The representation of Muslims in Donald J. Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign: A discourse-historical analysis

By

Cilya BOUCHERAK

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Language Studies and Applied Linguistics

Canterbury Christ Church University

2023

Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to explore how Donald J. Trump, represents and evaluates Muslims in the 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration, mainly in his discourse on terrorism, vigilance, and policing. To this end, I analyse the nominations, actions, and qualities Trump attributes to Muslims and the arguments he employs to defend his attributions. I selected data from a variety of genres, i.e., I selected 5 campaign rallies, 11 TV interviews, one statement, one campaign ad and 28 tweets, from a timeline of 12 months, viz., from November 2015 to October 2016. To analyse the selected data, I adopted the discourse-historical approach (DHA) (Wodak, 2001b). The latter proposes five methods for the analysis of the representation of social actors, nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivisation, and mitigation and intensification, and incorporates van Leeuwen's (1996) socio-semantic analytical categories and van Dijk's (1991) strategies of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. In this thesis, I consider nomination, predication, and argumentation as the main methods of analysis and perspectivisation, and mitigation and intensification as aspects influencing the nomination, predication, and argumentation, following KhosraviNik (2010, pp.57-8).

The analysis of the selected data indicates that Trump represents the Muslims of Muslim majority countries and Muslim Americans as violent religious extremists and associates them to terrorism to position them as a threatening 'Other.' 'The Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p), dominates Trump's discourse because he represents immigrants from Muslim-majority countries and Muslim Americans as threats to the security and 'cultural values' of non-Muslim Americans. He associates President Barack H. Obama and the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, whom he refers to by 'the Obama-Clinton administration', to represent their admissions of Muslim immigrants as the source of these threats. He represents the presidential candidate Hillary Clinton as an extension of 'the Obama-Clinton administration', arguing that she supports the admission of Muslim immigrants. To differentiate his potential future administration from 'the Obama-Clinton administration' and the Clinton potential future administration and represent himself as the saviour and the protector of non-Muslim Americans from Muslims, he engages in 'Border Politics' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.), i.e., he suggests measures to restrict Muslim immigration such as the so-called 'the Muslim Travel Ban.'

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

Very special thanks to my parents, brothers and sister for their encouragement and emotional support.

I cannot thank enough my husband Walid. I would not have completed my PhD without his support.

Many thanks to my family in law for supporting me through difficult times, especially during the Covid-19 lockdown.

I owe special thanks to my supervisor Dr Alexandra Polyzou for her encouragements, advice, and insightful feedback.

I would like to thank Prof. Adrian Holliday for the interesting conversations we had on academic writing and the insightful comments he offered on chapter one.

I would like to thank Dr Christopher Anderson for the inspiring discussions we had on discourse and data analysis.

I would like to thank Dr Eleni Kapogianni for the discussion we had on Grice's theory of implicature.

I would like to thank Dr Ruth Rogers for the interesting discussions we had on Trump's Tweets and rhetoric.

I thank everybody in the Discourse Power Society Group of Canterbury Christ Church University for the critical discussions we had on Critical Discourse Studies.

I am indebted to the Algerian Government which funded my PhD course.

I thank everybody in the School of Language Studies and Applied Linguistics of Canterbury Christ Church University.

Dedication

I dedicate this PhD thesis to my well-behaved son, Ilyan RAHAL.

I also dedicate it to my sister, Linda BOUCHERAK, and my grandfathers, in loving memory.

List of tables and figures

1. Introduction

This thesis examines how Muslims are represented and evaluated in the discourse of the republican presidential candidate Donald J. Trump in the 2015-16 presidential campaign. Trump started campaigning to become the 45th president of the US in June 2015, but he started talking about Muslim immigration after the terrorist attack that happened in Paris, France, in November 2015. After the Paris attack, he frequently called for stopping the admission of Muslim refugees into the US and surveilling Muslim Americans and mosques, arguing that these measures may prevent potential terrorist attacks. The US witnessed the San Bernardino terrorist attack on the 2nd of December 2015. After this attack, Trump centred his discourse on Muslim immigration, specifically on terrorism, vigilance, and policing. As a reaction to the San Bernardino attack, he wrote the 'the Muslim Travel Ban statement' in which he called for banning all Muslims from entering the US (see appendix one for the transcript of the statement). He also advocated all the measures he proposed after the Paris attack, namely banning Muslims (refugees and non-refugees) from coming to the US and surveilling Muslim Americans and mosques in the US. To emphasise non-racist and non-discriminatory intents, Trump argues that his suggestions to ban Muslims from immigrating to the US and watch Muslims and mosques in the US are security measures necessary to prevent terrorism in the US.

When I first heard Trump's policy suggestions, especially 'the Muslim Travel Ban Statement', My reaction to his suggestions was 'what is going on with Trump's language?' I argue that, whether his intention is discrimination or security, his discourse is islamophobic because it conflates the actions of terrorists with all Muslims and essentialises Muslims as security threats. I also argue that his discourse is discriminatory and racist because it targets an entire religious group. Moreover, I argue that his discourse about Muslims might help him in the campaign. He is campaigning to become President. Obviously, the goal of his discourse is to convince people to vote for him. Sides (2006) argues that in election campaigns, candidates 'win votes by emphasizing issues where they perceive an advantage, thereby making these issues prominent in voters' minds' (p.407). Because of islamophobia (see section 3.4 in chapter three for a detailed explanation of islamophobia) and the constant link made between Muslims and terrorism, many non-Muslim Americans worry about their security (Alsultany, 2013; Abdullah, 2015). Thus, Trump's discourse on vigilance and policing may reassure electorates and convince them to vote for him, while reinforcing orientalist and islamophobic stereotypes such as the stereotype of violence and terrorism (Saïd, 1980, n.p.).

Whether Trump's intent is security, islamophobia and discrimination or uses Islamophobia as a mean to gain votes, he needs to draw on an essentialist and stereotyped discourse widespread about Muslims, i.e., the orientalist discourse of inferiority (see section 3.3 in chapter three for more details about Orientalism) and the discourse of violence, terrorism, and insecurity widespread after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 (generally known as 9/11), to construct security threat scenarios and represent Muslims as a violent 'Other' (Saïd 1978/1995/2003; 1980; Abdullah, 2015). In this thesis, I do not focus on Trump's intentions or goals; I worry about the ramifications of his discourse. A divisive discourse by an authority, a presidential candidate, is very likely to result in social inequality, such as unequal treatment and an unequal distribution of resources (van Dijk, 1997b, p.144) and hostility and violence (CAIR, 2017). During the campaign, anti-Muslim bias incidents increased dramatically in the US (ibid). Many Muslim Americans experienced harassment, intimidation, bullying and hate crimes (ibid). They also witnessed anti-mosque incidents and experienced discrimination in employment (ibid). It is not surprising that they polled that they worry about their security, and they are concerned about their place in the American society (Pew Research Center, 2017). I am a Muslim living in the United Kingdom where Islamophobia is on the rise (Carter, 2019). I can understand the worry of Muslim Americans as I always have had the same feeling. I have always felt that disclosing my religion may result in discrimination or violence. For instance, when I fill in administrative documents, such as the GP registration form, I answer the question about religion, but I keep thinking if this may affect the services I am entitled to. My concerns and worry did not develop in a vacuum; they developed because of the increasing anti-Muslim incidents and the discrimination and racism experienced by Muslims in Europe and US (see section 2.7 in chapter two about social constructivism). I write this thesis from a non-racist and a non-islamophobic position. Therefore, my aim is not to find out if Trump's intention is to discriminate against Muslims or not. My aim is the critique of the essentialist discourse he may use to represent Muslims, which he may normalise, legitimise, and justify through appeals to insecurity. I aim to show the impact this discourse is likely to have on Muslims such as religious oppression, social inequality, hostility and hate crimes. I decided to carry out my research within the CDS paradigm because the aim of critical discourse analysts is to critique any discourse which may result in social inequality, exclusion, domination, oppression, and to help the oppressed to emancipate themselves from forms of domination (Wodak & Meyer, 2016, p.7) and understand, expose and ultimately resist social inequality and discrimination (van Dijk, 2008, p.85).

Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse has been the case study of many researchers (Poudret, 2016; Montgomery, 2017; Lakoff, 2017; Nuruzzaman, 2017; Waikar, 2018; Khan et al., 2019; Raza; 2020; Rubin, 2020 and Khan et al., 2021). Some of these researchers have analysed how Muslims are represented (Poudret, 2016; Nuruzzaman, 2017; Waikar, 2018; Khan et al., 2019; Raza, 2020; Rubin, 2020 and Khan et al., 2021). Others have not explored the representation of Muslims; they focused on the success of Trump in the 2015-16 presidential elections (Montgomery, 2017; Lakoff, 2017). This thesis explores how Muslims are represented but focuses more on Right-wing Populism (see section 3.5 in chapter three for more details about Right-wing Populism) and the relationship between the representation of Muslims and the representation of President Obama and the presidential candidate Clinton. Trump showed strong opposition to Muslim immigration and proposed a variety of policies, such as 'the Muslim Travel Ban', to restrict it. Right-wing populists oppose immigration, and they generally legitimise their opposition by appeals to fear such as fear of losing one's culture, fear of insecurity (Wodak, 2015). To the best of my knowledge, none of the mentioned researchers has made an explicit link between Trump's discourse and Right-wing Populism. Also, none of them explored the link between the representation of Muslims and the representation of Obama and Clinton. I argue that Trump criticises Clinton as a Secretary of State of Obama and as a presidential candidate to legitimise his policy proposals on Muslims and convince electorates that Clinton is not qualified to be President.

I considered the whole presidential campaign i.e., from Trump's candidacy announcement in June 2015 till the elections in November 2016, to consult all the available data. Discourse on Muslim immigration, particularly discourse on terrorism, vigilance, and policing, turned out to be dominant since the Paris terrorist attack. Thus, I narrowed down my timeline to 12 months, i.e., from November 2015 till October 2016. I excluded the month of November because the elections took place on the 8th of November 2016. I selected 5 campaign rallies, 11 TV interviews, one statement, one campaign ad and 28 tweets. Because of the word limit in Twitter, i.e., 250 character per tweet, Trump used to post a set of tweets to cover all the sub-topics he discusses during interviews and campaign rallies. For this reason, I selected 28 tweets in which Trump clearly refers to the sub-topics discussed in the selected campaign rallies and interviews. Trump proposes his policies in campaign rallies, but he discusses them extensively during interviews. For this reason, I have more interviews than campaign rallies in my database.

I employed Wodak's' (2001b) DHA to analyse the selected data. The DHA suggests five methods for the analysis of the representation of social actors: (1) referential analysis, (2)

predicational analysis, (3) argumentation analysis, (4) perspectivisation analysis, and (5) mitigation and intensification analysis. Through referential analysis, I have looked at how Trump nominates Muslims to find out if his nominations connote violence. Through predicational analysis, I looked at the actions and qualities he assigns to Muslims in order to find out if he attributes them violence to emphasise insecurity. The DHA incorporates van Leeuwen's (1996) socio-semantic analytical categories and van Dijk's (1991) strategies of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. van Leeuwen's (1996) socio-semantic analytical categories have allowed an in-depth analysis of the nominations, qualities, and actions Trump attributes to Muslims. Through van Dijk's (1991) strategies of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation, I have examined if Muslims, the 'Other', are compared to any other social groups the 'Self', and if the stereotypes of violence and inferiority are reproduced in Trump's discourse. Trump's representation of Muslims is stereotyped and appeals to insecurity; thus, he legitimises and defends it through argumentation, particularly through topoi of danger, threat, and difference. I consider nomination analysis, predication analysis, and argumentation analysis as the main methods of analysis and perspectivisation, mitigation and intensification as aspects influencing the three levels of analysis from nomination to argumentation, following KhosraviNik (2010, pp.57-8). The aspects of mitigation and intensification have shown which nominations and qualities are deemphasised, and which ones are emphasised and exaggerated. For instance, predication analysis has revealed that violent actions are attributed to Muslims, and the aspect of intensification has revealed that violence is intensified. The aspect of perspectivisation has shown that the nominations, actions, and qualities Trump assigns to Muslims are expressed from orientalist, islamophobic, discriminatory and right-wing populist perspectives.

The analysis of the selected data shows that Trump talks mainly about four social groups: the Muslims and non-Muslims of Muslim-majority countries and the Muslims and non-Muslims who live in the US. On the one hand, he represents the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries and Muslim Americans as religious extremists hateful against non-Muslims, particularly non-Muslim Americans. He also associates them with violence and terrorism. By assigning them these negative qualities, he represents them as security threats to non-Muslim Americans. He also represents them as threats to 'the American values' of openness and tolerance. On the other hand, he represents non-Muslim Americans as peaceful and tolerant people and positions them as the victims of Muslims' extremism and terrorism. Trump adopts the right-wing populist style known as the 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.), as he constructs threat

scenarios and positions Muslims as hateful, violent, extremist, and devilish 'Other' who desire to harm the 'Self', i.e., non-Muslim Americans. Trump's discourse is islamophobic because it associates Muslims with extremism and terrorism, and this association encourages fear of Muslims. It is also orientalist because by the binary division of intolerant and violent 'Other' and tolerant and peaceful 'Self', he emphasises difference and reproduces the orientalist stereotype of inferiority (Saïd 1978/1995/2003). Trump constructs a security crisis; he argues that non-Muslim Americans face a security crisis because of the presence of Muslims in the US. Then, he collectivises Obama and his Secretary of State Clinton, whom I refer to by 'the Obama-Clinton administration' in this thesis, in order to represent them as the source of the crisis. He emphasises that they opened the borders to Muslim immigration. He then moves to talk about Clinton as a presidential candidate, i.e., an opponent. He argues that she supports open borders and constructs her potential future administration as an extension of 'the Obama-Clinton administration.' By opposing Muslim immigration and proposing policies to restrict it, such as 'the Muslim Travel Ban', he represents himself as the solver of the security crisis and the protector and saviour of non-Muslim Americans from Muslims. This is a right-wing populist style known as 'Border Politics' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). The latter means to propose immigration restrictions, which are usually discriminatory, and argue that they are aimed to protect the 'Self' from a devilish and deviant 'Other' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.).

Trump constructs a security crisis and puts part of the blame on his opponent Clinton, but he represents himself as the solver of the crisis and plays the protector. This may reassure non-Muslim Americans and give them confidence to vote for Trump. This is how Trump, a businessman with no political experience, tries to defeat his opponent who has an extensive political experience. Trump's criticisms of his opponent reinforce my assumption that his discourse seeks to attract electorates, and islamophobia and discrimination are the by-products of his discourse. However, this interpretation changes when we look at the post-election period. After taking the oath of presidency on the 20th of January 2017, Trump appointed an islamophobic administration (Patel, 2017). He appointed Steve Bannon as his senior adviser, Michael Flynn as his national security advisor, and Sebastian Gorka as his Deputy assistant (ibid). The three are known for their anti-Islam stance (ibid). They are also closely connected to Frank Gaffney, who heads the Center for Security Policy, a think tank known for promoting anti-Muslim agenda (ibid). Trump's administration officialised 'the Muslim Travel Ban' after one week of presidency (see appendix two for details about the official 'Muslim Travel Ban Policy'). This contextual information show Trump's anti-Muslim position. I argue that

Trump's discourse is islamophobic because it associates Muslims with terrorism. I argue that Trump's discourse is racist and discriminatory based on religion because if Trump's campaign discourse only aimed to gain votes, he would have put them aside after becoming president.

This thesis contributes to a bulk of literature on Trump's Islamophobic discourse (Poudret, 2016; Nuruzzaman, 2017; Waikar, 2018; Khan et al., 2019; Raza, 2020; Rubin, 2020; Khan et al., 2021) but focuses more on the orientalist and islamophobic stereotypes Trump bases his arguments on, such as the stereotypes of inferiority and violence (Saïd, 1978/1995/2003; 1980), the use of the basic micro-politics of Right-wing Populism, specifically the 'Politics of Fear' and 'Border Politics' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.), and the association he makes between Muslims, President Obama and the presidential candidate Clinton. Importantly, it also provides guidelines for a non-essentialist, non-islamophobic, non-racist and non-discriminatory discourse on Muslims (see section 5.3 in chapter five).

1.1 Research questions

The first research question I raised aims to find out how Muslims are represented and evaluated in Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration, mainly in his discourse on terrorism, vigilance, and policing. After considering the islamophobic, orientalist and racist stereotypes widespread about Muslims in the US, i.e., the stereotypes of inferiority and violence (Saïd, 1978/1995/2003; 1980), I raised sub-research question one. The latter seeks to find out if Trump's discourse represents Muslims from an orientalist, islamophobic and racist perspective. In his 'Muslim Travel Ban Statement', Trump called for banning Muslims from entering the US. It is generally, right-wing populists who oppose immigration and justify their opposition through appeals to security and protection (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). Thus, sub-research question one also aims to find out if Trump's representation of Muslims can be considered right-wing populist. Trump's discussions of Muslim immigration always include reference to President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidate Clinton. Trump always differentiates himself from President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidate Clinton. Thus, the second research question I formulated aims to find out how President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidates Clinton and Trump are represented and evaluated and explore the link between the representation of Muslims and the representation of President Obama and the Secretary of State Clinton. I also raised sub-research question two. It aims to explore the link between the representation of President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidates Clinton and Trump and Right-win Populism.

RQ1: how are Muslims represented in Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration?

Sub-RQ1: to what extent is Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration orientalist, islamophobic, and racist, and how does his representation of Muslims link to Right-win Populism?

RQ2: how are President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidates Clinton and Trump represented in Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration?

Sub-RQ2 how do the representations of President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidates Clinton and Trump link to Right-win Populism?

1.2 Structure of the thesis

This thesis explores how Muslims are represented and evaluated in Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration, particularly in relation to terrorism, vigilance, and policing. I begin with an introduction chapter in which I summarise my research, i.e., research topic, motivation, position, aims, data collection and selection, methods of analysis, findings, and contribution.

I consider my thesis a critique of the discourse of insecurity Trump employs to represent Muslims as my aim is to show the impact his discourse can have on Muslims such as reinforcing racist beliefs and actions. I decided to carry out my research within the CDS paradigm because it encourages researchers to critique and argue against racism and pursue anti-racist strategies (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.2). Thus, in chapter two, I will introduce the CDS paradigm. I will give a brief history of CDS. I will explain why I use the term 'CDS' instead of 'CDA.' Then, I will introduce the CDS paradigm, define the key concepts relevant to this thesis such as 'discourse', 'ideology', 'power', 'critique', and 'context.' I will highlight the theoretical principles that unify its main approaches such as Norman Fairclough's dialectical-relational approach, Teun van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach, and Ruth Wodak's discourse historical approach. I will also explain social constructivism. I will provide an overview of the DHA because it is the approach I selected for this research and explain how it deals with discriminatory discourse.

In chapter three, I will explain the social theories I draw upon to interpret the linguistic findings, such as Saïd's (1978/1995/2003) theory of Orientalism and Right-wing Populism. I will also discuss how the orientalist stereotypes widespread about Muslims contributed to the spread of Islamophobia. I will focus on 'race' and racism and explain how the latter is manifested through the language of differentiation and 'Othering.' That is, I will discuss how some politicians emphasise biological, cultural, and religious difference between some social groups to oppress them and legitimise social inequality.

In chapter four, I will discuss the methodological framework of my research. I will discuss the aspects of discourse that the DHA examines: nomination, predication, and argumentation. I will explain why I consider perspectivisation, mitigation and intensification as aspects influencing nomination, predication, and argumentation, as per KhosraviNik (2010, pp.57-8). I will also explain why I decided to incorporate van Leeuwen's (1996) Socio-semantic approach and van Dijk's (1991) strategies of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation to the DHA. In section two, I will focus on the criteria for data collection and selection, including why I collected and selected data from different genres.

In chapter five, I will analyse the selected data in relation to how Trump represents Muslims. I will focus on how Trump represents the Muslims of Muslim majority countries. Also, I will analyse how he represents Muslim Americans, and I will highlight the comparisons established between Muslim Americans and non-Muslim Americans. finally, I will discuss the major findings.

In chapter six, I will explore how Trump represents President Obama and his secretary of state Clinton. I will analyse how Trump represents Clinton as a presidential candidate. I will focus on why and how Trump represents Clinton as an extension of the Obama administration. I will analyse how Trump represents himself and how he differentiates his potential future administration from 'the Obama-Clinton administration' and the Clinton potential future administration. Finally, I will discuss the major findings.

I will conclude my thesis in chapter seven. I will address and answer my research questions. I will highlight the limitations of my research, and I will suggest ideas for future research.

2. Critical discourse studies (CDS)

2.1 Introduction

People have different backgrounds and interests; however, when they talk about a given social group, they can find themselves thinking alike and have the same representations (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, pp.8-9). This is because some beliefs and ideas are reproduced, promoted, and become dominant in society (ibid). These dominant beliefs are generally taken for granted and considered 'neutral' and non-ideological (ibid). The critical perspective of the CDS paradigm encourages researchers to critique this kind of hegemonic discourse by 'exposing strategies that appear normal or neutral on the surface but which may in fact be ideological and seek to shape the representation of events and persons for particular ends' (Machin and Mayr, 2012, p. 5). Therefore, the term 'critical' means 'denaturalising' the language to reveal the kinds of ideas, absences and taken-for-granted assumptions in texts (ibid) and raise awareness of the impact they can have such as domination, oppression, social inequality, and discrimination (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p.12).

In the case of Muslims, Saïd (1978/1995/2003) argues that orientalists produced a hegemonic knowledge promoting the inferiority of Muslims to 'Westerners' (see section 3.3 in chapter three for more details on Orientalism), and after the 9/11 terrorist attack, Muslims are usually associated with terrorism and perceived as security threats (Alsultany, 2013; Abdullah, 2015), i.e., they are perceived in an islamophobic way. During the 2015-16 American presidential campaign, Trump draws on the discourse of inferiority and the discourse of violence and terrorism to appeal to insecurity. Trump's discourse reproduces the orientalist and islamophobic beliefs widespread about Muslims. I decided to carry out my research within the CDS paradigm to critique the discourse of inferiority and the discourse of violence and terrorism which people may take for granted and show that it is likely to result in hostility (islamophobia), discrimination and racism against Muslim Americans and Muslims around the world. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the CDS paradigm, define key concepts such as 'ideology', 'power', 'critique', and 'context', summarise the principles unifying the approaches of CDS paradigm, such as Norman Fairclough's dialectical-relational approach, Teun van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach, and Ruth Wodak's DHA, explain 'social constructivism', and discuss the theoretical underpinnings of the DHA.

2.2 History of CDS: From an exchange programme into a branch of DA

Critical discourse studies (CDS), traditionally called critical discourse analysis (CDA) (van Dijk, 2016, p.63), developed historically out of Critical Linguistics (CL), a movement developed at the University of East Anglia in the mid- 1970s (van Leeuwen, 2006, p.291). CDS has been in existence for a quite long time (ibid, p.292). It started as a new direction of research in the mid- 1980s thanks to the influential works of Norman Fairclough, Language and Power, Teun van Dijk, Prejudice in Discourse, and Ruth Wodak, Language, Power, and Ideology (ibid).

In the early 1990s, CDS emerged as movement of scholars and an exchange programme (Wodak, 2001a, p.4). In January 1991, Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theo van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak met by coincidence at the University of Amsterdam (ibid). Thanks to the support provided by the university of Amsterdam, these scholars spent two days together and successfully hold the symposium of CDS (ibid). These scholars, belonging to different schools, exchanged their research ideas and discussed their different approaches to the study of discourse (van Leeuwen, 2006, p.292). To create a kind of network or group, they laid out the theoretical similarities that unify their approaches and at the same time they differentiated them from other theories and methods of Discourse Analysis (DA) (Wodak & Meyer, 2016, p.4). After this symposium, some of the scholars have chosen other theoretical frameworks and have distanced themselves from CDS (such as Gunther Kress), new scholars joined this research network, and new approaches have been created by either integrating the traditional theories or by elaborating them (ibid). The Amsterdam meeting determined an institutional start, an attempt both to constitute an exchange programme (ERASMUS for three years) as well as joint projects and collaborations between scholars of different countries (ibid). The Erasmus network refers to collaborations between Siegfried Jäger, Duisburg; Per Linell, Linkoeping; Norman Fairclough, Lancaster; Teun van Dijk, Amsterdam; Gunther Kress, London; Theo van Leeuwen, London; Ruth Wodak, Vienna (ibid, p.22)

From 1992 onward, the study of CDS seemed to get into a phase of rapid development as new journals emerged, and a lot of works were published (van Leeuwen, 2006, p.292). For instance, the research works presented in this seminar of CDS were published in 1993 as a special issue in the journal of Discourse and Society launched by Teun van Dijk (ibid). This was the first visible outcome (Wodak & Meyer, 2016, p.5). In 1996, interesting papers were published in Caldas-Coulthard & Coulthard's book entitled 'Texts and Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis' (van Leeuwen, 2006, p.292). In 2004, an international conference was

held in Valencia and the Journal of Critical Discourse Studies, and the Journal of Language and Politics emerged (ibid). Several e-journals also published critical research, such as CADAAD (Wodak & Meyer, 2016, p.5). Thanks to all these contributions, CDS has become an established paradigm in Linguistics (ibid), an influential branch of DA (van Leeuwen, 2006, p.292) and 'a discipline institutionalized across the globe in many departments and curricula' (Wodak & Meyer, 2016, p.5).

2.3 CDA or CDS

CDS does not comprise a well-defined empirical method but rather a set of approaches (Wodak & Meyer, 2016, p.21). The latter suggest different methods for the analysis of discourse. i.e., they suggest different analytical categories (KhosraviNik, 2010, p.56). There is no specific method or a closed list of analytical categories that critical discourse analysts must employ to analyze discourse (van Dijk, 2000b, p.86). All the approaches encourage eclecticism (KhosraviNik, 2010, p.56). They encourage researchers to select and mix the analytical categories relevant to their research (van Dijk, 2000b, p.86; KhosraviNik, 2010, p.56). This thesis employs the analytical categories of the DHA: nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivisation, mitigation and intensification (Wodak, 2001b). The DHA adopts some analytical categories from van Leeuwen's (1996) socio-semantic approach, such as the categories of exclusion, inclusion, suppression, backgrounding, passivation, categorisation, assimilation, collectivisation, aggregation, impersonalisation, abstraction and objectivation, for the analysis of referential/nomination strategies (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, pp.46-7). Though the DHA excludes van Leeuwen's (1996) strategies of association and dissociation (ibid, p.46), I adopt them in this study. The DHA also adopts van Dijk's (1991) strategies of positive-self and negative-other presentation, which I adopt in this study as well.

In CDS, textual analysis is informed by social theories (KhosraviNik, 2010, pp.55-6). On the one hand, critical discourse analysts use theories of language to study and describe the salient linguistic mechanisms employed in discourse (ibid). On the other hand, they use social theories to contextualise their linguistic findings and explain the impacts of discourse on social structures or the impact of social structures on the production of discourse (ibid). Social theories provide researchers with a 'relatively systematic, abstract and general reflection on the workings of the social world' (Baert & Carreira da Silva, 2010, p.1), thus help them understand their implications for beliefs and ideologies and reach social critique (Forchtner, 2018, pp. 260-1). This thesis draws on some social theories, such as Orientalism (Saïd, 1978/1995/2003), to find out how Trump's discourse is influenced by and reproduces the orientalist stereotype of

inferiority and violence. In addition, CDS is multidisciplinary; researchers can incorporate ideas and insights from the social sciences, such as History, Politics, Sociology and Psychology, etc. and combine them with linguistics to explore the complex linkage between discourse structures and social structures (van Dijk, 2001, p.96). Linguistic analysis can be 'combined with any approach and subdiscipline in the humanities and social sciences' (ibid) to accurately explore complex social issues such as racism (van Dijk, 2013, n.p.). In addition to socio-theoretical insights, researchers may take methods from the social sciences (ibid) because they offer a host of methods of fieldwork, such as ethnography, participant observation, interviewing, life stories, focus groups, and many more, that may be relevant for obtaining insight into the social conditions and consequences of discourse (ibid). However, adopting insights and methods from the social sciences is not always necessary (ibid).

CDS research is oriented towards denouncing power abuse, domination, social inequality and discriminatory practices (van Dijk, 2013, n.p.). Researchers must select adequate analytical categories, social theories, and insights and methods from the social sciences to answer their research questions and realise their critical goals (ibid). Being critical is an attitude and a way of dissenting, but not a method for the description of the structures or strategies of discourse (ibid). CDA is DA with a critical attitude against power abuse, inequality, and discrimination in society (ibid). Hence, 'CDA is rather a social or political movement than a method' (ibid). van Dijk recommends using 'the term *Critical Discourse Studies* for the theories, methods, analyses, applications and other practices of critical discourse analysts' (ibid) and avoid the term *Critical Discourse analysis* because 'it suggests that it is a *method* of discourse analysis, and not a critical *perspective* or *attitude* in the field of discourse studies (DS), using many different methods of the humanities and social sciences' (ibid, 2016, p.63). Therefore, this thesis will use CDS instead of the traditional term and abbreviation CDA.

2.4 Discourse as a social practice: ideology, power, and critique

Critical discourse analysts perceive discourse as a form of social practice (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p.258). They argue that discourse is socially constitutive because it affects and shapes social structures; it is also socially conditioned since it is affected and shaped by social structures (ibid). For this reason, CDS employ the Marxist concept 'the dialectic' to show that there exists a two-way dialectical relationship between discourse and society (Phelan, 2018, p.288). They are mediated by ideologies, i.e., ideologies widespread in society influence discourse and the ideologies underlying discourse can influence society (Liu & Guo, 2016, p.1076). Fowler (1991, p.118) explains the mediation between discourse and society as follows:

> all linguistic usage encodes ideological patterns or discursive structures which *mediate* representations of the world in language; that different usages (e.g. different sociolinguistic varieties or lexical choices or syntactic paraphrases) encode different ideologies, resulting from their different situations and purposes; and that by these means language works as a social practice: it is not, as traditional linguistics claims, a transparent medium for communication about an objective world, nor is it a reflection of a stable social structure, but it promulgates a set of versions of reality and thereby works as a constantly operative part of social processes.

Ideology can be defined as a constellation of abstract mental representations, convictions, opinions, attitudes, and evaluations people have about certain aspects of the social world or certain social groups (van Dijk, 1993, p.258; Reisigl and Wodak, 2009, p.88; Fairclough, 2003, p.218). Mental representations are usually shared by the members of society (van Dijk, 2018, p.31; Reisigl & Wodak, 2016, p.25). Widespread ideologies are often labelled 'grand narratives' and usually include three interconnected imaginaries: an image of society in the present, how it should be in the future, and how the desired society could be reached (Reisigl & Wodak, 2016, p.25). Ideologies underlying discourse create shared social identities and establish or maintain power (ibid). The latter means 'privileged access to socially valued resources, such as wealth, income, position, status, force, group membership…' (van Dijk, 1993, p.254). This means that that there exist 'asymmetric relationship among social actors, who have different social positions or who belong to different social groups' (Reisigl & Wodak, 2016, p.26). Unequal relationships of power usually result in domination and oppression (van Dijk, 1997b, p. 144). Hence, ideology could be defined as 'representations of aspects of the world which contribute to establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination, and exploitation' (Fairclough, 2003, p.218).

The figure 2.1 below explains the cyclical relationship between discourse and ideology. It shows that ideology, as a set of socially shared abstract representations of the social world (macro structures that exist in society), needs to slip into a concrete linguistic form to permeate and spread in society (KhosraviNik, 2010, p. 61). That is, discourse producers employ a set of perspectivized, i.e., strategic, linguistic mechanisms to encode some ideologies and (re) produce collective social identities and mentalities (ibid). Then, discourse consumers use their socio-cognitive resources to interpret and decode the macro-structures (ideologies) interwoven in discourse (ibid). This process of comprehension plays a vital role in rendering the ideology back to society (ibid). Discourse is the main apparatus through which ideologies are transported into society (ibid).

Figure 2.1 The discourse and ideology interplay (KhosraviNik, 2010, p.61)

Some beliefs and representations are dominant in society (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, pp.8-9). That is, they are reproduced and promoted to the extent they appear 'neutral' and non-ideological (ibid). These widespread ideologies often remain unchallenged and unquestioned (ibid) and help in gaining or maintaining power, (re)producing unequal power relations in society (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 259). Unequal power relationships usually result in domination, oppression, social inequality, and discrimination such as unequal distribution of resources and unequal access to social services (van Dik, 1997b, p.144). Critical discourse analysts analyse both apparent and implicit ideologies underlying discourse, but they are more

interested in the ideologies that are latent inherent in everyday-beliefs, and which are generally expressed and transported into society through discourse (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p.8). That is, they focus on what is not in the text. They investigate the ideas that are communicated, but they are not explicitly stated (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p. 3). In other words, they aim primarily at decoding the implicit ideologies underlying explicit and overt linguistic propositions (Fowler, 1996, p.3). Orientalist and islamophobic representations of Muslims, such as inferiority and violence, are dominant in American society (Saïd, 1978/1995/2003; 1980). My analysis shows that Trump's draws on the discourse of inferiority and the discourse of violence and terrorism to appeal to insecurity. Trump's discourse reproduces the orientalist and islamophobic beliefs widespread about Muslims. His representation of Muslims is impacted by orientalist and islamophobic ideologies. In turn, his discourse renders these ideologies back to society and promotes them. The aim of this research is the critique of Trump's discourse of inferiority and the discourse of violence and terrorism, which people may take for granted, and show that it is likely to result in islamophobia, discrimination, and racism against Muslims.

The critical perspective of the CDS paradigm encourages critical discourse analysts to challenge and question the taken-for-granted ideologies to elucidate their opaque meanings to people and the effects they can have on society (Fairclough, 1985, p.31). Thus, the term 'critique' means to reveal the kinds of ideas, absences, and taken-for-granted assumptions in discourse. This will allow to reveal the hidden, opaque, and visible structures of dominance, discrimination, power and control, social inequality as manifested and legitimised by discourse (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p.12). The aim of CDS research is social change; CDS research should 'improve the lives of ordinary people by making transparent the relationships of power that oppress and diminish' (McKenna, 2004 p. 21). That is, the research findings should contribute to the freeing and emancipation of low-power groups that suffer from different forms of domination (ibid) to help them understand and resist social inequality (van Dijk, 2008, p.85). Studying social issues through discourse analysis should 'have effects in society: empowering the powerless, giving voices to the voiceless, exposing power abuse, and mobilizing people to remedy social wrongs' (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000, p. 449). Thus, CDS can be defined as 'a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context' (van Dijk, 2008, p.85). CDS researchers believe in the role of language use in 'maintaining and legitimating inequality, injustice, and oppression in society' (van Leeuwen, 2006, p.290), therefore their research primarily focuses on the analysis of discourse

'to show how this is done, and it seeks to spread awareness of this aspect of language use in society, and to argue explicitly for change on the basis of its findings' (ibid). The DHA adheres to the socio-philosophical orientation of critical theory (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009, p.88). Thus, it suggests a concept of critique which integrates three related levels: the text or discourse immanent critique, the socio-diagnostic critique, and the prospective critique (ibid). According to Reisigl (2018, pp.50-1), the three different types of critique can be defined as follows:

1. Text or discourse immanent critique is primarily knowledge-related. It assesses conflicts, contradictions and inconsistencies in text-internal or discourse-internal structures, for example with respect to cohesion, presuppositions, argumentation and turn-taking structures.

2. Socio-diagnostic critique is both epistemic and deontic. It aims at exposing manipulation in and by discourse, at revealing ethically problematic aspects of discursive practices. This form of critique focusses on discrepancies between discursive and other social practices and functions as a form of social control. It relies on social, historical and political background knowledge. This critique includes the critique of ideology, the critique of the ethos of social actors, pragmatic critique, political critique and "social critique" (relating, for instance, to social recognition).

3. Prospective critique is strongly application-oriented. It is practical, aimed at reducing dysfunctional communication and language barriers, at improving communication within public institutions by elaborating proposals and guidelines on the basis of careful fieldwork.

To create social change, the DHA emphasises that one should pay great attention to the 'prospective critique' (Reisigl, 2018, p. 49). For instance, when analysing discriminatory discourse, the DHA activists may put forward guidelines on non-discriminatory language use (ibid), or they may 'act politically and participate in the fight against racism and discrimination, they may engage in civil society and express a perspective critique that aims at optimising anti-racist policy' (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.2). The discourse historical analysts 'are politically engaged and often application oriented' (Reisigl, 2018, p. 49). More specifically, '[t]hey make practical claims of emancipation and criticise discursively constituted power abuse, injustice and social discrimination, and they make epistemic claims of revelation or enlightenment' (ibid). This thesis deals with Trump's discourse on Muslims. Trump's discourse of inferiority

and violence and terrorism resulted in hate crimes and discrimination (CAIR, 2017). I approach Trump's discourse from a critical stance. That is, I critique his discourse of inferiority and violence while emphasising its impacts such as discrimination and racism (see section 5.3 in chapter five).

2.4.1 Genres of discourse and fields of action

CDS is interested in the analysis of different discourses such as educational discourse (Rogers, 2018), such as textbooks (Macgilchrist, 2018), Legal discourse (Rajah, 2018), musical discourse (van Leeuwen, 2018), political discourse (van Dijk, 2000b), media discourse (Fairclough, 1995b; KhosraviNik, 2014; KhosraviNik 2018) and many others. In this thesis, I analyse Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse, i.e., political discourse, specifically campaign rallies, TV interviews, statements, ads and tweets. Political discourse means discourse produced by political actors and intended to achieve a political goal (van Dijk, 1997a). For instance, Trump was campaigning to become the 45th President of the US. When politicians discuss a given topic, they discuss it from their own perspective of society (Chilton 2004, p. 23). Therefore, their representations are determined by ideological beliefs (van Dijk, 1998). Their discourses result in issues that are of interest to CDS i.e., power, injustice, abuse, and political-economic or cultural change in society (Fairclough, Mulderrig and Wodak, 2011, p. 357).

Political discourses belong to different 'fields of action' and genres. 'Field of action' 'indicates a segment of social reality which constitutes or shapes the 'frame' of a discourse' (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.66). To distinguish the different fields of action, one needs to distinguish the functions or aims of discursive practices (ibid). In the case of political discourse, researchers can distinguish between 'the functions of legislation, self-presentation, the manufacturing of public opinion, developing party-internal consent, advertising and vote-getting, governing as well as executing, and controlling as well as expressing (oppositional) dissent' (ibid, pp. 66-7) depending on the function of the discursive practice (see figure 2.2 below). A 'discourse' about a specific topic 'can start within one field of action and proceed through another one (ibid, p.67). This means that discourses can be socio-functionally linked with each other, thus can spread to different fields and relate to or overlap with other discourses (ibid). A 'genre' may be defined as 'a socially ratified way of using language in connection with a particular type of social activity' (Fairclough, 1995a, p.14). The figure 2.2. below highlights several political genres and their fields of political action.

Fields of action					Field of control
Law making political procedure	Formation of public opinion and self-presentation	Party-internal development of an infromed opinion	Political advertising, marketing and propaganda	Political executive and administration	Political executive and administration
Genres					
- laws - bills - amendments - speeches and contributions of MPs - regulations - recommenda-tions - prescriptions - guidelines - etc.	- press releases - press conferences - interviews - talk shows - lectures and contributions to conferences - articles, books - commemora-tive speeches - inaugural speeches - etc.	- party programmes declarations statements and speeches of principle - speeches on party conventions - etc.	- election programmes - slogans, speeches in election campaigns - announcements - posters - election brochure - direct mailings - fliers, etc.	- decisions (approval/ rejection) - inaugural speeches - coalition papers, speeches of ministers/heads - governmental answers to p.q.	- declarations of opposition parties - parliamentary questions - speeches of MPs - petitions for a referendum - press releases of the opposition parties

Discourse Topic 1 Discourse Topic 2 Discourse Topic 3 Discourse Topic 4 Discourse Topic 5 Discourse Topic 6

Figure 2.2 Fields of political action and political genres (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 68)

For this study, I selected data from a variety of genres, i.e., 5 campaign rallies, 11 TV interviews, one statement, one campaign ad and 28 tweets. These different genres belong to different fields of political action: the campaign rallies and ad belong to the field of political advertising, and TV interviews, tweets and the 'Muslim Travel Ban Statement' (posted under press releases in Trump's presidential campaign) can be included in the field of the formation of public attitudes, opinions and will. During the South Carolina rally, Trump read the 'Muslim Travel Ban Statement' to the audience. This means, that the South Carolina rally starts in the field of the field of political advertising and continues to the field of formation of public opinion. I selected data from different genres because Trump proposes his ideas and policies during campaign rallies and supports them through TV interviews and Twitter. Orientalist ideas are propagated by the Media (Saïd, 1980). Trump's use of the media (mass and social media) can contribute to the maintaining and reproduction of orientalist and islamophobic representations of Muslims in the US.

2.5 The notion of context

CDS practitioners argue that there is a dialectical link between discourse and society (Fairclough, 2001, p.231). They argue that discourse and society are two different elements, but they are pervasively connected and cannot be studied as separate and discrete entities (ibid). They aim to 'study society through discourse, and contextualise (and understand) discourse through an analysis of its historical, socio-political and cultural foundations' (Flowerdew & Richardson, 2018, p.1). Discourse is historically produced and should be studied in its social context (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p.276). CDS employs the concept 'dialectic' to avoid the charge of discursive reductionism (Phelan, 2018, p.288). In other words, it is used to indicate that discourse and society co-exist (Fairclough, 2001, p.233); one internalises the other without being reducible to each other (ibid). It is true that discourse is the basic unit of analysis in CDS, but this does not mean that CDS privileges the study of discourse over society or studies society through using only language theories (ibid, p.231). Social elements such as social relations, social identities and cultural values are in part discursive (they are negotiated in discourse), but that does not allow researchers to theorize and explore them relying only on the theories and methods used to theorize and research language (ibid).

Critical discourse analysts cannot understand social relations or social problems if they rely on the analysis of the formal properties of discourse and neglect the context in which it is embedded (Wodak & Meyer, 2016, p.19). van Dijk (2001, p.108) distinguishes between two types of contexts: local and global. Local contexts refer to the 'properties of the immediate, interactional situation in which a communicative event takes place. Some properties of such a situation are its overall domain ..., an overall action ..., participants ..., as well as their intentions, goals, knowledge, norms and other beliefs' (ibid), whereas the global contexts refer to 'the social, political, cultural and historical structures in which a communicative event takes place' (ibid). In CDS, global contexts 'form the ultimate explanatory and critical rationale of discourse and its analysis' (ibid). Fairclough (2015) uses different terms to refer to local and global contexts; he names local contexts the 'description level', in which researchers are more concerned with the identification and the description of the linguistic properties of the text and its content, and global contexts the 'explanation level', in which researchers should explain and clarify the social effects by relating the discursive event to the different levels of the social context (pp. 57-59). The DHA also uses different terms to refer to local and global contexts. That is, the DHA refers to global contexts by the broader socio-political and historical context

and refers to local contexts by three related aspects of context: (1) the immediate, language or text-internal co-text and co-discourse, (2) the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses, and (3) the extralinguistic social variables and institutional frames of a specific 'context of situation' (Wodak, 2001b, p.67; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p.41; Reisigl & Wodak, 2016, pp.30-1 and Reisigl, 2018, p. 53).

1. The immediate, language internal co-text and co-discourse regards thematic and syntactic coherences, lexical solidarities, collocations, connotations, implications, presuppositions and local interactive processes.

2. The intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses (e.g., with respect to discourse representation, allusions, evocations) is a further contextual research dimension.

3. Social factors and institutional frames of a specific context of situation include: degree of formality, place, time, occasion, addressees, interactive and political roles, political and ideological orientation, gender, age, profession, level of education, ethnic, regional, national, religious identities, etc.

4. On a meso- and macro-level, the broader socio-political and historical context is integrated into the analysis. At this point, fields of action and the history of the discursive event as well as of discourse topics are looked at.

The DHA puts great emphasis on the fourth dimension of context (Reisigl, 2018, p.53) because it 'attempts to integrate a large quantity of available knowledge about the historical sources and political fields in which discursive 'events' are embedded' (Wodak, 2001b, p.65). This historical knowledge is analysed because it plays a vital role in the interpretation of the discursive event (ibid, p.70). In addition to the general historical knowledge of the discursive event, the historical dimension of discursive actions can be investigated 'by exploring the ways in which particular genres of discourse are subject to diachronic change' (ibid, p.65). Thus, the use of the adjective historical in the label 'stresses the strong historical research interest of the approach' (Reisigl, 2018, p.44). Historical information on the representation of Muslims, especially how they are represented in orientalist discourse since World War II, will help interpret Trump's discourse on Muslims. Seemingly, all CDS research engage in two major levels of analysis: the descriptive level in which linguistic theories are employed to describe

the formal properties of discourse, and the explanatory level in which the linguistic findings are interpreted and explained through socio-theoretical insights (KhosraviNik, 2010, p.55).

Critical discourse analysts look 'beyond the formal structure of Language as an abstract system, towards the practical interaction of language and context' (Fowler, 1996, p.3). Doing critical analysis is not an 'automatic hermeneutic procedure which would allow one to identify linguistic structure (passive voice, say) and read off ideological or social significance from it' (Fowler, 1991, p.119) because 'there is no invariant relationship between textual structure and its social meanings: the latter are dependent on the contexts in which the former occurs and the purposes for which it is used' (ibid). Researchers cannot get the real meaning embedded in 'a piece of language unless [they possess] rich and accurate intuitions and understanding of context, function and relevant social relations. Then the analysis will be plausible to the extent that this understanding of context is made explicit, and documented' (ibid). Thus, using appropriate linguistic tools, and referring to relevant historical and social contexts can reveal the ideologies underlying discourse (ibid).

2.6 The tenets of the approaches of CDS

Based on the above explanation and discussion of the CDS paradigm, I understand that the approaches of CDS propose a variety of analytical frameworks, i.e., methods and tools, to the study of discourse, but they all share the following characteristics (Fairclough & Wodak. 1997, pp. 271-80):

1) They are all problem oriented, i.e., they address social problems. They encourage interdisciplinarity to investigate intricate social and political structures and processes which take a (partly) discursive character.

2) They all argue that social power relations are discursive. That is, they are negotiated and performed in discourse.

3) They all argue that discourse is socially and culturally influential and constitutive. That is, discourse shapes social and cultural structures, and it is also shaped by them.

4) They all argue that discourse is ideological. To determine the ideologies that are embedded in a particular discursive event, critical discourse analysts should analyse the formal properties of a given discursive event and consider how (a) discourse is consumed and interpreted and (b) its effects on society.

5) They all agree that discourse is historically produced and interpreted. That is, discourse should be analysed in the social context in which it is embedded to accurately interpret, understand, and explain its meanings.

6) They all agree that the connection between social structures and discursive structures is mediated (intricate and implicit), and the role of critical discourse analysts is to elucidate it to people.

7) They all argue that discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory in intent. People can interpret and explain the same discourse differently depending on the amount of contextual knowledge.

8) They all agree that discourse is a form of social action because it contributes to social change.

In addition to all the mentioned principles above, the CDS paradigm encourages social constructivism (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p.16). Social constructivists believe in the social construction of reality (Burger and Luckman, 1966). They believe that reality is constructed through socialisation and habitualization (ibid). That is, through interaction, the members of a given society create knowledge, and through use and repetition of the created knowledge, they become habituated to it and develop collective mental representations (ibid). CDS scholars are social constructivists because they argue that people communicate, interact, and socialize to create shared mental identities, i.e., ideologies (van Dijk, 2009, p.6). They argue that some ideologies, are (re)produced and habitualised through discourse (Fowler, 1991, p.119; Machin & Mayr, 2012, p.24). That is, some ideologies are dominant in society (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, pp.8-9) because they are reproduced and promoted to the extent that people are habituated to them and consider them 'neutral' and non-ideological (ibid). For this reason, they argue that discourse is 'carrier of ideologies and linguistic practice – as a type of social action – which contributes to construction of collective mentalities, e.g., ideologies' (KhosraviNik, 2014, p.505). These collective mentalities usually remain unquestioned (Machin and Mayr, 2012, pp.8-9). When analysing discourse, critical discourse analysts employ 'linguistic tools, and refer to relevant historical and social contexts, to bring ideology, normally hidden through the habitualization of discourse, to the surface for inspection' (Fowler, 1991, p.119) and explain how it serves power relations (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p.12).

CDS scholars believe that ideologies are social constructs (van Dijk, 2009, p.6). In addition, they argue that discourse is a social construct since its production and interpretation are conditioned by the non-linguistic parts of society, i.e., the shared mental representations/ideologies people have about a given topic or issue (Fairclough, 1989/2001/2015, pp.55-9). These ideologies are called 'members resources' (MR), and they are not only cognitive since they reside in people's heads, but also social because they are socially generated (ibid). van Dijk (2009) also believes that discourses are socially constructed and interpreted (p. 6). He distinguishes between two types of cognition: personal and social (ibid, 2018, pp. 30-1). By personal cognition, he means the participants' subjective definitions of the social event, and such they are stored in the participants (Autobiographical) Episodic Memory (EM which is the personal part of the Long-Term Memory LTM), where they gather their ongoing or past personal experiences (ibid, p.30). In social cognition, people are social actors and members who share sociocultural knowledge of the world, attitudes, ideologies, norms, and values; these forms of social cognition are accumulated in the other part of LTM known as Social Memory (ibid, p.31). van Dijk (2009) believes that there is an undeniable link between social and personal cognition (p.6). The subjective mental representations of the aspects of the communicative environment are not completely personal; they have social inter-subjective dimensions since people communicate, interact, and socialize to acquire some shared knowledge and beliefs (ibid). People's representations and interpretations of events are the direct results of their value-systems (Fowler, 1996, p.4). Since people's value-systems are different, their representations can transport different realities (i.e., it depends on the representations they acquired in society), thus there is no single reality that can be unpacked via critical practice (ibid).

I argue that Trump's discourse on Muslims is influenced by the orientalist and islamophobic ideologies widespread about Muslims, such as inferiority and violence (Saïd, 1978/1995/2003; 1980) and his discourse promotes these ideologies because it has resulted in hostility and discrimination. During the campaign, anti-Muslim bias incidents increased dramatically in the US (CAIR, 2017). Many Muslim Americans experienced harassment, intimidation, bullying and hate crimes (ibid). They also witnessed anti-mosque incidents and experienced discrimination in employment (ibid). Because I am a Muslims, by conducting this research and arguing that Trump's discourse is orientalist and islamophobic, one may think that I am adopting a defensive stance. That is, I am defending Muslims because I am a Muslim. I must mention that this interpretation emerged after a close and detailed consideration of contextual

knowledge. That is, I focused on how Muslims are represented and treated in American orientalist discourse since World War II, and I found out that Muslims are derogated and constructed as uncivilised people threatening 'the US cultural values' (Saïd, 1978/1995/2003), and they are also associated to terrorism (ibid, 1980). Trump constructs Muslims as threats to security and 'cultural values' of non-Muslim Americans. The aim of this study is not to find if Trump's intention is islamophobia, discrimination, and racism, since it aims to critique the orientalist discourse of inferiority and violence (Saïd, 1978/1995/2003; 1980), he draws on to represent Muslims as threatening 'Other', and the way he legitimises 'Otherness' through appeals to security and protection. Adhering to a 'critical' stance, embedding the data in the social context, having a focus on continuous self-reflection, and aiming at social change should be understood as gaining distance from the data (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, pp. 87-8). I draw on the historical context on how Muslims are represented, I adopted social theories, such as Orientalism and Right-wing Populism, to interpret my data, and I adopted a critical stance to 'to avoid an excessively simplistic and one-sided perspective' and 'to avoid simply politicizing, instead of accurately analysing' (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 35) or, in my case, to avoid defensiveness.

2.7 The discourse-historical approach (DHA)

This section will give an overview of the DHA, i.e., the approach adopted in this research. I already mentioned in section 2.4 above that all the approaches to CDS encourage adopting a critical stance when analysing discourse, but the DHA puts a particular emphasis on the prospective critique (Reisigl, 2018, p. 49). In this study I critique racist discourse and encourage non-islamophobic and non-discriminatory discourse against Muslims (see section 5.3 in chapter five). In section 2.5, I highlighted that the DHA also puts a particular emphasis on the historical context of the communicative event (ibid, p.53). Historical knowledge on the representation of Muslims, especially how they are represented in American orientalist discourse since World War II, will help interpret Trump's discourse on Muslims. The understanding of critique and context in addition to its methods of analysis which will be outlined in chapter four below are the main reasons for selecting the DHA.

2.7.1 History of the DHA

The development of the DHA can be summarised in four phases (Reisigl, 2018, pp.44-7). The first phase is referred to as Viennese Critical Discourse Studies, and it ranges from 1987 to 1993 (ibid, p.44). This period witnessed the emergence of the DHA and some of its basic principles (ibid, p.45). The study for which the DHA was originally developed and applied investigated 'the constitution of anti-Semitic stereotypes, as they emerged in (semi)public discourses in the 1986 Austrian presidential campaign of Kurt Waldheim' (ibid). In this first application, four characteristics were set up: (1) interdisciplinary and historical alignment, (2) teamwork, (3) triangulation of data, theories, and methods, and (4) the attempt to practically apply the findings (ibid). Subsequently, the DHA was adopted in a study entitled 'Languages of the Past' and analysed 'the discourse about the Austrian Year of commemoration in 1988, the year in which the 50th anniversary of Austria's integration into the Third Reich in 1938 was commemorated' (ibid). The DHA was adopted in several studies such as examining doctor patient communication, the comprehensibility of laws and news broadcasts and guidelines for non-sexist language use in administrative texts in the second half of the 1980s (ibid).

In the second phase ranging from 1993 to 1997, the DHA was institutionalised in Vienna (Reisigl, 2018, p.45). In the 1990s, it was established as one of the main approaches to CDS (ibid). It was adopted and further developed in a variety of studies, for example, a study on racist discrimination against migrants from Romania and a study on the discourse about the nation and national identity in Austria after the 1990s (ibid). From 1994 to 1996, the sociological and discourse-analytical project investigating 'language of diplomacy' gave rise to the comparative study on 'methods of text analysis' (ibid, p.46)

The third phase, ranging from 1997 to 2003, witnessed the foundation of the Research Centre 'Discourse, Politics, Identity' (henceforth DPI) (Reisigl, 2018, p.46). After being awarded the Wittgenstein Prize in 1996, Ruth Wodak established the centre in Vienna and funded research projects analysing a wide range of subjects and supported a large research team of postgraduate and postdoctoral colleagues (ibid). This research centre allowed a shift from the Austrian to the European level as there was a great emphasis on the transnational and global phenomena (ibid).

The fourth phase (2004-present) marked further internationalisation of the DHA as it maintained the transnational focus of the DPI research centre (Reisigl, 2018, p. 46). The two studies that allowed the transition from the third to the fourth phase investigated (1) the print mediated discourse on the Constitution of the European Union and (2) the study on the discourses of integration, discrimination, and migration in the European Union (ibid). In 2004, Lancaster University awarded the personal chair to Ruth Wodak and thus became another base of the DHA in addition to Vienna (ibid). A decade after the establishment of the DHA in Lancaster, the universities of Loughborough, Bern and Örebro also became other centres of the DHA (ibid). Since 2004, research focused on a variety of topics such as identity politics, migration, and discrimination and the relationships between discourse and politics (ibid, p.47). Among the many research areas which have recently earned critical attention by discourse historical analysts are Right-wing Populism and fascist discourses in Europe, as well as discourses on environment and climate change (ibid).

2.7.2 Principles of the DHA

Various principles have evolved since the study conducted on Austrian post-war antisemitism (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016, p.31). According to Wodak (2001b, pp.69-70) and Reisigl and Wodak (2016, pp.31-2) these principles can be summarised as follows:

1. It is interdisciplinary. This interdisciplinary perspective involves theory, methods, methodology, research practice and practical applications.

2. It is problem-oriented because it focuses on real discourse-related social issues rather than on the linguistic structures of discourse.

3. It is eclectic. Various theories and methods are combined if required for an adequate understanding and explanation of the object under investigation.

4. The research incorporates fieldwork and ethnography (study from 'inside'), wherever there is a need for a thorough exploration and theorising of the research object.

5. The approach is abductive. A constant and recursive movement back and forth between theory and empirical data is necessary.

6. Multiple genres and multiple public spaces are studied, and intertextual and interdiscursive relationships are investigated.

7. There is a special focus on the historical embedding of the discursive event. The historical context is always analysed and integrated into the interpretation of discourses and texts. The historical orientation permits the reconstruction of how recontextualization functions as an important process linking texts and discourses intertextually and interdiscursively over time.

8. The categories and tools of analysis are not fixed once and for all. Rather, they must be selected and defined according to the specific research problem.

9. 'Grand theories' often serve as a foundation. In the specific analyses, however, 'middle-range theories' frequently provide a better theoretical basis.

10. Practice is the target. Its major aim is putting the results into practice. It demonstrates a clear focus on concrete social applications of results. The results should be made available to experts in different fields and, as a second step, be applied with the intention of creating social change.

2.7.3 Areas of the DHA

The DHA is concerned with a wide range of research interests. Reisigl (2018, p. 46) summarizes them as follows:

- discourse and discrimination (e.g., racism, ethnicism, nationalism, xenophobia, islamophobia, sexism);
- language barriers in various social institutions (such as hospitals, court rooms, authorities, academic language, media);
- discourse and politics/ policy/ polity (e.g., politics of the past/ political commemoration, nation-building, European Union, migration, asylum, multilingualism, language policy, populism);
- discourse and identity (e.g., national and supranational/ European identity, linguistic identity);
- discourse and history (e.g., National Socialism, fascism, commemoration, history of discourse studies);
- discourse in the media (both classical print media and new social media);
- organisational communication (e.g., in institutions of the European Union);
- discourse and ecology (climate change).

This study is interested in Trump's orientalist and islamophobic discourse which has resulted in hostility and discrimination against Muslims (CAIR, 2017). During the campaign, anti-

Muslim bias incidents increased dramatically in the US, i.e., many Muslim Americans experienced harassment, intimidation, bullying and hate crimes (ibid).

2.7.4 Discourse and discrimination

The DHA was originally developed to investigate the discursive form of racism/discrimination/exclusion in Austria i.e., it was developed to investigate 'the constitution of an anti-Semitic stereotyped image, or `Feindbild', as it emerged in public discourse in the 1986 Austrian presidential campaign of Kurt Waldheim' (Wodak, 2001b, p. 70). The approach argues that 'racist opinions and beliefs are produced and reproduced by means of discourse… through discourse, discriminatory exclusionary practices are prepared, promulgated and legitimised' (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p.1). More specifically, it emphasises that racism can be produced by attributing essentialist negative traits to some social groups to construct them as the 'Other' (ibid, p.10). These traits can be related to biological features, appearance, cultural practices, customs, traditions, and language (ibid). The representation of the 'Other' cannot be separated from the representation of the 'Self' (Wodak, 1996, p.126). The latter is usually represented positively (van Dijk, 1995, p. 143). The differentiation between the 'Self' and the 'Other' usually results in social inequality and discrimination (van Dijk, 1997b, p. 144). To explain how the polarisation 'Self' versus 'Other' happens, the DHA adopts van Dijk's (1991) strategies of positive self-presentation ad negative other-presentation.

The DHA focuses on discriminatory discourse (Wodak, 2001b, p.45). It puts a particular emphasis on how the 'Other' is represented and evaluated (ibid). It suggests five methods of analysis: nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivisation and mitigation and intensification (ibid). It incorporates the socio semantic approach to the analysis of exclusionary and discriminatory discourse (see chapter four for the methods of the DHA). It also focuses on the right-wing populist strategy the 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) to explain how politicians construct threat scenarios to legitimise otherness, domination, and discrimination (see chapter three for more details about Right-wing Populism). When dealing with discriminatory discourse, the DHA puts great emphasis on the prospective critique, it encourages researchers to suggest guidelines for non-discriminatory language use (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 2).

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the definition of the concepts of 'ideology', 'power', and 'critique.' The ideologies present in society influence discourse, and discourse (re)produces and promotes these ideologies (Fowler, 1991, p.118). The ideologies underlying discourse serve to gain or maintain power (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 259). In societies where a group holds more power than another, domination and oppression, social inequality and discrimination may take place (van Dijk, 1997b, p.144). Critical discourse Analysts believe in the role of language use in 'maintaining and legitimating inequality, injustice, and oppression in society' (van Leeuwen, 2006, p.290), therefore their research primarily focuses on the analysis of discourse 'to show how this is done, and it seeks to spread awareness of this aspect of language use in society, and to argue explicitly for change on the basis of its findings' (ibid).

Saïd (1978/1995/2003; 1980) emphasises that Orientalism focuses on the stereotypes of cultural inferiority and terrorism to 'Otherize' Muslims. In right-wing populist discourse, 'Othering' is legitimised through the 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). That is, right-wing populists construct threat scenarios and appeal to protection (ibid). Trump draws on the orientalist stereotypes of inferiority and terrorism to represent Muslims as security and cultural threats, i.e., the threatening 'Other.' This is how he legitimises his anti-Muslim stance. I critique this kind of discourse and emphasise the outcomes it may have such as islamophobia and discrimination. In chapter three, I will draw connections between Orientalism, Islamophobia, and Right-wing Populism. That is, I will explain how Muslims are 'Otherised' through orientalist and islamophobic stereotypes and how 'Otherness' is realised through the 'Politics of Fear' (ibid). I will also justify why I consider Orientalism and Islamophobia as forms of cultural racism.

3. Muslims as the unwanted 'Other'

3.1 Introduction

Politicians often talk about 'Them': ethnic minority groups, immigrants, or refugees (van Dijk, 1992, p.115). Their discourses 'maybe inspired by general norms of tolerance and acceptance, but also, and sometimes at the same time, by feelings of distrust, resentment or frustration about those 'others'' (ibid). In case of the latter, they may attribute 'Them' essentialist prejudiced traits (Anthias, 1995, p, 294; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.10) or focus on different topics, stories, and argumentation to construct 'Them' as a problem or a threat to 'Our' country (van Dijk, 1992, p.115). For instance, they may focus on cultural difference to construct 'Them' as a threat to the cultural identity of the 'Self' (Wodak, 2009, p.319). Threat scenarios are generally emphasised in right-wing populist discourse, and they are referred to by the 'Politics of Fear' (ibid, 2015, n.p.). When difference is emphasised, the binary division of 'Self' versus 'Other' will take place (ibid, 2001b, p.73). The 'Self' or ingroups and their members will be evaluated positively, whereas 'Others' or outgroups and their members will be described derogatorily (van Dijk, 1995, p. 143). Positive evaluation and derogation are referred to in CDS by the strategies of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation (ibid, 1991) The negative presentation of 'Others' is likely to result in social inequality and racism (van Dijk, 2000a, pp.38-9). This study defines racism as the prejudiced representation of 'Others' and its resulting discriminatory practices (van Dijk, 2008, p.145; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.10).

Since the orientalist writings of the 17th century, Muslims are usually 'Otherised' through the stereotype of cultural inferiority (Saïd, 1978/1995/2003). They are also 'Otherised' through the stereotype of violence and terrorism (Saïd, 1980; Saïd,1995) disseminated particularly after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, in the US, generally known as 9/11 (Saïd, 2003, p. xx). Muslims are always represented as a threat to the cultural identity and security of the 'Self' (Wodak, 2009, p.319). These stereotypes usually end up in Islamophobia, i.e., 'negative sentiments, dread or hatred of Islam that includes multi-form discrimination against Muslims, manifested into the exclusion of Muslims around the world from economic, social, and public life' (OIC Observatory Report, 2017, p.6). Discrimination is legitimised through appeals to security and protection (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). The aim of this chapter is to discuss racism and Orientalism and Islamophobia which I consider as forms of 'differentialist racism/cultural racism' in this thesis (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p.9). I believe that orientalist and islamophobic threat scenarios are realised and legitimised through the right-wing populist style the 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). Therefore, I will also discuss Right-wing Populism. Accordingly,

in section 3.2, I will discuss 'race' and racism; in section 3.3, I will discuss Orientalism; in section 3.4, I will discuss Islamophobia, and in section 3.5, I will discuss Populism with a particular focus on the micro-politics of Right-wing Populism.

3.2 'Race' and Racism

In the late eighteenth century, the term 'race' was employed in Europe and North America to refer to the phenotypic features that differentiate between human beings, and in the mid-nineteenth century, the idea that the population is divided into different 'races', and each race is characterised by a biologically determined capacity for cultural development emerged (Miles, 1993, pp.28-9). The German antisemites and National Socialists in the tradition of Arthur de Gobineau, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, and Georg Ritter von Schönerer adopted an extremely radicalised 'race' theory (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p.4). That is, they grouped 'synchretistically (i.e., intermingling different doctrinal pieces without any strict internal coherence) the religious, nationalist, economist, culturalist, and biologistic antisemitism, which then served as the ideology to legitimise systematic, industrialised genocide' (ibid). The terms 'antisemitism' and 'antisemitic' can be understood as the 'whole range of religious, economist, nationalist, socialist, Marxist, culturalist and racist prejudicial aversion and aggression against Jews' (ibid). The 'race' theory used by the German National Socialists 'stimulated a more thorough critical appraisal of the idea of 'race' in Europe and North America and the creation of the concept of racism in the 1930s' (Miles, 1993, p.29). The concept 'racism', with its suffix '-ism', which indicates a theory, doctrine, beliefs or school of thought (Fleisher and Barz, 1992, p.190 as cited in Miles 1993, p.29), was first utilized as a title of Magnus Hirschfeld book written in German language in 1933/4 in which he criticises the idea advanced in the nineteenth century that there exists a hierarchy of biologically distinct 'races' (Miles, 1993, p.29). This book was translated into English and published in 1938 (ibid). After this publication, other books were published to argue that 'the idea of 'race' in Nazi ideology lacked any scientific foundation, some of which also used the concept of racism to label these ideologies' (Miles, 1993, p.29).

Political, bureaucratic, corporate, media, educational, and scholarly 'elite' control the most crucial dimensions and decisions of the everyday lives of immigrants and ethnic minority groups, entry, residence, work, housing, education, welfare, healthcare, knowledge, information, and culture, and they do so through discourse (van Dijk, 2008, p.102). Their discourses may encourage tolerance and acceptance (ibid, 1992, p.115) or may adopt a racist attitude and may thus end up in discrimination (ibid, 2000a, pp.40-1). A racist discourse

inferiorises certain social groups based on 'race' to construct them as 'Others' and deny them access to material, cultural and political resources, work, welfare services, housing, and political rights (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p.2). Inferiorisation is not necessarily based on racial terms. As Anthias (1995) puts it '[u]ndesirable groups need not be conceptualised in explicit racial terms, but as Others more generally' (p. 294) The concept of 'race' has nothing to do with biological reality (Jacquard, 1996, p.20 as cited in Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p.2) because it has been used as a legitimising ideological tool to oppress and exploit specific social groups and deny them some rights (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.2).

 'Elite' may emphasise difference to legitimise social inequality (van Dijk, 1997b, p.144), i.e., they may emphasise biological and/or cultural difference (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.10). When difference is emphasised the binary division of 'Self' versus 'Others' will take place (Wodak, 2001b, p.73). The 'Us' versus 'Them' representation is the basic fundament of discourse of difference (Wodak, 1996, p.126). In other words, 'Others' are always differentiated and separated from the 'Self' (ibid). Differentiation is realised through the strategies of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation (van Dijk, 1995, p. 143). The essentialist prejudiced beliefs and representations or ideologies widespread about 'Others', such as cultural inferiority, are used to inferiorise 'Them' (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.10) and construct 'Them' as different to the 'Self' (van Dijk, 2000a, p.40). The 'Self' is usually represented in positive terms such as ethnic and racial superiority (ibid). 'Others' are also problematised, i.e., in addition to being perceived and evaluated as different, 'They' are generally presented as deviant, problematic, and dangerous (ibid). In this case, threat scenarios are usually emphasised, i.e., 'Others' are represented as a threat to the 'Self', or the 'Self' is described as the victim of 'Others' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). The division of negative 'Others' and positive 'Self' usually results in unequal treatments between 'Others' and the 'Self', i.e., '[s]ome social groups can only be treated differently if they are being perceived and categorized as being different. And they are treated more negatively, they are problematized, marginalized and excluded if they are being evaluated as being "less" on all relevant dimension of social evaluation' (van Dijk, 2000a, p.40). The comparisons between the 'Self' and 'Others' and the widespread ideologies about 'Others', i.e. stereotypes, prejudices, racist attitudes or other socially shared negative opinions that are historically, socially and culturally deeply ingrained in the social mind of the members of the 'Self', are used to justify and legitimise the unequal treatment between the Self' and 'Others' and the everyday social practices of discrimination or the everyday racism experienced by the

'Others' such as inequities in work, education, and school, harassment, intimidation by racist slurs and jokes (ibid, pp.39-40). Ordinary racism is a form of oppression simply because it is part of the everyday life of minorities, and it is usually taken-for-granted (ibid)

I already mentioned that differentiation between the 'Self' and 'Others' follows a strategic pattern, i.e., there is always a focus on ingroup favouritism or positive self-presentation and outgroup derogation or negative other-presentation (van Dijk, 1995, p. 143). In other words, 'racist discourse generally emphasizes Our good things and Their bad things, and de-emphasizes (mitigates, hides) Our bad things and Their good things' (ibid, 2008, p.105). To emphasise homogeneity and essentialise negative features in the out-group or positive features in the in-group, racist discourse exaggerates similarities between the members of a group, whereas it understates similarities between different groups; in addition, it plays down differences within a group and considers them as being smaller than differences between groups, which are overemphasised (Hogg and Abrahams, 1988; Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1985; Turner. 1981; 1985; Turner and Giles, 1981; Turner et al. 1987 as cited in Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.11). Racism means the attribution of specific collective stereotyped traits to a given social group (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.10). These traits are considered invariable and are primarily linked to biological features, appearance, cultural practices, customs, traditions, language, or socially stigmatised ancestors (ibid). Racism can be defined as an ideology because it refers to the negative prejudiced representations 'We' have about 'Others' (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p.10; van Dijk, 2008, p.105). Generally, prejudiced discourse or attitudes result in negative treatments, i.e., everyday discriminatory practices (van Dijk, 2000a, pp.39-40). Therefore, racism cannot be reduced to a racist ideology; it is 'a complex societal system or ethnically or "racially" based domination and its resulting inequality' (van Dijk, 2008, p.145) or simply a 'discriminatory social practice' (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.10). Similarly to van Dijk (2008) and Reisigl & Wodak (2001), Hage (1998, p.29) opposes defining racism as an ideology and argues that racism is not

> a system of beliefs, a mode of clarification or a way of thinking […] this general and dominant tendency to define racism as a mental phenomenon has continually led to an under-theorisation of the relationship between the mental classification involved and the practices in which they are inserted, between what racists are thinking and what racists are doing.

Billig (1991, pp. 122–141) also criticises the definition of racism as an ideology, arguing that by focusing on racism as an ideology, the discriminatory functions of racism will be neglected. In the same vein, Richardson (2004) emphasises that one should not neglect 'the very practical

functions of racism in maintaining: first, inequitable systems of social power; and second, behavioural manifestations of racism such as verbal rejection, avoidance, discrimination, physical attack and extermination' (p.2). Anthias (1995) expresses the same idea, arguing that racism is 'not just about beliefs or statements (discourse in this narrow sense). Racism also involves the ability to impose those beliefs or world views as hegemonic, and as a basis for the denial of rights or equality. Racism is thus embedded in power relations of different types' (p. 291). Therefore, racism should be understood as a system of ethnic/racial inequality (van Dijk, 2000a, p.41), in which some groups have more power than other groups in society (ibid, p.38). Power difference 'shows in differential access to scarce social resources, such as having less of most material goods, but also having less access to or control over symbolic resources, such as education, knowledge, information and status, among a host of other resources' (ibid, p.38). Social inequality is reproduced by 'discriminatory social practices, including discourse, at the local(micro) level, and by institutions, organizations and overall group relations on the global (macro) level, and cognitively supported by racist ideologies' (ibid, p. 41).

According to Reisigl & Wodak (2001, p.9), when genetic/biological and cultural differences are emphasised two types of racism are likely to take place: 'inegalitarian' and 'differentialist racism/cultural racism.' 'Inegalitarian racism' means 'the legitimisation of domination, discrimination, and separation based on overt doctrines in support of genetic, biological inferiority' (ibid), whereas 'differentialist racism' focuses on 'cultural differences, including lifestyles, habits, customs and manners, and paints a threatening picture of the mixing and interbreeding of cultures and ethnic groups' (ibid). 'Differentialist racism' may avoid 'explicit hierarchisation. Implicitly, however, an inferiorisation of the cultures of the 'others' is always presupposed by the social, economic and political inequality between the members of the 'own' culture and the members of the 'other' culture(s)' (ibid, pp.9-10). 'Differentialist racism/cultural racism' is also referred to by 'neo/new racism' (ibid, p.9); however, the term is criticised, arguing that the cultural or national 'character' and 'uniqueness' were emphasised since the 19th century (Rattansi, 1994, p.55 as cited in Reisigl &Wodak, 2001) p.9). I oppose the concept 'neo-racism' because racism against Muslims based on culture is not new, i.e., since the orientalist writings of the 17th century, racism against Muslims included the inferiorisation of the 'Islamic culture.' One of the main forms of cultural racism is 'ethnopluralist racism' (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.10). The latter means to 'legitimise strict segregation and discrimination by claiming that multiculturalism threatens 'cultural and ethnic purity' and leads to 'contamination', 'degeneration', and 'decline'' (ibid). Right-wing populist

politicians usually engage in 'ethnopluralist racism' because they oppose multiculturalism and argue that it is 'a recipe to denationalize one's (own) nation, to deconstruct one's (own) people' (Pelinka, 2013, p.8). Thus, they usually engage in 'Border Politics' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.), i.e., they oppose immigration and suggest discriminatory policies (ibid). They often legitimise discrimination by emphasising threat scenarios and appealing to security and protection (ibid).

This study defines racism against Muslims as the ideology of inferiorisation, denigration and 'Othering' of Muslims and its resulting everyday discrimination such as harassment, intimidation, bullying, hate crimes, anti-mosques incidents and discrimination in employment (CAIR, 2017). This thesis criticises the racist stereotypes, i.e., the stereotypes of inferiority and violence Trump employs to denigrate Muslims and represent them as a problematic and dangerous 'Other' and emphasises the possible outcomes of this discourse of inferiority and violence such as discrimination and social inequality. Saïd (1978/1995/2003) argues that Orientalism emerged from the belief that there is an ontological and epistemological distinction between East and West (p.2). That is, he argues that orientalist writers always highlighted that the 'Islamic culture' is inferior to and incompatible with 'Western culture' (ibid). This thesis defines Orientalism as a form of 'differentialist racism/cultural racism' (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p.9). In section 3.3 below, I discuss Orientalism and the orientalist stereotypes widespread about Muslims.

3.3 Orientalism as a form of racism

In the theory of Orientalism, Saïd (1978/1995/2003) analyses the representations of the Near Orient, i.e., the Arab/Islamic Orient, in occidental studies, mainly in the Franco-British and American studies. The aim of Saïd's theory is the critique of the essentialist and negative Franco-British and American depictions and portrayals of Arab-Orientals/Muslims (ibid). Saïd's research focuses on France, Britain, and America because France and Britain dominated the Arab/Islamic Orient from the 19th century until the end of World War II, and since World War II America has taken over the Arab/Islamic Orient and approached it as France and Britain did (ibid, p.4). Three interdependent understandings of Orientalism emerged from Saïd's study (ibid, pp.2-3): first, Orientalism is an academic discipline developed by Occidental scholars; second, this academic discipline emerged from the belief that there is an ontological and epistemological distinction between the Arab/Islamic Orient and the 'West;' third, this academic discipline have produced a hegemonic discourse promoting the ideology that the 'western' world is superior to the Arab/Muslim world i.e., an ideology accounting for and justifying the domination of Arab/Muslim Oriental people (Macfie, 2002, p. 4). This academic

discipline aims to bring the Arab/Islamic Orient into 'western' consciousness, western dispensation and under western domination (Richardson, 2004, p.5).

According to Saïd (1978/1995/2003) '[a]nyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient—and this applies whether the person is an anthropologist, sociologist, historian, or philologist—either in its specific or its general aspects is an Orientalist, and what he or she does is Orientalism' (p.2), and the body of knowledge and texts he or she produces is orientalist (ibid, p.4). To differentiate between the Arab/Islamic Orient and 'Occident', orientalist writers attribute the Arab/Islamic Orient a set of imaginary biased and derogatory characteristics such as sensuality, tendency to despotism, aberrant mentality, barbarism, and backwardness (ibid, p.205). In addition, they also represent the Arab/Islamic Orient as exclusively a male province with sexist blinders (ibid, p.207). Orientalists represent Arab/Islamic societies are male-dominated societies (Green, 2015, p.137) and emphasise that women are oppressed in a backward and male-dominated society (Al-Tarawneh, 2022, pp.74-5). To justify that orientalist writers produced imaginary knowledge, Saïd (1978/1995/2003, p.6) refers to Flaubert's encounter with an Egyptian courtesan Kuchuk Hanem. He states that this woman never spoke of herself, her emotions, presence, or history; it was Flaubert who represented her and informed the reader what makes her Oriental (ibid). He adds that, Like Flaubert, many writers wrote imaginary descriptions produced realities of the Arab/Islamic Orient not so much out of the Arab/Islamic Orient as out of their own observations (ibid, p. 176). Though the Arab/Islamic Orient's cultural varieties, orientalists always approach and study it as a homogeneous Orient sharing the same characteristics (ibid, p.3). Richardson (2004) argues that the portrayal of 'a single 'Orient', or a single Muslim 'Middle East' which can be studied as a cohesive whole, works to essentialise an image of an archetypal (and usually male) 'Oriental', unchanging in 'His' primitive, culturally specific beliefs and practices' (p.6). That is, orientalist writers present the Arab/Islamic Orient and culture as monolithic, i.e., they claim that they are unchanging and they lack 'diversity and internal differences and disagreements' (Green, 2015, p. 12). According to the Runnymede Trust (1997, p.6), this stereotype is an ingredient of islamophobic discourse (see section 3.4 below for more details on Islamophobia). Attributing invariable negative traits to some social groups to represent 'Them' as 'Others' is common in racist discourse (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.10). 'Others' are always compared to and differentiated from the 'Self' (Wodak, 1996, p.126). The latter is usually positively represented (van Dijk, 2008, p.105). Orientalist writers employ the binary division the Arab/Islamic Orient versus 'Occident' because they claim that the Arab/Islamic Orient is the oppositive of the

'Occident' (Saïd, 1978/1995/2003, pp.2-3), and they claim that the 'Occident' is civilised and superior to the Arab/Islamic Orient by emphasising that it is rational, peaceful, liberal, logical and capable of holding real values (ibid, p.49). They emphasise that the Arab/Islamic Orient lacks all the characteristics that the 'Occident' possesses (Yeğenoğlu, 1998, p. 6). Though Saïd does not use 'Self' versus 'Other', I argue that the Arab/Muslim Orientals are represented as the 'Other' and 'Occidentals' are represented as the 'Self.' Thus, Orientalism can also be understood as 'a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between "the Orient" and (most of the time) "the Occident"' (Saïd,1978/1995/2003, p.2). Since the inferiorisation of the Arab/Islamic Orient is based on cultural aspects, I define Orientalism as a form of 'differentialist racism/cultural racism' (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.9). Though there is no explicit reference to biological differences between the Arab/Islamic Orient and 'Occident,' the words Orient and oriental imply dark-skinned people, and the word 'Occident' and 'occidental' imply white people. To some extent, I also consider Orientalism as a form of 'inegalitarian racism' (ibid) because it focuses on cultural differences between two biologically distinct groups: dark-skinned Arab/Muslim Orientals and white skinned 'Westerners.'

One of the writers who reproduced the stereotyped binary division the inferior Islamic Orient versus the superior 'West' is Huntington (1996) in his book entitled 'The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.' Huntington (1996), in his theory of 'Clash of Civilizations', claims that in the post-Cold War, conflicts will be between civilizations and between cultures. He cites different civilizations such as Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, 'Western', Latin American, and African (ibid, p. 45). However, he puts great emphasis on the conflict that he claims will happen between the 'Islamic civilization' and the 'Western civilization' (ibid, pp.217-18). By the 'West,' he mainly refers to Noth American and European Civilizations (ibid, p.47). He claims that the main problem of the West is not Islamic fundamentalism (ibid, p.217); the main problem is 'Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power' (ibid). He also claims that the main problem of Islam 'is the West, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the universality of their culture and believe that their superior, if declining, power imposes on them the obligation to extend that culture throughout the world' (ibid, pp.217-8). He believes that these are the main reasons that fuel conflict between Islam and the 'West' (ibid). Discussing how Muslims perceive the West, he claims that they are Muslims who stress 'the differences between their civilization and the

Western civilization, the superiority of their culture, and the need to maintain the integrity of that culture against Western onslaught' (ibid, p.213). He claims that Muslims detest the West, a sentiment he refers to as 'anti-westernism' (ibid, p.215), and emphasises that they hate and attack the West 'not for adhering to an imperfect, erroneous religion, which is nonetheless a "religion of the book, "but for not adhering to any religion at all. In Muslim eyes Western secularism, irreligiosity, and hence immorality are …evils' (ibid, p.213). He emphasises that there is a conflictual relationship between the Muslim world and the 'Western' world, this conflict is religious and cultural (ibid, p.210). He also mentions that when Muslims migrate to 'Western' countries, Muslims refuse assimilation and continue to adhere and seek to propagate the cultural values of their home countries (ibid, pp.304-5). That is, Muslims seek islamicisation of non-Muslims through Jihad (ibid, p.211). According to the Runnymede Trust (1997, p.8), representing Muslims as militant people is an ingredient of islamophobic discourse (see section 3.4 for more details on Islamophobia). This representation spreads the belief that Muslims have a manipulative view of their religion i.e., they are not sincere in their beliefs, and Islam is 'undistinguishable from weapon' (ibid, p.9,). I argue that Huntington (1996) separates the Islamic world and the 'West' and reinforces the orientalist representation that the Islamic World is inferior to the 'Western' World.

Saïd (1978/1995/2003) notices that orientalist writers were citing each other, and in some cases, they copied from each other verbatim (pp.176-7). They were not only reproducing the same biased knowledge but also granting each other with authority (ibid). Through time and repetition, they created a kind of consensus that the knowledge produced is objective and valid (ibid, p.202). Through citation and reproduction, orientalists created a hegemonic body of biased knowledge, i.e., around 60,000 books were written between 1800 and 1950 (ibid, p.204). Thus, Orientalism is 'after all a system for citing works and authors (ibid, p.23). Hegemonic knowledge on the Arab/Islamic Orient contributed to the collective formation of Orientalist knowledge (ibid, pp.23-24) and created a shared mental identity, i.e., it is enough to use the word Oriental and the readers will recall a set of derogatory information (ibid, p.205). This hegemony of knowledge gives Orientalism durability and strength (ibid, p.7). Writers preferred predecessors' descriptions to what their 'eyes and minds showed them immediately', thus the actualities of the modern Orient were systematically excluded (ibid, pp.176-7). 'There were— and are— cultures and nations whose location is in the East, and their lives, histories, and customs have a brute reality obviously greater than anything that could be said about them in the West' (ibid, p.3). This reality would have been discovered if writers focused on the modern

actualities rather than imaginary descriptions of predecessors (ibid, p.176). The orientalist approach to Arabs/Muslims is essentialist, empiricist, and historicist; it impoverishes diversity by producing an essentialist caricature (Sayyid, 1997, p. 32). Saïd (1978/1995/2003, p. 6) argues that orientalists created the primitive and inferior Arab/Islamic Orient to dominate it:

> [t]he relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony…The Orient was Orientalized not only because it was discovered to be "Oriental"…but also because it could be – that is, submitted to being – made Oriental.

Imperialist societies created an Oriental who is primitive, irrational, violent, despotic, fanatic, and inferior to the westerner or the native informant to argue that 'Enlightenment can take place only when "traditional" and "reactionary" values are replaced by "contemporary" and "progressive" ideas that are either western or western-influenced' (Marandi & Pirnajmuddin, 2009, p.24). Thus, imperialist societies usually justify imperialism and domination through civilising missions (Moosavinia et al, 2011, p.104). One of the contemporary stereotypes that emerged in imperialist societies, particularly in the US, is the stereotype of violence and terrorism. Saïd (1980, n.p.) argues that

> [s]o far as the United States seems to be concerned, it is only a slight overstatement to say that Moslems and Arabs are essentially seen as either oil suppliers or potential terrorists. Very little of the detail, the human density, the passion of Arab–Moslem life has entered the awareness of even those people whose profession it is to report the Arab world. What we have, instead, is a series of crude, essentialized caricatures of the Islamic world, presented in such a way as to make that world vulnerable to military aggression.

According to Saïd (1980, n.p.), the first reason why Arabs/Muslims are perceived as terrorists is that 'westerners' are provided information about violence and terror particularly by the mass media. That is, 'terrorists are the best-known figures in the foreground, while the background is populated by shadowy (though extremely frightening) notions about *jihad*, slavery, subordination of women and irrational violence combined with extreme licentiousness' (ibid). The positive aspects of the Islamic history, cultures and societies are excluded (ibid). The second reason is that 'much of the Western discourse about Islam conflates the actions of a minority with the majority of Muslims' (Green, 2015, p.4). That is, if a Muslim extremist group, such as al-Qaeda, 'launches violent attacks against Western targets, some might conclude that this is due to an inherent quality in Islam and that, by extension, all Muslims are prone to violence because all Muslims are fundamentally the same' (ibid, p.13).

The media propagated the stereotype of violence especially after the 9/11 terrorist attack (Saïd, 2003: xx). Because of the attack, Muslims are usually associated with terrorism and perceived as a threat to the security of 'Western' countries, particularly America (Alsultany, 2013; Abdullah, 2015). The 9/11 attack happened in the presidency of Geroge W. Bush. The Bush administration directly attributed the attack to al-Qaeda, whose leader is Osama Bin Laden, because of the group's prior involvement in the World Trade Center bombing of 1993, the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and the attack against the USS Cole navy ship in 2000 (Deflem, 2013, p.987). Because of the 9/11 attack, 'restrictions for [Muslim] immigration were quickly legitimized via security measures presented as necessary' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). In the wake of the attack, domestically, Bush ordered the o-called the 'Terrorist Surveillance Program' without formal court approval (Deflem, 2013, p. 989). The latter involved the interception of communications of an overseas party and a domestic party where one of the parties was suspected of being associated with Al-Qaeda or related terrorist groups (ibid). It was a secret operation led by the National Security Agency (ibid). It was only revealed in 2005, and Bush justified it as an inevitable security measure (ibid). Bush also introduced the so-called narrative 'war on terror' (ibid, p.987). Occasionally also capitalized as War on Terror and sometimes referred to as the War on Terrorism and the Global War on Terror (GLOT) (ibid). Bush argued that his aim is to fight against Al-Qaeda, its allies, and the countries and governments that support terrorist groups (ibid). He added that he would have to expand this war globally wherever terrorist groups were hiding and would involve a lengthy campaign rather than a confined series of attacks (ibid). The first military operation carried out by the Us under this narrative was the invasion of Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 (ibid, pp. 987-8). This invasion was justified by the fact that Al-Qaeda had been using the country as a base and training ground (ibid). On March 20, 2003, Bush invaded Iraq arguing that the President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, supports a brutal regime no different from Bin Laden and that al-Qaeda (ibid, p.988). The Bush administration also assumed that there were ties between the Iraqi Government and Al-Qaeda (ibid). Bush argued that the aim of his invasions is to fight terrorism, but the aim is to exploit oil resources (Green, 2015, p.123). The invaded countries have expansive oil and energy reserves (ibid, p.105). Bush based the so-called narrative 'war on terror' on the three broader orientalist stereotypes, i.e., the stereotype of inferiority, the stereotype of sexism and misogyny and the stereotype of terrorism to justify violent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (Green, 2015, p.119) and oil exploitation (ibid, 123). That is, to legitimise violence and exploitation, he describes the US military invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan as civilising, introducing democracy, liberating women, and fighting terrorism

missions (ibid, p.119). Saïd's (1978/1995/2003) theory of Orientalism is important to understand how Muslims are 'Otherised' and how the stereotype of inferiority, the stereotype of sexism and misogyny and the stereotype of terrorism are employed to justify domination and oppression, i.e., to legitimise and defend racism against Muslims. These stereotypes are extensively discussed by the Runnymede Trust (1997) and classified as islamophobic views (Green, 2015, p. 98). This means that Orientalism provided the building blocks for what became Islamophobia (ibid). The following section will discuss Islamophobia.

3.3.1 Criticisms of Orientalism

In his theory of Orientalism, Saïd (1978/1995/2003) focuses on the 'Occidental', mainly the Franco-British and American, studies of the Orient. By the 'Occident' or the 'West', Saïd (1978/1995/2003) refers to three countries, France, Britain, and America, and excludes many 'Occidental' countries, such as Germany, Italy, Russia, Spain, and Portugal. Saïd (1978/1995/2003) divides the Orient into two geographical parts, which are the Far East/ Far Orient and the Near East/ Near Orient. Saïd's (1978/1995/2003) study excludes the Far East, mainly India, China, and Japan, and focuses on the representation of the Near East. In Saïd's (1978/1995/2003) theory of Orientalism, the Orient refers mainly to the Near East or more specifically to Arab Orientals and Muslims. The criticisms directed towards Saïd's (1978/1995/2003) theory of Orientalism focused mainly on the exclusion of the German, Italian, Russian, Spanish, and Portuguese studies of the Orient and the exclusion of the representation of the Far East, mainly India, China, and Japan (Lewis, 1982; Ning; 1997).

Lewis (1982) criticises Saïd's exclusion of many 'Occidental' studies of the Orient, especially the exclusion of German Orientalist works. Saïd (2003) states that the exclusion of many 'Occidental' countries is a limitation but argues that his study focuses on the Franco-British representation of the Orient because France and Britain are the pioneers of the Oriental scholarship (p.4). That is, France and Britian dominated the Orient from the 19th century until the end of World War II, and since World War II America has taken over the Orient and approached it as France and Britain did (ibid). The excluded countries contributed to Orientalism or the Oriental scholarship; however, the major steps in Oriental scholarship were first taken in Britain and France and then developed by other 'Occidental' countries (ibid, pp.17-18). In response to Lewis (1982), Saïd (1982) argues that 'the German school—despite its prodigious output—can best be regarded as elaborating and extending the essential *Weltanschauung* adumbrated by its French and British predecessors' (n.p.). For this reason, Saïd (1978/1995/2003) regards Orientalism as 'a system for citing works and authors'

(p.23). Geographically speaking, the Orient also covers China, India, and Japan, but Saïd (1978/1995/2003) excludes these countries and focuses on the representation of the Near East. This exclusion generated criticisms as well. Ning (1997) states that Saïd considers the Orient as being geographically restricted to the Near East because of his family background, i.e., he is an Americano-Palestinian (p.6). Saïd (2003) acknowledges that the countries of the Far East, mainly India, China, and Japan, were important but argues that one could analyse Europe's experience of the Near Orient, or of Islam, apart from its experience of the Far Orient (p.17). Saïd's (2003) argument shows that the restriction of the Orient to the Near East in his theory of Orientalism is not because of his family background.

To criticise Saïd's theory of Orientalism, Buruma & Margalit (2004) point to 'Occidentalism' and define it as the negative and hostile representation of the 'West.' Buruma & Margalit (2005) emphasise that 'Occidentalism' means 'anti-Westernism' therefore consider it as the opposite of Orientalism. While Buruma & Margalit (2005) perceive 'Occidentalism' as 'anti-Westernism' or the opposite of Orientalism, Al-Azm (1981); Ning (1997); Hanafi (2006); Muharram (2014) argue that 'Occidentalism' is not the opposite of Orientalism and emphasise that 'Occidentalism' is an anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism discourse. Therefore, some of them such as Al-Azm (1981) and Muharram (2014) use the term 'Orientalism in reverse' instead of 'Occidentalism.' Al-Azm (1981) argues that 'Orientalism in reverse' is an anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism movement/discourse. Muharram (2014, p.47) argues that 'Orientalism in reverse' means speaking out to challenge the biased 'Western' stereotypes about the Orient especially the stereotype of inferiority. Hanafi (2006) emphasises that 'Occidentalism' means denouncing and speaking out against Orientalism. Ning (1997) defines 'Occidentalism' as a strategy of discourse opposing and challenging the Western cultural hegemonism and power (p.66). This opposition sometimes evolves into armed clashes such as the Libyan American antagonism, the blood-shedding conflict between the Iraqi and the Allied Army and the Iranian American conflict (ibid, pp.62-3). 'Occidentalism' is an anti-colonialism and anti-hegemonism discourse (ibid). Unlike Buruma & Margalit (2004;2005) who perceive 'Occidentalism' as the opposite of Orientalism, Al-Azm (1981); Ning (1997); Hanafi (2006) and Muharram (2014) perceive 'Occidentalism' as a counter discourse to Orientalism and emphasise that 'Occidentalism' is not the opposite of Orientalism.

'Occidentalism' is impossible because it is impossible to compare the movement of 'Westerners' eastwards with the movement of Easterners westwards, i.e., the 'Western' armies, consular corps, merchants, and scientific and archaeological expeditions were always going East, i.e., the number of travellers from the Islamic East to Europe between 1800 and 1900 was very tiny when compared with the number of travellers from Europe to the Islamic East (Saïd, 2003, p.50). Saïd (1994) argues that the 'Occident' has constructed and positioned itself as a superior and advanced culture. The miniscule travellers from the Islamic Orient were in the 'West' to learn from a culture constructed as superior and advanced, whereas the purpose behind Orientalism was cultural imperialism and hegemonism, domination and colonisation (Saïd, 2003, p.50). The 'Occident' has constructed and positioned itself as a superior and advanced culture that should share its civilization with inferior others via colonization, i.e., (Saïd, 1994). Imperialism is the direct result of the division inferior Near East and superior 'West' (ibid). Moreover, around 60,000 books studying the Near Orient were written between 1800 and 1950 and there is no comparable figure for Oriental books about the 'West' (ibid, 2003). Finally, Orientalism has been institutionalised and there is no field symmetrical to it called 'Occidentalism' (ibid). Like Saïd (2003), Ning (1997) and Muharram (2014) emphasise the non-institutionalisation of 'Occidentalism' to justify why one cannot consider 'Occidentalism' as the opposite of Orientalism. Unlike Orientalism, 'Occidentalism' is not institutionalised, i.e., easterners seek to challenge and confront the 'Western' oppressions and invasions (Nig, 1997, p.64). That is, they do not seek to create a discipline of 'Occidentalism' but to derive the 'Western' powers from the Near Orient (ibid, p. 62). In his book Muqaddimah fi Ilmi al-Istighrab (Introduction to the Science of 'Occidentalism'), Hanafi (1991) encourages the institutionalisation of 'Occidentalism'; however, Muharram (2014) argues that this institutionalisation is in a way impossible because 'Occidentalism' is different 'from Orientalism in terms of its knowledge/power configuration' (p.48), '[i]t does not match Orientalism's grounding in academic and institutional support' (ibid), and '[i]t is more dispersed, elusive, disarticulated, and fragmented than Orientalism' (ibid).

Despite criticisms, Saïd's (1978/1995/2003) theory of Orientalism is important to understand how Muslims are 'Otherized' and how the stereotypes of inferiority, sexism, misogyny, violence and terrorism are employed to justify domination and oppression of Muslims, i.e., to legitimise and defend racism against Muslims, colonisation, and imperialism.

3.4 Islamophobia as a form of racism

The word 'Islamophobia' appeared in its French form, 'Islamophobie', in a book by the painter Etienne Dinet in 1918 (Green, 2015, p.9). It was used in its English form in the American periodical Insight, the 4th of February 1991 (Richardson, 2004, p.21). The word Islamophobia has been widely used and popularised only after a study by the Runnymede Trust in 1997 entitled 'Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All' (ibid). The Runnymede Trust (1997) uses the term Islamophobia to refer to an 'unfounded hostility toward Islam' (p.4) and refers to the consequences of such hostility such as discrimination against Muslims, and their exclusion from mainstream political and social affairs (ibid). Therefore, Islamophobia is not only 'hatred, hostility, and fear of Islam and Muslims but also the discriminatory practices that result from this hostility (Green, 2015, p.9). In the 20th anniversary report, the Runnymede Trust (2017, p.1) emphasises the discrimination and exclusion Muslims suffer because of their (perceived) religious identity with a more detailed explanation being:

> Islamophobia is any distinction, exclusion, or restriction towards, or preference against, Muslims (or those perceived to be Muslims) that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.

Emphasising exclusion and discrimination means that Islamophobia is racism against Muslims (The Runnymede Trust, 1997;2017). Islamophobia is racism against Muslims (or individuals who are perceived Muslims) because of their (perceived) religious identity (Green, 2015; Hopkins et al., 2017; Najib and Hopkins, 2020; Hopkins, 2021). The adjective 'perceived' means that Islamophobia affects 'Muslims and other groups of people who are mistaken for being Muslim such as Sikhs, Hindus and other people of South Asian heritage' (Hopkins, 2021, p.21). Islamophobia 'is a type of racism that targets expressions of Muslimness or perceived Muslimness' (Student News, 2022, n.p.). I understand that Islamophobia has negative consequences on Muslims and non-Muslims.

People distinguish (perceived) Muslims through a set of phenotypical features, such as skin colour, facial features and hair texture, and non-phenotypical features, such as wearing a veil/scarf, that problematically (and often incorrectly) associate people with specific countries of origin and with the Islamic faith (CRER, 2020). When phenotypical and non-phenotypical features are emphasised two types of racism are likely to take place: 'inegalitarian' and 'differentialist racism/cultural racism' (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p.9). 'Inegalitarian racism' means 'the legitimisation of domination, discrimination, and separation based on overt

doctrines in support of genetic, biological inferiority' (ibid), whereas 'differentialist racism' focuses on 'cultural differences, including lifestyles, habits, customs and manners, and paints a threatening picture of the mixing and interbreeding of cultures and ethnic groups' (ibid). Therefore, this thesis defines Islamophobia as form of racism, more specifically a form of inegalitarian and differentialist/cultural racism. By perceiving Islamophobia as a type of racism, I recognise that 'Muslims are subject to more than just overt expressions of religious hatred and abuse, but a system of discrimination, control and exclusion that is manifested in public, economic, political and social spheres of life' (Student News, 2022, n.p.).

Islamophobia generally results because of phenotypical difference (CRER, 2020) or because of the negative stereotypes, such as the stereotypes of inferiority, misogyny and sexism and violence and terrorism, promoted by orientalist writers about the Islamic culture and faith (Green, 2015, p.98). Many in the 'West' believe that that Muslims are violent people and acquire violence from Islam (OIC Observatory Report, 2017, p.6). Thus, they perceive Islam as 'a serious threat; a religion of intrinsic violence whose disciples [have] a tendency to spread harm to the followers of other religions' (ibid). These essentialist constructions of Muslims and Islam are widespread in the 'West' because 'much of the Western discourse about Islam conflates the actions of a minority with the majority of Muslims' (Green, 2015, p.4). That is, many 'westerners' think that the violence or terrorism carried out in the name of Islam by a small minority of Muslim extremist groups is somehow endemic to Islam and all Muslims (ibid, p.12). In other words, if a Muslim extremist group, such as al-Qaeda, 'launches violent attacks against Western targets, some might conclude that this is due to an inherent quality in Islam and that, by extension, all Muslims are prone to violence because all Muslims are fundamentally the same' (ibid, p.13). Many in the 'West' present Islam and Muslims as monolithic (The Runnymede Trust, 1997, p.5). That is, they claim that Muslims have the same worldviews and qualities such as violence (Green, 2015, p.12), and they claim that Islam lacks 'diversity and internal differences and disagreements' (ibid). The representation of Muslims as monolithic people neglects disagreements among Muslims and different debates such as the different debates on human rights and freedoms (The Runnymede Trust, 1997, p.5). The following list outlines diversity and difference in Islam (ibid, p.6):

- between the Middle East and South Asia, Iranians and Arabs, Bosnia and Chechenia, Nigeria and Somalia, Pakistan and Bangladesh;

- between Muslims who are profoundly critical of the human rights records of certain Muslim countries and those who maintain such criticisms are merely symptoms of Islamophobia;

- between the different interpretations of specific terminology, doctrines and injunctions in the Qur'an and Islamic traditions;

- between the perceptions of women and men;

- between older and younger generations, particularly in the Muslim communities of Western Europe;

- between members of different social classes;

- between a wide range of political movements `, parties and projects which have little in common with each other apart from the tendency of their opponents to label them as fundamentalists;

- between major strands and paths in the twentieth century for example, between Sufism and Islamism, or between the movements known as modernism and revivalism.

The belief that Muslims are violent people promote the beliefs that Islam is inseparable from weapons, and Muslims are militant and fundamentalist people (The Runnymede Trust, 1997, pp.8-9). These beliefs imply that Muslims have a manipulative view of their religion because they use their religion for strategic, political, and military aims (ibid). The media contributed to the dissemination of the stereotype of violence and terrorism because they provide extensive information about violence and terror and silence the positive aspects of the Islamic history, cultures, and societies (Saïd, 1980, n.p.). The 'terrorists are the best-known figures in the foreground, while the background is populated by shadowy (though extremely frightening) notions about *jihad*, slavery, subordination of women and irrational violence combined with extreme licentiousness' (ibid). Another widespread belief in the 'West' is that the 'Islamic culture' is inferior to the 'Western culture' (The Runnymede Trust, 1997, p.6). Thus, 'We' (non-Muslims or 'Westerners') are always represented as civilised, reasonable, generous, efficient, sophisticated, enlightened, and non-sexist, and 'They' (Muslims) are always distinguished from 'Us' and represented as primitive, violent, irrational, scheming, disorganised and oppressive (ibid).

Figure 3.1 Islamophobia, a visual summary (The Runnymede Trust, 1997, p.11)

Negative stereotyping eventually ends up into islamophobia, i.e., 'multi-form discrimination against Muslims, manifested into the exclusion of Muslims around the world from economic, social, and public life' (OIC Observatory Report, 2017, p.6). That is, the representation of Muslims as the 'Other' usually results in prejudice, exclusion, and discrimination, i.e., racism (The Runnymede Trust, 1997, pp.10-11). The negative representation of Muslims also results in excluding Muslims from participating in 'society's moral deliberations and debates' (ibid, p.10) to prevent their views and ideas from 'finding resonance' (ibid). The table 3.1 below summarises islamophobic and non-islamophobic views (The Runnymede Trust, 1997, p.5).

Distinctions	Closed views of Islam	Open views of Islam
1. Monolithic / diverse	Islam seen as a single monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to new realities.	Islam seen as diverse and progressive, with internal differences, debates and development.
2. Separate / interacting	Islam seen as separate and other – (a) not having any aims or values in common with other cultures (b) not affected by them (c) not influencing them.	Islam seen as interdependent with other faiths and cultures – (a) having certain shared values and aims (b) affected by them (c) enriching them.
3. Inferior / different	Islam seen as inferior to the West – barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist.	Islam seen as distinctively different, but not deficient,

		and as equally worthy of respect.
4. Enemy / partner	Islam seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism, engaged in 'a clash of civilisations'	Islam seen as an actual or potential partner in joint cooperative enterprises and in the solution of shared problems.
5. Manipulative / sincere	Islam seen as a political ideology, used for political or military advantage.	Islam seen as a genuine religious faith, practised sincerely by its adherents.
6. Criticism of West rejected / considered	Criticisms made by Islam of 'the West' rejected out of hand	Criticisms of 'the West' and other cultures are considered and debated.
7. Discrimination defended / criticised	Hostility towards Islam used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society	Debates and disagreements with Islam do not diminish efforts to combat discrimination and exclusion.
8. Islamophobia seen as natural / problematic	Anti-Muslim hostility accepted as natural and 'normal'.	Critical views of Islam are themselves subjected to critique, lest they be inaccurate and unfair.

Table 3.1 Closed and open views of Islam (The Runnymede Trust, 1997, p.5)

The negative beliefs widespread about Muslims are used to justify discrimination and racism, i.e., the latter are not challenged, they are defended (ibid, p.9). The legitimisation of discrimination and racism is frequently combined with attacks on 'political correctness' or the ones fighting for equality (ibid). I also noticed that the legitimisation of discrimination and racism is also combined with criticisms against the concept of Islamophobia. The frequent criticism advanced against the concept Islamophobia is that it prevents freedom of speech and discussions and debates about religion (Green, 2015, p.19), i.e., it 'stifles legitimate criticism of Islam, and that it demonises and stigmatises anyone who wishes to engage in such criticism' (The Runnymede Trust, 1997, p.4). I strongly disagree with this criticism because people can freely make considered criticisms without being hateful or discriminatory, i.e., islamophobic (E.S.R.C, 2018, p.2). It is important to draw a border line between islamophobic statements and legitimate criticisms of Islamic beliefs and practices (Green, 2015, p. 21). Non-Muslims can disagree with Islamic beliefs and criticise them, but these criticisms and disagreements should be legitimate, i.e., I am not against 'a legitimate difference of opinion over an actual

belief held by a large number of Muslims, a belief that one would not reasonably expect [non-Muslims] to embrace' (ibid) because 'I do not consider Islamophobia as synonymous with criticism of Islam as a religion, as criticism of religion is not necessarily prejudiced' (Moosavi, 2014, p.653). However, I am against focusing on stereotypes to criticise Islam because 'I consider Islamophobia as being about demonising Islam and/or Muslims by using stereotypes that are often historic such as that Islam/Muslims are violent, barbaric and oppressive' (ibid). I also condemn generalisation or what Green (2015, p.21) refers to as 'guilt by association.' That is, I oppose using a situation in which an individual Muslim is judged to have behaved badly as an illustrative example to condemn all Muslims (The Runnymede Trust, 1997, p.5) such as accusing 'all Muslims of being inherently prone to violence in light of the deadly campaigns against civilians conducted by extremist groups' (Green, 2015, p.21). Criticism of Islam should be based 'on aspects of the religion that many Muslims recognize as a part of their faith' (ibid) and should avoid stereotypes as arguments (Moosavi, 2014, p.653) and 'guilt by association' (Green, 2015, p.21). Halliday (1999, p. 898) criticises the concept Islamophobia arguing that it focuses on hostility against Islam but not hostility against Muslims. Halliday (1999, p. 898) suggests the term 'anti-Muslimism' arguing that it clearly shows hostility and discrimination against Muslims (ibid) and emphasising that the concept Islamophobia

> misses the point about what it is that is being attacked: "Islam" as a religion was the enemy in the past: in the crusades or the reconquista. It is not the enemy now […] The attack now is not against Islam as a faith but against Muslims as a people, the latter grouping together all, especially immigrants, who might be covered by the term (ibid).

Reisigl & Wodak (2001) criticise the suffix phobia, arguing that 'it neglects the active and aggressive aspect of discrimination' and 'pathologises racism …through the 'disease metaphor' of 'phobia', which, as such, plays down racism and, at least implicitly, exculpates racists' (p.6). I think it is accurate to use the term Islamophobia because any attack against a given religion is by implication an attack against the followers and adherents of that religion (Green, 2015, p. 11). The concept Islamophobia is always linked to the exclusion and discrimination Muslims do experience because of their religious identity (ibid, p.32). Also, I think that the term is not that important. That is, if we focus on the term, we will overlook the issue itself; it is not the term that needs to be addressed but the issue of Islamophobia and the anti-Muslim hatred, anti-Muslim racism, discrimination, and exclusion Muslims or those perceived to be Muslim experience because of Islamophobia (E.S.R.C, 2018, p.2).

The mass media (print and broadcast) and social media have contributed to the creation and spread of Islamophobia (Hopkins, 2021, p.37). Post 9/11 attacks in the US and 7/7 attacks in the UK, print and broadcast media have contributed to the creation of an anti-Muslim/Islam content by negatively portraying and demonising Islam and Muslims and reporting misinformation, and inflammatory and sometimes misleading headlines (ibid). Saïd (1980) emphasises the role of the media in the perpetuation of Islamophobia emphasising the focus of the media on terrorism and the exclusion of the positive aspects of Muslims and their culture and religion (n.p.). In addition to the mass media, social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube are other contexts where people experienced Islamophobia (Hopkins, 2021, p.38). For example, during Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign, anti-Muslim hashtags increased in Twitter (Müller & Schwarz, 2020). Right-wing politicians and elections have also contributed to the spread of Islamophobia (Hopkins, 2021, pp.31-2). Right-wing populist movements, organisations and media have promoted hostile ideas, and these have encouraged extremists to be more and more confident about openly practising abusive behaviour towards (perceived) Muslims (ibid). The analysis of the representation of Muslims in Chapter five shows how Trump's right-wing populist discourse and use of the media, particularly Television and Twitter, contributed to the spread of Islamophobia during 205-16 presidential campaign.

Islamophobia must be resisted and challenged. Print, broadcast and social media are contexts where Islamophobia can be experienced and promoted but also provide contexts where Muslims can challenge and resist it (Newcastle and St Andrews Universities as cited in Hopkins 2021 p.37). In addition to challenging Islamophobia in the media, governments should enforce policies and take islamophobia seriously (Hopkins, 2021, p.35). Also, there should be a greater control of the media. i.e., the regulatory bodies should by law control the channels they operate and suspend the accounts encouraging and spreading Islamophobia and report them to the law enforcement bodies (ibid, p.40). Though Trump expressed islamophobic ideas in his Twitter account during the 2015-16 presidential campaign, the company of Twitter did not ban him from using Twitter. He was not condemned for his islamophobic discourse on Twitter. On the 8th of January 2021, the company of Twitter permanently suspended Trump from Twitter not because of his islamophobic tweets but because his tweets 'encourage and inspire people to replicate the criminal acts that took place at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021' (Twitter, 2021). The regulatory body of Twitter was not concerned about Islamophobia and the negative consequences it can have on Muslims but was concerned about the U.S. Capitol. Trump also

appeared on many TV channels where he practised Islamophobia overtly and some channels conducted many interviews on Muslims throughout the campaign.

3.5 Populism

The aim of this section is to define Populism and distinguish between Left-wing Populism and Right-wing Populism. I will put a particular emphasis on the basic characteristics of Right-wing Populism, namely the 'Politics of Fear', 'Border Politics' the 'Politics of Denial' and 'Scandalization' (Wodak, 2015) because they will help in interpreting some of the linguistic findings in chapters five and six.

Populism derives from the Latin term Populus, which means 'the people' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). It is perceived as an appeal to 'the people' because it claims to present, speak for, defend 'the people', whose interests and opinions are dominated by 'the elite' (Canovan, 1999, p.5), and argues that 'politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people' (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p.6). Populists claim that 'the people' have legitimate demands (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017). Thus, they represent them as the 'pure people' (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 23). However, they refer to 'the elite' as 'the corrupt elite' (ibid) because they claim that 'the elite' oppress 'the people' and frustrate their legitimate demands (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017). Seemingly, in populist discourse, 'the elite' 'are positioned antagonistically as an enemy trying to 'frustrate the will of the people' (Breeze, 2019, p.132), and they are constructed as the 'the source of crisis, breakdown, corruption or dysfunctionality, as opposed to 'the people' who in turn have been 'let down', 'ripped off', 'fleeced', rendered powerless or badly governed' (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013, p.11). Therefore, populism can be defined as a dichotomic discursive practice (Hidalgo-Tenorio et al., 2019, p.2) 'in which "the people" are juxtaposed to "the elite" along the lines of a down/up antagonism in which "the people" is discursively constructed as a large powerless group through opposition to "the elite" conceived as a small and illegitimately powerful group' (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017). In addition to defining populism as a discursive practice (Hidalgo-Tenorio et al., 2019, p.2), it can also be perceived as an ideology deeply rooted in the negative representation of 'the elite' and the positive representation of 'the people', i.e., populists always endow 'the elite' with an array of negative features and 'the people' with an array of positive qualities (ibid).

3.5.1 Types of Populism: Left-wing Populism versus Right-wing Populism

Populism can be divided into two types: Left-wing Populism and Right-wing Populism. These two movements agree that society is divided into two antagonist groups, i.e., 'the elite' versus 'the people' (Agustín, 2020, p.4), but they disagree in their understandings of these concepts (Salmela & von Scheve, 2018).

Left-wing Populism targets 'political and economic establishment deemed responsible for austerity politics' (Salmela & von Scheve, 2018, p.1). Therefore, in left wing discourse, 'the elite' are 'those responsible for enforcing politics perceived to increase injustice, inequality, and precariousness' (ibid, p.7). 'The people' are 'those who have been aggrieved by neoliberal austerity politics' (ibid). Its appeal to 'the people' is integrative (Canovan, 1999, p.5) i.e., it is inclusionary because it includes women; immigrants; and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer people and emphasizes their equal rights (Salmela & von Scheve, 2018, p.7). In addition, it holds an emancipatory potential because it seeks to liberate these groups from the neo-liberal policies and their advocates (ibid, p.11).

Right-wing Populism targets 'political and cultural [elite] accused of favoring ethnic, religious, and sexual out-groups at the expense of the neglected in-group' (Salmela & von Scheve, 2018, p.1). Thus, in right wing discourse, 'the elite' are those 'political and cultural [elite] who are accused of favoring, both economically and culturally, various out-groups at the expense of "the people" defined in nativist terms' (ibid, p.7) and ethnic terms (ibid). Right-wing populists have a nativist and ethnic understanding of 'the people' because they usually exclude non-natives and ethnic minorities (ibid). Their appeal to 'the people' is divisive because it distinguishes 'Our' people, viz., natives or the dominant ethnic group, from non-natives or ethnic minority groups (Canovan, 1999, p.5). In addition to 'the corrupt elite', minority groups are also constructed as the antagonism of 'the people' (Moffitt and Tormey, 2013, p. 11). Right-wing Populism excessively define the antagonists (Salmela and von Scheve, 2018, p.7), of course, derogatorily (Wodak, 2015, n.p.), to appeal to 'the people's' fear of insecurity and stir up their anger and hatred against the constructed antagonists (Salmela and von Scheve, 2018, p.8).

3.5.2 The micro-politics of Right-wing Populism

Right-wing populist politicians employ the 'Politics of Fear' and the 'Politics of Denial' strategies to legitimise discrimination against some social groups (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). Discrimination against 'Others' in right-wing populist discourse is usually intended to provoke scandals to attract the attention of the media and set the news agenda (ibid, n.p.).

a) The Politics of Fear

Right-wing populists usually adopt a nativist body politics as they use the concept 'the people' to refer to natives only (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). That is, they construct native people as a collective and exclude 'Others', specifically non-natives, from this constructed collective (ibid, n.p.). They may also adopt an ethnic appeal to 'the people', i.e., they may distinguish the dominant ethnic group from ethnic minority groups (Canovan, 1999, p.5). In addition, they emphasise a heartland (or homeland, fatherland) which must be protected from 'Others' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.), perceived as different and deviant (ibid, n.p.). In this way, they construct threat scenarios to emphasise that 'We', 'the people' and the heartland, must be protected from 'Them', dangerous foreigners who are either inside or outside the heartland (ibid, n.p.). In right-wing populist discourse, 'They' are always constructed as scapegoats and blamed for 'threatening or actually damaging [the heartland]' (ibid, n.p.). This strategy of scapegoating is referred to as the' Politics of Fear' (ibid, n.p.). 'Otherness' and inferiorisation of non-natives or ethnic minority groups is usually legitimised through appeals to necessities of security and protection (ibid, n.p.)

Right-wing populists usually criticise 'the elite' who opened to borders to different and deviant 'Others' (Pelinka, 2013, pp.8-9). That is, they emphasise that the 'Other' is already in the heartland because of 'the elite' who opened the borders (ibid). Therefore, they engage in 'Border Politics' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.), i.e., they oppose old borders and suggest new ones, not only via visas, language and citizenship tests and a multitude of policies (ibid, n.p.) but also via real walls of stone, brick, and cement (ibid, n.p.), i.e., to stop the constructed different and deviant 'Other' from coming to the heartland (ibid, n.p.). The 'elite' who opened the borders to foreigners and allowed cultural diversity are also constructed as 'Others' in right-wing populist discourse (Pelinka, 2013, p.8) and 'Otherness' is legitimised through conspiracy scenarios, i.e., right-wing populists claim that 'the elite' who advocate open borders are conspiring against 'Us', i.e., the heartland and its 'people' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). Right-wing populists construct scapegoats and create fear to appeal to necessities of security to legitimise discriminatory policies (ibid, n.p.).

Right-wing populists rely on the language of difference to create threat scenarios and appeal to fear (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). They emphasise biological difference or cultural difference to perform racist opinions (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p.9). Then, they make up threat scenarios by emphasising that 'They' are a threat to 'Us', to 'Our' security and 'Our' cultural identity, to legitimise racism (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). They adopt the 'Politics of Fear' to legitimise racism and discriminatory policies (ibid, n.p.). Trump may rely on orientalist and islamophobic stereotypes to problematise and 'Otherize' Muslims. He may employ the 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015) to construct them as threats to the security and culture of the dominant group, i.e., white non-Muslims, to legitimise the policies he proposed such as the so-called 'the Muslim Travel Ban' and the proposals to surveil Muslims and mosques in the US.

b) The Politics of Denial

Reisigl and Wodak (2001) argue that '[t]he simplest and most elementary form of linguistic and rhetorical discrimination is that of identifying persons or groups of persons linguistically by naming them derogatorily, debasingly or vituperatively' (p.45). Discriminatory rhetoric characterises right-wing populist discourse because the latter usually targets foreigners, such as immigrants, and demonize them to construct them as the 'Other' and distance them from the 'Self' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). Right-wing populists are routinely accused of discrimination (van Dijk, 1992, p.114), but they never accept the accusations or even insinuations that their discourse and/or policies are discriminatory (ibid, p.113). Therefore, they would unavoidably use the 'Politics of Denial' to deny that they condone discriminatory beliefs or support discriminatory policies (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) and emphasise that accusations of discrimination are only 'a figment of the imagination' (van Dijk, 1992, p.101).

To deny a discriminatory remark/act , right-wing populists may use different types of denial: (1) act-denial ('I did not do/say that at all'), (2) control-denial ('I did not do/say that on purpose', 'It was an accident'), (3) intention-denial ('I did not mean that', 'You got me wrong'), (4) goal-denial ('I did not do/say that, in order to …') (van Dijk, 1992, p.92). They may express denial through disclaimers such as 'I have nothing against … but…' (ibid). They may use mitigations when describing their negative actions (ibid, p.92). Mitigation means 'downtoning, using euphemisms or other circumlocutions that minimize the act itself or the responsibility of the accused' (ibid, p.106). They may admit their negative actions but at the same time they may find excuses (ibid, p.93). First, they may put part of the blame on special circumstances; they may say that there are already ethnic tensions in inner cities, so they will stop the admission of immigrants to prevent aggravating the situation (ibid, pp.93-4). Second, they may

also put blame on immigrants (ibid, p.94), i.e., they may attribute them negative qualities, such as lack of integration, to emphasise the necessity of tough policies (ibid). This strategy is known as blaming the victim (ibid). They may represent them as problems (ibid, p.100). That is, they may focus on the problems (they claim) immigrants create, such as crime and unemployment (ibid), to emphasise that 'We' are the victims of immigration (ibid, p.99). Politicians from the left are generally represented as anti-racists (ibid, p.107); however, the right claim that the left discriminate against 'Us' because they advocate the admission of immigrants (ibid, p.114). The right's opponent, i.e., the Left, accuses the right of racism against immigrants (ibid, pp.107-8), and the right accuse its opponent, the left, of racism against 'Us' (ibid, p.116). When right-wing populists criticise the anti-racist left, they are in a way defending themselves (ibid, p.107). It is self-defence because they emphasise that they care about the interests of 'the people' (ibid, p.111), unlike the left who discriminates against them (ibid, p.116).

If they engage in denial, first, they will try to present their rhetoric or actions as unprejudiced (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). To this end, they will cite several phenomena that occurred or are currently happening in other nations and emphasise their similarity with what they said or the policies they proposed (ibid, n.p.). In case there is no similarity, they will try to redefine these phenomena and reformulate their meanings to create similarity with what they said or the actions they proposed (ibid, n.p.). This strategy is referred to as equating and balancing (ibid, n.p.) and is generally realised through metaphors, analogies, redefinition of concepts and reformulation of meanings and topoi of history (ibid, n.p.). Second, they will emphasise that their prejudiced and discriminatory 'criticisms, remarks or actions are 'factual', 'objective' and 'reasonable', rather than based upon irrational feelings, and will accordingly employ a range of discursive strategies of legitimization' (ibid, n.p.). That is, they will stress that they advocate tough measures, but they will emphasise that they are not racist (van Dijk, 1992, p.115). They will try to represent themselves as strict but at the same time fair (ibid, p.111). They will emphasise the humanitarian values of tolerance and hospitality to convince the public that they are fair and respect human rights (ibid). However, their disclaimers will be followed by a 'but' and arguments of reasonableness to construct their statements or restrictions as common-sense (ibid). Once the discriminatory rhetoric and/or acts are legitimised, they will play, dramatize, and exaggerate victimhood and claim to have been wrongly accused of racism (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). Furthermore, they may employ the right of freedom of speech as a justificatory strategy (ibid, n.p.) and emphasise that 'the people' deserve to know the truth (van Dijk, 1992, p.90), i.e., they deserve to know the dangers that threaten their community (Albertazzi, 2007, p.335).

They may construct accusations of racism 'as a more serious social infractions than racist attitudes or actions themselves' arguing that they prevent free speech and a 'true' or 'honest' assessment of the situation (van Dijk, 1992, p.90). Utterances such as ''Why can one not utter critique?', or 'One must be permitted to criticize Turks, Roma, Muslims, Jews …!' or 'We dare say what everybody thinks' and so forth' may be used to claim the right of freedom of speech (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). Using such utterances, they may trigger another discussion, about freedom of speech and political correctness, and distract attention from discriminatory remarks or policies (ibid, n.p.).

The different types of denial cited above may be used for face-keeping and positive self-presentation (van Dijk, 1992, p.89). That is, they may be used to avoid face-threatening judgements and construct a positive impression about the 'Self' (ibid, p.90). Importantly, denials are not used to avoid a negative judgment about one specific situation but to avoid an enduring negative evaluation (ibid). To be judged as a 'racist' or 'intolerant' is an enduring evaluation that is face-threatening (ibid). Thus, right-wing populists may employ denials to emphasise that their opinions or policies are not possessive of discriminatory attitudes and save themselves from an enduring negative judgment (ibid). If they deny discrimination, they will not only engage in positive-self presentation but also in negative-other presentation (ibid, p.109). On the one hand, they will acknowledge that they are strict (ibid, p.111), but their intention is not discrimination (ibid, 113); their intention is the protection of the needs of 'the people' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). That is, they will emphasise that they care about 'the national interests, the interests of their own population' (van Dijk,1992, p.111) to represent themselves as patriotic politicians (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). This can be expressed through 'apparent altruism ('It is in their own best interests), choice of the lesser evil ('Restriction of immigration prevents conflicts in the inner cities')' (van Dijk, 1992, p. 111). Then, they will enumerate the crises and problems that threaten their country (Albertazzi, 2007, p.335) and emphasise that they will save 'the people' from these threats (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). They will represent themselves as saviours, problem solvers and crisis managers (ibid, 2017, p.5). Furthermore, they will predicate themselves as honest politicians (van Dijk, 1992, p.90) and emphasise they always tell the truth to the people (ibid, p.92) and provide them with 'honest' assessments of issues and crises (ibid, p.90). They will try to give the impression that they are ''soft', 'caring' and 'responsible' politicians' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) and this will 'provide voters with more confidence in the effectiveness in the politics of [right-wing populist parties]' (ibid, 2017, p.5). On the other hand, they will 'viciously attack their opponents [i.e., left-wing politicians] ad

hominem, in televised debates, interviews or during election rallies' (ibid, 2015, n.p.,) and emphasise that they are not caring about the interests of 'the people' (ibid, n.p.). For instance, they will emphasise that they are admitting immigrants (van Dijk, 1992, p.114) and create employment and housing problems to 'the people' (ibid, p.100). They will try to construct them as the source of all the crises and the problems that threaten 'the people' (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013, p.11)

c) Scandalization

Most societies encourage tolerance and acceptance and prohibit (blatant) forms of ethnic prejudice and discrimination (van Dijk, 1992, p.89). If politicians discriminate against ethnic minorities (for instance, through prejudiced negative representation), they will break the social norm of tolerance or acceptance' (ibid). Right-wing populist politicians blatantly violate social norms of tolerance and acceptance because they deliver blatant prejudiced and discriminatory remarks about 'Others' (ibid, p.109). Wodak (2015, n.p.) argues that they intentionally violate these social norms to provoke scandals and attract the attention of the Media. This strategy is called 'Scandalization' (ibid, n.p.). That is, they deliver a deliberate discriminatory remark or insinuation about 'Others' (ibid, n.p.) to violate the social norms of tolerance and acceptance (van Dijk, 1992, p.89). They are aware that the media cannot marginalise it because if they do, they might be perceived as endorsing it (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). Scandalization is intentional because the politician's aim is to get the scandal reported (ibid, n.p.). When the media report it, they reproduce the prejudicial remark and propagate it (ibid, n.p.). 'Letters to the editor, news interviews, debates and discussions in various forms keep the scandal alive' (Ekström & Johansson, 2008, p.23). When the media invite the politician to an interview to discuss his/her remark or insinuation, they do not only keep the scandal alive, but they also give him/her more face time (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) and an opportunity to deny racist accusations and play victimhood (ibid, n.p.).

I argue that Trump's 'Muslim Travel Ban' is a scandal because I believe that it violates the constitutional right of freedom of religion established in the First Amendment, which states that 'congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof' (US Constitution). This scandal attracted the attention of the media since Trump was invited to many interviews to discuss his policy proposal. I selected all these interviews for analysis to find out how Trump, a businessman with no political and organisational knowledge (Wodak, 2017, p. 5), succeeded to set the news agenda during his presidential campaign.

Populist politicians force the media into a 'no-win' situation: if they ignore the scandal, they will be accused of supporting it, and to avoid this negative representation, the media will report it and disseminate it – this situation is known as the right-wing populist perpetuum mobile (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). 'Scandalization' help right-wing populist parties to set the news agenda and distract both the media and the public from other important news (ibid, n.p.). It is now clear that '[a]ctivities from two sides are required for a political scandal to come about. From the politician's side, actions that overstep strongly held norms or moral codes in a society are necessary' (Ekström & Johansson, 2008, p.18). From the media's side, the reporting of the politicians' scandalous actions is necessary (ibid). 'A scandal is not merely something that is revealed but also something that is shown, reported, staged and kept alive day after day' (ibid).

According to Wodak (2017, p.4), self-mediation, i.e., the use of social media, is another key reason behind the upsurge, success and longevity of populist ideologies and views. Social media 'such as Twitter, Facebook or YouTube enable politicians to reach out to global audiences as never before (Ruth Breeze,2019, p.1) and allow them 'to express their opinions more openly and freely" (Zúñiga et al. 2014, p. 613). They also enable them 'to appeal to their audiences on a more personal level' (Ruth Breeze, 2019, p.1) to 'arouse strong reactions of a highly affective nature, triggering politically operative emotions such as fear, anger and sadness' (Breeze and Vallejo, 2019, p.9). Though social media are available to all politicians, right-wing populist politicians make particularly effective use of them (Ruth Breeze, 2019, p.1). Right-wing populist politicians 'skills in self-mediation … have served to spread exclusionary or outright discriminatory populist ideologies and imaginaries' (Wodak, 2017, p.5) 'in that they are open to the widest possible range of users, are subject to very few controls, and are often multimodal, allowing users to combine images, video and words to create striking emotive messages' (Breeze and Vallejo, 2019, p.9). Trump joined Twitter in March 2009. His official Twitter account is @realDonaldTrump. When I consulted his Twitter account, I noticed that he is an active and prodigious user since he posts many tweets almost every day. Interestingly, I also noticed that he used Twitter during his presidential campaign to communicate his plans and policy proposals on Muslim immigration. Thus, analysing his tweets will reveal the strategies he employed to demonise Muslims, support, and legitimise his discriminatory policy proposals on Muslim immigration.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed racism, Orientalism, Islamophobia and Populism, particularly Right-wing Populism. It has shown that racism is not necessarily expressed through racial terms but through 'Othering' (Anthias, 1995, p.294). The two main forms of racism are 'inegalitarian racism' which means 'Othering' social groups based on biological aspects and 'differentialist racism' or 'cultural racism' which means 'Othering' based on cultural aspects (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p.9). This study considers Orientalism as a form of 'cultural racism' as orientalists inferiorise and 'Otherize' Muslims based on their culture, especially their religion (Saïd, 1978/1995/2003). The stereotypes employed to 'Otherize' Muslims are backwardness and inferiority, sexism, and misogyny (ibid), violence and terrorism (ibid, 1980). These stereotypes result in hostility and discrimination against Muslims, i.e., Islamophobia (OIC, 2017). Discrimination is usually defended through threat scenarios, which are generally realised through the right-wing populist style the 'Politics of Fear' and through appeals to security and protection (Wodak, 2015, n.p.).

Chapter four below will be about Wodak's (2001b) DHA. The latter suggests five methods for the analysis of racist discourse: nomination/reference, predication, argumentation, perspectivisation, mitigation and intensification (ibid). The methods of the DHA can be used to analyse traces of Orientalism and Islamophobia in Trump's discourse. Referential and predicational analysis can show if the nominations, qualities, and actions Trump attributes to Muslims connote cultural inferiority, sexism, misogyny and/or violence and terrorism. It will also reveal if Trump differentiates Muslims from any other social groups the 'Self' and if he adopts the 'Politics of Fear' to construct threat scenarios. The analysis of argumentation will reveal if he uses valid arguments or relies on stereotypes and fallacies to justify his attributions to Muslims and the binary division of 'Self' versus 'Other.' The aspects of mitigation and intensification can show which nominations and qualities of Muslims are deemphasised and which ones are emphasised and exaggerated. For instance, predication analysis can reveal if violent actions are attributed to Muslims, and the aspect of intensification can reveal if violence is intensified. The aspect of perspectivisation can show if the nominations, qualities, and actions Trump assigns to Muslims are expressed from orientalist and islamophobic perspectives.

4. Methodology

4.1 Introduction

The DHA suggests five analytical categories for the analysis of discriminatory discourse: nomination/reference, predication, argumentation, perspectivisation, and mitigation and intensification (Wodak, 2001b). I consider nomination, predication, and argumentation as the main methods of analysis and perspectivisation, mitigation and intensification as aspects influencing nomination, predication, and argumentation, following KhosraviNik (2010, pp.57-8).

Through referential and predicational analysis, I have analysed the nominations, actions, and qualities Trump attributes to Muslims. That is, I have explored if Trump's nominations and characterisation of Muslims is influenced by the orientalist and islamophobic stereotypes mentioned in chapter three. For an in-depth analysis of the nomination strategies, the DHA incorporates van Leeuwen's (1996) analytical categories, viz. the categories of exclusion, inclusion, suppression, backgrounding, passivation, categorisation, assimilation, collectivisation, aggregation, impersonalisation, abstraction and objectivation (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, pp.46-7). I have adopted the latter and van Leeuwen's (1996) strategies of association and dissociation, and they allowed a detailed analysis of the nominations, actions, and qualities Trump attributes to Muslims. The DHA also adopts van Dijk's (1991) strategies of positive-self and negative-other presentation, which I have adopted in this study to analyse if Trump differentiates Muslims from any other social groups, the 'Self', and if he employs the 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) to construct threat scenarios. Through argumentation analysis, I have analysed if Trump employs sound arguments or relies on fallacious justifications to defend his nominations and characterisation of Muslims. The aspects of mitigation and intensification have enabled to identify the nominations, actions and qualities Trump deemphasises and mitigates/emphasises and exaggerates. The aspect of perspectivisation revealed the ideologies that influence the nominations, actions and qualities Trump assigns to Muslims.

The aim of this chapter is to explain the methods of the DHA and the procedures for data collection and selection. Therefore, in section 4.2, I will discuss the methods of the DHA, and in section 4.3, I will summarise the eight steps of the DHA. In section 4.4, I will discuss texts as data. In section 4.5, I will explain how I collected and selected data. In section 4.6, I will conclude with how I will conduct data analysis.

4.2 The analytical categories of the DHA

The DHA was originally developed to investigate racism against Jews in public discourse in the 1986 Austrian presidential campaign of Kurt Waldheim in Austria (Wodak, 2001b, p. 70). Focusing on the study of anti-Semitic discourse in Austria, the DHA suggests the strategies of nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivisation, mitigation and intensification (Wodak, 2001b) for the analysis of the discursive representation of 'individuals and groups of people who in CDS are often termed 'social actors' or 'participants'' (Machin and Myer, 2012, p.77). Discursive representation means how 'certain social and political actors are represented, portrayed and positioned in discourse, as well as endowed with social and political agency by means of different discursive moves' (Krzyżanowski, 2013, p. 117). In CDS, discursive moves are referred to as 'representational strategies' (Machin and Meyer, 2012, p.77). The latter allow the discourse producers 'to place people in the social world and to highlight certain aspects of identity [they] wish to draw attention to or omit' (ibid).

The polarisation of 'Self' versus 'Other' is the basic fundament of racist discourse (van Dijk, 2008, p.105). The 'Self' is represented positively, whereas the 'Other' is represented negatively (ibid). This is referred to as the strategies of positive-self presentation and negative-other presentation (ibid, 1991). 'Racist discourse generally emphasizes Our good things and Their bad things, and de-emphasizes (mitigates, hides) Our bad things and Their good things' (ibid, 2008, p.105). In racist discourse, the strategies of nomination and predication will reveal who is positioned as the 'Self' and who is positioned as the 'Other' (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p.45). That is, nomination analysis will show the social actors included in discourse and how they are referred to, and predication analysis will show who is evaluated negatively (the 'Other') and who is evaluated positively (the 'Self') (ibid). Argumentation analysis will reveal the arguments used to support the binary division of 'Self' versus 'Other' (ibid). I consider nomination, predication, and argumentation strategies as the main analytical categories and perspectivisation and mitigation and intensification as aspects influencing nomination, predication, and argumentation, as per KhosraviNik (2010, pp.57-8). I use strategy to refer to 'a more or less accurate and more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim' (Wodak, 2001b, p.73).

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                                 ┌─── Reference
Positive self-presentation and   ├── Predication
negative other-presentation    ─┤── Perspectivation and involvement
                                 ├─── Intensification or mitigation
                                 └─── Argumentation
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
Figure 4.1 Strategies of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p.46)

Reisigl & Wodak (2016) state that '[w]hen approaching these strategies in our analyses, within the framework of our methodology we frequently orient ourselves to five questions' (p.32). Therefore, the table 4.1 below summarises the DHA analytical strategies, the questions that the analytical strategies aim to answer and the goals they seek to achieve. Seemingly, the questions are not randomly selected.; rather, they are formulated according to the five proposed analytical strategies (Wodak, 2001b, p.72; Reisigl and Wodak,2001, p.44).

Questions to approach discursive features	Discursive strategies	Purpose
How are persons, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions named and referred to linguistically in the discourse in question?	Nomination	discursive construction of social actors
		discursive construction of objects, phenomena, events
		discursive construction of processes and actions
What characteristics or qualities are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions mentioned in the discourse?	Predication	discursive characterization of social actors, objects, phenomena, events processes and actions (e.g., positively or negatively)
What arguments are employed in discourse?	Argumentation	persuading addressees of the validity of specific claims of truth and normative rightness
From what perspective are these nominations,	Perspectivisation	positioning the speaker's or writer's point of view and

attributions, arguments expressed?		expressing involvement or distance
Are the respective utterances articulated overtly, are they intensified or mitigated?	mitigation and intensification	modifying the illocutionary force of utterances in respect to their epistemic or deontic status

Table 4.1 The discursive strategies of the DHA (Reisigl, 2018, p.52)

The DHA does not only relate each question to a specific analytical strategy but also proposes a set of linguistic devices that can be analysed. The table 4.2 below outlines the linguistic devices suggested by Reisigl and Wodak (2016, pp.32-3).

Strategy	Linguistic Devices
Nomination	- membership categorization devices, deictics, anthroponyms, etc. - tropes such as metaphors, metonymies, and synecdoches (*pars pro toto, totum pro parte*) - verbs and nouns used to denote processes and actions, etc.
Predication	(stereotypical) evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits (e.g., in the form of adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctional clauses, infinitive clauses and participial clauses or groups) - explicit predicates or predicative nouns/adjectives/pronouns - collocations - comparisons, similes, metaphors and other rhetorical figures (including metonymies, hyperboles, litotes, euphemisms) - allusions, evocations, presuppositions, implicatures, etc.
Argumentation	- topoi (formal or more content-related) - fallacies
Perspectivisation	- deictics - direct, indirect or free indirect speech - quotation marks, discourse markers/particles - metaphors - animating prosody, etc.

Mitigation or Intensification	- diminutives or augmentatives (modal) particles, tag questions, subjunctives, hesitations, vague expressions, etc. - hyperboles or litotes - indirect speech acts (e.g., question instead of assertion) - verbs of saying, feeling, thinking, etc.

Table 4.2 The linguistic devices of the DHA (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016, pp.32-3).

According to Reisigl (2018), '[t]he discourse-analytical categories are not completely fixed, but have, at least partially, to be modified, adapted and newly developed for each research object' (pp.52-3). In this study, I adopt the five analytical categories suggested by the DHA; however, unlike the DHA, I consider nomination, predication, and argumentation as the main analytical strategies and perspectivisation, mitigation and intensification as aspects influencing nomination, predication, and argumentation, as per KhosraviNik (2010, pp.57-8). Unlike the DHA, which understands perspectivisation as an analytical category that serves to analyse how discourse producers express their involvements and position their points of view in discourse (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.81), I understand perspectivisation as an aspect influencing all the linguistic choices of the discourse producers, following KhosraviNik (2010, pp.57-8). That is, I use perspectivisation to refer the 'linguistic mechanisms/processes that the text producers may strategically incorporate within the qualities of the texts' (ibid). I argue that perspectivization also occurs by 'both choosing certain manners of linguistic realization as well as the lack of certain choices, and as such a critical textual analysis needs to constantly look out for the elements chosen against the background of the elements which are not' (ibid). Unlike the DHA, which considers 'intensification and mitigation as a common place strategy to topicalize and de-topicalize a certain point of view' (ibid), I believe that intensification and mitigation strategies can be used to emphasise and deemphasise not only a point of view but also nominations, predications, and arguments (ibid). For example, when referring to Muslims, Trump can exaggerate violence and terrorism to represent Muslims as security threats.

4.2.1 Nomination/reference and predication

Nomination or referential strategies aim to identify how social actors are named and referred to linguistically (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p.45). Referential analysis allows to identify which social actors are represented as 'in-group' and which ones are represented as 'out-group' (ibid). Predication strategies aim to find out the evaluations that are attributed to social actors (ibid). In other words, predication analysis allows to find out if social actors are labelled more or less positively or negatively, deprecatorily or appreciatively (ibid). Nominations and evaluations may be able to signal discrimination (ibid). That is, '[t]he simplest and most elementary form of linguistic and rhetorical discrimination is that of identifying persons or groups of persons linguistically by naming them derogatorily, debasingly or vituperatively' (ibid). Nomination and predication are two different strategies with two different aims. Nomination refers to the discursive construction of actors whereas Predication refers to the discursive qualification of those actors (Reisigl, 2018, p.52). However, these strategies are complementary and hard to separate because some nominations are themselves predications i.e., 'some of the referential strategies can be considered to be specific forms of predicational strategies, because the pure referential identification very often already involves a denotatively as well as connotatively more or less deprecatory or appreciative labelling of the social actors' (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 45). For instance, the anthroponymic terms like the German 'Neger' and 'Nigger', 'Zigeuner ','Jud ','Kanake ' and 'Tschusch ' (Austrian German) 'are sufficient to perform racist or ethnicist slurs on their own, as they connotatively convey disparaging, insulting meanings, without any other attributive qualification' (ibid). The identification of referential/nomination strategies will show if the binary division of 'Self' versus 'Other' / 'Us' versus 'Them'/ 'in-group' and 'outgroup' is present in a given database, and the analysis of the predicational strategies will demonstrate which social actors/groups are negativized/derogated and therefore discriminated against (ibid). However, sometimes, the analysis of referential/nomination strategies alone can reveal if the division is discriminatory because some references bear the feature of predication (ibid).

References and evaluations can be expressed explicitly or implicitly (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, pp.54-5). In the case of referential/nomination strategies, the naming of social actors and the social practices in which they are involved can be triggered by the explicit denotative as well as the implicit connotative meanings of the linguistic devices employed (ibid). In addition, some connotations contain implicit predications since they do not only express how social actors and their actions are constructed but also how they are evaluated (ibid). Like referential/

nomination strategies, predication strategies can also take two routes: the qualities assigned to social actors and their actions may be apparent or disguised using implicature and presuppositions (ibid). I adopt Grice's (1975) conversational and (2) conventional implicatures. Conversational implicature is determined in virtue of features of context (Grice, 1975, p.44). That is, the implicated proposition is largely independent of the conventional meanings of the words used in an utterance (ibid), but dependent on the features of the context in which an utterance is embedded (ibid). Unlike conversational implicatures which are 'utterance contents that are conveyed in virtue of particular features of the utterance context' (Blome-Tillmann, 2013, p. 173), 'conventional implicatures are utterance contents that are grammatically encoded and thus triggered by the conventional meaning of (some of) the words used in the utterance' (ibid). That is, '[i]n some cases the conventional meaning of the words used will determine what is implicated, besides helping to determine what is said' (Grice, 1975, pp.44-5).

The DHA adopts a set of analytical categories from van Leeuwen's (1996) system network of representation of social actors in discourse, viz. the categories of exclusion, inclusion, suppression, backgrounding, passivation, categorisation, assimilation, collectivisation, aggregation, impersonalisation, abstraction and objectivation, for the analysis of referential/nomination strategies (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, pp.46-7) as they are relevant to 'accurately describing some of the more subtle forms of discriminatorily, as well as positive-representatively, constructing, identifying or hiding social actors' (ibid). Thus, in addition to the referential/nomination strategies of the DHA, I also explore van Leeuwen's (1996;2008) socio-sematic approach and select the analytical tools relevant for this research.

4.2.1.1 An overview of van Leeuwen's socio-semantic approach
Similarly to the DHA, van Leeuwen's (1996;2008) socio-semantic approach is primarily interested in the study of the representation of social actors, i.e., ingroup versus outgroup, in discourse. The socio-semantic approach 'prioritizes the socio-semantic aspects over linguistic realisations' (KhosraviNik, 2010, p.58) as it demonstrates a clear focus on the possible ways in which people or groups of people can be represented rather than on how such representations are linguistically realised (van Leeuwen, 1996, p.32). Its basic assumption is that meanings pre-exist in society, and language is only a means employed to transport those meanings; hence, the analysis should start from 'social encapsulations', e.g., foregrounding/backgrounding, and then be linked to micro-linguistic devices which may be adopted to realise such meanings (KhosraviNik, 2010, p. 58). More specifically, it is not interested in 'the way in which

inequality is realised in the <u>forms</u> of social interaction' but rather on 'the <u>representations</u> which socially dominant subjects make and distribute about the 'others' they dominate in order to provide ideological scaffolding for the inequal social practices themselves' (van Leeuwen, 1993, p.09). Seemingly, van Leeuwen (1996;2008) puts a great emphasis on the discursive form of social inequality and discrimination which he argues can be realised through the pattern of inclusion and exclusion (van Leeuwen, 1996, p.38). 'Representations include or exclude social actors to suit their interests and purposes in relation to the readers for whom they are intended' (ibid). That is,

> [t]he communicator always has a range of semiotic choices available to them when they wish to represent a person. The choices they make will never be neutral but will be based on the way they wish to signpost what kind of person they are representing, or how they wish to represent them as social actors engaged in action. These choices allow us to place people in the social world and highlight certain aspects of identity we wish to draw attention to or omit (Machin and Mayr, 2012, p.103).

It is clear that '[t]he social actors' exclusion from or inclusion in the linguistic representations can serve many different psychological, social or political purposes or interests on the side of the speakers or writers' (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p.47). The table 4.3 below presents an array of analytical tools that the socio-sematic approach proposes for the investigation of the patterns of inclusion and exclusion (see van Leeuwen's 1996, p.67; 2008, p.52 figure) for an extensive summary of the socio-semantic inventory):

Inclusion

- Role allocation: activation / passivation
- Assimilation: collectivisation and aggregation / Individualisation
- Impersonalisation: abstraction and objectivization / Personalisation
- Specification / Genericisation
- Nomination / Categorisation
- Determination and indetermination/ Differentiation
- Association / Dissociation

Exclusion

- Suppression
- Backgrounding

Table 4.3 van Leeuwen's (1996;2008) socio-semantic analytical categories

The representational possibilities presented in table 4.3 above are the principal modes through which social actors can be constructed in discourse (van Leeuwen, 1996, p.65). They are worth using not only to analyse how social actors are linguistically portrayed but also to explore some of the linguistic possibilities available to the communicator, elucidate the tactical choices made, why they are made and what interests and ideologies they serve (ibid, p. 43). However, because of the 'the lack of biuniqueness of language' and the fact that 'meaning belongs to culture rather than to language and cannot be tied to any specific semiotic' (see van Leeuwen's, 1996, pp.32-4 for more details), these representational choices cannot be linked to specific grammatical categories as they can be realised through a variety of linguistic devices (ibid, p.33). Thus, if '[CDS] ties itself in too closely to specific linguistic operations and categories many relevant instances of [language use] might be overlooked' (ibid). van Leeuwen's (1996; 2008) socio-semantic inventory is promising because it 'can take on linguistic facades through various linguistic mechanisms' (KhosraviNik, 2010, p.58).

I.   Exclusion: suppression and backgrounding

Discourse producers may exclude some social actors and/or their activities when they assume that such details are irrelevant to the discourse consumers, or when they assume that the discourse consumers already know such details (van Leeuwen, 1996, p.38) and a detailed reference would be overcomminicative (ibid, p.41). However, discourse producers may exclude social actors for a purpose (ibid). That is, they may avoid mentioning some aspects of a given social practice to obfuscate certain aspects of reality (ibid). For instance, they may 'conceal persons responsible for discriminatory activities' (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.47). If discourse producers exclude both social actors and their activities, the exclusion will not leave any trace in the representation (van Leeuwen. 1996, p.39). 'Such radical exclusion can play a role in a critical comparison of different representations of the same social practice, but not in an analysis of a single text, for the simple reason that it leaves no traces behind' (ibid). The analysis of radical exclusion can be relevant for this study because I deal with a variety of texts from different genres and fields of action. If the discourse producers exclude social actors but include their activities, the exclusion will leave a trace in the representation because the discourse consumers can think of the doers of those activities (van Leeuwen. 1996, p.39). Two types of exclusion can be distinguished: (a) suppression and (b) backgrounding (ibid). Suppression means that social actors are radically excluded, whereas their actions are included (ibid). Some activities are included, but it is not mentioned who did them (ibid). Backgrounding means that social actors are not completely excluded, they are only de-emphasised or pushed

into the background (ibid). More specifically, they are not mentioned in relation to an activity, but they are mentioned somewhere in the text, and discourse consumers can reasonably infer who they are (ibid). These two types of exclusion serve to 'background social actors to different degrees, but both play a part in reducing the number of times specific social actors are explicitly referred to' (ibid, 2008, p.31).

II. Inclusion

a. Role allocation: activation/passivation

One of the significant aspects of inclusion is to consider the grammatical roles attributed to social actors in representations (van Leeuwen, 1996, p.42). It is worth noting that 'there need not to be congruence between the roles that social actors actually play in social practices and the grammatical roles they are given in texts (ibid, p.43). Representations can reallocate roles, rearrange the social relations between the participants' (ibid). That is, sometimes, the discursive roles allocated to social actors do not match with the real roles they perform in society (ibid). However, this congruence or incongruence of roles cannot be identified through text analysis only (ibid). Thus, analysts need to 'investigate which options are chosen in which institutional and social contexts, and why these choices should have been taken up, what interests are served by them, and what purposes achieved' (ibid). In other words, critical discourse analysts need to first analyse the grammatical roles attributed to social actors and then link them to the socio-political context to find out if these grammatical roles are congruent or incongruent with the real roles the represented social actors play in society (ibid). When inconsistency between the grammatical roles and real social roles is found, researchers need to consider why there is such contradiction, what interests are being served and what ideological work is being done (ibid).

'[R]epresentations can endow social actors with either active or passive roles' (van Leeuwen, 1996, p.43). In activation, 'social actors are represented as the active, dynamic forces in an activity' (ibid). In passivation, 'they are represented as 'undergoing' the activity, or as being 'at the receiving end of it' (ibid, pp.43-4). Passivation can be divided into two types: subjection and beneficialisation (ibid, p.44). Passive social actors can be subjected or beneficialised (ibid). Subjected social actors are described as objects in the representation, for instance as objects of exchange (immigrants 'taken in' in return for the skill or the money they bring), and the beneficialised social actors are the ones who, positively or negatively, benefit from the subjected social actors (ibid). The active and passive activities attributed to social actors can be identified through transitivity analysis (ibid). Participants are coded differently depending on the process types employed (ibid). For instance, they are actors in material processes,

behavers in behavioural processes, sensers in mental processes, sayers in verbal processes or assigners in relational processes (ibid). Activation and passivation can also be realised through 'circumstantialisation' (ibid). Martin (2000) suggests that the analysis of transitivity 'allows us to ask questions about who is acting, what kinds of actions they undertake, and who or what or anything they act upon' (p.276). The way social actors are perceived can be shaped by 'the representation of *transitivity* or how they are represented as acting or not acting. Again, this can promote certain discourses and certain ideologies that are not overtly stated' (Machin and Mayr, 2012, p.104). Transitivity is 'the study of what people are depicted as doing and refers, broadly, to who does what to whom, and how. This allows us to reveal who plays an important role in a particular clause and who receives the consequences of that action (ibid). Therefore, transitivity is briefly a 'model of meaning based on verb choice' (Jeffries, 2014, p. 410). This choice of verbs 'always has a significance, some of which maybe ideological' (Machin and Mayr, 2012, p.104). In other words, '[t]hese choices are able to portray participants in ways that tend to align us alongside or against them without overtly stating that this should be the case. As such, they are able to align us likewise alongside the sequences of activity that these participants represent' (ibid).

b. Genericisation and specification

Social actors can be referred to generically or specifically (van Leeuwen, 1996, p.46). Generic reference means that social actors are represented as classes whereas specific reference means they are referred to as identifiable individuals (individualised) (ibid). That is, genericisation refers to generalised essences and classes whereas specification refers to the 'specific participants are 'specimens' of those classes' (ibid). However, in some cases, specification can also mean 'a specific, concrete world, populated with specific, concrete people, places, things and actions' (ibid). Genericisation is generally expressed by plural without article or by singular with a definite and indefinite article.

c. Individualisation and assimilation

In addition to specification, individuality can also be realised through individualisation (van Leeuwen, 1996, p.48). In case social actors are grouped, one shall refer to assimilation (ibid, p.49). The latter can be realised by plurality, mass nouns or nouns denoting a group of people, while individualisation is expressed by singularity (ibid). Assimilation necessitates a further distinction: the assimilated social actors can either be aggregated or collectivised (ibid). In aggregation, there is quantification of groups of social actors whereas in collectivisation there is not (ibid). Aggregation means 'the quantification of groups of participants; it means the

linguistic treatment of persons as numbers and statistics by means of definite or indefinite quantifiers' (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 53). Collectivisation means reference to social actors as group entities but without quantifying them, for example by means of deictics like 'we' or of collectives like 'family', 'group', 'team', 'tribe', 'troupe', 'class', 'mob', 'population', 'people', 'ethnicity', 'nation' and 'race' (ibid).

d. (In)determination and differentiation

According to van Leeuwen (1996) *indetermination* occurs when 'social actors are represented as unspecified, 'anonymous' individuals or groups, *determination* when their identity is, one way or another, specified' (p.51). The former 'is typically realised by indefinite pronouns ('somebody', 'someone', 'some', 'some people') used in nominal function' (ibid). In this case, '[i]ndetermination *anonymises* a social actor' and 'treats his or her identity as irrelevant to the reader' (ibid, p.52). It 'can also be realised by generalised exophoric reference, and in this case it endows social actors with a kind of impersonal authority, a sense of unseen, yet powerfully felt coercive force' (ibid). Finally, it 'can also be aggregated, as, for example, in: 'many believe …', 'some say…', etc' (ibid). 'Self and Other actually are so intertwined that to stop talking about "them," one must stop talking about "us"' (Riggins, 1997, p.6). That is, the representation of the 'Other' cannot be separated from the representation of the 'Self' (Wodak, 1996, p.126). The former is usually represented negatively, and the latter is usually represented positively (van Dijk, 1995, p. 143). The differentiation between the 'Self' and the 'Other' usually results in social inequality and discrimination (ibid, 1997b, p. 144).

e. Impersonalisation and personalisation

Personalisation means that social actors are represented as human beings (van Leeuwen, 1996, p.59). It is 'realised using personal or possessive pronouns, proper names or nouns (sometimes adjectives…) whose meanings include the semantic feature of 'human'' (ibid). Unlike personalisation, in impersonalisation, social actors are dehumanised since they are described by abstract or concrete nouns whose meanings exclude the semantic feature of 'human' (ibid). Impersonalisation is usually employed to 'background the identity and/or role of social actors; it can lend impersonal authority or force to an activity or quality of a social actor; and it can add positive or negative connotations to an activity or utterance of a social actor' (ibid, p.60). There are two types of impersonalisation: (1) abstraction and (2) objectivation (ibid, p.59). In abstraction, social actors are denoted by means of a quality attributed to them by the representation (e.g., describing immigrants as a problem) (ibid). Whereas, in objectivation, they are constructed by means of reference to a place or thing closely related to them as persons or

to the activity they are attributed in the representation (ibid). Seemingly, objectivation is realised through metonymical reference (ibid).

Objectivation can be divided into four categories: spatialisation, utterance autonomisation, instrumentalisation and somatisation (van Leeuwen, 1996, p.59). In spatialisation, 'social actors are represented by means of reference to a place with which they are, in the given context, closely associated' (ibid). In utterance autonomisation, they are constructed 'by means of reference to their utterances' (ibid, p. 60). In instrumentalisation, they are referred to 'by means of reference to the instrument with which they carry out the activity which they are represented as being engaged in' (ibid). Finally, in somatisation, they are denoted 'by means of reference to a part of their body' (ibid). The noun used to refer to the body part is always preceded by a possessive pronoun or genitive to designate its owner (ibid). Thus, possessivated somatisation can also be called 'semi-objectivation' as the social actor is not completely impersonalised but semi-impersonalised (ibid).

f. Nomination and categorisation

In nomination, social actors are referred to by their unique identity (van Leeuwen, 1996, p.52). Conversely, in categorisation, they are represented 'in terms of identities and functions they share with others' (ibid). Nomination is typically realised by proper nouns, which can be formal (surname only, with or without honorifics), semi-formal (given name and surname) or informal (given name only) (ibid, p.53). However, '[o]ccasionally what we might call 'name obscuration' occurs: letters or numbers replace names (e.g., 'Mr X') so that nomination can be signified while the name is, at the same time, withheld '(ibid).

Van Leeuwen (1996) uses categorisation to mean 'the representation of social actors by functionalising, identifying or appraising them: in other words, by referring to them by virtue of ascribing to them identities, functions and positive or negative evaluations they share with others' (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.47). Thus, categorisation necessitates a further distinction between functionalisation, identification (van Leeuwen, 1996, p.54) and appraisement (ibid, p.58). In the case of functionalisation, social actors are represented in terms of what they do, for instance an occupation or role (ibid, p.54). In identification, they 'are defined, not in terms of what they do, but in terms of what they, more or less permanently, or unavoidably, are' (ibid). In appraisement, they are 'referred to in interpersonal, rather than experiential terms…social actors are appraised when they are referred to in terms which evaluate them, as good or bad, loved or hated, admired or pitied' (ibid, p.58). Identification can be divided into

three types: classification, relational identification, and physical identification (ibid, p.54). Classification occurs when social actors are represented 'in terms of the major categories by means of which a given society or institution differentiates between classes of people. In our society these include age, gender, provenance, class, wealth, race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and so on' (ibid, p.54). In Relational identification, they are constructed 'in terms of their personal, kinship or work relation to each other' (ibid, p.56). In Physical identification, they are denoted by 'the physical characteristics which uniquely identify them in a given context' (ibid, p.57).

g. Association/dissociation

Association is a strategy employed to refer to social actors as groups (van Leeuwen, 1996, p.50). These groups may be 'formed by social actors and/or groups of social actors (either generically or specifically referred to) which are never labelled in the text (although the actors or groups who make up the association may of course themselves be named and/or categorised)' (ibid). However, in many texts, many of the formed associations become unformed/disassociated (ibid, p.51). For instance, prior to entering school for the first time, an association was formed between two children from the same neighbourhood, i.e., they walked to school together and shared the same worries thus they were grouped and referred to as 'Mark and Mandy' (ibid). However, they were dissociated when they entered the classroom as they were referred to separately or as part of the collective of the 'class' (ibid). The categories of association and dissociation are not adopted in the DHA, but I adopt them in this study because I noticed that Trump most of time associates President Obama and the Secretary of State Clinton to emphasise the failures of Clinton as a Secretary of State and convince electorates that she is unfit to be President. I also noticed that he dissociates President Obama and the Secretary of State Clinton to construct Clinton as the source of bad decisions in 'the Obama-Clinton administration.'

4.2.1.2 Differences between the DHA and the socio-semantic approach

van Leeuwen's (1996) general characterisation of 'somatisation' is adopted in the DHA (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 53). Like the socio-semantic approach, in the DHA, 'somatonyms' and 'somatisation' refer to 'the linguistic construction of social actors by synecdochisingly picking out a part or characteristic of their body: that is to say, by referring to a person on the basis of a meronymic semantic relationship' (ibid). However, somatisation considered in the socio-semantic approach as a form of impersonalisation, mainly objectivation, is better understood in the DHA as a form of categorisation, specifically physical

identification (ibid) because 'the names of somatic parts of a person still carry the semantic feature '+ human' and these somatic parts are prototypically not called 'objects' in the sense of 'inanimate things' (ibid). Van Leeuwen (1996) acknowledges that, in the case of somatisation, the noun used to refer to the part of the body is always preceded by a possessive pronoun or genitive to designate its owner (p.60). Thus, there is a partial impersonalisation of the social actor and thus a semi-objectivation (ibid). The social actor is designated and there is a reference to his/her physical characteristics which include the semantic feature of 'human'. Thus, I endorse Reisigl and Wodak's (2001, p.53) claim that it is more accurate to consider somatisation as a form physical identification rather than as a form of objectivation.

Though the DHA adopts van Leeuwen's (1996) general characterisation of nomination and categorisation, it redefines identification and classification (Wodak and Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.47). The DHA uses identification 'in a broader sense than van Leeuwen does, taking it as hyponym for all forms of personal reference by nomination' (ibid) and understands classification 'in the very strict sense of identifying a person by ascribing her or him a general status of social class membership' (ibid). It is worth noting that van Leeuwen's (1996) definition of identification and its form of classification are more relevant to this thesis because I noticed that Trump identifies and classifies Muslims according to their religion 'Islam' but not social class.

Relational identification which is 'the linguistic construction of social actors in terms of their personal, kinship or work relations etc. to each other' (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.53) is labelled in the DHA as ''*relationalisation*' and '*sociativisation*' (we understand 'sociativisation' as the specific form of 'relationalisation' that consists in explicitly expressing the relationship by prefixes like 'co-' and 'fellow'), and the respective linguistic means as 'relationyms' and 'sociatives'' (ibid) such as enemies/opponents, ausländische/jüdische Mitmenschen (foreign/Jewish fellow persons), guest, victim, victimiser, oppressor, oppressed, murderer, friends, neighbours, compatriots, Mitmenschen (fellow persons), children, (blood) relatives, ancestors (ibid, p.52). I noticed that the DHA adopts the definition of relational identification but substitutes the name by relationalisation and sociativisation. The terms relational identification, relationalisation and sociativisation will be used interchangeably in this thesis.

4.2.2 Argumentation

Argumentation means to make a claim and support it with evidence to convince others to accept it and take it as true (van Eemeren et al., 1997, p. 208). This 'claim-plus-support arrangement' is referred to as an argument (ibid). When someone makes a claim and defends it by arguments, it means that s/he wants other people to take her/his statements seriously (Toulmin, 2003, p.11). Arguments are employed because they prove the soundness, solidity and merits of the claims and convince the audience that they deserve attention (ibid). In case the addressee wants to express a positive position regarding the claim s/he makes, s/he will employ pro-argumentation to guarantee the acceptability of the claim by justifying the proposition involved in the standpoint (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p.7). Whereas, when the claim defended is negative, the addressee will use contra-argumentation to convince the other party by rejecting the proposition involved in the standpoint (ibid). In both situations, argumentation refers to the set of propositions employed to defend a given standpoint (ibid). This thesis explores Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslims, i.e., it analyses political discourse. Political discourse is essentially argumentative since it primarily contains arguments for or against particular ways of acting i.e., arguments that can ground decision (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012, p.1). For this reason, the analysis of political discourse should focus on the analysis of argumentation (ibid). The pragma-dialectical approach of van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1994, p.21) suggest ten rules for a sound argumentation (as cited in Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, pp. 70-1). In the table 4.4 below, I summarise the ten rules that the DHA draws on to explain sound and fallacious argumentation (see Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, pp.70-1 for more details).

Rule	Explanation
Rule 1 (freedom to argue)	parties must not prevent each other from advancing or casting doubt on standpoints.
Rule 2 (obligation to give reasons)	whoever advances a standpoint is obliged to defend it if asked to do so.
Rule 3 (correct reference to previous discourse by the antagonist)	an attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has actually been advanced by the protagonist.
Rule 4 (obligation to 'matter-of-factness')	a standpoint may be defended only by advancing argumentation relating to that standpoint.
Rule 5 (correct reference to implicit premises)	a person can be held to the premises she or he leaves implicit. Conversely, antagonists

	must not be attacked on premises that cannot be inferred from their utterances.
Rule 6 (respect of shared starting points)	a standpoint must be regarded as conclusively defended if the defence takes place by means of arguments belonging to the common starting point. A premise must not falsely be taken as a common starting point, and, conversely, a shared premise must not be rejected.
Rule 7 (use of plausible arguments and schemes of argumentation)	a standpoint must be regarded as conclusively defended if the defence takes place by means of arguments in which a commonly accepted scheme of argumentation is correctly applied. A standpoint must not be considered to be conclusively defended if the defence does not take place by means of schemes of argumentation which are plausible and correctly applied.
Rule 8 (logical validity)	the arguments used in a discursive text must be valid or capable of being validated by the explicitisation of one or more unexpressed premises.
Rule 9 (acceptance of the discussion's results)	a failed defence must result in the protagonist withdrawing her or his standpoint, and a successful defence in the antagonist withdrawing her or his doubt about the standpoint.
Rule 10 (clarity of expression and correct interpretation)	formulations must be neither puzzlingly vague nor confusingly ambiguous and must be interpreted as accurately as possible.

Table 4.4 The ten rules of sound argumentation (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, pp.70-1)

In racist, ethnicist, nationalist, sexist and other forms of discriminatory discourse, critical discourse analysts encounter many violations of the ten rules mentioned in table 4.4 above (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.71). These violations are referred to by 'fallacies' (ibid). The fallacious argumentation schemes that are usually employed in the discursive legitimation of racist, ethnicist, nationalist and other forms of discriminatory discourse are: the argumentum ad baculum, the argumentum ad hominem, the argumentum ad misericordiam, the argumentum ad populum or pathetic fallacy, the argumentum ad ignorantiam, the argumentum ad

verecundiam , the 'post hoc, ergo propter hoc, the petitio principii, the fallacy of rigged questions, the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi, the straw man fallacy, the fallacies of ambiguity, equivocation, amphibole or clarity (see Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, pp. 71-4 for more details).

The fallacies that maybe relevant to this research are the following: the argumentum ad hominem, the argumentum ad verecundiam and the fallacy of 'hasty generalisation.' The argumentum ad hominem means attacking verbally the antagonist's personality and character or focusing on his/her credibility, integrity, honesty, expertise, and competence instead of advancing arguments to refute the antagonist's standpoint (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.72). This fallacy violates rule 4 (ibid). Trump always attacks 'the Obama-Clinton administration' and the presidential candidate Clinton because he describes them as dishonest and incompetent politicians. The argumentum ad verecundiam or fallacy of authority means supporting one's own claim by reference to authorities (ibid). An appeal to an authority will be fallacious if the respective authority is incompetent, prejudiced or if s/he is quoted inaccurately (ibid). The fallacy of authority also means 'presenting oneself as an authority or expert if one is not' (ibid). This fallacy violates rules 4 and 7. To justify his negative claims on Muslims, Trump frequently refers to the Center for Security Policy. However, the latter is known for anti-Muslim prejudice (Patel, 2017). Trump also refers to himself to justify his claims on Muslims. The fallacy of 'hasty generalisation' or secundum quid means generalising based on a quantitative sample that is not representative (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 73). 'This fallacy can either take the form of a compositio or of a divisio, the former consisting of replacing the whole by a part, the latter consisting of replacing a part by the whole' (ibid). This fallacy violates the rules 5 and 7 (ibid). Trump employs the fallacy of 'hasty generalisation' to represent Muslims as a homogeneous social group whose members share the qualities of misogyny and sexism, violence, and religious extremism.

Apart from fallacies, in racist, ethnicist, nationalist, sexist and other forms of discriminatory discourse, argumentation can be analysed by means of topoi (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.74). The latter are 'warrants' or 'conclusion rules' that link the argument(s) to the conclusion, they justify the transition from the argument(s) to the claim (Kienpointner, 1992, p.194). The DHA focuses on the analysis of argumentation through topoi, and this is referred to as content-related analysis of argumentation (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.74). The table 4.5 below summarises the main topoi used in racist, ethnicist, nationalist, sexist and other forms of discriminatory discourse and their corresponding conditionals.

Topoi	Conditionals/argumentation schemes
The topos of advantage or usefulness	If an action under a specific relevant point of view will be useful, then one should perform it.
The topos of uselessness/disadvantage	If one can anticipate that the prognosticated consequences of a decision will not occur or if other political actions are more likely to lead to the declared aim, the decision has to be rejected.
The topos of definition or topos of name-interpretation or locus a nominis interpretation	If an action, a thing or a person (group of persons) is named/designated (as) X, the action, thing or person (group of persons) carries or should carry the qualities/traits/attributes contained in the (literal) meaning of X.
The topos of danger or topos of threat	If a political action or decision bears specific dangerous, threatening consequences, one should not perform or do it. Or formulated differently: if there are specific dangers and threats, one should do something against them.
The topos of humanitarianism	If a political action or decision does or does not conform with human rights or humanitarian convictions and values, one should or should not perform or make it.
the topos of justice	If persons/actions/situations are equal in specific respects, they should be treated/ dealt with in the same way
The topos of burdening or weighing down (a causal topos or a topos of consequence)	If a person, an institution or a 'country' is burdened by specific problems, one should act in order to diminish these burdens.
The topos of finances	If a specific situation or action costs too much money or causes a loss of revenue, one should perform actions that diminish the costs or help to avoid the loss.
The topos of authority	X is right or X has to be done or X has to be omitted because A (= an authority) says that it is right or that is has to be done or that it has to be omitted.
The topos of numbers	If the numbers prove a specific topos, a specific action should be performed/not be carried out.

The topos of history	Because history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation (allegedly) comparable with the historical example referred to.
The topos of culture	Because the culture of a specific group of people is as it is, specific problems arise in specific situations.

Table 4.5 Prevalent topoi in discriminatory discourse (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, pp. 75-80)

4.2.3 Perspectivisation, mitigation and intensification

In the DHA, perspectivisation and mitigation/intensification are two other analytical strategies critical discourse analysts may analyse (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.45). In discriminatory discourse, perspectivisation serves to investigate how 'speakers express their involvement in discourse, and position their point of view in the reporting, description, narration or quotation of discriminatory events or utterances' (ibid). Mitigation and intensification strategies 'help to qualify and modify the epistemic status of a proposition by intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of racist, antisemitic, nationalist or ethnicist utterances' (ibid). These strategies 'play an important role in the discursive presentation inasmuch as they operate upon it by sharpening it or toning it down' (ibid).

'[D]iscourse is a systematic, internally consistent body of representations' (Riggins, 1997, p.2). The latter are expressed from a particular point of view' (Fairclough, 1995a, p.56). That is, they are expressed from a specific perspective (van Dijk, 2004, p.108). This may be the point of view of the speaker or more generally the social or political position of the speaker (ibid). Perspectives 'may be expressed or more indirectly signaled in many ways, for example, by the choice of specific verbs […] but also more generally appears in lexical items, sentence structure, and the overall meaning of propositions' (ibid). The DHA proposes perspectivisation as an analytical category to analyse how discourse producers express their involvements and position their points of view in discourse (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.81). KhosraviNik (2010, p.63) argues that perspectivization affects the textual choices of the speaker, thus it is better understood as a feature or an aspect influencing the linguistic choices of the speaker (i.e., nomination, predication, and argumentation) rather than a separate analytical category. In this thesis, I adopt KhosraviNik's understanding of perspectivisation, thus I use it to refer the 'linguistic mechanisms/processes that the text producers may strategically incorporate within

the qualities of the texts' (ibid). I also think that it occurs by 'both choosing certain manners of linguistic realization as well as the lack of certain choices, and as such a critical textual analysis needs to constantly look out for the elements chosen against the background of the elements which are not' (ibid).

The DHA proposes mitigation and intensification strategies as analytical categories to analyse how speakers play with the epistemic status of their propositions and points of view through sharpening or toning down the elocutionary force of their utterances (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.45). Unlike the DHA, which considers 'intensification and mitigation as a common place strategy to topicalize and de-topicalize a certain point of view' (KhosraviNik, 2010, p.57), I believe that intensification and mitigation strategies can be used to emphasise and deemphasise not only a point of view but also nominations, predications, and arguments (ibid). For instance, an argument (sound or fallacious) may be intensified/mitigated by several 'choices in the quality of realization of the text, e.g., whether the text is using an implicit or explicit tone, what points are exaggerated or downplayed, whether or not the points are presented overtly or through allusions' (ibid, p.58).

4.3 The DHA in eight steps

Wodak and Meyer (2016, p.34) argue that for '[a] thorough, ideal-typical discourse-historical analysis', analysts should implement eight recursive steps   (in section 4.6, I explain how this research adheres to these steps), which include:

1. Activation and consultation of preceding theoretical knowledge (i.e. recollection, reading and discussion of previous research);
2. Systematic collection of data and context information (depending on the research questions, various discourses and discursive events, social fields as well as actors, semiotic media, genres and texts);
3. Selection and preparation of data for specific analysis (selection and downsizing of data according to relevant criteria, transcriptions of tape recordings, etc.);
4. Specification of the research question/s and formulation of assumptions (on the basis of literature review and a first skimming of the data);
5. Qualitative pilot analysis, including a context analysis, macro-analysis and micro-analysis (allows testing categories and first assumptions, as well as the further specification of assumptions);

6. Detailed case studies (of a whole range of data, primarily qualitatively, but in part also quantitatively);

7. Formulation of a critique (interpretation and explanation of results, taking into account the relevant context knowledge and referring to the three dimensions of critique);

8. Practical application of analytical results (if possible, the results may be applied or proposed for practical application targeting some social impact).

4.4 CDS and data: texts as data

'[M]any CDS approaches work with existing data, i.e., texts not specifically produced for the respective research projects' (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p.22). Since data already exist, and new data constantly emerge, researchers assume that all what they need is to collect data and start the analysis (Wetherell et al., 2001, p.24). However, they need to consider exactly what constitute data (ibid). That is, it is important to distinguish between material and data (ibid). They need to be aware that they only have access to a body of material which will be transformed into data through selection (ibid). After accessing the materials available, they should collect and select a sample that is relevant to their research interests i.e., questions and aims, etc (ibid). This means that there are two important phases that researchers need to take into consideration: (1) consultation of the available materials and (2) collection and selection of relevant data (ibid). For a systematic collection of relevant data from the body of material available, the DHA suggests considering the following criteria (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016, p.38):

1. specific political units or language communities;
2. specific periods of time relating to important discursive events, which are connected with the issue in question;
3. specific social and especially political and scientific actors (individual and 'collective' actors organizations;
4. specific discourses;
5. specific fields of political action;
6. specific semiotic media and genres.

In qualitative research, '[i]t is often difficult to put the data into a succinct form for either analysis or presentation. The researcher is therefore likely to use a much smaller sample. This may, nonetheless, be designed to be as broad and inclusive as possible' (Wetherell et al., 2001, p.24). Thus, once the relevant data is collected, researchers need to go through the process of selection to downsize it into a smaller corpus (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016, p.39). There are some

criteria for selection such as frequency, representativity, (proto) typicality, intertextual and interdiscursive scope, salience, uniqueness and redundancy (ibid). However, selection can also be extended to which features of the data are relevant to the analysis; some researchers can be interested in what is inside the documents (content) such as language, and others can be interested in the form such as the general appearance and layout (Wetherell et al., 2001, p.25).

4.5 Data collection and selection

In this section, I will explain how I went through the two phases of material consultation and data selection (Wetherell et al., 2001, p.24). Also, I will explain how the six criteria mentioned in the section 4.4 helped in the selection of the final corpus of data.

4.5.1 Consultation of materials and data collection

This research focuses on discourse on Muslims within the American context with a special focus on Trump as a political actor and Muslims, both inside and outside the US, as social actors. To this end, I considered the whole presidential campaign of Trump, i.e., from his candidacy announcement in June 2015 till taking the oath of presidency in November 2016 to consult the available materials and collect the relevant data.

To collect data, I googled the key words 'Muslim immigration', 'Muslims', and 'Trump's presidential campaign.' I got plenty of results, especially Trump's campaign rallies and TV interviews on Muslims. Interestingly, I also got readymade timelines summarising Trump's remarks on Muslim immigration. One timeline is from *The Washington Post* and the other one from *medium.com*. I used the timelines to easily find the available materials. I noticed that the timelines included materials from both the pre- and post-election periods. This gave me an idea about the materials available in both periods. Considering the timelines and doing my own search on the available materials, I noticed that there is enough data to analyse in the pre-election period rather than the post-election period. I mean, it was clear that if I opt for the post-election period, I will be short of materials. This reason was enough to exclude the post-election period and decide to focus on the pre-election period. I selected a timeline of 12 months (from June 2015 to October 2016). The elections took place on the 8th of November 2016. I am interested in Trump's presidential campaign only. Thus, I excluded the month of November 2016 as it is irrelevant to my analysis. I must acknowledge that the timelines were only used as guides because I did my own search to find if there are any other texts that are missing in the timelines. Of course, after doing my own search, some texts were added, and some, i.e., the

ones from the post-election period, were excluded because they were irrelevant. I ended up with my own timeline and started to collect data accordingly.

During the campaign, Trump proposed various policies on Muslims. By collecting all his remarks, I could draw a synthesis of all the policies he suggested. For instance, he constantly called for surveilling/closing mosques and stopping the admission of Syrian refugees. However, discourse on Muslims, particularly discourse on policing and vigilance turned out to be dominant since the terrorist attack that happened in Paris in November 2015. As a reaction to this attack, Trump called for going after the families of terrorists. In December 2015, the US witnessed the San Bernardino terrorist attack. As a reaction to this attack, he wrote 'the Muslim Travel Bn Statement' in which he called for stopping Muslim immigrants from coming to the US (see appendix one for 'the Muslim Travel Ban Statement'). In March 2016, another terrorist attack took place in Brussels, Belgium. Thus, he proposed surveilling Muslims. Trump advocated all his proposals until he won the election in November 2016. I also noticed that some of his proposals and policies changed during this period. For example, the 'Muslim Travel Ban' he suggested, which he said would be a limited-time measure, changed into Extreme Vetting. By the latter, he means the suspension of immigration from all the countries that have a proven history of terrorism, i.e., Muslim and non-Muslim countries. Trump policy proposals are manifested through a variety of genres, i.e., campaign rallies, TV interviews, statements, campaign ads and tweets. I collected data from all these genres to draw comparisons and investigate if context influences the way Trump represents Muslims. These different genres belong to different fields of political action: the campaign rallies and ad belong to the field of political advertising, and TV interviews, tweets and 'the Muslim Travel Ban Statement' (posted under press releases in Trump's presidential campaign) can be included in the field of the formation of public attitudes, opinions and will (see sub-section 2.4.1 in chapter two for more details on genres and fields of action). The sources of data of this study are YouTube and the official websites of different TV channels. I must mention that the transcripts are mostly retrieved from the websites Factba.se, the American Presidency Project and c-span.org. There are transcripts that I could not find such as Fox and Friends TVI2. Therefore, I listen to the video and transcribe the needed extracts (see appendix three for the links of the selected data). In the table 4.6, I present in a chronological order the data I collected, namely campaign rallies, TV interviews, statements, campaign ads, from the whole presidential campaign period.

Text	Genre	Date
1.Campaign Hall in New Hampshire	Campaign rally	17/09/15
2.Interview on NBC News 'Meet the press'	Live phone interview	20/09/15
3.Remarks in New Hampshire	Campaign rally	30/09/15
4. Interview on NBC News 'Meet the Press'	Face to face TV interview	5/10/15
5. Interview on 'Face the Nation'	Face to face TV interview	11/10/15
6.Interview on CNN	Face to face TV interview	25/10/15
7.Interview on 'Fox Business'	Live phone interview	20/10/15
8.Remarks on Paris attack, Fox News	Live phone interview	15/11/15
9.Interview on MSNBC 'Morning Joe': A reaction to Paris attack.	Live phone interview	16/11/15
10.Campaign Hall NEWTON, Iowa	Answer to question of NBC's reporter	20/11/15
11.Remarks in Birmingham, Alabama	Campaign rally	21/11/15
12.Interview on ABC News	Live phone interview	22/11/15
13.Interview on MSNBC	Live phone interview	30/11/15
14.Interview on 'Fox and friends': a reaction to San Bernardino attack	Live phone interview	02/12/15
15. 15. Tv interview in Infowars	Live video Conference	02/12/15
16.Remarks at Republican Jewish Coalition Presidential Forum	Campaign rally	03/12/15
17. Interview on CBS News 'Face the Nation': A reaction to the San Bernardino attacks	Face to face TV interview	06/12/15
18.Travel Ban Statement	Written policy statement	07/12/15
19.Remarks on Muslims in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina: A reaction to San Bernardino attacks	Campaign rally	07/12/15
20.Interview on 'Morning Joe' MSNBC: Muslim Travel Ban	Live phone TV interview	08/12/15
21.Interviewon ABC News: Muslim Travel Ban	Live phone TV interview	08/12/15
22. Interview on ABC's 'Live with Kelly and Michael'	Face to face TV interview	09/12/15

23.Interview on Fox News Sunday	Face to face TV interview	13/12/15
24.Remarks in Iowa	Campaign rally	12/01/16
25.First campaign ad	Ad	04/01/16
26.CNN Q&A (Question and Answer)	Face to face TV interview	04/02/16
27.Remarks in Charleston, South Carolina	Campaign rally	19/02/16
28. The 11th GOP debate on Fox News	Political debate	04/03/16
29. Trump's interview on CNN	Face to face TV interview	09/03/16
30.The 12th republican primary debate on CNN	Political debate	10/03/16
31.Fox News Sunday (March 13, 2016)	TV interview	13/03/16
32.Interview on Fox and Friends: A reaction to Brussels attacks	Live phone Interview	22/03/16
33.Interview on Fox Business: A reaction to Brussels attack	Live phone interview	22/03/16
34.Interview on 'TODAY' on NBC News	Live phone interview	22/03/16
35.Interviewon Bloomberg TV "With All Due Respect": A reaction to Brussels terrorist attack	Face to face TV interview	23/03/16
36.CNN Milwaukee Republican Presidential Town Hall	Face to face TV interview	29/03/16
37.Interview on Fox News	Live phone interview	20/05/16
38.Interview on Fox and Friends: A reaction to the Orlando terrorist attack	Live phone interview	13/06/16
39.Remarks at Saint Anselm College in Manchester, New Hampshire: A reaction to Orlando nightclub terrorist attacks	Campaign rally	13/06/16
40.Remarks in Greensboro, North Carolina A response to Obama's statement on foreign policy and terrorism	Campaign rally	14/06/16
41.Donald Trump at Hannity on Fox news	Face to face TV interview	14/06/16
42.Trump and Mike Pence joint interview on '60 Minutes' on CBS News	Face to face TV interview	17/07/16
43.Trump's GOP nomination acceptance in Cleveland, Ohio.	Nomination acceptance speech	22/07/16

44.Interviewon Meet the press on NBC	Face to face TV interview	24/07/16
45.Remarks in Orlando, Florida	A meeting of evangelical leaders	11/08/16
46.Remarks on foreign policy in Ohio, Youngstown	Campaign rally	15/08/16
47.Remarks in Charlotte, North Carolina	Campaign rally	18/08/16
48.Speech on immigration	Campaign rally	31/08/16
49.Remarks in Fort Myers, Florida about immigration and national security threats a reaction to New York attacks new Jersy	Campaign rally	19/09/16
50.The second presidential debate between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump	Political debate	09/10/16

Table 4.6 Data collection (excluding tweets) from June 2015 to November 2016

4.5.2 Data selection, sampling, and coding

After skimming all the collected data presented in the table 4.6 above, I noticed that Trump's discourse on Muslim immigration is related to discourse on terrorism and discourse on vigilance and policing. As shown in the table 4.6, discourse on Muslim immigration, i.e., discourse on vigilance and policing, turned out to be dominant from November 2015. I mean since the Paris attack. Therefore, I used dominance as a criterion and reduced the timeline from 18 months to a period of 12 months, viz., from November 2015 to October 2016. By specifying the period, the texts were reduced from 50 into 42. These 42 texts are indiscursively related. Interdiscursivity means that there is topic and/or sub-topics relatedness between discourses (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p.28). Trump's discourse on Muslim immigration is always related to (1) discourse on terrorism and (2) discourse on vigilance and policing. The set of subtopics he refers to are stopping the admissions of all non-refugee Muslims, stopping the admissions of Syrian refugees, and tracking Muslims and surveilling mosques in the US. These sub-topics are intertextually related. Intertextual relatedness can be realised by 'explicit reference to a topic or main actor; through references to the same events; by allusions or evocations; by the transfer of main arguments from one text to the next, and so forth' (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p.28). I cannot neglect the analysis of intertextuality because Trump refers to the same actors, such as the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries (Muslims immigrants), Muslim Americans, President Obama and his Secretary of State Clinton and the presidential candidate Clinton. In

addition, he points the same events and uses the same examples and arguments mentioned below:

- He attributes the same qualities to Muslims, such as misogyny and sexism, violence, religious extremism, and sympathy with terrorism, and he always represents Islam as the source of these negative qualities.

- He uses the same examples; Trump always refers to the terrorist attacks that happened in the US, such as the 9/11, San Bernardino and Orlando terrorist attacks, and around the World, such as the Paris and Brussels attacks.

- He uses the same topoi (he refers to the same authorities and numbers)

- He criticises 'the Obama-Clinton administration' for the admissions of Muslims (refugees and non-refugees), and political correctness on Muslims,

- He criticises 'the Obama-Clinton administration' approach in the 'Middle East' to represent them as the source of terrorism.

- He attributes corruption, dishonesty, and lack of credibility to 'the Obama-Clinton administration.'

- He represents the presidential candidate Clinton as an extension of 'the Obama-Clinton administration.'

To reduce the selected 42 texts into a much smaller corpus, I focused on the texts in which the main topic of Muslim immigration is dominant. I excluded all the texts in which a variety of topics are discussed, i.e., I selected only the texts in which terrorism, vigilance and policing are the macro-topics and the sub-topics summarised above proved to be dominant. I ended up having a corpus of 18 texts. When I finished data selection, I noticed that all the selected texts are reactions to the terrorist attacks that happened in the US, such as the San Bernardino, Orlando and New Jersy attacks, and abroad, such as the Paris attack in France and Brussels attack in Belgium. Therefore, the selected corpus can be considered as a synthesis of Trump's reactions to the terrorist events that happened during the campaign domestically and in Europe. Trump proposes his policies in campaign rallies, but he discusses them extensively during interviews. Thus, I have more interviews than campaign rallies.

I coded all the selected data to illustrate from which texts the analysed extracts are taken and make the analysis clear. To code the rallies, I combined the complete name of the town in which the speech took place with the abbreviation CR by which I refer to 'campaign rally.' For interviews, I used the name of the channel or TV programme in which it was broadcasted

together with the abbreviation TVI by which I refer to 'TV interview.' In cases where different interviews were aired in the same channel, I used numbers to differentiate between them. I considered the chronological order of the interviews to do the numbering. I use the abbreviation TBS to refer to 'the Muslim Travel Ban Statement' and the abbreviation CAD to refer to campaign ad. In the table 4.7 below, I summarise the selected texts and provide a code for each text.

Text	Date	Codes
1.Live phone Tv interview on MSNBC 'Morning Joe'	16/11/15	MSNBC TVI1
2.Live phone Tv interview on 'ABC News'	22/11/15	ABC News TVI1
3.Live phone Tv interview on MSNBC	30/11/15	MSNBC TVI2
4.Face to face Tv interview on CBS News 'FACE THE NATION'	06/12/15	CBS News TVI
5.Travel Ban Statement Written policy statement	07/12/15	TBS
6. Campaign rally in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina	07/12/15	Mt Pleasant CR
7. Live phone Tv interview on 'Morning Joe' MSNBC	08/12/15	MSNBC TVI3
8. Live phone Tv interview on ABC News: Muslim Travel Ban	08/12/15	ABC News TVI2
9.First campaign ad	04/01/16	CAD
10. Live phone Tv interview on Fox and Friends	22/03/16	Fox and Friends TVI1
11. Live phone Tv interview on Fox Business	22/03/16	Fox Business TVI
12. Live phone Tv interview on 'TODAY' on NBC News	22/03/16	NBC News TVI
13. Live phone Tv interview on Fox and Friends	13/06/16	Fox and Friends TVI2

14. Speech at Saint Anselm College in Manchester, New Hampshire	13/06/16	Manchester CR
15. Campaign rally in Greensboro, North Carolina	14/06/16	Greensboro CR
16. Face to face interview at Hannity on Fox news	14/06/16	Fox News TVI1
17. Campaign rally on foreign policy in Ohio, Youngstown	15/08/16	Youngstown CR
18. Campaign Rally in Fort Myers, Florida about immigration and national security threats	19/09/16	Fort Myers CR

Table 4.7 The selected corpus excluding tweets

4.5.3 Data collection and selection from Twitter

In CDS, researchers should not take data collection 'as a specific phase that must be completed before the analysis can be conducted' (Wodak & Meyer, 2016, p. 21) because 'after the first data collection one should perform first pilot analyses, find indicators for particular concepts, expand concepts into categories and, on the basis of these first results, collect further data (theoretical sampling)' (ibid). This shows that 'data collection is never completely concluded nor excluded, and new questions may always arise that require new data or re-examination of earlier data' (ibid). For this study, I initially considered the whole presidential campaign (from June 2015 till November 2016), and I collected 50 texts from different genres and fields of actions (see table 4.6). I selected a timeline of 12 months (from November 2015 to October 2016) and thus reduced the texts into 42 texts. To further downsize the texts, I selected only the ones in which terrorism, vigilance and policing are the macro-topics, and I ended up having 18 texts. When I started data collection from Twitter, I considered only the selected timeline (from November 2015 to October 2016), and I collected 153 tweets.

Trump joined Twitter in March 2009. His Twitter page is @realDonaldTrump. Trump is an active and prodigious user of Twitter since he posts many tweets almost every day. Thus, analysing his 2015-16 presidential campaign tweets will reveal how he represents Muslims and how he supports his policy proposals on Muslims. To collect data, I did not consult the whole campaign period as the timeline was already selected. I only collected data from November

2015 to October 2016. To go back to Trump's 2015 tweets, I used Twitter advanced search which is available only for people who are logged to twitter.com (Twitter Help Center, 2020). Advanced search helps Twitter users to tailor search results to specific date ranges, people, hashtags, and language, etc (ibid). This makes it easier for users to find the specific tweets they are searching for (ibid). Instead of scrolling down until 2015, I used the calendar of advanced search to select a 'from' date 'to' date. For instance, when I consulted Trump's October 2015 tweets, I selected the 1st of October 2015 till the 31st of October 2015 from the calendar and only the tweets posted within the date range selected appeared. This advanced search helped me do a detailed month by month consultation of Trump's tweets posted within the timeline selected. Because of the word limit in Twitter, 250 character per tweet, Trump posts a set of tweets to cover all the sub-topics he discusses during interviews and campaign rallies (see sub-section 4.5.2 above for the sub-topics). For this reason, I selected 28 tweets in which Trump clearly refers to the sub-topics discussed in the selected campaign rallies and interviews. I do not consider a tweet a text because the size of a tweet, i.e., 250 character per tweet, is too small to be considered a text. Thus, in this thesis, I consider all the tweets I collected on Muslims as one text, and I consider the selected tweets as extracts. For this reason, in chapters five and six, I will use the word 'extract' to refer either to excerpts taken from campaign rallies, interviews, statements or Tweets.

The collected tweets	The selected tweets
November 2015	November 2015
1. We, as a country either we have borders or we don't. IF WE DON'T HAVE BORDERS WE DON'T HAVE A COUNTRY! Nov 12, 2015 2. They laughed at me when I said to bomb the ISIS controlled oil fields. Now they are not laughing and doing what I said. #Trump2016 Nov 13, 2015 3. President Obama said "ISIL continues to shrink" in an interview just hours before the horrible attack in Paris. He is just so bad! CHANGE. Nov 14, 2015 4. Why won't President Obama use the term Islamic Terrorism? Isn't it now, after all of this time and so much death, about time! Nov 15, 2015	1. "@thewatcher23579: one of Paris terrorist came as a Syrian refugee. Donald Trump is right again. BOMB THEIR OIL – TAKE AWAY THEIR FUNDING" Nov 15, 2015 2. Why won't President Obama use the term Islamic Terrorism? Isn't it now, after all of this time and so much death, about time! Nov 15, 2015 3. When will President Obama issue the words RADICAL ISLAMIC TERRORISM? He can't say it, and unless he will, the problem will not be solved! Nov 15, 2015

5. When will President Obama issue the words RADICAL ISLAMIC TERRORISM? He can't say it, and unless he will, the problem will not be solved! Nov 15, 2015

6. @realDonaldTrump on ISIS & OIL FIELDS! Saying it for years! @AndersonCooper, you should acknowledge this! #Trump2016 (link to YouTube video) Nov 15, 2015

7. "@thewatcher23579: one of Paris terrorist came as a Syrian refugee. Donald Trump is right again. BOMB THEIR OIL – TAKE AWAY THEIR FUNDING" Nov 15, 2015

8. President Obama just told President Putin how important the Russian air strikes against ISIS have been. I TOLD YOU SO! Nov 16, 2015

9. Remember, I was the one who said attack the oil (ISIS source of wealth) a long time ago. Everyone scoffed, now they're attacking the oil. Nov 16, 2015

10. Refugees from Syrian are now pouring into our great country. Who knows who they are - some could be ISIS. Is our President insane? Nov 17, 2015

11. I, with almost everyone else, have so little confidence in President Obama. He has a horrible attitude – a man who is resigned to defeat. Nov 17, 2015

12. Eight Syrians were just caught on the southern border trying to get into the U.S. ISIS Maybe? I told you so. WE NEED A BOG & BEUATIFUL WALL! Nov 19, 2015

13. The media must immediately stop calling ISIS leaders "MASTERMINDS." Call them instead thugs and losers. Young people must not go into ISIS. Nov 20, 2015

14. The media must denigrate ISIS at all levels or youth will continue to be drawn to it. These are low levels degenerates, NOT masterminds! Nov 20, 2015

15. Under our President ISIS is gaining strength (a link to Instagram post) Nov 20, 2015 16. I didn't suggest a database- a reporter did. We must defeat Islamic terrorism & have surveillance, including a watch list, to protect America Nov 20, 2015 17. 13 Syrian refugees were caught trying to get into the U.S. through the Southern Border. How many made it? WE NEED THE WALL! Nov 22, 2015 18. We better get tough with RADICAL ISLAMIC TERRORISTS, and get tough now, or the life and safety of our wonderful country will be in jeopardy! Nov 22, 2015 19. Hillary Clinton is weak on illegal immigration, among many other things. She is strong on corruption- corruption is what she's best at! Nov 22, 2015 20. I LIVE IN NEW JERSY & @realDonaldTrump IS RIGHT: MUSLIMS DID CELEBRATE ON 9/11 HERE! WE SAW IT! (a link to an article on Infowars.com, Trump quoted the title) Nov 26, 2015	
December 2015 Tweets	December 2015 Tweets
21. The horrible shooting that took place in San Bernardino was an absolute act of terror that many people knew about. Why didn't they report? Dec 4, 2015 22. Wonder if Obama will ever say RADICAL ISLAMIC TERRORIST? Dec 6, 2015 23. Hillary just said that she will not use the term "radical Islamic" – but was incapable of saying why. She is afraid of Obama & the e-mails! Dec 6, 2015 24. BIG NIGHT ON TWITTER TONIGHT. I WILL BE LIVE TWEETING PRESIDENT OBAMA'S SPEECH AT 7:50 P.M. (EASTERN). MUST TALK RADICAL ISLAMIC TERRORISM! Dec 7, 2015	4. Well, Obama refused to say (he just can't say it), that we are at war with RADICAL ISLAMIC TERRORISTS. Dec 7, 2015

25. Hillary won't call out radical Islam! She will be soundly defeated. Dec 7, 2015 26. Is this all there is? We need a new President - Fast! Dec 7, 2015 27. Wish Obama would say ISIS, like almost everyone else, rather than ISIL. Dec 7, 2015 28. Should have gone after the oil years ago (like I have been saying) Dec 7, 2015 29. Well, Obama refused to say (he just can't say it), that we are at war with RADICAL ISLAMIC TERRORISTS. Dec 7, 2015 30. Obama said in his speech that Muslims are out sport heroes. What sport is he talking about, and who? Is Obama profiling? Dec 7, 2015 31. Just put out a very important policy statement on the extraordinary influx of hatred and danger coming into our country. We must be vigilant! Dec 7, 2015 32. Our country is facing a major threat from radical Islamic terrorism. We better get very smart, and very tough, Fast, before it is too late! Dec 9, 2015 33. Wow, what a day. So many foolish people that refuse to acknowledge the tremendous danger and uncertainty of certain people coming into U.S. Dec 9, 2015 34. "Rupert Murdoch Defends Trump: 'Complete Refugee Pause' Makes Sense'" (quoted the title of an article published in breitbart.com) Dec 9, 2015	
January 2016 Tweets	January 2016 Tweet
35. Hillary said that guns don't keep you safe. If she really believes that she should demand that her heavily armed bodyguards quickly disarm! Jan 3, 2016 36. Germany is going through massive attacks to its people by the migrants allowed to enter the country. New Years Eve was a disaster. THINK! Jan 6, 2016 37. Man shot inside Paris police station. Just announced that terror threat is at highest	5. Hillary Clinton is a major national security risk. Not presidential material! Jan 30, 2016

level, Germany is a total mess- big crime. GET SMART! Jan 7, 2016 38. More radical Islam attacks today – it never ends! Strengthen the borders, we must be vigilant and smart. No more being politically correct. Jan 16, 2016 39. Far more killed than anticipated in radical Islamic terror attack yesterday. Get tough and smart U.S., or we won't have a country anymore! Jan 17, 2016 40. Hillary Clinton is a major national security risk. Not presidential material! Jan 30, 2016	
February 2016 Tweets	February 2016 Tweets
41. ISIS is making big threats today – no respect for U.S.A. or our "leader" – If I win it will be a very different story, with very fast results Feb 9, 2016 42. Hopefully others will follow suit. Our country needs & should demand security. It is time to get tough & be smart! Feb 19, 2016 43. I use both iPhone and Samsung. If Apple doesn't give info to authorities on the terrorists I'll only be using Samsung until they give info. Feb 19, 2016 44. Boycott all Apple products until such time as Apple give cellphone info to authorities regarding radical Islamic terrorist couple from Cal Feb 19, 2016 45. I wonder if President Obama would have attended the funeral of justice Scalia if it were held in a mosque? Very sad that he did not go! Feb 20, 2016	/
March 2016 Tweets	March 2016 Tweets
46. We don't have a country – if we don't have borders. #VoteTrump Video: (Facebook link) March 14, 2016 47. Do you all remember how beautiful and safe a place Brussels was. Not anymore, it is from a different world! U.S. must be vigilant and smart! Mar 22, 2016	6. Obama, and all others, have been so weak, and so politically correct, that terror groups are forming and getting stronger! Shame. Mar 22, 2016

48. I have proven to be far more correct about terrorism than anybody – and it's not even close. Hopefully AZ and UT will be voting for me today! Mar 22, 2016

49. My heart & prayers go out to all the victims of the terrible #Brussels tragedy. This madness must be stopped, and I will stop it. Mar 22, 2016

50. Obama, and all others, have been so weak, and so politically correct, that terror groups are forming and getting stronger! Shame. Mar 22, 2016

51. Incompetent Hillary, despite the horrible attack in Brussels, wants borders to be weak and open – and let the Muslims flow in. No way! Mar 23, 2016

52. Just watched Hillary deliver a prepackaged speech on terror. She's been in office fighting terror for 20 years- and look where we are! Mar 23, 2016

53. I will be the best by far in fighting terror. I'm the only one that was right from the beginning, & Lyin' Ted & others are copying me. Mar 23, 2016

54. N.A.T.O. is obsolete and must be changed to additionally focus on terrorism as well as some of the things it is currently focused on! Mar 24, 2016

55. Remember when I recently said that Brussels is a "hell hole" and a mess and the failing @nytimes wrote a critical article. I was so right! Mar 24, 2016

56. It is amazing how often I am right, only to be criticized by the media. Illegal immigration, take the oil, build the wall, Muslims, NATO! Mar 24, 2016

57. Hillary Clinton has been working on solving the terrorism problem for years. TIME FOR A CHANGE, I WILL SOLVE – AND FAST! Mar 24, 2016

58. Just announced that as many as 5000 ISIS fighters have infiltrated Europe. Also, many

in U.S. I TOLD YOU SO! I alone can fix this problem! Mar 26, 2016	
59. Europe and the U.S. must immediately stop taking in people from Syria. This will be the destruction of civilization as we know it! So sad! Mar 24, 2016	
60. Top suspect in Paris massacre, Salah Abdeslam, who also knew of the Brussels attack, is no longer talking. Weak leaders, ridiculous laws! Mar 26, 2016	
61. Another radical Islamic attack, this time in Pakistan, targeting Christian women and children. At least 67 dead, 400 injured. I alone can solve Mar 27, 2016	
62. We need to secure our borders ASAP. No games, we must be smart, tough and vigilant. MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN & MAKE AMERICA STRONG AGAIN! Mar 29, 2016	
April 2016 Tweets	April 2016 Tweets
No relevant tweets	/
May 2016 Tweets	May 2016 Tweets
63. Crooked Hillary Clinton wants completely open borders. Millions of Democrats will run from her over this and support me. May 7, 2016	7. Obama administration fails to screen Syrian refugees' social media accounts (a link to a post by washingtontimes.com with the same title) May 28, 2016
64. Crooked Hillary just can't close the deal with Bernie. It will be the same way with ISIS, and China on trade, and Mexico at the border. Bad! May 8, 2016	8. Crooked Hillary Clinton looks presidential? I don't think so! Four more years of Obama and our country will never come back. ISIS LAUGHS! May 20, 2016
65. Senator Lindsey Graham called me yesterday, very much to my surprise, and we had a very interesting talk about national security, and more! May 13, 2016	
66. If Crooked Hillary Clinton can't close the deal on Crazy Bernie, how is she going to take on China, Russia, ISIS and all of the others? May 14, 2016	
67. Looks like yet another terrorist attack. Airplane departed from Paris. When will we get tough, smart and vigilant? Great hate and sickness! May 19, 2016	

68. Crooked Hillary Clinton looks presidential? I don't think so! Four more years of Obama and our country will never come back. ISIS LAUGHS! May 20, 2016 69. Look where the world is today, a total mess, and ISIS is still running around wild. I can fix it fast, Hillary has no chance! May 20, 2016 70. Crooked Hillary has zero imagination and even less stamina. ISIS, China, Russia and all would love for her to be president. Four more years! May 20, 2016 71. Crooked Hillary Clintons foreign interventions unleashed ISIS in Syria, Iraq and Libya. She is reckless and dangerous! May 21, 2016 72. How can Crooked Hillary say she cares about women when she is silent on radical Islam, which horribly oppresses women? May 22, 2016 73. Crooked Hillary wants a radical 500% increase in Syrian refugees. We can't allow this. Time to get smart and protect America! May 22, 2016 74. The American people are sick and tired of not being able to lead normal lives and to constantly be on the lookout for terror and terrorists! May 22, 2016 75. Obama administration fails to screen Syrian refugees' social media accounts (a link to a post by washingtontimes.com with the same title) May 28, 2016	
June 2016 Tweets	June 2016 Tweets
76. See, when I said NATO was obsolete because of no terrorism protection, they made the change without giving me credit. Jun 6, 2016 77. Really bad shooting in Orlando. Police investigating possible terrorism. Many people dead and wounded. Jun 12, 2016 78. Appreciate the congrats for being right on radical Islamic terrorism, I don't want	9. Is President Obama going to finally mention the words radical Islamic terrorism? If he doesn't he should immediately resign in disgrace! Jun 12, 2016 10. Reporting that Orlando killer shouted "Allah hu Akbar!" as he slaughtered clubgoers. 2nd man arrested in LA with rifles. near Gay parade. Jun 12, 2016 11. American must now get very tough, very smart and very vigilant. We cannot admit

congrats, I want toughness & vigilance. We must be smart! Jun 12, 2016

79. Horrific incident in FL. Praying for all the victims & their families. When will this stop? When will we get tough, smart & vigilant? Jun12, 2016

80. Is President Obama going to finally mention the words radical Islamic terrorism? If he doesn't he should immediately resign in disgrace! Jun 12, 2016

81. Reporting that Orlando killer shouted "Allah hu Akbar!" as he slaughtered clubgoers. 2nd man arrested in LA with rifles. near Gay parade. Jun 12, 2016

82. What has happened in Orlando is just the beginning. Our leadership is weak and ineffective. I called it and asked for the ban. Must be tough Jun 12, 2016

83. I have been hitting Obama and Crooked Hillary hard on not using the term Radical Islamic Terror. Hillary just broke-said she would now use! Jun 13, 2016

84. In my speech on protecting America I spoke about a temporary ban, which includes suspending immigration from nations tied to Islamic terror. Jun 13, 2016

85. I thought people weren't celebrating? They were cheering all over, even this savage from Orlando. I was right. Jun 13, 2016

86. Crooked Hillary says we must call on Saudi Arabia and other countries to stop funding hate. I am calling on (link to Facebook post) Jun 13, 2016

87. Saudi Arabia and many of the countries that gave vast amounts of money to the Clinton Foundation (link to Facebook post) Jun 13, 2016

88. American must now get very tough, very smart and very vigilant. We cannot admit people into our country without extraordinary screening. Jun 14, 2016

89. Thank you the LGBT community! I will fight for you while Hillary brings in more people into our country without extraordinary screening. Jun 14, 2016

12. Hillary took money and did favors for regimes that enslave women and murder gays. Jun 21, 2016

13. Crooked Hillary Clinton is totally unfit to be our president- really bad judgements and a temperament, according to new book, which is a mess! Jun 21, 2016

14. Hillary says this election is about judgment. She's right. Her judgement has killed thousands, unleashed ISIS and wrecked the economy. Jun 21, 2016

15. We must suspend immigration from regions linked with terrorism until a proven vetting method is in place. Jun 26, 2016

16. We only want to admit those who love our people and support our values. #AmericaFirst. Jun 26, 2016

17. We must do everything possible to keep this horrible terrorism outside the United States. Jun 28, 2016

people that threaten your freedom and beliefs. June 14, 2016

90. I will be meeting with the NRA, who has endorsed me, about not allowing people on the terrorist watchlist, or the no fly list, to buy guns. Jun 15, 2016

91. People very unhappy with Crooked Hillary and Obama on Jobs and SAFETY! Biggest trade deficit in many years! More attacks will follow Orlando Jun 17, 2016

92. MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN! MAKE AMERICA SAFE AGAIN! Jun 17, 2016

93. When I said that if, within the Orlando club, you had some people with guns, I was obviously talking about additional guards and employees Jun 20, 2016

94. Crooked Hillary Clinton is totally unfit to be our president- really bad judgements and a temperament, according to new book, which is a mess! Jun 21, 2016

95. Hillary says this election is about judgment. She's right. Her judgement has killed thousands, unleashed ISIS and wrecked the economy. Jun 21, 2016

96. Hillary Clinton's open borders immigration policies will drive down wages for all Americans – and make everyone less safe. Jun 21, 2016

97. Hillary took money and did favors for regimes that enslave women and murder gays. Jun 21, 2016

98. ISIS threatens us today because of the decisions Hillary Clinton has made along with President Obama." – Donald J. Trump Jun 23, 2016

99. Obama and Clinton should stop meeting with special interests, & start meeting with the victims of illegal immigration. Jun 23, 2016

100. Hillary Clinton's open borders are tearing American families apart. I am going

to make our country Safe again for all Americans. #Imwithyou Jun 23, 2016 101. Our inner cities have been left behind. We will never have the resources to support our people if we have an open border. Jun 23, 2016 102. On immigration, I'm consulting with our immigration officers & our wage-earners. Hillary Clinton is consulting with Wall Street. Jun 23, 2016 103. We must suspend immigration from regions linked with terrorism until a proven vetting method is in place. Jun 26, 2016 104. We only want to admit those who love our people and support our values. #AmericaFirst. Jun 26, 2016 105. Yet another terrorist attack, this time in Turkey. Will the world ever realize what is going on? So sad. Jun 28, 2016 106. We must do everything possible to keep this horrible terrorism outside the United States. Jun 28, 2016 107. ISIS exploded on Hillary Clinton's watch – she's done nothing about it and never will. Not capable! Jun 29, 2016	
July 2016 Tweets	July 2016 Tweets
108. These crimes won't be happening if I'm elected POTUS. Killer should have never been here. #AmericaFirst. Jul 1, 2016 109. When you can't say it - or see it – you can't fix it. We will MAKE AMERICA SAFE AGAIN! #ImWithYou #AmericaFirst (link to Facebook post) Jul 2, 2016 110. Crooked Hillary will NEVER be able to handle the complexities and danger of ISIS – it will just go on forever. We need change! Jul 4, 2016 111. With Hillary and Obama, the terrorist attacks will only get worse. Politically correct fools, won't even call it what it is – RADICLA ISLAM! Jul 4, 2016 112. Another horrific attack, this time in Nice, France. Many dead and injured. When	18. With Hillary and Obama, the terrorist attacks will only get worse. Politically correct fools, won't even call it what it is – RADICLA ISLAM! Jul 4, 2016 19. Crooked Hillary Clinton wants to flood our country with Syrian immigrants that we know little or nothing about. The danger is massive. NO! Jul 27, 2016 20. When you can't say it - or see it – you can't fix it. We will MAKE AMERICA SAFE AGAIN! #ImWithYou #AmericaFirst (link to Facebook post) Jul 2, 2016

will we learn? It is only getting worse. Jul 14, 2016 113. Crooked Hillary is spending big Wall Street money on ads saying I don't have foreign policy experience, yet look what her policies have done Jul 16, 2016 114. As the days and weeks go by, we see what a total mess our country (and world) is in – Crooked Hillary led Obama into bad decisions! Jul 17, 2016 115. Another attack, this time in Germany. Many killed. God bless the people of Munich. Jul 23, 2016 116. Dems don't want to talk ISIS b/c Hillary's foreign interventions unleashed ISIS and her refugee plans make it easier for them to come here. Jul 26, 2016 117. Hopefully the violent and vicious killing by ISIS of a beloved French priest is causing people to start thinking rationally. Get tough! Jul 27, 2016 118. Crooked Hillary Clinton wants to flood our country with Syrian immigrants that we know little or nothing about. The danger is massive. NO! Jul 27, 2016	
August 2016 Tweets	August 2016 Tweets
119. Hillary, whose decisions have led to the deaths of many, accepted $ from a business linked to ISIS. Silence at CNN. Aug 1, 2016 120. Hillary Clinton raked in money from regimes that horribly oppress women and gays & refuses to speak out Against Radical Islam. Aug 1, 2016 121. When will CNN do a segment on Hillary's plan to increase Syrian refugees 550% and how much it will cost? Aug 1, 2016 122. President Obama refuses to answer questions about Iran terror funding. I won't dodge questions as your president (a link). Aug 5, 2016 123. I am running against the Washington insiders, just as I did in the Republican	21. Hillary, whose decisions have led to the deaths of many, accepted $ from a business linked to ISIS. Silence at CNN. Aug 1, 2016 22. "CLINTON REFUGEE PLAN COULD BRING IN 620,000 REFUGEES IN FIRST TERM AT LIFETIME COST OF OVER $400 BILLION" (a link to sessions. Senate) Aug 15, 2016

September 2016 Tweets	September 2016 Tweets
primaries. These are the people that have made U.S. a mess! Aug 9, 2016	
124. ISIS gained tremendous strength during Hillar y Clinton's term as Secretary of State. When will the dishonest media report the facts! Aug 12, 2016	
125. "CLINTON REFUGEE PLAN COULD BRING IN 620,000 REFUGEES IN FIRST TERM AT LIFETIME COST OF OVER $400 BILLION" (a link to sessions. Senate) Aug 15, 2016	
September 2016 Tweets	September 2016 Tweets
126. Crooked Hillary wants to take your 2nd Amendment rights away. Will guns be taken from her heavily armed Secret Service detail? Maybe not! Sep 17, 2016	23. @HillaryClinton-Obama #ISIS Strategy Has Allowed It To Expand to Become a Global Threat #DebateNight (Link) Sep 27, 2016
127. I would like to express my warmest regards, best wishes and condolences to all of the families and victims of the horrible bombing NYC. Sep 18, 2016	
128. Under the leadership of Obama & Clinton, Americans have experienced more attacks at home than victories abroad. Time to change the playbook! Sep 19, 2016	
129. Terrible attacks in NY, NJ and MN this weekend. Thinking of victims, their families and all Americans! We need to be strong! Sep 19, 2016	
130. Hillary Clinton's weakness while she was Secretary of State, has emboldened terrorists all over the world..cont: (a link to Facebook post, important I have a screenshot). Sep 19, 2016	
131. Crooked Hillary has been fighting ISIS, or whatever she has been doing, for years. Now she has new ideas. It is time for change. Sep 20, 2016	
132. The situations in Tulsa and Charlotte are tragic. We must come together to make America sage again. Sep 21, 2016	
133. Hopefully the violence and unrest in Charlotte will come to an immediate end. To	

those injured, get well soon. We need unity & leadership. Sep 21, 2016	
134. Five people killed in Washington State by a Middle Eastern immigrant. Many people died this weekend in Ohio from drug overdoses. N.C. riots! Sep 26, 2016	
135. Hillary Clinton is the only candidate on stage who voted for the Iraq war. #Debates 2016 #MAGA (link). Sep 27, 2016	
136. @HillaryClinton-Obama #ISIS Strategy Has Allowed It To Expand to Become a Global Threat #DebateNight (Link) Sep 27, 2016	
October 2016 Tweets	October 2016 Tweets
137. A country that Crooked Hillary says has funded ISIS also gave Wild Bill $1 million for his birthday? SO CORRUPT! Oct 16, 2016	24. ISIS has infiltrated countries all over Europe by posing as refugees, and @HillaryClinton will allow it to happen here, too! #BigLeagueTruth. Oct 20, 2016
138. Thank you Colorado Springs. If I'm elected President I am going to keep Radical Islamic Terrorists out of our country! #DrainTheSwamp. Oct 18, 2016	25. @HillaryClinton has been a foreign policy DISASTER for the American people. I will #MakeAmericaStrongAgain #Debate #BigLeagueTruth Oct 20, 2016
139. #DrainTheSwamp Oct 19, 2016	26. 'Clinton Charity Got Up To $56 Million From Nations That Are Anti-Women, Gays' #CrookedHillary. Oct 24, 2016
140. Plain & Simple: We should only admit into this country those who share our VALUES and RESPECT our people. Oct 20, 2016	27. Hillary has called for 550% more Syrian immigrants, but won't even mention "radical Islamic terrorists." #Debate #BigLeagueTruth Oct 20, 2016
141. Hillary has called for 550% more Syrian immigrants, but won't even mention "radical Islamic terrorists." #Debate #BigLeagueTruth Oct 20, 2016	28. Plain & Simple: We should only admit into this country those who share our VALUES and RESPECT our people. Oct 20, 2016
142. @HillaryClinton- you have failed, failed, and failed. #BigLeagueTheTruth Time to #DrainTheSwamp! Oct 20, 2016	
143. @HillaryClinton has been a foreign policy DISASTER for the American people. I will #MakeAmericaStrongAgain #Debate #BigLeagueTruth Oct 20, 2016	
144. I opposed going into Iraq. Hillary voted for it. As with everything else she's supported, it was a DISASTER. (link) Oct 20, 2016	

145. After Crooked @HillaryClinton allowed ISIS to rise, she now claims she'll defeat them? LAUGHABLE! Here's my plan: (Link) Oct 20, 2016
146. I WILL DEFEAT ISIS. THEY HAVE BEEN AROUND TOO LONG! What has our leadership been doing? #DrainTheSwamp. Oct 20, 2016
147. ISIS has infiltrated countries all over Europe by posing as refugees, and @HillaryClinton will allow it to happen here, too! #BigLeagueTruth. Oct 20, 2016
148. If elected POTUS – I will stop RADICAL ISLAMIC TERRORISM in this country! In order to do this, we need to #DrainTheSwamp! Oct 20, 2016
149. Crooked Hillary Clinton Tops Middle East Forum's 'Islamist Money List' (link, he quoted the title) Oct 22, 2016
150. 'Clinton Charity Got Up To $56 Million From Nations That Are Anti-Women, Gays' #CrookedHillary. Oct 24, 2016
151. Wow, just came out on secret tape that Crooked Hillary wants to take in as many Syrians as possible. We cannot let this happen - ISIS! Oct 24, 2016
152. Crooked Hillary launched her political career by letting terrorists off the hook. #DrainTheSwamp (Link). Oct 27, 2016
153. Thank you Geneva, Ohio. If I am elected president, I am going to keep RADICAL ISLAMIC TERRORISTS OUT of our country! #MakeAmericaSafeAgain. Oct 28, 2016

Table 4.8 The collected and selected tweets from Trump's Twitter

4.6 My research in eight steps

In this section, I explain how I adhered to the eight steps of the DHA (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p.34) I mentioned in section 4.3 above.

- Activation and consultation of preceding theoretical knowledge

Literature on the representation of Muslims reveals that American orientalists produced an extensive knowledge promoting the inferiority of Muslims to Americans (see section 3.3 in chapter three for more details on Orientalism) since World War II (Saïd, 1978; 2003). Muslims are frequently associated with terrorism and perceived as security threats (Saïd, 1980, Alsultany, 2013; Abdullah, 2015). After the terrorist attack that happened in Paris (France) in November 2015, Trump centred his campaign discourse on Muslim immigration, particularly on terrorism, vigilance, and policing. He called for banning Muslim immigrants, and he suggested surveilling Muslims and mosques in the US. I seek to explore how Trump represents Muslims and if his representation can be considered orientalist, islamophobic and racist. It is usually right-wing populists who oppose immigration. Thus, I also seek to find out if his discourse is right-wing populist.

- Systematic collection of data

I considered the whole presidential campaign, i.e., from June 2015 till November 2016. I collected 50 texts on Muslim immigration, particularly on terrorism, vigilance, and policing from a variety of genres: campaign rallies, TV interviews, statements, ads and tweets. These genres belong to different fields of political action: TV interviews, tweets and statement can be included in the field of the formation of public attitudes, opinions and will, Trump's campaign speeches and ad belong to the field of political advertising (see sub-section 2.4.1 in chapter two for more details on genres and fields of action).

- Selection and preparation of data for specific analyses

Discourse on Muslim immigration, particularly on terrorism, vigilance, and policing proved to be dominant since the Paris attack. Thus, I selected a timeline of twelve months from November 2015 to October 2016 and selected 18 texts (5 campaign rallies, 11 TV interviews, one statement, and one campaign ad). Because of the word limit in Twitter, 250 character per tweet, Trump posts many tweets to cover the sub-topics he discusses in interviews and campaign rallies. I collected 153 tweets and selected 28 tweets in which Trump clearly refers to the sub-topics discussed in the selected campaign rallies and interviews. Trump proposes his policies

in campaign rallies, but he discusses them extensively during interviews. Thus, I have more interviews than campaign rallies in my database.

- Specification of the research questions and the formulation of assumptions

I formulated the following research questions:

RQ1: how are Muslims represented in Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration?

Sub-RQ1: to what extent is Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration orientalist, islamophobic, and racist, and how does his representation of Muslims link to Right-win Populism?

RQ2: how are President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidates Clinton and Trump represented in Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration?

Sub-RQ2: how do the representations of President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidates Clinton and Trump link to Right-win Populism?

I assume that Trump represents Muslims as security threats. I assume that Trump's engages in negative presentation of President Obama and the Secretary of State Clinton to legitimise his policy proposals against Muslims, and he criticises his opponent Clinton to positively represent himself and attract electorates. I assume that Trump's discourse is islamophobic because it conflates the Muslims with terrorists; it is discriminatory because it targets an entire religious group, and it is right-wing populist because he opposes Muslim immigration by constructing Muslims as a threatening 'Other' (Wodak, 2015).

- Qualitative pilot analysis

I selected Trump's 'Muslim Travel Ban Statement' for a pilot analysis (see appendix one for the transcript of the statement).

> 1.Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country's representatives can figure out what is going on.

In extract (1), Trump collectivises and classifies Muslims according to their religious identity. The nomination '*Muslims*' specifies religion, but it is not evaluative. Trump proposed the ban as a reaction to the San Bernardino terrorist attack which happened on the 2nd of December 2015. This means that Trump conflates Muslims with terrorists. The adjectives 'total' and

'complete' conventionally imply that he conflates all Muslims with terrorism and considers them as security threats. The nomination Muslims becomes evaluative because Trump links it to terrorism.

> 2. According to Pew Research, among others, there is great hatred towards Americans by large segments of the Muslim population.

> 3. A poll from the Center for Security Policy released data…that violence against Americans here in the United States…

In extracts (2) and (3), Trump activates Muslims through the circumstantial 'by' and passivates Americans through the circumstantials 'towards' and 'against.' He represents Muslims as violent people and Americans as the victims of violence and hate. He refers to 'Pew Research' and the 'Center for Security Policy' as topoi of authority to justify the attributions of violence and hate. The center for security policy is known for its anti-Muslim stance and islamophobic statements (Patel, 2017). Through the expression '*beyond comprehension*' in extract (4), Trump emphasises that the feeling of hatred against Americans is intense (intensification).

> 4.…it is obvious to anybody the hatred is beyond comprehension.

> 5. Shariah authorizes such atrocities as murder against non-believers who won't convert, beheadings and more unthinkable acts that pose great harm to Americans, especially women.

In extract (5), by the verbal process 'authorise', Trump claims that Sharia allows violence against non-Muslims, especially if they are 'Americans.' Violence is expressed by the words 'murder', 'beheadings' and 'atrocities.' He excludes who it authorises, but it can be inferred that he means it authorises its followers, Muslims. He means that Sharia gives consent to Muslims to violently oppress non-Muslims especially if they are 'Americans.' The prepositional circumstantials with 'against' and 'to' activate Muslims and construct them as victimisers. He constructs non-Muslims, especially 'Americans', as the victims of Muslims. By the adverb 'especially', he claims that women are the community mostly targeted by Sharia. 'More unthinkable acts' is a hyperbolic expression emphasising that Sharia allows more than beheadings. He does not specify the acts, but the adjective 'unthinkable' implies barbarism.

All in all, Trump refers to Muslims as a collective and represents them as violent religious extremists (essentialist representation). By pointing to Sharia, he claims that Muslims learn extremism from Islam. He employs the 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) because he represents Muslims as security threats. By suggesting the ban, he engages in 'Border Politics' (ibid) and appeals to protection, i.e., he represents himself as the saviour of non-Muslim

Americans from Muslims. Trump's discourse is orientalist and islamophobic because it associates Muslims to terrorism and represents them as security threats. It is discriminatory because it targets an entire religious group. In this thesis, I consider racism an ideology of inferiorisation and 'Othering' (as per Anthias, 1995), thus I argue that Trump's discourse is racist because it denigrates Muslims and positions them as the 'Other.'

- Detailed case studies

The analysis of the selected data indicates that Trump represents the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries and Muslim Americans as violent religious extremists. He adopts the right-wing populist style known as 'the Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) because he represents Muslims immigrating from Muslim-majority countries and Muslim Americans as threats to the security and 'cultural values' of non-Muslim Americans. He represents 'the Obama-Clinton administration' as the source of these threats. He represents his opponent Clinton as an extension of 'the Obama-Clinton administration' arguing that she supports the admission of Muslim immigrants. He engages in 'Border Politics' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.), i.e., he suggests measures to restrict Muslim immigration such as 'the Muslim Travel Ban', to differentiate himself from 'the Obama-Clinton administration' and Clinton potential future administration and represent himself as the saviour and the protector of non-Muslim Americans from Muslims (see chapters five and six for the analysis).

- Formulation of critique

This thesis criticises the discourse of inferiority, violence, and insecurity Trump employs to represent Muslims as violent and uncivilised 'Other.' Trump's discourse resulted in anti-Muslim bias incidents in the US (CAIR, 2017). Many Muslim-Americans experienced harassment, intimidation, bullying and hate crimes (ibid). They also witnessed anti-mosque incidents and experienced discrimination in employment (ibid).

- Application of the detailed analytical results

Reisigl and Wodak (2001) explain the two different roles that critical discourse analysts can play when analysing racist discourse (p.2). They can pursue anti-racist strategies by trying 'to describe, socio-diagnostically, the actual anti-racist discursive practices and their efficiency or inefficiency' or they can 'act politically and participate in the fight against racism and discrimination, they may engage in civil society and express a perspective critique that aims at optimising anti-racist policy' (ibid). In this thesis, I provide some guidelines for a non-discriminatory language use, but I put a particular emphasis on the rhetoric of generalisation

and essentialism Trump employs to represent Muslims (see sub-section 5.3 in chapter five). Trump refers to Muslims as a collective to essentialise them as violent and uncivilised people. Social groups can never be homogenous (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) and the rhetoric of generalisation 'only serves reinforcing and perpetuating dangerous stereotypes' (ibid). The latter can have dangerous consequences such as 'negative sentiments, dread or hatred of Islam that includes multi-form discrimination against Muslims, manifested into the exclusion of Muslims around the world from economic, social, and public life' (OIC Observatory Report, 2017, p.6).

4.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have summarised the analytical categories that the DHA (2001b) suggests for the analysis of the discursive representation of social actors, namely nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivisation, and mitigation and intensification. The DHA incorporates van Leeuwen's (1996) analytical categories, viz. the categories of exclusion, inclusion, suppression, backgrounding, passivation, categorisation, assimilation, collectivisation, aggregation, impersonalisation, abstraction and objectivation (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, pp.46-47). For this reason, I have explained van Leeuwen's (1996) analytical categories, and I have highlighted the ones selected for this study. I have also explained the procedures for data collection and selection.

In chapters five, I will employ the methods of the DHA, namely nomination, predication, and argumentation, to analyse how Trump represents Muslims. I will employ the same methods in chapter six to find out how Trump represents 'the Obama-Clinton administration', the presidential candidate Clinton and himself. The methods of nomination, predication, and argumentation are complementary; thus, I will deal with them simultaneously rather than individually. First, I will try to identify the actors included in the selected texts. Then, I will try to find out how they are nominated. I will always analyse the nominations with the actions and qualities they are associated with, to find out if a positive or negative presentation develops, and the (sound or fallacious) arguments used to justify a given nomination, quality, or action. When I analyse the nominations, predications, and arguments, I will always try to find the ones that are repeated and exaggerated and interpret why some nominations, actions are arguments are selected instead of other available choices.

5. The representation of non-American Muslims, Muslim and non-Muslim Americans

5.1 Introduction

The analysis of the selected data indicates that Trump talks about four main social groups: the Muslims and non-Muslims of Muslim-majority countries and the Muslims and non-Muslims who live in the US. Trump generally refers to Muslims in the US by the nominations 'Muslims', 'Muslim community' or their corresponding plural pronoun 'they.' These nominations do not indicate legal status, i.e., they do not specify if Trump refers to undocumented or documented Muslim immigrants, naturalised or unnaturalised immigrants, or refugees or Muslims born in the US, etc. However, Trump's references to second and third generations of immigrants imply that he refers to Muslims who live in the US long term. In this study, I use the nomination Muslim Americans to refer to Muslims who live in the US long term regardless of their legal status. Trump refers to non-Muslims in the US by 'Americans.' This implies that he means that Muslims cannot be Americans. I will use the nominations Muslim Americans when I refer to Muslims in the US and non-Muslim Americans when I refer to non-Muslims in the US to emphasise my objection to Trump's classification of Muslims by religion and non-Muslims by nationality. I oppose this classification, because, first, according to the Fourteenth Amendment, people can be Americans regardless of their origins, skin colour, ethnicity or religion (U.S. Constitution); and second, according to the First Amendment, which states that 'congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof'(ibid), the US supports freedom of religion, so Americans can belong to any religious group.

This chapter will present the main representational strategies Trump employs to represent non-American Muslims, Muslim and non-Muslim Americans. It aims to answer RQ1 and sub-RQ1, i.e., RQ1: how are Muslims represented in Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration? and sub-RQ1: to what extent is Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration orientalist, islamophobic, and racist, and how does his representation of Muslims link to Right-win Populism? Trump provides an extensive derogatory portrayal of the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries and Muslim Americans to position them as the 'Other.' Then, he differentiates them from non-Muslim Americans. The latter are described positively and positioned as the 'Self.' Accordingly, in sub-section 5.2.1, I will consider the representation of the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries. In the same sub-

section, I will also consider the representation of non-Muslims to highlight how Trump represents them as the oppressed minority. In sub-section 5.2.2, I will focus on the portrayal of Muslim Americans and non-Muslim Americans, i.e., I combined the analysis of the representations of Muslim Americans and non-Muslim Americans to highlight the comparisons Trump establishes between them. I present the analysis in this order because, in almost all the data, Trump first talks about the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries; he moves to speak about Muslim Americans and emphasise their similarity to the Muslim residents of Muslim-majority countries; he then differentiates non-Muslim Americans from Muslim Americans (any difference established between non-Muslim Americans and Muslim Americans is also meant to differentiate non-Muslim Americans from the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries).

5.2 Nomination, predication, and argumentation analysis

Some nominations may perform evaluative and judgmental meanings on their own (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.45). That is, they maybe predications (ibid). Some nominations may be non-evaluative on their own (ibid). Therefore, their predicates will indicate if a positive or negative evaluation takes place (ibid). Nomination and predication strategies are complementary and hard to separate (ibid). Sound or fallacious argumentation may be used to defend a positive or a negative evaluation (ibid). For this reason, I combined the analysis of referential, predicational and argumentation strategies. The nomination and predication analysis of the selected texts show that Trump represents the Muslim residents of Muslim-majority countries and Muslim Americans as two similar social groups. He positions them as the 'Other.' Also, he distinguishes them from non-Muslim Americans. He positions the latter as the 'Self.' This chapter will highlight the linguistic tools Trump employs to realise similarity, differentiation, and the binary division of 'Self' versus 'Other' and the topoi and/or fallacies he utilises to defend the binary division of 'Self' versus 'Other.' I will italicise the terms that indicate the analytical categories I use to analyse the selected data. In sub-section 4.5.2 in chapter four, I explained that the selected texts are intertextually linked because Trump refers to the same actors, events, examples, and arguments in almost all the data. I acknowledge that the extracts discussed in this chapter and chapter six belong to different texts, but they are interrelated.

5.2.1 The Muslims and the non-Muslims of Muslim-majority countries

In table 5.1 below, I summarise the main nominations Trump uses to refer to the Muslim and non-Muslim residents of Muslim-majority countries. I also provide the numbers of the extracts where I found the nominations.

The residents of Muslim-majority countries	Referential strategies and extracts numbers
The nominations of Muslim residents of Muslim-majority countries	Entire countries in the Middle East (1), Islamic laws (1), they (1), the Middle East (2) and (6), fundamentalist teachings (2), many countries overseas (4), Sharia (5), refugee flows (9)
The nominations of non-Muslim residents of Muslim-majority countries	Christian women (3) (Christian) children (3) and non-believers (4)
The nominations of Americans residing in Muslim-majority countries	Americans (5) and people (6)

Table 5.1 The nominations of the residents of Muslim-majority countries

The table 5.1 above shows that Trump *ref*ers to the residents of Muslim-majority countries metonymically by pointing to the 'Middle East', i.e., *spatialisation* (extract 1). He *refers* to Muslim residents metonymically by pointing to 'Islamic laws' (extract 1), 'fundamentalist teachings' (extract 2) and 'Sharia' (extract 5). Islamic laws or Sharia mean laws 'based on the Qur'an and the Sunna…that provides a blueprint for proper conduct in accordance with God's revelations' (Green, 2015, p.16). Pointing to Islamic laws, he implies their adherents, i.e., Muslims. He also implies that the countries he refers to are 'middle eastern' Muslim-majority countries. Seemingly, Trump *impersonalises* 'middle eastern' Muslims through *objectivation*, i.e., he refers to them metonymically by reference to Muslim-majority countries (*spatialisation*) and religion (*classification*). Trump's metonymic references are neither *deprecatory/negative* nor *appreciative/positive*, i.e., they refer to 'middle eastern' Muslims, and sometimes they specify their religion, but they do not evaluate them. However, predicational analysis (which will be discussed in the rest of this sub-section) shows that Trump attributes violent actions to 'middle eastern' Muslims such as the killings of Muslim women (extract 2), Christian women and children (extract 3), non-believers (extract 4), and Christian Americans (extracts 5 and 6). He represents Muslim residents as oppressors of women (Muslim and non-Muslim women) and non-Muslim minorities. Trump's neutral metonymic references are associated with *negative qualities* such as misogyny and sexism, violence, and religious extremism. I put the term 'Middle East' and the adjective 'middle eastern' in inverted commas

because Trump refers to the 'Middle East,' but he provides examples from countries that are not 'middle eastern' such as Pakistan (see extract 2 and 3). This implies that by the 'Middle East', he means both 'middle eastern' and non- 'middle eastern' Muslim-majority countries.

Trump acknowledges that 'middle eastern' Muslim-majority countries have Muslim and non-Muslim residents. He *refers* to certain groups of non-Muslims by 'Christian women' and (Christian) children in extract (3) and 'non-believers' in extracts (4) and (5). He *refers* to non-Muslim Americans by 'Americans' in extract (5) and 'people' in extract (6). The *nominations* of non-Muslims and Christian Americans are *non-evaluative*. That is, they have the attributes of religion and nationality, but they do not signal a negative or positive representation. However, predicational analysis shows that Trump represents them as the victims of misogyny and sexism, violence, and religious extremism. Seemingly, Trump adopts the strategy of *victim-victimiser*. In the rest of this sub-section, I will present the actions and qualities Trump assigns to 'middle eastern' Muslims to construct them as misogynistic and sexist people and religious extremists and non-Muslims, particularly Christian Americans, as the victims. That is, I will analyse how he positions 'middle eastern' Muslims as *the victimiser 'Other'* and non-Muslim minorities as *the victimised 'Self.'*

> 1. Entire countries in the Middle East living under Islamic law and they engaged in the worst kind of violent oppression, and now we have them coming into our country. Greensboro CR

The circumstance of location 'in the middle East' in extract (1), metonymically *refers* to 'middle eastern' people. The adjective 'entire' *conventionally implies* that Trump *collectivises* 'middle eastern' countries/ 'middle eastern' people. He states that 'middle eastern' countries and their residents are governed according to Islamic law, i.e., Sharia, and through the material process 'engage', he *activates* and describes them as violent oppressors. The *inclusion* of the detail that they live under Sharia *conversationally implies* three possible meanings, i.e., he *refers* to 'middle eastern' Muslim-majority countries/ 'middle eastern' Muslims, Muslim-majority countries do not have secular governments (Islam is the religion of the state), and Islam is the source of violence. He ambiguously *associates* Islam and Islamic countries to violence. He only assumes that Muslims are violent oppressors because he neither specifies the acts of violence he refers to nor provides arguments to justify the attribute of violence. In the same extract, through the material process 'come', he states that Muslims are admitted to the US to appeal to fear of insecurity. In extract (1), he *radically excludes* the victims of the assumed Muslims' violence. In extract (2), he uses the same circumstance of location as in

extract (1), i.e., 'in the Middle East', *to collectivise* 'middle eastern' countries and points again to Islamic teachings to show that he refers to Muslim-majority countries/the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries. Unlike extract (1), extract (2) *specifies* Muslim women as the victims of the assumed Muslims' violence.

> 2. In the Middle East (…) the horrible practice of honor killings, where women are murdered by their relatives for dressing, marrying or acting in a way that violates fundamentalist teachings. Over 1,000 Pakistani girls are estimated to be the victims of honor killings by their relatives each year. Recently, a prominent Pakistani social media star was strangled to death by her brother on the charge of dishonoring the family. In his confession, the brother took pride in the murder and said: "Girls are born to stay home and follow traditions." Youngstown CR

In extract (2), Trump points to honour killings in Muslim-majority countries. The latter mean acts of violence or murders committed against females by male relatives for dishonouring the family (Debabrata, 2018, n.p.). Women can be the targets of honour killings for a variety of reasons such as refusing an arranged marriage, asking for divorce (even from an abusive husband) and adultery (ibid). Men can also be the victims of honour killings (ibid). The word 'relative' in extract (2), *conventionally implies* that there is a kinship relationship between the doers of honour killings and the victims (this is what van Leeuwen (1996, p.56) refers to as *relational identification*), but it *excludes* the gender of the doers. The gender is not *radically excluded*; it is only *backgrounded*. That is, it can be inferred from the word 'brother' later on that the doers are male relatives. The material processes 'murder' and 'strangle' *activate* the relatives and the brother of the victim and engage them in violence against women. The use of these two material processes instead of the material process 'kill' *intensifies* violence and convey brutality against women. Trump draws upon the *topos of example* since he refers to Pakistan to justify that honour killings happen in Muslim-majority countries. He uses 'guilt by association' (Green, 2015, p.21), i.e., using a situation in which an individual Muslim is judged to have behaved badly as an illustrative example to condemn all Muslims (The Runnymede Trust, 1997, p.5), to generalise honour killings to Muslim-majority countries. However, generalising violence against women to the entire 'Middle East' based on honour killings in one country, Pakistan, is not a valid argument; this is a *fallacy of hasty generalisation/secundum quid*. Trump's example and number cannot even be used as an argument to say that all Pakistani people support honour killings. I am aware that honour killings happen and exist, but it is fallacious to attribute honour killings and violence against

women to all Muslims or an entire Muslim country. Generalisations perpetuate the orientalist stereotype that all Muslims are violent, sexist, and misogynistic (Saïd, 1978/1995/2003, p.207).

Trump employs a *topos of consequence* to emphasise some of the reasons of honour killings. The topos can be paraphrased as follows: if women refuse to marry or dress according to Sharia or if they reject Islamic traditions, such as refusing to stay at home, they will be killed by male relatives. I must acknowledge that there are Muslim women who are oppressed; there are Muslims who do not respect women' rights or countries that restrict women' rights, but Trump should not generalise that all Muslim countries or all Muslims oppress women. These *hasty generalisations* reinforce the orientalist stereotypes of misogyny and sexism (Saïd, 1978;1995;2003, p.207). By focusing on women' oppression, Trump claims that Islamic societies favour men over women. He attributes the qualities of misogyny and sexism to Islamic societies and men. He reproduces the orientalist stereotype that the Muslim-majority countries are exclusively male provinces with sexist blinders (Saïd, 1978;1995;2003, p.207) and implicitly reproduces the islamophobic view that they are inferior to the West, i.e., they are 'barbaric, irrational, and sexist, in contrast to the civilized, enlightened, and gender-equal West' (Green, 2015, p.14).

> 3. Another radical Islamic attack, this time in Pakistan, targeting Christian women and children. At least 67 dead, 400 injured. Tweet Mar 27, 2016

In extract (2), Trump emphasises violence against Muslim women. In example (3), he *includes* the religious identity and the gender of the victims 'Christian women' to emphasise violence against non-Muslim women. The adjective 'Islamic' *conventionally implies* that the terrorist is a Muslim. By *including* the country of the terrorist 'Pakistan'(*spatialisation*), he *specifies* that the terrorist is a Pakistani Muslim and the attack happened in a Muslim-majority country. The attacker is *activated* through the material process 'target.' Material processes such as 'kill' are not utilised, but they are implied through the adjective 'dead.' He represents Christian women as *passive victims* of violent oppression. Trump *classifies* the victimiser and the victims by religion. The victimiser is a Pakistani Muslim (religious identity is *conventionally implied* through the adjective 'Islamic'), and the victims are Christian women (religious identity and gender are *conventionally implied* through the adjective 'Christian' and the noun 'women'). By this *classification*, he shows that the attack is committed by a Muslim against non-Muslims and emphasises not only misogyny but also religious oppression, i.e., intolerance of religious differences. By the determiner 'another' and the adverb 'this time', he *conventionally implies* that the attack in Pakistan is only one example, i.e., he implies that other attacks took place in

other Muslim-majority countries. He is ambiguous because he does not give examples of some of these previous attacks and does not specify the countries where they happened. He avoids specification to *generalise* misogyny and religious oppression to other Muslim-majority countries. He moves from attributing misogyny and religious oppression to one Muslim-majority country, Pakistan, to attributing it to other Muslim-majority countries. He *evaluates* Muslims as misogynistic people and violent religious extremists because he claims that they are hostile to women and non-Muslims. He generalises violence to all Muslims because of an attack that happened in Pakistan, i.e., Pakistan is the only country he points to defend the qualities of misogyny and religious oppression he attributes to Muslim-majority countries. Once again, he relies on *the fallacy of hasty generalisation/ secundum quid* to defend the attribution of misogyny and religious oppression. Maybe there are some Muslims who are hostile to and violent against non-Muslim women, but this does not mean that all Muslims are hostile to or violent against non-Muslim women. To avoid these *hasty generalisations*, Trump should not conflate the actions of a minority of Muslims with the majority. In example (3) he refers to violent oppression by claiming violence against Christians. In extracts (4) and (5), he further emphasises religious oppression by claiming violence against all non-Muslims.

4. In many countries overseas, non-believers face the death penalty. Fort Myers CR

In the Fort Myers campaign rally, Trump discusses Islam, and by 'overseas countries,' he refers to Muslim-majority countries. Through an implicit *topos of consequence*, he emphasises that the punishment of non-Muslims in Muslim-majority countries is death. The topos can be paraphrased as follows: If you are a non-Muslim in Muslim-majority countries, you will be killed. His claim is ambiguous as it does not specify which countries he is referring to. Trump only employs the determiner 'many' to emphasise a large number of countries and *intensify* violent oppression against non-Muslims in Muslim-majority countries. He emphasises that non-Muslims are punished by death. He *excludes* who punishes them, but the word 'penalty' *conventionally implies* that the killing of non-Muslims is a governmental law. It also implies that Muslim-majority countries oppose freedom of religion; in this case, reject secularism. Muslim majority countries may govern according to Sharia, but this does not mean they restrict religious freedom for non-Muslims.

Trump *excludes* the constitutional right of freedom of religion established in many Muslim-majority countries to appeal to human rights. He employs an implicit *topos of humanitarianism* which can be paraphrased as follows: the law of Islam as the religion of the state should be

opposed as it prohibits free exercise of religion for non-Muslims and justify violence against them. However, his topos is fallacious as Trump excludes that many Muslim-countries support freedom of religion. I argue that he attributes sexism and misogyny and violent religious extremism to Muslim-majority countries to claim that governing according to Islam results in negative outcomes. In sub-section 5.2.2, I will show that he claims that, unlike Islamic governments, secular governments support tolerance and freedom. In the TBS and the Mt Pleasant CR, Trump unjustifiably claims that Islam allows violence against women and non-believers.

> 5. Sharia authorizes such atrocities as murder against non-believers who won't convert, beheadings, and more unthinkable acts that pose great harm to Americans, especially women. TBS & Mt Pleasant CR

In extract (5), Trump points to Sharia, and claims, through the verbal process 'authorise,' that it allows violence against non-Muslims, especially against non-Muslim Americans, and women. Violent oppression is *conventionally implied* by the words 'murder', 'beheadings' and 'atrocities.' By the adjective *'unthinkable'*, he stresses that Sharia allows more than beheadings to *intensify* violence and convey barbarism. He *excludes* whom it authorises, but it can be inferred that it authorises its followers, i.e., Muslims, or governments of Muslim-majority countries. He claims that Sharia gives consent to Muslims or governments of Muslim-majority countries to violently oppress non-Muslims, particularly non-Muslim Americans, and women. He *activates* Muslims and governments of Muslim-majority countries through the prepositional circumstantials with 'against' and 'to' to construct them as victimisers. He *passivates* non-Muslims, particularly non-Muslim Americans, and women and constructs them as the victims. Pointing to women, he *conversationally implies* that Sharia and Islam allow violence against women or misogyny and sexism stem from Sharia. To further emphasise religious oppression, in extract (6) Trump claims that Christian Americans are oppressed in Muslim-majority countries.

> 6. We have people whose heads are being chopped off in the Middle East because they're Christian, and for other reasons. They're being dumped and drowned in sealed cages. Mt Pleasant CR

The plural pronoun *'We'* in extract (6) *refers* to the US. The attributive relational process 'have' conveys that there are American people who live in the 'Middle East.' These American people are *identified* by their religion, Christianity. Trump claims violence against Christian Americans through the material processes 'chop off', 'dump' and 'drown.' The use of passive

voice *conceals* the actors of these actions, but it can be easily inferred from the text that Trump refers to Muslims. The three mentioned material processes *activate* Muslims and engage them in violence and *passivate* Christian Americans and presents them as the victims of violence. Trump employs a *causal topos* to emphasise that the reason of violence is religion. The topos can be paraphrased as follows: Trump claims that American people are violently treated in Muslim-majority countries because they are Christians. He *conversationally implies* that Muslims are religious extremists because they do not support religious freedom; they do not respect people from other religion, and they do not tolerate religious differences. He does not specify the countries he refers to. He *collectivises* Muslim-majority countries by referring to them by the 'Middle East.' This is how he *fallaciously generalises* violence against Christians and religious oppression to Muslim-majority countries. Trump *includes* acts of violence he claims are committed against Christian Americans, but he does not mention that the US invaded many 'middle eastern' countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq to *exclude* the acts of violence committed against Muslims in these invaded countries. He *emphasises* violence against Christian Americans and *deemphasises* violence against Muslims. *Deemphasising negative things* about 'Us' and *emphasising negative things* about 'Them' (van Dijk, 2008, p.105) to legitimise exploitation or violence is an ingredient of racist discourse (ibid, 1997b).

> 7.According to Pew Research, 99% of people in Afghanistan support oppressive Sharia Law. We admit many more from other countries in the region who share these same oppressive views. Manchester CR

In extract (1), Trump unjustifiably makes an implicit *association* between Islam and violence. In extract (5) below, Trump explicitly *evaluates* Sharia as oppressive, i.e., he claims that it encourages violence against non-Muslims and women and implicitly describes Muslims as religious extremists. Though extract (7) is taken from a different text, by oppressive sharia laws, he *conversationally implies* the claims of the killings of non-believers and women, i.e., he implicitly claims religious extremism and misogyny. Afghanistan is an example Trump uses to emphasise that Muslims support Sharia laws, which he claims are oppressive laws. Trump refers to Pew Research as an authority to defend his claim. The *topos of authority* can be explained as follows: Pew Research, an authority, *evaluates* Pakistani people are oppressive, so people may think that this evaluation is true. In the same extract, Trump employs a *topos of similarity*. He claims that other 'middle eastern' Muslim-majority countries are similar to Afghanistan. Similarity is expressed through the verb 'share.' This is a *hasty generalisation/ secundum quid,* and it can be paraphrased as follows: Afghans are Muslims; Afghans are religious extremists; like Afghans, all 'middle eastern' Muslims are religious extremists. This

is how Trump moves from *specification* to *generalisation*. Trump employs the strategy of *negative other-presentation*. He *evaluates* Muslims as violent people against women (extracts 2 and 3), so he describes them as misogynistic people. He also *evaluates* them as violent people against non-Muslims (extracts 5 and 6), particularly Christian Americans, so he describes the as religious oppressors. He claims that they acquire violence from Islam to represent them as religious extremists. To justify this negative presentation, in the Youngstown CR, Trump employs a *topos of authority* i.e., he points to Pew Polling.

> 8. Pew polling shows that in many of the countries from which we draw large numbers of immigrants, extreme views about religion – such as the death penalty for those who leave the faith – are commonplace. Youngstown CR

The expression 'extreme views about religion' in extract (8) is synonymous to religious extremism. Unlike extract (7), Trump explicitly presents Muslims as religious extremists. He *conversationally implies* the claim of the killings of non-believers. He claims that many Muslim-majority countries (by which he metonymically *refers* to Muslims) support religious extremism. He employs a *topos of authority* to justify his claim. The topos can be paraphrased as follows: people may think that Trump's claim is right because Pew Polling (an authority) says that it is right. Trump is vague and ambiguous because he does not specify the countries he refers to. Vagueness and the determiner 'many' *intensify* religious extremism.

 In extracts (7) and (8), Trump represents Muslims as religious extremists. In both extracts, the plural pronoun 'we' *refers* to the US. The latter is *activated* in terms of admitting Muslims by the material processes 'admit' and 'draw.' He expresses a *topos of threat and danger* through an implicit *topos of consequence*. That is, by *including* the detail that the US admits Muslims, he *conversationally implies* the consequences of their admission: if women and non-believers, particularly Christians, are the targets of Muslims in Muslim-majority countries, they will be the targets of Muslim immigrants in the US, or if women and non-believers, particularly Christians, are oppressed in Muslim-majority countries, they will be oppressed in the US. He implicitly constructs Muslim immigrants as a threat to the security of American women and non-believers. He adopts a right-wing populist style, i.e., he employs the *'Polics of Fear'* (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) to represent Muslims as a threat to non-Muslim Americans, particularly women. He fallaciously appeals to the fear of non-Muslim Americans and encourages fear of Muslims, in particular fear of Muslim-Americans (see sub-section 5.2.2 below for the representation of Muslim-Americans and non-Muslim Americans).

9. ISIS is trying to infiltrate refugee flows into Europe and the United States. Youngstown CR

10. They're likelihood of being recruited into the terror at some later date, which is going to happen in many, many cases. Youngstown CR

In the Youngstown campaign rally, by 'refugees', Trump refers to Syrian refugees. By the material process 'infiltrate', he *conventionally implies* that terrorists pose as refugees to enter to the 'West.' He refers to the 'West' by the *association* of the US and Europe through the conjunction 'and.' He *conversationally implies* that the 'West' is the target of terrorism. In extract (10), he *conventionally implies* that if ISIS fail to enter as refugees, they will recruit refugees once in the 'West.' Trump *intensifies* the number of ISIS terrorists trying to infiltrate by the metaphor 'refugee flows' in extract (9) and the number of refugees that will join ISIS through the determiner 'many' in extract (10). He links Syrian refugees to ISIS to construct them as security threats. He employs the *'Polics of Fear'* (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) because he represents Syrian refugees as security threats. In sub-section 5.2.2, I will analyse the representational strategies Trump employs to associate the Syrian refugees admitted to the US to terrorism.

11. Tremendous money is pouring into ISIS and other terrorist groups through very wealthy countries that we think are our friends and they're not our friends. MSNBC TVI1

12. The countries are obvious and they're very rich and they're sending money out to the terrorists and sending money to ISIS. Tremendous amounts of money. MSNBC TVI1

13. Countries are giving massive amounts of money. People from other countries are giving massive amounts of money. …one of them happens to be Saudi Arabia. MSNBC TVI1

The material processes 'pour' (extract 11), 'send out' (extract 12) and 'give' (extract 13) *activate* rich Muslim countries and construct them as the sponsors of terrorism. The metaphor 'pour into' in extract (11), the adjectives 'tremendous' in extract (12) and 'massive' in extract (13) *intensify* the amounts of money rich Muslim countries spend on recruiting terrorists and financing terrorism. The word 'friends' in extract (11) *conventionally implies* that the sponsors of terrorism are the allies of the US and emphasises betrayal and hostility. Trump does not provide any arguments to justify the claim that wealthy Muslim-majority countries finance terrorism, which means that his claim can be taken as a personal biased opinion.

5.2.1.1 Concluding discussion

The referential and predicational analysis of the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries shows that Trump refers to them metonymically by pointing to Muslim-majority countries (spatialisation) and religion (classification). Trump's nominations are non-evaluative; however, the actions and qualities he associates the nominations with show that a negative representation takes place. That is, he engages them in violent actions against Muslim women and terrorism against non-Muslims to attribute them the qualities of sexism and misogyny, religious oppression and religious extremism and position them as the victimiser 'Other.' He relies on hasty generalisations/secundum quid and 'guilt by association' (Green, 2015, p.21) to construct them as a homogeneous and monolithic social group/collective. He positions Muslim and non-Muslim women and non-believers as the victims, i.e., the victimised 'Self.' I argue that he draws on orientalist stereotypes, particularly the stereotypes of sexism and misogyny (Saïd, 1978/1995/2003, p.207) and the stereotype of terrorism (ibid, 1980, n.p.) to derogate Muslims and represent Muslim immigrants as security threats.

As mentioned in section 3.2 in chapter three, this thesis defines racism as the denigration of certain social groups to construct them as 'Others' and the discriminatory practices that result from such denigration (van Dijk, 2000 a; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Billig, 1991; Anthias, 1995; Hage, 1998; Richardson, 2004; van Dijk, 2008). Denigration is usually based on 'race' (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). I consider Islamophobia a type of racism, i.e., it is not only the denigration and 'Otherization' of Muslims because of their religion but the discriminatory practices that result from this denigration and 'Otherization' (The Runnymede Trust, 1997;2017; Green, 2015; Student News, 2020) Trump's discourse is islamophobic and racist because it collectivises and inferiorises the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries based on the widespread stereotypes about the 'Islamic culture' and religion such as, the stereotypes of inferiority, sexism and misogyny (Saïd, 1978;1995;2003, p.207) and the stereotypes of violence and terrorism (ibid, 1980, n.p.), to construct them as the 'Other' and legitimise the discriminatory policy proposal 'The Muslim ban.' In addition to denigrating the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries, to legitimise the discriminatory 'Muslim Ban', Trump emphasises religious and cultural differences between Muslims, positioned as 'the Other', and non-Muslims, (particularly non-Muslim Americans), positioned as the 'Self' and employs the right-wing populist strategy the 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) to construct Muslim immigrants as a threat to the 'Self.' Trump's representation is discriminatory because during the campaign Trump relied on the stereotypes of inferiority, sexism and misogyny (Saïd,

1978;1995;2003, p.207) and the stereotypes of violence and terrorism (ibid, 1980, n.p.) to problematise Muslims and urge 'the Obama-Clinton administration' to deny entry to Muslim immigrants to the US. Also, after one week of taking the oath of presidency, Trump used the stereotypes of violence and terrorism (Saïd,1980, n.p.) to ban seven predominantly Muslim-majority countries from immigrating to the US (see appendix two for Trump's official 'Muslim Travel Ban Policy'). Trump relied on the mass media, particularly TV, and social media, particularly Twitter, to promote islamophobic and racist statements.

Trump's discourse is right-wing populist because he employs the 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) to construct Muslim immigrants as a threat to non-Muslim Americans. This right-wing populist style helped Trump to feely express islamophobic statements and suggest discriminatory policies on Muslim immigration and legitimise them through appeals to security. The analysis of the representation of Muslim Americans and non-Muslim Americans in sub-section 5.2.2 in this chapter shows that Trump employs the process of similarity to inferiorise Muslim Americans and this inferiorisation resulted in everyday racism and discrimination against Muslims. For instance, anti-Muslim bias incidents increased dramatically in the US, such as harassment, intimidation, bullying, hate crimes and anti-mosque incidents (CAIR, 2017). In addition, Muslims witnessed discrimination in various fields of public life such as in employment (ibid). Islamophobia is not only the negative representation of Muslims because of their religion but the negative consequences of such negative representation on Muslims (The Runnymede Trust, 1997;2017; Green, 2015 and Student News, 2020).The analysis in sub-section 5.2.2 in this chapter also reveals that Trump adopts the right-wing populist strategy the 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) to problematise Muslim Americans and represent them as a threat to non-Muslim Americans. It also shows that Trump relied on the mass media, particularly TV, and social media, particularly Twitter, to promote islamophobic and racist statements.

5.2.2 Muslim Americans versus non-Muslim Americans

In the table 5.2 below, I present the nominations Trump uses to refer to Muslim Americans and non-Muslim Americans and provide the numbers of the extracts from which I took the nominations.

The nominations of Muslim Americans and non-Muslim Americans	Referential strategies and extracts numbers
The nominations of Muslim Americans	Second and third generation (14), they (17, 18, 20, 28, and 33), people (19, 20, and 35), Muslims (22), many, many other people (29), the Muslim community (33 and 46), large Arab populations (35), a heavy Arab population (35), a large number of people (36), many, many, many people (44), many Muslims (45), large segments of the Muslim population (48)
The nominations of non-Muslim Americans	We (17, 24), our (18, 19, and 21), our country (20), Americans (28, 41, 48)

Table 5.2 The nominations of Muslim Americans and non-Muslim Americans

The table 5.2 above shows that Trump *refers* to Muslims in America by the exclusive plural pronoun 'They', and he *refers* to non-Muslims by the inclusive plural pronoun 'We.' The use of the pronouns shows that Trump employs the binary division of 'Self', non-Muslims, versus 'Other', i.e., Muslims. He also *refers* to Muslims by the generic references 'Muslims', 'the Muslim community' and 'the Muslim population.' The three *nominations assimilate* Muslims, i.e., they *collectivise* and *identify* them as group based on their religious identity. Trump also *collectivises* non-Muslims by *identifying* them by nationality as in 'Americans.' Referring to non-Muslims by 'Americans' shows that he believes that Muslims cannot be American. I oppose this nomination because, first, According to the Fourteenth Amendment, people can be Americans regardless of their origins, skin colour, ethnicity culture or religion (US Constitution); and second, according to the First Amendment, which states that 'congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof' (US Constitution), the US supports freedom of religion, so Americans can belong to any religious group. Therefore, I will use the nomination Muslim Americans to refer to Muslims in the US and the nomination non-Muslim Americans to refer to non-Muslims.

Semantically, none of Trump's nominations of Muslims is *evaluative*. Some specify religion, and they separate Muslims from non-Muslims (i.e., they separate Muslims from non-Muslims and reinforce the binary division 'Self' versus 'Other'), but they are neither *deprecatory/negative* nor *appreciative/positive*. The binary division of 'Self versus 'Other' is an ingredient of racist discourse and it usually follows a strategic pattern: the 'Other' is usually negatively presented and the 'Self' is positively presented (van Dijk, 1995, p. 143). The analysis of the qualities and actions Trump assigns to Muslims highlight that he *derogates* Muslim Americans because he *associates* them with misogyny, religious extremism, violence, and terrorism to 'Otherise' them. These qualities show that a racist discourse develops. He *describes* non-Muslim Americans as the victims of Muslim Americans, but he also *distinguishes* them from Muslim Americans because he represents them as tolerant and peaceful people. Therefore, I argue that Trump avoids the nomination 'Muslim Americans' because he implies that Muslims do not respect 'the American values' of religious freedom and tolerance. The analysis of the representation and evaluation of the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries presented in sub-section 5.2.1 shows that Trump employs the 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) because he represents the admission of Muslims into the US as a danger and threat to the security of non-Muslim Americans (see the analysis of extracts 7 and 8). This sub-section 5.2.2 explores the representational strategies Trump employs to construct Muslims in the US as a threat to the security of non-Muslims and to 'the American values', 'way of life' and laws. In extracts (14), (15) and (16), Trump claims that Muslims do not assimilate into America and Europe.

14. (…) second and third generation. They come, they don't for some reason there's no real assimilation. Fox News TVI1

15. Belgium (…) frankly, there's no assimilation. NBC News TVI.

16. They're not assimilating in other locations either. NBC News TVI

In Fox News TVI2, Trump reacts to the Orlando terrorist attack which happened in the US on the 12th of June 2016 against the LGBTQ community. In NBC News TVI, he reacts to the Brussels attack which happened in Belgium, a European country, on the 22nd of March 2016. In extract (14), he *explicitly refers* to second and third generations. He *implicitly refers* to the first generation by the material process 'come.' Therefore, the plural pronoun 'they' used with the material process come *refers* to Muslim immigrants and the other plural pronoun 'they' *refers* to Muslims in the US. Trump *collectivises* Muslims by the plural pronoun 'they' and negates the existential process 'be' by 'no' to emphasise that Muslims do not assimilate in the

US. In extract (15), he *backgrounds* the actors, but it can be inferred from the text that he refers to Muslims in Belgium. By the negation of the existential process 'be' by 'no', he claims that Muslims do not assimilate in Belgium. He attributes lack of assimilation to all Muslims in the US and Belgium based on single attacks committed by two terrorists who are Muslims. Referring to an attack committed by an individual Muslim as an illustrative sample to generalise that Muslims do not assimilate is not a valid argument; this is a *fallacy of hasty generalisation/secundum quid*. According to The Runnymede Trust (1997, p.5), generalisation or 'using a situation in which an individual Muslim is judged to have behaved badly as an illustrative example to condemn all Muslims' fuel hostility against Muslims and encourages discrimination, i.e., promotes islamophobia.

In extract (16), Trump *assimilates* 'Muslims', i.e., he *collectivises* Muslims using the plural pronoun 'they.' He *generalises* lack of assimilation to other countries as well. *Generalisation* is expressed through the circumstance of location 'in other locations either.' He does not *specify* what are the countries he is referring to. By ambiguity he implicitly conveys that If Muslims do not assimilate in Belgium, a European country, they will not assimilate in other European countries as well (or the 'West'). Ambiguity *intensifies* the quality of lack of assimilation. This is *a fallacy hasty generalisation/secundum quid* because Trump attributes lack of assimilation to all Muslims in Europe without giving any arguments. He only relies on Belgium as *topos of example* to illustrate lack of assimilation. In extract (15), Trump clearly states that 'for some reason there's no real assimilation…' in the US, but he did not *specify* the reason. Though extracts (17), (18), (19) and (20) below are taken from different texts, they highlight that he claims that Muslims do not assimilate because they reject 'the US values', 'way of life', 'culture' and laws.

> 17. They want to go by Sharia law. They want Sharia law. They don't want laws that we have. They want Sharia law. NBC News TVI

> 18. They don't want our system. They don't want our system. Mt Pleasant CR

> 19. People (…) who reject our values. Manchester CR.

> 20. Our country cannot be the victims by people that believe only in Jihad (…) they want to change your religion. Mt Pleasant CR

> 21. Our system of government, and our American culture, is the best in the world and will produce the best outcomes for all who adopt it. Youngstown CR

In extracts (17), (18), (19), and (20), Trump *conversationally implies* that Muslims do not assimilate in the US. By the negation of the mental process 'want' in extracts (17) and (18) and the use of the material process 'reject' in extract (19), he claims that Muslims do not adhere 'the US values' and laws. Joining the mental process 'want' with the material process 'go' in extract (17), he claims that Muslims want to be governed by Sharia. In sub-section 5.2.1, he claims that the 'values' of freedom and tolerance are non-existent in Muslim-majority countries because Islam is the religion of the state. Since he attributes religious oppression to Muslim-majority countries, by referring to US laws in extract (17), he *conversationally implies* that Muslims in the US reject the First Amendment, which calls for freedom of religion and secularism. The First Amendment states that 'congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof' (US Constitution). The First Amendment clearly emphasises that the US is a secular state and people are free to practice the religion they want. By 'values' in extract (19), he *conversationally implies* freedom and tolerance of religious differences. In extracts (17) and (19), Trump establishes an *implicit comparison* between the US and Islamic countries, i.e., unlike Muslim countries where Islam is the religion of the state, the US is a secular, open and tolerant society. This is an orientalist representation as he represents the Muslim societies as the opposite of American society. In addition, in extract (21), he represents the US culture and government *positively* through the adjective 'best.' The latter *conventionally implies* superiority, thus reproduces the orientalist binary division of 'We' are superior to 'Them.' Seemingly, he employs the strategies of *negative other-presentation* and *positive-self presentation* (van Dijk, 1991). By emphasising that Muslims reject freedom of religion, he reproduces Huntington's (1996, p.215) claim that Muslims are hostile to secularism and the claim that Muslims detest the West, a sentiment referred to in the theory of 'Clash of Civilisations' as 'anti-westernism.' He also promotes the claim that Muslims hate and attack the West 'not for adhering to an imperfect, erroneous religion, which is nonetheless a "religion of the book, "but for not adhering to any religion at all. In Muslim eyes Western secularism, irreligiosity, and hence immorality are …evils' (ibid).

Joining the mental process 'want' with the material process 'change' in extract (20) and pointing to Jihad, he *conventionally implies* that Muslims desire to replace 'the US values' and laws by 'Islamic values' and laws, i.e., he claims that they seek the islamicisation of the US through Jihad. In the 'Clash of Civilisations' theory, Huntington (1996) claims that when Muslims immigrate to the 'West', they do not assimilate as they continue to adhere to and seek to propagate the cultural values of their home countries (pp.304-5) through Jihad (ibid, p.211).

Trump reproduces Huntington's (1996) claims because he refers to Jihad and claim that Muslims desire to islamicise the US to represent them as militant people. He uses Jihad interchangeably with violent Islamicisation. He uses in an extremist way and ignores that Jihad could be an armed struggle against injustice, the desire to better oneself morally, or the pursuit of knowledge (Council on Foreign Relations, 2021). Representing Muslims as militant people is an ingredient of islamophobic discourse (The Runnymede Trust, 1997, p.8). This representation spreads the belief that Muslims and Islam are 'undistinguishable from weapon' (ibid, p.9). Trump constructs a conflict between 'the Islamic values' and laws and 'the American values' and laws and represents Muslims as the source of conflict to represent them as a threat to 'the US values' and laws. Extract (22) is a *topos of authority* trump employs to justify the claim that Muslims desire to live under Sharia laws in the US.

> 22. A poll from the Center for Security Policy released data showing (…)
> 51% of those polled agreed that Muslims in America should have the choice
> of being governed according to Sharia. TBS and Mt Pleasant

Trump's topos can be paraphrased as follows: Trump claims that Muslims reject secularism as they want to be governed according to Sharia; people may think that Trump's claim is true because the Center for Security Policy (an authority) says that it is true. First, Trump's argument is fallacious because he employs *hasty generalisation/secundum quid* to justify the claim that Muslims want Sharia in the US, i.e., The Center for Security Policy states that half of the Muslim population or 50% polled favourably for the implementation of Islamic Laws in the US. Based on a sample of 50%, Trump justifies the claim that all Muslims reject the US laws and desire to live by Islamic laws. Second, the Center for Security Policy is a think tank known for promoting anti-Muslim agenda (Patel, 2017). He refers to a prejudiced authority, and this is referred to as the fallacy *of argumentum ad verecundiam* or *fallacy of authority.*

From extract (17) to extract (20), Trump claims that Muslims reject assimilation and desire to live according to the laws and 'values' of their home countries. Trump relies on the 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) to emphasise lack of assimilation and represent Muslim Americans as a threat to 'the American values and culture' and laws. The expressions 'the best in the world' and 'the best outcomes' in extract (21), *conventionally imply* that the 'American culture' is superior to the 'Islamic culture.' Thus, I argue that reinforces the orientalist representation that 'They', Muslims, are inferior to 'Us', non-Muslim Americans. Trump also refers to lack of assimilation in Belgium and *generalises* it to other European countries. Thus, he reinforces the assumption of the 'Clash of Civilisations' theory that there will be a cultural

conflict between the Islamic and 'western' cultures (Huntington, 1996). I argue that Trump does not consider Muslims Americans because he claims that Muslims reject 'the American way of life' and 'culture.'

In extract (21), Trump *conventionally implies* that adopting the 'American culture' will give positive outcomes such as are freedom, peace, tolerance. The analysis in sub-section 5.2.1 shows that he claims that the 'Islamic culture', 'way of life' and religion produce negative outcomes such as sexism and misogyny, death, and violence. In extract (2) in sub-section 5.2.1, Trump points to honour killings in some Muslim-majority countries and claims that this is one of outcomes that the 'Islamic culture' and religion produce. He represents Muslims as misogynistic and sexist people. In extract (23), he refers to honour killings in the US (he refers to the US by 'our shores') to emphasise *similarity* between the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries and Muslims in America and illustrate the claim of lack of assimilation.

> 23. Shockingly, this is a practice that has reached our own shores. One such case involves an Iraqi immigrant who was sentenced to 34 years in jail for running over his own daughter claiming she had become "too Westernized." Youngstown CR

In extract (23), Trump employs *relational identification* because he specifies that the doer/victimiser is the father (a male), and the victim is the daughter (a female). He *activates* the father through the material process 'run over.' *Classifying* the victimiser according to his nationality 'Iraqi', he shows that the victimiser is originally from a Muslim-majority country, i.e., he implies that the victimiser is a Muslim. *Including* that the father was jailed, he *conventionally implies* that the US government condemns and punishes violence against women. Trump *includes* that the westernisation of the daughter is the reason of the attack. In sub-section 5.2.1, the analysis of extract (2) shows that Trump claims that Muslim women have restricted freedom in Muslim-majority countries, i.e., he claims that they are not free to wear what they want, and they are not allowed to work or study. Thus, I argue that he *conversationally implies* that the victim was killed because she became free like 'western' women. Therefore, he implicitly represents Muslim men as a threat to 'western' women. In extract (2), he refers to honour killings in Muslim-majority countries. In extract (23), he refers to honour killings in America. Thus, he implicitly emphasises that Muslims bring the 'values' and laws of their home countries, i.e., they do not assimilate and refuse the assimilation of their children. He bases on one example to illustrate that the practice of honour killings reached the

US; however, one cannot generalise lack of assimilation based on an act of an individual Muslim (*fallacious generalisation/ secundum quid*).

> 24. Here, in America, we have seen one brutal attack after another. Youngstown CR

In extract (6) in sub-section 5.2.1, Trump claims violence against non-Muslim Americans in Muslim countries. He thus represents the admission of Muslim immigrants as a threat to the security of non-Muslims Americans (see the analysis of extracts 7 & 8 in sub-section 5.2.1). In extract (24), Trump states that Americans, referred to by the plural pronoun 'we', witnessed a variety of violent attacks. He points to the San Bernadino attack (extract 25) and the Orlando attack (extracts 40 and 41) as examples to claim that Muslim Americans are violent against non-Muslim Americans in the US and emphasise similarity between the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries and Muslim Americans.

> 25. Last December, 14 innocent Americans were gunned down at an office party in San Bernardino, another 22 were injured. Youngstown CR

> 26. The male shooter in San Bernardino – again, whose name I won't mention -- was the child of immigrants from Pakistan, and he brought his wife – the other terrorist - from Saudi Arabia. Manchester CR

> 27. (…) they killed 14 co-workers that gave them a baby shower. They gave a shower for their baby, and they were friends and they walked in and shot them all, killed them all, and plenty of wounded in the hospital. Fox Business TVI

Extract (25), (26) and (27) belong to different texts, but in all of them Trump points to the San Bernardino attack. In extract (25), using passive voice he *conceals* the identity of the attackers. In extract (26), he *includes* the attackers, and through the word 'wife', he *conventionally implies* that they are a couple (*relational identification*). Through *spatialisation*, he emphasises that the woman is admitted from Saudi Arabia, an Islamic country which he constructs as a sponsor of terrorism in section 5.2.1. *Including* that the husband is from a Pakistani family, he *conversationally implies* that he is from a Muslim family. He *activates* the attackers through the material process 'gun' in extract (25), and the material processes 'kill' and 'shot in extract (27). He *refers* to the victims by '14 Americans' in extract (25) and 'co-workers' and 'friends' in extract (27). He employs *relational identification* in extract (27) because he stresses that there is a friendship relationship between the attackers and the victims. He thus *conversationally implies* betrayal. He appeals to fear of socialising with Muslims as he gives the impression that Muslims as untrusty.

28. Most recently, a poll from Center for Security Policy released data showing 25% of those polled agreed that violence against Americans …here in the United States is justified. As part, think of that, as part of the global jihad. They want to change your religion. Mt Pleasant CR

In extract (28), Trump *aggregates* Muslims as he refers to them by percentage, i.e., 25%. He associates the latter with the material process 'change' joined with the mental process 'want' to claim that the reason of the San Bernardino attack is religion. In extract (6) in sub-section 5.2.1, he states that non-Muslim Americans are killed in Muslim countries because of their religion 'Christianity.' In extract (28), he claims that non-Muslim Americans are targeted in the US for the same reason 'religion.' He represents the 25% of Muslims living in the US as religious extremists who do not tolerate religious difference. Like extract (22), in extract (28), he refers to Jihad to claim that Muslims seek to islamicise the US. According to the Runnymede Trust (1997), this representation is islamophobic because it spreads the belief that Muslims and Islam are inseparable from weapons (ibid, pp.8-9). Trump represents Muslims as threats to the security of non-Muslim Americans. To justify that non-Muslim Americans are targets of violence in the US, he employs a *topos of authority*. His topos can be paraphrased as follows: Trump claims that non-Muslim Americans are the target of violent Jihad in the US; people may think that Trump's claim is correct because the Center for Security Policy (an authority) says that it is true. Trump's argument is fallacious because the Center for Security policy is a think tank known for promoting anti-Muslim agenda (Patel, 2017). This is a *fallacy of argumentum ad verecundiam or fallacy of authority* because he refers to a prejudiced authority.

29. They found 28 thousands dollars just put into his account just put into his account. He was paid a lot of money. Where did that money come from I'll bet you will be surprised to find out where there are many, many other people like him in this country, right now. ABC News TVI2

30. We learned that $28,000 was poured into this guy's account, this horrible person that did the shooting along with his wife, his radicalized wife. MSNBC TVI1.

Extracts (29) and (30) belong to different texts, but they show that Trump claims that the San Bernardino terrorists were sponsored to commit the attack. By the material processes 'put' and 'pay' in extract (29) and 'pour' in extract (30), Trump claims that the San Bernardino attack was sponsored, but he uses passive voice to *conceal* the sponsor. In extract (13) in sub-section 5.2.1, he constructs Saudi Arabia, an ally of the US, as one of the sponsors of terrorism. In extract (26) in this sub-section, he states that one of the terrorists in San Bernardino is from Saudi Arabia. He *conversationally implies* that the attack was planned and sponsored by Saudi

Arabia. The phrase 'a lot of money' in extract (29) and the *inclusion* of the sum of money '28 thousand dollars' and '$28,000' in extracts (29) and (30) are *intensification strategies* emphasising that a massive amount is given for one attack. He employs a *topos of similarity* in extract (29) to claim that there are other Muslims in the US recruited and sponsored to commit acts of violence against non-Muslim Americans. *Similarity* is expressed through the preposition 'like.' In the same extract, he repeats the determiner 'many' twice to *intensify* the quantity of Muslims sponsored to commit acts of terror in the US. He appeals to fear because he emphasises potential terrorist attacks. This spreads the islamophobic belief that Muslims aim to harm non-Muslims (OIC Observatory Report, 2017, p.6) and represents Muslim Americans as security threats. He employs the '*Politics of Fear*' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) because he constructs threat scenarios. In extracts (31) to (33), he claims that Muslim Americans sympathised with the terrorists of the San Bernardino attack.

> 31. we had a situation in California very recently where somebody was making bombs in an apartment. The mother saw. The mother didn't notice anything wrong. I watched the sister being interviewed. Believe me, in my opinion, she was lying like crazy. I watched that interview. 'Oh, my brother was such a wonderful guy. I didn't know. I didn't know. I didn't know'. Mt Pleasant CR

> 32. A neighbor saw suspicious behavior but didn't warn authorities, because said they didn't want to be accused of racially profiling – now many are dead and gravely wounded. Youngstown CR

> 33. The Muslim community knew that this guy, what he was doing and his wife, his very heavily radicalized wife, they knew what they were doing was wrong. Nobody called the police. Nobody said this is what happened. MSNBC TVI3

> 34. Those wives knew exactly what was going to happen. And those wives went home to watch their husbands knock down the World Trade Center, the Pentagon. CBS News TVI

The mental process 'see' and the sentence 'she is lying' in extract (31) *conventionally imply* that the mother and sister of the attacker were aware of the attack. The mental process 'see' in extracts (32) *conventionally implies* that the neighbour of the attacker as well was aware of the attack. The negated verbal process 'warn' *passivates* the neighbour in terms of reporting the terrorists. In extracts (31) and (32), Trump represents the mother, sister, and neighbour as terrorist sympathisers. He *individualises* the constructed terrorist sympathisers. In extract (33), he *collectivises* the Muslims who live in the neighbourhood of the terrorist through the mass noun 'the Muslim community' and the plural pronoun 'they.' He claims their awareness of the

131

attack through the mental process 'know.' To construct them as terrorist sympathisers, he *passivates* them in terms of reporting terrorists by joining the pronoun 'nobody' with the verbal processes 'call' and 'say.' In extract (34), Trump refers to the attack against the World Trade center or 9/11. Through the mental process 'know', he emphasises that the wives of terrorists ware aware of the attack. To further emphasise sympathy with terrorism, in extracts (35) and (36), he claims that Muslims in New Jersey celebrated the 9/11 terrorist attack.

> 35. There were people that were cheering on the other side of New Jersey, where you have large Arab populations. They were cheering as the World Trade Center came down. (…) There were people cheering as that building came down -- as those buildings came down. (…) There were people over in New Jersey that were watching it, a heavy Arab population, that were cheering as the buildings came down. Not good. ABC News TVI1

> 36. There's a large percentage of people that, as you said, went wild and were celebrating all over the world (…) There were a large number of people who celebrated the downing of the World Trade Center. MSNBC TVI2

Though extracts (35) and (36) are taken from different texts, they all show that Trump claims that Muslims celebrated the 9/11 terrorist attack. Through the verbal process 'cheer' in extract (35) he claims that people celebrated the 9/11 attack. The mass noun people in extract (35) *conceals* who celebrated. However, he refers to 'Arabs' in the same extract, an ethnic group whose skin is predominantly dark and whose religion is predominantly Islam. He *conversationally implies* that the people who celebrated the attack are Arab Muslims. He uses the adjectives 'large' and 'heavy' to *intensify* the number of Muslims who he claims celebrated the attack. In extract (36), he claims that it is not only Muslims in the US who celebrated the attack, but Muslims around the world. This *generalisation* is expressed through the circumstance of location 'all over the world' and celebrations through the verbal process 'celebrate'. In addition to claiming that Muslims sympathise domestically with terrorism, in extracts (37), (38) and (39), he claims that Muslims in Belgium, a European country, sympathise with terrorism.

37. You look at Brussels, where this guy was being hidden by his friends, OK, his friends are holding him out. Fox and Friends TVI1

38. You know, this guy that they caught yesterday, he was living right in this neighborhood. He was living there with all of these people, they all knew he was there, they didn't turn him in. Fox Business TVI

39. Somehow that community doesn't believe in reporting. They know exactly what's going on. And they don't know -- they don't believe in reporting to the police. Fox and Friends TVI1

The material processes 'hide' and 'hold' in extract (37) *conventionally imply* that friends were protecting the terrorist instead of reporting him. Trump thus constructs them as terrorist sympathisers. He *collectivises* the Muslims that live in the neighbourhood of the terrorist by the mass nouns 'people' and the corresponding plural pronoun 'they' in extract (38), and 'community' and the corresponding plural pronoun 'they' in extract (39). The latter is taken from a different text than extracts (37) and (38). He claims that they were aware of the attack through the mental process of cognition 'know' in extracts (38) and (39). The negation of the verbal process 'turn' in extract (38) and the mental process 'believe' in extract (39), he claims that they do not report terrorism (he *passivates* them in terms of reporting terrorism). He moves from *specification* of the sympathisers in extract (37) to *generalising* that all the Muslims who live in the terrorists' neighbourhood are sympathisers. Trump does not provide any sound arguments to justify his claims. He unjustifiably links Muslims in the US and Belgium to sympathy with terrorism. He only employs *hasty generalisations/secundum quid* to claim that Muslims support terrorists and terrorism against non-Muslims. In extract (5) in sub-section 5.2.1 in chapter five, he claims that Islam is violent against non-Muslims. Therefore, attributing sympathy with terrorism to Muslims in the US (extracts 33 and 35), Muslims in Belgium (extracts 38 and 39) and Muslims all over the world (extract 36), I argue that he claims that that this quality is inherent to Muslims and acquired from Islam. Mogahed's (2007) work at Gallup enabled to oversee numerous public opinion polls among Muslims and confirms that Muslim religiosity did not correlate with the tendency to sympathize with terrorism (cited in Green, 2015, p. 322). She argues that 'Islam as a net influence is the reason we don't have more hate and animosity between Muslims and the West' (ibid), and if more people knew this and considered the implications, perceptions of Islam might start to change (ibid). Trump claims that Muslims celebrated the 9/11 terrorist attack; however, The New York Times (2015) confirm that this is not true. Trump claims that Muslims sympathise with terrorists, but he *excludes* that Muslims sympathised with the victims of the attacks, i.e., Muslims were holding

candles for the victims (Fahmy, 2005). In addition to the San Bernardino terrorist attack, Trump points to the Orlando Terrorist attack in extracts (40), (41) and (42), which are taken from different texts, that happened in the US on the 12th of June 2016 and specifies that it targeted the LGBTQ community.

> 40. Reporting that Orlando killer shouted "Allah hu Akbar!" as he slaughtered clubgoers. 2nd man arrested in LA with rifles near Gay parade. Tweet Jun 12, 2016

> 41. A radical Islamic terrorist targeted the nightclub not only because he wanted to kill Americans, but in order to execute gay and lesbian citizens because of their sexual orientation. Manchester CR

> 42. The shooter in Orlando (…) His father, a native of Afghanistan, supported the oppressive Taliban regime, and expressed anti-American views. Youngstown CR

The word 'Allah hu Akbar' in extract (40), which is the Arabic/Islamic word for God (Green, 2015, p.37), and the adjective 'Islamic' in extract (41), *conventionally imply* that the attacker is an Arab and a Muslim. Trump *activates* the latter through the material processes 'slaughter' in extract (40) and 'target' in extract (41). He *refers* to the victims by clubgoers in extract (40), and he *identifies* them according to their nationality 'Americans' and sexual orientation, 'gay and lesbian citizens' in extract (41). He *specifies* that the victims belong to the LGBTQ community. The *inclusion* of the place where the second attacker was arrested 'near the gay parade' (a circumstance of location) and the *inclusion* of the detail that he possesses rifles (*instrumentalisation*) in extract (40) *conventionally implies* that he was about to commit another attack against the LGBTQ community or other attacks were planned against the LGBTQ community and *intensify* hostility against the LGBTQ community. He *includes* the word 'Allah hu Akbar' to claim that the attack was committed on the name of Islam. I argue that he associates it to Islam because Islam forbids this sexual orientation. He claims Muslims' hostility to sexual orientations that are forbidden in Islam and represents Muslims as threats to the security of the GBTQ community. That is, he uses the 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) to represent Muslim-Americans as a danger to the LGBTQ community. I also argue that he nominates the victims 'Americans' in extract (41) to further stress that Muslims cannot be Americans because he claims that they refuse 'the US values' such as freedom of sexuality.

In extract (42), by 'anti-American', he *conventionally implies* the terrorist's father is hostile to 'the American way of life and values', and laws. This is an example that Trump claims that Muslims cannot be American because he claims that they are anti-Americans. In extract (42),

he *specifies* that the family of the terrorist is from Afghanistan. In extract (7), he *generalises* religious extremism to Afghan people, i.e., he claims that they support Islamic laws which he constructs as oppressive laws. In extract (26), he specifies that the family of the terrorist of the San Bernardino attack is from Pakistan. In extract (2) in sub-section 5.2.1, he represents Pakistani people as oppressive and points to misogyny as an example of oppression. In extracts (26) and (42), he *conversationally implies* that parents bring the 'values' of their home countries (i.e., he claims lack of assimilation) and radicalise their children. Extract (43) below is also taken from a different text, but it is employed by Trump as a *topos of authority* to emphasise the claim that the children of Muslim parents are radicalised.

> 43. As the Washington Times reported, the children of Muslim immigrant parents, they're responsible for a growing number, for whatever reason, a growing number of terrorist attacks. Greensboro CR

Trump's *topos of authority* in extract (43), can be paraphrased as follows: Trump claims that parents radicalise their children; the Washington Times, an authority, states that the children of Muslim families are implicated in terrorism in the US, so people may think that Trump's claim is true. In extract (44) below Trump states that the Orlando terrorist is hostile to non-Muslim Americans, specifically the LGBTQ community, and employs the process of similarity to claim that there are many hateful Muslims in the US.

> 44. That man yesterday was sick with hate (…) you have many, many, many people right now living in the United States who are worse than him; who are more hateful than him. Fox and Friends TVI2

> 45. I would say we are not exactly loved by many Muslims. MSNBC TVI2

> 46. there's a level of hatred within a certain community, in this case the Muslim community. MSNBC TVI2

> 47. Thousands, tens of thousands of people are pouring into our country and many of them are no different than this guy yesterday who created this horrible action. Fox and Friends TVI2

Though extracts (44), (45), (46) and (47) belong to different texts, they all show that Trump claims that Muslims are hateful. In extract (44), through the metaphor 'sick with hate' he describes the Orlando terrorist attack as hate crime. The metaphor emphasises an intense feeling of hate the shooter has towards the American LGBTQ community. In the same extract, he compares the Muslims in the US to the shooter, and through the adjective 'worse' and 'more hateful' (superlative) he *intensifies* the feeling of hate. In extract (45), hostility is expressed through the negation of the emotive mental process 'love.' Trump *intensifies* the quantity of

hateful Muslims through the determiner 'many' in extract (44) and (45). In extract (46), through the existential process 'be', he states that hate exists, but like extracts (44) and (45), he does not specify how many or the percentage. He does not *mitigate* the quantity of hateful Muslims, and this gives the impression that he claims that there are more extremists and hateful Muslims than good Muslims in the Muslim community. In extract (47), he refers to the Muslims seeking admission to the US (Muslim immigrants). He claims that, like the terrorist of the Orlando attack, many of them are hateful. Similarity is *conventionally implied* through the expression 'no different.' He employs the determiner 'many' to *intensify* the number of hateful Muslim immigrants. He implicitly represents Muslim immigrants as threats to the security of non-Muslim Americans.

I argue that Trump employs radical Islam interchangeably with Islam. In an interview on MSNBC on the 30th of November 2015 (the interview is selected for analysis), Trump was asked if he believes that 'Islam is an inherently peaceful religion…perverted by some' or thinks that 'Islam is an inherently violent religion?' Trump's answer is ambiguous because he says that the question can be answered both ways. This means that he thinks that violence and radicalism maybe inherent to Islam. He also had an interview on CNN on the 9th of March 2016 (the interview is collected but not selected for analysis), he emphasises that Islam hates 'Americans', i.e., he implies Muslims hate 'Americans.' Extract (5) in section 5.2.1 in chapter five, also shows that Trump emphasises that Sharia is hostile to Americans and represents Muslims as violent religious extremists and intolerant people. In extracts (44), (45), (46) and (47), Trump does not generalise hate to all Muslims, but he intensifies the number of hateful Muslims. I argue that Trump does not generalise hate to all Muslims because of the context. For instance, the interviewers in the MSNBC TVI2 urged Trump to specify that there are good Muslims in the Muslim community.

> 48. According to Pew Research, among others, there is a great hatred toward Americans by large segments of the Muslim population. TBS and Mt Pleasant CR

> 49. Mr. Trump stated, without looking at the various polling data, it's obvious to anybody the hatred is beyond comprehension of such a big portion. TBS and Mt Pleasant CR

In extract (48), Trump refers to Pew Research as an authority to justify the claim that many Muslims are hostile to non-Muslim Americans. The *topos of authority* can be paraphrased as follows: If Pew Research an authority states that many Muslims are hateful, so Trump's claim

is right. In extract (49), The actors are *backgrounded*, i.e., it can be inferred that Trump refers to Muslims because in the statement he discusses the possibility to ban Muslim immigrants. He employs a *fallacious topos of authority* as he refers to himself as an authority to justify the claim that a large number of Muslims are hateful. He is prejudiced as he relies on orientalist stereotypes to represent Muslims. In extract (50), he states that the 'Obama-Clinton administration' admit Syrian refugees which in extracts (9) and (10) in sub-section 5.2.1 and in extracts (52), (53) and (54) in this sub-section associates to ISIS.

> 50. You're letting people in from Syria, they have no documentation. Fox News TVI1

> 51. I've spoken to every law enforcement, top people, there is no way you can tell anything about these people about documentation, because it's all gone. It's all gone. Fox Business TVI

By the negated relational process 'have' in extract (50), Trump claims that Syrian refugees do not possess identity documents. He *conversationally implies* that they cannot perform identity checks to find out if they are ISIS related. In extract (51) which is taken from another text, he employs a *topos of authority* to defend the claim that it is impossible to perform identity checks on Syrian refugees. The topos can be paraphrased as follows: Trump claims that Syrian refugees have no documents to perform identity checks; people may think that he is right because law enforcement, an authority, say that it is right. I consider Trump justification *a fallacy of authority* because he refers to his personal conversations with law enforcement to justify that refugees do not possess identity documents.

> 52. I look at the migration and the lines and I see all strong, very powerful looking men, they're men and I see very few women, I see very few children. ABC News TVI1

> 53. Thousands and tens of thousands and even millions of people with cell phones with ISIS logo in okay. Number one how do they get cell phones? Number two, why there's so many men, young strong men, but they've got cell phones with an ISIS logo on many of them. Fox News TVI1

> 54. (…) how did they get the cell phones and where do they get their bills paid? NBC News TVI

In extract (52), Trump *exaggerates* the number of male refugees seeking admissions through the adverb 'all.' By the inclusion of their physical appearance as in 'strong, very powerful looking men' in extract (52) and as in 'young strong men' in extract (53) which is taken from another speech, he *conventionally implies* that there are no elderly. In extract (52), he *mitigates*

the number of women and children through the determiner 'few.' However, The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' data on arrivals by sea show that European countries also admitted women and children (as cited in The Washington Post, 2016). By claiming that men dominate Syrian refugees, he *conversationally implies* that they are selected and chosen by ISIS. Through the preposition 'with' in extract (53), he claims that Syrian refugees possess cell phones with an ISIS logo. By 'ISIS logo', he *conventionally implies* that they Syrian refugees' cell phones are offered by ISIS. In the same extract, he *intensifies* the number of Syrian refugees possessing cell phones through the expression 'thousands and tens of 'thousands and even millions.' In extract (54), he *conversationally implies* that ISIS pays their bills. He unjustifiably associates refugees to ISIS. That is, he only relies on his judgements to justify the claim that Syrian refugees are ISIS. This is how he tries to represent Syrian refugees as security threats. In extracts (55), (56), and (57), which are taken from different texts, he backs up his claim by referring to terrorist attacks committed by refugees in some European countries.

> 55. "@thewatcher 23579: One of Paris terrorist came as Syrian refugee (…)". Tweet Nov 15, 2015
>
> 56. in Germany, a refugee armed with an axe wounded five people in a gruesome train attack. Youngstown CR and Fort Myers CR
>
> 57. Brussels (…) he's one of the Paris leaders and killers (…) Fox and Friends TVI1
>
> 58. ISIS has infiltrated countries all over Europe by posing as refugees (…) Tweet Oct 20, 2016
>
> 59. they're coming into our country, they're coming in by the thousands. Fox and Friends TVI1.
>
> 60. the migration in Syria. President Obama is taking in thousands of people…it's going to lead to, you know, just catastrophic problems. If you look at what's going on in Paris, if you look at what's going on, I mean, Brussels we know, but look at what's going on in Germany. Fox Business TVI

Extracts (55), (56), and (57) are *topoi of example* Trump employs to illustrate that the terrorists of the Paris, Brussels, and Germany attacks are refugees. Though they were committed by refugees, Trump cannot *exaggerate* that the majority are ISIS. This is a *fallacy of hasty generalisation*. In extract (58), he claims that ISIS succeeded to infiltrate Europe. Extracts (59) and (60) are taken from different texts but they carry the same idea. That is, they are *topoi of*

threat in a form of *topoi of consequence* which can be paraphrased as follows: If ISIS infiltrated Europe by posing as refugees, they will infiltrate to the US because the 'Obama-Clinton administration' admit them to the US. He appeals to fear of insecurity. In sub-section 6.2.1, I will show that Trump represents Obama's admissions of Muslims (non-refugees and refugees) as a threat to the security of non-Muslim Americans.

5.2.2.1 Concluding discussion

The referential and predicational analysis of the representation of Muslim Americans reveals that Trump refers to them generically and collectively by identifying and classifying them according to their religious identity Islam. Trump's nominations are not evaluative on their own. When I analyse them with the actions and qualities Trump links them to, a negative representation takes place. He attributes them the same actions he attributes to the Muslims of Muslim majority countries such as violence against women and non-believers, particularly non-Muslim Americans. He attributes to them the qualities of sexism and misogyny, religious oppression and religious extremism and positions them as the victimiser 'Other.' He also attributes to them violence against the LGBTQ community. He positions Muslim women and American non-believers and LGBTQ community as the victims. He uses the nomination 'Americans' and the inclusive plural pronoun 'we' to refer to non-Muslims. The latter also are referred to generically and collectively by identifying and classifying them according to their nationality (American nationality). By identifying Muslims by religion and non-Muslim by nationality, he implies that Muslims cannot be considered Americans because they reject 'the American way of life', i.e., they reject secularism and religious and sexual freedom. According to Trump, to be an American means to support secularism, religious and sexual freedom, and respect women, which he claims Muslims do not. The 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) dominates Trump's discourse because he represents all Muslims as a threat to the security of 'Americans', particularly women, non-believers, and the LGBTQ community, and as threats to 'the American values' of openness, tolerance, freedom, and law of secularism, i.e., a threat to the 'American culture.' He claims that the 'American culture' is superior to the 'Islamic culture.' Thus, he reinforces the orientalist representation that 'They', Muslims, are inferior and uncivilised (Saïd, 1978/1995/2003).

Like the representation of the Muslims of Muslim majority countries, Trump's representation of Muslim Americans is islamophobic and racist because it collectivises and inferiorises Muslim Americans based on the widespread stereotypes about the 'Islamic culture' and religion such as, the stereotypes of inferiority, sexism and misogyny (Saïd, 1978;1995;2003, p.207) and the stereotypes of violence and terrorism (ibid, 1980, n.p.), to construct them as a problematic and dangerous 'Other' and legitimise his discriminatory policy proposals such as surveilling Muslims, their mosques and neighbourhoods. Trump also emphasises cultural and religious differences between Muslim and non-Muslim Americans and attributes Muslim Americans lack of assimilation to construct them as a threat to the security of non-Muslim Americans, the US constitution and 'cultural identity' and defend and get support for his discriminatory policy proposals, i.e., he employs the right-wing populist strategy the 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). Trump used the media, particularly TV and Twitter, to promote his islamophobic statements and discriminatory policy proposals. Trump was invited to a variety of TV interviews to discuss his policy proposals on Muslims and succeeded to set the news agenda. Muslims experienced Islamophobia in Twitter because of the rise of anti-Muslim hashtags in Twitter during Trump's campaign (Müller & Schwarz, 2020). They also experienced Islamophobia in TV because different channels reported Trump's islamophobic remarks and discriminatory policy proposals and contributed to their spread. Trump's discourse on Muslims resulted in everyday racism and discrimination against Muslims in the US, i.e., Muslims suffered from harassment, intimidation, bullying, hate crimes and anti-mosque incidents increased dramatically in the US (CAIR, 2017). In addition, they witnessed discrimination in various spheres of public life, such in employment (ibid).

5.3 Discussion

This chapter aims to answer RQ1 and sub-RQ1, i.e., RQ1: how are Muslims represented in Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration? and sub-RQ1: to what extent is Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration orientalist, islamophobic, and racist, and how does his representation of Muslims link to Right-win Populism? The nomination and predication analysis of the selected texts show that Trump represents the Muslim residents of Muslim-majority countries and Muslim Americans as two similar social groups. He employs the strategy of negative presentation (van Dijk, 1991) to position them as the 'Other.' Then, he distinguishes them from non-Muslim Americans. He employs the strategy of positive presentation (ibid) to position the latter as the 'Self.'

In sub-section 5.2.1, I found out that Trump refers to the Muslim residents of Muslim-majority countries metonymically by pointing to Muslim majority-countries (spatialisation) and religion (classification). He negatively represents them because he attributes to them violent actions such as violence against Muslim and non-Muslim women and violence against non-believers. He attributes to them the qualities of sexism and misogyny, religious oppression, and religious extremism.

To attribute the orientalist stereotype of sexism and misogyny (Saïd, 1978;1995;2003, p.207). to the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries, Trump claims that the punishment of women who refuse an arranged marriage or who refuse to wear a 'veil' and stay at home is honour killing, i.e., death. He implies that women are forced to enter arranged marriages. He claims that sexism and misogyny stem from Sharia (Islam). I must mention that Islam encourages arranged marriage; however, an arranged marriage can only take place if both parties (the groom and bride) accept it (The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, n.d., n.p.). That is, marriage needs to commence with a proposal and end with a consent, i.e., there should be a proposal to marriage on the part of one party, and marriage will only take place if the offer is accepted by the other party (Sharmin & Azad, 2018, p. 30). This means that women are allowed to refuse arranged marriages. In addition, he claims that Muslim women are forced to wear a 'veil.' The veil can be Hijab, Niqab or Burqa. Hijab is 'a headscarf worn to cover the head but leaves the face exposed' (Green,2015, p.22). Burqa is 'a garment that covers most of the body and face but with eyeholes or a grid around the eyes' (ibid, p.23). Niqab is like burqa, but it is in black-and-white and hides the face below the eyes (ibid, p.344). The 'veil' is obligatory for Muslim women; however, there is no law in Islam outlining death as a punishment for non-veiled women (The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, n.d., n.p.). The only punishment referred to in Islam is God's punishment on the Day of Judgement (ibid). Trump constructs the 'veil' as a sign of oppression. That is, he claims that Muslim women are forced to wear the 'veil.' May be there are women who are forced to wear it, but there are also women who wear it willingly, and sometimes, they wear it 'in opposition to governmental regulations or the wishes of their families' (Diffendal, 2006, p. 129) and they protest 'veil' bans (The Guardian, 2011; France24, 2022). For instance, in 2011 Muslim women protested on Nicolas Sarkozy's law banning the wearing of niqabs and burqas in public in France (The Guardian, 2011). In January 2022, Muslim women footballers protested in front of France's Senate on Emmanuel Macron's law banning the wearing of hijab in sport (France24, 2022). Islam does not instruct anybody to punish women who refuse an arranged marriage or refuse to wear the veil, so honour killings

or violence committed simply against women cannot be attributed to Islam. There are women who are forced to enter arranged marriages or wear the 'veil', but this does not mean that this oppression stems from Islam. These are social and/or cultural pressures, not religious.

Trump also claims that Muslim women have no rights of education or work. The Hadith 'Acquisition of knowledge is binding on all Muslims' emphasises that Islam does not privilege men over women in getting access to education and does not constrain Muslim women from getting education (Khan, 2016, pp.339-340). A figure from World bank data shows that Muslim countries provide education for women (as cited in Haque et al., 2020, p. 782). It shows that the percentage of educated women was on the rise from 2010 to 2018 (ibid). I focused on the percentage of educated Muslim women in 2016, i.e., at the time of Trump's presidential campaign, and I noticed that more than 40% of women were educated in Pakistan, more than 70% in Bangladesh, Middle East and North Africa and more than 90% in Indonesia and Malysia (ibid). The percentage of educated women in some Muslim-majority countries, such as Pakistan, is not good enough, but at least it shows that Muslim women have access to education. Muslim women also occupied high positions (Green, 2015, p.137). For instance, they have served as heads of state, including Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan, Megawati Sukarnoputri in Indonesia, and Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh (ibid). 'These examples are a stark contrast to a Western country such as the United States where, at the time of this writing, a woman has yet to be elected president or vice president (ibid). Some restrictions are not stated in Islam (i.e., they are not religious); they are specific to some countries, i.e., as I stated above, they are social and cultural pressures. For instance, if women in Saudi Arabia are not allowed to drive, this does not mean that all Muslim women are not allowed to drive (Green, 2015, pp.12-13). One should not attribute the practices of one country to all Muslim countries and should not attribute the laws of a given country to Islam. Trump clearly does that and reinforces the stereotype that Muslim-majority countries and Muslims are oppressive. Islam states that women are morally and spiritually equal to men but also indicates that wives and mothers have specific roles in the family and society, but some governments/Muslims focus on the latter to restrict women's rights (Council on Foreign Relations, 2021). There are Muslim women who are oppressed; there are Muslims who do not respect women' rights or countries that restrict women' rights, but Trump should not generalise that all Muslim countries or all Muslims oppress women. These hasty generalisations reinforce the orientalist stereotypes of misogyny and sexism (Saïd, 1978;1995;2003, p.207). Also, they

promote the islamophobic stereotype that Muslims are monolithic, i.e., people may think that all Muslims are violent against women because their religion encourages violence against them.

Trump speaks against honour killings committed against women and excludes honour killings committed against men. He points to the Islamic dress code for women but excludes the Islamic dress code for men. Islam also instructs men to watch their clothing: '[s]ay to the believing men that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty: that will make for greater purity for them: And Allah is well acquainted with all that they do' (Quran 24:30 as cited in Stacey, 2012). There are conditions of dress code for men as well: it should not resemble non-believers or women' clothing, it should not be tight or transparent, the thighs must not be revealed, the garment must not be too long, hanging below the ankles, and garments made of silk, or jewellery made of gold are also not allowed (Stacey, 2012, pp. 1-2). Both women and men can refuse an arranged marriage (Sharmin & Azad, 2018, p. 30). The Hadith 'Acquisition of knowledge is binding on all Muslims' emphasises that Islam does not privilege men over women in getting access to education (Khan, 2016, pp.339-40). Seemingly, in marriage, in clothing and in education, Islam does not privilege men over women. By focusing on women' oppression, Trump claims that Islamic societies favour men over women. He attributes the qualities of misogyny and sexism to Islamic societies and men. He reproduces the orientalist stereotype that the Muslim-majority countries are exclusively male provinces with sexist blinders (Saïd, 1978;1995;2003, p.207) and implicitly reproduces the islamophobic view that they are inferior to the West, i.e., they are 'barbaric, irrational, and sexist, in contrast to the civilized, enlightened, and gender-equal West' (Green, 2015, p.14). Orientalists represent Islamic societies as male-dominated societies (Green, 2015, p.137) and emphasise that women are imprisoned and oppressed in a backward and male-dominated society (Al-Tarawneh, 2022, pp.74-5). These stereotypes of sexism and misogyny resulted from the stereotyped belief that the Quran considers a woman as an 'inferior being, heartless, who must unconditionally bow to the man, having the purpose to keep the house clean and to procreate" (Nicolau, 2014, p), i.e., they are imprisoned at home (Green, 2015, p.137). This stereotype is generally employed to justify oppression and exploitation of Muslims. For instance, Bush relied on this stereotype when he was President of the US to justify the invasion of some middle eastern Muslim majority-countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, i.e., he argued that he seeks to liberate Muslim women from oppression (Green, 2015, pp.133-4).

In addition to the claim of sexism and misogyny, Trump also claims that Muslims and Muslim-majority countries oppress non-believers. He claims that Muslim-majority countries oppress

non-Muslims because they oppose freedom of religion; in this case, reject secularism. Muslim-majority countries may govern according to Sharia, i.e., establish Islam as the religion of the state, but this does not mean they restrict religious freedom for non-Muslims. For instance, Pakistan's constitution, the country from which Trump's examples are taken, supports religious freedom. The constitution of Pakistan establishes Islam as the state religion and requires all provisions of the law to be consistent with Islam (U.S. Department of State, 2022). However, the constitution allows freedom of religion stating that '[s]ubject to law, public order, and morality, every citizen shall have the right to profess, practice, and propagate his religion' (as cited in U.S. Department of State, 2022). Though Islam is the religion of the state, the constitution states that non-Muslims are free to practice their religion. If some Pakistani Muslims are hostile to non-Muslims, it does not mean that all Pakistani Muslims are hostile to non-Muslims or Pakistani government forbids freedom of religion. Establishing Islam as the religion of the state does not necessarily mean forbidding other religions. Like Pakistan, many Muslim-majority countries establish Islam as the religion of the state such as Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan, Oman, Bahrain, Algeria, Morocco, and many others, but their constitutions support the right of freedom of religion and prohibit discrimination (Stahnke and Blitt, 2005, pp.29-80). Maybe they fail to protect non-Muslims from violence and discrimination, but they do not actively restrict freedom of religion. The same applies to the US. That is, the First Amendment guarantees freedom of religion (U.S. Constitution), but sometimes Muslims are discriminated against because of their religion (Pew Research, 2019). However, this does not mean that all non-Muslim Americans are religious oppressors or discriminatory and racist. It is better to specify the countries one talks about to avoid misrepresentation and to not produce the stereotype that establishing Islam as the religion of the state means prohibiting non-Muslims from practicing their religions.

By the conflation of the laws of one Muslim-majority country with all Muslim-majority countries, the conflation of the restrictions of women's right in some Muslim-majority countries with all Muslim-majority countries and the conflation of the violent actions of some Muslims with all Muslims, Trump promotes the belief that Islam is the source of violence, honour killings and the belief that Islam allows its disciples and the governments of Muslim-majority to harm non-Muslims. In addition, he presents Muslims and Muslim-majority countries as monolithic, i.e., he claims that they lack diversity and differences. According to The Runnymede Trust (1997), presenting Islam and Muslims as monolithic is one of the building blocks of islamophobic discourse as it allows generalising that all Muslims are

barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist, violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism, engaged in 'a Clash of Civilisations.' When attributing violence to Muslims, some non-Muslims may refer to Jihad as a justification. They may use it in an extremist way, i.e., they may assume that Jihad only refers to an armed struggle against non-Muslims and exclude positive meanings such as struggle against injustice, the desire to better oneself morally, or the pursuit of knowledge (Council on Foreign Relations, 2021). According to the Runnymede Trust (1997, p.8), representing Muslims as militant people is an ingredient of islamophobic discourse. This representation spreads the belief that Muslims and Islam are 'undistinguishable from weapon' (ibid, p.9). This is what Trump does. He claims that Muslims desire to islamicise the US and presents them as militant people (see sub-section 5.2.2 for more details on Trump's claims on Jihad).

Trump represents Muslims as a collective and presents them as monolithic based on their shared religious identity, i.e., he claims that Muslims share the same qualities and engage in the same actions. That is, he claims that they lack diversity and differences. Trump draws on essentialist orientalist stereotypes, particularly the stereotypes of sexism and misogyny (Saïd, 1978;1995;2003, p.207) and the stereotypes of violence and terrorism (ibid, 1980, n.p.) widespread about the 'Islamic culture' and faith to derogate Muslims and represent Muslim immigrants as security threats. Trump's discourse is right-wing populist because he employs the 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) to construct Muslim immigrants as a threat to non-Muslim Americans. According to The Runnymede Trust (1997), presenting Muslims as monolithic because of their religion is one of the building blocks of islamophobic discourse as it allows generalising that all Muslims are sexist, barbaric, violent, aggressive, threatening, and supportive of terrorism. Trump's denigration of the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries resulted in discrimination because, during the campaign, Trump relied on the stereotypes of sexism and misogyny (Saïd, 1978;1995;2003, p.207) and the stereotypes of violence and terrorism (ibid, 1980, n.p.) to urge 'the Obama-Clinton administration' to deny entry to Muslim immigrants to the US. After taking the oath of presidency, he relied on the stereotypes of violence and terrorism to ban seven predominantly Muslim countries from immigrating to the US (see appendix one for 'the Muslim Travel Ban Statement' and appendix two for 'the Muslim Travel Ban Policy'). Therefore, I argue that Trump's representation of the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries is orientalist, islamophobic, racist, and right-wing populist.

In sub-section 5.2.2, I found out that Trump negatively represents Muslim Americans because he attributes to them the same actions and qualities he attributes to the Muslims of Muslim-

majority countries. In addition, he describes them as terrorist sympathisers and claims that they oppress the LGBTQ community. Trump represents the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries and Muslim Americans as similar social groups to claim that Muslims do not assimilate in the US, i.e., he claims that they bring the 'values' of their home countries and reject 'the American values' and laws such as secularism and religious freedom. He avoids the nomination of 'Muslim Americans' and classifies Muslim Americans according to their religion to imply that they cannot be American if they refuse 'the US values and culture' and laws. He represents non-Muslim Americans as tolerant, peaceful, and civilised people.

Trump claims that Muslims reject assimilation and desire to live according to the laws and 'values' of their home countries. Lack of assimilation is emphasised in right-wing populist discourse as they usually focus on 'culture', representing it 'as an essentially bounded entity whose integrity is threatened by the presence of residents supposedly belonging to a different 'culture', and thus not willing to learn and adopt 'our' conventions and norms, that is, to assimilate' (Wodak, 2013, p.32). Threat scenarios are referred to by the 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.), and the latter is one of the basic fundaments of right-wing populist discourse. Trump uses the 'Politics of Fear' (ibid) because he emphasises lack of assimilation to represent Muslim-Americans as a threat to 'the American values and culture', and laws. He also represents them as security threats. He claims that the American culture is superior to the Islamic culture. Thus, he reinforces the orientalist representation that 'They', Muslims, are inferior. Trump also refers to lack of assimilation in Europe. Thus, he reinforces the assumption of the 'Clash of Civilisations' theory that there will be a cultural conflict between the 'Islamic' and 'western' cultures (Huntington, 1996). I argue that Trump implies that Muslims cannot be American because he claims that Muslims reject 'the American way of life' and 'culture.' By claiming that Muslims reject freedom of religion he reproduces Huntington's (1996) claims that Muslims are hostile to secularism and detest the West ('anti-westernism') and attack it 'not for adhering to an imperfect, erroneous religion, which is nonetheless a "religion of the book, "but for not adhering to any religion at all. In Muslim eyes Western secularism, irreligiosity, and hence immorality are …evils' (p.215).

Trump employs the 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) to represent the Muslims immigrating from Muslim-majority countries and Muslim Americans as threats to the security and 'American cultural values.' He appeals to fear of non-Muslim Americans to legitimise his negative representation of Muslims. Trump's threat scenarios are socially constructed. He represents Muslims based on the essentialist orientalist and islamophobic ideologies that are

widespread about Muslims, particularly the ideologies of sexism and misogyny (Saïd, 1978;1995;2003, p.207) and the ideology of violence and terrorism (ibid, 1980, n.p.). I argue that these ideologies influenced Trump's understanding of Islam. Therefore, his discourse on Muslims is negative. The figure 5.1 below shows that Trump's discourse reproduces the same ideologies and renders them back to society, i.e., it reproduces and promotes them in society. Trump's discourse is socially conditioned because it is influenced by the widespread negative evaluation of Muslims in the US, and it is socially constitutive as it reproduces the same representation and promotes in the American society.

Figure 5.1 Ideology in Trump's discourse, adapted from KhosraviNik (2010, p.61)

To realise positive self-presentation, politicians usually emphasise positive things and deemphasise negative things about 'Us' and to realise negative other-presentation, they emphasise negative things and deemphasise positive things about 'Them' (van Dijk, 2008, 105). Trump includes bad things about Muslims and excludes good things about them. He emphasises good things about non-Muslim Americans and deemphasise bad things about them. However, groups are never homogeneous (Wodak. 2015, n.p.). There are good/non-extremist and bad/extremist Muslims and there are good and bad non-Muslim Americans. There are non-Muslim Americans that are intolerant and discriminatory against Muslims. Thus, Trump should

not essentialise and attribute only negative qualities to Muslims and positive qualities to non-Musim Americans. Trump excludes the success of Muslims in the American society. For instance, Muslim Americans are successful in U.S. society because they are more likely than other members of the population to open a business or work full time (U.S. Embassy in Georgia, 2022). He only focuses on violence and extremism to represent them as a violent and dangerous 'Other'.

Like the representation of the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries, Trump presents Muslim Americans as a collective based on their shared religious identity and attributes them essentialist orientalist qualities such as sexism and misogyny (Saïd, 1978;1995;2003, p.207) and violence and terrorism (ibid, 1980, n.p.) to appeal to fear of insecurity. He also emphasises cultural and religious differences to distinguish Muslim Americans from non-Muslim Americans and represent Muslim Americans as a different, deviant, and inferior 'Other' threatening the US 'cultural identity', constitution, laws, and values. Trump employs the right-wing populist strategy the 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) to appeal to fear of insecurity and fear of losing one's culture, values and laws to legitimise his discriminatory policy proposals such as surveilling Muslim Americans and their neighbourhoods and mosques. Moreover, Trump's representation of Muslim Americans resulted in everyday racism and discriminatory practices against Muslims. That is, anti-Muslim bias incidents increased dramatically in the US during Trump's campaign, such as harassment, intimidation, bullying, hate crimes and anti-mosque incidents (CAIR). In addition, Muslim-Americans experienced discrimination in various fields of public life, such as in employment (ibid). Therefore, Trump's representation of Muslim Americans is orientalist, islamophobic, racist, and right-wing populist.

I argue that If Trump's negative representation of Muslims was only used to attract electorates, his position on Muslims would have changed after becoming president. After taking the oath of presidency on the 20th of January 2017, Trump elected an islamophobic administration (Patel, 2017). He elected Steve Bannon as his senior adviser, Michael Flynn as his national security advisor, and Sebastian Gorka as his Deputy assistant (ibid). The three are known for their anti-Islam stance (ibid). They are also closely connected to Frank Gaffney, who heads the Center for Security Policy, a think tank known for promoting anti-Muslim agenda (ibid). In addition, he issued 'the Muslim Travel Ban Policy' which banned seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the US after one week of presidency and relied on the stereotype of Terrorism to legitimise it.

I strongly oppose the rhetoric of generalisation and essentialism Trump employs to represent Muslims. He could have avoided this biased representation of Muslims by specifying that there are extremists in the Muslim community. That is, he could have avoided generalising that all Muslims are extremists. He could have specified that there are Muslim terrorists and avoided genericising that all Muslims are associated to terrorism. He could have avoided stereotypes. He could have acknowledged the difference between the 'Islamic culture' and the 'American culture' without focusing on stereotypes and without inferiorising Muslims.

5.4 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to answer RQ1 and sub-RQ1, i.e., RQ1: how are Muslims represented in Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration? and sub-RQ1: to what extent is Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration orientalist, islamophobic, and racist, and how does his representation of Muslims link to Right-win Populism? The analysis of the representation of Muslims has shown that Trump represents the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries and Muslim Americans negatively. He attributes them sexism and misogyny, violence and terrorism and sympathy with terrorism to represent them as security threats. In addition, he claims that they do not assimilate, thus he represents them as threats to 'the American values' and laws. Also, he claims that the presence of Muslims in the US resulted in a security crisis. In chapter six, I will analyse the strategies Trump employs to represent 'the Obama-Clinton administration' as the source of the crisis and himself as the solver of the crisis.

6. The representation of Obama, Clinton, and Trump

6.1 Introduction

Trump talks about four main political actors: President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidates Clinton and Trump. I use the concept political actors instead of social actors because of the function of the actors I focus on in this chapter, i.e., politicians. The aim of this chapter is to analyse how President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidates Clinton and Trump are represented and evaluated to answer RQ2: how are President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidates Clinton and Trump represented in Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration? and sub-RQ2: how do the representations of President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidates Clinton and Trump link to Right-win Populism?

The analysis of the representations of President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidates Clinton and Trump shows that Trump associates President Obama and his Secretary of State, Clinton, when he refers to the Obama administration. Thus, in this thesis, I refer to President Obama and his Secretary of State, Clinton, by 'the Obama-Clinton administration.' I put the latter between inverted commas because it is one of the nominations Trump employs to associate President Obama and the Secretary of State Clinton. Then, he dissociates them to focus on Clinton as a presidential candidate. Trump, as a presidential candidate, frequently differentiates himself from 'the Obama-Clinton administration' and the presidential opponent Clinton. Accordingly, in sub-section 6.2.1, I will analyse the strategies Trump employs to represent 'the Obama-Clinton administration.' In sub-section 6.2.2, I will analyse the strategies he employs to dissociate President Obama and the Secretary of State Clinton to talk about Clinton as a presidential opponent and construct her potential future administration as an extension of 'the Obama-Clinton administration.' In sub-section 6.2.3, I will analyse the strategies he employs to differentiate his potential future administration from 'the Obama-Clinton administration' and the Clinton potential future administration.

My analysis shows that Trump positions President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the opponent Clinton as the 'Other' and himself as the 'Self.' He adopts the strategy of differentiation to distinguish his potential future administration from 'the Obama-Clinton administration' and the Clinton potential future administration. To realise this differentiation, he engages in negative-other presentation and positive-self presentation (van Dijk, 1991). That is, on one hand, he endows 'the Obama-Clinton administration' with a set of negative features such as incompetence, dishonesty, and corruption. He attributes to Clinton's potential administration the negative features he attributes to 'the Obama-Clinton administration.' That is, he employs the process of similarity to construct Clinton's potential future administration as a continuation of 'the Obama-Clinton administration.' On the other hand, he attributes his potential future administration a set of positive features, such as competence, honesty, and incorruptibility. He positions 'the Obama-Clinton administration' and the Clinton potential future administration as the 'Other.' Then, he distinguishes them from his potential future administration. He positions the latter as the 'Self.' This chapter will highlight the linguistic tools Trump employs to realise similarity, differentiation, the binary division of 'Self' versus 'Other', and the topoi and/or fallacies he utilises to defend the binary division of 'Self' versus 'Other.' I will italicise the terms that indicate the analytical categories I use to analyse the selected data.

6.2 Nomination, predication, and argumentation analysis

In this section, I present the representational strategies Trump employs to represent 'the Obama-Clinton administration', the Clinton potential future administration and the Trump potential future administration. I will also analyse the arguments Trump employs to justify the qualities and actions he attributes to each administration. I explained in chapters four and five that nomination and predication strategies are complementary and hard to separate (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.45). That is, some nominations may perform evaluative and judgmental meanings on their own (ibid), but if they do not, the analysis of their predicates will indicate if a positive or negative evaluation takes place (ibid). Speakers most of the time rely on argumentation, either sound or fallacious, to defend a positive or a negative evaluation (ibid). For this reason, I combined the analysis of nomination, predication, and argumentation strategies. In sub-section 6.2.1, I will analyse the strategies Trump employs to represent the Obama-Clinton immigration system as the source of Radical/Islamic Terrorism and insecurity in the US. In sub-section 6.2.2, I will analyse the strategies he employs to construct Clinton's immigration plan as a follow up of the Obama-Clinton immigration system. In sub-section

6.2.3, I will analyse the strategies he employs to distinguish his immigration approach from the Obama-Clinton and the Clinton immigration approaches and represent himself as the fighter of insecurity and Radical/Islamic Terrorism.

6.2.1 President Obama and the Secretary of State Clinton

The table 6.1 below presents the main nominations Trump uses to refer to President Obama and the Secretary of State Clinton and the numbers of the extracts from which the nominations are taken.

The nominations of President Obama	The nominations of the Secretary of State Clinton	The nominations of 'the Obama-Clinton administration'
our government (62), President Obama (69, 70, 73, 77, 78, 80, and 98), he (70, 71, 73, 81) Obama (71 and 72), the Obama administration (77 and 82), a president (81)	Clinton's State Department (62), Hillary Clinton (77, 90, and 93), @HillaryClinton (91), Hillary (92) Clinton charity (94)	they (75 and 77), Obama-Clinton (76), Hillary and Obama (79), politically correct fools (79), the Obama-Clinton administration (85), Obama-Clinton (86), @HillaryClinton-Obama (88), Obama and Clinton (87)

Table 6.1 The nominations of President Obama and the Secretary of State Clinton

The table 6.1 above shows that Trump utilises formal *nominations* to refer to Obama. That is, he refers to him by his surname (Obama) as in extracts (71) and (72). He *refers* to him metonymically in extract (62). He also *refers* to him by the Obama administration in extracts (77) and (82). He *nominates* him anaphorically in extracts (70), (71), (73), and (81). In extracts (69), (70), (73), (77), (78), (80), (81) and (98), he functionalises him because he denotes him by his function, i.e., President. The latter is the dominant nomination. To refer to Clinton, he uses both informal and semi-formal *nominations*. He *nominates* her informally in extract (92) because he refers to her by her first name (Hillary). He *nominates* her semi-formally in extracts (77), (90), and (93) as he uses both he first name and surname (Hillary Clinton). Clinton's husband served as the 42nd President of the US. Therefore, I argue that Trump avoids the formal *nomination* 'Clinton' and employs informal and semi-formal *nominations* to specify that he does not refer to her husband. He *functionalises* her in extract (62) since he specifies her function (Secretary of State) and in extract (94) he specifies that she runs a charity.

Trump most of the time *associates* President Obama and the Secretary of State Clinton to refer to them as a collective as in extracts (75), (76), (77), (79), (85), (86), (87) and (88). Therefore, I refer to them by 'the Obama-Clinton administration' in this thesis. I put the latter between inverted commas because it is Trump's nomination. Most of the *nominations* Trump employs to refer to President Obama, secretary of State Clinton and 'the Obama-Clinton administration' are *non-evaluative* except the *nomination* 'politically correct fools' in extract (79). However, when I analysed the qualities and actions Trump associates the *non-evaluative nominations*, I noticed that *negative depictions* of President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton and 'the Obama-Clinton administration' take place. That is, he attributes them incompetence, dishonesty and corruption and passivates them in terms of fighting Radical/Islamic Terrorism. I devote the rest of this sub-section 6.1.1 to the analysis of the qualities and actions Trump attributes to President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and 'the Obama-Clinton administration.'

> 61. We are importing Radical Islamic Terrorism into the West through a failed immigration system. Manchester CR
>
> 62. Each year, the United States permanently admits more than 100,000 immigrants from the Middle East, and many more from Muslim countries outside the Middle East. Our government has been admitting ever-growing numbers, year after year, without any effective plan for our security. In fact, Clinton's State Department was in charge of the admissions process for people applying to enter from overseas. Manchester CR
>
> 63. We have a dysfunctional immigration system which does not permit us to know who we let into our country, and it does not permit us to protect our citizens. Manchester CR

In extract (61), Trump refers to the US by the plural pronoun 'we' and the noun the 'West.' There is a *negative representation* of the American immigration system because Trump *describes* it as a failure and unjustifiably represents it as the source of Radical/Islamic Terrorism. The analysis of the representation of the Muslims of Muslim majority countries in sub-section 5.2.1 in chapter five reveals that he associates Muslims to terrorism. Therefore, in extract (61), he *conversationally implies* that they bring Radical/Islamic Terrorism in the US through the admissions of Muslims. He *backgrounds* Obama, but it can be inferred from the material process 'import' conjugated into present simple that he refers to the Obama administration. The latter is also *referred to* metonymically by 'our government' in extract (62). The material processes 'import' in extract (61) and 'admit' in extract (62) *activate* the Obama administration in terms of admitting Muslim immigrants. The analysis of the

representation of the Muslims of Muslim majority countries in sub-section 5.2.1 in chapter five, shows that Trump employs the term 'Middle East' to refer to non/ middle eastern Muslim majority-countries. In extract (62), he clearly separates middle eastern and non-middle eastern Muslims. Trump's understanding of the 'Middle East' is not important. What is important is that he talks about all Muslims. Using the present perfect continuous 'has been admitting' and the adverb 'permanently' in extract (62), he claims that the admissions of Muslims are non-stop. I argue that he *describes* Obama's admissions of Muslims as non-stop, *includes* the number of Muslims Obama admits (100,000) and uses the adjective 'ever growing' in in extract (62) to *intensify* danger because he associates Muslims to terrorism, religious extremism, and violence against non-Muslims, particularly non-Muslim Americans (see chapter five for the representation of Muslims).

I argue that in extract (63), he *conversationally implies* that the US immigration system is dysfunctional because it fails to screen Muslims to find out if they advocate violence and terrorism against non-Muslim Americans. In the same extract, Trump *functionalises* Clinton because he refers to State Department. By the *inclusion* of the detail that she oversaw the admission programme, he claims that she supported the admissions of Muslims without screening them. He *associates* Obama and Clinton and criticises them for threatening the security of non-Muslim Americans. Like right-wing populists, he employs the '*Politics of Fear*' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) because he implicitly represents the admissions of Muslims and/or the Obama-Clinton immigration system as a threat to the security of non-Muslim Americans. Trump *activates* 'the Obama-Clinton administration' in terms of admitting Muslims but *passivates* it in terms of protecting non-Muslim Americans. In extract (64), Trump refers to the FBI Director, an authority, to justify the claim that the Obama-Clinton immigration system lacks effective screening mechanisms.

> 64. Even our FBI Director has admitted that we cannot effectively check the backgrounds of the people we are letting into America. Manchester CR

The *topos of authority* in extract (64) can be interpreted as follows: Trump's claim that the US immigration system is dysfunctional because it lacks effective screening mechanisms is correct because, the FBI director, an authority, confirms that it is ineffective. Trump *conceals* the identity of the FBI Director, but I think he refers to James Comey who served as the director of Federal Bureau of Investigation from 2013 to 2017, i.e., he was the director during Trump's presidential campaign (Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.).

65. The killer (…) was born to Afghan parents who immigrated to the United States The bottom line is that the only reason the killer was in America in the first place was because we allowed his family to come here. Manchester CR

66. Immigration from Afghanistan into the United States has increased nearly five-fold in just one year (…) We admit many more from other countries in the region. Manchester CR

67. The male shooter in San Bernardino (…) was the child of immigrants from Pakistan, and he brought his wife – the other terrorist - from Saudi Arabia, through another one of our easily exploited visa programs. Manchester CR

In extracts (65) and (67), Trump states that the terrorists and/or their families are admitted from Muslim-majority countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. He is ambiguous because he *excludes* the administration that admitted them. However, since they were born and grew up in the US, they were admitted before 'the Obama-Clinton administration.' The Orlando and the San Bernardino terrorist attacks are committed during the presidency of Obama. Trump's reference to the attacks gives the impression that they are admitted by 'the Obama-Clinton administration', but they are not. The only terrorist that is admitted in 'the Obama-Clinton administration' is the wife of the terrorist who committed the San Bernardino attack. The analysis of the representation of the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries in sub-section 5.2.1 in chapter five reveals that Trump represents Afghanistan and Pakistan as countries of violent religious extremism and Saudi Arabia as a sponsor of terrorism. It also shows that Trump generalises violent religious extremism to all Muslim-majority countries. I argue that in extracts (65) and (67) he *conversationally implies* that the families of terrorists and/or terrorists brought religious extremism to the US. He also *conversationally implies* that the attacks would have been prevented if there were effective screening mechanisms. In extract (66), by the material processes 'increase' and 'admit', he *activates* Obama in terms of admitting immigrants from Muslim-majority countries. He appeals to common-sense, i.e., non-Muslim Americans may ask why Obama admits immigrants from Muslim-majority countries if they are security threats. He also appeals to fear. That is, like extracts (62) and (63), he represents the admissions of Muslims as a threat to the security of non-Muslim Americans. Like in the Manchester CR, in the Fort Myers CR, he also reminds the public of the terrorist attacks that happened in the US.

68. There have been Islamic terrorist attacks in Minnesota and New York City and in New Jersey. These attacks and many others were made possible because of our extremely open immigration system, which fails to properly vet and screen the individuals and families coming into our country. Attack after attack, from 9/11 to San Bernardino, we have seen how failures to screen who is entering the United States puts all of our citizens, everyone in this room, at danger. So let me state very, very clearly Immigration security is national security. Fort Myers CR

Joining the process 'fail' with the material processes 'vet' and 'screen' and the adverb 'properly' in extract (68), he *conventionally implies* that the US immigration system is ineffective. In the same extract, he also *conventionally implies* that the terrorist attacks that happened in the US are the direct result of the lack of screening mechanisms. He appeals to fear in the same extract because he states that the lack of vetting mechanisms threatens the security of non-Muslim Americans. Like extracts (62), (63) and (66), he represents the American immigration system as a threat to the security of non-Muslim Americans. He *excludes* the administrations under which the terrorists were admitted in extracts (65), (67), and (68). The terrorists of the San Bernardino and Orlando attacks were born in the US which means that their parents immigrated before the Obama administration. The 9/11 hijackers immigrated in 2000, i.e., during the Bill Clinton administration. Only the wife of the San Bernardino terrorist immigrated in 'the Obama-Clinton administration.' Therefore, I argue that he blames the previous administrations for open borders and puts more blame on 'the Obama-Clinton administration' for keeping it open and increasing admissions. He adopts the basic fundaments of right-wing populist discourse: (1) using the *'Politics of Fear'* to represent immigrants as a threat to the 'Self' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) and (2) criticising 'the elite' who opened the borders to immigrants or who support open borders (Pelinka, 2013, pp.8-9). In extracts (69), (70), (71), (72) and (73), Trump criticises Obama's political correctness on Muslims.

69. Why won't President Obama use the term Islamic Terrorism? Isn't it now, after all of this time and so much death, about time! Tweet Nov 15, 2015

70. When will President Obama issue the words RADICAL ISLAMIC TERRORISM? He can't say it, and unless he will, the problem will not be solved! Tweet Nov 15, 2015

71. Well, Obama refused to say (he just can't say it), that we are at war with RADICAL ISLAMIC TERRORISTS. Tweet Dec 7, 2015

72. Obama, and all others, have been so weak, and so politically correct, that terror groups are forming and getting stronger! Shame. Tweet Mar 22, 2016

73. Is President Obama going to finally mention the words radical Islamic terrorism? If he doesn't, he should immediately resign in disgrace! Tweet Jun 12, 2016

The five extracts (69), (70), (71), (72) and (73) above are Trump's reactions to some of the terrorist attacks that happened domestically and in Europe. For instance, in extracts (69) and (70), he reacts to the Paris attack. In extract (71), he reacts to the San Bernardino attack. In extract (72), he reacts to the Brussels attack. In extract (73), he reacts to the Orlando attack. In all the extracts, Trump refers to terrorism. In extract (69), he avoids the adjective 'radical' and uses only the adjective Islamic to present terrorism as a religious issue. In the remaining extracts, he adds the adjective 'radical' and mentions that it is Islamic, and it is radical. In sub-section 5.2.2 in chapter five, I explained that he uses 'Radical Islam' interchangeably with 'Islam.' Thus, it is not surprising if he uses 'Radical Islamic Terrorism' interchangeably with 'Islamic Terrorism' and *associates* the followers of Islam to terrorism. In this thesis, I use the term Radical/Islamic Terrorism to always remind the readers that Trump uses them interchangeably.

After every terrorist attack, either domestically or in Europe, he urges Obama to use the term radical/Islamic Terrorism. That is, he criticises Obama's political correctness. The *legitimisation strategy* he employs in extract (70) to justify his opposition to political correctness can be presented as follows: if Obama does not acknowledge the problem of Radical/Islamic Terrorism, he will not be able to fight it. Political correctness has positive connotations as it prevents offensive and racist discourse; however, Trump employs it in a negative way by stating that it prevents solving Radical/Islamic Terrorism (extract 70) and aggravates Radical/Islamic Terrorism (extract 72). He chooses the right time to promote the islamophobic stereotype that Muslims are associated to violence and terrorism (Saïd, 1980, n.p.). According to The Runnymede Trust (1997, p.9), attacks on political correctness are very common in Islamophobic discourse and used as a strategy to legitimise discriminatory and racist representations of Muslims. Extracts (74), (75) and (76) below show that Trump does not only criticise political correctness in his Twitter but also in his campaign rallies and in TV interviews.

74. we're having problems with the Muslims and we're having problems with Muslims coming into the country and we are seeing it, whether it's California where they killed the 14 people, the two young married couple. Fox Business TVI

75. They refuse to say what the problem is. I mean, you'd almost think they have the terrorists coming out from Sweden. They refuse to say what the problem is. The problem is obvious. It's not even obvious, it's 100 percent. MSNBC TVI1

76. Obama-Clinton have been silent about Islamic terrorism for many years. Fort Myers CR

In extract (74), Trump employs the nomination 'Muslims' twice. He employs one with the definite article 'the' and the other one with the material process 'come.' The material process 'come' *conventionally implies* that he *refers* to the Muslims of Muslim majority countries (Muslim immigrants). I argue that the nomination 'Muslims' used with the definite article 'the' *refers* to Muslim Americans. Trump collectivises Muslims and pointing the San Bernardino terrorist attack in the same extract shows that he employs 'guilt by association' (Green, 2015, p.21), i.e., he *associates* Muslims to terrorism based on acts of terror created by a minority of Muslims. That is, he conflates the actions of terrorists or radicals with all Muslims (*generalisation*). By associating them to terrorism, he problematises all Muslims not radical Muslims in the Muslim group (*abstraction*). In extracts (65) and (67), which belong to the Manchester CR, he clearly mentions that the terrorists of the San Bernardino and the Orlando attacks and/or their families are admitted from Muslim-majority countries. By the negation of the material processes 'come' in extract (75), which belongs to another text, he implicitly expresses the same idea. That is, he says that terrorists are not admitted from Sweden, a European/'Western' country, and terrorist attacks are not committed by Swedish people. He *conversationally implies* that the terrorists are Muslims admitted from Muslim-majority countries, i.e., he implies that they are not 'westerners.' By the adjective 'obvious' and the percentage '100%' in extract (75), he *intensifies* the *association* between Muslims and terrorism. In extracts (74) and (75), which belong to different texts, he implies that the problem is Radical/Islamic Terrorism. In extract (76), he clearly states that the problem is Islamic Terrorism. Like extract (69), he avoids the adjective 'radical' which further shows that he uses Islamic Terrorism synonymously with Radical Islamic Terrorism. Extracts (75) and (76) are taken from different texts but in both Trump *associates* Obama and his Secretary of State, Clinton, and criticises them for being politically correct on Muslims. In both extracts, he appeals to common-sense. That is, non-Muslim Americans may say that the San Bernardino

and Orlando attacks are committed by Muslim individuals and may agree with Trump that 'the Obama-Clinton administration' should not be politically correct on Muslims. By conflating Muslims with terrorists, he also appeals to fear of insecurity, i.e., he represents Muslims as security threats. Extract (77) shows that in the Manchester CR, Trump associates Obama and Clinton and declares that 'the Obama-Clinton administration' prioritised political correctness over common sense and prioritised the protection of terrorists over the security of non-Muslim Americans.

> 77. The Obama Administration, with the support of Hillary Clinton and others, has also damaged our security by restraining our intelligence-gathering and failing to support law enforcement. They have put political correctness above common sense, above your safety, and above all else Nearly a year ago, the Senate Subcommittee asked President Obama's Departments of Justice, State and Homeland Security to provide the immigration history of all terrorists inside the United States. These Departments refused to comply. Manchester CR

> 78. President Obama must release the full and complete immigration histories of all individuals implicated in terrorist activity of any kind since 9/11. The public has a right to know how these people got here. Manchester CR

In extract (77), Trump *associates* President Obama and the Secretary of State Clinton by the preposition 'with' and the plural pronoun 'they.' He claims that 'the Obama-Clinton administration' is a danger to the security of 'Americans' because he claims that they sympathise with terrorists. That is, he claims that they do not denounce terrorists. He expresses sympathy with terrorists by joining the verbal process 'refuse' with the material process 'comply.' The material process 'damage' shows that he refers to political correctness as something bad because he claims that it results in insecurity. I am against political correctness on terrorists, but I am for political correctness on Muslims because many conflate the actions of terrorists with Muslims to legitimise islamophobic and racist representations. In extracts (62) and (63), Trump claims that 'the Obama-Clinton administration' prioritise the admission of Muslims over the security of non-Muslim Americans. In extract (77), he claims that they protect terrorists and are careless about the security of non-Muslim Americans. This is a right-wing populist strategy. That is, right-wing populists criticise 'the elite' who admitted or support the admission of foreigners (Palinka, 2013, pp.8-9) and accuse them of favoring 'Them' over the 'People' (Salmela & von Scheve, 2018, p.7). Trump employs another right-wing populist strategy in extract (78) which is appeal to honesty, i.e., right-wing populists always state that the people deserve to know the truth (van Dijk, 1992, p.90; Albertazzi, 2007, p.335). In extract

(78), Trump clearly states the public deserve to know how terrorists came to the US. By the expression 'how these people got here', he *conventionally implies* that they deserve to know who admitted them. Stating that 'the Obama-Clinton administration' hide the immigration history of terrorists in extract (77) gives the impression that it is 'the Obama-Clinton administration' that admitted terrorists. However, I already mentioned that the terrorists of the San Bernardino and Orlando attacks were born and grew up in the US and their families were not admitted under the 'Obama-Clinton administration.' This takes me to another interpretation which is: Trump *conversationally implies* that Obama sympathises with terrorists because he is Muslim, i.e., during the campaign, Trump states that Obama is Muslim (CNN, 2015). Trump describes Islam as a monolithic religion (see chapter five for more details), any association between Obama and Islam might interpreted as an association between Obama and terrorism or extremism (Green, 2015, p. 13). I argue that Trump claims that Obama is politically correct because he is a Muslim. In extract (99), I will show that he claims that Clinton is politically correct for her personal interests.

> 79. With Hillary and Obama, the terrorist attacks will only get worse. Politically correct fools, won't even call it what it is – RADICAL ISLAM!
> Tweet Jul 4, 201

In extract (79), Trump *associates* Obama and Clinton. He *nominates* Obama formally because he refers to him by his surname (Obama), and he *nominates* Clinton informally because he refers to her by her first name (Hillary). He employs *non-evaluative* formal and informal *nominations*. However, he also uses *the evaluative nomination* 'politically correct fools.' The latter has the attributes of political correctness, which Trump uses in a negative sense, and incompetence and lack of common-sense. He employs a *topos of threat* in a form of a *topos of consequence*, i.e., he claims that political correctness on Muslims will result in more attacks to appeal to fear of insecurity.

In extract (62) taken from the Manchester CR, Trump states that 'the Obama-Clinton administration' admit 100,000 Muslim immigrants yearly (non-refugees). Like extract (62), in extract (80) taken from Fox Business TVI, he *activates* 'the Obana-Clinton administration' in terms of admitting Syrian refugees through the material process 'take.' In extract (81) taken from the ABC News TVI1, he states that 'the Obama-Clinton administration' would take 250, 000 Syrian refugees.

80. You know, the migration in Syria. (…) President Obama is taking in thousands of people, distributing all over the United States, we don't even know how many and nobody even knows where they're going. Fox Business TVI

81. The number he wants is much higher than 10,000. I've heard it's 200,000. That's the real number. That's the real number he wants. I've even heard 250,000 people. We have a president that doesn't know what he is doing. We have a president, George, who is totally incompetent. ABC News TVI1

Through the material process 'distribute' and the circumstance of location 'all over' in extract (80), he claims that 'the Obama-Clinton administration' do not gather Syrian refugees in one place. He repeatedly called for the surveillance of Syrian refugees in the US during the campaign. Therefore, in extract (80), he *conversationally implies* that 'the Obama-Clinton administration' cannot surveil refugees since he claims that they do not put them in one location. The analysis of the representation of Muslims in chapter five shows that Trump *associates* Syrian refugees with terrorism. Since he associates them with terrorism, in extract (80), he also *conversationally implies* that distributing them all over the US is a danger to the security of Americans. He appeals to fear of insecurity. Through the negation of the mental process of cognition 'know' in extract (80), he states that 'the Obama-Clinton administration' do not disclose the locations of refugees. In extract (81), which belongs to a different text, he also unjustifiably claims that 'the Obama-Clinton administration' do not disclose the real number of refugees they admit, i.e., he represents Obama and his Secretary of State Clinton as dishonest politicians. Like extract (78), in extracts (80) and (81), Trump employs a right-wing populist strategy which is appeal to honesty.' Like extracts (75) and (76), in extract (80), he describes 'the Obama-Clinton administration' as an incompetent administration to appeal to common-sense, i.e., non-Muslim Americans may ask why 'the Obama-Clinton administration' admit Muslims if they are linked to terrorism. In sub-section 6.2.3 below, I will show that Trump appeals to common sense to legitimise the suggestion that he may ban Syrian refugees deny racism. This legitimisation strategy is common in right-wing populist discourse (van Dijk, 1992, p.111).

82. Obama administration fails to screen Syrian refugees' social media accounts (he quotes the title of a post by washingtontimes.com and provides the title). Tweet May 28, 2016

83. We just don't learn. We don't learn. I mean, Brussels is an amazing example. Brussels was an absolutely a crime-free city, one of the most beautiful cities in the world. And now you look at it, it's a disaster. Fox and Friends TVI1

84. You go to Paris and you go to Brussels and you go to other cities, you look at what's happening now with Germany. NBC News TVI

In extracts (53) and (54) in sub-section 5.2.2 in chapter five, Trump claims that ISIS affords cell phones to Syrian refugees. In extract (82), he quotes the title of an article written by the Washington Times claiming that 'the Obama-Clinton administration' fail to screen Syrian refugees' social media accounts. This is a *topos of authority* which *conversationally implies* that 'the Obama-Clinton administration' fail to find out if Syrian Refugees communicate with ISIS. In extracts (55), (56) and (57) in sub-section 5.2.2, Trump states that the Brussels, Paris, and Germany terrorist attacks are committed by refugees to justify the claim that Syrian refugees have links to ISIS. In extracts (83) and (84), which belong to different texts, he implicitly employs the strategy of *equating* and *balancing* (Wodak, 2015, n.p.), common in right wing-populist discourse, to emphasise that since terrorist attacks happened in Belgium, France, and Germany, they will happen in the US because 'the Obama-Clinton administration' admit Syrian refugees. Based on three attacks committed in Europe, he *generalises* that Syrian refugees are ISIS. This is a *fallacious generalisation*. I agree that some refugees engage in terrorism, but the majority flee war and destruction. In sub-section 6.2.3 in this chapter, I will show that Trump relies on the negative representation of Syrian refugees to legitimise his suggestion to ban them if elected President. In extract (86), which is taken from the Youngstown CR, Trump claims that 'the Obama-Clinton administration' ruined the 'Middle East', and in extract (87) taken from the Fort Myers CR, Trump represents 'the Obama-Clinton administration' as the founder of ISIS.

85. Let's look back at the Middle East at the very beginning of 2009, before the Obama-Clinton Administration took over. Libya was stable. Syria was under control. Egypt was ruled by a secular President and an ally of the United States. Iraq was experiencing a reduction in violence. The group that would become what we now call ISIS was close to being extinguished. Iran was being choked off by economic sanctions. Youngstown CR

Bush, the president of the US before Obama, invaded two Muslim-majority countries, i.e., Afghanistan and Iraq, under the so-called narrative 'War on Terror' (Deflem, 2013, pp. 987-988). Bush explicitly stated that the aim of his invasions is to fight terrorism, but the implicit aim behind his invasions is to exploit oil resources (Green, 2015, p.123, see section 3.3 in chapter three for more details about Bush's so-called narrative 'War on Terror'). These countries have expansive oil and energy reserves (ibid, p.105). In extract (85), there is an implicit *positive representation* of the Bush administration. Trump *excludes* Bush, but Bush can be inferred from the circumstance of location 'before the Obama-Clinton.' Through the adjective 'stable', the phrases 'under control', 'reduction in violence', and the sentence 'ISIS was about to disappear', Trump *conventionally implies* that under the Bush administration the 'Middle East' was stable, i.e., he implies that though Bush invaded Iraq and Afghanistan, he did not destabilise the middle East. By stating that ISIS was about to disappear, he claims that Bush succeeded in fighting terror.

86. What have the decisions of Obama-Clinton produced? Libya is in ruins, our ambassador and three other brave Americans are dead, and ISIS has gained a new base of operations. Syria is in the midst of a disastrous civil war. ISIS controls large portions of territory. A refugee Crisis now threatens Europe and the Unites States. In Egypt, terrorists have gained a foothold in the Sinai desert, near the Suez Canal, one of the most essential waterways in the world. Iraq is in chaos, and ISIS on the loose'. Youngstown CR

87. Obama and Clinton have toppled regimes, displaced millions of people, then opened the door to ISIS to enter our country. Fort Myers CR

88. @HillaryClinton-Obama #ISIS Strategy Has Allowed It To Expand to Become a Global Threat #DebateNight (Link). Tweet Sep 27, 2016

In extracts (86), (87), and (88), which belong to three different texts, Trump *associates* Obama and Clinton and claims that their foreign policy decisions created ISIS. In extract (86), he states that under 'the Obama-Clinton administration' ISIS spread in Syria, Libya, Egypt, and Iraq. This is expressed through the material processes 'control', 'gain' and the idiom 'on the loose.' By the words 'ruins', 'death' and 'chaos', Trump *conventionally implies* that 'the Obama-Clinton administration' destabilised the 'Middle East.' He *negatively represents* 'the Obama-

Clinton administration' foreign policy approach, i.e., he represents their decisions as the source of ISIS. In extract (87), by the material processes 'topple' and 'displace', he claims that 'the Obama-Clinton administration' destabilised countries in the 'Middle East' and created a refugee crisis. The analysis of the representation of Muslims in chapter five reveals that he associates refugees to ISIS, thus in extract (87) he *conversationally implies* that they admit ISIS through the admission of refugees. In extract (88), he unjustifiably states that 'the Obama-Clinton administration' made ISIS a global threat, but he *conversationally implies* that the countries, such as Germany, Belgium, and France which he refers to in extract (84), that take refugees are admitting ISIS. In extract (90) and (91), Trump dissociates Obama and Clinton to represent Clinton as the source of the bad foreign policy decisions in 'the Obama-Clinton administration.'

> 89. President Obama has since said he regards Libya as his worst mistake. Youngstown CR

> 90. According to then – Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the invasion of Libya was nearly a split decision, but Hillary's Clinton forceful advocacy for the intervention was the deciding factor. Youngstown CR

> 91. @HillaryClinton has been a foreign policy DISASTER for the American people. I will #MakeAmericaStrongAgain #Debate #BigLeagueTruth. Tweet Oct 20, 2016

In extract (89), Trump reports what President Obama said about the invasion of Libya. He uses the verbal process 'say' to claim that Obama admits that the invasion of Libya was a bad decision. In extract (90), he employs *a topos of authority*, i.e., he refers to the Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to emphasise that President Obama disagreed with his Secretary of State Clinton on the invasion of Libya and blame Clinton for the invasion. Extract (91) shows that Trump also *individualises* Clinton in Twitter to represent her as the source of bad foreign policy decisions. It is not important to find out who made bad foreign policy decisions. What is important is the way Trump *individualises* Clinton to represent her as an incompetent Secretary of State and convince electorates that she is incompetent to be President. From extract (92) till extract (94), he individualises her and represents her as a corrupt Secretary of State to further convince electorates that she is not qualified to be President.

92. Hillary took money and did favors for regimes that enslave women and murder gays. Jun 21, 2016

93. Hillary Clinton raked in money from regimes that horribly oppress women and gays & refuses to speak out Against Radical Islam. Aug 1, 2016

94. 'Clinton Charity Got Up To $56 Million From Nations That Are Anti-Women, Gays' #CrookedHillary. Oct 24, 2016

Through the material processes 'take' in extract (92), 'rake in' in extract (93) and 'get up' in extract (94), Trump claims that Clinton received money from Islamic countries. In sub-section 5.2.1 in chapter five, he represents Muslim-majority countries as oppressive countries. Therefore, I argue that by the sentences 'regimes that enslave women and murder gays' in extract (92), 'regimes that horribly oppress women and gays' in extract (93) and 'Nations That Are Anti-Women' in extract (94), he *conversationally implies* Muslim-majority countries. In all the three extracts, he represents Clinton as a corrupt Secretary of State. Accusing 'the elite' of corruption is very common in populist discourse (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013, p.11). Interestingly, in extract (93), he makes an association between corruption and political correctness. He claims that Clinton is politically correct for her personal interests.

6.2.1.1 Concluding discussion

The analysis of the representation of President Obama and the Secretary of State Clinton shows that Trump mostly associates President Obama and the Secretary of State Clinton to refer to them as a collective. Therefore, in this thesis, I nominate them by 'the Obama-Clinton administration.' All the references Trump employs to *nominate* 'the Obama-Clinton administration' are non-evaluative except the nomination 'politically correct fools.' The latter is negative because it carries the attributes of political correctness, which Trump uses in a negative sense because he claims that it prevents fighting Radical/Islamic Terrorism, and foolishness, by which Trump means bad judgements and decisions (i.e., incompetence). The non-evaluative nominations are also associated with political correctness, bad judgements and decisions and incompetence. They are also associated with dishonesty.

Trump individualises the Secretary of State Clinton and represents her as the source of bad judgements and decisions in 'the Obama-Clinton administration' and a corrupt Secretary of State. Trump passivates 'the Obama-Clinton administration' in terms of fighting Radical/Islamic Terrorism and protecting the security of 'Americans' because he claims that they support the admissions of Muslims, who he associates to violent religious extremism and terrorism in chapter five, without screening their backgrounds. Therefore, he represents the

'Obama-Clinton' open borders as a danger to the security of non-Muslim Americans. Domestically, Trump claims that 'the Obama-Clinton administration' protect Muslims and terrorists at the expense of the security of non-Muslim Americans. He claims that Obama sympathises with Muslims because he is a Muslim, and Clinton sympathises for her personal interests. He seemingly promotes a negative representation/evaluation of 'the Obama-Clinton administration' and positions them as a threatening 'Other.' I argue that Trump represents 'the Obama-Clinton administration' from a right-wing populist perspective because criticising 'the elite' who support open borders and admit 'Others' represented as different and deviant (Pelinka, 2013, pp.8-9), and accusing them of favoring those 'Others' over the 'Self' are the fundaments of right-wing populist discourse (Salmela & von Scheve, 2018, p. 1). In sub-section 6.2.2 below, I will analyse the strategies Trump employs to represent Clinton as a follow up of 'the Obama-Clinton administration.'

6.2.2 The presidential candidate Clinton

The table 6.2 below shows that Trump employs various nominations to refer to the presidential candidate Clinton, i.e., informal, semi-formal, anaphoric, and functionalising. The table also provides the numbers of the extracts from which the nominations are taken.

The nominations of the presidential candidate Clinton				
Informal	Semi-formal	Anaphoric	Evaluative	Functionalising
Hillary (96), (98) and (105)	Hillary Clinton (112) and (113)	She (96), (98), (100) and (102) Her (100), (103), (108) and (109)	Crooked Hillary Clinton (97), (99), (107)	My opponent (101) and (110)

Table 6.2 The nominations of the presidential candidate Clinton

The table 6.2 above shows that Trump employs a mixture of informal and semi-formal *nominations* to refer to Clinton. He *nominates* her informally in extracts (96), (98) and (105) because he refers to her by her first name (Hillary). He *nominates* her semi-formally in extracts (112) and (113) because he uses both her first name and surname (Hillary Clinton). I already argued in sub-section 6.2.1 that Trump avoids the formal nomination 'Clinton' and employs informal and semi-formal nominations to specify that he does not refer to her husband, Bill Clinton, who served as the 42nd President of the US. He also *refers* to her by the singular plural pronoun 'she' in extracts (96), (98), (100) and (102) and the determiner 'her' in extracts (100), (103), (108) and (109). In extracts (101) and (110), he *functionalises* her because her refers to her as an opponent. Trump *nominates* Clinton informally and semi-formally and *functionalises*

her, but his *nominations* are *not evaluative*. However, in extracts (97), (99), and (107), he uses the *evaluative nomination* 'Crooked Hillary Clinton.' The latter is negative because it has the attribute of dishonesty. This nomination shows that a *negative representation* will take place. The analysis of the qualities and actions Trump attributes to Clinton shows that he attributes her the same qualities he attributes to 'the Obama-Clinton administration' such as incompetence and bad judgements. Accordingly, in the rest of this sub-section, I will analyse the strategies Trump employs to represent the Clinton potential future administration as an extension of 'the Obama-Clinton administration.'

> 95. That's all we need is four more years of Obama, expect worse. Fort Myers CR

> 96. I know Hillary. It's just going to be an extension of Obama. I think maybe worse. She's got no strength. She's got no stamina. Remember that. You don't need a president with no strength or stamina. Mt Pleasant CR

> 97. Crooked Hillary Clinton looks presidential? I don't think so! Four more years of Obama and our country will never come back. ISIS LAUGHS! Tweet May 20, 2016

Though extracts (95), (96), and (97) belong to different texts, Trump clearly represents Clinton as an extension of 'the Obama-Clinton administration.' Representing the Clinton potential future administration as an extension of 'the Obama-Clinton administration' means that he attributes the Clinton potential future administration the derogatory qualities and actions he attributes to 'the Obama-Clinton administration' (*similarity*) such as incompetence, bad judgements, corruption, and the advocation of open borders. In extracts (95) and (96), he unjustifiably worsens the Clinton potential future administration. Since he represents Clinton as the source of bad decisions and ISIS in 'the Obama-Clinton administration', I argue that in extracts (95) and (96) he *conversationally implies* that Clinton will worsen the problem of Radical/Islamic Terrorism. He *represents* Clinton as the source of bad decisions in 'the Obama-Clinton administration', and in extracts (98) and (99), he attributes her bad judgements and temperament to claim that she will make bad decisions if elected president.

98. Hillary says this election is about judgment. She's right. Her judgement has killed thousands, unleashed ISIS and wrecked the economy. Tweet Jun 21, 2016

99. Crooked Hillary Clinton is totally unfit to be our president- really bad judgements and a temperament, according to new book, which is a mess! Tweet Jun 21, 2016

100. Even her former Secret Service Agent, who has seen her under pressure and in times of stress, has stated that she lacks the temperament and integrity to be president. Manchester CR

In extracts (98), (99), and (100), there is a negative representation of Clinton. By the sentences 'She's got no strength' and 'She's got no stamina' in extract (96), Trump *conventionally implies* that Clinton is physically and mentally weak. In extracts (98) and (99), he attributes her bad judgements. In extracts (99) and (100), he attributes her bad temperament. The *nomination* 'crooked Hillary Clinton' in extract (99) is evaluative because the adjective 'crooked' means dishonesty. Dishonesty is also expressed in extracts (100) through the phrase 'lacks…integrity.' In extract (100), he employs a *topos of authority* which can be paraphrased as follows: Trump claims that Clinton has a bad temperament and is dishonest; people may think that the claim is true because Clinton's former Secret Service Agent, an authority, states that it is true. Seemingly, Trump attributes Clinton a set of derogatory qualities to claim that she is not qualified to be president which he explicitly states in extracts (99) and (100). He attacks her personality and focuses on her integrity and honesty instead of giving sound arguments to defend the claim that she is unfit to be president. This fallacy is known as *the argumentum ad hominem.*

I argue that Trump uses a sexist tone when he refers to Clinton. In sub-section 6.2.1, I found out that he represents Clinton as the source of bad decisions in 'the Obama-Clinton administration.' He *conversationally implies* that Obama has good judgments than Clinton, and if Clinton was not secretary of State, Obama would have never made bad decisions. In extract (96) in this sub-section 6.2.2, he clearly says that she is physically and mentally weak and in extracts (98) and (99), he attributes her bad judgements. By these qualities, he *conversationally implies* that Clinton is unable to work or think (use common-sense) like men, which is a sexist representation. In extract (100), he refers to lack of integrity to represent her as a corrupt and dishonest politician. I already explained in sub-section 6.2.1 that right-wing populists attribute corruption to their opponents to emphasise that their opponents care about their interests and do not care about the interests of the 'people' (van Dijk, 1992, p.111). He does not explain why

he claims she lacks integrity. However, in sub-section 6.2.1, I found out that he represents her as a corrupt Secretary of State because he claims that she is silent about Radical/Islamic Terrorism for her interests, i.e., he claims that she receives money from Muslim-majority countries. I argue that by constructing her as an extension of 'the Obama-Clinton administration', he means that she will favour her interests if elected president. I also argue that he engages in *negative presentation* to convince electorates that she is not qualified to be president. In sub-section 6.2.1, he claims that 'the Obama-Clinton administration' support open borders. From extract (101) to (107), he claims that, like 'the Obama-Clinton administration', Clinton supports open borders.

> 101. My opponent has the most open borders policy of anyone ever to seek the presidency. Fort Myers CR
>
> 102. She now plans to massively increase admissions without a screening plan, including a 500% in Syrian refugees. This could be a better, bigger version of the legendary Trojan Horse…Altogether, under the Clinton plan, you'd be admitting hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Middle East with no system to vet them. Manchester CR
>
> 103. Altogether, her plan would bring in 620,000 refugees in her first term with no effective way to screen them or vet them. Law enforcement said there's no way Fort Myers CR
>
> 104. This would be additional to other to all non-other refugee immigration. Unbelievable numbers. Unbelievable numbers. Youngstown CR

Through the attributive relational process 'have' in extract (101), taken from the Fort Myers CR, he attributes open borders to the Clinton potential future administration. He uses the material process 'increase', joins the material process 'admit' with the modal verb 'would in extract (102) and joins the material process 'bring' with the modal verbs 'would' and 'could' in extracts (103) and (106) to *activate* the Clinton potential immigration system in terms of admitting 'middle eastern'/Muslim refugees (the analysis of the representation of the Muslims of Muslim majority countries in sub-section 5.2.1 in chapter five shows that Trump conflates the 'Middle East' with Muslim-majority countries). By the material process 'increase' in extract (102), he shows that the numbers she will admit will be worse than what 'the Obama-Clinton administration' used to admit. He employs *topoi of number*, i.e., in extracts (102) and (105), he *includes* the percentage of Syrian refugees (550%), and in extracts (103) and (106), he *includes* the total number of refugees (620.000) Clinton plans to admit, to *emphasise* large quantities. That is, he employs *topoi of number* as *intensification strategies*. He also *emphasises* large quantity through the metaphor of flood in extract (107). From extract (101) to extract

(107), it is apparent that, in different campaign rallies and in Twitter, Trump attributes open borders to Clinton and activates her potential immigration system in terms of admitting refugees.

> 105. Hillary has called for 550% more Syrian immigrants, but won't even mention "radical Islamic terrorists." #Debate #BigLeagueTruth. Tweet Oct 20, 2016

> 106. CLINTON REFUGEE PLAN COULD BRING IN 620,000 REFUGEES IN FIRST TERM AT LIFETIME COST OF OVER $400 BILLION" (a link to sessions. Senate). Tweet Aug 15, 2016

> 107. Crooked Hillary Clinton wants to flood our country with Syrian immigrants that we know little or nothing about. The danger is massive. NO! Tweet Jul 27, 2016

In campaign rallies and in Twitter, Trump claims that Clinton supports open borders and the admission of Muslims (refugees and non-refugees). Therefore, he implicitly emphasises that the Clinton potential future administration will be an extension of 'the Obama-Clinton administration.' Importantly, like extracts (62) and (63) in sub-section 6.2.1, in extracts (102) and (103), he repeats the claim that the American immigration system is ineffective because it lacks screening mechanisms. In extract (103), he repeats the *topos of authority* employed in extract (64), which can be interpreted as follows: Trump claims that the American immigration system is ineffective because it fails to screen the backgrounds of Muslim immigrants; People may think that the claim is true because law enforcement, an authority, says that it is true.

The analysis of the representation of Muslims in chapter five shows that Trump *associates* Syrian refugees to terrorism. That is, he claims that they are ISIS trying to come to the US by posing as refugees. In extracts (102) and (107), he represents the admissions of refugees as a danger. In extract (107) danger is *conventionally implied* through the word 'danger', and in extract (102), danger is expressed through *interdiscursivity*, i.e., Trump refers to the story of the Trojan Horse. During the Trojan War, the Greeks pretended to desert the war and built a huge hollow wooden horse and offered it to the Trojans as a present to the goddess of war Athena (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2022). The horse was put inside the city, and that night Greek warriors emerged from it and opened the gates to the Greek army (ibid). The story can be found in Book II of the Aeneid and is touched upon in the Odyssey (ibid). Since Trump *associates* Syrian refugees to ISIS, I argue that in extracts (102), he *conversationally implies* that a similar story will happen in the US because ISIS is trying to infiltrate to the US by posing as refugees. In right-wing populist discourse, this kind of analogy is referred to as

equating and *balancing* (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). In extracts (102) and (107), Trump appeals to fear because he represents the admissions of Syrian refugees as a threat to the security of non-Muslim Americans. I argue that by claiming that Clinton supports open borders and the admission of Muslims (refugees and non-refugees) without screening them, he emphasises that Clinton is not willing to better the US immigration system. In extracts (108) and (109), he *includes* the amount of money Clinton's potential future admissions could cost.

> 108. Her plan will cost Americans hundreds of billions of dollars long-term. Wouldn't this money be better spent on rebuilding America for our current population, including the many poor people already living here? Manchester CR

> 109. The subcommittee estimates her plan would impose a lifetime cost of roughly $400 billion when you include the cost of healthcare, welfare, housing, schooling, and all other entitlement benefits that are excluded from the State Department's placement figures. Youngstown CR

Though extracts (108) and (109) belong to different texts, Trump claims that the admission of Syrian refugees would cost a lot of money (hundreds of billions of dollars or more specifically $400). In extract (109), he employs a *topos of authority* to justify the claim that the admission of Syrian refugees would cost a lot of money. The topos can be paraphrased as follows: Trump claims that the admission of refugees will cost a lot of money; people may think that this claim is correct because the senate subcommittee, an authority, says that it is correct. In extract (109), he claims that the Clinton Department of State *excludes* some benefits to *intensify* the cost and to claim that $400 billion is not the real number and *attribute* the Clinton potential future administration dishonesty and lack of credibility. In extract (108), Trump *conversationally implies* that Clinton favours Syrian refugees at the expense of 'Americans', a nomination he uses to exclude Muslims. He appeals to 'Americans', particularly the poor, to show that he sympathises with them, and, unlike Clinton, he cares about them. This is a strategy used by right-wing populists to represent themselves as caring politicians (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) and convince electorates to vote for them. In extracts (110) and (111), he claims that Clinton sympathises with Muslims.

110. my opponent (…) won't even say the words radical Islamic terror. Fort Myers CR

111. anyone who cannot name our enemy, is not fit to lead this country. Anyone who cannot condemn the hatred, oppression and violence of radical Islam lacks the moral clarity to serve as our President. Youngstown CR and Fort Myers CR.

By the negation of the verbal process 'mention' in extract (105) above and the verbal process 'say' in extract (110) below, he represents Clinton as a politically correct politician. He implicitly claims that like 'the Obama-Clinton administration', the Clinton potential future administration will sympathise with Muslims. He uses *indetermination* in extract (111) because he employs the pronoun 'anyone', but it can be inferred that he implicitly refers to President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidate Clinton because these are the ones Trump criticises for political correctness. He implicitly attributes Clinton lack of moral clarity to *conventionally imply* that she is unable to understand the problem of Radical/Islamic Terrorism, which he refers to by the 'enemy', and solve it. Like extracts (96), (98), (99) and (100), in extract (111), he attacks her personality and focuses on her integrity and honesty instead of giving sound arguments to defend the claim that she is unfit to be president. This fallacy is known as *the argumentum ad hominem.*

112. Hillary Clinton's catastrophic immigration plan will bring vastly more Radical Islamic immigration into this country, threatening not only our security but our way of life**.** Manchester CR

113. Hillary Clinton is a major national security risk. Not presidential material! Tweet Jan 30, 2016

In extract (112), Trump represents Clinton's immigration plan as a threat to the security and 'way of life' of non-Muslim Americans. In sub-section 5.2.2 in chapter five, Trump claims that Muslims are hostile to 'the American values' and laws such as secularism and freedom of religion. Therefore, I argue that in extract (112), he *conversationally implies* that Clinton's open borders to Muslims will result in terrorism against non-Muslim Americans. He appeals to fear of insecurity and fear of losing one's values and way of life to justify the negative representation of the Clinton potential immigration system. I argue that in extract (113), he represents Clinton's victory as a security threat because she supports open borders to Muslims. He represents her as a dangerous 'Other.' In right-wing populist discourse 'the elite' who open the borders or support open borders to immigrants are constructed as the 'Other' and are usually described in a negative way (Pelinka, 2013, pp.8-9). The sub-section 6.2.3 below will focus on

172

the strategies Trump employs to differentiate his potential future administration from 'the Obama-Clinton administration' and the Clinton potential future administration.

6.2.2.1 Concluding discussion

Trump sometimes nominates Clinton informally and semi-formally, and at other times, he functionalises her, but his nominations are generally not evaluative. He only employs one evaluative nomination 'Crooked Hillary Clinton.' The latter is negative because it has the attribute of dishonesty. The analysis of the qualities and actions Trump associates the non-evaluative nominations with shows that he attributes Clinton the same qualities he attributes to 'the Obama-Clinton administration' such bad-judgements, dishonesty, lack of credibility, and corruption. Also, the actions Trump attributes to the Clinton potential future administration are like the actions he attributes to 'the Obama-Clinton administration.' He claims that like 'the Obama-Clinton administration', the Clinton potential future administration will open the borders to Muslims (refugees and non-refugees), will not screen Muslim immigrants, and adopt a politically correct approach towards Muslims. He passivates the Clinton potential administration in terms of fighting Radical/Islamic Terrorism. He seemingly promotes a negative representation/evaluation of the Clinton potential future administration and represents it as a threat to the security and 'way of life' of non-Muslim Americans. He represents Clinton as a follow up of 'the Obama-Clinton administration.' I argue that Trump represents his opponent Clinton from a right-wing populist perspective because criticising opponents for supporting open borders (Pelinka, 2013, pp.8-9) and accusing them of favouring 'Others' over the 'Self' are the basic characteristics of right-wing populist discourse (Salmela & von Scheve, 2018, p.7). I also argue that Trump uses a sexist tone when he refers to Clinton. In sub-section 6.2.1, I found out that he represents Clinton as the source of bad decisions in 'the Obama-Clinton administration.' He *conversationally implies* that Obama has good judgments than Clinton. In this sub-section, he clearly says that she is physically and mentally weak and attributes her bad judgements to claim that she is unable to work or think like men, which is a sexist representation. In chapter five, I found out that he claims that Muslim men are sexist and speaks against sexism. I was expecting him to criticise Clinton's potential future administration plans, but I was not expecting him to use a sexist tone. Trump emphasises dishonesty and corruption and uses a sexist tone (negative other-presentation) to convince people that Clinton is not qualified to be President. In sub-section 6.2.3, I will analyse the strategies he employs to differentiate his potential future administration from 'the Obama-Clinton administration' and

the Clinton potential future administration to convince non-Muslim Americans to support his policy proposals on Muslims and convince them to vote for him.

6.2.3 The Presidential candidate Trump

In the table 6.3 below, I refer to the nominations Trump employs to nominate himself and his potential future administration and the numbers of the extracts from which the nominations are taken.

The nominations of the presidential candidate Trump	
Anaphoric	Semi-formal
I (114), (117), (118), (128), (129), (131), (134), and (135)	Donald J. Trump (116) and (118)
We (115), (118), (119), (120), (121), (122), (123), (124), (126), (127), (128), (130), (136) and (137)	Donald Trump (133)

Table 6.3 The nominations of the presidential candidate Trump

Seemingly, the table 6.3 shows that Trump *nominates* himself by the singular pronoun 'I', and sometimes, he uses his full name like in Donald J. Trump or Donal Trump. The dominant *nomination* is the plural pronoun 'We.' However, the latter is ambiguous, i.e., he mostly uses it to refer to his potential future administration, but sometimes he uses it to refer to the US. The plural pronoun 'We' is classified by Hampl (n.d., p.67) as an 'exclusive we' because the speaker includes himself and the various sections of the administration but excludes his/her audience. The use of this kind of 'We' indicates that the whole apparatus of power 'is actively involved in the process of the confrontation and elimination of the enemies' (ibid). In extracts (62) and (77), Trump passivates the departments of the Obama administration, especially the Department of State (Clinton's department), in terms of screening Muslim immigrants and helping law enforcement in fighting against Radical/Islamic Terrorism. Using the exclusive 'We', Trump *refers to* and *activates* the various departments of his potential future administration in the fight against Radical/Islamic Terrorism. The nominations Trump employs to refer to himself and his potential future administration are *non-evaluative*, but the actions and qualities they are associated with show that a *positive portrayal* develops such as fighting Radical/Islamic Terrorism, good judgements, competence, and honesty. He employs *positive self-presentation* when he refers to himself and his potential future administration. This strategy is very important in public discourse, particularly in politics, because speakers need to impress large audiences and avoid any professional or political damage that might result from a 'wrong'

presentation of the 'Self' (van Dijk, 2005, p.76). For instance, a wrong presentation of the 'Self' may cost a presidential candidate many votes in the elections (ibid).

> 114. We have an incompetent administration, and if I am not elected
> President, that will not change over the next four years. Manchester CR

In sub-section 6.2.1 in this chapter, Trump attributes incompetence to 'the Obama-Clinton administration.' In sub-section 6.2.2, he attributes incompetence to the Clinton potential future administration and constructs it as a follow up of 'the Obama-Clinton administration.' In extract (114), Trump uses *differentiation*. That is, he describes 'the Obama-Clinton administration' and the Clinton potential future administration as incompetent (*negative other-presentation*) and his potential administration as competent (*positive self-presentation*).

> 115. We must do everything possible to keep this horrible terrorism outside
> the United States. Tweet Jun 28, 2016

Right-wing populist discourse always emphasises a heartland, a country, that must be protected from 'Others' represented as different and deviant (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). This is what Trump does in extract (115). He refers to the US, the heartland, and through the material process 'do' with the modal verb of obligation 'must', he emphasises that the protection of the heartland from Terrorism is a duty of his potential future administration. I argue that he refers to Radical/Islamic Terrorism because the analysis in chapter five shows that he *associates* Muslims with terrorism and employs the '*Politics of Fear*' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) to represent Muslims as potential security threats. It also reveals that Trump makes up a security crisis in the US, and the analysis in sub-section 6.2.1 in this chapter shows that he constructs the Obama-Clinton open borders as the source of the crisis. The analysis in sub-section 6.2.2 in this chapter reveals that he represents the Clinton potential future administration as an extension of 'the Obama-Clinton administration' because he claims that she supports open borders. To differentiate his potential future administration from 'the Obama-Clinton administration' and the Clinton potential future administration, in extracts (116) and (117), he engages in '*Border Politics*' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.), i.e., he suggests closing the borders to Muslims.

116. Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country's representatives can figure out what 'the hell' is going on. TBS/Mt Pleasant CR

117. I would close up our borders to people until we figure out what is going on. Fox and Friends TVI1

Though extracts (116) and (117) belong to different texts, they both show that Trump wishes to close the US borders to Muslims. Extract (116) is found in the 'Muslim Travel Ban Statement' which Trump wrote in reaction to the San Bernardino attack. Through the verbal process 'call', he urges 'the Obama-Clinton administration' to close the borders to Muslims. But in extract (117), he joins the material process 'close up' with the modal verb 'would' to stress the possibility to ban Muslims from entering the US if elected President. Trump was elected president and did ban seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the US after one week of presidency (see appendix one for 'the Muslim Travel Ban Statement' and appendix two for 'the Muslim Travel Ban Policy'). I argue that 'the Muslim Travel Ban Statement' is racist based on religion because it conflates the actions of terrorists with all Muslims and essentialises Muslims as security threats to deny them entry to the US. Suggesting a ban on all Muslims evidence Trump's anti-Muslim stance. The official 'Muslim Travel Ban Policy' is racist based on nationality because it is unacceptable to ban all the residents of seven Islamic countries based on acts of terror done by a minority. To legitimise 'the Muslim Travel Ban Statement' and emphasise non-racist intents, in extract (118), Trump appeals to common-sense.

118. Shall I read you this statement? Donald J. Trump is calling for - - you have to listen to this because this is pretty heavy stuff and it's common sense and we have to do it. Mt Pleasant CR

Extract (118) belongs to the Mt Pleasant CR in which Trump points to 'the Muslim Travel Ban Statement' and reads it to the audience. He disclaims that the ban is tough, but he appeals to common-sense to get support for it. The audience may say that the ban is a reaction to the San Bernardino attack, which is committed by a Muslim couple, and they may think that it is a security measure and support it. We generally encounter this legitimisation strategy in right-wing populist discourse, i.e., right-wing populists usually acknowledge that they are strict, and their policies are tough, but they use *goal denial* to deny discrimination (van Dijk, 1992, p.92).

119. The ban will be lifted when we as a nation are in a position to properly and perfectly screen those people coming into our country. Manchester CR

120. In addition to screening out all members or sympathizers of terrorist groups, we must also screen out any who have hostile attitudes towards our country or its principles – or who believe that Sharia law should supplant American law. Those who do not believe in our Constitution, or who support bigotry and hatred, will not be admitted for immigration into the country. Youngstown CR

In extract (119), through the material process 'lift', Trump *conventionally implies* that the ban is temporary. He states that it will be stopped when effective screening methods are in place. He implicitly *activates* his potential future administration in terms of developing effective screening methods, and in a way, he *differentiates* his immigration system from 'the Obama-Clinton administration' who he claims admit Muslims without effective screening mechanisms. The analysis of the representation of Muslims in chapter five shows that Trump represents Muslim Americans as terrorist sympathisers. He also claims that they do not assimilate in the US because they reject 'the US values' of openness and tolerance and the laws of freedom of religion and secularism. In extract (120), he *refers* to Muslims metonymically by pointing to Sharia. In the same extract, he joins the material process 'screen' with the deontic modal verb of obligation 'must' to *conversationally imply* the necessity to screen Muslim immigrants to find out if they are affiliated or support terrorism or will not respect the US constitution. Extracts (121), (122), (123) and (124) show that Trump uses Twitter to advocate his policy proposals on Muslims, such as banning Muslims and the screening of Muslims, and uses *goal denial* (van Dijk, 1992, p.92) to legitimise them, i.e., he appeals to security and protection to deny discriminatory intents.

121. American must now get very tough, very smart and very vigilant. We cannot admit people into our country without extraordinary screening. Tweet Jun 14, 2016

122. We must suspend immigration from regions linked with terrorism until a proven vetting method is in place. Tweet Jun 26, 2016

123. We only want to admit those who love our people and support our values. #AmericaFirst. Tweet Jun 26, 2016

124. Plain & Simple: We should only admit into this country those who share our VALUES and RESPECT our people. Tweet Oct 20, 2016

125. In the Cold War, we had an ideological screening test. The time is overdue to develop a new screening test for the threats we face today. Youngstown CR

In sub-section 5.2.1 in Chapter five, Trump represents the Muslims immigrating from Muslim majority countries as potential security threats. In extracts (121) and (122), he tries to legitimise the ban and the screening of Muslim immigrants through *goal denial* (van Dijk, 1992, p.92), i.e., he appeals to vigilance and security to deny discriminatory intents. In sub-section 5.2.2, he represents Muslim Americans as a threat 'the American way of life', 'values' of freedom and tolerance and laws of freedom of religion and secularism. In extracts (123) and (124), he legitimises the screening of Muslim immigrants through *goal denial* (van Dijk, 1992, p.92), i.e., he appeals to the protection of 'the American values' and laws to deny discriminatory intents. In extracts (121), (122), (123) and (124), he appeals to emotions, i.e., he appeals to fear of insecurity and fear of losing one's values and laws to legitimise his policy proposals. Because of islamophobia and the constant link made between Muslims and terrorism, non-Muslim Americans worry about their security (Alsultany, 2013; Abdullah, 2015). Thus, Trump's appals to vigilance and protection not only to legitimise his policy proposals but also to reassure electorates and convince them to vote for him.

In extract (125), Trump employs another right-wing populist legitimisation strategy known as *equating* and *balancing* (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) to legitimise the screening of Muslims. He compares the screening methods he will develop if elected president to the ideological screening test America used in the Cold War to prevent the infiltration of Communist agents pretending to be immigrants from East-Central Europe (Verovšek, 2019). He *conversationally implies* that he will screen Muslim immigrants to prevent the infiltration of those who are not consistent with 'the US values' and constitutional laws. Through the strategy of *equating* and *balancing* (Wodak, 2015, n.p.), he argues that his goal is vigilance and not discrimination. In addition to suggesting screening Muslim immigrants in extracts (119), (120), (121) and (122), in extracts (126), he states that he would surveil mosques, and in extract (127), he states that he would surveil Muslim Americans.

> 126. So, if you have people coming out of mosques with hatred and with death in their eyes and on their minds, we're going to have to do something, John. We can't just say, we're not going to look at it. CBS News TVI

> 127. You have people that have to be tracked. If they're Muslims, they're Muslims. But you have people that have to be tracked. And we better be -- I use the word vigilance. We have to show vigilance. CBS News TVI

> 128. We were doing it recently until De Blasio closed them up in New York City. We were doing it recently. We have to surveil the mosques. And big material and good material, from what I understood, from a very good

source, was coming out of those mosques. We were learning a lot. And they were stopping problems and potential problems by learning what was happening. ABC News TVI1

In sub-section 5.2.2 in chapter five, Trump represents Muslim Americans as people violent against and hateful to non-Muslim Americans. In extract (126) above, he represents mosques as the source of hatred and terrorism, which he *conventionally implies* through the word death. He does not specify what he will do with mosques. I argue that he *conversationally implies* that he would surveil mosques because, during the campaign, he repeatedly stated that he would do. I argue that the surveillance of mosques is racist because this violates the constitutional right of freedom of religion established in the First Amendment. The latter states that 'congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof' (US Constitution). In extract (127), by joining the modal verb of obligation 'have to' with the material process 'track', Trump unjustifiably states that it is a necessity to surveil Muslim Americans. He *conversationally implies* that Muslims have to be tracked because they are security threats. I argue that surveilling Muslims is a way to restrict their freedom and oppress them. It is oppressive to live under surveillance, thus I consider the surveillance of Muslim-Americans as a form of everyday racism (van Dijk, 2000a, pp.39-40). In both extracts (126) and (127), he appeals to vigilance to legitimise the surveillance of Muslim Americans and their mosques and deny discriminatory intents, i.e., he employs *goal denial* (van Dijk, 1992, p.92). Extract (128) belongs to a different text but shows that Trump employs the strategy of *equating* and *balancing* (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) to legitimise his proposal of surveilling mosques. He states that the surveillance of mosques is not new. He says that they did in New York and prevented terrorism. He *conversationally implies* that he will do it for the same goal,

i.e., he will do it to avoid terrorism. It can also be interpreted as a *topos of advantage* and can be paraphrased as follows: if the surveillance of mosques can prevent potential terrorist attacks in the US, then one should perform it. Like extracts (116) and (117), in extract (129), Trump engages in '*Border Politics*' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) by suggesting to ban Syrian refugees.

129. Well, I would exclude the people coming in from Syria that don't have documentation. NBC News TVI

130. But when these Syrians come in, or wherever they are, because we're not even sure that they're coming in from Syria, if they're going to come in, we have to be very, very vigilant. And a database would be fine for them and a watchlist is fine. ABC News TVI1

131. I want a database …we don't know if they're ISIS, we don't know if it's a Trojan horse. ABC News TVI1

In extract (129), Trump joins the material process 'exclude' with the modal verb 'would' to stress the possibility to ban Syrian refugees, who are predominantly Muslims, from entering the US if elected President. In sub-section 5.2.2 in chapter five, Trump claims that Syrian refugees are linked to ISIS. I argue that this is a racist representation because he *refers* to Syrian refugees as a collective and *associates* them to terrorism to represent them as a dangerous 'Other' and deny them entry to the US.

In sub-section 5.2.2 in chapter five, he constructs Syrian refugees as potential security threats because he claims that they have no identity documents to check if they are linked to ISIS. In extract (129), he repeats the claim that Syrian refugees do not have identity documents and *conversationally implies* that identity checks cannot be performed and emphasise danger. In extract (130), he states the possibility to admit them, but he suggests a database to surveil them. He *conversationally implies* that, unlike 'the Obama-Clinton administration' which distribute them all over the US (see extract (80) for this claim), he will surveil them.

Like extract (102), in extract (131), he expresses danger through *interdiscursivity*, i.e., he refers to the story of the Trojan Horse. Since Trump *associates* Syrian refugees to ISIS, I argue that in extracts (131), he *conversationally implies* that an ISIS army is trying to infiltrate to the US. In extracts (129), (130) and (131), he appeals to fear of insecurity to legitimise his policy proposals on Syrian refugees.

132. We have opened the world to ISIS and now we have to close those doors. Fort Myers CR

In extract (132), Trump employs two opposing material processes 'open' and 'close.' He uses both material processes with the plural pronoun 'we.' The 'We' he associates with the material process 'open' *refers* to America', i.e., he means that the American borders are open to ISIS. He *conceals* who opened the borders, but it can be inferred that he refers to 'the Obama-Clinton

administration', which he claims admit ISIS through the admission of refugees (see sub-section 6.2.1). By the 'we' he associates with the contrasting material process 'close', he *refers* to his potential future administration to stress that, unlike 'the Obama-Clinton administration', his administration will stop the admission of Syrian refugees to stop the infiltration of ISIS.

> 133. Politicians can pretend it is something else, But Donald Trump calls it radical Islamic terrorism. CAD

> 134. Our system of government is the best in the world, and as your president, I will defend our values and speak out against all of those who assault our values in any way, shape or form. Fort Myers CR

In extract (133), Trump uses the noun 'Politicians', but he *excludes* to whom he refers to. However, it can be inferred that he means President Obama and the Secretary of State Clinton and the presidential candidate Clinton because these are the politicians he criticises for political correctness and not using use the term Radical/Islamic Terrorism. The use of the conjunction 'but' in the same extract *conventionally implies* that unlike President Obama and the Secretary of State Clinton and the presidential candidate Clinton, Trump will speak against Radical/Islamic Terrorism. By the verbal process 'call' in the same extract, he emphasises that he will not be politically correct. Though extract (134) belongs to a different text, through the verbal process 'speak against' he emphasises that he will not be politically correct. The same point is expressed in extract (135), which also belongs to a different text, through the verbal process 'talk' joined with the adjective 'willing.'

In sub-section 5.2.2 in chapter five, he claims that Muslims are hostile to 'the US values', 'way of life', and laws. Therefore, by the expression 'those who assault our values in any way, shape or form' in extract (135), he *presupposes* Muslims.

> 135. you're not going to solve the problem unless you're willing to talk about what the problem is. I'm willing to talk about what the problem is…we have to know what the problem is before we can solve the problem. MSNBC TVI2

> 136. When you can't say it - or see it – you can't fix it. We will MAKE AMERICA SAFE AGAIN! #ImWithYou #AmericaFirst (link to Facebook post). Tweet Jul 2, 2016

> 137. We also must ensure the American people are provided the information they need to understand the threat. Manchester CR

In extracts (135) and (136), he employs *goal denial* (van Dijk, 1992, p.92) to justify his opposition to political correctness. That is, he *conversationally implies* that he acknowledges the problem of Radical/Islamic Terrorism to fight it not to discriminate against Muslims. In a way, he positively represents himself, i.e., he knows what the problem is, and is willing to solve it. Trump's campaign slogan is 'make America great again', but he uses the slogan 'make America safe again' when he talks about Muslims. Through the adverb 'again' in extract (136), he *conventionally implies* that he will restore the security he claims Obama-Clinton's political correctness damaged (see sub-section 6.2.1 specifically extract 77). Right-wing populists predicate themselves as honest politicians (van Dijk, 1992, p.90) and emphasise they always tell the truth to the people (ibid, p.92) and provide them with honest assessments of issues and crises (ibid, p.90). This is what Trump does in extract (137), i.e., he states that he will explain the threat of Radical Islamic/Terrorism to non-Muslim Americans to represent himself as an honest politician. In sub-sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, he claims that 'the Obama-Clinton administration' and the presidential candidate Clinton are not willing to fight Radical/Islamic Terrorism, and they are dishonest. In extracts (135), (136) and (137), he *differentiates* himself from President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidate Clinton.

6.2.3.1 Concluding discussion

All the actions Trump attributes to his potential future administration are the opposite of the actions he attributes to 'the Obama-Clinton administration' and the presidential candidate Clinton. He states that unlike 'the Obama-Clinton administration' and the Clinton potential future administration, his potential future administration will close the borders to Muslims (refugees and non-refugees), will screen Muslim immigrants, and will not be politically correct. Through the right-wing populist strategies known as *goal denial* (van Dijk, 1992, p.92) and *balancing* and *equating* (Wodak, 2015, n.p.), he denies discrimination and argues that his goal is fighting Radical/Islamic Terrorism. He activates his potential future administration in terms of fighting Radical/Islamic Terrorism and represents it as an administration that will seek to re-establish security in the US (the security he claims 'the Obama-Clinton administration' damaged), protect 'the American values' and laws and save non-Muslim Americans from Radical/Islamic Terrorism. He seemingly promotes a positive representation/evaluation of his potential future administration and constructs himself as the fighter of Radical/Islamic Terrorism, the solver of the insecurity crisis he claims 'the Obama-Clinton administration' created, and the saviour of non-Muslim Americans from Radical/Islamic Terrorism.

6.3 Discussion

This chapter answers RQ2 and sub-RQ2, i.e., RQ2: how are President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidates Clinton and Trump represented in Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration? and sub-RQ2: how do the representations of President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidates Clinton and Trump link to Right-win Populism? The analysis of the representations and evaluations of President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton and the presidential candidates Clinton and Trump reveals that Trump associates and collectivises President Obama and his Secretary of State Clinton and refers to them as group. Therefore, I refer to them by 'the Obama-Clinton administration.' Then, he individualises Clinton (dissociates her from Obama) and talks about her as a presidential opponent. He represents her potential future administration as an extension of 'the Obama-Clinton administration.' He frequently distinguishes his potential future administration from 'the Obama-Clinton administration' and the Clinton potential future administration. To realise differentiation, he employs the strategies of negative-other presentation and positive-self presentation (van Dijk, 1991).

The analysis of the representation of Muslims in chapter five reveals that the 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) dominates Trump's discourse because he represents the Muslim residents of Muslim-majority countries and Muslim Americans as threats to the security of non-Muslim Americans by attributing to them sexism, misogyny and violent religious extremism and engaging them in terrorism against non-Muslims. He associates Muslims to terrorism and makes up a security crisis in the US. The analysis in sub-section 6.2.1 in this chapter shows that he represents 'the Obama-Clinton administration' as the source of the crisis. To represent them as the source of the crisis, he attributes to them open borders. With the help of transitivity, he activates them in terms of admitting Muslims and passivates them in terms of screening Muslims, fighting Radical/Islamic Terrorism, and protecting non-Muslim Americans from Muslims. In addition, he represents them as Muslim sympathisers. That is, he claims that they sympathise with Muslims because they are politically correct. Political correctness has positive connotations (i.e., prevents offensive language); however, Trump uses it in a negative sense as he states that it prevents fighting Radical/Islamic Terrorism. He implies that President Obama sympathises with Muslims because he is a Muslim, and the Secretary of State Clinton sympathises with Muslims for her interests (corruption). Also, he represents them as dishonest politicians because he claims that they do not disclose the real numbers of Muslim immigrants or Syrian refugees they admit. He also attributes to them negative qualities such as bad

judgements and decisions and incompetence. Interestingly, Trump dissociates President Obama and the Secretary of State Clinton to represent Clinton as the source of bad judgements and decisions in 'the Obama-Clinton administration.' Seemingly, all the actions and qualities he attributes to 'the Obama-Clinton administration' promote a negative image.

The analysis in sub-section 6.2.2, shows that Trump represents the presidential candidate Clinton as a follow up of 'the Obama-Clinton administration.' He employs the process of similarity to assign her the same actions and qualities he attributes to 'the Obama-Clinton administration', such as open borders to Muslims, no screening of Muslims, dishonesty, and bad judgements, to construct her potential future administration as an extension of 'the Obama-Clinton administration.' He engages in negative presentation to represent his opponent. I argue that Trump uses a sexist tone when he refers to Clinton. In sub-section 6.2.1, I found out that he represents the Secretary of State Clinton as the source of bad decisions in 'the Obama administration.' This implies that he claims that Obama has good judgments than Clinton. In this sub-section 6.2.2, he attributes her bad judgements and implies that she is unable to work or think like men, which is a sexist representation.

To differentiate his potential future administration from 'the Obama-Clinton administration' and the Clinton potential future administration, Trump activates his potential future administration in terms of fighting Radical/Islamic Terrorism. To do so, he attributes the opposite actions he attributes to 'the Obama-Clinton administration' and the Clinton potential future administration. He states that his potential future administration will close the borders to Muslims (refugees and non-refugees), will screen Muslim immigrants, and will not be politically correct. He thus represents his potential future administration as an administration that will restore security in the US, protect 'the American values' and laws and save non-Muslim Americans from Radical/Islamic Terrorism. He seemingly promotes a positive representation/evaluation of his potential future administration and constructs himself as the fighter of Radical/Islamic Terrorism, the solver of the insecurity crisis he claims 'the Obama-Clinton administration' created, and the saviour of non-Muslim Americans from Radical/Islamic Terrorism.

To show that he opposes open borders, Trump engages in 'Border Politics' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.), i.e., he proposes 'the Muslim Travel Ban' to emphasise that, unlike the 'Obama-Clinton administration' and the presidential opponent Clinton, he will not admit Muslims (refugees and non-refugees). Also, he states that if he admits them, he will screen them to find out if they

support extremism and terrorism.   In addition, he emphasises that, domestically, he will surveil Muslim Americans and watch their mosques. The table 6.4 below shows that Trump proposes a policy for every quality he attributes to Muslims.

Qualities	Trump's policy proposals
Religious extremists	• Banning Muslim immigrants
	• Screening Muslim immigrants
	• Surveil Muslim-Americans and their mosques
Syrian refugees are ISIS-related	• Stop the admission of Syrian refugees

Table 6.4 Trump's policy proposals on Muslims

Many politicians employ a discursive strategy called 'Defining the Situation', which is relevant in discourses whose main aim is to make comments on a social or political situation, to recommend specific actions, or to legitimise actions (van Dijk, 2005, p.71). That is, if politicians want to explain or justify why they acted in unacceptable and criticized way, they will lay out a situation in which such acts appear common-sense, i.e., necessary, logical, comprehensible, unavoidable, or otherwise acceptable (ibid). Trump defines a situation in which he represents Muslims as threats to the security of non-Muslim Americans and the American cultural identity to appeal to the necessities of security and protection and construct his policy proposals as common-sense. Also, he employs the 'Politics of Denial' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.), particularly *goal denial* (van Dijk, 1992, p.92) to deny that his policies and statements on Muslims are discriminatory and racist. That is, he emphasises that his policies target Radical/Islamic Terrorism but not Muslims. He also employs *blaming the victim strategy* (ibid, p.94). That is, he attributes Muslim-Americans negative qualities such religious extremism, hostility to and violence against non-Muslim Americans to emphasise that Muslims are not the victims of discrimination; they are non-Muslim Americans who are the victims of Muslims. He also employs the strategy of *equating* and *balancing* (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). These are the main legitimisation strategies he employs to avoid a negative self-presentation and get support for his discriminatory policy proposals.

I argue that Trump represents 'the Obama-Clinton administration' from a right-wing populist perspective because criticising 'the elite' who support open borders and admit the (constructed)

deviant and threatening 'Others' and accusing them of favoring those 'Others' over the 'Self, engaging in 'Border Politics' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) to differentiate oneself, and using the 'Politics of Denial' (ibid) to legitimise discriminatory policies are the basic fundaments of right-wing populist discourse (ibid).

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has answered RQ2: how are President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidates Clinton and Trump represented in Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration? and sub-RQ2: how do the representations of President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidates Clinton and Trump link to Right-win Populism? The analysis has revealed that Trump constructs an insecurity crisis and represents 'the Obama-Clinton administration' as the source of the crisis. He represents the presidential candidate Clinton as an extension of 'the Obama-Clinton administration' claiming that her immigration plan will aggravate insecurity in the US. He engages in positive self-presentation to differentiate his potential future administration from 'the Obama-Clinton administration' and the Clinton potential future administration. That is, he represents himself as the solver of the insecurity crisis, he claims President Obama and the Secretary of State Clinton created, and the protector of non-Muslim Americans from insecurity.

7. Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

Multicultural societies are made up of a variety of social groups (van Dijk et al., 1997b, p.144). These social groups may have different norms, religions, customs, principles, values, social practices, and languages i.e., they may have different cultural identities (ibid). To co-exist, these divergent social groups need to learn each other's languages, familiarise themselves about each other's social habits and tolerate differences in their cultural identities (ibid). However, in some multicultural societies, mutual respect, and tolerance of differences between different social groups 'is merely a social, political or moral ideal' (ibid). That is, some multicultural societies usually acknowledge multiculturism and emphasise that they have nothing against some minority groups, but cultural misunderstanding, ethnic conflicts and also prejudice, xenophobia, ethnocentrism, antisemitism, and racism frequently characterise relations between the members of the groups that are somehow different from each other (ibid). Discrimination and racism do not only happen when these groups meet and try to co-exist but also when politicians emphasise difference between these social groups in their discourses for an unequal treatment (ibid). They may emphasise genetic/biological and/or cultural differences (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p.9). When genetic/biological and cultural differences are emphasised two types of racism, i.e., 'inegalitarian' and 'differentialist racism/cultural racism' (ibid), and the binary division of 'Self' versus 'Other' are likely to take place (Wodak, 2001b, p. 73). To realise this binary division, politicians usually engage in positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation (van Dijk, 1995, p. 143). The primary aim of this study has been to find out how Trump represents Muslims. The analysis in chapter five reveals that Trump emphasises cultural difference to represent Muslims as a threatening 'Other.' The aim of this chapter is to synthesise the main findings presented in chapters five and six and address the following research questions:

RQ1: how are Muslims represented in Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration?

Sub-RQ1: to what extent is Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration orientalist, islamophobic, and racist, and how does his representation of Muslims link to Right-win Populism?

RQ2: how are President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidates Clinton and Trump represented in Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration?

Sub-RQ2: how do the representations of President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidates Clinton and Trump link to Right-win Populism?

In section 7.2 I will address the research questions presented above. In section 7.3, I will present the limitations of this study. In section 7.4, I will suggest ideas for future research. In section 7.5, I will conclude this chapter with some guidelines for a non-orientalist, non-islamophobic and non-racist discourse on Muslims.

7.2 Addressing the research questions

In the 2015-16 presidential campaign, Trump showed strong opposition to immigration from Muslim-majority countries. He repeatedly urged President Obama to stop the admission of Muslim immigrants (both refugees and non-refugees). Domestically, he called for surveilling Muslim Americans and their mosques. Therefore, I decided to analyse how Trump represents Muslims. The first research question I formulated aims to find out how Muslims are represented and evaluated in Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration. Since orientalist, islamophobic and racist stereotypes are widespread about Muslims in the US, such as the stereotypes sexism and misogyny (Saïd, 1978;1995;2003, p.207) and the stereotype of violence and terrorism (ibid, 1980, n.p.) and Right-wing Populism is on the rise, I raised sub-RQ1. The latter seeks to find out if Trump's discourse represents Muslims from orientalist, islamophobic, racist and right-wing populist perspectives.

RQ1: how are Muslims represented in Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration?

Sub-RQ1: to what extent is Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration orientalist, islamophobic, and racist, and how does his representation of Muslims link to Right-win Populism?

The analysis of the selected texts shows that Trump represents the Muslim residents of Muslim-majority countries and Muslim Americans as two similar social groups. He represents them negatively to position them as a threatening 'Other.' He distinguishes them from non-Muslim Americans whom he sometimes represents as the victims of Muslims and at other times as the

civilised and superior 'Self.' Seemingly, he employs the strategies of negative other-presentation and positive self-presentation (van Dijk, 1991).

Trump refers to the Muslim residents of Muslim-majority countries metonymically by pointing to Muslim majority-countries (spatialisation) and religion (classification). The metonymic references Trump employs to refer to the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries are non-judgemental; however, the actions and qualities he attributes to them show that a negative representation takes place. He attributes to them violent actions against Muslim women and non-Muslims to engage them in terrorism, attribute them the qualities of sexism and misogyny, religious oppression and religious extremism, and position them as the victimiser 'Other.' He relies on hasty generalisations 'guilt by association' (Green, 2015, p.21) to construct them as a homogeneous and monolithic social group/collective sharing the same qualities and worldviews and engaged in the same actions. The 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.), which is one of the basic fundaments of right-wing populist discourse (ibid), dominates Trump's discourse because he represents Muslims immigrating from Muslim-majority countries as threats to the security of non-Muslim Americans, particularly women.

Trump mostly identifies Muslim Americans according to their religion (classification). He negatively represents them because he attributes to them the same actions and qualities he attributes to the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries. In addition, he describes them as terrorist sympathisers and claims that they oppress the LGBTQ community. Therefore, he represents them as security threats. Trump represents the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries and Muslim Americans as similar social groups and claims that Muslims do not assimilate in the US, i.e., he claims that they bring the values of their home countries and reject 'the American values' of openness, tolerance, and freedom and laws such as the law of religious freedom and secularism (First Amendment). He thus represents Muslim immigrants and Muslim Americans as threats to 'the American values' and laws. I argue that he avoids the nomination of 'Muslim Americans' and classifies Muslim Americans according to their religion to imply that they cannot be American if they do not adopt 'the US values' and laws, i.e., if they do not assimilate. He represents the 'American culture' positively because he claims that the 'American culture' is superior to the 'Islamic culture', which is an orientalist representation (Saïd, 1978/1995/2003). Thus, he claims that 'They', Muslim Americans, are intolerant, barbaric, and uncivilised and, 'We', non-Muslim Americans, are tolerant, peaceful, and civilised.

Trump draws on the orientalist and islamophobic stereotypes of sexism and misogyny (Saïd, 1978;1995;2003, p.207) and the stereotype of violence and terrorism (ibid, 1980, n.p.) to derogate the Muslims of Muslim-majority countries and Muslim Americans and represent them as a threatening 'Other.' Therefore, I argue that his discourse is orientalist and islamophobic. I also argue that Trump's discourse is right-wing populist because he employs the 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015) to construct them as threats to the security of non-Muslim Americans and 'the American values' of openness, tolerance and freedom and law of freedom of religion and secularism. Trump's representation of Muslim immigrants is racist because he refers to Muslims as a collective and relies on essentialist orientalist stereotypes to denigrate them, such as the stereotypes of sexism (Saïd, 1978/1995/2003), violence, and terrorism (ibid, 1980), and discriminatory because, during the campaign, Trump relied on these stereotypes to urge 'the Obama-Clinton administration' to deny entry to Muslim immigrants to the US (see appendix one for 'the Muslim Travel Ban Statement'). His representation of Muslim-Americans is racist because he focuses on cultural difference to distinguish Muslims from non-Muslim Americans and represent Muslims as a sexist and misogynistic, violent, and extremist 'Other', i.e., an inferior 'Other.' This is what (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p.9) call 'cultural racism.' Trump's representation is discriminatory because it resulted in everyday racism (van Dijk, 2000a, pp.39-40).). That is, anti-Muslim bias incidents increased dramatically between 2014 and 2016 in the US (CAIR, 2017) such as harassment, intimidation, bullying, hate crimes and anti-mosque incidents (ibid). In addition, Muslim Americans witnessed discrimination in employment (ibid). I argue that Trump's representation of Muslims was not only meant to attract electorates but also to discriminate against Muslims because his approach towards Muslims did not change after electing him President of the US on 20th of January 2017. That is, Trump appointed an islamophobic administration (Patel, 2017). He appointed Steve Bannon as his senior adviser, Michael Flynn as his national security advisor, and Sebastian Gorka as his Deputy assistant (ibid). The three are known for their anti-Islam stance (ibid). They are also closely connected to Frank Gaffney, who heads the Center for Security Policy, a think tank known for promoting anti-Muslim agenda (ibid). In addition, after one week of presidency, he issued 'the Muslim Travel Ban Policy' which banned seven Muslim majority countries from entering the US and relied on the stereotype of Terrorism to legitimise it (see appendix two for 'the Muslim Travel Ban Policy').

Trump's discourse on Muslims always includes reference to President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidates Clinton and Trump. Thus, I raised the second research question. The latter aims to find out how President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton and the presidential candidates Clinton and Trump are represented and evaluated.

RQ2: How are President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidates Clinton and Trump represented in Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign discourse on Muslim immigration?

Sub-RQ2**:** how do the representations of President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidates Clinton and Trump links to Right-win Populism?

The analysis of the selected data shows that Trump most of the time collectivises President Obama and the Secretary of State Clinton. Therefore, in this thesis, I refer to them by 'the Obama-Clinton administration.' He negatively represents 'the Obama-Clinton administration.' That is, he makes up a security crisis and a cultural conflict between Muslim Americans and non-Muslim Americans and constructs 'the Obama-Clinton administration' as the source of the crisis and conflict. He also represents the immigration system of 'the Obama-Clinton administration' as a threat to the security and 'values' of non-Muslim Americans because he claims they admit Muslims, to whom he attributes violent religious extremism, terrorism, and lack of assimilation. He individualises Clinton to represent her potential immigration system as a follow up of the immigration system of 'the Obama-Clinton administration,' i.e., he claims that Clinton will aggravate the security crisis and the cultural conflict that he claims exist between Muslim Americans and non-Muslim Americans because she supports open borders to Muslims. He engages in 'Border Politics' to differentiate his potential immigration system from 'the Obama-Clinton' immigration system and the Clinton potential immigration system. He positively represents his potential future administration because he represents it as the administration that will restore security in the US, i.e., the solver of the security crisis, and protect non-Muslim Americans and 'the American values' and laws from Muslims.

Trump adopts the basic fundaments of right-wing populist discourse. He adopts the 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) because he represents Muslims as threats to the security of non-Muslim Americans and 'the American values' and laws. He criticises 'the Obama-Clinton administration' and the Clinton potential future administration for open borders to Muslims, and he engages in 'Border Politics' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.), i.e., he proposes 'the Muslim Travel Ban', to show that, unlike the 'Obama-Clinton administration' and the presidential opponent

Clinton, he will not admit Muslims. Also, he states that if he admits them, he will screen them to find out if they support extremism and terrorism or if they are hostile to 'the American values' and constitution. He adds that, domestically, he will surveil Muslim Americans and watch their mosques. He engages in 'Border Politics' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) to emphasise that the US, the heartland, must be protected from Muslims. He employs the 'Politics of Denial' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.), particularly goal denial (van Dijk, 1992, p.92) to legitimise his discriminatory policy proposals on Muslims. That is, he states that his policies target Radical/Islamic Terrorism but not Muslims. He problematises Muslims to emphasise that Muslims are not the victims of racism; they are the victimisers of non-Muslims. This is known as blaming the victim (ibid, p.94). He also employs the strategy of equating and balancing (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) to show that he is not the first politician to advocate tough measures on Muslims. These are the main legitimisation strategies he employs to avoid being called a racist and get support for his discriminatory policy proposals (see sub-section 3.5.2 in chapter three for more details on the micro-politics of Right-wing Populism). Because of the spread of Islamophobia (see section 3.4 for more details on Islamophobia) and the constant association made between Muslims and terrorism (Alsultany, 2013; Abdullah, 2015), non-Muslim Americans are concerned about their security. Therefore, I argue that Trump engages in 'Border Politics' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) to reassure electorates and gain votes. This is how Trump, a businessman, tries to defeat the presidential candidate Clinton who has a long and extensive political career.

Interesting studies belonging to a variety of socio-political contexts have been carried out on the racist and discriminatory representation of social actors/groups within the CDS framework (van Dijk, 1991; Wodak, 1996; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Wodak 2001b; van Dijk, 2004; KhosraviNik, 2010; KhosraviNik, 2014; Wodak, 2015; Khan et al., 2019; Khan et al., 2021). This research contributes to this body of literature on the racist and discriminatory representation of social actors/groups because it analyses the racist and discriminatory representation of Muslims in Trump's 2015-16 presidential campaign within the CDS framework. As far as I know, Trump 2015-16 presidential campaign has been the case study of some researchers (Poudret, 2016; Montgomery, 2017; Lakoff, 2017; Nuruzzaman, 2017; Waikar, 2018; Khan et al., 2019; Lacatus, 2019; Raza, 2020; Rubin, 2020; Khan et al., 2021; Campani et al., 2022). Some researchers focused on the representation of Muslims (Poudret, 2016; Nuruzzaman, 2017; Waikar, 2018; Khan et al., 2019; Raza, 2020; Rubin, 2020; Khan et al., 2021). Others focused on the success of Trump in the presidential elections; however, they

did neither explore how Muslims were represented nor pay attention to Right-wing Populism (Montgomery, 2017; Lakoff, 2017). Some others focused on Populism and traces of Right-wing Populism in Trump's discourse but not in relation to the representation of Muslims (Lacatus, 2019; Campani et al.,2022). Similarly to Montgomery (2017) and Lakoff (2017), Lacatus (2019) and Campani et al., (2022) did neither analyse the representation of Muslims nor Right-wing Populism in relation to the representation of Muslims. Poudret (2016); Nuruzzaman (2017); Waikar (2018); Khan et al., (2019); Raza (2020); Rubin (2020); Khan et al., (2021) analysed the representation of Muslims and concluded that Trump's discourse is islamophobic. This study contributes to literature on Islamophobia with a particular emphasis on how the orientalist stereotypes of inferiority, sexism, and misogyny (Saïd, 1978;1995;2003, p.207) and the stereotypes of violence and terrorism (ibid, 1980, n.p.) are still used to 'Otherize' Muslims, perpetuate and legitimise Islamophobia. The analysis of the representation of Muslims in chapter five shows that Trump emphasises the mentioned orientalist stereotypes to legitimise islamophobic statements and discriminatory policy proposals on Muslims, such as the surveillance of Muslims and their neighbourhoods and mosques. This thesis provides the readers with a good example of Orientalism because it shows how Trump's discourse on Muslims in the 2015-16 presidential campaign reproduces the orientalist stereotypes of sexism and misogyny (Saïd, 1978;1995;2003, p.207) and the stereotypes of violence and terrorism (ibid, 1980, n.p.) and the stereotyped binary division the inferior Muslim world versus the superior 'Western' world (Saïd, 1978;1995;2003). This study also demonstrates how Saïd's (1978/1995/2003) theory of Orientalism is important to understand how Muslims are 'Otherized' and how the stereotypes of inferiority, sexism, and misogyny (Saïd, 1978;1995;2003, p.207) and the stereotypes of violence and terrorism (ibid, 1980, n.p.) are employed to legitimise and defend racism and discrimination against Muslims.

To the best of my knowledge, none of the mentioned researchers has made an explicit link between Trump's discourse on Muslims and Right-wing Populism. This research contributes to literature on Right-wing Populism because it shows how right-wing populist discourse, particularly the use of the 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) contributes to the spread and legitimisation of Islamophobia. Hopkins (2021) states that right-wing politics and media contributes to the spread of Islamophobia and this research shows how right-wing populist discourse, through the 'Politics of Fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.), contributes to the spread of Islamophobia with an emphasis on how Islamophobia is legitimised through appeals to security and protection. Trump's discussions of Muslim immigration always include references to

President Obama, the Secretary of State Clinton, and the presidential candidate Clinton. As far as I know, none of the mentioned researchers explored the link between the representation of Muslims and the representation of Obama and Clinton. This thesis reveals that Trump criticises Clinton as a Secretary of State of Obama and as a presidential candidate and engages in 'Border Politics' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) not only to positively represent his potential future administration but also to legitimise his discriminatory policy proposals on Muslims. This study provides the readers with a good example of Right-wing Populism because it shows how Trump employs the basic fundaments of right-wing populist discourse, i.e., the 'Politics of fear', 'Border Politics' and diatribe against the opponents (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) to positively represent his potential future administration and legitimise Islamophobia.

This research is a critique of Trump's discourse of insecurity and inferiority which resulted in everyday racism against Muslims in the US, i.e., many Muslim Americans suffered from harassment, intimidation, bullying, hate crimes and discrimination in various spheres of public life (CAIR, 2017). I critique the rhetoric of generalisation and essentialism Trump employs to represent Muslims as misogynistic and sexist, violent and uncivilised people. Social groups can never be homogenous (Wodak, 2015, n.p.). The rhetoric of generalisation can only perpetuate negative stereotypes (ibid) and result in Islamophobia, i.e., discrimination and exclusion of Muslims. I condemn misogyny, sexism, violence, and terrorism against non-Muslims, but I oppose denigrating all Muslims based on misogynistic and terrorist acts committed by a minority of Muslims. This is what (Green, 2015, p.21) refers to as 'guilt by association.' This research is a critique of the orientalist stereotypes used to promote and legitimise Islamophobia and racism against Muslims or perceived Muslims. It is also a critique of the right-wing populist strategy 'the politics of fear' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) as it is used as a tool to legitimise Islamophobia and encourage people to freely express islamophobic statements. This research is significant because it draws a border line between islamophobic and legitimate criticisms of Muslims and Islam and between Islamophobia and freedom of speech. It is also significant because it aims to promote race equality, tolerance of religious/cultural differences, and cultural diversity and inclusion.

7.3 Limitations of the study

In CDS, data collection is not 'a specific phase that must be completed before the analysis can be conducted' (Wodak & Meyer, 2016, p. 21). That is, researchers can do the first data collection and then perform pilot analyses, find indicators for particular concepts, expand concepts into categories and, on the basis of these first results, they can collect further data (ibid). Thus, 'data collection is never completely concluded nor excluded, and new questions may always arise that require new data or re-examination of earlier data' (ibid). When I started my data collection from Trump's Twitter, I collected as many tweets as I can, and I decided to collect more once I progress in my analysis. Unfortunately, on January 8, 2021, the company of Twitter permanently suspended Trump from Twitter arguing that his tweets can 'encourage and inspire people to replicate the criminal acts that took place at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021' (Twitter, 2021). Though the tweets I collected are enough for a qualitative analysis, I wanted to check if I missed any interesting tweets. I am aware that I could locate a copy of the tweets elsewhere online, but I did not because of time constraints, i.e., looking for the tweets elsewhere will cost me a lot of valuable time.

7.4 Suggestions for future research

I suggest three ideas for future research. First, it was beyond the scope of this research to thoroughly analyse how Trump creates scandals to set the news agenda. I referred to 'Scandalisation' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) only to show that Trump was invited to a variety of interviews to discuss his statements and policy proposals on Muslims. Only this way, I can justify why interviews are present and dominant in my database. Second, my thesis concludes that Trump's representation of Muslims is islamophobic and his policy proposals are discriminatory. Researchers can focus on how he employs the 'Politics of Denial' (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) to deny islamophobia and discrimination. Third, I focused on Right-wing Populism in the pre-election period (2015-16). Researchers can investigate Right-wing Populism in the post-election period (2017-21) with a special focus on Trump's 'Muslim Travel Ban Policy' (see appendix two for 'The Muslim Travel Ban Policy').

7.5 Conclusion

Critical discourse analysts can play two different roles when analysing racist discourse (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.2) They can suggest anti-racist strategies by trying 'to describe, socio-diagnostically, the actual anti-racist discursive practices and their efficiency or inefficiency' or they can 'act politically and participate in the fight against racism and discrimination, they may engage in civil society and express a perspective critique that aims at optimising anti-racist policy' (ibid). I consider this study a critique of Trump's discourse of insecurity and inferiority which resulted in everyday racism against Muslims in the US, i.e., many Muslim Americans suffered from harassment, intimidation, bullying, hate crimes and discrimination in employment (CAIR, 2017). I strongly oppose the rhetoric of generalisation and essentialism Trump employs to refer to Muslims as a collective to represent them as misogynistic and sexist, violent and uncivilised. Social groups can never be homogenous (Wodak, 2015, n.p.) and the rhetoric of generalisation can only perpetuate negative stereotypes (ibid) on Islam and Muslims and result in 'negative sentiments, dread or hatred of Islam that includes multi-form discrimination against Muslims, manifested into the exclusion of Muslims around the world from economic, social, and public life' (OIC Observatory Report, 2017, p.6). I condemn misogyny and sexism, violence, and terrorism against non-Muslims, but I oppose inferiorising all Muslims based on misogynistic and terrorist acts committed by a minority of Muslims. This is what (Green, 2015, p.21) refers to as 'guilt by association.' I encourage non-Muslims to socialise with Muslims. If non-Muslims live a bad experience with a Muslim individual, they should not generalise that all Muslims are bad. Also, when a Muslim individual commits a terrorist attack, non-Muslims should not associate all Muslims to terrorism. There are good and bad people in every social group.

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Appendices

Appendix one: 'The Muslim Travel Ban Statement'

Trump posted the 'Muslim Travel Ban Statement' on his presidential campaign platform donaldjtrump.com under the press releases section (Kick, 2017). However, he deleted all the press releases from the platform including the 'Muslim Travel Ban Statement' (ibid). All the campaign press releases deleted by Trump has been backed up using the Internet Archive Wayback Machine (ibid). The link https://web.archive.org/web/20170428091439/https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases can now be used to access all the pages deleted from Trump's presidential campaign platform (ibid). The link https://web.archive.org/web/20170430020450/https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trump-statement-on-preventing-muslim-immigration can be used to access the 'Muslim Travel Ban statement' (ibid).

I retrieved the transcript of the 'Muslim Travel Ban Statement' from the official website of the American Presidency Project using the link https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-donald-j-trump-statement-preventing-muslim-immigration. Here is the transcript:

(New York, NY) December 7th, 2015, -- Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country's representatives can figure out what is going on. According to Pew Research, among others, there is great hatred towards Americans by large segments of the Muslim population. Most recently, a poll from the Center for Security Policy released data showing "25% of those polled agreed that violence against Americans here in the United States is justified as a part of the global jihad" and 51% of those polled, "agreed that Muslims in America should have the choice of being governed according to Shariah." Shariah authorizes such atrocities as murder against non-believers who won't convert, beheadings and more unthinkable acts that pose great harm to Americans, especially women. Mr. Trump stated, "Without looking at the various polling data, it is obvious to anybody the hatred is beyond comprehension. Where this hatred comes from and why we will have to determine. Until we are able to determine and understand this problem and the dangerous threat it poses, our country cannot be the victims of horrendous attacks by people that believe only in Jihad, and have no sense of reason or respect for human life. If I win the election for President, we are going to Make America Great Again." - *Donald J. Trump*

Appendix two: 'The Muslim Travel Ban Policy'

After one week of presidency, specifically on the 27th of January 2017, Trump signed the executive order 13769 entitled 'Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States' (Chishti & Bolter, 2019). Trump banned the citizens of seven predominantly Muslim countries, i.e., Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, from entering the US for 90 days (ibid). He suspended the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) for 120 days and the entry of Syrian refugees indefinitely (ibid). He lowered the number of refugees to be admitted into the US in 2017 by one half, from 110.000 to 50,000 (Wadhia, 2018, p.1484). People use different terms to refer to Trump's Travel Ban Policy (ibid, p.1483). Some use the term 'travel ban' because it is neutral, and others use the term 'Muslim ban' or 'Muslim/Refugee ban' arguing that Trump's restrictions impact the admission of nationals from countries with majority Muslim populations and refugees (ibid). Since Trump's Executive Order targets people from Muslim majority countries, the term Muslim Travel Ban is more accurate. Therefore, in my thesis, I will use the Muslim Travel ban Statement to refer to the statement Trump suggested in his presidential campaign and the Muslim Travel Ban Policy to refer to the official policy. The Muslim Travel Ban Policy provoked a wave of public protests and confusion and difficulties at airports around the country (Chishti & Bolter, 2019). For instance, it caused confusions for the application of the ban to certain classes such as lawful permanent residents (Wadhia, 2018, p.1484). In addition to these challenges, it was realised that Trump had not consulted with the attorneys of the White House before issuing the ban (ibid, p.1485). On the 3rd of February 2017, the US district court in Washington stopped the implementation of the Executive Order.

Trump replaced executive order 13769 by the Executive Order 13780 (Chishti & Bolter, 2019). The latter, whose title is like the first executive order, was signed by Trump on the 6th of March 2017. It kept all the provisions of the first executive order (Wadhia, 2018, p.1486), but it lifted the ban on Iraq (Chishti & Bolter, 2019); lifted the indefinite ban on Syrians (Wadhia, 2018, p.1486). Unlike the first version, it clarified that legal permanent residents, dual nationals, and refugees already formally scheduled to travel could not be denied entry (Chishti & Bolter, 2019). Presumably, these clarifications were made because of the confusions generated by the first executive order (Wadhia, 2018, p.1486). Trump established a new waiver scheme (ibid). Migrants from the banned countries cannot be denied entry if they prove that '(1) denying entry would cause the foreign national undue hardship; (2) entry would not pose a threat to the

national security or public safety of the United States; (3) entry would be in the national interest'(ibid). Trump gave some examples of the foreign travellers who might qualify for the waiver program: people with significant work or study; people who enter for business or professional obligations; and people who have relatives in the U.S and want to reside with them (ibid). The US courts rejected it arguing that it is a rebranded version of the first executive order (ibid, p.1487).

Trump replaced the executive order 13780 by the Presidential Proclamation 9645 on September 24, 2017 (Wadhia, 2018, p.1487). The latter kept all the provisions of executive order 13780 (Wadhia, 2018, p.1487), but it lifted the ban imposed on Sudan and banned Chad, North Korea, and Venezuela (Chishti & Bolter, 2019). The courts rejected it arguing that it did not provide enough data to prove that the entry of the nationals of the banned nations is a threat to the US national security, it encourages religious bias, and it encourages discrimination based on nationality (ibid). The Presidential proclamation 9645 was replaced by Presidential Proclamation 9723 on April 10, 2018 (ibid). The latter lifted the ban imposed on Chad (ibid). Despite it kept all the provisions of the previous proclamation, it was validated by the Supreme Court on the 26th of June 2018 (ibid).

Appendix three: The selected corpus excluding tweets

Text	Date	Code and link
1.Live phone Tv interview on MSNBC 'Morning Joe'	16/11/15	MSNBC TVI1 https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-interview-msnbc-morning-joe-november-16-2015
2.Live phone Tv interview on 'ABC News'	22/11/15	ABC News TVI1 https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/week-transcript-donald-trump-ben-carson/story?id=35336008
3.Live phone Tv interview on MSNBC	30/11/15	MSNBC TVI2 Transcript Quote - MSNBC: Joe Scarborough and Mika Brzezinski Interview Donald Trump - November 30, 2015	Factbase

4.Face to face Tv interview on CBS News 'FACE THE NATION'	06/12/15	CBS News TVI https://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-transcripts-december-6-2015-trump-christie-sanders/.
5.Travel Ban Statement Written policy statement	07/12/15	TBS https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-donald-j-trump-statement-preventing-muslim-immigration.
6. Campaign rally in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina	07/12/15	Mt Pleasant CR https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-speech-mt.-pleasant-sc-december-7-2015
7. Live phone Tv interview on 'Morning Joe' MSNBC	08/12/15	MSNBC TVI3 https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-interview-morning-joe-december-8-2015
8. Live phone Tv interview on ABC News: Muslim Travel Ban	08/12/15	ABC News TVI2 https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/video/donald-trump-speaks-plan-ban-muslims-35640498.
9.First campaign ad	04/01/16	CAD https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=itsSDhgKwhw
10. Live phone Tv interview on Fox	22/03/16	Fox and Friends TVI1 https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-interview-fox-and-friends-march-22-2016

and
Friends

11. Live phone Tv interview on Fox Business	22/03/16	Fox Business TVI https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-interview-fox-business-bartiromo-march-22-2016
12. Live phone Tv interview on 'TODAY' on NBC News	22/03/16	NBC News TVI https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-interview-nbc-the-today-show-march-22-2016
13. Live phone Tv interview on Fox and Friends	13/06/16	Fox and Friends TVI2 Donald Trump interview on Fox and Friends 6-13-16 - YouTube
14. Speech at Saint Anselm College in Manchester, New Hampshire	13/06/16	Manchester CR https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarkssaint-anselm-college-manchester-new-hampshire-0
15. Campaign rally in Greensboro, North Carolina	14/06/16	Greensboro CR https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=2&v=tT3wG_Wz0Ho&feature=emb_title
16. Face to face interview at Hannity on Fox news	14/06/16	Fox News TVI1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0zG8T3L2KcQ
17. Campaign rally on	15/08/16	Youngstown CR

foreign policy in Ohio, Youngstown		https://time.com/4453110/donald-trump-national-security-immigration-terrorism-speech/.
18. Campaign Rally in Fort Myers, Florida about immigration and national security threats	19/09/16	Fort Myers CR https://www.c-span.org/video/?415477-1/donald-trump-speaks-immigration-national-security-threats