansfield. See p. 7 for more about the general nature of Mansfield's atrocities.

On 23 July 1622 Tilly invested Heidelberg whilst Frederick remonstrated from the safety of Sedan.²³⁶ But although he protested that, as he had laid down his arms, so should Tilly and Cordoba whilst negotiations continued in Brussels, this was an implausible dream and the Brussels negotiations failed in the face of the Emperor's intransigence and the reality of military advantage. Vere did not have enough men left in Mannheim or Frankenthal, which was now the extent of his command, to attempt to relieve Frederick's old capital and all he could do was to strengthen his defences and await his fate. He was too experienced a soldier, especially when it came to sieges, to expect anything but a bad outcome at Heidelberg. After 11 weeks of resistance, and severe bombardment by Tilly from the heights overlooking the city, Heidelberg fell on 16 September 1622.²³⁷ Futile resistance continued for another three days in the castle and Sir Gerard Herbert, the Commander of the garrison there, was mortally wounded during the siege. The surviving Protestant troops, a mixture of English volunteers, Dutch and local soldiers were allowed to leave unmolested. On the 5th August Vere had written to Trumbull about the siege;

'I had on Sunday last... a letter from the Gouvernour of Heidelberg dated the 28th of the last [July], he tells me that the siege hath been there synce the 8th of the same, that they hold their owne not having lost any one worke at all, that the bourghers as well as the soldiers doe their duties very cheerfully, that for his owne particular he is resolved to stand yt out to the uttermost extremity till he know of any seccours intended.'

Vere tells Trumbull that he has given the Governor as much encouragement as he can and has 'come as neere to him as I could' and 'let him know the wants of the enemy.'... 'I hope soe well of his fidelity & valor that I hope the enemy will have a harder morsel of yt than he expected'.²³⁸

In the same month of Vere's letter to Trumbull reports were circulating in England that Vere had been 'forced to turne out of their Townes all superfluous people aswell Inhabitants as others' because of 'the fear of want of victuals'.²³⁹

Conversely, some six weeks later following the fall of Heidelberg, Vere writes to Trumbull in a different tone.

²³⁶ Pursell, *The Winter King*, p.183. See also *A Remonstrance of the French Subjects Professing the Reformed Religion*, (London, 1622), p.2.

²³⁷ Anon, *A relation of letters, and other advertisements of newes, sent hither vnto such as correspond with friends beyond the sea*. (London, 1622), pp.18-19.

²³⁸ BL Add Mss, 72315, f 155, Vere to Trumbull 5th August 1622.

²³⁹ Anon. *Newes from sundry places, both forraigne and domestique From Venice, Rome, Spaine, France, Naples, the Palatinate, and the Low-Countries*. (London, 1622, p.13.

'You will have heard how .. the enemy.. is become master of Heidelberg which he took on Friday last through the unworthiness of such as commanded in the outworks which without shote striking, both offycers and soldiers shamefully abandoned, Sir Gerard Herbert [the commander of the citadel] was the only man I hear that made any opposing, he with the English endured two sharp assaults, the enemy reenforcing the assailants with fresh men... Sir Gerard... was shot in the body and dyed on the place' several senior officers then surrendered... 'and diverse captains rendered themselves shamefully to the mercy of the enemy and thus in two hours were the works, suburbs and town lost'.²⁴⁰

Vere thus implies that though the English fought valiantly, troops of other nationalities were less inclined to die, the more especially since the soldiers were allowed to leave unmolested. This view is supported by Sir Simon D' Ewes who says it happened 'through the cowardice of the Dutchmen in the outworks'.²⁴¹ Clements Markham though argues that after twenty days of bombardment Tilly was able to capture part of the outworks and that with the gates of the city blown in, the Dutch Governor of the town Van Den Merven, retreated into the castle. Then, following the surrender of the castle, the soldiers were allowed to march out unharmed.²⁴² But townspeople were subjected to what was then considered a routine sacking and plundering for three days.²⁴³ News of the fall of Heidelberg finally ended the farcical peace negotiations in Brussels. But Frederick remained obdurate, refusing to give up his claims to either the Bohemian crown or to his electorate and he made preparation to return to the Hague and Elizabeth.²⁴⁴

Meanwhile Tilly had now moved on to invest Mannheim as recorded in a Coranto describing the resolution of Vere 'seeing hee had endured so much to his eternal fame and memory, he would sure put up the rest in the account of his Honour, and beare all with patience whatsoever might chance'.²⁴⁵ In his letter of the 21st September to Trumbull Vere had also noted that 'the enemy is sitting down before us, hath almost made some entrenchment and is bringing up the rest of his army.' Vere

²⁴⁰ BL Add MS 72315 f 157, Vere to Trumbull 21/11 September 1622. (written by Vere's secretary Francis Urenham).

²⁴¹ Akkerman (ed) *The Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart*, p. 401.

²⁴² Clements Markham, *The Fighting Veres*, p. 418. Markham, as usual, eschews any sources.

²⁴³ Akkerman (ed), *The Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart*, Vol 1. Frederick to Elizabeth, 20/30 September 1622, 'Behold my poor Heidelberg, taken they are exercising all kinds of cruelty, pillaging the whole town, setting fire to the suburbs, which were the most beautiful in the said region, poor Sir Herbert has been killed - please God that all those who are there would have been as loyal as he', p.399.

²⁴⁴ Pursell, *The Winter King*, pp.184 – 185.

²⁴⁵ Anon, *A True Relation of the Affaires or Europe, especially, France, Flanders, and the Palatinate*. (London,1622), p.13.

had less than 3000 men in the city, which was barely enough to secure even such modern, if incomplete, fortifications (Frederick's father had made improvements in Mannheim's defences, particularly the castle, in line with the *'trace italien'* style), especially as many of his men were sick and all of them were many months in arrears of their pay which – certainly amongst the mercenaries - led them more easily to desertion or surrender.

In late October (at about the same time that Mannheim was finally given up to its besiegers) a *Coranto* was circulating in England which contained what was claimed to be a letter from an Irish soldier in Tilly's army. This correspondent relates that Tilly had refused to allow letters from King James to Vere through his besieging lines, despite the fact that the messenger had a pass from the Archduchess who was, nominally, Tilly's superior. Nevertheless the messenger was treated well and escorted on his way to Heidelberg, now in Spanish hands. But before he left 'the English made a resolute sally out of the towne of about 4. Or 500 upon our trenches and I am sure he will report it to England that his nation had the best of it. But we hope ere long to give the general the *boniour*, and bid him good morning' The Irishman's letter goes on to say that Vere now has less than 3,000 men of whom 1,000 are English and that though he has food for some months he is short of ammunition and cannot now sufficiently man the walls, meaning that he will have to retire to the castle.

The overflowing Rhine had hampered Tilly for a while but now, the Irishman says, the army had established itself with well positioned batteries and additional troops. 'And after we have taken in this towne, we hope to have no great worke about Frankenthal for Generall Vere hath left but 2. English companies in the town & then the whole Palatinate is ours.'²⁴⁶ There is some confirmation of the refusal of Tilly to allow a messenger to get to Vere in a letter from a Thomas Locke to Dudley Carleton on 12th October 1622, Locke writes that 'Yesterday Murray the post came back from Mannheim and brought word that he could not deliver the Kings letter to Sir Horatio Vere; and the news is come hither that it is little better than lost'.²⁴⁷

Vere, realising the hopelessness of his position wanted to move all his remaining men to Frankenthal, where a combined force had a better chance of survival, but the burghers of Mannheim refused to allow him to leave.²⁴⁸ So, realising that he did not have sufficient men to defend the town, he tried to reinforce his garrison with men from Frankenthal 'I have called up hither 6 companies [at this stage probably

²⁴⁶ *A continuation of the weekly newes from Bohemia, Austria, the Palatinate, Italy, Spaine, France, the Low-Countries, and the East-Indies*, (London, 1622), No. 4.

²⁴⁷ Mr Thomas Locke to Sir Dudley Carleton, 12th October 1622. In Birch, *The Court and Times of James I*, Vol 2, p. 341.

²⁴⁸ Pursell, *The Winter King*, p.186. Pursell cites no authority for either of James's instructions.

less than 600 men] out of Frankenthal which wee and they together must make the best defence we cane and leave the rest to the providence of the almighty'.²⁴⁹

But it was not enough and Tilly was able to capture the town in late October 1622. When Vere retreated into the castle, Tilly offered him the chance of an honourable submission and Pursell says that King James then ordered him to surrender.²⁵⁰ Vere did so, marching out of the city with his troops and retreating to Frankfurt, having been forbidden by James to re-enter the Palatinate or to continue the fight at all.²⁵¹ The exact date of the surrender is in some doubt.²⁵² It must have been before the 30th of October 1622, because Vere wrote to Francis Nethersole, from Frankfurt, on that date;

'What I have long foreseen but could not prevent, to be forced by stronge hand out of a Country I have so much laboured to keepe is now fallen upon me. I am not ignorant what a great reputation the citadell of Mannheim hath for strength which will add some things to my unhappiness that it should resist noe longer, but such as truly understand the means left me to defend yt & this [page is torn] within will noe way wonder at the rendering a place so slenderly provided for, tis upon their judgement that I cast the censuring of my proceeding for the rest I shall the more lightly esteem of them by how much the more myne own experience & conscience narrows me in what is done, to have exposed myself & the rest under me to manifest butchery would have happily better satisfied ye first, but in these extremities to have chosen the lesser evill will (I assure myself) be better approved by the latter; This bearer cann acquaint you with what hath passed and therefore I shall not need to enlarge myself further upon this sad subject.'²⁵³ This last, sad but realistic letter of Vere's from the Palatinate war ended a period of Vere's military life which had seen him take on what had always been a difficult and unpromising role.²⁵⁴

James had never wanted to pour men and money into supporting what he saw as a diplomatic as well as a military mistake, and the Dutch were too wary of the impending end of the 12 year truce to devote more than a token force to the defence of the Palatinate, much less Frederick's lost Bohemian crown. The princes of the

²⁴⁹ BL Add Ms 72315, f157, Vere to Trumbull 21/11 September 1622.

²⁵⁰ Pursell, *The Winter King*, p.186. It would certainly have been difficult in the short time frame for James to order the surrender.

²⁵¹ *Biographica Britannica*, p.4012 f (m).

²⁵² Pursell gives no date for the surrender. Wedgewood give the date as November 5th whereas Peter Wilson offers November 2nd. This discrepancy could be due to the differences between the surrender of the town and the later surrender of the citadel. Neither say if the date given is old style or new style, so it is possible that, if Vere's date is old style, all three dates could be correct!

²⁵³ BL Add Mss 72315, f 159, Vere to Nethersole 30th October 1622.

²⁵⁴ Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier*, p.82.

Protestant Union might have provided some real backing for Vere and Frederick, but their valour failed and faded in the face of the Hapsburgs, whilst later the notorious Count Mansfield, with Duke Christian and the Marquis of Baden rallied enough troops to give Frederick some brief if transitory hope. But in the end Vere was left with too small and too unsupported an army to resist the much larger forces of Tilly and Cordoba, two of the most able generals of the age.

Some criticism was voiced against Vere for his surrender at Mannheim.²⁵⁵ But this was minimal, and as Vere said in his letter to Nethersole, he 'chose the lesser evil' which 'such as truly understand the means left me to defend this place...will noe way wonder at the rendering'. Vere clearly understood that the defences at Mannheim, newly constructed in the trace italien style to withstand canon fire might have been expected to prolong the defence. But his wider understanding and his humanity in 'choosing the 'lesser evil' is apparent. His staunch and heroic experiences at Ostend 20 years earlier had already proven his ability in a defensive role, so this assessment of the position at Mannheim – his 'experience & conscience' - warrants serious consideration.

In any case, Horace Vere returned to England in early 1623, where he was well received by the King.²⁵⁶ 'On Saturday [probably January 28th 1623] arrived here the Lord General Vere, who was the next day twice with his Majesty, brought in by Lord Marquis Buckingham, graciously received, and kissed his majesty's hand, who is said to have acknowledged his good services.'²⁵⁷ Indeed there is even the possibility that Vere was awarded a medal for his actions. Records held in the Punjab indicate that one of Vere's gentleman volunteers in the Palatinate, Dudley North 3rd baron Guildford, was awarded what is described as a 'badge for Military Service' in 1623. North was with Vere at the end in Mannheim but there are no extant records either of any special service he carried out or of the award of this 'badge'. However, it is certainly possible that if North was awarded such an honour then maybe others were given similar marks of prestige.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁵ *CSPD, James 1, 1622*, p. 462, Locke to Carleton, 20 Nov. 1622. And *CSPD James I, 1622*, p. 461.

²⁵⁶ *CSPD, James 1' 1623*, p. 489, Chamberlain to Carleton 10 Feb 1623, 'Sir Horace Vere has returned.' John Chamberlain also records Vere's return elsewhere 'I hear, since dinner, that the Lord general Vere is arrived at Gravesend'. Chamberlain to Carleton, 25th Jan 1623, in Birch, *The Court and Times of James I*, Vol 2, p. 359.

²⁵⁷ Birch, *The Court and Times of James I*, Vol 2, p. 360. This [anonymous] report, contained in a letter (dated 31st Jan) to the Revd J. Mead, also describes the difficulties faced by Vere and his troops at the end of their defence of Mannheim.

²⁵⁸ A. N. McClenaghan, 'Two Unusual Early Medals' *The Orders and Medals Research Society*, Vol.33, (Winter 94), p. 355-358. I am grateful to Dr David Trim for suggesting this possibility.

Vere was then, in July 1624, appointed to the council of War together with Cecil, who 'as the son of an Earl' demanded precedence over Vere.²⁵⁹ Vere then accompanied the King on an inspection tour of the royal dockyards whilst most of his troops were immediately reassigned, as ordered by James, to Cecil's regiment in the Low Countries.²⁶⁰

The last of Vere's strongholds, Frankenthal, managed to defy the Spanish and the troops of the Emperor for a further six months, even managing to take the offensive on occasion to capture much needed sustenance.²⁶¹ In addition the cold winter and floods assisted the defence.²⁶² Frankenthal's commander William Burroughs, Vere's Sergeant major general, only gave up his post on the direct orders of King James, on the condition that the town be restored to Elizabeth, James' daughter and the erstwhile Queen of Bohemia, but this promise was not kept either then or in subsequent negotiations.²⁶³ In fact the Spanish 'failed to deliver' on all their assurances over the Palatinate.²⁶⁴ Nevertheless for Vere to hold the Lower Palatinate for more than two years with such a small force, thus denying Spanish and Imperial forces from attacking the Dutch, all the while suffering the vicissitudes of Mansfield's mercenaries and Frederick's floundering, demonstrate his outstanding qualities as a leader.²⁶⁵

Later Life

The year 1623, as Horace Vere returned to England, seems to have been a comparatively quiet year militarily with no major engagements on either side. But then, in the summer of 1624, Spinola laid siege to Breda, an important town 50 Km south west of Rotterdam. Strategically located on the navigable river Mark, it was one of the strongest cities in the republic and had been captured by stratagem in 1590 by Maurice in what may have been Horace Vere's first taste of military action. Spinola had

²⁵⁹ CSPD, *James 1, 1624*, p. 244.

²⁶⁰ Dalton, *Life and Times*, p. 33f. This also recorded in a letter to the Rev. J. Mead from an unknown person in Birch, *The Court and Times of James I*, London 1848, Vol 2, p. 355.

²⁶¹ Anon, *A relation of letters, and other advertisements of newes, sent hither vnto such as correspond with friends beyond the sea*, (London, 1622). They apparently captured several hundred cattle.

²⁶² 'A New Survey of the Affaires of Europe with Other Remarkable accidents, not yet published by the ordinary Posts, but faithfully collected out of Letters of credit and good relations', (London, 1623), p 20.

²⁶³ Markham, *The Fighting Veres*, p.419.

²⁶⁴ Cust, *Charles I, A Political Life*, p.127.

²⁶⁵ In 1625 Mansfield persuaded King James to allow the recruitment of an army in England whose purpose was to be the recovery of the Palatinate. Vere was not involved and the expedition was a disaster.

assembled a large army for the task, by some estimates as many as 80,000 men. Most of the troops were south Dutch and German but there were also a significant number of Spanish and as many as 4,000 English and Irish. In late 1624 Maurice tried to relieve the siege but failed and then in early 1625 Horace Vere returned to command another relief force.

By 1624 Horace was in his 59th year but was still an active and committed soldier. On April 21st, just as Spanish soldiers started preparing for action against Breda, he was appointed to a grand council of war along with Edward Conway, Edward Cecil, John Ogle and 6 others in anticipation of war with Spain.²⁶⁶ This council was to have the direction of any monies spent on war by the English parliament.²⁶⁷

King James died in March 1625, followed less than a month later by Prince Maurice. Maurice had been a resolute and skilled military commander, whose tactical and strategic innovations had greatly helped to create not only a modern and highly efficient Dutch army, but had also played a major part in bringing these improvements to the forces of those nations whose volunteers had flocked to assist the Dutch. Both Francis and Horace Vere, amongst others, had learned their trade under his command. Fortunately for the Dutch and their allies Maurice's successor was a man of similar ability. Prince Frederick Henry took command of the Allied army in early May 1625, he was the half-brother of Prince Maurice and was accounted as at least as capable a general and a better politician.²⁶⁸ He now marched, with just 6,000 men, on Spinola whose army had been severely affected by disease and winter conditions. Horace Vere had re-joined his troops in the United Provinces, also in May, and assumed his old position at the head of the English. A report on the campaign, attributed to Horace Vere, is to be found in the National Archive.²⁶⁹ The report lists divisional and company commanders, the numbers injured and slain and commends the bravery of the English.²⁷⁰ Also mentioned, (amongst others) are Phillip Skippon (who was a lieutenant in the Forlorn Hope), Jacob Astley and Vere's nephew John Vere.

Vere describes 23 English companies marching out of Brabant on the 2/12 of May together with Scottish and French troops making up three Divisions for the attack on Terheyden. On this occasion Vere's second cousin Henry, the 18th Earl of Oxford, was his second in command, having previously served with Horace briefly in 1620.²⁷¹

²⁶⁶ Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier*, p.101.

²⁶⁷ Dalton, *Life and Times*, p. 65.

²⁶⁸ Wielenga, *A History of the Netherlands*, pp. 58-59.

²⁶⁹ NA SP84/127/147,151 and 154.

²⁷⁰ Vere reports that the English companies lost 62 killed and a further 103 injured.

²⁷¹ CSPD, *James I 1625*, p.171. And in Birch, *The Court and Times of James I*, Vol2, p. 208. In a letter to Carleton Chamberlain reports that Sir Horace Vere has 'carried the earl of Oxford out of reach of debauchery'. The young man certainly redeemed himself in the following

Henry had raised a regiment to serve under Horace and Vere's men took the lead in the assault but they were unable to break Spinola's siege of Breda, despite some early success. Henry Hexham later described the assault,

' His Highness the prince of Orange... gave command to Sir Horace Vere ... Lord Tylbery, and coronel Goring of the English, with my lord of Oxford, who commanded the new English, on the 16th May 1625, to fall upon the dike of Terhey, betweene the drowned lands; the dike being not above 20, or 30 foote broad at the most; the enemie having two, or three strong Redoubts ypo[upon] it, ere you came to the Half-moon before their quarter of Terhey. An hour before day, the new English fell on, first tooke two Redoubts upo that Dike, & an other upo Seuenberks-Dike, beate the Enemie out of the[re], slew many of the[m], & after a long fight the new & the old English fell upon the half moone, & disputed it a long with the Enemie, till such time as the Marquis [Spinola] sent fresh forces, horse and foote;.. to defend that quarter; now after sunrising, finding it not feisible, our men were drive(n) to retreat.'²⁷²

Hexham draws a distinction betwixt Vere's old English, i.e. the men of the existing English force and the New English that Henry De Vere had brought over to assist. Frederick, the deposed King and Elector, was also present. He wrote to his wife Elizabeth describing the camp and the outworks and of his attending a parade of English soldiers 'That morning I went with Baron Vere and Sir [Edward] Harwood to the approaches of the English where they are making a gallery to cross the ditch'²⁷³

Dudley Carleton, writing to Conway a few days later, suggests that want of sufficient ammunition and poor support from the rest of the army were contributing factors in their failure.²⁷⁴ Breda had been re-fortified in the modern style as recently as 1622 but Spinola's forces were numerous and well organised and the English suffered considerable loss with the Earl of Oxford amongst those wounded.²⁷⁵ Earl Henry died a few month later of fever, leaving no issue. He was succeeded after some legal wrangling by his second cousin Robert De Vere, a descendant of the 15th Earl and a

decade. Chamberlain to Carleton, 4 Aug 1620. Chamberlain had copied a doggerel poem which said that 'Horace Vere hath carried the Earl of Oxford where he neither shall have wine nor cheer'.

²⁷² Henry Hexham, *The famous siege of Breda*, 1637 Introduction p. 4-5. This account is found at the start of Hexham's longer relation of the retaking of Breda by Frederick Henry in 1637. Hence the reference to Lord Tylbery- Horace Vere – who was not ennobled until 25th July 1625, seven weeks after the action described above, p. 88.

²⁷³ Akkerman (ed), *The Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart*, Vol 1, Frederick to Elizabeth, p. 752.

²⁷⁴ NA SP84/127/36, Holland, Carleton to Conway 7th May 1625.

²⁷⁵ Clements Markham, *The Fighting Veres* suggests that Henry was the victim of sunstroke later writing to his wife that ' We fought as long as our ammunition lasted', p. 428.

soldier in the Dutch army.²⁷⁶ At the time of his succession to the Earldom, Robert had no children and this elevated Horace to the status of heir presumptive until 1627, when Robert's son Aubrey was born.

Unable to break the siege the allied forces, including Vere's English contingent, now retreated and Breda eventually surrendered to the Spanish on 2nd June 1625. On the 16/26 May Elizabeth, the exiled Queen of Bohemia, wrote to Sir Thomas Roe about the campaign 'if it had gone well Breda had bene safe but it was impossible the enemy being so well fortified, our nation had the vanguard and got much honour General Vere and my lord of Oxenford commanded them, who did carrie themselves so well as all admire their courage.'²⁷⁷ Breda was recaptured by Prince Frederick Henry in 1637.

Horace, the most distinguished soldier in the country, was then created Baron Vere of Tilbury on the 25th July 1625.²⁷⁸ This was an honour that had eluded brother Francis. But Horace's honour was well-deserved and long overdue and, since he was now the heir presumptive to the second oldest earldom in England his status as one of the most senior social figures in England necessitated noble rank.²⁷⁹ Yet there may have been another reason for this ennoblement. In May of 1625 the Duke of Buckingham offered command of an ambitious expedition to Cecil. This was the infamous raid on Cadiz which took place in October 1625. Cecil mismanaged the venture, failing to secure the treasure ships which were the main objective of the attack though in his defence, Cecil did importune Buckingham about the lack of time to prepare properly for the raid and the quality of the troops at his disposal.²⁸⁰ But the raid had been Buckingham's project and its commander had been the Duke's choice so despite its miserable outcome Cecil was raised to the peerage as Baron Cecil of Putney and Viscount Wimbledon in November 1625, thus leaping ahead of Vere in the aristocratic stakes. Yet even Cecil's biographer says that 'this title was ill-deserved'.²⁸¹ Despite the apparent rapprochement between Cecil and Vere which had been instigated by Buckingham and engineered by Carleton in the Hague in 1620, Cecil remained jealous of his (very) distant relation.²⁸² This is evidenced in a letter he wrote to Buckingham on 19th July 1625, having just discovered that Horace was soon to be

²⁷⁶ Lord Willoughby claimed the title through his mother's line. Lady Mary Vere [not to be confused with Horace Vere's wife] was the daughter of the 16th earl. Parliament finally awarded the title to Robert in 1627.

²⁷⁷ Akkerman (ed), *The Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart*, Vol 1, Elizabeth to Roe, p. 533.

²⁷⁸ *CSPD, Charles I, 1625*, p. 49a, July 13 1625. He was the first creation of Charles's reign. John Freeman (ed), Fuller, *Worthies of England*, p.180.

²⁷⁹ Trim, 'Fighting Jacobs Wars', p. 27. Of the 70 or so peers in England around this time more than a quarter were 'mercenaries' or had been created after first serving another country.

²⁸⁰ Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier*, pp. 85-86.

²⁸¹ Charles Dalton, *Life and Times*, p. 244.

²⁸² Charles Dalton, *Life and Times*, p.108. They shared a common ancestor in John de Vere the 12th Earl of Oxford.

ennobled. 'I hear that there is a Commission a drawing to make Sir Horace Vere a Baron of England. It is strange for me at this time to hear it, for that I know not what worth there is more in him, than in those that are equal in profession and before him in birth'²⁸³ Cecil's jealousy prompting here one of the few extant disparaging comments about Vere which may have been exacerbated by the fact that Cecil traced his ancestry back to the earls of Oxford through the female line.

Before the raid on Cadiz Buckingham had written to a number of senior diplomats and army officers in the Low Countries, advertising the expedition and asking them to send picked troops and officers to serve. But Horace Vere was told by the Duke that he would be required to stay behind and continue to command the English troops in the Low Countries.

The Duke's letter went on, 'For the present I have bin soe happy as to obtain from his Ma' the creating of you a Baron'.²⁸⁴ Charles Dalton commented on this as follows 'Richly as Sir H. Vere deserved the title, it is more than likely that he would never have got it had not the king wished to atone to him for appointing general Cecil, his junior officer, to a high command in the fleet'.²⁸⁵ Horace Vere was an unusual character for his time. He never seems to have solicited for any post or office or for royal favours and indeed he was treated badly by Elector Frederick, who never seems to have acknowledged Vere's efforts in support of Frederick's ambitions.²⁸⁶

Despite his ennoblement, Vere was still unpaid for his service in the Palatinate. Lady Vere had tried, on his behalf, to obtain redress via Prince Charles but was told in March 1625 by Sir Jasper Fullerton, one of the Princes servants, that the £500 asked for could not be paid because the King was too ill to authorise it.²⁸⁷ Later that same year Conway wrote to Dudley Carleton asking leave for Vere to come to England.²⁸⁸ Vere thus remained at home for the next two years because we know that during the siege of Grenlo (Groll) in July and August 1627 Edward Cecil commanded the English part of the Dutch army. The city surrendered to Maurice on the 19th August and Carleton, writing to Conway on the 18th July, just before the siege started, reports that 'my Lord General Vere came opportunely, who this day should be at the Campe'.

²⁸³ Ibid., p.108..

²⁸⁴ NA SP84/127/21, Buckingham to Vere, 5 May 1625. See too CSPD, Charles I, 1625, p. 60. In July Conway wrote to the Attorney General, Sir Thomas Coventry, asking him to prepare the grant of creation.

²⁸⁵ Charles Dalton, *Life and Times*, p. 95.

²⁸⁶ NA SP84/111/21, Carleton to Calvert. Carleton wrote that 'His [Vere's] pains and sufferance in that service deserve (I must confesse) better countenance than he hath found during the whole time of his abode here of the prince Elector', 20th January 1623.

²⁸⁷ CSPD *James I* 1625. p. 507, Fullerton to Lady Vere 23 March 1625. This was less than a week before James died.

²⁸⁸ CSPD, *Charles I* 1625, p.115, Oct 3, 1625. Conway's letter book, Minutes, p. 231.

There is no other extant record of Vere's presence either at the Hague, which is where Carleton was writing from, or at the siege itself.²⁸⁹ Secretary Coke, writing to Carleton on the 8th August (in the middle of the Siege) asks Carleton if he has received the last letter which was sent 'by the Lord Vere' which indicates that Vere was in England up until that time. Carleton clearly thought that Vere should be at the camp but as Cecil was definitely in command there then, as in 1610, it is unlikely that Vere was on active service at Grenlo.²⁹⁰

Upon his return to England in the autumn of 1625, after the failure at Breda, Horace and Mary moved from their London lodgings in the City to a house in Clapton, Hackney. They also owned land elsewhere in London as well as in Buckinghamshire, Bedfordshire and Gloucestershire.²⁹¹ Though Horace was of necessity away in Holland for much of 1627/28 their house in Hackney saw the marriage of Vere's eldest daughter Elizabeth to Lord Haughton in September 1626. A member of the Holles family, Haughton was the son of Lord John Holles who had served under Francis Vere. Another brother, Sir George Holles, had fought with the Veres at Nieuwpoort and Ostend. The second Vere daughter, Mary, then married Sir Roger Townshend just eight months later in May 1627. Townshend died in 1638 and Mary then married Mildmay Fane just five months after the death of her first husband. Horace Vere was also attending Parliament at this time in his new guise as Lord Tilbury but some sort of bodily indisposition must have afflicted him in May 1626 because he was granted leave to be absent from the House of Lords at this time.²⁹² Later in the same year Vere requested permission to be excused from going to Denmark and assisting the King of Denmark in the low countries which request was also granted.²⁹³

Then in March 1629 George Carew, the Earl of Totnes, died and Vere received the long awaited appointment as Master of the Ordnance, promised him in 1617. The office of the ordnance had existed since about 1400, but the war with Spain and subsequent European conflicts necessitated an enlargement of what had once been a small department of the King's privy wardrobe.²⁹⁴ The ordnance office stored gunpowder, weapons and armour and was responsible for the purchase and distribution of the same. Located in the Tower of London it also had smaller

²⁸⁹ Thomas Phillips (ed), *Sir Dudley Carleton's state letters, During his Embassy at the Hague*, A, Part 1627, (1841). p.41. Carleton to Conway 18th July 1627.

²⁹⁰ Phillips, (ed), *Sir Dudley Carleton's state letters, During his Embassy at the Hague*, A, Part 1627, 1841. Secretary Cooke to Carleton, 8th Aug 1627.

²⁹¹ See NA E115/396/47, E115/398/82, E115/397/123 and E115/397/118, for documents recording these holdings.

²⁹² CSPD, *Charles I 1626*, App. p. 566, Dispensation to be absent from parliament, 5th May 1626.

²⁹³ CSPD, *Charles I 1626*, p. 479, Conway to Buckingham, Nov 6 & 9 1626.

²⁹⁴ Stewart, *The English Ordnance Office*, p.6.

storehouses around London, though these were mainly used for naval supplies. As well, various castles around the country were used from time to time to store military supplies. The office of master was largely a formal post involving little actual administration and thus was usually given as a sinecure to a senior court figure.

One of the responsibilities of the office was the proving, or testing, of new firearms, a practice which is extensively covered in the drill manual attributed to Vere (see App.1).²⁹⁵ So unlike many of his predecessors in the post, Vere would have understood this practice and its importance in an age with few standards regarding manufacture and safety.²⁹⁶ Supposedly the ordnance reservoir for the English nation, the office was frequently starved of funds, occasionally defrauded by unscrupulous and corrupt officials, and all too often unable to supply weapons and gunpowder when they were actually needed.²⁹⁷ The irony of Vere's appointment was that eight years earlier, even given three months' notice, the Ordnance Office had been unable to supply or even procure enough arms to equip Vere's small expedition to the Palatinate.²⁹⁸

However, during his time as Master there is no extant evidence to show that there were any positive changes made in the Ordnance office which, until the creation of a standing army or navy, was the only permanent military establishment in England. But Vere was certainly actively involved, being instructed as late as May 10th 1634 to 'survey ther ordnance and gunners stores' aboard several of HM ships.²⁹⁹ And on the 1st of May of that year writing to Sir John Heyden regarding the equipment of the cavalry with carbines.³⁰⁰

In early September 1628, the Dutch Admiral, and sometime privateer, Piet Heyne captured a Spanish treasure fleet just off the coast of Cuba.³⁰¹ The treasure, 11,509,524 guilders worth of booty in gold, silver and expensive trade goods such as indigo and cochineal, was brought safely back to the United Provinces and used to fund the Dutch war effort for most of the following year.³⁰² This unexpected windfall prompted Frederick Henry to contemplate renewed military action and Vere returned to the Hague at Frederick's request to consult over what that action should be. It was thus resolved to capture Bois-le-Duc – Hertzogenbosh (usually called 's Bosch) or in English, Busse, a town that lies about 65 Kilometres south east of Rotterdam in

²⁹⁵ Lawrence *The Complete Soldier*, p.15. NA SP9/202/1, 'A Compendium of the Art of war'.

²⁹⁶ Stewart, *The English Ordnance Office*, pp. 96-98.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 42- 47.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.144.

²⁹⁹ CSPD, *Charles, 1634*, p.16, Privy Council to Vere 10 May 1634.

³⁰⁰ CSPD, *Charles, 1634*, p.1 May 1634, Vere to Sir Charles Heyden.

³⁰¹ Wielenga *A History of the Netherlands*, p. 59. Equal to about two thirds of the Republics annual war budget.

³⁰² Phillips, (ed), *Sir Dudley Carleton's state letters, During his Embassy at the Hague*, A, Part 1627, 1841. Secretary Cooke to Carleton May 1627. p.32.

northern Brabant. Initially constructed as a fortress town it was for a time in the 16th century the second largest city in what is now the Netherlands. Its importance at the time lay in its position close to the United Provinces and it had been used as a base of operations by the Spanish for their forays into Dutch territory. Frederick Henry began assembling troops, and Vere rendezvoused with him at Arnhem, 110 Km due west of Rotterdam. All in all the Prince managed to gather 28,000 men.³⁰³

Once again many young gentlemen went over to the Low Countries to serve under Vere, according to Hexham more than 100 of them, including, notably, the young Thomas Fairfax who was not yet 18 years old. Two of Fairfax's Uncles had been killed in the defence of Frankenthal seven years previously and Thomas was of the third generation of Fairfax's to enter Dutch service.³⁰⁴ Re-joining Vere was Phillip Skippon, who had first served under Vere in the Palatinate, enduring the two sieges of Frankenthal. Cecil, now Lord Wimbledon, and Sir Edward Vere, Horace's nephew were also present. Accompanying the army was Sir Harry Vane (the elder) who had replaced Dudley Carleton as ambassador to the Hague.

The city was bounded by marshes and low lying swampy ground which made a conventional siege impossible, but Frederick Henry used his men to divert the rivers Dommel and Aa, construct earthworks and, after pumping out the water, to closely invest the town.³⁰⁵ English and French troops were an important part of the siege and Vere was prominent in the assaults that took place. Although the city was strongly defended and a large Spanish force was nearby, after some minor encounters the Spanish relief force marched away and the city was forced to surrender in late September 1629, after a siege of three months but not before a mine was sprung under one of the city's bastions, creating a breach that was 'capable of being stormed'.³⁰⁶ Its loss was a real blow to the Spanish, the surrender cut the town off from the rest of the province and the area was treated by the Republic as an occupation zone without political liberties.

A second serious setback to the Spanish then occurred with the loss of Ambrosio Spinola 'one of the ablest generals of his time' who died in 1630.³⁰⁷ Without him, the remaining Spanish generals seemed unable to agree over command and basic strategy issues which resulting paralysis led to an inability to organise a proper relief army for Hertzogenbosh.³⁰⁸ Whilst the capture of the city was of limited strategic

³⁰³ t' Hart, *The Dutch Wars of Independence*, p.69.

³⁰⁴ Hopper, *Black Tom*, pp. 16-17.

³⁰⁵ Dalton, *Life and Times*, Vol 2, (London,1885), p. 294.

³⁰⁶ Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution. Military innovation and the rise of the West*. P. 13.

³⁰⁷ Edward Cust, *Lives of the Warriors of the Thirty Years War*, p.65.

³⁰⁸ t'Hart, *The Dutch Wars*, p.26.

value to the Dutch and the cost of its capture to the United Provinces was, at over 18 million guilders, an enormous amount of money - almost half as much again as the treasure captured by Piet Heyne, its loss was a considerable embarrassment to the Spanish.³⁰⁹ The siege was also remarkable for the presence of a large number of young men who, a dozen years later, played a significant role in the English Civil War.³¹⁰ With the Spanish in disarray and the Dutch now short of money, negotiations once again opened between them for peace, though no agreement was reached.

Vere now returned to the Hague and, for the next three years, divided his time between England and the United Provinces. One of Vere's last letters dates from this time. Writing to Constantin Huygens, Prince Frederick Henry's secretary, Vere asks permission for a certain Captain Theobalds to be granted leave to return to England to take the waters at Bath. 'wherein he hopes to enabler himself to doe the State and his Ex[cellency] better service, than he cann doe in the present infirmities of his bodie.' The letter suggests that Horace Vere is himself going to take the waters, as he had done in Spa in 1616.³¹¹

Then in 1632 Vere was summoned once again by Frederick Henry, this time to attempt to capture Maastricht, a city which lies about 100 Km south east of Antwerp. Maastricht had been in Spanish hands since 1579 and it lay deep in Spanish territory but Frederick Henry had received intelligence that suggested that the garrison there had been considerably reduced so as to reinforce the Palatinate which was now under direct threat from the Swedish forces of Gustavus Adolphus.³¹² The allied army assembled at Nijmegen on the 22nd May 1632 and consisted of Dutch, English, French, Scottish and south Dutch soldiers.³¹³

His southward march unhindered by the Spanish, Frederick Henry 'seized Venloo and Roermond' on his way to Maastricht, both towns surrendering with little resistance.³¹⁴ The siege of Maastricht then began on 9 June 1632 and lasted until the 22 August. Vere had 23 companies under direct command, twice the size of all the other regiments except that of Frederick Henry, the army commander, but even he had only 14 companies. With a total of 281 companies of foot, 58 troops of horse and 83 pieces of ordnance, Vere and Frederick Henry began first to complete an encirclement of the city, equipped with defensive fortifications both to resist sorties from Maastricht

³⁰⁹ Ibid., p.26.

³¹⁰ See Appendix 2.

³¹¹ <http://ckcc.huygens.knaw.nl/epistolarium>, huyg001/0506, Vere to Huygens, 15/5 April 1630.

³¹² Hexham, *A Journal of the taking in of Venlo*, pp. 4-5.

³¹³ C.V. Wedgewood, *The Thirty Years War*, p. 303.

³¹⁴ Hexham, *A Journal of the taking in of Venlo*, pp. 5,6.

and attacks from other Spanish forces in the vicinity.³¹⁵ Regiments took turns manning these dangerous forward positions and Vere, ever the pious God-fearing soldier, issued commands that, before going on duty there, the men should attend a service to hear prayers and sing a Psalm.³¹⁶

Hexham relates that during the Seige there were a number of attempts by the defenders to send messages outside the walls. On at least two occasions females from the city were stopped and found to have swallowed such messages.³¹⁷ On the 13th August one brave woman was caught and was forced to take 'over night...some pills' which, as Hexham writes 'worked so well with her, that the next morning they ([the messages] were found; the letters were to this effect, that unless they were presentlie relieved... it was impossible for them, to holde out the towne any longer.'³¹⁸ This must have heartened the attackers who thereafter resumed their assaults with increased ferocity.

In any case, by early August attempts to breach the fortifications of the city were looking promising and attempts were made to rush the walls, but the garrison resisted strongly and successfully denied the allied forces. Hexham explains that several of these sorties were preceded by the ignition of barrels of gunpowder placed underneath the city walls to produce a huge explosion. On one occasion, the defenders managed to remove half of the stockpile just before the explosion, 'neverthelesse it shooke the foundation of the wall so, that some earth being blowne up, the stone wall tumbled downe into the moate, about a rodd in breadth, which our men perceiving, giving a great shoote [shout], fell on Couragiously and ... gave fire in the teeth of the Ennemy.'³¹⁹ On that evening Vere's men were manning the entrenchments with Horace personally conducting the assault by the advanced English parties. The fighting continued, reaching a crucial point on the 17th August when it was only with the assistance of fresh troops that the city defenders, who had made continuous sorties, were pushed back.³²⁰ It was at this point that Robert, the nineteenth Earl of Oxford, was

³¹⁵ Ibid., pp.5,6.

³¹⁶ Ibid., p.8.

³¹⁷ Nadine Ackerman's book *Invisible Agents, Women and Espionage in Seventeenth-Century Britain*, (Oxford, 2018), gives other examples of the role of women in securing or delivering vital information in such situations.

³¹⁸ Hexham, *A Journal of the taking in of Venlo* p 16. And see Anon, *A Journal of all the Principal Passages of the late famous siege and Taking of the Citie of Mastricht by the Prince of Orange, by a gentleman of quality*, p 16.

³¹⁹ Hexham, *A Journal of the taking in of Venlo*, p. 19.

³²⁰ Anon, *A Journal of all the Principal Passages of the late famous siege and Taking of the Citie of Mastricht by the Prince of Orange, by a gentleman of quality*, p. 21.

shot in the head, leaving his 5 year old son Aubrey to inherit the Earldom.³²¹ Once again Horace Vere was the heir presumptive.

On the 20th August Vere's regiment was manning the entrenchments when another huge mine was detonated underneath the defences of the city which caused the collapse of a large section of the wall. A general assault was now ordered with Vere's troops in the vanguard. Vere himself, now 67 years old, supervised the assault despite heavy fire from the defenders. Despite the changes in military organisation Vere remained to some extent a part of the older mediaeval tradition of leading from the front as he had done many times before. Fortunately, unlike Gustavus Adolphus at Lutzen barely three months later, Vere was unharmed on this occasion.³²² The days of a commander leading his troops into battle were beginning to come to an end.³²³

Eventually, the loss of men caused Vere to order a retreat back into the entrenchments, but the defenders had reached the end of their resistance and the next day the city was surrendered to Prince Frederick Henry. Hexham records that 909 men of the allied army died, almost half of them English (423). Similarly of the 51 officers slain, 25 were English.³²⁴ All of which suggests that the victory was in essence an English triumph.³²⁵ The surrender terms were generous to the defenders in that they were allowed to march out and retain their weapons, and the terms of surrender also included a promise that 'the publique exercise of the Romish catholique Religion shall [continue] without any let or hinderance whatsoever.'³²⁶ But Frederick Henry had promised his men that they might pillage the city, a standard punishment for cities that resisted a siege, even though most of the ordinary townsfolk had no say in the decision to resist, yet were always the ones who suffered the most if the city was lost.³²⁷

This was to be Horace Vere's last campaign, bringing to an end over forty years of military service devoted to Dutch freedom and the Protestant faith. He now returned home to Hackney from whence, in early 1633, he wrote his last extant letter to an aide of Prince Frederick Henry. It is a letter of recommendation; 'The bringer of this, Mr

³²¹ Hexham, *A Journal of the taking in of Venlo*, p. 17. Aubrey was the last of the Veres, he had only one child, a daughter, and when Aubrey died in 1703, the Earldom died with him.

³²² Martin Van Creveld, *Command in War*, p. 51.

³²³ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

³²⁴ Henry Hexham, 'A Journal of the taking in of Venlo', pp. 25 -28.

³²⁵ Marks, 'England, The English and the Thirty Years War', p. 87.

³²⁶ Hexham, *A Journal of the taking in of Venlo*, p. 29.

³²⁷ t' Hart, *The Dutch Wars of Independence*, p. 101 -105. Throughout the 30 years' war the peasantry in areas of fighting or troop movement suffered dreadfully. Whilst towns were often sacked and looted following an unsuccessful defence the countryside was ravaged constantly by friend and foe alike. Extortion, murder, torture, rape and the burning of homes and villages were commonplace. The fact that the soldiers (and particularly the cavalry) were often starving and almost destitute themselves only exacerbated their actions.

Morris, hath a busyness with you, wherein hee prayeth your assistance. I doe joyne with him in the request that he makes to you'. Vere ends by saying 'yt is an affliction to me, that I am not able to doe him personal services'.³²⁸ But Frederick Henry would have been well aware just how much the new Dutch state and he personally (Mulheim; see page 118) owed Horace Vere.

Before the Maastricht affair Horace had been empowered to confer knighthoods and his last public act as commander of the English forces was on July 25th 1633, when he knighted William Boswell, the King's resident with the States - General. Horace Vere thereafter lived mainly in England. He saw his third child, Katherine, married to Oliver St John and arrangements begin for the marriage of his fourth daughter, Anne, to his old subordinate Thomas Fairfax though the marriage took place in June 1637 two years after Vere's death.

Vere made his will on the 10th November 1634, and began giving up all his posts.³²⁹ At the time his personal military command included thirty three foot companies, and some troops of horse. These were handed, respectively, to George Goring and one Mr Wilmott. At the same time Vere relinquished the mastership of the Ordnance to Lord Newport. The following year, on May 2nd 1635 at about 5pm, whilst dining with Sir Harry Vane [the elder] at Whitehall he was 'seized with an apoplexy as he sat at table'. *Biographia Britannica* says he had reached out for some fresh salmon but was then unable to draw his hand back and sunk down. Carried to a bed, he died two hours later. Horace Vere, Lord Tilbury, was buried in the same tomb as his brother Francis in Westminster Abbey. Abbey Records show that Horace was interred with his brother on May 8th 1635. There is no inscription to his memory on the tomb, though he was buried with full pomp and ceremony including a salute from the minute guns in the Tower.³³⁰ Horace Vere's modesty may be seen here too. He must have expressed a wish to be buried alongside Francis and if he did so then he must also have refused to have any additional inscriptions on the shared monument, otherwise Mary, his daughters, his many soldierly comrades and a grieving nation would surely have erected some fitting legend on the tomb. Sir Edward Cecil, Viscount Wimbledon, did at outdo his rival in one thing, he outlived him by three years dying in November 1638.³³¹

³²⁸ <http://ckcc.huygens.knaw.nl/epistolarium>, huyg001/0758, Vere to Huygens, 4th Feb 1633.

³²⁹ NA. Prob11/168/39 ff,7-8. He left everything to Mary who was also named as sole executrix.

³³⁰ *Biographia Britanica*, p. 4013.

³³¹ Dalton, *Life and Times*, p.351.

Conclusion

Horace Vere, the most famous soldier of his age served with distinction for over 40 years. His personal bravery, at Nieuwpoort, Ostend, Sluys and Mulheim followed by his astute generalship and man-management skills in the Palatinate, Hertzogenbosh and Maastricht were the precursor to the sort of admired military leader that finds favour today as was his modest, unassuming, character. Meanwhile his 'Compendium' demonstrated his understanding and application of the many facets of the still newly developing gunpowder warfare of the age, especially in relation to the duties and responsibilities of those in command under him. It was an understanding that influenced the 1623 Privy Council manual which he helped prepare.

Vere balanced service to a foreign power with the continuing admiration of successive English monarchs and other senior governmental figures whilst almost always away from the intrigues of the English court, an absence which had often worked to the detriment of others. He gained the admiration of both Prince Henry and Prince Charles who championed his cause respectively, over the Brill and the Palatinate command. Meanwhile Prince Maurice insisted on Horace's presence as a 'voluntary' in the first Cleves-Julich war even though Vere did not take command of the English there and the close collaboration of the two men over a 20 year period says much about Vere both as a soldier and as a politico-diplomat. Maurice was an astute politician and celebrated military commander himself and it is unlikely that he would have kept Vere at his side had he not esteemed his contribution to the Dutch cause.

Maurice's successor Frederick Henry, (another astute and respected leader) whom Vere had saved at Mulheim, consulted Vere about the attack on Hertzogenbosh in 1629 recalling him back from England to the Hague and repeating the process three years later at Maastricht.

All three of Horace Vere's predecessors in the Dutch command fell afoul of the Dutch and the English hierarchy, but Horace Vere maintained good relations with both in an age where nepotism and rank were the essence of success. This ability, born out of Horace Vere's shrewd awareness of his initially low status, demonstrated that noble rank was not a prerequisite component of a successful military career. Diplomatically too Vere showed throughout his career an understanding of contemporary politics that kept him at the forefront of his profession for so long. His behaviour and foresight at Utrecht, his carefully worded letter to Secretary Coke and his support from both Prince Henry and Prince Charles aided by his strong and consistent backing from both Maurice and Henry of Nassau, point to a shrewd and well attuned individual who understood how to thrive in the political jungle of his day. His ability to do so when

functioning in military, diplomatic and religious fields accros two separate political environments points to a remarkable diplomat and leader.

This is all the more noteworthy given that Vere carried his faith with him at all times, even eschewing command when he was not convinced that a campaign was in the service of his faith as with the first Cleve-Julich war. Added to these solid and remarkable achievements Vere's lasting bequest was the influence he had on the large number of young men who, less than a decade after his death, would fight the English civil wars. (see App 2). Both the Compendium and the Privy Council manual must in turn have greatly influenced the men who learned their trade in his 'nursery'. These men took forward the lessons they had learned under Vere's tutelage and command to fight the English Civil War and to create the first English standing army on home soil thereafter.

But before discussing Vere's legacy it is important to study contemporary views of his achievements, his character and his impact upon society. In the absence of press and other media reporting of the sort we expect today we must look elsewhere for such material. Poetic sources supply a rich trove and the next chapter will discuss these contributions.

5. Poetic Acclaim

This chapter will consider the way in which Horace Vere was seen by contemporaries before and just after his death by analysing the several poetic appreciations of the man that exist. These appreciations will help to paint a more rounded picture of Vere than his strictly military persona as it appears in his letters and in contemporary and other histories of his life. They uncover and embellish not only his military achievements but his piety, his humanity and his public image. They are more than simply poetic approbation because they represent almost the only public assessment available from the time and therefore represent a much larger proportion of popular awareness than they might today. In the absence of newspapers or indeed any of what we might today call 'the media' and when a substantial proportion of the population was illiterate, easily learned and oft repeated verse was almost the only way that fame could accrue. One good example of this is the fact that even today, it is only through this medium that we know that Horace Vere spent most of his career partially disabled. The importance of poetry in rounding out the man and its universally good opinion of him must not be underestimated.

In 1609, the great poet Ben Jonson wrote a glowing tribute to Horace Vere in the form of an epigram.¹ Jonson, one of the most important poets and playwrights of the day, almost certainly knew Vere and sent this appreciation to him on October 18th.² Jonson's words are thus tinged with the memory of Vere as a man rather than as just a public figure. The epigrams were intended, as Jonson himself states, to identify and include 'many good and great names...to their remembrance to posterity.'³ Vere is in powerful company in this collection where Jonson writes about a number of senior societal figures which Philip West acknowledges 'To have one's name recorded by Jonson is to have done something to rise above the general level of humanity'.⁴ But more importantly, according to Philip West, Jonson 'names the virtuous and praiseworthy' hoping to 'effect moral reformation', an ambition for which Horace Vere was a very suitable candidate.⁵

Then, in the autumn of 1622 with Vere besieged in Mannheim, George Chapman wrote a lengthy appeal to the nation and the King to send a relieving force to save Vere from defeat and possible death. *Pro Vere, Autumnl Lachryme* (autumn

¹ Richard Dutton, (ed), *Ben Jonson, Epigrams and the Forest*, (Oxford, 2003). The OED defines an epigram as 'a short poem with a witty ending or pointed saying. p.70

² Phillip West, Epigrams and the Forest, in *The Oxford handbook of Ben Jonson*. p.2, 8.

³ Ibid., p.6

⁴ Ibid., p. 8

⁵ Ibid., Abstract.

tears) is an emotional work which runs to over one hundred lines.⁶ Chapman was a classical scholar, translator, dramatist and poet.⁷ He was associated with the De Vere (Earls of Oxford) family about whose members he wrote at least three works and it is probable that he knew Horace Vere personally since Chapman had himself served in the Dutch Wars under Francis Vere in the 1590s.

More poetic praise was to appear in 1642, seven years after Vere's death, when a collection of elegies in his memory were collected by one R. Badger for a Christopher Meredith, who published them in London and dedicated them to Lady Mary Vere, Horace's widow.⁸ It may be that some of the elegies were written immediately after Vere's death though several of the elegists would then have been in their early teens, however the elegies are interesting in their own right because of the light they shed on Vere as a soldier, a champion of Protestantism and an important but largely unstudied figure in early modern English military, religious and social history. All but two of the 19 elegists were either students at Christchurch College Oxford or were recent graduates thereof. At the time, as Andrea Brady notes, 'Universities, notably Christ Church College at Oxford in particular, were a centre for verse production in the seventeenth century.'⁹

In addition eleven of the Vere elegists had been pupils at Westminster school which had a number of places at Christchurch reserved for the school's alumni. (Ben Jonson was one). Furthermore, at the time of writing, six of the elegists were, or were training to be, in holy orders. Why did this group of young, unknown scholars, most of them gentlemen or of the nobility, decide to commemorate Horace Vere at a time when England was on the brink of civil war? What were their motives in writing what they did, when they did and why did such a closely connected group decide to do so, especially at such a turbulent time in English history when a declaration concerning both religion and politics could be dangerous? But more importantly, what can their words tell us about the nature, life and character of Horace Vere?

Whilst there is no evidence that Vere was a pupil at Westminster or an alumnus of Christchurch College we do know that the De Vere family did have one presence at the college. Horace Vere's cousin Henry, the 18th Earl (who served under Horace and

⁶ George Chapman 'Pro Vere, Autumnl Lachryme' Inscribed to the Immortal memory of the most Pious and Incomparable Souldier, Sir Horace Vere, Knight Besieged and Distressed in Mannheim'. (London, 1622). Which title may be translated as For truth, autumn tears. Playing on the name of Vere.

⁷ <https://www.britannica.com/biography/George-Chapman>. (c.1559-1634), A prominent dramatist and poet, he knew the Veres personally both as a soldier and as a friend of the family so his Autumnl Lachrym has added poignancy. 1911 .

⁸ *Elegies celebrating the Happy Memory of Sir Horatio Veere*,

⁹ Andrea Brady, *The English Funeral Elegy in the 17th century, Laws in Mourning*, (London, 2006), p. 20.

was killed at the siege of Breda in 1625) was at Christ Church in 1605.¹⁰ Horace's older brother Robert, who was killed in 1595, fighting against the Spanish, was also at Oxford though much earlier (1581) and at a different college (Magdalen).¹¹ There is no extant indication of an academic career in the elegies but there is considerable evidence about Vere's character.

Interestingly, it is only from the elegies that there emerges strong evidence that Horace Vere spent much of his military life partially disabled. Since several of the elegists mention him being lame. This chapter will discuss the importance of Jonson's epigram, Chapman's plea, and the nineteen elegies in evaluating the character of Horace Vere and the way in which he was seen and assessed by contemporaries.

Ben Jonson

Jonson's poetic accolade, '*To Sir Horace Vere*' is written in the form of an epigram. It is important, not only because it came from one of the most respected and well known writers of the day, but because of the way the work focuses on Vere's character rather than his military exploits.¹² When Jonson published his poetic tribute, Horace Vere was a famous and distinguished military figure, and as such he was a particularly suitable subject for the sort of heroic, muscular, Christian poetic praise that was popular at the time. This was especially so coming from the pen of Jonson, a man of uncommon wit and talent, a noted playwright and, like Horace Vere a contemporary of Shakespeare.

Jonson does not dwell upon the already well known and much admired military aspects of Horace's life. Indeed, Jonson deliberately passes over these martial aspects as something almost to be taken for granted. Rather he addresses the personal characteristics apparent only to someone who had seen and witnessed them at first hand. In the early 1590s Jonson had fought in the Dutch wars of independence.¹³ Under Francis Vere's command – like Chapman - Jonson and Horace Vere probably served alongside each other as young gentlemen and it may have been then that Jonson formed an early impression of the God fearing, pious soldier in his militarily formative years.¹⁴ Though written in 1609 his epigram to Horace appears in Jonson's

¹⁰ Admitted to the bar in 1604 he gained his Master's degree in 1605.

¹¹ Email from Magdalen College Dev. Office, 12/6/20.

¹² Jonson is regarded as one of the major dramatists and poets of the seventeenth (or indeed any other) century.

¹³ See William Drummond, *Heads of a Conversation betwixt the Famous Poet Ben Johnson and William Drummond of Hawthornden, January 1619*, p.18.

¹⁴ Epigrams and the Forest', (ed) Richard Dutton, (Manchester, 2003) p.70. Jonson's later epigram '*To True Soldiers*' suggests that he remained enamoured of the profession thereafter;

I love Your great Profession; which I once, did prove:
And did not shame it with my actions, then,

1616 folio edition of the *Workes*. Jonson would have been well aware of the by then famous general's public exploits, but his personal knowledge of Vere prompted him to concentrate on Vere's individual qualities.¹⁵ Jonson died less than two years after Horace Vere so his epigram was both current and contemporary. Philip West explores Jonson's apparent delight in 'wordplay' here, especially what he calls 'the simple act of periphrasis', that is, using a personal attribute to name someone¹⁶. In Horace Vere there was a surfeit of such possibilities. (see p 200 below). Jonson compares Vere to the Roman Horatius,

'Which of thy names I take, not only bears
A Roman Sound, but Roman Vertue wears
illustrious Vere, or Horace; fit to be
Sung by a Horace, or a muse as free:¹⁷
Which thou art to thyself'¹⁸

This was 'Ancient' Roman (and pagan) virtue of course, not the Romish religion. The poem continues;

'Whose fame was won
In th'eyes of Europe, where thy deeds were done'
When on thy Trumpet she did sound a blast,
Whose relish to Eternity shall last.
I leave thy acts, which should I prosecute
Throughout, might Flatt'ry seem; and to be mute
To any one, were Envy: which would live
Against my Grave, and Time could not forgive.

Jonson sees dilemma in either seeming to flatter Vere by over description of his achievements or of envying him by not recounting all his many triumphs.¹⁹ In the end he chooses not to dwell upon Horace's martial prowess '*won in th'eyes of Europe*' but instead

'I speak thy other graces, not less shown

¹⁵ Charles David Jago, 'Names and Naming in Ben Jonson's Epigrammes: performing the social performance'. MA thesis, (McMaster University, 1993).

¹⁶ Phillip West, Epigrams and the Forest, in *The Oxford handbook of Ben Jonson*. p.9

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 8-9

¹⁸ Jonson knew and admired the works of (The Roman) Horace. See Drummond, *Heads of a Conversation*, p. 5.

¹⁹ West, Epigrams and the Forest, p.6

nor less in practice; but less marked, less known;
 Humanity and piety which are
 As noble in great chiefs, as they are rare;
 And best become the valiant man to wear,
 Who more should seek Men's reverence, than fear?'²⁰

Jonson chooses to expose the personal qualities that made Horace Vere so loved and admired by those who served under him as well as by those who continued to trust him with command. Jonson writes of '*other graces ... less known*' perhaps by the wider public who would have been much more cognisant of Vere's military prowess.

The literary scholar Richard Hillyer discusses the poetic influences and nuances of the poem in detail, asserting that the epigram to Vere was Jonson's 'finest name-based epigram.'²¹ Hillyer suggests that Vere 'has become his own free muse by making his life a piece of heroic poetry' which makes Vere an artist in his own right since he has created 'undying fame without (writing) commemorative verse'. Hillyer notes how the names 'Horace' and 'Vere' themselves play semantically, Vere on the Latin root for such qualities as truth (vere) and manliness, strength, bravery and courage (virtus) and Horace both as the great Roman muse and poet as well as the legendary hero who 'kept the bridge' against the hordes of Lars Porsena.²² This is an apt comparison, as the Roman Horatius kept the bridge against overwhelming odds in much the same way that Vere defended Mannheim and the Palatinate in 1622.

Chapman and Jonson certainly knew each other, had previously engaged in a fleeting literary feud and were both sponsored by the prominent Calvinist Lucy Russell, Countess of Bedford. Russel was a cousin of William Herbert with whom she collaborated in many ventures. As a leading Puritan 'the scale of her patronage was impressive' and she was the dedicatee of over 50 works herself including Jonson and Chapman.²³ So when he came to write the epigram, Jonson drew upon not only his own personal experiences of Horace formed in and at a time of conflict but also upon the contemporary views and feelings of court circles and of society at large. Literary patronage was not only an attempt to encourage and spread ideas and cultural norms,

²⁰ Richard Hillyer, 'In more than name only' *The modern language review*, Vol.85, (Jan.1990), pp. 1-11. Jonson, 'To Sir Horace Vere', p. 59.

²¹ Hillyer 'In More Than Name Only': Jonson's 'To Sir Horace Vere' pp. 1-11.

²² Babington, Thomas, Lord Macaulay, 'Horatius at the Bridge' in Bliss Carman, et al., (eds), *The World's Best Poetry, Volume VII*, (Philadelphia, 1904), p.121. For the best known though of course much later version of the story.

²³ Marion O'Connor, Godley patronage: Lucy Harington Russell, Countess of Bedford, in Elizabeth Scott Baumann and Johanna Harris (Ed's), *The Intellectual Culture of Puritan Women, 1558-1680* (Basingstoke, 2010).

especially amongst like-minded religious groupings such as those favoured by the Puritan Russell but a way of declaring membership of a particular circle, reinforcing and legitimising (in this case) a particular brand of piety. In this respect those patronised by Horace and Mary Vere and those who in turn dedicated works to them were affirming their membership of a religious grouping, both giving and taking comfort from a shared conviction of religious rightfulness.

It has been suggested that Chapman's work, and that of Jonson, were simply part of a counter blast to some contemporary denunciation of Vere for his surrender but both works clearly predate the defeat at Mannheim.²⁴

Jonson clearly sees Horace as a worthy man, humane, pious and possessing the ability to win men's hearts, something he probably saw demonstrated at first hand. It may be that the nineteen less poetically able elegists, who wrote their tributes 25 years after Jonson's accolade had read what he wrote and tried to emulate his style. Certainly several of them took up and elaborated on his theme of piety and humanity, though with less economy and less perceptive simplicity. Jonson could easily (and certainly more popularly) have concentrated on Vere's martial qualities, but chose instead to dwell upon his personal characteristics of kindness and concern for others.

Given Vere's martial reputation, Jonson is clearly pointing out that such personal traits enhance mere military prowess. Jonson also stresses that such characteristics are rare in 'great chiefs' and is, in effect, saying that commanders would do well to follow Vere's example and 'seek Men's reverence' rather than their 'fear.' Certainly, if 'piety and humanity' had been common Jonson would not have made so much of these qualities. Jonson had actually fought with and for other leaders and must have mingled with yet others at court which suggests that he knew what he was talking about. As someone who knew Francis and Horace personally Jonson's comments about 'reverence' and 'fear' in the epigram may well be allusions to what Thomas Fuller says about the two brothers. (page 126)

Chapman

Chapman was a friend of Jonson with whom he often collaborated and with whom he had spent time in prison for writing *Eastward Ho*, a play about Scottish Urbanites that James I considered offensive to his fellow Scots.²⁵ The detailed knowledge displayed in

²⁴ Akkerman, (ed), '*The Correspondence of Elizabeth*', Vol.1, p. 434, f2.

²⁵ The play was a collaboration between Ben Jonson, Chapman and another prominent English playwright, John Marston. Marston was a notable writer of satirical pieces and he was imprisoned again in 1609 for a similar offence, Marston later became a clergyman and married the daughter of James I's chaplain. Editors of *Encyclopædia Britannica*, accessed June 2017.

another of Chapman's works, 'The shadow of Night' of an incident in the Dutch wars suggests that Chapman served as a soldier under Francis Vere and was familiar with military life. Thus it is likely that he knew Horace Vere personally.

In the autumn of 1622 Horace Vere was besieged in Mannheim. Surrounded by Imperial forces his plight was, by the end of October, hopeless. Vere's plight was well known in England where most of his men, volunteers in the main, originated. Contemporary Protestant opinion in England thought it an outrage that James would do nothing to assist his son-in-law to regain his patrimony thus leaving James' only daughter to live in exile. But James was not moved to act. And without assistance Vere, heavily outnumbered in Mannheim and without hope of relief, had to face the inevitable.²⁶ (see above p 180). But just before he was forced to surrender the writer George Chapman published 'Autumnl Lachryme', his plea for a rescue attempt.

From the start of the work it is clear that Horace Vere is a public figure. Chapman makes no material attempt to explain who Vere is and what is his situation, he assumes that his readers will be aware of Vere and his role in the Palatinate. He has no hesitation in acclaiming Vere. He calls him 'this full spring of man, this Vere of Veres'. Chapman knew the De Vere family well so to call Horace Vere the 'Vere of Veres' is quite a claim. Chapman is raising Horace above the rest of a family which included previous and existing earls and, most tellingly, Sir Francis Vere, Horace's older brother. Thus Chapman's claim is great indeed especially since many, if not most, of his intended readers would have been aware of the exploits of both brothers as prominent members of

'That race of bright ELIZA'S blessed Raigne,
past all fore-Races, for all sorts of men'²⁷

Chapman asks if Vere is to be left 'In a Dutch Cytadell, (to) dye pinn'd, and pinde' [pined]) contrary to all the old national ties 'To Vertue and thy English Valour' and warns that it will be 'a blasting Ban to let him perish'. He asks to 'Muster then ... all they armed men... and fly to his rescue'. This is only just, Chapman argues, 'For who can Resist God, in the Right of such a man'

But Chapman wants only the bravest and hardiest of men for the task, those that 'hee hath made to live in forts and tents, And not in soft SARDANAPLIAN STIES of swinish Ease.'²⁸ For though these men are rare they are commendable and so 'worthy men the breeders are of Worth'. Here Chapman utilises a popular convention which we

²⁶ Clements Markham *The Fighting Veres*, p.419.

²⁷ George Chapman *Pro Vere, Autumnl Lachryme*, Leaf B.

²⁸ The Assyrian king Sardanapalus was apparently noted for his luxurious and sensual lifestyle.

shall see employed frequently in later poetic tributes. He uses the heroic status of Vere to encourage the same virtue in others combining guilt and anger with piety and nationalism in the hope of producing a real, practical response. Chapman ends his flowery and allusion laden verse with a clear and straightforward appeal to King James.

‘But thou hast now a kind and pious King
That will not suffer his immortall Spring [Vere]
To die untimely; if it in him it lye
To lend him Rescue.’²⁹

But the appeal went unheeded. James did try several times diplomatically to have the Palatinate returned to Frederick but all of them failed. In any case, given the date of its publication, even if Chapman’s entreaty had been successful there would not have been enough time to send a relief force before Mannheim fell. Chapman wrote for a living and was often in debt, so it is possible that he was hoping for some material reward for his words as well as a rescue mission, but it is unlikely that he would have written at all unless he felt that his words would be well received. Clearly, Vere’s reputation already stood high in the public consciousness when Chapman’s plea was published.

The Elegies

The funerary culture of pre-Reformation Europe has been characterised as ‘a cult of the living in the service of the dead’.³⁰ For most Catholics up to and beyond the Protestant Reformation final salvation was dependent upon formal and elaborate ceremony, continuing prayers, and often money, for those they left behind. But the Reformation challenged and changed this practice for those who adopted and then often adapted the new religion. Those who favoured this fresh approach clearly agreed with Shakespeare that ‘moderate lamentation (was) the right of the dead; (but) excessive grief the enemy to the living’³¹

So in the minutiae of the apparent hair splitting that characterised the rapid evolution of Protestantism between Luther and the English civil war, Catholic lamentation was, in the non-Catholic world, at least in part, replaced by the growth of the Elegy. Though similar in function, the elegy is distinct from the epitaph, ode, and eulogy: the epitaph is brief; the ode solely exalts; and the eulogy is most often written in

²⁹ See Appendix 3.

³⁰ Dennis Kay, *Melodious Tears. The English Funeral Elegy from Spenser to Milton*, (Oxford, 1990), p.2.

³¹ William Shakespeare, ‘All’s well that ends well’ 1.1.51. Lafeu is consoling the Countess on the death of her husband.

formal prose.³² Dennis Kay suggests that it was Edmund Spencer, the Tudor poet, who was the first to apply the word 'Elegy' to a funeral lament.³³ Particularly after the ascent of Elizabeth and into the reign of James the elegy became an increasingly popular way of commemorating a life's achievements.³⁴ Several reasons have been advanced for this.

Firstly, the growth of literacy amongst the nobility and the gentry was a marked feature of the period.³⁵ Secondly, the gradual demise and democratisation of the elaborate formal funerary rites of the Catholics left room for the interpolation of new forms of remembrance which were not necessarily the preserve of the established poets of the day.³⁶ In fact it is clear that growing numbers of newly literate young men (and it does seem to be young men) began to seize upon the writing of elegies as a sort of Jacobean equivalent of social media comment. Thirdly, some schools began to use the writing of elegies as a method of examination, when students would be expected to lay out their prose to be tested, and to have their composition compared to that of their fellows. To that end poems were often displayed in communal spaces – such as the Hall of Westminster School where scholars hung verse on the King's Birthday.³⁷ Such a method of praise for gallant virility became part of the curriculum and soldiers such as Horace Vere suited this purpose well.³⁸ This was particularly the case given the suggestion, at the time, that as sin and vice agree best with basic human nature those who overcame it effectively, with Gods help, are doubly blessed.³⁹ In this respect Horace Vere was a perfect fit.

Being able to write good verse, using proper grammar, in the form of an elegy, concentrated the writer on a single, immediate, subject often within time constraints and colleges became a kind of laboratory in which the writers practiced and learned about composition.⁴⁰ Authors, competing with one another to demonstrate fluency and invention within a strict format, composed most elegies in rhyming couplets and their production was encouraged partly because (it was felt) they stimulated the reader to emulate the achievements and virtues of the subject but also because they contributed to the maintenance of a military society through the praise of active virtue.⁴¹

³² Scott Newstock. *Quoting Death in Early Modern England: The Poetics of Epitaphs Beyond the Tomb*, (London, 2009), Intro, pp. 2-9.

³³ Kay, *Melodious Tears*, p.125.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

³⁵ Newstock, *Quoting Death*, p.16.

³⁶ Kay, *Melodious Tears*, p.66.

³⁷ Brady, *The English Funeral Elegy*, p.66.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.30.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.37.

⁴⁰ Kay, *Melodious Tears*, p.5.

⁴¹ Brady, *The English Funeral Elegy*, pp.12 - 18

The untimely, unexpected, and much mourned death of Prince Henry in 1612 at the age of 18 helped to further promote and popularise the elegy. As Kay observes 'never before had so many elegies been written on a single occasion'.⁴² Henry had been a great and pious champion of the Reformation, banning Catholics from his court and being seen as 'the hope of militant Protestantism'.⁴³

His early death was much lamented by Protestants generally who had looked to him to lead a great militant Protestant crusade when he succeeded his father, James II, who had himself been cast in a similar role before his accession, but had proved to be a disappointment to many in that respect. That these hopes and expectations then settled upon Henry may well have been useful to James. A militarily enthusiastic son helped to mop-up some of the Protestant passion for action, which would have been expensive, politically risky, and may have become subversive. It was a pressure that grew out of the expectation that had surrounded James almost from the time it became apparent that he would succeed Elizabeth, long before he actually ascended the English throne.⁴⁴ Once established as King in England the pressure grew, exacerbated by the various plots against him.

But remembrance of, or praise for, the deceased was not always the ultimate objective of the elegy. 'Elegists used the occasion... to parade their rhetoric or to prove their worth by commending the virtue of the departed'.⁴⁵ Even more self-serving there was sometimes a chance that an elegy, sent to a grieving relative, would be rewarded financially or by preferment. Richard West, one of the Vere elegists, wrote an earlier elegy, to Lord Strafford, who was executed in 1641.⁴⁶

'What is it to me who am no herald if a baron die? I do not hope for fees;
I'm none of those that pay down tears for legacies, or clothes.
My solemn griefe flowes in a nobler tide.'⁴⁷

West was rector of Shillingford in Dorset in 1649 and later, in 1664, Canon of Combewall, and Rector of Durweston in the same county. He was ejected from his

⁴² Kay, *Melodious Tears*, p.128.

⁴³ Ibid., p.129.

⁴⁴ Elizabeth Gilliam, W.J. Tighe, To 'Run with time. Archbishop Whitgift, the Lambeth Articles, and the Politics of Theological Ambiguity in Late Elizabethan England'. *The XVI Century Journal*, 1 July 1992, Vol.23 (2,), pp. 325-340.

⁴⁵ Brady, *The English Funeral Elegy*, p. 22.

⁴⁶ Thomas Wentworth, 1st Earl of Strafford (13 April 1593 – 12 May 1641) was an English statesman and a major figure in the period leading up to the Civil War. He was a favourite of Charles I but was eventually abandoned by the King who signed his death warrant.

⁴⁷ Brady, *The English Funeral Elegy*, p. 77.

college in 1647 by parliamentary visitors who must have considered him to be a liability to the Parliamentary cause.⁴⁸ He died in on May 22 1690.

The Vere elegies follow the earlier classical and traditional pattern of expressions of grief followed by acclaim and respect ending with a measure of consolation and comfort. Of course, elegies did not spring fully formed into life as Elizabeth came to the throne. Pre- Reformation obituary verses had a long history as Dennis Kay observes.⁴⁹ Beginning with laments for monarchs, influenced by European practices, and taking on board the need to teach others by the example of the deceased, they also included warnings from the grave and an exhortation to valour.

It is helpful to categorise the Elegies under four headings; Military Prowess; Piety; Humility and Lameness.

Military Prowess

Horace Vere's lost fame rests primarily upon his military legacy. A lifelong soldier from the age of 25 up until his death, he fought in the front line in many campaigns, was both besieger and besieged, and commanded troops, often of different nationalities, at every level from junior officer to commander in chief. He served on councils of war at home in England, and in the United Provinces, and he understood all the ancillary issues of war such as finance, supply and morale. His elegists touch upon all these things.

The first of these elegists to be considered is Richard West. He is one of six Vere elegists who took holy orders.⁵⁰ West was a student at Christchurch in 1636/7 and before that a pupil at Westminster School. He begins his elegy to Vere by reassuring his readers that though Horace fought for the Dutch he was most definitely English and nobly born too.⁵¹ But he then goes on to say that

‘he (Horace) high births as things of chance did scorn.

He lived more nobly than he was borne.

He left the Wanton Chambers, where soft beds Beare Feathers
and what's lighter Courtiers heads’

⁴⁸ *Alumni Oxoniensis 1500-1714*, Parker and Co, (London,1891). The Parliamentary Visitations began in September 1647 and continued for several years both at Oxford and Cambridge. The H of P wanted to reform the University Colleges and many heads of college were expelled including Samuel Fell at Christ Church together with seven of his canons, one of whom was Richard West.

⁴⁹ Kay, *Melodious Tears*, p.9.

⁵⁰ These are West; William Snow; William Towers; Thomas Isham and Francis Palmer. Their elegies do not extoll Vere's piety any more or less than their lay fellow elegists.

⁵¹ *Elegies* leaf B – B5.

Horace however has 'chosen the fields of Honour' with 'The earth (his) bed' where 'hard nights bred solid fame.'⁵² Not only is Richard West praising Horace as a man who chose the hard life of a soldier, but he is criticising those who chose a softer calling and he is thus promoting the valorous endeavour beloved of the age. More dangerously, given the times, in identifying the 'light heads' as belonging to courtiers he is indirectly criticising the crown though this was a common topos at the time. There is an echo here too of Chapman's 'soft SARDANAPLIAN STIES.'

West criticises not only those who stayed in England in their soft beds but also calls into question the motivation of some of those who actually went to fight abroad listing thieves, debtors and those who 'think unlawful births, and murders here may be expiated by killing there.'⁵³ Horace however 'like good physicians, all at home being well he strove exotic poysons to expel.' Catholicism was seen by contemporary Protestants as a poison, just as the Catholic church saw breakaway religious movements as a poison that, if not checked, would spread.⁵⁴ So Spanish oppression of the Dutch who were striving for independence, and the overrunning of the Palatinate by Catholic Hapsburg forces could all be seen as 'exotic poysons' which 'doctor' Vere had tried to expel, whilst Protestantism thrived in England. And Horace did 'all this too for strangers, what could he have d'it to set his native country free.'

This could be suggesting that, had he lived long enough, Horace might have fought against the Crown's dalliance with Catholicism and with Charles I's tendency towards absolutism. But it might also, within living memory of the Armada, refer to a possible Spanish, Habsburg or French invasion, all Catholic powers. Thus if England too needed liberation then Horace was, or would have been, the prime choice to lead triumphant Protestantism against any attempt to 'poyson' England. West makes a strong point too about the real nature of Vere's devotion to his duty through reference to his lameness.

'Though age and Wounds had given him writs of ease,
Yet would he halt and crawle to the enemies and with lame feet trample them down'.

⁵² Richard West would have known that Vere had spent much of his long life as a campaigning soldier. Sleeping in a tent or just in a rolled up blanket on the ground he was known to share the hardships of his men. So hard nights did translate into respect, admiration and trust amongst the troops that, layer by layer, built the 'solid fame' of the man.

⁵³ Right up until 1914 English and British soldiers were often characterised as comprising largely criminal elements, often forced to choose between the Army and gaol. There was some truth in this generalisation which was not swept away until the mass conscription of the First World War.

⁵⁴ Paul Ormerod, Andrew P. Roach. Ormerod, Paul & Roach, Andrew P, 2004. "The Medieval inquisition: scale-free networks and the suppression of heresy," *Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications*, Elsevier, vol. 339(3), pages 645-652.

Some elegists are only identified by their initials. One of these, HR, (almost certainly Harry Ramsey, a London gentleman, who left Christchurch in 1639 and who was also at Westminster) suggests that Vere had not been the subject of elegist praise before this publication.⁵⁵

‘How have you wronged our Vere to let him lye
so long interr’d without an elegy’.⁵⁶

If true, as it appears, it is surprising given the then prevalent penchant for such writing and the contemporary fame of Horace.

Richard Painter/Paynter from Tonbridge in Kent was born in 1615. He was something of an odd man out from this group in that he attended the Merchant Taylors school and St Johns College (and also because he is described in the Oxford Alumni Record as a pleb). Painter emphasises Vere’s quiet demeanour and soft spoken manner. ‘Nor was he of that crew, whose Captaine-ships consist in a big voice, and bristled lips.

That thump the board, and roare out Oaths so large
You’d think they did not discourse, but discharge?
That damne and tilt at every breath
They ken, these are not valiant, but possest.
The best of his Artillery was prayer.’⁵⁷

We might imagine Vere enforcing (more?) prayers for those who did ‘damne and tilt’? But the stronger point is that he could command men without the need for such bluster. Painter then praises Vere’s leadership just about as highly as it is possible for him to do saying

‘Heaven also hath its wars, and Veere is chosen Generalle of those stars’

Another of the elegists, John Borough, later Sir John, was probably born around 1600 and was at Christchurch before 1620. In 1622 he was in Venice reporting back to a kinsman about the acquisition of manuscripts.⁵⁸ His elegy went further with this leadership of men theme suggesting that

⁵⁵ Harry Ramsey is the only Westminster and Christchurch alumnus with these particular initials and at this particular time. This is circumstantial but nevertheless compelling evidence.

⁵⁶ *Elegies.*, Leaf B6-B7.

⁵⁷ *Elegies*, Leaf C1-C3.

⁵⁸ Originally from Sandwich in Kent his ancestry on his mother’s side was from Brabant. This connection with what is now Belgium may have given extra impetus to Borough’s motivation

‘So dreadful was great Veere, So loud his fame.
That absent, they might conquer by His Name’

Borough's Brabant ancestry resonates in his words lamenting Vere's loss;

‘Thou wert all Frontiers to the States, and wee
Did yield them Brill and Flushing fending Thee’.⁵⁹

Which refers to the returning of the cautionary towns to Dutch control in 1616.⁶⁰ Vere had been the Governor of both and so had been their defender and their frontier. But the word ‘fending’ also has an older meaning which is; to manage alone, or to strive alone. In this sense then as Vere is ‘all frontiers’ to the States they can manage without him directly in Brill and Flushing as he was defending the entire State, i.e. the United Provinces.

Henry Harris from London (and another pleb) attended Magdalen College and speaks of the very worms that eat Vere's flesh as empathising with his heroism ‘we are Vere's worms, there's valour in His Clay.’⁶¹ This imagery is suggestive of the transference of Vere's abilities and demeanour into even such lowly creatures as worms. How much then, it is suggested, could this transference infuse and enthuse men?

Thomas Isham was another Westminster/Christchurch boy who later filled clerical appointments in Haringworth and Barby (both in rural Northants) dying in 1676. He alludes to Vere's humanity in war;

‘nor did the flood Which his arme spilt, make him delight in blood,
he was all peace, the tender hearted mayd’.⁶²

Martin Llewellyn, yet other Westminster/Christchurch alumni was a serial elegist who continued such writing throughout his life.⁶³ He concentrates on the even temperament and modest nature of Vere even in war.

‘No conquest made him swell, an equall brow sustained
the Lawrell, and the Cyprus bough:
The same calm view'd retreats and Victories’
‘No rich foe made Him glad, no needy pause,

to write. He was also an MP, Keeper of Records at the Tower and a garter principal King of Arms.

⁵⁹ *Elegies*, Leaf C7.

⁶⁰ In accordance with the treaty of Nonsuch, 1585.

⁶¹ *Elegies*, Leaves C3-C4.

⁶² *Ibid.*, Leaves C8-D.

⁶³ Brady, *The English Funeral Elegy*, p.88.

He fought not 'gainst the booty, but the cause.'⁶⁴

Llewellyn maintains that Vere was not motivated by the prospect of gaining riches through conquest, but only by the legitimacy of the [Protestant] cause. Given Vere's constant need for money to pay the troops this is another great compliment.⁶⁵ The calm, unfluctuating disposition that Llewellyn attributes to Vere is crucial in the stress and uncertainty of war and would be particularly valuable in gaining the trust of his men.

Thomas Severne from Worcester, also a Westminster/Christchurch boy gives Vere credit for the action at Broek Castle in 1605, the occasion when Horace Vere led his greatly reduced company to cover the retreat of Dutch cavalry even though Vere's men were outnumbered by the Spanish.⁶⁶

'Spaines forces I dispraise not, 'twas no shame,
that he your greater numbers overcame.'⁶⁷

It was an action in which Vere was wounded and for which he gained much credit with Prince Maurice.⁶⁸

Francis Palmer, another graduate of Westminster and Christchurch, was later a Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford and later still rector of Sandys in Buckinghamshire and of Wickes in Northants. He is one of just two Vere elegists to mention (albeit by inference only) Vere's celebrated older brother, Francis. Palmer writes about Horace Vere's reasons for going to the wars and like Richard West makes it clear that he went for good, pure reasons not to escape debts or drunken debauchery 'Nor was't a younger brothers angry fire' i.e. the envy of Francis, Palmer also makes a point regarding the apparently blurred distinction between Vere's military and religious roles 'Men doubt so far Whether Thou Leader were in Church or War.'⁶⁹ Palmer is saying that Horace Vere appeared to adopt what had previously been a royal prerogative, that of being both. As a pious and committed Puritan Vere's command may have seemed like militant, muscular Protestantism in action. But this line is simply

⁶⁴ *Elegies*, Leaves D3-D4.

⁶⁵ See above p. 170.

⁶⁶ Clements Markham, *The Fighting Veres*, pp. 313-316 Meteren, *History of the Netherlands and its neighbouring wars*, p.116.

⁶⁷ *Elegies*, Leaves DD5-D6.

⁶⁸ Vere's ability to hold the good graces of the Dutch and English leadership for over 30 years is a remarkable achievement in itself given the vicissitudes and shifting alliances both at court and in the military world at that time. The more especially since Vere never had the opportunity to win a major independent victory.

⁶⁹ *Elegies*, Leaves E2-E5.

saying that Vere did not forget his piety when engaged in war and points to what was an unusually consistent, living belief.

John Godfrey and his younger brother Richard (both born in Sellinge, Kent) were also Westminster/Christchurch graduates and Vere elegists. Richard, who signed The Solemn League and Covenant, is the second of them to allude to Francis.⁷⁰

‘A conquering name that may succeed as thou
Didst they famed brother! (nay we’l give him more)
That may excel; as thou didst him before.’⁷¹

Godfrey is clearly saying, like Chapman before him, that Horace was the greater of the two brothers’. Certainly Horace was able to serve as a soldier, always in the Low Countries or lower Germany, for forty years, far longer than Francis, and Horace achieved independent command, in the Palatinate, which Francis was never quite able to do.⁷² And as we have seen Horace Vere was of even temperament, liked and respected by the Dutch leaders who had often been at loggerheads with Francis.⁷³ Horace’s letters show this equanimity even in extreme circumstances. At the height of his campaign in the Palatinate he wrote, on the 26th July 1621, to Dudley Carleton.

‘I understand that his Excellency intends that the English shall not march in our body. I am very sorry to hear it, for my own part my affection is such to the good prosperity of that cause, and the honour of my country men, that I do rather choose to suffer in my particular there for any respect to me the services I should be prejudiced...That I dare not contest in anything wherein my conscience tells me that therein I shall do any hurt to the service, yet I am not altogether sensible how I suffer in the estimation of the world.’

And later in the same letter

‘For my part I do wish with all my heart that all the State servants could lay aside all particular respects, and look to that that tends most to the public good.’⁷⁴

⁷⁰ ‘The Solemn League and Covenant’ (1643) was a treaty between the English and Scottish Parliaments. The treaty advocated the introduction of the Scottish model of reformation in England along similar lines and the removal of Catholicism and bishops. Not all English parliamentarians were in favour but at the time they needed Scottish military support.

⁷¹ *Elegies*, Leaves C5-C6.

⁷² Borman, ‘Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands’. p.133.

⁷³ J.G Kickert, *Maurits van Nassau*, (Weesp, 1985), p.71. And see Borman, ‘Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands’. pp.132-136.

⁷⁴ NA, SP84/101/315, Horace Vere to Dudley Carleton, 26th July 1621.

Horace knew the line to take in public correspondence, whether he actually thought that way or not. Richard Godfrey may thus have simply been stating a commonly held view that Horace was the greater of the two brothers.

Edmund Borlasse (1620–1682) may have been the same man who as a medical doctor achieved some fame in the mid Seventeenth Century. He received a doctorate from Oxford in 1660 but was noted mostly for his '*History of the Irish (Execrable) Rebellion*.'⁷⁵ He was also considered to be something of a poet. Born in 1620 he was certainly of an age with the other elegists. Borlasse praises not only Vere as a soldier

‘In whose brave Frame (for which ‘was chiefly built)

The noble genius of All soldiers dwelt’⁷⁶

but his administrative skill too, taking in Vere’s Governorship of the Brill and writing

‘Here when the souldiers stars fell away,

He soley like the sun, order’d the day

Make him Governor of the Bril,

where He single did shew whole councils Policy’⁷⁷.

Horace remained a soldier right up into his late sixties in an age when reaching fifty was something of an accomplishment. The fact that Horace survived to such a comparatively advanced age is the more remarkable since he spent well over half of that life as a soldier, was frequently in combat, wounded several times and spent a large part of his later life with a permanent limp.⁷⁸

Piety

The changes and subtle differences that epitomised religious belief during Horace Vere’s lifetime provide the setting for his own beliefs, and their outward manifestation. What is certain is the externally manifest, pious, nature of the man, as evidenced by Chapman and Jonson. This is greatly reinforced by many of the Vere elegists.

Richard West emphasises Vere’s sober reverence and temperance in putting his piety first if to win was not the Godly thing to do.

‘and would lose the day, When ‘twas a sin to fight,

⁷⁵ Edmund Borlase, *The history of the execrable Irish rebellion trac’d from many preceding acts to the grand eruption the 23 of October, 1641, and thence pursued to the Act of Settlement*, MDCLXII. (London, 1680).

⁷⁶ *Elegies*, Leaves E5-E7.

⁷⁷ R. B. Wenham, *Before the Armada: The growth of English foreign policy 1485–1588* (Princeton, 1966), p. 371. This refers to his governorship of the Brill.

⁷⁸ At the time the average life expectancy in England was only 35 although if you survived childhood there was a reasonable chance you might reach 50 or even 60.

ill victory Being at the best but brave Iniquity'

And West stresses more pointedly the open and practicing nature of Vere's faith
 'though some mad captaines think religion a thing belonging only to the gown,
 laughing devotion out o'th'camp, and say he's a dull foolish coward that does Pray.
 Yet was He nere ashamed of piety preffering that still before victory'.

West penned the longest of the elegies and despite the obvious flattery and flowery verse, gives us insight into other important aspects of Vere's life.

'Each under his command appear'd a Saint,
 As if His Campe were the Church Militant'

and then in a dig at the Dutch, who at the time were considered to be excessive consumers of alcohol,

'No drinking matches there: Their temperance such
 They liv'd a sober life amongst the Dutch'

which West clearly saw as a considerable achievement.

Harry Ramsey is brief but he too lauds Vere's piety and his devotion naming him 'an hero too in his religion' and he calls him 'the leader priest'.⁷⁹

Vere was clearly a pragmatic and inspirational commander though at times he had to exert discipline and order. But his known and respected piety, combined with his obvious skill and courage as a soldier and a leader of men, helped or forced him to develop into something more than just a war leader. The true nature of many people often only emerges when under duress and few situations are more immediately debilitating than the battlefield or cataclysmically sapping than a hopelessly defended siege, yet Vere's religiosity seems to have never deserted him, on the battlefield or through the enervating harshness of several sieges when fear and doubt must prey cruelly, if understandably, on the mind.

Thomas Isham too praises Vere's religious nature, stating that 'By him a regiment Turnes to a quire, a church what was a tent.

Thomas Severne says that 'Religions enemies were his [Vere's] and who gainst him did fight, did gainst religion too.' This is another reference to the perceived insidiousness of Catholicism, the Hapsburg Empire and sinners in general. But it is a

⁷⁹ *Elegies*, leaves B6-B7.

sturdier message because it essentially claims that Catholicism is not even a true religion.

William Snow was, somewhat later, vicar of Black Bourton (1663-1666) and then Rector of Kencote from May 1664 until his death on 23rd September 1666.⁸⁰ Both parishes are in Oxfordshire. Snow also praises Vere's forceful faith.

'Religion was thy banner, faith thy shield.

Thou taught courageous piety to wield a conquerors sword.'⁸¹

This link between piety and warfare is important. It glorifies, justifies and legitimatises the Christian man to wage war in a just cause (leaving the definition of what is just to the King and/or the Church). It uses religious fervour to try to build unity amongst the troops and links their efforts to those at home, consciously shaming, encouraging and cajoling others to follow their example.

The elegies as a whole press strongly upon both the military and the religious aspects of Vere, and Palmer, as a budding clergyman and philosopher, no doubt saw this dual role as a novel development. Most if not all military leaders of the day would have given lip-service to religion. This would have been prudent even for the most sceptical commander given the beliefs of most of the men under his command. Vere clearly went far beyond this sort of practical application. There can be no doubt, given the constant referrals within the Vere elegies, and from Jonson and Chapman, that Vere was deeply and outwardly religious and that he practiced, literally, what he preached.

Edmund Borlasse also stresses Vere's unwavering piety

'Though he with Rebels of religious meet,

yet always He escaped the Tempters net,

Keeping his soul untainted, and so came Home

like the God he worshipp'd STILL THE SAME

I'one hand His prayer book, th' other held his sword

oh how in Him all vertues did accord!

⁸⁰ A *Vicar* was originally the appointee of a monastic order for whom he acted 'vicariously' and he was paid by the order which continued to receive the Temporalities (income) from the land and people to whom the vicar ministered. *Rectors* usually enjoyed the Temporalities directly and thus were usually richer. This may explain Snow's adoption of Kencote. When Henry VIII abolished the monasteries many of the parishes they controlled became the property of the families that bought the monastic lands from Henry. Thus many parishes were in the gift of the local land owners. By the end of the 16th century almost half the better livings had passed into the hands of the laity. Foster, *The Church of England 1570-1640*, p.5.

⁸¹ *Elegies*, leaves D2-D3.

Again we see the link between heroic, martial masculinity and pious resolve which encouraged admiration and emulation'⁸²

Humanity.

There are many references in the elegies to Vere's kindness and the affection in which he was held by others, particularly his soldiers. Soldiers, certainly experienced men, understand that casualties in war are inevitable and front line troops are, of necessity, particularly expendable. Francis and Horace were both successful and respected commanders, but unmistakeably, Horace was considered to be the less profligate when it came to husbanding his soldier's lives, a practice that would certainly enamour him to them. But this is just one aspect of benevolent military leadership. Richard West, for example, stresses Vere's intimate knowledge of his men compared to

'others who may boast their care in that they know their soldiers names,
he knew their nature too:'

And Richard West also tackles the age old issue of soldiers' depredations amongst those they encounter or defeat, notwithstanding whose side they are on

'and the neighbours be vexed with their Guard, as much as enemies'. However, claims West, Vere 'was all honesty; the countrymen lost not their cock Or hen'

This statement is borne out by Vere's own hand. His letters from the Palatinate, for example, make constant, scathing reference to the ravages of both his enemies' soldiers and those of his allies.⁸³ Plunder and appropriation must have played a part in all this, indulged in and even expected by both sides and a predictable norm of warfare, even up to modern times. In Vere's day, soldiers lived off the land and were expected to do so. Official compensation for those supplying victuals and other necessities, often compulsorily, was often late, discounted or not paid at all. But in all wars much requisition was simply a matter of soldiers taking by force, or threat, whatever they needed. So for West to state that 'Vere was all honesty' is a considerable and unusual plaudit given at a time when the average person would not consider such an attitude as typical or normal and most soldiers would find it strange. In particular too, for someone of noble birth to take any cognisance of the sufferings of the foreign poor was close to unique. In addition this comment supports the view that Vere, though apparently a staunch Puritan, took a less than uninterested view of his ungodly fellows.

⁸² *Elegies*, leaves E5 – E.

⁸³ B L. Trumbull Papers Add Mss72315, f135, 1620:1622. NA SP 84/74/- f16, f174, f185, and f 188.

The elegies all attest to Vere's popularity amongst his men, and his kindness even to strangers is demonstrated in letters he wrote to Dudley Carleton about a widow who owed Carleton money. Remembering that Carleton was an influential man whose patronage and support would have been important, Vere risked some annoyance from Carleton when he stressed the difficulties the woman faced and asked Carleton for his tolerance, especially since

'The tymes are full of tears so that her grandchild Anne Rousseau is gone out of Frankendalle & the overseers [those that managed her affairs] also.'⁸⁴

Henry Bennet (or Benet) rose to become the first Earl of Arlington in 1672 after a string of increasingly senior appointments in the 1660s following the Restoration.⁸⁵ He had joined the Royalists as a volunteer at the outbreak of the Civil War and seems to have gone into exile with the young Prince Charles. His verses therefore come from a Royalist sympathiser on the eve of the civil war and can be considered as a diverse appraisal.⁸⁶ He too must have known Vere's views on religion but despite this he acclaims the old soldier as well. His elegy to Horace praises both Vere's bravery and his ability to 'subdue not men alone but their affections too'⁸⁷

From the earliest of times the ability of a war leader to gain the affection of his soldiers has been seen as a key part of any commander's success. The Elegies thus paint a picture of Horace as a calm, softly spoken leader, who combined military ability and personal bravery with the talent to appeal both to his troops and to his superiors, and as a man who could get things done without the bullying tactics that some commanders employed. This was a lesson that contemporary and many later commanders might have learned to their and their subordinate's benefit. It remains part of the Vereian legacy.

Martin Llewelyn alludes too to one of the reasons for Vere's universal popularity 'No rudeness made the publick shares more thin' So though he was a military hero, the grandson of an Earl, and had earned the right to a certain degree of respect, he was polite and accommodating which maintained the breadth and depth of his appeal.

⁸⁴ B L. Trumbull Papers, Add Mss 72315, f132-f133 1620:1622. On the 21st and 29th September 1621 Vere wrote to Carleton about a debt owed to Carleton by a certain widow 'Engelgraeue'. Vere has clearly been asked to intercede in the matter. His letters back to Carleton ask for patience and forbearance for the widow and stress the problems she faced with the loss of her grandchild and those who worked for her. Given Vere's constant need for money to pay his troops this shows considerable delicacy.

⁸⁵ Alan Marshal 'Henry Benet', Earl of Arlington (1618-1685)', ODNB, (2004).

Marshal suggests that Benet was not unskilled as a poet. He attributes Benet's influence to the leaning of Charles II towards Catholicism. Marshall also observes that Benet was, in his lifetime, seen as a self-serving, ambitious and unscrupulous politician.

⁸⁶ Given Charles's Episcopalian, Catholic tendencies.

⁸⁷ *Elegies*, leaves B7-C.

Richard Geale was ejected from the College in 1649 for drinking the King's health. Was he a royalist in 1642 when he wrote his contribution to the Vere elegies? It was a decision that many might have been wrestling with in that year, though some fluidity in attitude and expressed allegiance may have been honestly, or dishonestly, prudent. If Geale was a Royalist then his praise for Vere is also all the stronger.⁸⁸ Geale (not a Westminster boy but he was at Christchurch) also writes about how Vere was able to combine the changing science of war with the art of courtesy.

'No antipathy was found 'twixt souldier and civility, In him both were united'
'No lesse charm was his tongue, then in his powerful arme:'

Geale hints at an intellectual dimension to Vere writing of his '*subtle arguments*' and his '*pure intelligence*'⁸⁹ This supports Richard West's sentiments regarding Vere's adroitness. Very useful in the minefield that was court intrigue and no less so in the diplomatic field. And no doubt handy too when competing for high command.

Palmer echoes Henry Harris's allusion to the worms imbibing Vere's spirit from the 'valour in his clay' as Palmer ends his elegy by saying

'Thy tomb shall be our alter, we will trust
Lesse our Castles powder, than thy dust'.

Borlasse also writes of

'How he by Precept and Example too,
Would show the meanest souldier where to go'.

Samuel Everard, born in 1619, and another Westminster boy and Christchurch graduate was later rector of Swyncombe, in Oxfordshire, and of Duddinghurst in Essex. He dwells on Vere's death and funeral march and includes the curious line;

'whose warlike looks put on with rich array
His scarlet hose, not worne since th' Wedding day.'⁹⁰

And so gives us a glimpse into the happier ceremony of 1607 when Horace married Mary wearing his red stockings!

⁸⁸ Born in 1620 he was from Sandhurst in Buckinghamshire where a long line of Geales (or Gales) held various local manors as minor gentry. As several of them were called Richard it is difficult to be precise about which one this is but he attended Christchurch in 1638 after being a pupil at Westminster. By drinking the King's health publicly he was in effect defying Parliament and declaring himself a royalist which is why he was ejected from the college.

⁸⁹ *Elegies*, leaves D8-E.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, leaves E8-E9.

William Towers appears last in the Vere elegies list. The son of the Bishop of Peterborough and another prolific writer of elegies he was born in 1617/18. Another Westminster boy, he was at Christchurch from 1634 and sought refuge in the city during the early stages of the civil war, implying Royalist leanings. His praise broadens the range of political backgrounds of the elegists. He gained his BD in 1664 and subsequently held several ecclesiastical posts in Northants and Oxfordshire dying at Fisherton in Lincoln in 1666. Towers was the only one to make a virtue of Vere's age calling him a

long liv'd aged miracle' and 'the quiet man went full of years and Peace,
a gray wonder, such as our Vere was.'⁹¹

Lameness

It is from the elegies alone that we get an indication that Horace Vere spent part of his life with a disability. Richard West is the first of several of the elegists to mention that Vere was disabled because his foot or leg was damaged. West speaks of 'stout piety on lame, uneven feet.' So was Vere always lame or did one of his many wounds cause the problem? Will Snow, also of Westminster School and of Christchurch, mentions 'lame Vere's' disability three times, but promotes it as an asset and a virtue. 'Thy lameness was the strength of weaker states' and 'He only seemed lame, because he could not fly.' But Snow also praises Vere's forceful faith as if to give the lie to any lack of zeal due to disability.

Richard Geale, like William Snow, professes Vere's 'daring lameness' as a 'defect deserv(ing) to be admir'd' as Vere 'Limpe(s) into honours bosom.' As for the Godfrey brothers, the elder of the two, John, spent much of his life travelling in Europe and died in Paris in his mid-thirties in 1655. He wrote that Horace,

'fought still for the alters.... When thou with grace
Went on unequal legs a wav'ring pace.'

and it is from John that we get a clue as to how Horace may have become lame;

'Wounds set thee upright, He that dares be lame
or halt by the fyord, knows how to leane on fame'

This must mean that Horace became lame as a result of wounds received in battle. A man wounded and permanently disabled in combat would be more likely to reach high command than someone who had been lame from birth or from extreme youth, if only because he would then have been unlikely to have embarked upon a military career.

⁹¹ Ibid., F-F3.

We know Horace was wounded on more than one occasion and wounds, even comparatively minor ones, in this pre-antibiotic age were often fatal. However, we learn from Jan Janzsen, in his '*Triumphs of Nassau*' that Horace was shot in the leg at the Siege of Ostend and this seems likely to have been the cause of his later lameness. Janzsen reports that, amongst other casualties, some 'thirtie or fortie ... Sir Horace Vere was shot in the leg'⁹²

Few ordinary people, other than his soldiers, would ever have met Horace Vere; particularly as he spent much of his adult life in Europe. Fewer still would have had access to the letters and reports by which he kept Government, officers of state and his family informed. Pamphlets and news sheets, though certainly emerging, were in their infancy and often subject to censorship. So word of mouth and personal contacts, especially from soldiers returning home after serving with Vere, would have been the main source of information for a still largely illiterate population. Thus when someone famous died elegies, and other poetic offerings, were the closest thing to modern social media that the Seventeenth Century could offer. Widely read (and no doubt read aloud to the illiterate) certainly by the family of the deceased, they were thus susceptible to contradiction, correction and criticism and this must have influenced the verity of their content.

Taking them in this vein we can see the love and respect, even awe that Horace Vere inspired though we must also acknowledge that any real character defects would almost certainly have been omitted. And whilst we do not know exactly why these Vere elegies were written at all, and why at that time, it may simply be that Christchurch College were looking for an unsung hero as a suitable vehicle to test the skills of their students.

Other, non-Christchurch students and older alumni then seem to have joined in, and this fact alone is an accolade to Vere. In any case the Elegies do provide us with a considerable insight into how Horace Vere was perceived on the eve of the civil war and, through their admittedly cloudy lens, we do get a glimpse of the real man. The fact that Vere was chosen as the subject must tell us something about how his character and achievements were perceived even seven years after his death, when any enemies at court or elsewhere would have had time to defame or criticise him. And the range of background, later career and political orientation of the people who wrote the elegies, together with the works of Chapman and Jonson points to the legitimacy of the picture they paint.

⁹² Janzsen, *The Triumphs of Nassau*, p.130.

Conclusion

Taken altogether, and allowing for the fact that Chapman and Jonson probably both knew Horace Vere and that the 19 elegists may have been simply honing their literary skills it still seems unlikely that such a universally approving, even laudatory, picture of Horace Vere would have emerged had there not been substance to the legend of a pious, valiant, disabled champion. Chapman had no real need to write his plea for help for the besieged Vere despite his need to earn a living by his pen, the more especially since Chapman must have known that his publication would be far too late to influence events. And whilst Chapman may just have had some ulterior pecuniary or aspirational motive it is hard to find one for Jonson. Jonson was, after all, a man who had switched religion twice, at a time when such an act was decidedly dangerous. He had killed a man and been imprisoned both for murder and for lese-majesty. Such a man would not write in these laudatory terms if he knew of a darker side to Vere. Jonson wrote many epigrams, not all of them complimentary.⁹³ And his failure to write an epigram for Prince Henry might imply some antipathy he preferred not to have to overcome in respect of a Prince of the realm. For a lesser personage though a man of such erudition as Jonson would have found a way to have encompassed any real or perceived Vereian flaw in his work

The motivation of the men who wrote the elegies is harder to ascertain. Many of them would have grown to maturity against a backdrop of Vere's exploits. Certainly those who were of the cloth must have applauded Vere's piety, many others his equanimity and friendly nature, and all of them his heroic deeds. Maybe, with the dissection of society almost upon them, they simply needed a hero. But Vere's heroism was not simply that of a brave man and competent leader, he was also an inspirational warrior, both for his martial ability and for his piety in war.

The creation of Vere's high reputation was thus a combination of long and worthy service during which time he sustained good relations with several princes and monarchs, managing all the while to stay true to his faith. This combination nurtured his reputation and status which was then compounded by the validation of Jonson's wonderful assessment of his character as a man. This was in turn strongly buttressed a few years later by Chapman's glowing praise of him as warrior and a patriot. The elegies then embellished his reputation, partly because of the praise they heap upon all aspects of his life, partly because of the sheer number that were written but mainly because they were written after his death thus continuing a forty year unbroken line of

⁹³ See for example 'To Alchymists. If all you boast of your great Art be true; sure, willing Poverty lives most in you. Or 'To Parliament', or 'To Court-ling' or 'To Captain Hungry'. <http://hollowaypages.com/jonson1692epigrams.htm>.

approval. And the elegies take their place as part of the continuing, wider literary community adding to the religiously themed written approbation of both Horace and Mary in the myriad dedications noted in Chapter 2.

As a role model and a shining example of a holy warrior he was unequalled in his day. The last chapter will thus consider the legacy of Horace Vere and determine what his contribution was to the military world and to wider society.

Conclusion and Legacy

Horace Vere's legacy rests upon his contribution to the development of the English and later British army, his profound influence upon the many civil war leaders who learned their trade under his tutelage, the dawn of meritocracy in military appointment and the advent of modest humility in public life.

These four main strands are;

1. 'Military Reformation'.

Vere's early codification of drill and military organisation found in his *Compendium of 1610-1614* (app. 1) was an early and important contribution to the development and use of gunpowder technology, volley fire, fortification enhancement, and their concomitant man management skills. Vere's long military experience was largely spent under the overall command of Maurice of Orange who, together with his cousins William Louis and Johann Ernst are generally regarded as having a major role in the 'Military Reformation' of land armies in the late 16th and early 17th centuries in western Europe. Whilst by no means the sole progenitors of these new military methods Maurice and his allies were well placed throughout the period to apply, refine and reiterate these new tactics as they struggled to resist Spanish attempts to re-impose their rule over the Low Countries. This Spanish opposition was a further incentive for the allied 'Military Reformation' since the Spanish forces were themselves military innovators, and the survival of the emerging Dutch state depended hugely upon the martial prowess of Maurice and his subordinate commanders. Horace Vere was the beneficiary of this evolving innovation. His military career spanned much of this period and he was, in particular, involved in numerous sieges both as a young soldier and as a commander. By the time of Maastricht he had over 40 years' siege experience to draw on, an unrivalled understanding.

The move away from the individualistic soldiering of sharp edged metal that these new, increasingly gunpowder based methods invoked necessitated more disciplined military formations if the desired concentrations of firepower were to be effective. This in turn provoked the growth of written instructions by which large numbers of troops, even in smaller groups, could be taught an identical manoeuvring and offensive capability, a crucial element of the new military order and in essence the essential script that accompanied these changes.

The 'Compendium' attributable to Horace Vere was an early English composition. Certainly borrowing from the Dutch model, but going further in its scope to provide detailed instructions on a range of related military topics, it was the precursor, by almost a decade, of the first official English manual. This latter work, ordered by the

Privy Council in 1623, drew on a number of sources, including, unsurprisingly, Vere's 'Compendium' and many of the instructions and commands are similar. The 1623 *Instructions for Musters and Armes* was in any case overseen by Vere, Cecil and Conway and, with later revisions, proved influential in shaping English army tactics right up to the Civil War. Indeed Vere's introduction of regular and systematic drill has been a key feature of English and British infantry training ever since. As the senior English field commander for over thirty years, Vere's 'nursery' for aspirant military leaders was thus grounded in what was cutting edge military organisation and discipline and the succeeding generations of men who learned their trade in this milieu under his direction were themselves conduits leading to the modern British army and to modern British infantry drill. At the least then, through example, long service at the top of his profession and through his 'Compendium' Horace Vere was a major influence on the adoption and integration of these new and enduring methods, particularly through the many civil war leaders, on both sides, who served under him and who carried with them his methodology and process. (See App 2).

2. Influence: Vere's men.

Horace Vere's influence on the men who, a generation later, fought the Civil War was considerable and was acknowledged in his time. Understanding the contextual and experiential military philosophy of these men necessitates referring back to their formative experience serving under Horace Vere. This is a considerable legacy and one that has been largely unattributed up until now. The widespread and fundamental changes in warfare, especially siege warfare, the use of massed firearms and the need for continuous and repetitive training in how to use them on the battlefield resonate in the New Model Army of the Civil wars and can be found in today's infantry training. In addition, Vere's piety must also have influenced the men who served under him as much as his military acumen.

The military careers of both Vere's and the many other Englishmen who fought predominantly in Europe between 1585 and the peace of Westphalia vindicates Adam Mark's view that English engagement in European conflicts of the time was significant and widespread.¹ Towards the end of his career Horace Vere commissioned a number of full length paintings of his subordinate commanders. This unique collection was left to Lady Mary Vere in Horace's will and she in turn left them to her grandson Horace Townshend, but after his death the collection began to be broken up and is now in a number of different places around the world. The art historian Barry Tsirelson is

¹ Marks, 'England the English and the Thirty Years War', pp. 21-25.

currently engaged in tracking down the paintings and their locations.² The images he has thus far uncovered (eleven in all) include a number of Vere's most trusted captains including his nephews Sir Edward Vere and Sir Thomas Conway. Also depicted are Sir John Borlasse and Sir John Burroughs as well as Sir Thomas Dutton whose appointment had caused Horace such difficulty in 1612 (see pp 125). The portraits themselves provide pictorial evidence of Vere's legacy depicting as they do an important group of early modern English military leaders whose own influence conveyed the lessons learned under Vere's command to a wider range of younger men during and after the Civil wars.

But these images reflect only a small proportion of the men who learned their military craft under his tutelage, many of whom went on to contest the Civil War as Royalists or Parliamentarians. Dr Pells work shows how many of these men were 'influenced by their experiences in the Netherlands, and how they established working relationships with those within their own armies and those in the armies of their adversaries'.³ Principal amongst these men was Thomas Fairfax, the victor of Naseby, who had joined Vere's forces in 1629 at the age of 17.⁴ He married Vere's daughter Anne in 1637 thus 'cement[ing] the Fairfaxes' links with England's premier military family'. Fairfax's biographer, Andrew Hopper, called Vere's company 'England's foremost Military academy' and Thomas was the third generation of his family to serve with the Veres, 'esteeming his Puritan religion as much as his martial virtue'.⁵ It is hard to see how such a close familial link to the Vere family did not include a high degree of military admiration and emulation when Fairfax rose to significant command during the Civil Wars.

Robert Devereaux, third Earl of Essex, was a major Parliamentary military leader and a devout Puritan. He went to the Palatinate with Vere and served at Breda too though his six years' service (1620 - 1626) was undistinguished. He was nonetheless successful at raising troops to serve in these various campaigns and was part of Edward Cecil's ill-fated raid on Cadiz in 1625. Philip Skippon, another senior Parliamentary military leader joined Vere's tiny army sent for the relief of the Palatinate in 1620 and eventually married a local woman there. He continued to serve intermittently with Vere up until the latter's retirement and death and during the civil war he served initially under Essex and was responsible for the training of the infantry. More than a decade of such consanguinity with Vere (and with the Dutch) would have

² Information from Barry Tsirelson, independent Art Historian in the US.

³ Pells, 'The legacy of the Fighting Veres', p. 78.

⁴ Hopper, *Black Tom*, p. 16. Thomas was sent by his family specifically to serve under Horace Vere. He was the fourth member of his family to do so.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p.17.

been an excellent preparation for such a role and it is more than likely that Skippon was aware of the *Compendium*. Sir John Borough also served within the Anglo- Dutch forces under both Veres and he went to the Palatinate too where he commanded in Frankenthal, holding that town until April 1623.

But Vere's veterans were not only parliamentarians, George Monck was another 'graduate' of the Vere military school. Though his earliest military experience was, aged just 18, on Cecil's Cadiz fiasco, he served under Vere at Breda and Maastricht, earning a reputation as an astute, brave and authoritative leader. Despite his service to the parliamentary cause and his ruthless control over Scotland Monck was a major player in the Restoration of Charles II and remained a senior military figure throughout his life. His regiment, the Coldstream Guards, are still a part of the British Army to this day. George Goring, to whom Horace Vere resigned his troop of horse in 1633, had served in the Dutch army and fought at Breda. Sir Richard Grenville, another Palatinate veteran, joined the Royalist side during the civil war alongside Monck and Goring. Another long-time Low Countries veteran was Jacob (Lord) Astley who had fought under Vere in several campaigns. He too became a royalist as did Ralph (Lord) Hopton who had served in Frederick's forces in the Palatinate under Vere's overall command. The return of these men, and many others like them, to Britain to dispute the Civil War was a major legacy of the Thirty Years War and indeed of previous conflicts.

It was these fighting men who, having experienced and learnt from their time in the English military diaspora in the Low Countries, developed the soldierly acumen of the civil war. And since all of these men served under Horace Vere, and conducted themselves according to his martial discipline it is reasonable to contend that they did, in some degree, take his soldierly style with them to their later civil war commands and to the establishment of the first permanent standing English army on home soil after the Restoration.

Horace Vere's position as a major contributor to English and British military development has been overlooked and largely forgotten. This thesis redresses this neglect and places him firmly amongst the primary progenitors of martial development in the UK.

3. Meritocracy and Durability

Horace Vere's long and eminent career began and then justified the practice of meritocratic appointments to high military office. His importance exceeded that of his brother though David Trim and Adam Marks suggest that the high point of English influence within the Dutch Republic, especially within the army, was achieved under

Francis Vere after 1599. Marks says that 'the scale and scope of his 1599 commission was never surpassed'.⁶ However Francis never enjoyed the authority or the rank bestowed upon his two predecessors as Elizabeth's representative in the Low Countries, he never achieved independent command as Horace did in the Palatinate, and he never earned the same level of trust and support from Maurice of Orange, the English Government and the wider English populace that Horace enjoyed for 30 years. Probably unwittingly, Horace Vere and brother Francis before him, began the long, slow but inevitable transition towards military meritocracy within the army command structure.

During the Civil wars Fairfax and Cromwell certainly promoted men on the basis of their ability, rather than on their birth, in an echo of the Veres ascendancy. Francis Vere's rise brought this practice to English soldiering for the first time and did so without the pressing imperative faced by the Dutch, and brother Horace confirmed the validity of such appointments during his lengthy tenure. Other armed groups from England had been led by commoners before, but Francis Vere was Queen Elizabeth's official representative and operated (up until 1598) under her command and pay, and the English troops serving the Dutch cause in the late 16th and early 17th Centuries were frequently used by both Elizabeth and James as a national resource when either monarch required military intervention directly on the State's behalf. Thus Francis' and Horace's assumption of command over the English troops was an important milestone in the evolution of meritocratic appointment.

But Francis's prickly and arrogant character did not endear him to his new masters and it was by no means a certainty that brother Horace would succeed him in command. Once in charge however Horace was able to maintain his authority, his martial reputation and his excellent character despite the vicissitudes of Jacobean/Caroline political life and his infrequent visits to London. Vere's success in remaining at the top of his field for almost three decades, in an age where nepotism, favouritism, wealth and above all rank, usually trumped ability and discretion, emphasise his political skills and adaptability. But even these attributes needed to be built on solid martial nous and talent, and in that department Horace Vere demonstrated again and again his striking capability both in the front line and as a commanding general.

Horace was not, of course, really a common man. He was the grandson of an Earl, twice the heir presumptive to that Earldom and he ended his life as a Baron of England, but at the start of his military career he had no great social rank, few

⁶ Marks, 'England the English and the Thirty Years War', p. 63.

expectations and three older brothers and cannot have anticipated the success and adulation that he achieved. His starting point may have been higher up the social scale than most modern hopefuls enjoy, but then the hurdles he faced in achieving high rank, status and fortune were more personal and less susceptible to ability alone than are found today. It cannot be argued that Horace Vere was sensible to modern egalitarian notions of advancement, that he would have approved of such notions or that he was aware that his success would begin the long, and still continuing progress of meritable appointment but, almost 250 years before Northcote – Trevelyan meritocratised the Civil Service and the purchase system was abolished for (some) army officers, his story was certainly a beginning and a vindication, substantiated in part with the meritocracy of the New Model Army.

4. Humility

Vere's modest approach to career advancement displayed a humility which, unusual for his times, is now considered to be the acceptable (and prudent) way in which to conduct a public service career. He held his abilities quietly in age when modesty seemed to bring little advantage. There is good evidence of Horace Vere's humility. This comes from three major sources, firstly the poetic appreciation found in the *Elegies* and in Ben Jonson's eloquent epigram. Secondly in his final resting place. He was buried in his brothers grandiose and flamboyant grave, with no external inscription or record of Horace's extraordinary life inscribed thereupon. Although he died suddenly he had already written his will and given up most of his military and other appointments so he was clearly preparing for his death. It is entirely in keeping with his humility therefore that he left no instructions for any such inscription and was content, in death, to lie unrecorded with his brother, in the latter's tomb inscribed solely with Francis's achievements.

Thirdly we find humility in the lack of expressed ambition which seemed to accompany all his major appointments. Of course lack of extant evidence cannot be construed as proof of its non-existence. But at a time when every major appointment seemed to attract a host of hopeful contenders, of which there is abundant evidence in State Papers and surviving private documents, the only evidence of this sort of conveyed ambition on the part of Horace Vere was his attempt in 1604, via his kinsman the Earl of Northampton, to maintain (not advance) his position as the head of the English troops in Dutch pay and the hearsay evidence of the same in Sir John Ogle's letter of that year. [page 115]

However there is also circumstantial evidence to support this claim. There can be no doubt about Horace Vere's Puritan/Calvinistic beliefs and this piety also

resonates strongly in the epigrams which consistently point to Vere's humility and self-effacing nature. It must have been frustratingly annoying for Vere's arch rival Edward Cecil, who used all his advantages to try to secure a number of high command posts, only to be constantly overlooked in favour of someone he saw as his social inferior. Vere's letters of June 1620 and August 1621 are all we have to inform us about Vere's own view on this rivalry, but whilst both letters demonstrate some frustration and irritation at Cecil's actions and demands, Vere's words suggest that he was incredulous rather than triumphalist which fits well with Vere's oft reported humility and modest, unassuming nature. An approach which would become any modern aspirant.

He was a man of uncommon talents both military and diplomatic. He sustained his position as the leader of English forces in the Low Countries and in the Palatinate despite the disadvantages of comparatively low birth, a changing political environment, the whims of several royal personages and their favourites and the fierce rivalry of Edward Cecil, whose own social credentials were superior to those of Vere. Yet throughout his career Vere also managed to negotiate successfully the oblique and sometimes direct religious opposition of senior Church of England leaders even to the extent of being able to shield his 'divines' from more than one Archbishop of Canterbury. By any measure Horace Vere's achievements are a distinct milestone in British socio-military history and stand alone as such as a legacy of some merit as in truth they always have, despite being at least partially obscured by the untroubled dust of historical amnesia.

This Thesis brushes away that dust, bringing together the salient elements of Vere's achievements, and recording and presenting his accomplishments in a more accessible and readily recognisable way so as to ensure his legacy is permanent, enduring and more easily discernible.

Appendix One

Compendium of the Art of War under Sir Horace Vere

Below is a full version of the Manual with modernised spellings

{page one of document}

1. The length and Lines of the muskets as is used

The barrel of the muskets be four foot long, shooting a bullet of 10 in the pound upon the proof, & in ordinary shooting a bullet of 12 in for the pound that may easily roll down the piece. The weight of them with stock & all the iron work weighed 13-14-15 pound. The barrel alone weighs 9½ -10½ - 11½ pounds all the stock with the plate beyond both weigh 3½ pound. To prove a musket there must be just as much powder as the bullet weighs & in ordinary shooting there must be but half as much powder as the bullet weighs. All new pieces doth weigh more than an old piece. A bandolier doth weigh 2½ pound & a rest 1½ pound; so there must be a pound of bullets, a pound of powder with a pound of match which is 6 fadom every fadom is 72 inches⁷

lands meat 5. & 6 inches *[blank gap in the script]* an over: so the whole weight that a musketeer doth carry is 25 pounds besides his bread & other necessaries

Every 24 accers? 144 inches of match, so that 2lb will serve 6 days & nights & might to burn night and day continually.

To every pound of powder there is allowed two pound of match, which is 12 fadom & a pound of bullets a pound of powder is 16 charges which is for two parts of a bullet of 12 in the pound

An armor weighs as followeth

A headpiece -----	4
Gorget -----	2
Forepart -----	7
Back -----	4
Fases -----	3

	20

⁷ The word 'fadom' is the old German or Dutch equivalent of the modern English word Fathom. The word stems from the idea of reach or span, i.e. the arm span of a man which is considered to be 6 feet or 72 inches.

P2 of Original

An extract of Discipline of a Company of Foot given out by Sir Horace Vere an[*no dominie*] 1611 to all his captains

Postures

For the posture of each weapon I refer you to the book that his Excellency hath set out of them wherein you are to instruct every particular soldier in the ready & graceful use of his arms. Using such words as you find there expressed.

But when your musketeers shall come to serve in troops you shall only use these three words.

1. Make ready, which importeth all the postures unto presenting
2. Present your musket which is to stand ready to give fire but not to execute it till the commandment be given.
3. Give fire

Files

The whole company is to be divided into files, every file consisting of ten men, the men to be distinguished by the names of leaders, bringers up, middlemen: the 2, 3, 4 to the front the 2^d 3^d 4th to the rear

Duty of a leader

The leader is to hold the first rank, & should be respected as the commander of the whole file & sometimes he should (exercise) his file to teach them the true use of their arms, distances, motions & measures of march; he ought in troop to give diligent guide to all manner of diversions, whether given by voice, drum, or any other signal & readily to express the same, for by his example all the rest of the file are to govern themselves.

Duties of a Bringer Up

The bringer up is the second man in estimation, & the last by his place of March, & as it were, the lieutenant of the file. His duty is to assist the leader in performance of every commandment, & in his sickness or absence to do the same office. & where the file shall be wounded in a body he is to take care that every man in it follows his leader directly, & keep even with his side men, especially those 4 which are next him, & when the whole troop or half of it shall turn faces about he is in all points to execute the office of the leader.

Duty of middle:

The middlemen, whilst the body remaineth entire are but to keep their order duly & to take care that those which do stand next them do so

Page 3 of Original

too: but when the front is doubled by them then is the middleman to the rear to do the office of a leader & the middleman to the front the office of a bringerup.

Dignity of Files

The rest are only to imitate their leaders in doing the things commanded & to keep even with their leaders & sidemen. The right hand leader is the most worthy, unto him all the troope must be ranged, & when it marcheth at a point distances by other troops, his duty is to know the same distance to the right side. The left hand leader is the second in dignity, because he is to do the same duty on the left hand. The two middleleaders are the next, & have for their particular duty to keep the front even & to alter distance when it shall be commanded. If there be a greater number of files they shall take their estimation by the places they stand in, the next unto the corners in each hand of the middle leaders.

Silence

When you exercise command a general silence, & see that it be duly held; if the bringer up or middleman have occasion to speak to those in their charge, let it be so softly that your officer may not hear it.

Place of Direction

All commandments are to be given in the head of the troop wheresoever it be.

The distances of ranks & files are commanded by these words.

In your order which is ranks 6 foot, file 3 foot asunder. In your open order which is rank 12 foot, files 6 asunder. In your close order, which is rank 3 foot, files 1 ½ foot, closer than this your musketeers should never be placed. In your close order, ranks at the rapiers point, files shoulder to shoulder which is for the pikemen only.

You shall often use to command ranks in order, files in open order. The motions commanded by these words following, open your ranks which is always done backwards, & if the commandment be to open unto a very large distance, the bringers up are to turn

Page 4 of Original

their faces about & to march till the residue of the ranks have their distance.

Close your ranks which is always done forwards. Open your file if no hand be specified to which you would have them open. They shall open indifferently to the right & left hand until the middletraders have the distance commanded; else they must open to the hand mentioned.

Close your file, the same rule holdeth also in closing.

March wherein you are to see that the ranks be kept even & the file straight, & that all the arms be ranged in one posture that they move all at one instant of time. The bringers up as soon as the leaders, that they be taught to march as your drum shall beat or your pace direct. In three measures

1. The slow. 2. The mean. 3. The swift

Countermarch which is thus performed. The leaders must turn & pass a long by the file till they come to the places where the bringers up stood, the rest following them at the same distance they had before the leaders stood.

Double your ranks to the right or left hand, double your files to the right or left hand.

As you wish

Middlemen you front by division, when the 5 first ranks do turn their face, the one half to the right and the other to the left, marching till they be all without the flanks, when without any second division they turn their faces to the frontwards again & march upon both flanks even with the front. In this motion it must be remembered to leave a fit distance to retain them betwixt the pikes & the shot. In going back they must turn faces about, & march till they have their distance, turning their faces one towards the other, they march in the places they held before they moved.

Faces to the right hand}

Faces to the left hand}

as you were

Faces about}

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Wheel about the body to the right hand. It is thus performed, the corner man or right man leader stands firm till all the ranks beginning at the left leader & taking it immediately one after another have moved & then he is to turn softly within like the point of a compass till his face be where his back was before, & then he must stand again, & all the rest must front by him.

Wheel the body to the right hand, it is but half a turn, & then the corner man when he moveth must only turn his face to the right hand & stand that all the body may front by him, file to the left hand, it is done by the same way as proceeding the hand only changed.

Rank 5 or 6 more or less as the officer shall find good, which is done by the breaking the rank & filling them one after another to the right hand.

Skirmish & wheel about to the rear, either by flanks or spares left for that purpose; In performance, whereas they must be led 10 spaces forward then the pikes before the first rank shoot: when they have halt: that sergeant keeping the same ground till they might speedily fall off, putting themselves into a file either upon the flank or through the spares, till they come into the rear where another should stand, to see them fall right into their ranks again.

Skirmish and Countermarch into the rear which may best be done if the file be in open order.

Skirmish in the rear & wheel about to the front, which is done by the turning of the last rank: which when it hath shot wheel in file to the front, & so all the ranks successively fill it be otherwise commanded.

Skirmish by file when the musketeers making ready, the 2 outermost files turn their faces, the right to the right and the left to the left, & present & give fire: which done they make ready again, & stand till the next have given fire also, which shall be as soon as in marching the bringer up shall be passed by the leader of file....

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... first file, & so all the rest of the files, A sergeant, or if the troop be greater another higher officer shall stand at the head of the first file & when the second hath given fire he shall lead forwards, & so when he hath gathered up all the file which stands firm till he cometh, he shall march by the battle of pikes as before.

Skirmish & pass through when the first shall have discharged & stand firm, the second shall pass through & at the same distance do so too, - & so all the ranks one after another, it may also be done, by the bringers up, which should pass through all the body, & so the rest after them, & the leaders last of all: both these must be done in a very large order.

Skirmish & wheel about both in front & rear at once, which is when the battle standing firm, the musketeers wheel duly onto the middle ranks

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The form of exercising of a company of foot translated out of Dutch by his Excellency's order and confirmed by my Council the 26th of December 1612 stile v.

It is to be understood that three facts of distance are to be observed,

the first is that every man is to have six foot distance in his rank

& file, secondly that every man be three foot or the half of so much as the first,

thirdly that every man be one foot & a half in his rank, & thence in his

file, which is only to be used a sudden charge being expected; to begin

then it behoves every man to stand his first distance & to begin as follows.

- 1 To the right hand as you were
- 2 To the left hand as you were
- 3 To the right hand about to the left hand as you were
- 4 To the left hand about to the right hand as you were
- 5 To the right hand double your ranks, ranks as you were.
- 6 To the left hand double your ranks, ranks as you were
- 7 To the right hand double your files, files as you were
- 8 To the left hand double your files, files as you were
- 9 With half files to your right hand double your ranks, half files as you were

Page 8 of the Original

10. With half file to the left hand double your ranks half file as you were
11. File to the right hand Countermarch files to the left hand Countermarch
12. To the right or left hand at discretion
13. Ranks to the right hand Countermarch ranks to the left Countermarch
14. Close your files}
 Close your rank} upon three foot distance
 Understand from both the outsides to the middle, & so likewise to both
 the outsides from the middle to open & so stand in their distance
 as three foot in their files.
15. To the right hand wheel
 To the left hand wheel
16. Open your ranks backwards
 open your file

In opening ranks or files you must keep them closed till the second rank or file beginning from the outfields have taken their distance & so still the rest close till every rank or file shall have taken their distance in order.

If you will command to close order files to the right or left and the outmost file stands still & the rest close to it.

A general commandment often to be used.

Stand right in your ranks

Stand right in your files.

Page 9 of the Original

For the Pikes Alone

1. Advance your pikes
2. Order your pikes
3. Shoulder your pikes
4. Order your pikes
5. Trail your pikes
6. Chake your pike
7. Charge your pike
8. Shoulder your pike stop
9. Charge to the rear as you were
10. Charge to the right hand
11. Shoulder your pike stop

12. Charge to the left
13. Shoulder your pike stop
14. Order your pikes

When the pikes do charge standing they must put back the right legge or foot & not to stirre, but when they charge marching they are to put a step forwards with their left foot but not else, the pikes are led up to a charge they must go a soft pace so not breaking of their ranks, & so keep them in breath & strength, they are to be both in rank & file & foot & no closer that they may have liberty to pass & to stir themselves.

The distance is to be observed to be taken from the middle of a man. For the placing the right or left hand before doubling either ranks or files is most fiitest, because the hand being first named; the soldiers do apprehend it best, & likewise settleth themselves to that hand which is spoken before the following directions be delivered, herein agreeing with all nations but is only by custom maintained, & by no other reason can well be defended.

The captain or chief officer is to march but six foot before your

Page 10 of the Original

First rank where he stands, the colours in the hand of the pikes of each division six foot before the former rank.

The drums in the third rank where they must accommodate themselves (to march) in the space of the distance of the foot which is between the Ranks so they have but their foot allow to them

Each officer in leading any division is to take up no more space then in rank which is six foot. A company is to exercise once a week precisely where all the officers

must be present to see each soldier so do ever their postures. Both with the musket & pike; which being done they are all put into rank & file, & are exercised with the words there before mentioned

All being done over the muskets are taken apart to discharge in ranks

In the manner as followeth, & so use no more words than make ready & present.

If you have 8 or 10 files of that you must divide them into two

Divisions, every division six foot from the other, & so stand between

Rank and rank & file and file, three foot & no closer

Musketeers

Skirmish & wheel about to the rear, either by flanks or spaces left for that purpose, In performance whereof you must lead up two ranks together, the second rank going right after the foremost in 6 foote holding up their muskets. The ranks must be led up a reasonable round

pace that they may do their postures in going up to shoot, their being led up 10 paces more forwards than the pikes, or as far as the officer shall find convenient, before the first rank do shoot, shooting their muskets at the waist of a man, having shot to go of a good round pace from before the rank that is behind him to give him the speediest time to shoot. The front rank standing in five foot of the foremost with their muskets upon their rests ready to present with their pans shut; the foremost rank having shot & fallen from before the front they must likewise presently give fire

Page 11 of the Original

Which being done, that officer keeping the same ground still, they might Speedily fall off putting themselves into a file either upon the flanks or through the spaces till they come into the rear where an another officer should stand to see them fall right into their ranks again.

+ 2

& so keep back with
right leg or foot
yet your left foot may
be foremost

Skirmish in the rank & wheel about to the front, which is done by the turning of the last rank + which when they have shot wheels in file to the front every man turning himself to the right hand to stand right before his own file; & all the ranks successively till it be otherwise commanded.

3

Their pans must
Be always kept
shut till they are

to shoot.

Skirmish standing still in a retreat, you must command all your men To make ready their pieces, being done the first rank gives first, & wheels away to the rear in file & so the second rank, & all the rest softly one after another; this must be done very quick to wheel from the front when they have shot in a trot.

Skirmish by files, when the musketeers making ready, the outermost File turns their faces to the right hand putting their left leg before & give fire; which being done they make ready again, & stand till the next have given fire also, which shall be as soon as in marching, the bringer up shall be passed by the leader of the first file, & so all the rest of the file. A sergeant or if the troop be great another higher officer stand at the head of the first file, & when the second hath given fire, he shall lead forwards, & so when you hath gathered up all the files which stand firm till he cometh, he shall march by the battle of pikes as before.

The second file must not advance up from the place where he stands not on foot, but to shoot in the ground where he turns him about.

Skirmish & pass through when the first rank shall have dischr-
ged & stand firm, the second shall pass through, & at the same distance do so too. & so all the ranks one after another.

This is all that is needful that the musketeers
Should do.

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A musket that is now used must shoot 10 bullets in the pound in the proof with as much powder as the bullet weighs, but in ordinary shooting 12. in the pound & half as much powder as the bullet weighs which is 26 charges of a musket in a pound: In a new musket you must shoot but half a charge of powder for some to shoot, a musket doth ordinary weigh 13, 14, & 15 pounds, the Bandolier with the charges weighs 2 ½ pound, & the musket rest weighs 1 ½ pound, one pound of powder to a pound of bullets comes in all to that a musketeer must carry besides his match & his vitals, 21 pounds.

The musket must be four foot long besides the stock when you shoot off your piece you must make it clean or else it will never shoot free.

There must be great regard held that the arms of each companie be kept in good order & clean; which is the duty of a captain les Armes or the clerk of the company, that when they see any arms or muskets foul or broken to carry them presently to be mended & cleansed, & upon the sending day to rebate so much out of the soldiers pay as his arms did cost mending or cleansing, & if he doth resist it or [space in the text] to commit him to prison to receive further correction.

In going from the guard the Provost of the company ought to be there to see what arms do remain behind of them that may be absent he is to take them to his lodging & to keep them till the soldier hath paid him his fee which is 6 sh[illings?] & if he stands against it he is committed to prison.

No soldier ought to hire his duty nor to hire any of his fellows to stand sentinel for him, but doing both to be punished severely without favour.

Every sentinel is to stand full armed with such arms as he doth carry upon his sentinel.

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A note of certain orders which are to be
Observed in a regiment when they come
first into the field.

The ordering of a regiment when they come to any rendezvous in-
their ships or else, to be drawn out to march, the first of all the-

quartermasters must get all the ships that hath in all the companies of one regiment to the together in order. Every company in his seniority, then he must presently get a note from every company the strength of their pikes & those able men to march with the officers that be present with every company & also of the drums of the pikes & shot. Then every colonel, or his chief officer must decide how many divisions of pikes & shot there be, putting in every division of pikes 5 files or 6 at the highest, & shot but 5 files at the most. Being done the officers of every company must have their places given them in a note where they shall march or lead being drawn early in a morning every man may know his place.

The quartermaster must look out for notes also of all the sick men & them that be unable to march that there might be some order taken in time where to find their men.

The quartermaster is to look out for ammunition, bread and powder & match & bullets providing a greater quantity of match than other ammunition; but there must be given special order that the match be not wasted in tying of boordes [an old spelling of boards] & to be used about their cabins for the carrying is very chargeable.

The colonels company is upon the right hand & his outermost file to be all gentlemen in the right hand; for there they guide all the ranks of the division & are ready for to be in the front when the troop hath order to charge to the right hand.

The company on the left hand of the division ought to be the Lieutenant Colonels company, or the second company in seniority

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Because the left hand is the second place, as also the left wing in a battle is next the right hand: this is used amongst all nations [but ox] but only put in practice at Gulick [Julich] by general Cecil.

The colours march is usual in the head of the division, but when they come to fight they are placed in the first rank.

So have every rank march in six foot distance & their file 3 foot, but the pikes very sloped.

So have the old men placed in the rear, pike by pikes & shot by shot, they are ready to supply any man's place which may fall sick or lame upon the march, & it doth likewise keep them from straggling

from showing ill precedents to other soldiers.

To have no soldier shote in his rank without leave of his officer.

The captain that leads in the head of the division must keep

Fifty paces but must 50 from the Regiment that goeth before; but if it

Be a division of one Regiment then something closer,

There is to march one wagon or two with ammunition for the Regiment.

The beer must be sold

upon the march as it is

sold upon the quarter, if

not to take such as will

serve the troops or Regiment

cheapest or else they will

set their owne prices

which must go in the head of the first division, & there is most commonly allowed two settlers carts or wagons which bear & victuals to march with the regiment for the present relief of the soldiers.

The women and boys must march in the rear of all, whom of the

Marshalls men to keep them together that they do not remain

Amongst the soldiers ranks.

When the divisions are drawn up in a body that every officer which

leadeth a division, when he hath brought them ranks up which he leadeth

to put them in order that they may stand right in rank & file

& not to stir from his place before the whole troop be ordered in coming

up.

The colours to be placed 6 foot before the head of the division all in a

Page 15 of the Original

a line the Colonels colours to be in the same rank with the Captains colours, but in breath a space extraordinary from the Captains colours so his Excellency found it the best way.

The shot must stand 50 foot behind the pikes & between every division of shot of 5 files there must be a space of 6 foot between every division so the shot to fall through when they have shot, when all the troops being placed so, so any show all the drums must beat being placed in the colonels of the divisions, but sometimes it is found fit not to do it because there can be little be heard.

When the quartermaster hath made the quarter to find a sergeant of every company along with him to see where he may best bring in his Capt. Company, but in no case send no soldiers, for they do spoil the quarter & bring disorder.

Before the company do march into their quarter they must be showed where they must draw the next morning if they do lodge in any village or else it is needles.

The next doth when the company come together, every captain Must order his own company & put them in even files 10 men in every file without there be other order, the old men to be brought in the head of the troop that the sergeant major may put them in even file & their old men to be placed as before.

For the officers changing of their places it is found the best course that every officer do keep their place where they were placed the first day but it hath been the captains that did lead these did change with each other, & so likewise the captains that leads pikes as was at Julich march.

So suffer no wagons to march out of the quarter before the Regiment be gone for getting & emptying the ways & stopping the passages that companies can not come out

Page 16 of Original

The officers in leading must take up no more distance than 6 foot from standing in a place of a rank

The orders that are observed in marching
With an army.

The general hath always by him 6 guides which is best for their

parley where he is to march.

The general orders given at Emmerich the
10th September 1614 stilo nuovo

The drums to beat after the third rank

The ranks are to be 6 foot distance

The whole body are to stir at one time, the last so soon as the first

The women to be in the rear of the regiment & the provost to
order them.

Every Regiment marches in 50 foot after him that goes before him.

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The observations

of the exercising of

his Excellency's guard. 1615

*[This is in a different hand
which appears, by the
formation of the letters,
to be much later]*

for doubling their ranks they do always fall the contrary hand

that they do come up on, & so sideways to their places, in turning to
the right or left hand they do always remove their pikes.

For their doubling of their files they are to march altogether in
doubling & so to their places.

The next they do stand as they were ,& then they do open their ranks

They do take their shot apart from the pikes & command to chase file

& ranks in discharging to the rank they do turnabout to the right hand

& step forward with the left foot to the flank they do step forwards with

their left foot ; seeing his Excellency doth never observe any fool nor is no
great curiosity to be used in it, they are always bad present before they
do open their pan; & then they must all look through their sight of their
piece & level at the model of a man.

For the pikes they do close them in file & rank to be understood always

but to three foot, except a charge standing still against horses and then two – 1½ foot & not less, do charge first to the front sometimes their pikes shouldered & others with their pikes advanced, the commandeth being given by the officer & not by the drum; the second is to the right hand stepping forward with the left leg marching a dozen paces or as far as the officer shall find convenient before they do shoulder their pikes the next to the left hand which is not much to be used but to keep the soldiers in discipline so in showing of a company it needs not to be done, 3 to the rank marching forwards, 5 to the front with their pikes tried.

In standing to receive a charge they are always to bring their right Leg or foot back but not else for the standing fast
 In trailing they do keep always their feet together
 The guard doth shoot 4 times in a year at a mark sometimes 200 paces off for the carrying of their muskets with their rests some of them in Their hands, others with their muskets.

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The muskets when they go up to discharge in rank so must go up a round pace to discharge.

When the musketeers are ready & the match in cock they must be bid to present or give first but to loose no fire.

The pikes must not march fast as to any charge but softly for braking their ranks & putting their men out of order, & to keep them in breath

The troop of the pikes when they do charge in the rear, they do march Away & then their faces about to charge, & so march softly in the advancing & in retiring.

The musketeers must always level to the middle of a man about his girdle

The musketeers must go very quick from before the ranks when they have discharged, specially when they make all ready together so hindering the other ranks that may not discharge speedily.

The directions given out for the week the

28th of September 1614 stilo nuovo

That no corporal should give the word to any man whatsoever but to take it from all men in the lines.

That when the corporal comes to take the word that he brings a guard of 3 or 4 musketeers with their matches cocked & their pan guarded with their two fingers.

The sergeant majors are to go the round to visit all the guard two times in the night, as at 12 of the clock, & at 4 of the clock in the morning, & the same day to make report to the sergeant major general in what manner they found the guards.

All wagons & soldiers that goes out to forage are to go when the convoys are appointed & not else, & being abroad not to straggle but to go where

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They are appointed, a provost marshal goes also out with his executioner to punish any soldier that he finds as to give the frappado or to whip boys of the horsemen.

No bottler is to tap or fill any beer after 9 of the clock which is when a piece of ordinance is shot off, for every soldier to be in his quarter, & then all lights to be put out.

The captain of the watch in the quarter is to round with his own men
& every captain to put a sentinel in the head of his quarter & an other
in the rear of the quarter for to see to the bottlers stretch to keep all in good order
No sentinel must stir of from his sentinel till the drum doth beat the
nota

relieving of the watch nor no sentinel to stir from his sentinel to call any
after to release him.

All men must go to the sergeant Major General for directions at two of the
Clock in the afternoon.

For to have a guard made behind the quarter in the rear of the soldiers, to
have watch kept for all disorders, amongst the soldiers & buying places, by
this house there out [ought?] to stand all the wagons of the Regiment both night
& day to see to them that they are not broken nor nothing stolen,
from them, for being decieveth of any of their necessities they can
not do any service till it be supplied & besides it is comely for them
to stand always in the head of the quarter by the Captains cabins.

Watches

That the whole guard keep on all the Armours all the night, & when
an officer of the field goes the round & he coming to visit the guards
to put all their men in arms or any other round, the sentinel
to stand but two hours at the most; no sentinel must be suffered
to give their duty, but in doing of it to be punished & the man that
stands for his fellow:

[No page 20]

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[a diagram of the battle array of the army – with commanders and numbers of men in
each command]

See attached: With the following legend:

The Command of his excellency was that half of all the musketeers should fight in the
vanguard & to every 200 musketeers, 30 pikes to second them & as soon as the troops
were joined with the remaining 8 squadrons, the shot to fall into the flanks of the
remaining 8 squadrons, with their swords.

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Reserve { French 32 = Colors --- 2600}

{ Frisons 11 Colors ----- 0900} 3500

Battle { Scots. 20. Colors ---- 1300}

{Cecil 12. Colors ---- 0900}

{Almonds 9. Colors ---- 1230} 3340

Vanguard { Guards 6. Colors --- 0900}

{ Vere. 20 Colors --- 1400}

{ Ogle 11. Colors --- 0790} 3900

The whole number of the foot in rank & file is as they stood before Emmerich the 10th of September 1614 n v

The number of ----- 10640

The Horse in Ranks is in all ----- 2500

Colors in all is ----- 133

The number of all the officers of foot is to every company 13 -- 15 – 17 29

The number of the officers of horse is ----- 0 -- 15 ---0355

The order of his excellency was changed to have the reserves in 300 foot as the second was & to have the divisions between every troop at 200 foot, but usually he doth put them to 50 foot distance & no more

Page 23 of the original is blank save for a series of 15 sets of dots

Page 24 of the original is a diagram of the order of battle [Rees; as part of the Cleve-Julich dispute)] see attached

With legend in Dutch or German saying '*This is the order of battle for the war at Rees 23rd September 1614*'

The diagram lays out the size of the field with distances between the various companies and tells us the number of men under each commander. It also tells us the number of each nationality.

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This order of the ranging of all the troops of the army before Rees is to be understood that there are spaces always to be left of six foot large, between every 40 or 50 files, & when the whole body do move to keep them spaces again at 6 foot, & as near as it possible for all the musketeers of every company to be together so they be not under three files.

The whole half of all the shot was before the pikes & the other half behind, the body of the pikes are to march in 12 foot after the musketeers & the front of the next division in some 20 foot. There is not to be but 50 foot between Regiment & Regiment. The pikes in the closest order is not to come in no closer than three foot at furthest but to receive a charge of horse. The colours in showing of a troop is to remove from the front some 20 foot by reason the front of the troop may be scane these men were reckoned in rank & file.

Battle { Almands ---- 1150]	Rear-guard 32	{ Chatthan --- 1350	Vanguard {
5 Garde -- 760			
{ Cecil -- 0850]		{ Corbeme -- 1310	{ 20 Vere --
1420			
{ Broge ---- 620]		{ 11 Frisons -- 960	
{11 Ogle -- 0680			
{ Henderson -- 6		{13 Walloons 830.	

Page 27 of Original

See attached. Order of battle for? :

Page 28 of Original is Blank

Page 29 of Original

The General [of] horse

His Lieutenant General

His sergeant major

The quarter master general
His Provost Marshall, horse.

This order of horse was done before Rees by his excellency the 26th of September 1614.

It is to be understood that the spaces of 50 foot between every Regiment is too near by reason that they were canted of ground, but where there is a field or heath large enough there must be 150 feet between every Regiment, or a 100 at least. This order is when horse doth fight alone from the foot, for they can fight all in front without hindering one another, or charge with part as they shall find convenient.

The distance between every horse in rank is 3 foot & in file 20 foot by reason of the horsemen's turning for their horses. The spaces of 50 foot between every company is held the best by reason that every company may second one another, & that they may see which companies do best; the enemy's horse holds no rank in marching nor fighting, by reason they say that the best man will press forwards to fight & them that bears the best affection to their Captain to follow him where he goes.

The best captains of horse hold that the best charging is upon the corner of a troop of horse or upon the front & not upon the side to discharge into the flanks in a manner of wheeling as some do; the horsemen that hath served a long time say that when the troops of each side do but give their pistols upon each other that one doth begin to run. The colonels company of horse is always placed upon the left hand, & the next Captain to him upon the right hand & the youngest in the middle. The captain fights only in the head of the Company, his lieutenant with the quartermaster in the rear.

Page 30 of Original

[The next pages are in French]

The exercises of the armies for the Cavalry as it was halted at the Hague, by his Excellency The Prince Maurice
& Henry de Nassau xxxx de May, Anno 161

Page 31 of Original

This page is in French

Page 32 of Original

[Plan of the army in camp with layouts of the tents. At the bottom of the page the legend says

Foot may be taken. [which I take to be saying that the scale is in feet].

[Text at the top says]:

300 the whole length of the quarter

[Text in centre says]

This is for the preacher,

Sergeant Provost

Quartermaster & wagon man

With the spare wagons of the quarter.

[Text at the right hand side says:]

This view is given for five places & is not for any other use

Here behind must be no holes nor fire places made in no case because the Regiment may sometimes

draw out behind. The place of General must be 200 or 300 paces from the soldiers.

Page 33 of Original

There is 8 foot for the streets & 8 foot for the colours & 8 foot for the spaces between every cap[tains] quarter, & for the Captains tents or cabins, 4 foot in length. & in breadth 24 foot; for the street between the captains tent & the quarter 20 foot; for the colonel 68 foot & in length for the cabins 200 foot, the street between the soldiers & the quarter 20 foot, the soldiers 20 foot in all 300 foot, the soldiers beds must be always made above the ground, some foot there is to lodge in the front no wagons nor horse but all in the wide span after the colonels tents & last of all the Marshall & the quartermaster of the regiment.

There is a court of guard to be in the rear of the quarter to hold watch in the day to keep good order among the suttlers [one who followed the army and sold provisions] & gansers, & to look to the foreman's wagons that they be not robbed of any necessities they have about their wagons.

There must be no suttler in the rear of the soldiers cabins, nor no officer nor soldier that victual or fill beer for money but in the suttlers street, nor no fires to be made but in the rear of the suttlers cabins.

The captains ought to lodge in the rear of the quarter for the gross of the front of the quarter not to be taken away, for all the Spaniards doth it.

Every captain must or ought to have a cord, very small, of 200 foot long to line their quarter when it is given them to build their cabins by in an even line.

There ought places to be made in the rear, some 200 foot of the rear, for the soldiers to xxx, it must be digged very deep.

There ought a well or two to be made for a quarter if there be no water near if the ground will yield water,

Watch must be made with 4 square pieces of timber over the mouth of the well to keep their cords for coming upon the side of the well to stir the earth so fouling the well

Page 34 of Original

The quartermaster ought to go through every captains quarters to see if the soldiers have built their cabins high and wide enough, made their beds above the ground, the captains ought every 3 weeks to get fresh straw to give their soldiers, & to make them cast out their old, & to air their cabins & to keep their quarter swept every day very clean to avoid sickness.

That no drum doth sound before he doth come to the colonels drum or all together, nor to twene or to strike upon his drum before the beds out xiglh, for the pikes & armes are not to be put before the street of the quarter but to companies to come near together .

To call all the soldiers out of their cabins when any great man passes by the colours or by the armes, & for to show him service.

That the sentinel must never stir from his sentinel but to stand always there till his corporal hath released him, he may have a bell to hang in the corporals cabin, & so have a string to ring it by.

To have the sutler that is appointed to come in the rear of a Regiment in marching to be commanded that he sells just upon the same prices that they sell in the place where all the soldiers wagons do march.

Page 35 of Original

To have always the quarter drawn out with a right corner called in Dutch a kell lake in English a sware & the quarter ought to be divided out in the rear as it is in the front if it be lodge for any time or days, to make a right square what any instrument with a small cord or line as this figure doth show. [image is blurred]

[See attached image for diagram]

[Then, below the image:]

First the stick where you fasten your cord the pound must so be put in the pound & so meet with the line to A

There to mark the line upon the point, then with the same distance put him to B. Then make a small circle at C

Being done draw out the stick, & put one end of the line at the point B. The other end draw inst upon the point O along to the circle. Where your line cuts in the circle that is the point of the square, draw the line from the point C to A where you must put up five stakes, & go far off with the 3 where they come into one so far in the right line.

Page 36 of Original

[An order of battle with explanation at the bottom]

See attached..

This is all pikes by his excellency but for one troop, saying that he can make them two or one as he finds occasion for the closing.

He sayth men naturally do close to much of themselves, doth seek to come in.

P 37 of Original [*An explanation of the diagram on P36*]

This figure doth show how a troop of 800 men shall stand. The pikes first & the muskets in the rear 50 foot from the

Pikes in the ranks three foot, & in the files 6 foot, the musketeers of every company must stand a part so they be not xxx 3 files, & a street of 6 foot between as the figure doth show, & they must always march in the same order after the pikes. With these distances closed, it is held fittest that every officer should fight with their own men, & specially with the musketeers for many reasons.

The rules that are given in troop are to be given by ranks downwards one after the other & not to have any space between in shooting in no case.

In marching these are to be closed, we stood in battle three foot between the files & two paces between the ranks

The drums in marching after the third rank, & in standing in the corners.

The places of leading is the first captain in the Vanguard of the pikes, 2 in the vanguard of the shot. 3 in the rear of the pikes, 4 in the rear of all. 5 in the head of the left wing of the shot. 6 in the head of the last division of the pikes. This is usual amongst our nation & The French; but the Spaniards and the Walloons the first Captain leads in the

vanguard of the shot, some do also lead in the rear of the pikes for the pikes for the second place.

The musketeers are always to have good store of match hung at their bandoliers for his excellency hath often commanded it.

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The Regiment in marching the half of the musketeers before of the whole Regiment, the pikes to be in 12 foot & the second troop in 24 foot, the other halfe of the shot in the rear marching all in front of the ground will give them leave & go before.

The musketeers being placed in the two flanks doth hinder the pike , for they there are not able to defend them with their pikes & besides being between the two troops of pikes when they are taking away by any occasion, or the pikes to gain, they do leave too great a space for the two bodies to come together to make one close body

Page 39 of Original

There is to be observed in a retreat with a whole army or a section
That all the divisions or troops or squadrons do stand with their faces in file
one after the other towards the enemy, the first troop to wheel off
& to march right after the hindmost troops with their faces towards the
enemy, & so the next to follow the first as soon as he is gone from be-
fore him, & to stand also behind the last troop & so all the rest following
through there can be disorder or confusion, for always the last
troop his {face} is towards the enemy & ready to receive
him if the enemy should press hard to charge into the
last troops all the rest must march up to maintain the fight
in the form of the manner of battle as they usually d

the 20 November
1614 novo
before Rhees.

Page 40 of Original is blank

The next page is un-numbered.(see attached) It is a plan of the camp, or quarter of Prince Maurice before the town of Rhees in 1614.

It shows the names of the various company commanders with the numbers of the men they command

It bears the following legend:-

The form of the quarter for to lodge the infantry being in the army of Count Maurice of Nassau before the town of Rhees, 1614

Page 41 of Original

[See attached] It seems to be a plan of a camp but apart from measurements has no legend.

P 42 of Original is also blank

Page 43 of Original

This [attached] shows the layout of a camp. It has labels at various points which appear to be in Dutch.

P 44 of Original is blank This seems to be the end of the military part of the text.

However there follows another document entitled: The Policy of the United Provinces

The document is about 20 pages long and is endorsed on the back of the last sheet with the words:

Project offered to Charles I relating to the possession of Holland.

Appendix Two

Vere's men.

There must have been many ordinary men who fought in the Civil Wars who had also seen service of some sort under Horace Vere in the Low Countries or in the Palatinate. Few of their names have been recorded. Below is a list of men who did serve under Vere and who then had senior military or fiscal/military roles in the Civil War. It was these senior men (and many others like them) who first experienced war serving under Vere and who were able to bring that experience to support parliament or the King. As well as the more prominent men such as Phillip Skippon, Thomas Fairfax and George Monck, mentioned above on page 8 of the introduction, there were;

Royalists

1. Montagu Bertie, 2nd Earl of Lindsey, KG, PC (1608 – 25 July 1666) was an English soldier, courtier, and politician. At some point during his early life, he was also Captain of a cavalry troop in the Low Countries. In the summer of 1639 Bertie provided four companies of life guards for the king's first campaign against the Scottish covenanters, and as civil war approached he instinctively rallied to Charles, joining him at Hull in April 1642. He and his father obeyed the commission of array and raised a regiment of cavalry in Lincolnshire. He commanded the life guards at Edgehill.¹
2. William Craven, 1st Earl of Craven, PC (June 1608 – 1697) was an English nobleman and soldier. Devoted to Elizabeth of Bohemia he fought for the Dutch in Vere's forces. He did not fight on the Royalist side but supported Charles financially, losing all his lands to parliament because of it. At the Restoration he was rewarded for his loyalty and created an Earl.²
3. Sir Thomas Glemham (1595–1649) was present at the siege of 's-Hertogenbosch with Vere in 1629. He became a royalist army officer and served in the West Country and in the North East.³
4. Sir Richard Grenville. (1600–1658) He took part in the expeditions to Cádiz, to the island of Rhé and to La Rochelle. Was a Royalist officer in the West Country.⁴
5. Sir Simon Harcourt (1603–1642) was Horace Vere's nephew. He spent much of his adult life in the service of the Dutch under his Uncle. A favourite of Elizabeth of

¹ David L. Smith, 'Montagu Bertie, 2nd Earl of Lindsey, (1582-1642)' ODNB, (2004).

² R. Malcolm Smuts, 'William Craven, 1st Earl of Craven (1609-1697)', ODNB, (2004).

³ Andrew J. Hopper, 'Sir Thomas Glemham (1594-1649)', ODNB, (2004).

⁴ Ian Roy, 'Sir Richard Grenville (1600-1658)', ODNB, (2004).

Bohemia he embraced the Royalist side and took part in the bishops war, later leading troops in Ireland.⁵

6. Ralph Hopton, 1st Baron Hopton DL (March 1596 – September 1652) served in the army of Frederick V, Elector Palatine in the early campaigns of the Thirty Years' War. In 1624, he was lieutenant-colonel of a regiment raised in England to serve in Mansfield's army. He was a Royalist commander in the English Civil War, appointed lieutenant-general.⁶

7. Marmaduke Langdale (1598 – 1661) served under Vere in the Palatinate and was a royalist leader.⁷

8. Edward Sackville, 4th Earl of Dorset KG (1591 – 17 July 1652). Went to the Palatinate with Vere. He was present at the Battle of the White Mountain on 8 November 1620. He supported and fought for the Royalist cause in the English Civil War.⁸

9. Sir John Suckling (10 February 1609 – after May 1641) He served briefly in Cecil's regiment at Maastricht under Vere's overall command. He was a royalist.⁹

10., Sir Thomas Tyldesley (1612–1651) Little is known about his early life but the general consensus is that he served as a professional soldier in the Thirty Years' War in Germany. Royalist army officer.¹⁰

Ambivalent Role

These men may have been seen as having 'flexible views on loyalty' as Andrew Hopper puts it in his lecture on *Turncoats and Renegadoes* at the National Army museum, published on YouTube on Nov 17, 2011. Hopper ascribes a range of general reasons for this behaviour including the fluctuating fortunes of war, slights to their honour, hopes of promotion or financial gain and family pressures.¹¹

11. Edward Conway, second Viscount, (1594 – 1665) was Vere's nephew. Horace obtained a commission for him in 1624. Served with Vere in the Palatinate and began the civil war as a Royalist, switching sides to the parliamentary camp and then later on reverting to the royalist camp once again There is some ambivalence regarding his

⁵ Edward M. Furgol, 'Sir Simon Harcourt (1603-1642)' ODNB, (2004).

⁶ Ronald Hutton, 'Ralph Hopton, 1st Baron Hopton (1596-1652)', ODNB, (2004).

⁷ Andrew J. Hopper, 'Marmaduke Langdale (1598-1661)', ODNB, (2004).

⁸ Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). *Dorset, Earls, Marquesses and Dukes of*. *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 8 (11th ed.). CUP, p. 433.

⁹ Tom Clayton, 'Sir John Suckling (1609-1641)', ODNB, (2004).

¹⁰ Gordon Blackwood, 'Sir Thomas Tyldesley (1612-1651)', ODNB, (2004).

¹¹ Dr Andrew Hopper, Lecturer in English Local History at the University of Leicester, discusses the practice of side changing and the role of treachery and traitors during the English Civil Wars.

position in the civil war and he had family members on both sides. He was general of horse against the Scots in 1639 but was implicated in Royalist plots. His sister, Brilliana, was a devout parliamentarian.¹²:

12. John Holles 2nd Earl of Clare (1595 – 1666) married Vere's daughter Elizabeth. Was at Bois-le-Duc – Hertzogenbosh, with Vere. He initially supported Parliament but in 1642 joined the King then later switched sides again. again.¹³

13. Sir John Hotham, 1st Baronet, of Scarborough (circa July 1589 – 3 January 1645) Sir John Hotham fought in Europe during the early part of the Thirty Years' War. Initially a parliamentarian leader and Governor of Hull but later was accused of selling out to Charles and beheaded.¹⁴

14. Sir John Urry [Hurry], (d. 1650) He spent some years in foreign military service, probably in Germany. Started as a Parliamentarian but switched to the Royalists and then later back again.¹⁵

Parliamentarian

15. Sir Walter Erle [Earle], (1586–1665), served briefly as a volunteer under the command of Horace Vere. In February 1644 he was entrusted with the office of lieutenant of the ordnance which gave him control over the provision of artillery and weapons for the parliamentarian forces.¹⁶

16. Alexander Leslie, 1st Earl of Leven, (1582 – 1661). Steve Murdoch argues that there is no evidence that Leslie (who did serve in the Netherlands between 1605-1608 then went to Swedish service) ever 'served under Horace Vere'¹⁷. However many Scots did serve in the English regiments, and Scots regiments were often under Vere's command as were the troops of many nationalities. Leslie fought as a Scot during the civil war but was on parliaments' side at Marston Moor

17. David Leslie, first Lord Newark (1600–1682) He bore testimonials from Charles I which honoured him as a commander in wars of France, Germany, Sweden, and the Low Countries. Scottish Officer in civil wars.¹⁸

18. Sir John Meldrum (*b.* before 1584?, *d.* 1645), a mercenary in the Low Countries, Meldrum returned to England where James I, who evidently liked his fellow

¹² James Knowles, 'Edward Conway, second Viscount (1594-1655)', *ODNB*, (2004).

¹³ P. R. Seddon, 'John Holles 2nd Earl of Clare (1595-1666)', *ODNB*, (2004).

¹⁴ David Scott, 'Sir John Hotham, 1st Baronet, of Scarborough (1589-1645)' *ODNB*, (2004).

¹⁵ Edward M. Furgol, 'Sir John Urry [Hurry] (d 1650)', *ODNB*, (2004).

¹⁶ Richard Cust, 'Sir Walter Erle [Earle] (1586-1665)', *ODNB*, (2004).

¹⁷ Steve Murdoch, Alexia Grosjean, *Alexander Leslie and the Scottish Generals of the Thirty Years War, 1618-1648*, p.32.

¹⁸ T. F. Henderson, revised by Edward M. Furgol, *David Leslie, first Lord Newark*, *ODNB*, 08 October 2009.

Scot, knighted him on 6 August 1622. In 1627 Meldrum was collecting weapons and recruits for the Ré expedition and fought with the Scots.¹⁹

19. Sir Thomas Morgan (1604 – 1679) Was in Horace Vere's volunteer expedition to the Palatinate. He fought in the Low Countries. A Parliamentary general, he served with Monck and was later involved in the Restoration.²⁰

20. Dudley North, (1581-1666) served under Vere in the Low Countries and later raised troops for the Dutch. Reluctant parliamentarian soldier.²¹

21. Sir William Waller (c. 1597 – 19 September 1668) . Knighted in 1622 after taking part in Vere's expedition to the Palatinate he served in the Venetian army and in the Thirty Years' War. He became a prominent supporter of the cause of Parliament and was an English Parliamentary general during the English Civil War.²²

¹⁹ Charles Carlton, *Sir John Meldrum*, (ODNB, 03 January 2008).

²⁰ Basil Morgan, *Sir Thomas Morgan*, (ODNB, 23 September 200).

²¹ Victor Stater, *Dudley North*, ODNB, (23 September 200).

²² Barbara Donagan, *Sir William Waller*, ODNB, (03 January 2008).

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